CHAPTER 1

DEVELOPMENT, ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT AND TARANAKI

This thesis explores how Māori, the Indigenous people of New Zealand, engage in environmental management processes in Taranaki in the context of postcolonial *iwi* [tribal] development and negotiated settlements with the government. Situating collaborative relationships in environmental management within the wider context of *iwi* development and postcolonial reconciliation reveals the complex interweaving of tensions, limitations and optimism that characterises this historical moment. Although ideas of settlement, reconciliation, partnership and collaboration invoke fixed and stable arrangements between Indigenous and government organisations, postcolonial coexistence is an ongoing process and remains profoundly unsettled. Drawing on postdevelopment and postcolonial theories I argue that (Indigenous) negotiations of collaborative environmental management and development can be read as unsettling openings that clear space for postcolonial mutuality and plurality.

Government-led environmental management is a fundamentally cultural, spatial and political act that asserts and maintains the government’s prerogative to control the use and construction of places. Colonial appropriations of Indigenous land are stabilised

1 Throughout the thesis Maori words will be italicised and translated into English at their first usage. Maori words and their translations can also be found in the glossary.
through the state’s environmental management; managerial disenfranchisement and exclusion affirm and enforce colonial dispossession (Memon and Perkins, 2000, Rossiter, 2007, 2008). This top-down approach to environmental management has proven problematic, not only because the state’s limitations undermine its efficacy, but also because it fails to recognise Indigenous rights (Tropp, 2002, 2003, Wilshusen et al., 2002). Collaborative and participatory approaches suggest a significant shift in environmental management practices, and advocates expect that greater local involvement will produce better and more just outcomes. In practice, there are numerous models for fulfilling this objective (Chapter Three), just as there are diverse rationales for seeking community input (Pero and Smith, 2008). Notably, in former colonies and settler-colony nations, collaborative approaches tend to be motivated by contemporary efforts to address colonial grievances, suggesting inclusion as a means of addressing historical exclusion (Kepe, 2008).

Collaborative models have often disappointed. Critics note that participation is costly, time-consuming, and that power inequalities are often repeated rather than ameliorated (Poncelet, 2001). Research focussing on collaboration between Indigenous communities and government agencies suggests that managerial inclusion may be tokenistic and ultimately subvert, rather than fulfil, Indigenous agency and aspirations (Kepe, 2008, Nadasdy, 2003, Palmer, 2006, Porter, 2006). To understand and address these limitations, environmental management scholars have developed analyses that grapple with diversity within the field of collaborative management and identify factors that influence effectiveness (Margerum, 2008, Plummer, 2009, Plummer and FitzGibbon, 2004). These insights reveal important ways in which collaborative efforts may be improved or strengthened, but do not fully unpack the reasons why tensions and optimism persist in collaborative governance by Indigenous and governmental organisations. This thesis aligns with a growing body of literature that contextualises environmental politics historically, culturally, economically and politically (Coombes, 2007, Kepe, 2008, Li, 2007, Palmer, 2006, Porter, 2006). This approach allows a more in-depth reading of why collaboration may be unacceptable or fall short of expectations, and provides a stronger foundation for analysing the prospects for and potential of collaborative governance.
In this thesis I draw on postdevelopment and postcolonial theories to build on and deepen understandings of collaborative environmental management. Postdevelopment scholars analyse development as a discourse, arguing that the systemisation of relationships between nations, resources, economies, governments and communities produces “permissible modes of being and thinking while disqualifying and even making others impossible” (Escobar, 1995: 5). Development discourse operates as a socio-cultural heuristic that prescribes development as the necessary and inevitable future for the ‘Third World.’ Postdevelopment authors trace the failures of development interventions to this cultural hubris, and ultimately reject development as cultural homogenisation, calling for thought and imagination that moves beyond inherited discursive logics (Escobar, 1995, Esteva, 1987). However, postdevelopment has been criticised as overly simplistic. Critics assert that postdevelopment is undermined by its characterisation of development as uniformly imperial, homogenising and irrevocably pernicious (Graaf, 2006, Parfitt, 2002, Pieterse, 1998, Pieterse, 2001, Radcliffe and Laurie, 2006, Simon, 2007). This is particularly significant given the recent shift of development practices and policies away from top-down interventions towards participatory and collaborative approaches. Further, many assert that postdevelopment calls to focus on local, Indigenous cultures of development, in place of Western development ideals, romanticises Third World cultures and communities and “fails to acknowledge the power relations that operate even at the smallest of scales...[and] overlooks the webs of connection that ensure that localities can never be entirely local” (Sharp and Briggs, 2006: 7).

Several scholars have constructed a theoretical dialogue between postdevelopment and postcolonial theories to refine analyses of Indigenous agency and the operation of discourse and power (Radcliffe, 2007b, Sharp and Briggs, 2006, Simon, 2006, Sylvester, 2006). Postcolonial theory explores the operation of discourse, representation, knowledge and power to understand how colonial hegemony and authority operate and identify subaltern strategies that subvert colonial categories and logics (Bhabha, 1994b, Loomba, 1998, Noxolo, 2006, Said, 1995). This diverse body of scholarship offers several tools for constructing a more nuanced reading of development. Postcolonial analyses reveal that colonial authority is fundamentally unstable; it rests on the continued assertion of essential differences between coloniser and colonised that are gradually mutated through colonial encounters. Hybridity illustrates the fundamental uncertainty of colonial authority and the potential of affecting change through
interaction rather than rejection. For postdevelopment, hybridity suggests a dialogic nature to development interventions that, although uneven and unequal, reveals the impossibility of development as a monolithic totality. Recent work in development studies demonstrates the utility of hybridity as a concept to explore the potential of changing development from the ‘inside’ (Cupples et al., 2007a, Robins, 2003).

Colonial and development projects are inherently about places and peoples, and postcolonial authors also draw attention to the relationship between discourses and their inscription in and through space (Nash, 2002, Said, 1995, Wainwright, 2005, Wainwright and Robertson, 2003). In countries like New Zealand, for example, colonial sovereignty is built on the idea of synchronicity between nation, state and territory; colonial discourse references and is ultimately realised and naturalised through space. Postcolonial tensions between Indigenous and government agencies cannot be separated from the spatiality of colonial sovereignty and the placing of Indigenous communities and nations. In an environmental management context, questions of territoriosity, sovereignty and authority are deeply embedded in the politics of collaboration between Indigenous and government agencies. Negotiating postcolonial coexistence in place is therefore a fundamental concern in this thesis, and equally within the fields of Indigenous development and environmental management. In this sense, the term ‘postcolonial’ signals moving beyond or counter to colonial relationships – and is frequently invoked by settler-state governments for this very purpose – but it is not a simple a temporal distinction connoting an era ‘after colonialism.’ As Nash (2002: 225) observes, “the ‘post’ in postcolonial registers neither a celebration of the end of colonialism nor the simple reproduction of the colonial in the present, but the mutated, impure and unsettling legacies of colonialism.” Throughout this thesis, then, such terms as ‘postcolonial’ and ‘postcolonialisation’ refer to the ongoing negotiation of colonialism and its legacies and the messy entanglement of past, present and future.

This thesis seeks to make several contributions to academic literature. Firstly, recent postdevelopment work explores a more nuanced conception of development and Indigenous engagements, and this project adds to this research agenda. It contributes to understandings of how Māori in New Zealand negotiate development in a postcolonial context and also contributes to the productive dialogue between postcolonial and postdevelopment work (Simon, 2006, Sylvester, 2006). The main contribution of this
thesis lies in applying the theoretical tools of postcolonial and postdevelopment to environmental management. This produces a deeper and more nuanced understanding of collaborative politics in postcolonial contexts. It highlights the agency of Indigenous communities in negotiating discourses of environmental management and development, and how subversion and being subverted are complexly entwined in apparently postcolonial opportunities. Further, it illustrates the significance of this historical conjuncture – at which (neo)colonial processes, postcolonial reconciliations and self-determination ambitions intersect – to understanding Indigenous approaches to and aspirations in environmental management. This reading of collaboration also illuminates the historical legacies and cultural and political ideas that traverse the ground that is held in common by Indigenous peoples and governments, and how these may destabilise the prospects for (successful) collaboration. Yet, a key finding of this thesis is that the promise and potential of collaboration rests precisely in this unsettled common ground: Moving beyond colonial patterns of environmental management and development requires an ongoing commitment to the unfolding and weaving of mutuality and differences.

1.1 TARANAKI AND NEW ZEALAND

Building on and deepening connections between theory and place helps produce more engaged, relevant and locally meaningful research and theorisation, and is a key concern to many postcolonial and postdevelopment theorists (Escobar, 2010b, Jazeel and McFarlane, 2007, 2010, Kapoor, 2004). Challenging boundaries between ‘the field’ and academic theorisation to recognise and fulfil the responsibilities, connections and potential that are present in relationships between researchers and researched is a key goal in postcolonial geographic research (Chapter Four). Postdevelopment and postcolonial theories provide apposite tools for analysing environmental management and Indigenous development in Taranaki and exploring the utility of postdevelopment and postcolonial analyses in the historical, political and cultural context of Taranaki contributes to the dialogue between these two traditions.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Iwi</th>
<th>Representative Organisation</th>
<th>Hapu</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ngāti Tama</td>
<td>Te Runanga o Ngati Mutunga (TRoNM)</td>
<td>Ngāti Kui, Ngati Mihi, Ngati Kehu, Ngati Teika, Ngati Takahi, Ngati Tearei, Ngati Rautao, Ngati Rongonui, Ngati Wharanui, Ngati Hinemokai, Ngati Kura ki Uta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ngāti Maru</td>
<td>Te Atiawa Iwi Authority (TAIA)</td>
<td>Ngati Te Whiti, Ngati Rahiri, Pukerangiora, Manukorihia, Otaura, Puketapu, Ngati Tuparikino, Ngati Tawhirikura, Hamua o Te Matehou</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Te Atiawa</td>
<td>Te Atiawa Iwi Authority (TAIA)</td>
<td>Ngatihia, Ngati Te Whiti, Ngati Rahiri, Pukerangiora, Manukorihia, Otaura, Puketapu, Ngati Tuparikino, Ngati Tawhirikura, Hamua o Te Matehou</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taranaki</td>
<td>Taranaki Iwi Trust</td>
<td>Ngati Tairi, Ngati Haumua Te Matehou, Matakahawai, Pukekohatu, O Rimupiko, Ngati Tamarongo, Ngati Kahumate, Ngati Tara, Ngati Tuhekerangi, Ngati Haupoto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ngā Ruahine</td>
<td>Ngā Ruahine Iwi Authority</td>
<td>Kanihi, Ngati Haumua, Ngati Manuhiakai, Ngati Tu, Ngati Tamahuroa, Inuawai, Okahu, Titahi, Araukuku</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ngāti Ruanui</td>
<td>Te Runanga o Ngati Ruanui</td>
<td>Hamua, Ngati Te Ruanui, Hapotiki, Araukuku, Ngati Haumua, Ngati Taparikino, Ngati Tearei, Ngati Rautao, Ngati Rongonui, Ngati Wharanui, Ngati Hinemokai, Ngati Kura ki Uta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ngā Rauru Kiitahi</td>
<td>Te Kāhui o Rauru (TKoR)</td>
<td>Ngati Hine, Pukokorokoro, Rangitawhia, Ngati Hine waiaata, Ngati Hine waiaatarua, Ngati Hou Tipua, Ngati Ariki, Ngati Pourua, Ngati Ruaiti, Ngati Tai, Ngati Maika, Ngati Pukeko, Ngati Iti</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


There are now eight Crown recognised *iwi* [tribes] in Taranaki, and most have several *hapu* [sub-tribe]. Each of these *iwi* maintain a separate geopolitical identity, and have representative organisations that interact with government organisations and other *iwi* or Māori organisations (see Table 1). The *iwi* all share Mount Taranaki as their *tupuna* [ancestor], and in many ways, the mountain symbolises the interweaving of cultural landscapes with histories of injustice and contemporary negotiations of postcolonial coexistence (Chapter Eight). Many *tangata whenua* [people of the land] identified the mountain as *korō* [grandfather, elderly man] and described a relationship where the people belong to their *korō*. The chant in Figure 1 “personifies our feeling for ‘Taranaki,’”\(^2\) and describes how the mountain grieves with the people of Taranaki. This

---

\(^2\) Taranaki Māori Trust Board (1975) Submission to the Prime Minister, AANS 7613 W5491/495 6/1/1/1 1, 1975-1978.
interrelationship with the *matunga* [mountain] extends across the landscapes of Taranaki; as one interviewee explained:

> So when you deal with the mountain, you’re dealing with the rivers. Dealing with the rivers, you’re dealing with people, because every *marae* [meeting grounds and house] has a river going past it with its name on it… And the rivers go back out to the sea, and ultimately [the water] comes down on the mountain, first drop of rain (TMTB Member, Kaumatua, 21.07.09).

For this thesis, the cultural and ecological connections between *iwi* in the region, as well as the regional nature of state governance, support a regional analysis of environmental management and Indigenous development. The geographic scope of this study encompasses the area within the *rohe* [territory] of the eight *iwi* (see Map 1). The region contains a mixture of urban, suburban and rural areas, and as illustrated in Figure 2, farming (predominantly dairy) and petrochemical industries dominate the local economy.

---

3 As discussed in Chapter Seven, Taranaki is administered as a coherent region through local government structures and forms part of the Taranaki/Whanganui Conservancy in the Department of Conservation’s (DoC) administration.
FIGURE 1: CHANT FOR MOUNT TARANAKI

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>English</th>
<th>Maori</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enchanting to the eye</td>
<td>Whakawaiwai ai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are you, O Taranaki</td>
<td>Te tu a Taranaki</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothed in your snowy garment</td>
<td>O kahu hukarere</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O mountain gloriously arrayed</td>
<td>I huatau ai koe ra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In spotless cloak of glistening white</td>
<td>Huhia iho koe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With fringe of patterned taniko</td>
<td>Ki to parawai ma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A robe of radiant beauty!</td>
<td>O kahu taniko</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I tino pai ai koe – e!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yonder cloud that wreathes your lofty brow</td>
<td>Me tipare koe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is as a mourning chaplet</td>
<td>Ki te rau-kawakawa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soft band of kawakawa leaves</td>
<td>He tohu aroha nui</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emblem of sorrow for the dead</td>
<td>Ki te iwi e ngaro nei.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Love circlet for the vanished ones</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forever lost to us.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remain you there, O peak of Rangi!</td>
<td>Waiho ra, e Rangi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steadfastly keep your silent watch</td>
<td>Kia taria ake</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For ocean-borne grief-messenger</td>
<td>Ka tere mai he karere</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From those who’ll come no more!</td>
<td>E kore ra e hoki mai!</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4 P. Tamati and R. Ngatata Love, TMTB to Prime Minister Rowling (nd), AANS 7613 W5491/495 6/1/1/1 1, 1975-1978; see also Sole, 2005. Images with no reference are my own.
CHAPTER ONE: Development, Environmental Management and Taranaki

MAP 1: IWI BOUNDARIES AND LAND CONFISCATION BOUNDARY

The history of colonisation and anxious efforts at postcolonialisation in Taranaki are interwoven with the history of New Zealand as a nation. The Treaty of Waitangi (1840, henceforth: the Treaty) signed by the Crown and many īwi is central to this narrative, and provides an important point of difference in the conception and recognition of Indigenous rights between New Zealand and other settler-colony nations, such as Canada and Australia. The Crown describes the three articles of the Treaty as:
• Article One: sovereignty (English text) or kāwanatanga (Māori text) was conveyed to the Crown.
• Article Two: Māori retained rangatiratanga or “chieftainship” over their resources and taonga for as long as they desired, but yielded to the Crown the right of pre-emption, which gave the Crown the sole right to purchase land from Māori.
• Article Three: Māori were guaranteed all the rights and privileges of British citizens (OTS, 2004: 12; the full text of the Treaty is in Appendix A).

The guarantees of the Treaty, however marred by ambiguities of translation, are perhaps made all the more poignant by the ensuing colonial disregard that enabled Māori dispossession and Crown authority. In Taranaki, Māori resistance to selling land was met with military resistance and ultimately the confiscation of 517,000 hectares – including the mountain – in 1864-1865 to punish ‘rebels’ who had fought against the Crown and facilitate settlement in Taranaki (Chapter Five focuses on this colonial history, see also Map 1). The significance of this confiscation cannot be understated. Indeed, discussions of contemporary iwi development and participation in environmental management frequently invoke the legacies of confiscation as a key barrier and influence on current iwi aspirations and actions (Chapters Six, Seven, Eight).

The Treaty of Waitangi Act (1975) suggests a fundamental Crown recognition of the extensive breaches of the Treaty and the continued import of the document to Crown-Māori relationships. This Act established the Waitangi Tribunal, a standing commission of inquiry, to investigate Crown breaches of the Treaty and recommend redress in the form of a Treaty settlement. The Crown addresses historic grievances by negotiating a ‘full and final’ settlement with iwi (not hapu) that consists of an apology, a negotiated historical narrative, economic and cultural redress (OTS, 2004; see Appendix B1 for a

---


6 Historic grievances pertain to Treaty breaches prior to 21.09.1992; all breaches after this date are considered contemporary (OTS, 2004). There are also ‘generic’ claims that relate to pan-iwi issues, such as the ownership of water, flora and fauna inter alia.
summary of the Treaty settlement negotiation process). Negotiated settlements are a common approach to resolving Indigenous grievances among settler-colony nations and suggest the importance of this historical conjuncture for Indigenous-state relationships (Chapter Two). In Taranaki, Treaty settlements are the latest iteration of Crown attempts to settle this history of confiscation (Chapter Five), and for many āti representatives the choice to negotiate is neither obvious nor easy. The economic and cultural redress to āti and the Crown apology offer some means for āti to advance their political, cultural and economic aspirations; however, the ‘full and final’ nature of settlements and the limited redress in comparison to what was taken have proven controversial (Chapter Six). Drawing on the analytical tools of postcolonial and postdevelopment theorists, such negotiated settlements can be read as an attempt to silence disquieting historic wrongs to facilitate a postcolonial future that cannot be questioned by the colonial past (Chapter Two).

Four āti have negotiated settlements in Taranaki to date (Ngāti Ruanui, Ngāti Tama, Ngā Rauru Kiitahi and Ngāti Mutunga), and the other four āti are working towards negotiating settlements (see Table 2; more detailed summaries of the settlements are listed in Appendix B2). In this sense, there is an emerging post-settlement geopolitical landscape in Taranaki, in which Māori political representation is concentrated within mandated āti organisations established through settlements and where āti development is increasingly tied to the use of settlement assets. Exploring a postdevelopment analysis of āti development in Taranaki suggests ways in which Crown approaches to Māori development repeat dominant tropes of development and entrench the presumed links between nation, territory and economy, yet it also opens spaces for exploring how āti negotiate and engage in development to advance their aspirations (Chapter Six). A central contention of this thesis is that āti participation in environmental management cannot be separated from these wider reconfigurations of āti governance and development.

---

7 Supplementary material is provided in Appendices. Because each appendix contains several different items, in-text references refer to the Appendix (A-G) firstly, and then to the specific number within the Appendix.
**TABLE 2: TREATY SETTLEMENTS IN TARANAKI**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Waitangi Tribunal report for Taranaki published (WAI143).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Te Atiawa Heads of Agreement* signed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Ngati Tama Deed of Settlement signed. Ngati Ruanui Deed of Settlement signed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Government sets 2014 deadline for the settlement of all historic Treaty claims.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Te Atiawa and Taranaki iwi are proceeding with negotiations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: OTS, 23.10.2010).

Since the late 1980s, requirements to ‘take into account’ and ‘recognise and provide for’ Māori interests have been integrated into environmental legislation (Chapter Seven). In response, local councils and DoC have consulted with Māori more frequently, in many cases leading to improved working relationships (Chapter Seven). Further, cultural redress in Treaty settlements has also provided increased requirements for recognition of Māori values and interests in specific sites and also for closer working relationships between iwi and government organisations. Many iwi representatives and government staff also anticipate that some form of comanagement will be included in future settlements over Mount Taranaki and freshwater (Chapter Eight). However, these inchoate efforts at collaborative and participatory approaches to environmental management have often disappointed iwi expectations and essentially fall short of meeting iwi aspirations (Chapter Seven). Postdevelopment and postcolonial theories highlight the ways in which the inclusion of Māori perspectives within state management may circumvent Māori aspirations, but also indicates spaces of hybridisation and potential for mutuality (Chapter Seven and Eight). Reading the ideas of postdevelopment through the context of postcolonial environmental management in Taranaki suggests the utility and potential of analyses that move beyond absolute

*This is a non-binding document that “outlines a Crown settlement offer” in detail (OTS, 2004: 36). Treaty settlement negotiators first agree on a ‘Heads of Agreement’ or ‘Agreement in Principle’ (a less detailed settlement outline) and then negotiate the finer details of the settlement to produce a ‘Deed of Settlement’ (see Appendix B1 for more detail).
rejection of development and explore the nuances of Indigenous approaches to working within and beyond dominant structures to advance alternative and multiple ways of doing.

Therefore, at this historical conjuncture in Taranaki there is considerable negotiation of the roles and rights of Māori in environmental management and the relationship between iwi organisations and the Crown, as well as shifts in iwi development through the Treaty settlement era. The tension and risk of settling the colonial past to set up a postcolonial future circles in and out of iwi approaches to collaborative environmental management and development in Taranaki. This is perhaps indicative of the importance of research that explores both the operation of dominant processes and systems and how iwi can and are negotiating them. Exploring postdevelopment and postcolonial theories in place and theorising from Taranaki also contributes a different perspective to academic discussions, and similarly responds to calls to postcolonialise geographies of knowledge production (Chapter Four).

This project was informed by an iterative approach to research, such that the foci, themes and case studies emerged through discussions with interviewees and reflections. The main aim that guided this research was to develop an understanding of how iwi in Taranaki negotiate environmental management processes to assert and define their role(s) as tangata whenua, and to situate these issues in the context of Treaty settlements and iwi governance and development more broadly. In order to fulfil these research aims, this research utilised a qualitative methodology. As outlined in Chapter Four, I was fortunate to be able to interview iwi [tribe] and hapu [sub-tribe] representatives in Taranaki, local government and Department of Conservation staff and members of the Taranaki/Whanganui Conservation Board, primarily during six months of fieldwork in 2009. I first conducted research in Taranaki for my Masters thesis (Tofa, 2007), and this PhD thesis draws on and extends relationships established with people then. This primary research is supported with analysis of legislation and various government and iwi documents, and archival research to construct an historical narrative of colonisation, development and environmental management in Taranaki. During initial discussions with iwi representatives in early 2008, several case studies were identified to provide more detailed examples of the wider themes explored in interviews and offer insights into the operation of environmental management in the region as a whole (Chapter Four). Though there are certainly limitations and ethical dilemmas associated with this
methodology (see Chapter Four and Chapter Nine), this approach to research has produced rich, personal narratives that provide insights into the implementation and effects of government policies and legislation, conjure optimism and potential grounds for mutuality and interdependence, and engender a deeper understanding of the values and aspirations that are woven through the political landscape of Taranaki.

1.2 **Thesis Outline**

This thesis begins by exploring the theoretical arguments that inform my research in Taranaki. In Chapter Two I discuss postdevelopment and postcolonial literature, highlighting apposite analytical tools for exploring Indigenous development in settler-colony nations. I argue that analysis inspired by these theories reveals the perpetuation of discourses and spatialities that may subvert Indigenous aspirations, the entanglement of Indigenous development and postcolonial nationhood, and the nuanced and creative ways Indigenous communities can and are engaging with development and the contemporary nation. In Chapter Three I assert that current environmental management literature on collaborative models falls short of explaining persistent tensions between Indigenous communities and governments, and also the continued optimism for collaborative approaches in postcolonial settings. Utilising theoretical tools identified in Chapter Two, I argue that institutions, power, resources and places are complexly entangled through processes of collaborative environmental management. Collaboration, and the spatial-territorial implications of rights and authority it invokes, therefore, cannot be separated from wider questions of postcolonial sovereignty. While not a panacea, it would be capricious to dismiss the potential of hybridising, iterative and contentious collaboration in environmental management.

Chapter Four outlines the methodology used in this research, and situates my approach and ethical dilemmas in the wider context of postcolonialising geography and (geographic) research. I explore the geographical imaginaries of academic research and suggest that challenging the boundaries between the field and academy, researcher and researched, makes visible the connections that traverse our research and opens questions of the roles and responsibilities of academics.
One of the key arguments of this thesis is the importance of contextualising contemporary politics. In Chapter Five I explore the historical context of Taranaki that foregrounds current approaches to and goals in iwi development and environmental management. Utilising archival sources, I discuss the Crown’s violent assertion of its authority and sovereignty, subsequent efforts to address colonial injustices and Māori development and participation in environmental management in this context.

In Chapter Six I utilise the theoretical tools outlined in Chapter Two to analyse Indigenous development in Taranaki in the Treaty settlement era. I argue that the Treaty settlement era and neoliberal reforms create opportunities laced with risks for iwi organisations, and within this context many iwi are seeking to articulate and advance their own approaches to development. A key finding is that iwi development agendas in Taranaki are evolving and syncretic; they simultaneously hold cultural and economic ambitions, and perhaps most importantly, a fundamental desire to reconfigure Crown-Māori relationships. Chapters Seven and Eight build on this analysis by exploring iwi participation in environmental management within the context of Treaty settlements and iwi development. I argue that the explicit inclusion of Māori perspectives in environmental management processes may ultimately subvert Māori aspirations, but that recent relationship-building has resulted in improved relationships and better mutual understanding. Further, as case studies of the maunga and water management in Chapter Eight demonstrate, the potential for and of collaboration cannot be separated from such issues as postcolonial responsibility, rights and authority in environmental management. Chapter Nine concludes this research by summarising the main findings, the limitations of this research, and the implications of these findings for policy and practice in Taranaki, as well as for future research into postcolonial and postdevelopment inspired analyses of environmental management and Indigenous development.
Postcolonial political landscapes are complexly grounded in the legacies of conquest and the nuances of prolonged cohabitation. Efforts to reconfigure Indigenous-state relationships to acknowledge historical injustices and contemporary inequalities produce new spaces and opportunities for engagement and negotiation, but have also been critiqued as perpetuating colonial structures (Ata o Tu MacDonald and Muldoon, 2006, Bhandar, 2004, Hill and Bonisch-Brednich, 2007, Muldoon, 2008, Seuffert, 2005). In New Zealand, processes of reconciliation, multiculturalism and neoliberalisation open a range of opportunities for negotiating relationships between the state and Māori. In this context, development emerges as an ambiguous site for Māori self-determination, coexistence, benevolence, and exploitation, and is an example through which the tensions and promise of postcolonial nationhood can be explored.

In this Chapter I argue that postcolonial and postdevelopment analyses of contemporary Indigenous development in settler-colony nations expose the perpetuation of discourses that can subjugate or restrict Indigenous agency, but also the ways in which development is being creatively re-worked to advance such goals as self-determination. Firstly, I outline aspects of postdevelopment and postcolonial theories. Secondly, drawing on these theoretical tools, I analyse contemporary (re)configurations of relationships between Indigenous peoples and governments to highlight neocolonial continuities and spaces of possibility. Finally, I examine Indigenous development in
apparently postcolonial contexts. As I discuss in Chapter Three, Indigenous participation in environmental management is intimately entwined with postcolonial reconfigurations of Indigenous governance and development. Therefore, examining collaborative environmental management processes in New Zealand requires their contextualisation within the broader historical moment and issues in Māori governance and development. As Chapters Seven and Eight demonstrate, not only are environment and development fundamentally intertwined, Māori approaches to engaging in collaboration cannot be held separate from iwi governance and development.

2.1 THEORETICAL STARTING POINTS

Analysing contemporary Indigenous development as a site of both agency and domination requires theoretical tools that are sensitive to the perpetuation of power inequalities, but cognisant of the limitations of hegemony and the potentiality of subaltern action (Escobar, 2005). In this Chapter I draw on postdevelopment and postcolonial literatures to construct a theoretical framework to explore contemporary Indigenous development and postcolonial environmental management throughout this thesis. Postdevelopment theory is a diverse body of literature that is inspired by poststructuralism (and in particular, Foucault). By analysing development as a discourse such theorists as Escobar, Esteva and Rist inter alia seek to de-naturalise western development, and dis-cover the systematic interplay of power, knowledge and representation to render certain cultures and practices legitimate (Escobar, 1995, 2005, Esteva, 2001, Rist, 2002). Rejecting development (and its corollaries of progress and modernisation) as exploitative and culturally destructive, postdevelopment authors assert that understanding how discourse operates opens spaces for critique, imagination and locally-driven alternatives (Agostino, 2007, Escobar, 1988, 1995, Harris, 2008a, Lie, 2007).

Postcolonial theorists deconstruct colonial discourses and the production of identity, subjectivity and difference to reveal such modes of subaltern agency and subversion as mimicry and strategic essentialism (Bhabha, 1994a, c, Kapoor, 2004, Legg and McFarlane, 2008, Spivak, 1990). Perhaps reflecting the historical links between colonialism, development and modernisation, postcolonial work is also influenced by poststructuralism, and these theoretical bodies explore similar and overlapping
processes and places (Harris, 2008a). Based on these commonalities, several authors have called for greater attention to “teasing out the historical and geographical continuities, similarities and differences” between development and colonial empires (Sidaway, 2007b: 356), and to exploring the potential synergies of postcolonial and postdevelopment theories (Harris, 2008a, Legg and McFarlane, 2008, McFarlane, 2006, Sharp and Briggs, 2006, Sidaway, 2007b, Simon, 2006, Sylvester, 2006). Wainwright (2008: 28), for example, observes that “colonialism solicited development... there are no clear lines separating a colonial past from the development present.” This statement is particularly true for New Zealand, a ‘First world’ nation within which the colonial agenda smoothly shifted to national developmentalism. Drawing on these two bodies of literature, therefore, helps to construct an analytical framework that is responsive to the particularity of Indigenous development issues in postcolonial New Zealand and also helps to articulate a nuanced understanding of contemporary development. In this section, I outline postdevelopment theory and its critiques, and then explore some ways that postcolonial theory can contribute to and complement postdevelopment scholarship and analyses of Indigenous development in postcolonial nations.

2.1.1 Discourse and Postdevelopment

Development discourse ascended in the post-World War II era, when such ideas as capitalism, modernisation and First and Third Worlds were naturalised by the expansion of development institutions and professionals across the so-called ‘Third World’ (Escobar, 2005). Postdevelopment theory emerged in the 1980s and 1990s, reflecting dissatisfaction with the ideals and practices of development and the manifest failure of development to address inequalities and the economic, cultural and political ambitions of the ‘Third World’ (Escobar, 2005, Esteva, 1987, 2001, Ziai, 2009). For postdevelopment scholars, understanding how such Western notions as development, progress and nationhood were transposed over diverse cultures and knowledges requires linking these grand narratives with their embodiment through spaces and quotidian practices (Escobar, 1995). Exploring development as a discourse is a means to uncover systematic relationships between knowledge, power and truth, and thereby clear spaces for alternative, subjugated and different ways of thinking (Foucault, 1981, Lie, 2007, Müller, 2008, Ziai, 2006).
Development discourse, as articulated throughout much of the second half of the twentieth century, operated as a socio-cultural heuristic that explained the world and mapped a pre-determined path for the future, while also defining Indigenous knowledges as illegitimate and irrational (Rist, 2002). In his seminal work *Encountering Development*, Arturo Escobar (1995: 41) argues that development was co-ordinated and maintained through the “system of relations” that “allows the systematic creation of objects, concepts and strategies; it determines what can be thought and said.” Following poststructuralism, Escobar and others deconstruct development discourse to question how places and peoples become defined as the ‘Third World’ and as needing development interventions. Crucially for postdevelopment theorists, because discourse exists through the circulation of particular representations, knowledges and statements, and the exclusion of others (Foucault, 1980), development is not innate, but a particular understanding of the world that finds truth through ever self-referential systems of knowledge production (Healy, 2003). Postdevelopment work thus reveals how development discourse functions, but also calls for “non-reductionistic and non-teleological notions of politics and development” (Escobar, 1992: 42).

Escobar (1995) highlights the use of ‘labels’ to demonstrate how development discourse works to define reality through the construction and abstraction of the ‘Third World.’ The designation of such ‘target groups’ as farmers, pregnant women and slum dwellers as subjects for intervention reflects, produces and maintains power relationships between the First and Third World so that “the whole dynamics of rural poverty is reduced to solving a number of “cases” with apparently no connection to structural determinants, much less to the shared experiences of rural people” (Escobar, 1995: 110). Such labels as ‘under-developed,’ ‘poor’ and ‘poverty’ are not innate or neutral: These terms are constituted by and constitutive of development discourses. Development (and) discourse are fundamentally tautological in character because these labels, concepts, utterances, statements combine to produce discourse, but are also contingent and dependent on discourse for validation (Dirlik, 1996, Escobar, 1995, Foucault, 1981, Said, 1995, Young, 1995). Notably, such labelling tacitly depoliticises development and poverty by “uncompromisingly reducing poverty to a technical problem, and by promising technical solutions to the sufferings of the powerless” (Ferguson, 1994: 254). Labels also have the effect of drawing people into (and simultaneously positioning them within) development discourse and ‘modern’ socio-
economic processes (Escobar, 1995, Esteva, 2001). Thus, “The language of hunger and the hunger of language join forces” upon Third World corporeality, restricting the ways in which the realities of ‘underdevelopment’ can be expressed, interpreted and resolved (Escobar, 1995: 104).

The institutionalisation of development through the state further ensured that “people and communities are bound to specific cycles of cultural and economic production and through which certain behaviors and rationalities are promoted” (Escobar, 1995: 46). In India, for example, state-led agricultural development was primarily achieved by tenurial reform, new techniques and farmer education, through which such tropes as progress, nationhood, property and modernisation became embedded in daily life (Ludden, 1992). Such bureaucratic re-inscription of space and the quotidian based on development discourse is consequential. Escobar (1995) argues that the objects of development – peasants, farmers, homeless inter alia – perforce adjust to the terms of discourse, in acts of ‘mimetic violence’ in order to interact successfully with institutions. In this way, the representations, logics and perceptions of development discourse are entrenched in lived reality. The power and danger of discourse arises from its inscription and normalisation in and across spaces, peoples and lives.

Precisely because development discourse is embedded in space and institutions, postdevelopment authors assert that such tropes as progress and modernisation are culturally violent (Escobar, 1988, Esteva, 1987, Rahnema, 1997). The ‘rules’ of a discourse police a boundary between truth and falsity, right and wrong, proper and improper, which is saturated with the power to include and exclude ideas, thoughts and knowledges (Foucault, 1981, 2002). This was expressed in development discourse by a cultural hierarchy that privileged Western knowledge over ‘primitive’ knowledges and the notion of unilinearity whereby Indigenous cultures were aligned with the past and Westernised development with the future (Esteva, 1987, Pretes and Gibson, 2008, Rist, 2002, Robins, 2003, Zoomers, 2006). For example, the United Nations Department of Social and Economic Affairs (1951, cited in Escobar, 1995: 3) stated that:

There is a sense in which rapid economic progress is impossible without painful adjustments. Ancient philosophies have to be scrapped; old social institutions have to disintegrate; bonds of caste, creed and race have to burst…
This quotation is suggestive of the creation and propagation of ‘legitimate’ knowledge, formed through science, and ‘illegitimate’ knowledges configured in the dominant discourse as beliefs and superstitions (Escobar, 1995). It also indicates the conflation of First World interventions and the inculcation of particular socio-economic relationships with benevolence and inevitability (Dirlik, 1997, Escobar, 1995, Kothari, 2005, Rist, 2002). Taking the ‘grand narrative’ of Western modernisation as universal worked to supplant diverse Indigenous ways of being, developing and knowing, and imposed the promise of a modern, Western future as the natural goal of progress (Escobar, 1995, 2010a, Rahnema, 1997, Rist, 2002, Zoomers, 2006). In this way, development discourse colonised conceptions of modernity and the future (Escobar, 1995, Rist, 2002, Robins, 2003). In her exploration of lives and livelihoods of Andean communities in Bolivia, Zoomers (2006: 1025) suggests that development can be culturally violent:

Indigenous identity was often equated with backwardness, a remnant of past modes of production, and seen as an obstacle to class-based organization, modernization and national integration. The Andean way was described in terms of traditional, pre-modern or ancient folkways, and progress was expected to arrive in the Andes only through the influence of Western industry, technology and values.

Postdevelopment work, therefore, seeks to contextualise and challenge the discursive production of “the spatiotemporal regions of ‘developed’ and ‘underdeveloped’” (Jolly, 2007: 526), and reveal dualistic structures of truth and legitimacy embedded in development practices and spaces that work to exclude Indigenous knowledges and cultures (Gibson-Graham, 2005). Based on this analysis, postdevelopment scholars reject development, “not merely on account of its results but because of its intentions, its worldview and its mindset” (Pieterse, 2001: 99).

To move beyond the totalising influence of development, Escobar (1995: 216) calls for a change in “the order of discourse,” that requires “the breakdown of the basic organization of the discourse, that is, the appearance of new rules of formation of statements and visibilities.” Postdevelopment work is “an attempt to carve out a clearing for thinking other thoughts, seeing other things, writing in other languages” (Escobar, 2001: 153), to break down the impersonal structures of discourse and reveal the ‘strangeness’ of the present (Graaf, 2006, Rist, 2002, Thompson, 2008). Indeed, analysing development as a discourse refers to the possibility of creating other
discourses, and the postdevelopment agenda thus summons a multitude of cultures and processes of development and, in particular, the need for closer attention to knowledges and practices of the ‘subjects’ of development and intercultural dialogue to negotiate and enable plurality and coexistence (Escobar, 2005, 2010a).

Similarly, postdevelopment thought also invites an openness to transformations and change. Rather than pursuing a predetermined, utopian future, postdevelopment theorists suggest that creating alternative futures “needs to be an open-ended process of multiple social negotiations” (Dirlik, 1997: 97). The challenge of postdevelopment is to imagine and to refrain from defining emancipation in fixed terms because “We need liberation – an immanent politics of opening; not salvation” (Gidwani, 2006: 17). Central to this endeavour is the need to disrupt “the discursive grip of unilinear trajectories on narratives of change” (Gibson-Graham, 2005: 5), and create social constructions and practices that are inclusive, grounded and shared (Dirlik, 1997, Escobar, 1992, 1995, Esteva, 2001). Postdevelopment, therefore, is a challenge to imagine and think beyond inherited discourses and structures.

2.1.2 Critiques and Debates in Post-development

meagre.” To this end, Agostino (2007: 197) suggests that postdevelopment literature “raises questions, motivates new debates, presents alternative examples, but does not necessarily constitute an alternative discourse.”

Participatory innovations to development practice further evidence the need for theoretical approaches sensitive to the amorphous interplay of power, discourse, representation and difference (Ziai, 2009). Within development studies and practice, the apparent failure of development interventions to deliver ‘progress’ or socio-economic justice inspired a realignment of development with local cultures, an attempt to enhance the effectiveness of development and to utilise and empower different local cultures and local knowledges within development and economic processes (Cleaver, 2001, Cooke and Kothari, 2001, Radcliffe, 2007a, Radcliffe and Laurie, 2006). Associated with the moralistic notion of empowerment, and positioned in the ruins of top-down interventions, participation has emerged as the new orthodoxy of development practice (Cleaver, 2001, Cooke and Kothari, 2001, McKinnon, 2006). In this revised development agenda, Indigenous culture is no longer treated as inimical to development, and instead, is included via the participation of local communities (Radcliffe, 2007a, Radcliffe and Laurie, 2006).

The cultural and participatory augmentation of development discourse produces an oxymoronic agenda that at once reforms and rebels against traditional development and yet covertly implements development (Cleaver, 2001, Cooke and Kothari, 2001, Escobar, 1992, 1995, Kothari, 2001). As Pieterse (2001: 60) puts it, the “articulation of culture and development is both a renegade notion at odds with established practices and a new brick in the wall of clichés.” For Escobar (1992: 21) this inability to transcend “the imaginary of development” – despite recognising the failure of development interventions – is indicative of the hegemony of development discourse and a crisis in critical thought. Participation becomes an important motif to legitimate development as an ethical and moral enterprise, but ultimately reproduces the very power inequalities, inefficiencies and cultural tensions it was intended to address because it fails to transcend the ‘givens’ and ‘norms’ of development discourse (Dikeç,

---

9 However, to supplant development with an alternative regime is somewhat antithetical to postdevelopment theory and the critical insights of discourse analysis (Escobar, 2005, Esteva, 1987, Rist, 2002).
These critiques are also salient to participatory environmental management (Chapter Three). Indeed, the confluence of participation as a means to resolve tensions in development and environmental management is suggestive of the significant common ground between these fields.

Although the political and cultural inclusion of local communities in development is “not quite the sought after magic bullet” (McKinnon, 2006: 32), these changes to development practices and the reconfiguration of the relationship between local cultures and development are significant. As Cupples et al. (2007: 795) note, “new spaces for the potential emergence of forces and imaginaries” arise precisely because the hegemony of development is contingent on its adaptation and mutation through, for example, participatory methods and greater attention to local cultures. Put differently, development discourse transforms social realities but is also remade itself through its articulation with and through diverse places and cultures, producing fragile opportunities for new, hybrid and different forms of development. Critical examination of the caricature of development as a single monolithic whole in postdevelopment writing has therefore yielded to a more nuanced understanding, in which the concept of development is porous and able to be manipulated, subverted and appropriated for liberatory purposes (Robins, 2002, 2003, Simon, 2007).

Understanding development discourse as unstable and constantly in process also supports a more refined analysis of Indigenous subjectivity to highlight strategies that are neither an absolute rejection nor embrace of development, and that reclaim and redefine such tropes as modernity, development and culture in creative ways (Dirlik, 1997, Goodale, 2006, Robins, 2003). Gombay (2005) uses the example of Inuit communities in Northern Quebec who, in the transition from nomadic lifestyles to living in fixed settlements, have articulated a hybrid identity that resists cultural assimilation and parochialism and is enacted in politically useful ways. It is precisely this ‘strategic ambiguity’ in constructing cultural categories that such postcolonial authors as Dirlik (1997) advocate as a means to challenge essentialised identities. Cosmopolitanism is one example of the utilisation of a hybrid and malleable notion of culture to confound the separation of indigenity and modernity (Gidwani, 2006, Giri, 2006, Goodale, 2006, Harvey, 2000, Zierhofer, 2007). Goodale (2006) explores the projection of a cosmopolitan Indigenous Bolivian identity that draws links between urban youth
rappers, Indigenous political leaders and subaltern cultures throughout the Americas, while remaining specifically Bolivian and Indigenous. The reconfiguration of Bolivian Indigenous identities forces the binary of tradition/modernity to collapse, revealing possibilities and ‘categories of belonging’ that challenge and stretch beyond the nation-state. Goodale (2006: 646) thus concludes that:

By envisioning new categories of inclusion by constructing an alternative moral universe in which Indigenousness represents a set of principles that are both cosmopolitan and uniquely Bolivian, Indigenous leaders and others in Bolivia do not simply “vernacularize” modernity or strike a “bargain” with it (Foster 2002)… Indigenous cosmopolitanism is a way of reclaiming modernity, a way of redefining both what modernity as a cultural category means and what it means to be modern in Bolivia.

The notion of ‘reclaiming modernity’ articulated here is suggestive of a postdevelopment agenda. Numerous authors have similarly argued that Indigenous peoples have shown that culture is both and neither traditional or modern (Andolina et al., 2005, Goodale, 2006, Jenkins, 2008, Laurie et al., 2005, Radcliffe, 2007a, Radcliffe and Laurie, 2006). Escobar (1995) concurs, and asserts that clearing epistemic space for postdevelopment requires thinking beyond the cross-cultural boundaries of ‘tradition’ or ‘modernity.’ This finding is also suggestive of the need for a more nuanced understanding of Indigenous negotiations of development and of the limitations of rejecting development. Wainwright (2008: 11), for instance, concludes that “there can be no simple negation or rejection of development. Not because development is good (it is not) but because a rejection still turns within the analytic space opened and shaped by development discourses.” Thus, reliance on idealised resistance or alternatives to development is dangerous and ethically questionable, and perpetuates essentialised differences and boundaries between exogenous and endogenous cultures. Taking a postcolonial approach to exploring subaltern subjectivity and the politics of representation is useful for constructing a critique of development that avoids facile rejection or embrace of development, and essentialised characterisations of the subaltern (Wainwright, 2008). This point is particularly relevant because in Taranaki Māori interactions with environmental management and development cannot be characterised as a clear acceptance or rejection, and instead are ambiguous and complex (Chapter Six, Seven).
Although postdevelopment theory may have “lost some currency following critiques” (Harris, 2008a: 1699), work in development studies that builds upon and refines analyses of development is promising. Ziai (2007: 232) suggests that researchers should “further pursue [postdevelopment’s] lucid arguments… [and] engage in discussion with its controversial claims.” Recent work in geography, anthropology and development studies has taken up this task by exploring the dialectical and multifarious interface of development and Indigenous communities and the legacies of years of development interventions (Andolina et al., 2005, Andreasson, 2005, Cupples et al., 2007b, McKinnon, 2007b, Radcliffe, 2005a, 2007b, Robins, 2003, Walker et al., 2007, Zoomers, 2006). The Eurocentric tendencies of development discourse are not disputed; rather a more nuanced account of the relationship between development and local cultures is pursued because development does not proceed “untouched through an unfolding of its own culturally determined trajectory. Instead, it is precisely through spatial interconnections with other places that it takes shape” (Yeh, 2007: 594). This thesis contributes to this growing body of literature as it explores conceptions of and relationships between development and Indigenous communities in postcolonial contexts.

2.1.3 Postcolonial theory

Postcolonial scholarship is a diverse body of work that stems from literary studies and is united by a focus on how representation and identity are deployed and structured in colonial discourse, and significantly, how subaltern peoples subvert and co-opt colonial categories, dichotomies and borders (Bhabha, 1994c, Blunt and Wills, 2000, Costello, 2005, Harris, 2008a, Robinson, 2003). In this section I explore ideas from postcolonial analyses of culture, difference and space to highlight ways in which these complement postdevelopment theory and contribute to a deeper understanding of the dynamics of contemporary Indigenous development (Legg and McFarlane, 2008, Sharp and Briggs, 2006, Sidaway, 2007b, Simon, 2006).

Like postdevelopment theory, postcolonialism is concerned with the entanglement of representation and knowledge in discourse. Said’s (1995, first published 1978) famous exploration of colonial discourse, Orientalism, reveals how representations of the Orient formed a tautological web of meanings that enabled the West “to manage – and even
produce – the Orient politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively” (Said, 1995: 3). Colonial representations defined the Orient in opposition to the Occident in a process whereby difference was equated with inferiority (Patton, 1995), setting up a “flexible positional superiority, which puts the Westerner in a whole series of possible relationships with the Orient without ever losing him the upper hand” (Said, 1995: 7). Although parts of Said’s argument perhaps overstate the hegemony of colonial representations (Kapoor, 2002), as in postdevelopment (see Section 2.1.1) the danger and significance of representation forms a key point of postcolonial work.

For postcolonial theorists, critiquing “without recourse to essentialism” is an important task in post and counter-colonial/development analyses (Wainwright, 2008: 17), which suggests the need for more nuanced representations of development and its ‘subjects’ (Ziai, 2007). Postcolonial theorists’ caution and scepticism towards representation of the subaltern is pertinent, especially because postdevelopment has been critiqued for romanticising and assuming to speak for local cultures (Escobar, 2005). Spivak (1988) has famously asserted that the conflation of representation as description (Darstellung) and representation in the political sense (Vertretung) – ‘speaking about’ and ‘speaking for’ – effectively silences the subaltern (See also: Kapoor, 2004, Letiche, 2010). In an academic context, for example, representing the ‘Other’ gives voice to the researcher rather than the researched (Kim, 2008); slippage between the voice of the author and that of the ‘native informants’ leads to subaltern agency being subsumed within the text (See Chapter Four). Similarly, the cacophony of representations of Third World peoples – deployed in support and opposition to development – have the potential to marginalise or render invisible subaltern subjectivities, and also obscure the complicity of Western development professionals and scholars in their making (Kapoor, 2004). A postcolonial approach to exploring and researching Indigenous development necessitates a critical awareness not only of representation, but also of “questions of power, subjectivities and exchange through interlinked analysis of development institutions and interconnected power topographies that link North and South” (Harris, 2008a: 1770). This has significant implications for research on Indigenous development and participation in environmental management (Chapter Four), and suggests the need for sensitivity to heterogeneity and diversity within Indigenous communities and dominant agencies (Decker, 2010).
An important critique of postdevelopment theory is the overly hubristic and unified presentation of development discourse. This appears insufficient given the diversity of approaches in contemporary development (Ziai, 2009), but it also obscures the instability of discourse and consequent opportunities for subaltern agency (Harris, 2008a, Kapoor, 2002). Postcolonial scholar Homi Bhabha asserts that colonial discourse and authority rest on slippery ground; colonial representations are ambivalent and become hybridised through their very enactment in the work of colonisation (Bhabha, 1994b, c, Kapoor, 2002). Rather than seeing colonialism as a totality, Bhabha asserts that it is an enunciation, revealing the “more dialogic process that attempts to track displacements and realignments that are the effects of cultural antagonisms and articulations – subverting the rationale of the hegemonic moment and relocating the alternative, hybrid sites of cultural negotiation” (Bhabha, 1994c: 177-178). Similarly, recent development studies scholarship (for example Radcliffe and Laurie, 2006, Yeh, 2007) has demonstrated that development interventions do not smoothly unfold over diverse and different cultures, but are worked out contrapuntally within specific places and cultures. In essence, the very act of intervention in colonialism and development opens a dialogue between claims to hegemony and alternative or incommensurable others. For postcolonial theorists, the hegemony of colonialism is therefore contingent and embedded in unstable relations across difference, and this “discursive instability” is significant because “it makes for agency” and suggests the potency of hybridity (Kapoor, 2002: 651).

Identifying promise in hybridity also reaches beyond rejection or acceptance of exogenous discourses. Instead, the strategy of hybridity lies in destabilising discourses by creating an unsettling presence within them, rather than rejecting discourse for Indigenous alternatives. In a sense, this is an “impossible ‘no’ to a structure that one critiques yet inhabits intimately” (Spivak, 1999: 191), and signals the “complicities and complexities in the exercise of critique” and the mutually inscriptive nature of colonial coexistence (Andreotti, 2009: 221). This an important divergence from (and contribution to) postdevelopment work (Robins, 2003), and is especially pertinent to Indigenous-state relationships in development and environmental management in Taranaki (Chapters Six, Seven, Eight).
However, postcolonial and postdevelopment suspicion of metanarratives extends to the notion of hybridisation as a liberatory process (Dirlik, 1997, Harris, 2008b, Nanda, 2001). Attention to the ways in which relationships and practices are remade is always needed because the hybrid forms that emerge may or may not transcend pre-existing unequal power relationships and injustices (Harris, 2008b). Indeed, as I argue in Chapters Six and Seven, efforts to ‘postcolonialise’ environmental management and state-Indigenous relations in Taranaki have brought changes in policies and practices, but these iterations often do not resolve tensions and grievances. The promise and potential of hybridity must always be tempered with an acknowledgement of its historically contingency – that it is a postcolonial predicament, a product of extended cohabitation (Dirlik, 1997, Harris, 2008b). Indeed, radical possibilities can be subverted where hybridity is a proxy for considering and questioning the political and historical terrain upon which hybrid identities are formed (Dirlik, 1997). In this way, the explicit hybridisation of existing institutions and forms of power may silence and subjugate marginalised others precisely by recognising them. The irony of postcolonial inclusion, then, is that it may work to further marginalise Indigenous perspectives; its promise lies in the potential of exposing and exploiting the porosity of boundaries and differences in colonial discourse to advance hybrid alternatives.

Finally, postcolonial theory directs inquiry into the production of spatialities and geographies. Imperial projects ultimately sought possession and control of land, and the conception, organisation and territorialisation of space is therefore a central aspect of the colonial experience (Ashcroft, 2001, Said, 1995). The imaginative geographies of colonialism – the bifurcation of West/East, metropole/colony, the demarcation of national boundaries – are consequential and intimately tied up in relations of domination and subjugation (Harris, 2008a, Said, 1995, Wainwright, 2008, Wainwright and Robertson, 2003). An extrapolation of this argument suggests that “hegemony is doubly geographical: it is constituted on the basis of spatial relations, and such relations become hegemonic as geographies are naturalized and sedimented as common sense through political and cultural practices” (Wainwright, 2008: 17). Taking the nation-state as an a priori space, for example, erases the ways in which state-territoriality was and is constituted, and the ways in which national subjectivities “gain a distinct ‘sense of place’ vis-à-vis their international borders and the internal landscapes” (Radcliffe, 2001: 126). Therefore, space matters because such discourses as colonialism and development are
constituted in and through space, and the naturalisation of particular spatial-territorial formations is an important effect of colonising relations.

Further, because the conceptualisation of space and place is so invested with culture, history and politics, postcolonial geography and analyses of Indigenous development must critically engage with the tautological relations between ideas of nation, state and territory (Ashcroft, 2001, Wainwright, 2008). This argument is consequential for the wider themes of this thesis for several reasons. Firstly, because “development was predominantly conceptualized as a national project” and “rested on a broad homology of territory and economy” (Sidaway, 2007b: 350), Indigenous claims and configurations of Indigenous development reveal ambivalence and violence in the territorialisation and continual re-production of nation-state space (Wainwright, 2008). Examining the spatialisation and placing of Indigenous development within the postcolonial state relates to wider questions of postcolonial nationhood and has implications for conceptualising such foundational ideas as the nation-state, sovereignty and territory. A corollary of this idea is that because the relationship between Indigenous peoples and settler populations is dialectical, Indigenous actions influence and hybridise western models of development, state and polity (Frenkel and Shenhav, 2006, Hall, 2007).

Secondly, understanding colonialism and development as discursive and spatial projects raises questions about the spatiality of postcolonial relations between Indigenous peoples and governments. Questions of sovereignty, authority and legitimacy are always grounded in specific places and histories and also contribute to making places. For example, apparently postcolonial reconfigurations of national polities through reconciliation or settlement seek to address socio-cultural, economic and historical differences, but are also fundamental spatial statements (Section 2.2.2). Similarly, collaborative approaches to environmental management reference colonial spatialities even as they seek to construct postcolonial alternatives (Chapter Three). In this way, “space is not a static entity, but rather an active variable in the ‘theatre of politics’” through which authority, power and territoriality are produced (Gazit, 2009: 85). As will be discussed in Chapters Six, Seven and Eight, alignments of spatial formations, legitimacy and sovereignty are key issues in postcolonial debates, and exploring tensions that persist in collaborative environmental management requires analysis of the politics of space and place.
Thirdly, spaces of domination are also spaces of possibility. For many theorists, space is not an empty stage on which teleological narratives of settlement and development unfold, rather, space is constitutive of social and political relations (Collinge, 2005, Dikeç, 2005, Howarth, 2006, Huxley, 2006). Space (and place) are transient manifestations of identity, culture and habitation; a palimpsest of transformations and differences (Ashcroft, 2001). For Dikeç (2005: 183) this “dynamic quality of space (and of place) suggests the impossibility of total closure, or, in other words, the possibility of opening, transformation, and appropriation.” In postcolonial terms, the ambivalence and instability of imperial claims to sovereignty mean that, despite the apparent coherency of colonial spatial formations, spatial control and the placing of different others is never secure and always anxiously maintained. Responding to postdevelopment calls to think beyond development discourse requires challenging established orders and norms. This is an inherently spatial task because “[f]orms of political engagement can mobilize from and make use of organizational spaces, spaces of categorization, representations of space, and physical spaces… for inaugurating spaces for politics” (Dikeç, 2005: 185). Put differently, re-thinking the ‘givens’ of a situation, like postcolonial Indigenous claims or environmental management, is a spatial struggle, but space can also serve as a basis for alternative, different and resistant action. This is also an important aspect of postcolonial geographies (Chapter Four) – as Wainwright (2008: 28) asserts: “The work of a geographer should question and unsettle the presuppositions about space and geography that underlie the hegemonies of an unjust world.” A postcolonial engagement with postdevelopment scholarship therefore enriches lines of inquiry and critique, offering a refined conceptualisation of the hegemony of development, the hybridity of encounters across difference, and the spatiality of development discourse. Taken together, postdevelopment and postcolonial literatures contain several theoretic tools that I explore in this thesis through the particular case of Taranaki.

### 2.2 Colonial Legacies and Postcolonial Nations

The politics of postcoloniality in such nations as New Zealand, Canada and Australia are grounded in legacies of colonial dispossession and also extended co-presence (Mbembe, 2006, Willow, 2009). Dirlik (1997: 169) argues that understanding
postcolonial contexts requires recognition of “the changes that come with historicity against ahistorical claims to a total European domination (erasing the subjectivities of the colonized) or, its opposite, the possibility of recapturing a precolonial identity uncontaminated by colonialism.” This understanding of colonisation (or development) as a dialectical process – albeit unequal, violent and contested – has implications for efforts to advance postcoloniality (or postdevelopment). Frenkel and Shenhav (2006: 856) assert that although Orientalist assumptions should be critically examined, “the hybrid nature of the colonial encounter, the fusion between colonizers and the colonized, and the mutual effects between them” need to be acknowledged. Therefore, the history of colonialism and the historical contingency of contemporary relations inform postcolonial reconfigurations of state-Indigenous relationships.

For Mbembe (2006: 381, 382) the postcolony is “a chaotic plurality” that has “an internal coherence,” and relationships between the state and its subjects can be characterised as “a promiscuous relationship” or a “convivial tension.” In this context, binaries like Occident/Orient or acceptance/resistance are inadequate descriptors because both sides of these binary are ‘intimately entangled’ (Frenkel and Shenhav, 2006, Nash, 2002). It is precisely this complexity and ambiguity that frustrates attempts to recover an ‘authentic other’ and sites of ‘pure resistance’ or ‘absolute domination.’ Ferguson (1994: 284) once described development as “a ‘mushy mixture’ of the discursive and the non-discursive, of the intentional plans and the unacknowledged social world with which they are engaged.” This ‘mushy mixture’ of colonial and development discourses embedded in and through landscapes and peoples, and indelibly inscribed on histories, places and identities, shapes and is being reshaped through postcolonisation processes (Ashcroft, 2001, Ferguson, 1994, Mbembe, 2006). In this sense, although colonial and development discourses may persist in contemporary arrangements, this is not “the simple reproduction of the colonial in the present, but the mutated, impure and unsettling legacies of colonialism” (Nash, 2002: 225). In this section I draw on ideas from postdevelopment and postcolonial work to examine reconfigurations of government-Indigenous relationships in settler-colonies and argue that this ‘historical moment’ of explicit but ambivalent postcolonialisation perpetuates colonial/developmentalist logics while also offering possibilities for negotiation and engagement.
2.2.1 Managing Plurality in the Postcolony

Colonial and development discourses invoke a negative recognition of difference, positing that because the ‘Other’ or Third World peoples are different, they are lacking, inferior and in need of civilisation or development (Patton, 1995). In contemporary postcolony nations this logic is augmented with what Kowal (2008) terms ‘positive Orientalism;’ a romanticised and idealised iteration of non-Western cultures. These two ideas exist simultaneously, producing the postcolonial dilemma of how to manage difference within the nation (Kowal, 2008). Multiculturalism is frequently invoked in narratives of postcolonial nationhood, manifesting as a liberal-pluralist revision and an apparently progressive and generous effort to give equal rights to all ethnic groups (Johnson, 2008). Although this apparent celebration of difference represents an important departure from the ‘negative Orientalism’ of colonial discourse, it is also problematic (Kowal, 2008, Said, 1995). In this section I demonstrate that the concurrent dangers and possibilities that emerge through multicultural iterations of nationhood are reflected in Indigenous development.

Postcolonial and postdevelopment theories direct attention to the representation of subaltern others and cultural differences, and highlight the use of difference to inform hierarchical binaries (for example, First/Third world, civilised/savage) and delegitimise alternative voices. Multiculturalism essentially re-embeds the idea of impermeable cultural difference by explicitly including different groups within the nation, promulgating an implicit denial of hybrid, dialectical relations and limiting opportunities for ‘serious cross-cultural dialogue’ (Fortier, 2005, Nagle, 2008). Critics therefore argue that “multiculturalism typically works in the service of neo-colonialism by constituting groups as bounded in ethnically defined communities and essentialist cultures” (Nagle, 2008: 179). Because the borders of cultural difference can never be transcended, difference within the nation is accepted, but this difference must always be performed and maintained (Cowlishaw, 2006, Marker, 2006, Nagle, 2008). In this way, even as difference is not explicitly equated with deficiency, it remains as a gap between the (colonial) ‘Self’ and (Indigenous) ‘Other’ (Fortier, 2005). The cultural and development ‘cul-de-sac’ that stems from such political investment in bounded identities is consequential. Marker (2006: 489) notes that, “The dominant society has preconceptions about how Indians will conduct themselves culturally, and therefore,
CHAPTER TWO: Postcoloniality and Indigenous Development

Attempts to communicate an identity and history that is outside this mainstream expectation are often rejected as illegitimate.” In development and environmental management, political inclusion and recognition based on cultural difference can produce expectations of what constitutes ‘appropriate’ development or can make acknowledgement of Indigenous rights conditional on articulating a recognisable form of ethnic difference (Muehlmann, 2009). This form of conscribed identification means that ethnic others must always “stay in place as ‘other’ in order to claim the multi of multiculturalism” (Fortier, 2005: 574, emphasis in original), which myopically limits possible ways of being Indigenous and immediately re-naturalises the white-settler identity as dominant and normal. Andreotti (2009) also identifies a ‘double bind’ in cultural difference, whereby Indigenous approaches are ‘so similar’ to Western modes that they become indistinguishable or ‘so different’ that their legitimacy and relevance is questioned.

The inclusionary aspect of multiculturalism limits the extent to which pluralist reconfigurations of the ‘imagined national community’ interrogate existing structures and inequalities (Dikeç, 2001, Fortier, 2005, Marker, 2006). As discussed in Section 2.1.3, the spatiality of postcolonial politics is critical to analysing state-Indigenous relations. Multiculturalism re-embeds the nation and governmental sovereignty as axiomatic, while creating new spaces for ethnic others within the existing structure (Dikeç, 2005). Explicit inclusion of ethnic others as the ‘other’ does not change their position as subaltern/other; it grants recognition of their presence without interrogating or changing the status quo. Recognition of cultural difference, therefore, not only restricts possible identities and ways of being (Kowal, 2008), but also “assumes sameness between individuals by denying the socio-political significance of ‘difference’ and evacuating histories of domination, racism and resistance” (Fortier, 2005: 572). This is particularly problematic when considering Indigenous claims to difference. Multiculturalism (and its coalescence with neoliberalism) promotes vision of ethnicity that is place-less, non-territorial and ahistorical and perpetuates the idea of indigeneity as the other and thus may be a shaky platform for advancing Indigenous claims (Fortier, 2005, Gershon, 2008, Marker, 2006).
2.2.2 Reconciling the Past, Settling the Future?

In many settler-colony nations, settlements between Indigenous nations/tribes and the government have emerged as a *modus operandi* for constructing a legitimated postcolonial sovereignty. Characterised by narratives of postcolonial partnership and nationhood, settlements and reconciliations essentially reconfigure and grant Indigenous rights within the nation-state ‘in exchange’ for the settlement of grievances against the government for historical wrongdoing (Bhandar, 2004, Blackburn, 2007, OTS, 2004, Short, 2005). In New Zealand settlements are framed as redress to *iwi* for Crown breaches of the Treaty of Waitangi (See Chapters One and Six), and include an apology, historical narrative, economic and cultural redress (OTS, 2004). These settlements are apparently ‘full and final,’ which is indicative of their historic and economic import for *iwi* [tribes] and for the wider formation of the national polity and political landscape. Set in a context of socio-economic inequality, the Crown also presumes that settlements will “contribute to a resource base for future development” (OTS, 2004: 3). This is suggestive of the need to examine the ways in which Indigenous development and self-determination are configured and entangled in postcolonial processes (See Section 2.3 and Chapter Six). Settlements do offer important spaces for asserting and achieving Indigenous goals, but these opportunities must be negotiated from a backdrop of risks, inequalities, and unstable political alignments.

Because contemporary reconciliation processes work within the analytic space of unitary statehood, possibilities for re-thinking Indigenous-state relationships are constrained (Durie, 2005). Acknowledgements of historical atrocities and Indigenous dispossession are sculpted into a linear narrative of national history (Bhandar, 2004, Blackburn, 2007). In this way, the violent and morally questionable foundations of nations are simultaneously recognised and positioned as the basis from which postcolonial nationhood grows. For example, Blackburn (2007: 625) observes that Canadian government officials invoked a “powerful language of political legitimation, one that took reflection on historical mistakes as a starting-point which nevertheless recuperated a teleology of progress into a fully modern future.” In New Zealand, the previous Minister in Charge of Treaty of Waitangi Negotiations similarly asserted that:

---

10 See Appendix B for an outline of New Zealand’s Treaty Settlement process.
The resolution of historical grievances is a necessary first step towards establishing the healthy and robust relationships required to enable the country to cope with, and benefit from, the opportunities and challenges of the 21st Century. The outcome - a settlement - will not make us forget the past. But it will allow us to leave the past in the past and turn to our new relationship, and our new future (OTS, 2004: 4).

Incorporating colonial history into national history weakens its disruptive potential and affirms the stability and legitimacy of the nation-state as a sovereign entity (Bhandar, 2004, Muldoon, 2008). As a corollary, the government “is both ‘judge’ and ‘historical wrongdoer’” (Gibbs, 2006: 27), meaning that reparative legislation and resource disbursal for colonial wrongs is often held contingent on the state recognising the legitimacy of the claims and/or identities (Mawani, 2005, Robins, 2001, Wolfe, 1999). For example, in her exploration of Aboriginal claims to Stanley Park, Vancouver, Mawani (2005: 336) found that “to be grated reparations and redress for colonial harms, Aboriginal peoples are required to fulfil a racial otherness that is demanded and then carefully examined by the state.” Muldoon (2008) further notes that Indigenous peoples are forced to translate their claims and aspirations into the juridical language of the state; the irony of this being that successful establishment of Indigenous ‘rights’ may work counter to ambitions for autonomy (See also Section 2.3.2). Postcolonial settlement processes, therefore, negotiate justice within the ambit of the colonial nation-state reinforcing and reproducing significant power inequalities between Indigenous claimants and governments.

The implications of such linear conceptions of nationhood are a key concern in the (post) settlement era in Taranaki (Chapter Six), reflecting the suspicion that reconciliations may form an uncertain foundation for Indigenous self-determination and postcolonial partnership. In New Zealand, for example, the Crown’s ambiguous position towards the Treaty produces scepticism and doubt about the post-settlement era, and the positioning of Māori after historical grievances have been ‘settled’ (Durie, 1998). Further, governmental antipathy towards Indigenous self-determination suggests a conception of indigeneity “as a threat to sovereignty (rather than an attempt to define the basis for belonging)” (Durie, 2005: 164). Reconciliations resolve this complication by affirming colonial authority and sovereignty and positioning Indigenous peoples within the nation-state “as the passive recipients of government legislation rather than equal and responsible agents with the right to take the lead in charting their own futures”
(Murphy, 2010: 19). As I discuss in the following sections, this particular conception of nation and government has implications for postcolonial Indigenous development and thus also collaborative environmental management.

### 2.2.3 Spaces of Possibility and Risk

Postcolonial and postdevelopment theory both explore discursive formations to suggest that “all existing social formations…are fully contingent and uninevitable, which is the starting point for a ‘politics of the possible’” (Raghuram et al., 2009: 10). Critical analyses of postcolonial processes reveal the ways in which existing social formations are being subtly reworked, producing more inclusive iterations of settler-colony nations but ultimately refraining from a full interrogation of political norms. Indigenous engagements with these processes are worthy of critical attention. State-led efforts to move beyond settler/Indigenous dynamics offer fragile opportunities for renegotiating ideas of nationhood, sovereignty and the state/Indigenous relationship, yet are also characterised by power inequalities and an institutional unwillingness to think beyond colonial norms. This is reminiscent of Escobar’s (1995) critique of the inability of innovations in development practice to transcend or imagine beyond development discourse (Section 2.1.1). These postcolonial negotiations are contentious but potent because, as Mbembe (2006: 385) notes, settler-colony society is “a chaotic plurality [and] it leaves an enormous space open to improvisation… it is practically impossible to enclose its system of signs, images, and traces in fixity and inertia.” Put differently, because settler-colonial dominance over the nation is contingent and continuously assembled rather than absolute, there are always spaces for the expression of Indigenous agency (Gazit, 2009). Johnson (2008: 47) asserts that Māori acts of self-determination leave “evidence of their exercise on the landscape of the state, they are also creating thirdspaces that operate as holes in the fabric of the state, challenging the frequently unquestioned settler sovereignty.” Postcoloniality, therefore, is being continuously negotiated on historically, politically and economically uneven terrain. In the following Chapters I explore how iwi in Taranaki have engaged with Treaty settlements and development processes and the implications of this for negotiating collaborative environmental management in postcolonial New Zealand.
Development discourses, as enacted in the Third World, were premised on the hierarchical distinction of Western and local/Indigenous cultures and a teleological notion of progress (Section 2.1.1). These ideas found similar expression in settler-colony iterations of development and intervention. In New Zealand, for example, colonisation, tenurial reform and the transformation of native bush to pasture were often framed as benevolent and legitimate acts of progress, couching Indigenous dispossession within the wider project of national development, civilisation and cultural improvement. Māori development was premised on the adoption of Western institutions and mores (Chapter Five), and as such “the process of colonisation attempted to disestablish Maori cultural and political institutions in order to facilitate the transfer of land from Maori to Pakeha and to enable the assimilation of Maori into the settler state of New Zealand” (O’Sullivan and Dana, 2008: 375). In settler-colony nations, therefore, state-led efforts in Indigenous development have previously exploited and appropriated Indigenous resources and labour, and so the “recurring loss of land and livelihood to national progress” tends to characterise Indigenous experiences of development (Russell, 2004: 133). Contemporary Indigenous development must be situated within these politico-historical contexts because “the legacies of colonial pasts…linger in twenty-first century political structures and continue to shape the positionality of both colonizers and the colonized” (Willow, 2009: 37).

In postcolonial contexts, Western cultural mores are often framed as incongruous with Indigenous cultures, yet development is also presented as a focus for self-determination efforts, a vehicle for addressing inequalities, and a national priority (Clydesdale, 2007, Smith, 2006, Taylor, 2010). Indeed, the relationship between Indigenous peoples and development is indicative of the positioning of indigenous peoples in relation to the postcolonial nation-state, and the complex and unsettling plurality within nations (Nash, 2002, Nesper et al., 2007). The cross-cultural nature of Indigenous economic activities forms a cornerstone of many analyses, invoking the normalcy of capitalist economic development and ‘other-ness’ of Indigenous cultures. According to Taylor (2010: 562) ‘Third World’ cultural norms “are perceived to retard the scale and scope of market activities [and] to block avenues for investment and entrepreneurship” which legitimates the role of the World Bank “as a reforming institution to facilitate the liberation of
societies from cultural atavism and deliver them into the universal embrace of rational, impersonal markets.” In the New Zealand context, Clydesdale (2007: 66) asserts that:

It is easy to fall into a trap that a return of resources will lead tribes back to a position of economic prosperity, but this is a dangerous trap if the culture still does not possess routines that can produce high level incomes... The New Zealand experience reveals that not only are [cultural] routines being perpetuated that are not compatible with growth but also several forces can stop the tribes from acquiring new routines that lead to growth. These include the romanticizing of past culture and a focus of education on language vis-à-vis technology.

Although he identifies tourism potential and the commitment to place and shareholders as positive attributes in Māori culture, Clydesdale (2007: 67) ultimately finds that “the acquisition of new capabilities” and cultural evolution are necessary for Māori organisations “to become significant players in their national economy.” A report by the New Zealand Institute of Economic Research Inc. (NZIER) for Te Puni Kokiri [Ministry of Māori Development] (TPK) similarly concludes that Māori culture contrasts with the demands of the free market and that mechanisms to enable (culturally sensitive) exploitation are needed:

Māori aspire to higher living standards and faster economic development, but cultural attitudes often do not support the activities – such as commercialization of cultural knowledge – which may be necessary to meet those aspirations. In order to achieve faster economic development, Māori need to examine how their social and cultural institutions contribute to attitudes (NZIER, 2003: 104-105).

As discussed in Section 2.1.2, thinking beyond polarised and static notions tradition/modernity is an important challenge in postdevelopment theory (Escobar, 1995, Pretes and Gibson, 2008). Indeed, development is an important idea through which Indigenous ambitions and agency can be expressed, particularly in the context of settlements and neoliberal government policies (Lewis et al., 2009, Pinkerton et al., 2008). However, exogenous forces, interests and values can complicate the emancipatory potential of development, and self-determined development qua self-determination potentially divests Indigenous development of political and cultural aspirations (Chile, 2006, Humpage, 2008, Kelsey, 2005). At this historical conjuncture of inclusive multiculturalism, reconciliation and neoliberalisation, the ways in which Indigenous communities engage with and negotiate development is particularly
significant. In this section, I argue that a postdevelopment and postcolonial analysis of Indigenous development in settler-colony nations reveals the potency and risk in postcolonial reconfigurations of Indigenous development. As discussed in Chapters Three and Seven, this context of negotiating postcolonisation and development has important implications for Indigenous participation in environmental management.

2.3.1 Neoliberalising Development

The evolution and implementation of neoliberalism since the late 1980s signals an important shift away from Keynesian policies and towards greater transnational flows of capital, resources and labour (Bargh, 2007a, Fenelon and Hall, 2008, Mansfield, 2007, Peck and Tickell, 2002). A corollary of such changes is the increased importance and profundity of the ‘free market,’ the reshaped (and arguably minimised) role of the state and the importance of the individual. Like earlier iterations of development discourse, Western concepts of the market, individualism and economic growth qua progress and empowerment are given ontological primacy – and are enacted through nation-states and international institutions (Bargh, 2007a, Peck and Tickell, 2002, Radcliffe, 2005b, Stewart-Harawira, 2005). Neoliberal development is framed as more efficient and empowering than state-led iterations, but critics assert that neoliberalism tends to devolve responsibility without disbursing resources and increases inequality (Bargh, 2007b, Kelsey, 2005, Lewis et al., 2009, Stewart-Harawira, 2005). However, the shapes and contours of neoliberalism are nuanced and contingent (Bargh and Otter, 2009). It is not a monolithic or coherent process; rather, neoliberalism finds expression through “complex and increasingly indigenised hybrids” embedded in local political and cultural contexts (Humpage, 2008: 425). In such countries as New Zealand, Australia and Canada, the intersection of neoliberalism, multiculturalism and postcolonial reconfigurations of Indigenous rights and interests celebrates the ‘essential difference’ of indigeneity while also positioning Indigenous peoples as individuals and citizens within the nation and economy (Ata o Tu MacDonald and Muldoon, 2006, Kowal, 2008).

Socio-economic inequality has become a key rubric for framing Indigenous development objectives within postcolonial nations, and notably insulates (neoliberal) Indigenous development from difficult cultural and political questions (Kelsey, 2005).
This logic diagnoses differences in health, education and wealth outcomes – the ‘gap’ between Indigenous and non-Indigenous populations – as the ‘problem’ to be resolved. In New Zealand, for example, “Maori ‘performance’ was measured against that of non-Māori and found to be lacking” (Humpage, 2008: 416). Such comparisons invoke a “set of assumptions about ‘the good life’” as natural (Kowal, 2008: 341), and define Indigenous development aspirations as securing individual social and economic well-being (Durie, 2005). In this way, attempts to address resultant socio-economic disparities between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples are essentially “an institutionalized and apolitical response to problems that are disguised by its seemingly natural and mutual goals” (Russell, 2004: 134). Further, interpreting and monitoring disadvantage through statistics, performance management and outcomes obscures the cultural, political and historical background of contemporary inequality and renders government attention to Indigenous development ‘technical’ and ‘race-neutral’ (Chile, 2006, Humpage, 2008, Kawharu, 2001, Kowal, 2008). Government policy in New Zealand has recently shifted from openly seeking to address Māori disadvantage to “a needs-based formula, derived from an analysis of individual circumstances” that denies “the aspirations of people to retain their own world-views” (Durie, 2005: 183). Indeed, the emphasis of statistical equality and on the ‘gaps’ between Indigenous and non-Indigenous populations works to obviate important questions about the balance human/civic rights and multiple value systems within postcolonial nations (Durie, 2005). The focus on individual rather than collective well-being also works to distance questions of Indigenous well-being and development from political, cultural, and sovereignty issues.

Yet cultural difference remains an important point in postcolonial Indigenous development. Kowal (2008), for instance, suggests that postcolonial interventions in Indigenous development are characterised by essentialised notions of Indigenous difference, and notes the anxious oscillation between ideas of self-determination, cultural differences and reducing inequality (and thereby difference). Simultaneously maintaining and challenging absolute boundaries between Indigenous and Western cultures produces an uncertain context for Indigenous self-determination and development. Cattelino (2010) describes this as a ‘double bind;’ arguing that in the USA, the legitimacy of American-Indian sovereignty and cultural distinctiveness is questioned
when tribes acquire wealth, even though economic resources are required to effectively exercise sovereignty. She asserts that tribes:

...cannot assert economic power—which, importantly, is often gained only as the direct consequence of their collective status as governments—without being individualized as U.S. citizens (and, therefore, exposed to the allegation that they enjoy undeserved “special rights”)... [This] needs-based sovereignty hinges on the cultural dimensions of economy as one way that peoples and polities mark difference. At stake are the economically and culturally differentiated possibilities of collective life within the political landscape of the United States (Cattelino, 2010: 237).

Similarly, in New Zealand, the apparent ‘corporatisation’ of iwi [tribes] has attracted both media and academic attention, and Māori ‘elites’ (businessmen) and economic development ambitions have attracted critique or scorn in the media for not being appropriately Indigenous (Bargh, 2007b, Clydesdale, 2007, Rata, 2006, Seuffert, 2005). The confluence of neoliberalism and multiculturalism, therefore, produces an ambivalent relationship between the continued performance of authentic and recognisable difference and continued recognition of Indigenous rights.

Notably, interventions and programmes to reduce inequality frequently draw on the choice, agency and responsibilities of Indigenous individuals or collectives. This discursive positioning of Indigenous peoples as active agents, rather than passive recipients, of development holds potential synergies with Indigenous self-determination, but also suggests a subtle reframing of the state’s responsibilities to Indigenous populations (Durie, 2005, Humpage, 2008). In Australia, for example, the idea of mutual responsibility and obligation informs ‘Shared Responsibility Agreements’ that hold governmental provision of services and infrastructure contingent on Aboriginal communities undertaking particular behaviours (Lawrence and Gibson, 2007). These agreements deploy ideas of choice and responsibility to mask the pedagogical goal of Aboriginal communities adopting ‘civilised’ practices. Therefore:

...neoliberalism does not mean ‘devolving’ responsibility or ‘less government’ (as its proponents would claim), but rather a way of governing that relies upon the capacities of citizens as responsible subjects to be active in the pursuit, negotiation and procurement of social services and provisions (Lawrence and Gibson, 2007: 664).
In this context, Indigenous citizenship and spaces for agency are shaped by coercive and punitive policies that require Aboriginal communities to work within the terms defined by the Federal government to secure services. Neoliberal choice and responsibility can elide genuine cross-cultural negotiation of the terms of development, instead, compelling Indigenous communities to work within externally defined systems and institutions (Ata o Tu MacDonald and Muldoon, 2006, Lawrence and Gibson, 2007).

Slippage between ideas of self-determination and self-determined development features in neoliberal iterations of Indigenous development within postcolonial nations, proffering ideas of economic growth qua political and cultural self-determination. In New Zealand, intensive neoliberal reforms have effectively refashioned Māori development as the ‘self determined’ development of tribal assets returned through Treaty settlements (Bargh, 2007b, Kelsey, 2005, Stewart-Harawira, 2005). This is suggestive of a re-spatialisation of development that grafts it to Indigenous (rather than state) organisations, and also suggests that Māori aspirations are presumed to be commensurate with and achievable through neoliberalised development. Kelsey (2005: 82) asserts that development is seen as “improving economic growth and social outcomes through the culturally-sensitive commercial exploitation of iwi, hapū [sub-tribe], whānau [family], and Māori resources” which would “see Māori achieving tino rangatiratanga [sovereignty, autonomy] through the quicker, simpler, and far less stressful road of commercial success in the international marketplace.” For Bargh (2007b) devolution of healthcare and education in tandem with iwi management of Treaty settlement assets compels Māori governance in the shape of neoliberal-corporate entities. She asserts that:

The Crown has also insisted upon the adoption by tribal organizations of corporate structures which, it argues, will assist Māori to achieve development. However, this insistence…[denies] Māori the opportunity to continue to pursue forms of governance that are contrary to neoliberalism. Māori are treated as citizens but only insofar as this allows them to be neoliberal citizens. Māori are treated as tribal members, but only insofar as this allows the tribe to be corporatized… To achieve a recognition, visibility, credibility and therefore, inclusion within a neoliberal vista and regime, Māori are pressured to accept neoliberal values and policies (Bargh, 2007b: 42).
Such mimetic violence evokes Escobar’s idea that the targets of development (like peasants) are forced to submit to the terms of the discourse (Section 2.1.2) – as the NZIER report (2003: 50) puts it: Māori “organizations are involved in the ‘play of the game’ and they need to be aware of ways to maximize returns under the ‘rules of the game.’” The apparent synthesis of such neoliberal policies as devolution and responsibility with Indigenous self-determination is, therefore, somewhat facile, and begets an apolitical approach to resolving inequalities and injustices within the postcolonial nation. As discussed in Chapter Six, iwi governance entities in Taranaki grapple with the convergence of neoliberal, economic processes and culturally specific ideas within their organisational agendas.

The nexus of neoliberalism, multiculturalism and Indigenous development provides fertile ground for exploring postcolonial iterations of development. Despite (and because of) recent economic, cultural and political reforms, ideas that have antecedents in development and colonial discourses (such as capitalism, progress, individualism, absolute state sovereignty) remain dominant. For Escobar (2010) this signifies an ‘era of changes’ [época de cambios] and not a ‘change in the era’ [cambio de época]; put differently, recent reforms evince alterations within the dominant discourse rather than a break away from the regimes. In this context, Indigenous development variously connotes an individual responsibility, an empowered act of self-determination and a benevolent act of remedial assistance; it is included within the ambit of national development agendas, yet also marked as something different (Johnson, 2008, Kelsey, 2005, Kowal, 2008).

### 2.3.2 Spatialising the Politics: Territoriality and Sovereignty

Postdevelopment and postcolonial analyses of development discourse therefore highlight neo-colonial processes and the need for research that critically engages with postcolonial Indigenous development. As Humpage (2008: 415) has noted: “there remains little analysis of the relationship between neoliberalism as a global phenomenon, national politics and ethnic claims, including those of Indigenous peoples living in former white settler states.” Postcolonial devolution and settlements create ambivalent spaces for Indigenous agency; spaces that are part of the ‘development machine’ (Ferguson, 1994) and further embed development and colonising logics, but also offer fragile opportunities for autonomy, contestation and strategism. Although neoliberal
policies tend to focus on rational economic behaviour and obscure tricky questions of culture, politics and sovereignty, Indigenous communities have been able to use and subvert the spaces and opportunities of neoliberalism to articulate and explore their own development goals (Berman Arévalo and Ros-Tonen, 2009, Lewis et al., 2009, Smith, 2008). As Chapters Seven and Eight demonstrate, these tricky negotiations of development and governance inform Indigenous approaches to and aspirations in environmental management.

Indigenous development in postcolonial nations is intertwined with ideas of dependence, independence and mutuality. In this sense, development functions as a prism for exploring and understanding relationships between Indigenous and state organisations and raises fundamental questions of postcolonial plurality within the nation:

Maori economic development presents a challenge to New Zealand society as a whole because it is a process in which the fundamental driver is the desire by Maori communities to restore sovereignty or self-government — *tino rangatiratanga*. To achieve such a desired restoration requires the nation state of New Zealand to consider how it can accommodate the desire of Maori communities to manage their own resources and people (O'Sullivan and Dana, 2008: 374-375).

Therefore, the spatial configuration of relations between Indigenous and nation-state governments emerges as a key rubric for understanding roles, rights and responsibilities in relation to Indigenous development. In the New Zealand context, Durie (1998: 238) notes that “Central to the debate is whether Māori aspirations for fairness and the chance to remain Māori can be fostered within a single nation-state or whether other arrangements are necessary.” As Gagne (2009) and Robbins (2010) have demonstrated, there are numerous and competing ideas about postcolonial Indigenous sovereignty and self-determination. While recent governmental recognition of Indigenous rights (however limited) pays homage to pre-existing rights, these contemporary rights also construct an ambiguous dependency between state sovereignty and Indigenous rights (Alfred and Corntassel, 2005, Robbins, 2010). In the USA, where Indigenous territory is demarcated by reservation boundaries, Indigenous nations are at once distinct and intertwined with the state. Neoliberal approaches to service delivery have exacerbated this ambiguity by producing “the conditions for the development of extensive tribal
bureaucracies deeply articulated with both federal and state agencies’ (Nesper et al., 2007: 676). In Taranaki, tribal governance organisations in the post-settlement era are similarly positioned as both state-sanctioned entities and autonomous Indigenous organisations (see Chapter Six). For some critics, deriving Indigenous rights from Western jurisprudence and concepts, and holding them contingent on state recognition is problematic:

As Indigenous peoples, the way to recovering freedom and power and happiness is clear: it is time for each one of us to make the commitment to transcend colonialism as people, and for us to work together as peoples to become forces of Indigenous truth against the lie of colonialism. We do not need to wait for the colonizer to provide us with money or to validate our vision of a free future; we only need to start to use our Indigenous languages to frame our thoughts, the ethical framework of our philosophies to make decisions and to use our laws and institutions to govern ourselves (Alfred and Corntassel, 2005: 614).

Such rights represent the *inclusion* of Indigenous peoples within an existing spatial order, rather than a fundamental negotiation of difference (Alfred, 2006, Alfred and Corntassel, 2005, Dikeç, 2005, Muldoon, 2008, Nash, 2002, Robbins, 2010). As discussed in Chapter Six, opposition to Treaty settlements in Taranaki frequently hinges around questions of inclusion within the state and giving up claims to *tino rangatiratanga*.

Framing Indigenous self-determination and state sovereignty as mutually exclusive is perhaps distracting from Indigenous development goals. This is particularly true in the New Zealand context where secession or separatism is seldom advocated (Gagne, 2009, Johnson, 2008), and so “In advocating Māori sovereignty, the focus inevitably shifts away from the advancement of Māori as Māori to the relationship of Māori with the Crown” (Durie, 1998: 219). Working with ambiguity and negotiating the complexity and plurality of postcolonial nationhood are significant challenges in creating spaces for Indigenous development and self-determination (Gagne, 2009). In essence, though articulating Indigenous claims within governmental structures suggests that colonialism perdures, contemporary iterations of colonial hegemony are shaped by “unequal but also deeply unsettling dialogues” with Indigenous peoples (Nash, 2002: 225). Writing in the Australian context, Robbins (2010: 271) calls for “genuine negotiations with the nation’s Indigenous peoples and to work co-operatively to find a basis for an acceptable co-existence on terms that are mutually respected.” In Taranaki, negotiating coexistence
in the (post) settlement era is a key issue in developing postcolonial relationships between Indigenous and state organisations for both environmental management and Māori development (Chapters Six and Seven).

Questions of territoriality and self-determination are clearly intertwined with Indigenous development aspirations. Indeed, space emerges as a tool for contestation and agency precisely because colonial and development discourses operate through, on and with space (Section 2.1.3). For example, drawing on the contested legality of industrial hemp production as an economic development strategy on Pine Ridge Reservation in the USA, Smith (2008: 232) asserts that the Sioux tribal members “extended the political arena by challenging the jurisdic{}tional scale of the nation-state and of the reservation… [thereby questioning] the soundness of the US nation-state as a territorially coherent entity.” In their legal battles, the space of the reservation was asserted as a legitimate site and a ‘political resource’ for the exercise of Indigenous autonomy and political authority, reflecting an effort to “reterritorialise the space of the reservation – that is, reshape the legal meanings of authority in that space” (Smith, 2008: 246). The increasing entanglement of Indigenous rights and state/legal institutions suggests that attention is needed to the ways that Indigenous organisations engage with, subvert and compromise with state apparatus. Yet it also suggests the potential of pluralism in postcolonial contexts (Antonsich, 2010, Howitt et al., 2009).

Neoliberal reforms have also established an ambiguous politico-economic context for pursuing development and self-determination, arguably creating greater risks for Indigenous economies while providing spaces and tools that can be appropriated for Indigenous agency and creativity (Drapeau, 2010, Lewis et al., 2009, Pinkerton et al., 2008). In New Zealand, devolution of social services to local scale organisations has provided opportunities for Māori organisations to have a greater role in service delivery. However, the reliance on state funding and the contractual nature of the work somewhat limits opportunities for self-determination (Chile, 2006, Durie, 2005). As Durie (1998: 227) notes: “economic self-sufficiency is critical to self-determination; tino rangatiratanga cannot be achieved without a sound economic base that enables financial independence from the government.” Further, neoliberal policies typically expose Indigenous resources and economies to the vagaries of global capitalism. For example, in negotiations regarding the expansion of a ski resort over Secwépemc peoples’
traditional territory in British Columbia, Canada, the Sun Peaks Resort Corporation asserted neoliberalism as the only model for economic development, and consequently sought to ‘integrate’ and ‘co-opt’ the Secwepemc into their tourism venture – in effect, “to restructure and scale concrete local places so as to conform them to transnational practices and imperatives defined at the global level” (Drapeau, 2010: 8). Though this case highlights the risks and inequalities of corporation-Indigenous community negotiations (contestation of the ski resort expansion ultimately failed), it also reveals that neoliberalism operates at a local and place-specific level. Drapeau (2010:8) thus concludes that “Although the Secwepemc people have not been able effectively to resist the expansion of [resort], other social forces elsewhere might be able to create new possibilities of resistance.” In essence, because neoliberalism – like development discourse – operates through and is embedded in space, space becomes a tool for resisting, negotiating, and creating possibilities (Section 2.1.3).

Authors also assert that grafting Indigenous cultural and political ambitions to neoliberal opportunities can produce ‘progressive spaces’ within neoliberalism. Using the example of Te Runanga o Te Rarawa [The Board/Council of Te Rarawa] in northern New Zealand, Lewis et al. (2009: 180) observe that “the strategic move…was to recognise the opportunities in the new public management contracts to build something much bigger, but also that to achieve this would require achieving success in the narrower terms of contract delivery.” The assertion of self-determination here is contingent on and works through “the temporary alignment of certain political projects” and dependent on key individuals within the organisation, but also reveals that “genuine community identities are able to subvert neoliberalism’s underlying governmentality of individual self-interest” (Lewis et al., 2009: 181). This is suggestive of the fragility and the contingency of opportunities for Indigenous self-determination through neoliberal regimes, but also evinces the possibility of working within the tools of the dominant discourse to advance alternative agendas (Pinkerton et al., 2008). Linda Tuhiwai Smith (2006: 258) thus argues that:

…what Māori have learned in the last two decades is that Māori communities can be active agents of, and partners in, change processes. Engagement and participation has been contentious, disappointing, frustrating and tiring. However, engagement has also been worthwhile because gains can still be made. It is always about compromise in the context of unequal power relations. The lesson here…is simply that the socially
excluded and marginalised may have limited space to manoeuvre in the messiness of reform but it is still a space worth negotiating. They may also have limited and uneven capacities to contest reform but they are capacities worth employing.

In this thesis, I explore how iwi governance bodies in Taranaki negotiate, contest and exploit postcolonial and neoliberal contexts to advance their aspirations in development and self-determination. As argued in Chapters Three and Seven, Indigenous participation and collaboration in environmental management cannot be separated from this context of postcolonial and neoliberal risk and opportunity.

Neoliberal, multicultural and neo-colonial development agendas therefore produce possibilities for re-configurations that challenge key assumptions of development discourse and confound the presumed opposition of Indigenous culture and development (Richland, 2007). Indigenous communities can and are creating futures based on epistemologies that are “neither simply premodern, nor contradictory and unstable, nor transitional to some Western idea of modernity, but rather alternatively modern – modern but differently so” (King, 2008: 333, emphasis in original). These hybrid strategies of development are a malleable bricolage of different ideas that are inherently tense and unstable, and that are subversive and potentially subverted (Ata o Tu MacDonald and Muldoon, 2006, Nanda, 2001). Indeed, perhaps implicit within recent devolution policies and post-settlement iwi governance is the presumption that Western development and culturally appropriate practices will emerge at the local level (Kelsey, 2005). Taiaiake Alfred (2006: 328) argues that:

The modern reality demands that indigenous people use the land much more intensively, and in very different ways, than their ancestors did. However, traditionalists believe that Native people must assert their consciousness of nature and power by demanding that their territories be used in ways that respect indigenous notions of justice, not simply for the short-sighted generation of wealth for others…. The primary goals of indigenous economy are to sustain the earth and to ensure the health and well-being of the people.

As further discussed in Chapter Six, for iwi organisations, articulating and implementing strategies for self-determination is a key aspect of their work in the (post) settlement era. Durie (1998: 240), for instance, stresses that Māori self-determination is about collective aspirations and values, and further notes that “the central goal of tino rangatiratanga is
for Māori to govern and enjoy their own resources and to participate fully in the life of the country.” Postcolonial Indigenous development is thus entangled with the politics of sovereignty and state-hood, conspicuously making plurality and diversity within the nation present, but it is also about the need for relationships across difference that do not simply repeat state authority, but engage in dialogue and creates histories that are “open and emergent” (Lewis et al., 2009: 182). The politics of hybridity – as an historical predicament that is debated and ‘resolved’ through tribunals and settlements (Dirlik, 1997), as the conceptual melting pot for incommensurability (Nanda, 2001), and as a potential source of creativity and possibility – are complex, intense and profoundly significant to the construction of postcoloniality and Indigenous self-determination.

2.4 CONCLUSIONS

Postdevelopment and postcolonial theories offer analytic tools for reading Indigenous development and postcolonial governance in settler-colony nations. This thesis builds on these bodies of work in an empirical sense by exploring Indigenous development and postcoloniality in Taranaki, New Zealand, and by contributing to the dialogue between postcolonial and postdevelopment scholars. Several key ideas identified in this Chapter will be underpin my analysis of environmental management in this thesis. Firstly, postcolonial and postdevelopment scholarship indicates the utility of exploring discourses. Making visible the circulation and systematisation of representations and knowledges that vivify discourse invites further understanding of how power and hegemony are constructed and wielded, and clears space for alternative ways of thinking and doing. Secondly, postcolonial theorists reveal that discourses are instable and porous; they are continually being made and remade. Despite the apparent solidity and impermeability of discursive formations, and in contrast to the monolithic status granted development in early postdevelopment work, discourses unfold in and through local, cultural contexts. This interweaving belies essentialised differences and strict boundaries invoked in discourses, which suggests the strategic potency of hybridity. Working inside and negotiating dominant discourses also escapes the analytic boundaries of the discourse; pursuing hybridity invokes a refusal to accept or reject a discourse on its terms, and instead creatively brings new worlds of semantic reach to bear on such ideas as development, nation and sovereignty. Thirdly, the evident malleability of discourse suggests the need for careful examination of how dominant
ideas are reworked in postcolonial contexts, especially because more inclusive reconfigurations of discourses may entrench and jettison existing structures and inequalities. Finally, discourse and space are intimately entangled and any renegotiation of discourse requires careful negotiation of its spatialities – which is especially true when considering Indigenous rights and environmental management. In the following Chapters I explore these ideas in relation to environmental management more broadly and then specifically in Taranaki, New Zealand.
Colonial territorialisation of vast landscapes to form settler-colonies is a reference point for contemporary nationhood, yet the production of places and the apparent stabilisation of state authority over environments were not instantaneous (Ashcroft, 2001, Bhandar, 2004, Blackburn, 2007, Tropp, 2003). Instead, claims to sovereignty were gradually transposed through narratives and acts that produced a colonial landscape replete with sites for settlement, resource exploitation and agriculture (Dominy, 2002, Ginn, 2008b, Grek-Martín, 2007, Sluyter, 2001). Environmental management played a key role in implementing and buttressing colonial authority over places, and significantly, remains an important arena where postcolonial relationships between the government, Indigenous communities and environments are negotiated. As in development, recent innovations in state-led environmental management have emphasised Indigenous participation (Lockwood, 2010), with the expectation that collaboration would engender more efficient, equitable and just environmental management (Ali-Khan and Mulvihill, 2008, Castro and Nielsen, 2001, Cullen et al., 2010, Margerum, 2008). However, numerous scholars have documented “the respective problems of these approaches” (Jones, 2006: 484). In this Chapter I argue that examining environmental management as a discourse assembled from representations, labels and alliances, stabilised through institutions, and enacted through space enriches understandings of the potential and limitations of collaboration in postcolonial contexts. Drawing on the postdevelopment and postcolonial work discussed in Chapter Two, I explore how apparently postcolonial innovations may mask...
neocolonial intentions, whilst being sensitive to the nuances of Indigenous agency and the instability of hegemonic discourses. This Chapter has three sections. Firstly I examine how environmental management can be read as a discourse. Secondly, I outline the shift towards collaborative models, and recent work that seeks to better understand factors that influence the success of collaboration. Finally, I explore the utility of a postdevelopment and postcolonial analysis for deeper understandings of collaborative environmental management.

3.1 DISCOURSE AND ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT

The justification, production and continual refinement of state environmental management is an inherently spatial, cultural and political act that can be usefully explored as a discourse. However, like development, environmental management does not form a unified or static discursive body. Rather, institutions, practices and systems of environmental management “are assembled from an existing repertoire, a matter of habit, accretion, and bricolage” (Li, 2007: 263). Thus, I argue that the colonial state’s ‘will to govern’ the environment was enacted and co-ordinated through a complex web of alignments to position the discursive field of ‘environmental management’ as a legitimate space for continuing government authority.

3.1.1 Defining Problems, Legitimating Interventions

Environmental management is premised on human and governmental authority over the environment, and speaks to a wider colonial impulse to harmonise government, territory and nation. Understanding how vast colonial landscapes became ‘managed’ and how Eurocentric visions of environmental management gained epistemic sovereignty requires deeper exploration of systemic relations between institutions, knowledges and spaces (Li, 2007). In this section, I argue that environmental problems and appropriate uses and relationships with the environment are established and maintained through various discourses. The collusion of representations, knowledges and power in these discourses legitimates state-led interventions and actions over the environment, and simultaneously renders Indigenous presences and practices illegitimate and invisible.

Binary logics that polarise Western and Third world cultures and peoples characterise development and colonial discourses, and this hierarchical distinction similarly informed
colonial understandings of Indigenous peoples and the environment. According to Marr et al. (2001: 55), colonial views of Indigenous peoples and the ‘new world’ were structured through “an ideology of discipline, order, land improvement and, through them, progress and civilisation.” The resultant geographical imaginary consequentially juxtaposed waste, savagery and nature against civilisation, progress and law (Rossiter, 2007), and attempted to naturalise colonial appropriation through positioning civilisation and cultivation as normative and morally superior. For example, a letter of instruction from Earl Grey sent to the Governor of New Zealand in 1846, stated that:

Men were to subdue the earth: that is, to make it by their labour what it would not have been by itself; and with the labour so bestowed upon it came the right of property in it… But so much does the right of property go along with labour, that civilised nations have never scrupled to take possession of countries inhabited only by tribes of savages—countries which have been hunted over, but never subdued or cultivated…when our fathers went to America and took possession of the mere hunting-grounds of the Indians—of lands on which man had hitherto bestowed no labour—they only exercised a right which God has inseparably united with industry and knowledge (Par. Papers on New Zealand (1847) cited in Chamerovzow, 1848: 186-187).

Such bold assertions of the authority and legitimacy of imperial conquest evince the will of colonial governments to take control and order ‘wild’ space. The valorisation of culturally specific land uses and tenure is exemplified by environmental management practices and norms. For example, colonial representations and modifications of ‘nature’ in New Zealand often draw on a ‘mechanist-materialist’ approach, which is perhaps epitomised in the term ‘wasteland’ to describe apparently un-utilised (or underutilised) lands (Marr et al., 2001, Park, 2001). This label evokes colonial disregard for Indigenous cultural and geopolitical landscapes, and reveals the tautological logic of discourse and representations: forests are only being ‘wasteful’ if pastoral uses are taken as normative and beneficial (Marr et al., 2001, Park, 2002).

Colonial transformations and management of the environment, therefore, are premised on particular ideas of appropriate uses and tenurial relationships (Dominy, 2002). The representation of unused, un-managed forest lands as ‘waste’ simultaneously problematises the existing landscape and prescribes the solution in a way that erases Indigenous uses and relationships and envelopes resources and landscapes within broader narratives of the developing colonial nation (Rossiter, 2007, 2008). For
example, Park (2002: 159) asserts that to settlers in New Zealand “the only possible purpose of swamp country, unpeopled and uncultivated as it seemed, was what they believed it was waiting for: providing the productivity that would sustain the cities they could imagine their culture building.” Swamps were consequentially represented as ‘useless’ in settler/government narratives and, despite their significance and extensive use by Māori, were systematically drained to make fertile land for agricultural uses (Park, 2001, 2002, Sluyter, 2001). Following various public works legislation, swamp drainage projects typically effected the individualisation of any recognised Māori land rights, drastically altered the ecological landscape destroying *mahinga kai* [customary fisheries], and also demonstrated the Crown-settler assertion of a pre-eminent ‘national interest’ and the Crown’s rights over water-ways and swamps.

The implementation of schemes to bring the land to its potential form part of the broader constellation of ideas of progress and improvement that framed colonial approaches to environmental management. This idea references the territorial and colonial aspects of resource management, but it also illustrates the symbiotic relationship between development and environmental management in settler-colonies where the “‘ideology of developmentalism’ can be a powerful force in justifying natural resource policies that have negative implications for Indigenous peoples” (Lane and Williams, 2008: 39). In tandem with such ideas as *terra nullius*, colonial possession and Crown sovereignty, Indigenous property was often subsumed within national agendas, imposing physical and managerial exclusion (Howitt, 2010, Russell, 2004). The legacies of such expropriation seep through contemporary (environmental) politics. Chapters Six-Eight highlight how land confiscation and its conversion to pastures in Taranaki has yielded a history of dispossession and displacement that continues to affect Indigenous development and participation in environmental management.

Further, literature exploring such ideas as nature, wilderness and resource has powerfully shown that these concepts are social, rather than innate (Asher and Ojeda, 2009, Bakker and Bridge, 2006, Benediktsson, 2007, Bridge, 2009, Mels, 2002). The labelling of particular trees, animals, minerals or lands as a resource is positioned within a wider matrix of social, economic, cultural and political norms and mores, leading Bridge (2009: 1221) to claim that “resources ‘become’ only through the triumph of one imaginary over others.” As postdevelopment and postcolonial critics have noted, the
naturalisation of particular representations of Third World poverty, hunger, under-development *inter alia* reduced diverse realities to apolitical terms. The disavowal of the cultural particularities in development/colonial representations promulgates an assumed legitimacy and truth in the knowledges produced and subsequent interventions (Chapter Two). In colonial environmental management regimes, definitions of particular materials and places as resources (including as aesthetic landscapes worthy of conservation) justified and informed management actions, while also refuting and refusing Indigenous conceptions and relationships.

In sum, analysing colonial environmental management as a discourse makes visible the labels, representations and knowledges that legitimate and conjure state pre-eminence in the management of resources and landscapes. Further, as Memon and Perkins (2000: 39) note, the “illusion that alienation only entailed misappropriation of physical resources…needs to be destroyed” because “alienation of the Maori right to plan, manage and develop remaining resources proved equally insidious and exclusionary.” This is suggestive of the symbiotic relationship between resource and environmental management with colonial projects of appropriation, development and territorial control, and the relevance of environmental management to postcolonialisation (Rossiter, 2008).

### 3.1.2 Producing National Space through Management

The implementation of colonial/settler ideas of how the land should be ‘managed’ was an inherently spatial project; one that simultaneously proclaimed and built national territoriality over complex cultural landscapes. In this way, the unity of government, territory and sovereignty is advanced through acts of environmental management, alienating Indigenous peoples and perpetuating foundational myths of nation-hood. The systematisation of relationships between flora, fauna, lands, the government and populations enacts and embeds particular rationalities, and excludes others. In the previous section I outlined how the need for managerial interventions over the environment is produced through representations. In this section, I argue that the institutionalisation of environmental management produces, maintains and extends colonial spatio-territorial formations.
The pervasive idea of *terra nullius* in colonial doctrines finds expression in environmental management. Drawing on Lefebvre, such authors as Mels (2002) and Roth (2008) assert that state environmental planning is premised on the idea of ‘abstract space’ through which landscapes are divested of socio-cultural meaning and reified as ‘empty’ or ‘natural’ spaces to be inscribed with appropriate uses. Spatiality in environmental management is therefore “constantly dynamic, evolving in conjunction with associated social, political, economic and…ecological processes” (Roth, 2008: 375). This idea of ‘empty’ pre-colonial space worked to legitimise resource appropriation and development, but was also particularly productive in the establishment of conservation spaces, such as scenic reserves and national parks (Singh and Van Houtum, 2002). Mels (2002: 137), for instance argues that “[s]implified conceptions of empty (natural) space are used to communicate (‘scientific’) understandings of national parks as ahistorical ‘pure’ ecosystems… facilitating the consumption of landscape as spectacle.” Hence, the idea of ‘nature’ is consequentially superimposed over abstract space through environmental management and conservation, revealing the ways in which discourses of environmental management are fundamentally spatio-territorial statements (Asher and Ojeda, 2009).

Colonial representations of nature connote pristine, untouched spaces that form a clear dichotomy with civilisation. Paradoxically, romantic images of Indigenous peoples living amongst nature were also appropriated for new national identities, invoking a racialised binary of nature and civilisation (Ginn, 2008a, Langton, 1998, Mels, 2002). Such recognition of Indigenous presences in ‘natural’ landscapes elides complex questions of Indigenous rights and local spatialities (Mels, 2002, Roth, 2008). Indeed, Mels (2002: 142-143) notes that in Sweden, pre-human nature was not “socially innocent;” instead because the Indigenous Saami peoples were “represented as ‘part of nature,’ they were prevented from being actively involved in the ‘civilized’ act of planning.” Such exclusion and de-legitimisation of Indigenous knowledges and territoriality is an effect of colonial discourses and spatialities.

The construction of nature as innate and external to society provides constitutive rationale for state authority (Delaney, 2001, Ginn, 2008b). Such labels as scenic reserve, endangered species, and biodiversity compile a state-authored taxonomy of ‘nature’ which establishes “a state presence and the idea of the state as a central and legitimate
focus of polity” (Asher and Ojeda, 2009: 300). Colonial administrators superimposed these polarised constructions of ‘nature’ and ‘culture’ over Indigenous geopolitical structures and physically separated Indigenous communities from an inert ‘nature’ to be administered by the state (Gillespie, 1998, Palmer, 2006, Tropp, 2002, Wilshusen et al., 2002). Representations of nature and the labelling of environmental ‘problems’ therefore privilege human agency over nature, forming an important basis for managerial interventions. The management of Indigenous flora and fauna thus emerges as a medium for particular forms of governance that position the state as the legitimate mediator of environmental use (Hibbard et al., 2008, Valdivia, 2008). Further, the language of nature protection in New Zealand – for example, sites of national significance and “representative samples” that “originally gave New Zealand its own recognisable character” (Reserves Act, 1977, Section 3(b)) – invokes the nation as an innate spatial form.

Like development and colonialism, discourses in environmental management are enacted in and through space. In this sense, Asher and Ojeda (2009: 301) conceptualise “states and nature as continually emerging realities (Whitehead et al, 2006, 14), and as realities that heavily rely on each other for their existence.” As I discuss in subsequent sections, attention to the spatialities of environmental management is central to negotiating more just reconfigurations.

3.1.3 Assemblage, Contingency and Management

The implementation of environmental management regimes – whether for resource extraction or nature conservation – performed vital work in colonial nation-building, translating abstract notions of governmental sovereignty into lived places and practices (Rossiter, 2008). The evident synergy of environmental management and colonial mores is suggestive of the importance of historical contexts and discourses in shaping environmental management policies. Further, the colonial origins and colonising legacies of past environmental management interventions indicate the significance of this field to wider issues of postcoloniality.

In New Zealand, although vast environmental changes were effected with disregard for Indigenous sovereignty and usufruct right, significantly, colonial ambitions to transform
and order unruly wild space were never fully realised. Like colonialism and development, more generally, the hegemony asserted in environmental management agendas is always compromised upon its implementation; complete authority and spatial control are physically and politically impossible, and instead, managerial regimes operate in constant dialogue with various others. For example, strict preservation approaches were frequently confronted by Indigenous resistance through ‘trespassing’ and ‘poaching’ that made manifest the limited capacity of state bureaucracies to police large tracts of land (Tropp, 2003, Wilshusen et al., 2002). Through such action, clean boundaries between sites of nature and local communities drawn on government plans are challenged and complicated (Neumann, 2000, Nygren, 2004, Tropp, 2003, Wilshusen et al., 2002). There is also a burgeoning literature on the role of non-humans in complicating and confounding strict boundaries between conservation and production landscapes or private and public lands (Dingler, 2005, Ginn, 2008b, Healy, 2007, Hobson, 2007, Instone, 2004, Whatmore, 2005). These contradictions and complications produce a malleability that belies the apparent coherency of environmental management structures. Li (2005: 386) argues that:

The stability of a discursive formation is demonstrated when elements that are pragmatically “lashed up” become systematized, their discrepant origins submerged…when problems remote in time, space or substance come to be thought of in a similar way.

In this way, challenges to state-led environmental management, whether practical or political, can be built into the discourse itself rather than generating moments of genuine pause and reflection. Precisely because environmental management discourses are enacted in and through places, communities and biota, uncertainty and contingency characterise any managerial intervention. The resultant hybridity of development and colonialism can be an important site for negotiating and challenging environmental management processes, ideas and practices (Frenkel and Shenhav, 2006, Harris, 2008b). As Roth (2008: 388) points out that “[s]patial organization of resource use and management will evolve as management institutions change to suit a different context, and likewise management institutions will change if policy precipitates a change in spatial organization.” In essence, though doubtless an unequal playing field, there is considerable scope for negotiating and challenging colonising environmental management regimes.
In New Zealand, the colonial environmental management interventions outlined in this section – the depoliticisation of nature, territory and governmental authority – engendered the perpetuation of environmental management and also of the state. The legacies of colonial appropriation and management of landscapes and resources continue to inform postcolonial environmental management in numerous ways. Bartley et al. (2008: 164) draw on historical institutionalism to assert that structures, ideas and practices become “self-perpetuating and mutually reinforcing.” This suggests the importance of analysing historical iterations of environmental management discourse and the need to carefully consider the ways in which traditional environmental management is perpetuated and challenged (Bartley et al., 2008, Rossiter, 2007, 2008). As demonstrated in subsequent Chapters, the history of development and environmental management in Taranaki (Chapter Five) has a significant impact on contemporary politics.

3.2 COLLABORATIVE SHIFTS

In recent years, collaborative and participatory approaches to environmental management that involve a range of stakeholders, including NGOs and government agencies have become increasingly popular (Ali-Khan and Mulvihill, 2008, Margerum, 2008). This represents a significant shift from colonial strategies of environmental management that were premised on the idea of the government as the primary actor and arbiter of environmental issues. Advocates of collaboration and participation anticipate more efficient and efficacious management that produces more socially just decisions and practices (Raik et al., 2008). In practice, however, collaborative approaches have seldom achieved these laudable goals, leading to important debates about the processes and policies of shared and inclusive management.

As Li (2007) observed, environmental management structures are an amalgam of inherited repertoire, habits and accretion, and this seems particularly true of collaborative innovations in environmental management. There are diverse and divergent rationales for shifting toward bottom-up, participatory environmental governance, and perhaps unsurprisingly, this generates innumerable approaches to collaboration (Ali-Khan and Mulvihill, 2008, Berkes, 2009). Drawing on Korfmacher
(2001), Pero and Smith (2008: 15) describe three rationales for participatory resource management:

(1) a democratic rationale, whereby there is an inherent value in involving communities in decisions that affect them within democratic societies;
(2) a substantive rationale, whereby members of communities often make unique contributions (e.g. local knowledge or community-based research) that inform [natural resource management] decisions and improve the decision outcomes; and
(3) a pragmatic rationale, whereby communities that have been involved in decisions are more likely to not only support, but to also help implement the decisions.

These rationales implicitly highlight the limitations and failures of state-led management. For example, enforcing conservation practices has proven practically impossible for many state agencies, which indicates a need for strategies that are more democratic and inclusive for conservation success. Institutional innovation is therefore a significant aspect of contemporary environmental management efforts; indeed, “the untidy character of the literature on collaboration reflects the way it has bubbled up from many local experiments, often in reaction to previous governance failures” (Ansell and Gash, 2007: 544).

The emergence and popularity of participatory and collaborative approaches in environmental management also reflects a wider shift in governance towards decentralised, neoliberalised governance and public-private partnerships (Lane and Williams, 2008, Lemos and Agrawal, 2006, Miraftab, 2004b). These ‘third-way approaches’ and notions of neoliberalism and decentralisation evince a loss of faith in the state and emphasise the capacity of individuals and communities to act (Fraser et al., 2006, Lemos and Agrawal, 2006, Miraftab, 2004a, b, Peck and Tickell, 2002). Frequently citing the idea of subsidiarity, devolved and decentralised approaches to environmental management essentially shift decision-making and responsibility to the local scale to achieve more efficient and equitable management than the state-level administration can provide (Lemos and Agrawal, 2006, Natcher and Davis, 2007, Nelson and Agrawal, 2008, Ribot, 2007). Such logics form an easy synergy with the more general

---

11 Although these ideas often connote similar policies, there are nuances between them – see the following for more detailed examinations on ‘Third Way’ approaches (Lane and Williams, 2009), decentralisation, (Bartley, Andersson, Jagger and Van Laerhoven, 2008, Ribot, 2007) and neoliberalism (Dressler and Buscher, 2008, Perreault, 2006).
neoliberalisation of governance in recent years (for example, in development – see Section 2.3), and the similarities between managerial innovation in development and environmental management are indicative of the utility of postdevelopment theory in environmental management.

These trends in (environmental) governance – taken in combination with the postcolonialisation efforts of many settler-colony governments – set up an interesting background to Indigenous peoples’ roles and relationships in contemporary environmental management. Overt steps to include Indigenous peoples, rather than politically and physically exclude, signal a considerable change in environmental management policy and practice. While moral and historical arguments for collaborative partnerships between Indigenous communities and state agencies are significant, the synthesis of Indigenous participation with neoliberal and decentralised governance cannot be disregarded. Like neoliberalised Indigenous development, collaboration and participation in environmental management is an ambivalent political space that may subvert or empower Indigenous agency. In the following sections, I explore disenchantment and continued optimism in different collaboration and participation models to demonstrate how postdevelopment analysis offers important insights into their limitations and potential.

### 3.2.1 Debates and Dilemmas in Collaboration

Such terms as ‘participation’ and ‘collaboration’ are invoked to describe a wide range of environmental management regimes. This diversity reflects the experimental and iterative evolution of collaborative approaches from inchoate efforts at stakeholder participation in the 1960s to such recent models as Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) and co-management (Plummer, 2009, Plummer and FitzGibbon, 2004, Reed, 2008). Although there are significant differences between various collaborative models, there are also commonalities that transcend ‘semantic differences’ (Plummer, 2009, Sandström, 2009). Margerum (2008: 487), for example, notes that collaborative models typically involve a “wide range of stakeholders” that participate to “achieve consensus on problems, goals and proposed actions” and require “a sustained commitment to problem solving,” Sandström (2009: 231) distils this to
“three core concepts of participation, power sharing, and process.” As experience in collaboration has increased, optimistic celebration has given way to critiques:

Critics varyingly berate these regimes for their high costs, inefficiency, and limited flexibility; for their patchwork quality, poor records of implementation and enforcement, and diminishing returns over time; and for their tendency to stymie innovation in the resolution of environmental problems (Poncelet, 2001: 13).

Critics have also found that collaborative models have seldom proved empowering or advanced social justice (Berkes, 2009, Jones, 2006, Lane and Corbett, 2005, Nadasdy, 2003, Nelson and Agrawal, 2008, Porter, 2007). As Berkes (2009: 1692) explains: “Co-management, and decentralization in general, often lead to reinforcement of local elite power or to strengthening of state control.” In postcolonial contexts, this finding is particularly significant as collaborative models are frequently seen as a vehicle for resolving land claims and historic grievances (Craig, 2002, Kepe, 2008).

In this context, Reed (2008) discerns an emerging ‘post-participation’ literature that seeks to produce ‘better’ ways of doing participation and reframe participation as a long term, iterative process; or as Berkes (2010: 2) puts it, a focus on understanding why some collaborative models “work and finding ways in which cooperative development and management can be improved.” Key areas that this literature has advanced include exploring typologies of collaborative models, exploring factors that influence collaborative success and developing understandings of how collaboration occurs. As I demonstrate below, this work contributes valuable insights but ultimately falls short of explaining tensions and optimism in collaboration. In this thesis, therefore, I argue that postcolonial and postdevelopment inspired critiques of collaboration offer a richer and more nuanced reading of the tensions and potentiality of collaboration.

Several authors have contributed work on typologies of collaborative approaches, arguing that the absence of clarity renders the lexicon nonsensical: “a partnership represents collaboration; collaboration may occur within co-management; and/or collaboration and co-management are forms of partnerships” (Plummer and FitzGibbon, 2004: 67) This ambiguity attaches significant uncertainty to collaborative proposals (Chapter Eight) and differing expectations can jeopardise the durability and acceptability of collaborative models (Chapter Seven). Further, the lack of specificity
hinders theorising and understanding collaboration in environmental management (Plummer and FitzGibbon, 2004). In response, Plummer and FitzGibbon (2004), for example, developed Figure 3 to illustrate the complex interaction of power-sharing (ranging from informing to local control), representation of various stakeholders and institutional arrangements that structure collaboration. In contrast, Margerum (2008) focuses on functional differences to distinguish between collaborative models. He observes three types – action, organisational and policy collaboratives – based on “the stakeholders that participate, the management arrangements for implementation and the approaches to implementing change” (Margerum, 2008: 493). These categorisations seek to bring greater precision to debates in environmental management literature and “help practitioners by providing a conceptual guide for analyzing and critiquing their work” (Margerum, 2008: 488). Developing greater accuracy in collaborative terminology allows for the extrapolation of useful lessons from individual experiences and theorisation that may improve collaborative models, and brings greater security in meaning to such terms as ‘comanagement’ and ‘partnership.’
The influence of adaptive management scholarship on this literature is readily perceptible through the transition from conceptions of collaboration as a static, power-sharing model to a dynamic process (Armitage et al., 2009, Berkes, 2009, 2010, Davidson-Hunt, 2006, Plummer, 2009). For these authors, the inchoate nature of many collaborative models and context of ecological and political uncertainty engenders:

...an experimental and reflective, learning-by-doing process in which multiple stakeholders collaboratively test and explore integrated policy prescriptions and management strategies... In principle, the core of this learning-by-doing or ‘adaptive management’ approach involves flexible institutional and organizational arrangements that encourage reflection and innovative responses...(Armitage et al., 2008: 91).
This shift has directed attention to the factors that influence collaborative success. Plummer (2009), for instance, identifies a range of exogenous factors (such as ecosystem change and legal mandates) and a complex mix of endogenous variables (such as the properties of networks or the attributes of organisations and individuals) that combine to influence collaborative models. Understanding collaboration as an iterative process in constant change has also prompted inquiry into how collaboration occurs; indeed, adaptive management scholars assert that through greater understanding of such concepts as learning and co-operation, collaborative processes can be better developed (Armitage et al., 2008, Carlsson and Berkes, 2005, Davidson-Hunt, 2006, Olsson et al., 2004, Plummer and Fennell, 2007, Plummer and FitzGibbon, 2004). Berkes (2009: 1699), for example, notes that such strategies as cooperation building tactics, collaborative monitoring and down-ward accountability have been deployed to improve comanagement efforts, but asserts that “a more useful approach may be to produce ‘diagnostic’ questions that may be adapted to the context of a given case.” He calls for greater research into learning in comanagement – how knowledge is generated, used, transferred – to “reveal capacity-building requirements and the ways in which networks are elaborated” (Berkes, 2009: 1699).

Several authors have contributed methods of assessing the relative success or effectiveness of collaborative environmental management (Conley and Moote, 2003, Cullen et al., 2010, Lockwood, 2010). Noting the relative novelty of contemporary environmental governance arrangements, Lockwood (2010), for example, suggests seven principles for good governance (legitimacy, transparency, accountability, inclusiveness, fairness, connectivity and resilience) and identifies key performance outcomes that establish a ‘standard’ for governance. This assessment “can provide performance accountability” and “can stimulate reflexive and continual improvement in governance as part of an adaptive cycle” (Lockwood, 2010: 763). Cundill and Fabricius (2010) similarly produce a ‘collaborative monitoring system’ that identifies attributes (for example, social capital), variables that influence collaboration and a range of outcome indicators. Upon applying this monitoring system to a range of case studies in Africa, they assert that it “provided a means to share state-of-the-art theory and best-practice insights about adaptive comanagement… [and] the conceptual space to create easily understood indicators” (Cundill and Fabricius, 2010: n. pag.). Further, recent work has highlighted the need for exploring the ‘adaptive capacity’ and responses of
local communities in collaborative environmental models (Armitage, 2005, Fabricius et al., 2007, Robins, 2008). Fabricius et al (2007), for instance, offer the terms ‘Powerless Spectators,’ ‘Coping Actors,’ and ‘Adaptive Co-managers’ to analyse the ability of communities to respond to institutional or ecologic change, and recommend support and institutional frameworks that empower communities.

In this context, Ali-Khan and Mulvihill (2008: 1979) conclude that “environmental governance is still very much an evolving practice and a key to its improvement is an enhanced understanding of the nature and dynamics of collaborative processes.” Typologies, models of collaboration and assessments offer useful insights to be drawn on in specific cases; as Berkes (2010: 6) puts it, “The task therefore is to understand the underlying complexity of cases to develop diagnostic methods (as a medical doctor would) to identify combinations of variables that affect governance.” However, when read against a context of postcolonial Indigenous self-determination, this body of literature contributes many useful insights but seems to fall short of explaining why collaboration may fail to provide a culturally, historically and politically acceptable role for Indigenous peoples in environmental management and why there is continued optimism for collaboration. As Carter (2010: 210) notes of generic protocols for engagement between state and Indigenous organisations, these analyses of collaboration “have their place” as a “heuristic guide,” but collaborative environmental management always unfolds through localised, dynamic and complex places, politics and histories.

Therefore, this project builds on the literature discussed in this section by employing postdevelopment and postcolonial theorisations of subjectivities and agency to generate new insights to how Indigenous communities engage with collaboration and environmental management (Berman Arévalo and Ros-Tonen, 2009, Huxley, 2006, Kubo, 2008, Tam, 2006). This highlights the potential for a more conceptually and historically grounded approach to analysing participation and the need for further analysis of Indigenous agency and engagement with collaborative environmental management in postcolonial contexts (Bartley et al., 2008, Kesby, 2007). This thesis also contributes to a growing literature that seeks to situate collaborative politics within the wider social, political, historical and cultural contexts (Carter, 2010, Coombes, 2007, Howitt, 2010, Howitt and Suchet-Pearson, 2006, Natcher et al., 2009, Palmer, 2006)
3.3 **Collaboration, Discourse and Postcoloniality**

In this section I draw on the theoretical tools of postdevelopment and postcolonial work to explore discourses that shape collaborative spaces in postcolonial environmental management and how these spaces are being negotiated and configured by Indigenous communities and state agencies. I argue that this contributes to a more nuanced understanding of collaborative politics in environmental management in former settler colonies, and reveals that collaborations are an ongoing transformation of environmental management structures that are at once unsettled and unsettling.

### 3.3.1 Continuities and Entanglements

A key contention in this thesis is that colonial histories pervade postcolonial reconfigurations of environmental management. Participation and collaboration represent an important innovation in environmental management and are frequently imbued with notions of emancipation and historical justice (Kepe, 2008). However, important questions of legitimacy, territoriality and authority often remain unexplored, generating fragile, inequitable or contested collaborations because “[c]ooperative governance is supplementary to existing environmental regulations and builds upon traditional policy procedures, dispute settlements, and policy tools” (Plummer and Fitzgibbon, 2006: 52). In this way, collaborative models may perpetuate colonising discourses and subvert Indigenous agency despite specifically including Indigenous representatives.

Although collaborative models offer a revised understanding of legitimate actors and authority in environmental management, the positionality of Indigenous communities and government agencies coming into any collaborative or participatory initiative cannot be disregarded. Economic disparities and power inequalities between government agencies and Indigenous communities can therefore be read as a palimpsest of colonial dispossession and extended cohabitation (Abrash Walton, 2010, Willow, 2009). Government authority in environmental management is similarly based on colonial appropriation, and is stabilised and maintained by intricate legal infrastructures and an historically grounded wealth in political and economic power (Porter, 2007).
These inherited ‘sociohistoric differences’ between actors are brought into play in collaborative models, and yet they:

…should not be seen as whole, coherent, and static but as partial, fragmented, at times contradictory, and under continual (re)production by actors who themselves are undergoing greater or lesser degrees of change and renewal. Moreover, these diverse and evolving conceptualizations and understandings are not neutral but infused with power, as they are utilized by individuals who themselves have different amounts of influence and prestige in the environmental arena (Poncelet, 2001: 15).

Collaborative arrangements in environmental management are therefore interwoven with broader questions of postcoloniality (and also Indigenous development), and may also serve as a microcosm for postcolonial politics. As I discuss in Chapter Seven, relationships within environmental management processes cannot be isolated from wider political, historical, social and economic contexts. Kubo (2008: 81) thus suggests that “One critical assumption of the co-management concept is that shared decision-making is possible among actors whose power relationships are skewed.” A key idea that I explore in Taranaki is how the contexts and power dynamics that foreground collaborative environmental management are negotiated.

A discursive approach to analysing environmental management “can make intelligible in concrete ways nothing less than the historical contingency” of contemporary situations (Takacs, 2004: 883). Governmental structures of environmental management similarly stem from particular relationships between such elements as nature, resources, governments, communities and science. Therefore, while popular participation in environmental management and partnership-style arrangements arguably represent a deliberate and explicit attempt to “neutralize power differentials (or asymmetries) among actors” (Raik et al., 2008: 737), careful attention to the institutional and institutionalised contexts of environmental management is required. Collaborative models frequently confront invidious institutional resistance to substantive change, so that while power inequalities that stem from historic, economic and political contexts are consequential, the “institutional context that structures the opportunities available to different actors” matters (Bartley et al., 2008: 171). The apparent “stickiness’ of the prior order” (Bartley et al., 2008: 170), expressed through existing regulations and pre-
determined positions, effectively restricts the radical possibilities of shared-management (Kepe, 2008, Kubo, 2008, Reed, 2008).

A politics of containment thereby emerges where, like postcolonial negotiations of historic grievances, the state and its managerial legitimacy are taken as *a priori*, producing new arrangements that are not truly divested of the rationales of their predecessors (Porter, 2006, 2007). While such institutional inertia can also reflect personal beliefs of managerial staff (see Chapter Seven), the conspicuous alignment of collaborative and participatory inclusion with ideas of empowerment and postcoloniality indicates an incomplete interrogation and reformulation of environmental management institutions that stem from colonisation. Postdevelopment critiques that participation augments rather than genuinely moving beyond existing discourses and structures are pertinent (Escobar, 2005, Ziai, 2009). As Kubo (2008: 81) observes, in collaborative environmental management “shared decision-making, or equitable partnership, [may be] more rhetorical than real and... a new institutional arrangement developed through a co-management process is confined to an actual policy scope of the state.” Inherited and imposed limits to the processes and outcomes of participation generate a benign inclusion that can simultaneously recognise and frustrate Indigenous claims and agendas.

Regulatory and legislative restrictions work to confine collaborative arrangements, yet some authors note that an emphasis on harmony and pragmatism within environmental management – and especially in multi-stakeholder models – may also restrict possibilities for dialogue and difference (Fay, 2007, Poncelet, 2001, Prasad and Elmes, 2005, Tam, 2006, Whelan and Lyons, 2005). Drawing on an analysis of land claims in protected areas in South Africa, Fay (2007: 82) argues that the governmental impulse “to frame negotiations as ‘win-win’ situations from the outset may work to the disadvantage of community representatives.” Defining such interactions between government and community representatives as a game of finding mutual benefits places negative connotations on dissent, conflict and self-interested actions, even though these may be “sensible and advantageous in terms of the interests of one party” (Fay, 2007: 83). The emphasis on harmony and consensus is also reflected in the ideas of pragmatism and practicality in environmental management. Prasad and Elmes (2005: 863, emphasis in original) suggest that practicality in environmental management:

…ultimately appears to rest on a narrow platform of economic instrumentality and on
a philosophy of *convenience* that emphasizes minimum socio-economic disruption and maximum conflict avoidance… [The] emphasis on this version of practicality imposes a powerful *discursive* closure on alternative environmental standpoints.

In essence, the enshrinement of consensus and pragmatism as positive and moral produces a dichotomy of appropriate and inappropriate behaviours and strategies in collaborative governance. Positioning conflict and dissonance as a route to eventual agreement overlooks “the possibility that power struggles and contestations are ubiquitous and may occur in situations devoid of conflict” (Raik et al., 2008: 730). Further, as Poncelet (2001: 22) notes, “When environmental partnerships have the effect of repressing rather than promoting serious environmental debate in society, they serve primarily to reproduce the established order.” Yet interests can also be advanced outside collaborative models. For example, environmental NGOs in Queensland, Australia, successfully pursued conservation goals through ‘conflict and contestation’ rather than through collaborative approaches because the ‘macro-setting’ for collaboration invoked a “business-as-usual approach to land use, which established a narrow framework for policy setting that limited the possibility of achieving significant positive conservation outcomes” (Whelan and Lyons, 2005: 609). Precisely because collaborative models operate within the ambit of existing political infrastructures, possibilities may be limited. For Māori communities in Taranaki, the boundaries of consideration through collaboration may frustrate ambitions in environmental management (Chapter Seven, Eight). In sum, despite the inchoate nature of policies and practices in collaborative environmental management, and the corresponding possibility for improvising norms and regulations, there is an emerging body of literature suggests that dissonance and confrontation are discouraged in current models. A key finding of this thesis is an understanding of collaboration as an ongoing negotiation of coexistence and partnership. In essence, moving beyond colonial modes of environmental management requires a politics of openings, mutuality and pluralism, rather than a politics by closure.

Inclusion in environmental management processes may ultimately circumvent Indigenous intentions. Kepe (2008: 312), for example, concludes that “comanagement has possibly represented a camouflage for the continuation of state hegemony regarding the protected area or national park idea in postapartheid South Africa.” However, as debates in postdevelopment illustrate, it would be inaccurate to characterise
collaborative models as inescapably and irreparably determined by neocolonial intentions. Li (2007) uses the idea of ‘assemblage’ to explore how community based forestry initiatives are enacted through contingent alignments of people, things and objectives. She describes six practices that enable governments to translate their ‘will to govern’ into tangible policies and actions. Firstly, alignments between “those who aspire to govern” and those who will be governed must be forged (Li, 2007: 265); secondly, the problem and appropriate intervention must be defined, and then knowledge that supports the hypotheses authorised and alternatives delegitimised. Fourthly, incongruities must be managed by “presenting failure as the outcome of rectifiable deficiencies” and “devising compromises,” and conducting a form of anti-politics to limit debate and finally the assemblage is ‘reassembled’ through “grafting on new elements and reworking old ones” (Li, 2007: 265). This analytic reveals that collaborative arrangements have no single divining rationality or origin, and are neither static nor stable. Instead, collaboration is more of an orchestrated collusion of intersecting (and sometimes competing) interests that is inherently amorphous in order to absorb contradictions and tensions (Li, 2007). Like recent interpretations of development discourse as a hybridised and hybridising process, understanding participatory and collaborative environmental management initiatives as an entanglement of peoples, things and interests that cannot be tied to a single, hegemonic discourse suggests the possibility and potency of Indigenous agency in these new fora.

Perhaps because contemporary efforts to revise top-down environmental management typically form a bricolage of colonial practices and innovation, the subjectivities of Indigenous communities and peoples in collaborative arrangements and the exercise of agency is particularly complex (Berman Arévalo and Ros-Tonen, 2009, Kubo, 2008, Li, 2007, Tam, 2006). Indigenous negotiation of and participation in environmental management processes that offer indeterminate support suggests that both pure resistance and uncomplicated implementation of national and international discourses and policies is unrealistic. Li (2007: 279) concludes that collaborative arrangements:

…cannot be resolved into neat binaries that separate power from resistance, or progressive forces from reactionary ones. It is difficult to determine who has been co-opted and who betrayed. Fuzziness, adjustment and compromise are critical to holding assemblages together.
Like in development, therefore, composing essentialised responses to collaborative environmental management that revolve around embrace, subjugation or absolute rejection and resistance cloud the nuances and complexities of Indigenous participation. As Thiem and Robertson (2010: 5) put it: “Because identities and alliances are unstable, there are no clear lines separating friends from enemies.”

Further, tying Indigenous environmental activism to ideas of ‘ecological nobility’ and ‘traditional’ or ‘authentic’ cultures overlooks the intricate nexus of environmental politics and self-determination, and the complexity of Indigenous ambitions in the shadows of colonial history (Willow, 2009). Drawing on Spivak (1988), Tam (2006: 12) asserts that “Subalterns wield the power to communicate or manipulate to suit the identity of their audience, creating selective silences or selected grievances and conflicts.” This suggests that Indigenous perspectives and participation are not a linear expression of extant and innate values, but a strategic engagement. For example, framing environmental positions through “the spiritual and timeless nature of Indian people’s connection to the land” can attract support, but also distracts from self-determination ambitions, historical justice and constrains Indigenous land-uses (Willow, 2009: 45). In her analysis of the use of ‘ecological nobility’ by the people of Grassy Narrows in Ontario to contest clear-cutting, Willow (2009: 57) concluded that:

…we must acknowledge indigenous environmental activism as deeply and inherently political, the much-debated reality of the Ecological Indian image is once again rendered untenable. The Grassy Narrows blockaders are not Ecological Indians. They are real people who make difficult (and sometimes incongruous) decisions within (and occasionally against) a dynamic and unbounded cultural framework. Their relationship to the forest they struggle to protect is mediated not only by culture but also by cross-woven strands of history, politics, and individual agency.

As argued in Chapter Seven, for īwi in Taranaki asserting environmental management aspirations similarly requires working through complex intersections of culture, historical injustices and economic and political inequalities. In this sense, Indigenous environmental activism negotiates postcolonial contours of risk and opportunity (Carter and Hollinsworth, 2009, Willow, 2009). Like multiculturalism discussed in Chapter Two, an injurious conditionality is frequently attached to postcolonial recognition of Indigenous cultural differences. In environmental management, this manifests as “a strong association of nature and a very narrowly defined post-productivism with
Indigenous people” that casts urbanity and utilitarian land-uses as inauthentic and illegitimate for Indigenous communities (Carter and Hollinsworth, 2009: 422). Postdevelopment and postcolonial literatures call for attention to local identities and the heterogeneity within Indigenous communities, which aligns well with recent work exploring the complexity of Aboriginal ruralities (Carter and Hollinsworth, 2009, Howitt, 2010, Panelli et al., 2009). In a collaborative context, this also suggests the need for attention to the postcolonial ambitions of Indigenous communities and their diverse relationships with the environment, and how these may (or may not) be advanced through collaboration (Chapter Seven).

Recent work exploring Indigenous uses of mapping and planning also highlight the potential for Indigenous communities to use exogenous tools to advance subversive agendas (Bryan, 2010, Pinkerton et al., 2008, Wainwright and Bryan, 2009, Wilson, 2005). Pinkerton et al. (2008: 353), for instance found that representatives for the Harrop-Proctor Community Forest, BC, Canada, were able to use “both the technical and the cognitive aspects of counter-mapping to assert their vision and to use state-legitimized planning processes to first assert and then to implement” their vision and assert a ‘comanagement agenda.’ Wainwright and Bryan (2009) explored the use of cartographic-legal strategies for advancing Indigenous rights by communities in Belize and Nicaragua. Based on the idea that maps are both cultural acts and culturally acting, they argued although illustrating the exclusion of Indigenous peoples and drawing their inclusion does not bring justice, “a failure to render indigenous livelihoods commensurable with state institutions and property relations may provide justification for their continued exclusion from power” (Wainwright and Bryan, 2009: 170). This is perhaps indicative of the dilemmas of such approaches to pursuing Indigenous rights, and as discussed in Chapter Seven, the complexity of asserting Indigenous values and goals in postcolonial contexts.

Further, the subjectivities and perspectives of staff within government organisations are similarly nuanced and a potential mode of advancing changes to the managerial policies and practices (Chapter Seven). Adaptive management analyses account for this by considering such factors as ‘willingness to learn from mistakes’ and ‘willingness to accept a diversity of institutions’ as influencing the collaborative success (Armitage et al., 2008, Cundill and Fabricius, 2010, Davidson-Hunt, 2006). Abrash Walton (2010: 19)
also suggests self-reflexive engagement as a means to “open up new understanding” about the ‘standing’ and responsibilities of conservation advocates and generate more effective and just conservation. This idea is also explored in relation to academia in Chapter Four, and aligns well with recent work on the positionality of development professionals (Brigg, 2009, McKinnon, 2007a, Tamas, 2007). This highlights a point of potential synergy between postdevelopment and environmental management literatures. Critics have powerfully demonstrated the limitations of analysing development as a pernicious monolithic force; similarly, analyses of environmental management that engage with heterogeneity and diversity within state or corporate entities not only engender a deeper understanding, but also potential spaces of commonality (Thiem and Robertson, 2010).

In this section I argued that postdevelopment and postcolonial theories provide apt tools to explore the neocolonial potential of collaborative environmental management. This analysis demonstrates that these inchoate participatory spaces are dynamic and hybrid, and directs attention to the heterogeneity and complexity of Indigenous and state approaches to collaboration. Therefore, although there is an increasing body of literature and experience that documents the limitations of collaborative attempts, it would be capricious to dismiss the potential of these institutions and processes.

### 3.3.2 Spatialities of Collaboration

In her analysis of conservation conflicts in Thailand, Roth (2008) conceptualises protected areas as a reorganisation of landscapes through the insertion of state managerial regimes and associated spatial forms. She concludes that “[t]he negotiation between states and communities about the balance of power and the sharing of resources is a spatial process that is intimately intertwined with resource management institutions and the location and distribution of resources” (Roth, 2008: 388). In contexts like New Zealand, colonial ecological transformations were inherently spatial and territorial endeavour that is perpetuated in contemporary environmental management structures (Dominy, 2002, Rossiter, 2007, 2008). In this section I argue that postcolonial iterations of environmental management that emphasise Indigenous participation and collaboration are similarly territorial, and must be considered alongside Indigenous aspirations for self-determination and sovereignty.
Although historic (and often also continuous) use and occupation of lands and resources is typically employed to evidence Indigenous managerial legitimacy, this acknowledgement is frequently divested of sovereign or territorial claims. In this way, comanagement or community-based management can be insulated from difficult questions about governmental legitimacy, but also provide a facile recognition of Indigenous rights. For example, Porter (2007) argues that Aboriginal contestation of logging in Nyah forest, Victoria (Australia) confronted governmental conceptions and orderings of place and correlative ideas about rational uses. Even though Aboriginal presence has been recognised and integrated into the planning process (mainly via consultation), “this has always occurred by defining an Aboriginal Other that can be brought safely into the existing regulatory regime without unsettling the epistemological and ontological philosophies that underpin that regime” (Porter, 2007: 474-475). Similarly, based on an analysis of conservation politics in New Zealand Ginn (2008: 350) suggests that:

A genuine commitment to bicultural conservation would go beyond the inclusion of Maori conservation tools and techniques within the goals of preservationist conservation, to entertain notions of self-determination and genuinely heterogeneous naturecultures. It would also involve a re-assessment of the preservationist paradigm, which has done so much to solidify the Western separation of nature and culture, with all its attendant political and ecological consequences.

Inclusion of alternative views while leaving state authority in authoring and organising places unchallenged entrenches colonial relations and may prove politically disingenuous for Indigenous peoples (see for example, Porter, 2006). Further, the historic and cultural elision inherent in recognising Indigenous interests but denying contemporary sovereignty and territoriality produces a significant disjuncture between Indigenous claims and governments’ apparently postcolonial offerings, and highlights a potential source of tension that may persist in spite of (and because of) collaborative models.

Indigenous participation and collaboration in environmental management is often viewed as a paradigm of postcoloniality; an harmonious synthesis of plurality within the modern nation. However, the nation-state-territory homology and its corollary of state
eminence are frequently repeated in collaborative iterations of management, even as the historicity of governmental sovereignty is challenged by accounts of violent and illegitimate land acquisition (Coombes and Hill, 2005, Kepe, 2008). Struggles over spatial imaginaries in environmental management are intimately related with postcolonial politics, illustrate the potential and significance of space in postcolonial politics (Larsen, 2006). Inclusion *qua* collaboration and the implicit assumption that the government is the obvious initiator of and partner in environmental management institutions may prove problematic because it fails to recognise Indigenous sovereignty.

For instance, Walker *et al.* (2007) argue that an NGO’s efforts to implement participatory conservation and development in Chimalapas forest in Oaxaca, Mexico were contested at least partly because the NGO presumed the legitimacy of its presence and role in conservation planning. They concluded that:

...the politics of invitation is rooted in the material space of the forest. The Zoques insist that the forest is their home, which they own, and that they therefore are the only ones who can extend invitations... Instead of accepting their circumscribed role as “participants” in someone else’s conservation plan, the Zoques are insisting, on the basis of their territorial control, that any invitation to participate in planning for their lands will come from them alone (Walker et al., 2007: 438).

Hence, determining who participates and the directionality of invitations to participate cannot be separated from territorial politics, and thinking through the spatiality of collaborative models may provide important insights to configurations of postcolonial coexistence. Yet these contested spaces of environmental management are also a site of Indigenous agency and action. The case explored by Walker *et al.* (2007) highlights the use of territorial claims to engage with and reformulate a participatory conservation initiative.

In this context, many authors suggest a plural politics of place, mutuality grounded in co-presences as a basis for collaboration and partnership that genuinely empowers Indigenous peoples (Howitt, 2001). For example, Pickerill (2009: 68) calls for dialogue between Indigenous and non-Indigenous parties that “starts by acknowledging” the importance of places and identities to all parties, and “acknowledges the complexity of place, different ontologies, and thus ultimately the pluralism of place.” In this way, dialogue provides a means for “moving beyond a colonial paternal sense of
responsibility, to a dynamic and engaged mutuality of concern for both processes and outcomes” (Pickerill, 2009: 78). Johnson and Murton (2007: 127) similarly identify place as a potential “common ground’ between Western and Indigenous thought,” and call for “an ethic which heightens our awareness of the ‘subtle qualities of a place’ and…recognises ‘many new voices’, including Indigenous voices, in its production.” Howitt and Suchet-Pearson (2006: 333) further suggest that by reconsidering the ‘building blocks’ of environmental management and engaging with multiple cultural landscapes and ways of relating to places “we might dance into being ways of weaving the social fabric that acknowledge ontological pluralism as an everyday reality.” Therefore, analysing the spatial aspects of collaborative management illuminates a potential source of friction and of mutuality. Precisely because negotiating partnership is so intimately entwined with negotiations of place, attention to the spatialities of environmental management regimes is needed.

3.4 NEGOTIATING ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT

This thesis is fundamentally concerned with how Indigenous organisations engage in contemporary environmental management processes and collaborative relationships. Postdevelopment and postcolonial analyses reveal how colonial approaches to environmental management informed discourses, representations and particular knowledges and worked to physically and managerially dispossess Indigenous peoples. Contemporary iterations that emphasise ideas of partnership, collaboration and participation signal an explicit inclusion of Indigenous perspectives and representation in environmental management, but the anticipated benefits have often proven illusory. In this context, research that explores the intricacies of collaborative politics, the complexity of Indigenous and government negotiations and how spatialities are reworked in postcolonial encounters offers some nuance to critiques of collaboration and a deeper understanding of the dilemmas and potential in collaborative environmental management. Situating analysis of collaborative environmental management dilemmas in the historical, political, economic and cultural conjuncture in which these relationships unfold reveals something of the complexity of contemporary efforts. Yet it also suggests the potentiality of collaboration in postcolonial contexts as a means for creating spaces of interdependence and pluralism.
Colonial ambitions in New Zealand, as in other nations, were enacted through the imposition of spatial order over diverse landscapes. Academic research has often been harnessed to service those ambitions, making lands, flora and fauna, and Māori knowable and legible to the Crown for the purpose of governing (Byrnes, 2001, Gough, 1968, Smith, 1999). In 1868, for example, Governor Sir George Bowen called for research “to throw light on that very complicated and difficult, but highly interesting subject,—the past and present condition and future prospects of the Maori race” (Bowen, 1868: 7-8). Under this guise, research in New Zealand rendered Māori as an exotic object of imperial curiosity, representing “Maori knowledge for ‘consumption’ by the colonisers” (Bishop, 1996: 14) to better understand how to govern the Māori and to record the traditions and arts of a dying race (Smith, 1999). Colonial research, therefore, has a binary logic embedded in its methodologies, through which the academic expert is an active producer of knowledge and the Indigenous subject is a passive object to be known and mastered (Cervone, 2007, Jacobson and Stephens, 2009). This history of academic research has contemporary significance, not only because such research advanced colonial dispossession and cultural derogation, but also because it has yielded distrust and suspicion of researchers in many Indigenous communities (Smith, 1999). Notably, remnants of this logic can also be discerned in contemporary research, where the power to author and represent...
the ‘field’ privileges the authority of researchers and (often) leads to more benefits for the researcher than Indigenous research participants.

This Chapter argues that efforts to postcolonialise research practice in human geography are necessarily characterised by a critical uncertainty that is cognisant of inequalities and power differentials inherent in the research process and strives to construct more ethical relationships (Jazeel and McFarlane, 2007, 2010, Noxolo et al., 2008). This is expressed in recent work in qualitative methodologies that seeks ways to give voice to participants, in particular by reframing research on communities as doing research with communities (Bishop, 1996). The methodology developed for this thesis, and discussed in the first part of this chapter, reflects these ideas and their entanglement with locally specific considerations, such as the current value of research for Treaty settlement negotiations. The second half of the chapter discusses the particular methods used and the ethical dilemmas encountered.

### 4.1 Postcolonial Anxieties in Geography

Postcolonial (and postdevelopment) theory is nominally about relationships between the coloniser and colonised, revealing potent matrices of discourses, representations, language and power and subaltern strategies of resistance and existence. The recent embrace of postcolonial theory in geographic scholarship has brought “urgent and continued reminders of the historical connections between different postcolonial spaces and their lasting legacies” (Noxolo et al., 2008: 146). Turning this analytical lens to the relationship between researcher and researched opens important questions about the ethics of doing research, about academic responsibility and power, and about the institutions that guide research (Jazeel and McFarlane, 2010, Mercer et al., 2003, Raghuram et al., 2009). In the New Zealand and Australian contexts, geographers have explored research as a tool for counter-colonial and postcolonial writings in and of place (d’Hauteserre, 2005, Howitt and Jackson, 1998, Stokes, 1992, 2002), arguing the need to acknowledge the ‘intimate links’ between geography and colonisation (Howitt and Jackson, 1998) and that “a shared understanding of this colonial history” may be critical for developing postcolonial geographies and postcolonial relationships between Indigenous and non-Indigenous communities (d’Hauteserre, 2005: 108). These nascent efforts align with discussions in critical geography (Blomley, 2007, 2008, Chatterton,
2006) and work in ethical and moral geographies (Valentine, 2005) that highlight a desire to invigorate research practices and more closely align academia with struggles for social justice and empowerment.

The postcolonialisation of geographical research confronts a long history of research that has extracted ‘facts’ about others for imperial and/or personal gain (Cervone, 2007, McNicholas and Barrett, 2005, Smith, 1999). As feminist geographers have powerfully argued, traditional approaches to research hinge on the disavowal of the researchers’ complicity in defining and shaping the research to present the findings as absolute facts (Chacko, 2004, Rose, 1997). The truth of researchers’ findings was based in their objectivity; Distance, detachment and difference allowed the researcher to discover ‘facts’ in the field unsullied by emotions or subjectivity. Research, therefore, operated through hierarchical binaries – subject/object, researcher/researched, self/other – that positioned the researcher as an expert who actively produces knowledge and the researched as passive, un-knowing participants, as something to know about (Cervone, 2007, Sundberg, 2005). Objectivity as the measure of truth and legitimacy in research is problematic because it assumes that “the researcher’s mind is separate (separable) from his or her body, social situation, and geographical location, and moreover, that the researcher is separate from, and unaffected by the “objects of research” (Sundberg, 2005: 18-19). Dissociating the research findings from the complex situations in which they were created allows partial, selective and contingent knowledge to masquerade as absolute truths, and sketches an omnipresent observer from no-where in place of the researcher.

Feminist critics have proffered such tools as reflexivity to locate the researcher within their research and develop a vocabulary for thinking through and articulating the power relationships, subjectivities, differences and connections that are present in and influence the research process (Rose, 1997). In my research, for example, this could include reflections on how my ethnicity (New Zealand, Samoan), age, gender (female), and my status as a ‘researcher’ (PhD, human geographer) my beliefs or assumptions inter alia impacted on my relationships with participants and how I interpreted the ‘field.’ Though reflexivity has become integrated into mainstream qualitative research practice (Crang, 2002), it largely fails to invigorate research praxis or address power inequalities within and beyond the research process (Mullings, 2005, Rose, 1997,
The radical potential of reflexivity is subverted in self-reflexive narratives based on problematic assumptions that the researcher-self, interview context and power dynamics are completely knowable to the researcher (Crang, 2002; Rose, 1997). Confessional narratives and an emphasis on ‘more honest’ accounts of the field can re-privilege the researcher as the focus of academic accounts and reconfigure the all-seeing gaze of the researcher, essentially creating a researcher self that is fully knowable (Doucet, 2008; Rose, 1997). Perhaps even more problematic, striving to provide a more honest account of how the research was conducted misses the essential point that all knowledge is embodied, situated, and inherently partial (Frohlick, 2002; Hyndman, 2001). Reflexivity should serve to locate and embody knowledge as a window to engagement, mutuality and responsibility, rather than to secure the truth of research.

Recent discussions call for multiple types of reflexivity; Nicholls (2009), for example, writes of different ‘layers’ of reflexivity to describe reflecting upon herself, interpersonal relationships and the research collaboration itself. Doucet (2008) similarly explores the ‘gossamer walls’ between various iterations of ourselves, between the researcher and researched, and the various audiences for the research. Rather than displacing self-reflexivity, these authors demonstrate that it is “important to be cautious about how much we can know about what influences us in research” (Doucet, 2008: 84), and that it is necessary to expand the scope of reflexive engagement beyond the researcher-self and situate the knowledge produced as partial, subjective and located at the nexus of multiple influences. As discussed below, reflexivity remains a significant tool in efforts to postcolonialise geography research.

4.1.1 Geographical Imaginaries and Responsibility

Invigorating geographical imaginaries in research is one important avenue for building on these discussions of reflexivity. Exploring and challenging the presumed boundaries between the field, universities and the ‘real world’ (and our professional/personal lives) provides fertile ground for conceptualising the role and responsibilities of researchers, and ideas about where and how knowledge is produced (Jazeel and McFarlane, 2010; Mullings, 2005). This also invites further consideration of the relationship between the researcher and the researched, and the task of developing ways of doing and
understanding research that respect and empower the subjectivities, knowledges and agency of those who participate in research (Wright et al., 2007).

Recent work on ethics, responsibility and postcoloniality in geographic research is often concerned with the spatialities created and represented in research. As Jazeel and McFarlane (2010: 122) note, “all intellectual projects have geographical imaginations, and these imaginaries can have real world effects.” Accounts of fieldwork-based research, for example, conjure ‘the field’ as a discrete site for academic analysis but also erase the authors’ complicity in defining the field to present it as “an unproblematic domain lying outside the academy” (Sparke, 1996: 218). Practices of inclusion and exclusion indelibly mark the field site as different and distant from researchers’ homes and institutions (Katz, 1994, Sparke, 1996). These ideas of difference and distance play to notions of researcher objectivity and neutrality in the field, and occlude (the development of) relationships between researcher and researched. Boundaries between home/university and the field also subtly locate the production of knowledge within institutional spaces, which as McNicholas and Barret (2005: 392) point out, has “marginalised, undervalued and belittled” Indigenous knowledge systems. Further, the field, in its conception and subsequent representation, is shaped by researchers’ geographical imaginations. Colonial geography, for example, is dominated by pioneering, heroic and masculine metaphors that posit the field as a wild, dangerous and exotic place to be mastered in scholarly pursuits (Hyndman, 2001, Sparke, 1996). Such conceptualisations of the field:

…could be seen as the expression of the bourgeois imaginary of a ‘free individual’ who ‘decides’ by him/herself what he/she ‘wants’ to ‘study’, when, where, how and for how long, while the people ‘studied’ are located in the ‘passive’ place of being observed, being the ‘informants’, and so forth (Restrepo and Escobar, 2005: 110).

Disrupting borders between the ‘field,’ universities and the ‘real world’ is therefore a key task for postcolonial geographies that seek to deconstruct hegemonies and imperialism (Katz, 1994, Mullings, 2005). In this context, responsibility has emerged as a key rubric for conceptualising ethical relationships between academics and research participants in counter-colonial work (Jazeel and McFarlane, 2007, 2010, Raghuram et al., 2009).

12 There is also a notable similarity between the language and metaphors used to describe fieldwork by early geographers and accounts of colonial/imperial activities (for example, see Sparke, 1996).
Taking responsibility as a researcher requires a critical understanding of the geographical imaginaries invoked in research, and the different places that research is produced in, contributes to and, in turn, influences. In this section, I argue that exploring the connections between the ‘field’ and academics’ homes and institutions, and between research outputs and research communities, suggests some key areas for developing responsible and ethical research practices in postcolonial geography.

Rather than treating the field or university as abstract spaces, understanding places as always, already part of the ‘real world,’ intertwined through global processes and the relationships forged in research produces a different perspective on the roles and responsibilities of researchers (Jazeel and McFarlane, 2010, Katz, 1994, Ruming, 2009). Conceptualising of the field as a place where “people’s lives [are] lived in real time and space” (Katz, 1994: 70) creates opportunities for common ground between the struggles of different places and people, for deeper reflection on the positionality and privilege of academics, and for a fuller understanding of how research unfolds in and through real places and time (Dewsbury, 2003). More fully displacing objectivity as the measure of research, therefore, also requires challenging the geographical imaginaries that define and delimit the field and university, and that consequentially keep the researcher and the researched from entering each others’ life-worlds. Attending to movement and, more importantly, connections between these two places also suggests the need to think through the researchers’ role and responsibilities in and to both the field and the academy. Hosking and Pluut (2010: 67) conceptualise research as ‘intervention,’ and argue that responsibility and ethics in research need to be “reconstructed and centred” to better align with the idea that “the identities of researcher, research object and related realities are in ongoing re-construction.” Similarly, Jazeel and McFarlane (2010: 113) argue that “intellectual work in some sense produces place, whilst simultaneously placing the academic within a spatiality connecting analyst and analysed” and so the “academic must bear some responsibility” to the field community.

Researchers, therefore, are multiply positioned – simultaneously inside and outside of the field community, and also located within the academia and home communities– in ways that blur boundaries between personal and professional spheres and create responsibilities to both places (Fuller, 1999, Katz, 1994). Put differently, “there is no clear inside to penetrate and there is no unambiguous outside from which to launch
CHAPTER FOUR: Politics, Research and Taranaki

external critique” (Robertson, 2010: 10). Rather than completing fieldwork as a disengaged observer from nowhere, researchers and their research are a part of the world they explore and become embedded in, impact upon and impacted by the places where they work (Dewsbury, 2003, Hosking and Pluut, 2010, Jazeel and McFarlane, 2010, Ruming, 2009). Notwithstanding the value of education and mutual understanding, producing research that is meaningful to both academic and field communities is inescapably complex, ambivalent and uncertain. Price (2001: 149), for instance, asserts that despite the “desire to give back to the communities and localities that sustain our academic pursuits… it is difficult to match the particular needs of a community with the theoretical concerns of the academy.” Katz (1994: 72) similarly notes that “I have built a career” from research, but “these field projects all have probably been more beneficial to me than to them.” Indeed, the one-sided accrual of benefits from research by academics has been a key critique of research from Indigenous scholars (Bishop, 1996, Louis, 2007, Smith, 1999). This indicates that responsible research may require multiple strategies and outputs for different places and audiences (Benson and Nagar, 2006, Jazeel and McFarlane, 2010), and that researchers must learn “to see, be seen, speak, listen and be heard” in multiple contexts (Katz, 1994: 72; see also Fuller, 1999). As Jazeel and McFarlane (2010: 111) put it, “effectively tacking back and forth between disciplinary and field communities – moreover reconciling the demands of those communities – is part of the challenge of responsible academic knowledge production.”

The supposition that any meaningful contribution to the communities where academics work must be separate from the research itself perhaps offers a bleak analysis of the worth of academic research. Certainly, academics’ engagements with people in the field and research outputs are affected by the structure of academia itself, and this may limit the utility and use-ability of academic outputs for local agendas. Restrepo and Escobar (2005: 103) assert that “institutionalized practices and relations of power shape the production, circulation and consumption of anthropological knowledge as well as the production of subject positions and subjectivities.” Noxolo et al. (2008) also discern a disciplining within academic writing that silences and tames ‘infiltrating’ others to established research and writing conventions, while Staeheli and Mitchell (2005: 359) observe that “rapid theoretical development [in geography]… may have also drawn it further from the social movements, political formations, policy makers, and lay people.
many of us hope to reach.” Notably, each of these critiques suggests that there is a significant disjunction between the concerns of the places where academics learn and participate and how academics write about these places.

Jazeel and McFarlane (2010) identify theorising and abstraction, key aspects of academic work, as having a tendency to dissociate the knowledge produced from the locations in which it is grounded precisely because theory is treated as neutral and universal. Arguing instead that theory is culturally situated, they call for socially and politically engaged theorisation and highlight the central “challenge of translating disciplinary geographical expertise and theoretical innovation into idioms that might also effectively speak to the concerns of a specific area” (Jazeel and McFarlane, 2010: 119). For Gilmartin and Berg (2007: 122) too, theoretical discussion that is “tempered by the specific geographies of colonialism, imperialism and postcolonialism” is necessary to construct a postcolonial geography that “challenges, rather than reinforces, colonial hierarchies.” Bringing place and theory closer together, reworking theory through local specificities, and making visible how the places from which we theorise influence our thinking therefore may be useful strategies to make academic knowledge locally meaningful (Fox, 2008, Gilmartin and Berg, 2007, Massey, 2008, McNicholas and Barrett, 2005). In the context of my research, this includes reading postdevelopment and postcolonial theory through the specific conditions of Taranaki and New Zealand, and drawing conclusions that tie into both wider (global) debates about postcoloniality, environmental management and Indigenous development, and also creating ideas that are grounded in local politics, cultures and histories. This also suggests the need to reconfigure the geographic imaginaries that underlie theorisation, shifting perceptions of the ‘field’ from “those spaces where data is collected” to the ‘field’ as “spaces where knowledge is produced” (Mullings, 2005: 278).

Responding to the methodological implications of these multiple responsibilities is complex: Predetermined or standardised approaches to understanding responsibility and defining responsible research would subvert the potential for substantive changes in research practice (Jazeel and McFarlane, 2010, Noxolo, 2009). Further, just as local contexts must be considered in collaborative models for environmental management or development, research methodologies must similarly be grounded in locally specific
histories, cultures and politics. Therefore, although core values of responsible and ethical research may be held in common, their implementation is likely to vary.

### 4.1.2 Learning to Work With Others

Understanding research as a part of the world it examines (re)positions ethics and responsibility as central to the research process, inviting important methodological considerations (Hosking and Pluut, 2010). Shifting the focus of methodological design away from how to best obtain ‘facts about the field,’ requires that:

> At every stage of our research endeavour we must perennially confront those most important questions concerning what knowledge does, who it is for, and why we are producing it, which in turn demands an openness to knowledge that drives change, is insurrectionary, just as it recognises the inevitability of ‘speaking for’ (Jazeel and McFarlane, 2010: 115).

Challenging the geographical imaginaries that structure academic research offers an insight to our complicity in and responsibility to the world; as Noxolo et al. (2008: 164) observe, academics and people in field communities are “all connected to structural processes that produce injustice,” but “we are not all equally positioned.” In this context, collaborative and participatory approaches to research (development and environmental management) have gained status as a method of restructuring practice and redistributing privilege and power (Benson and Nagar, 2006, Cahill, 2007, Marika et al., 2009, Watson and Till, 2010, Wright et al., 2007). These efforts to shift from researching on to researching with invite further consideration of how we might move beyond (or subtly perpetuate) the subject-object binary in research and work together across our differences (Hosking and Pluut, 2010). Learning to work with others necessarily holds in tension intervening without imposing in unjust situations, representing without silencing, engaging with theory while remaining grounded *inter alia* (Blomley, 2007, Jazeel and McFarlane, 2010, Noxolo, 2009, Noxolo et al., 2008). It follows, therefore, that postcolonialising geography is an ambiguous, imaginative and uncertain project, and that reconfiguring relationships between the researcher and researched is a key aspect of postcolonialising research methods.

Recent ethnographic work on development professionals’ positionalities argues that “Developers’ selves cannot be read off a framework” (Brigg, 2009: 1413) and calls for a
more complex and nuanced discussion of how development practitioners understand their work in the ‘ruins’ of development idealism and in politically and economically uneven situations (McKinnon, 2006, 2007a, Tamas, 2007). This reflective approach opens consideration of how development professionals might manage and work the tension between simultaneously appreciating the history of failures, while continuing to work with optimism and hope (McKinnon, 2007a). It is precisely this productive and confounding tension that is found in postcolonial geography: between understanding the colonial histories and institutions of research and doing research with optimism and hope that both the process and outputs will work against inequalities or injustices. Brigg (2009: 1423) asserts that development practice is premised on exchanges of culture and knowledge, and that “[o]nly by taking alternative conceptions…seriously, can we respect differences and open ourselves to different professional and personal futures.” Undertaking self-reflection in which we “critically engage, rather than merely reproduce who we are” may open possibilities for new and different modes of development efforts (Brigg, 2009: 1423). Applied to academia, this suggests that ‘radical reflexivity’ (Thomas et al., 2009) which opens the researcher ‘self’ to change and development through the process opens spaces for different ways of doing, presenting, and conceptualising research. Indeed, this is an extension of feminist geographers’ efforts to ‘embody’ the researcher voice by locating the researcher in the text (Sundberg, 2005). Learning to work with others, therefore, requires the humility to learn about ourselves and, by so doing, “deconstruct the authority of the researcher” and reconfigure the problematic subject-object binary in research practice (Choi, 2006: 414).

Choi (2006) provides an example of this style of reflection in her discussion of her research with youths who dropped out of high school in South Korea. She found that her research questions and interpretations reinforced hegemonic representations of the students as problems, marginal, abnormal and deviant. Such reflection proved transformative: “The more I engaged in this research, the more I revealed who I was, what I believed and what my gaze was constitutive of” (Choi, 2006: 450). Self-reflexivity does not displace the dilemmas of uneven power dynamics between the researcher and the researched. Choi (2006), for instance, notes that she ‘straddled’ between embodying an ‘academic-self’ with epistemological and positional power, and being an ‘other’ as a woman of colour in the USA, and as an academically successful adult amongst teenage South Koreans. Yet, as Brigg (2009: 1413) suggests for development professionals,
“engaging our selves requires engaging with others and their worlds in order to open ourselves” to ideas beyond the circumference of our theoretical, political, cultural and social imaginations. In research then, making visible such self-interrogation is a method of situating the knowledges produced, and of acknowledging how “the practice of speaking for others is also the practice of speaking for ourselves” (Kim, 2008: 1359, emphasis in original). Further, understanding our subjectivity as unstable and dynamic perhaps offers space for reworking the role of researchers and research in relation to the communities with whom we research to produce knowledge and identities that “strengthen us in our encounters with these structures of dominance, and allow us the possibility of connecting…to confront their manifestations in everyday life” (Katz, 1994: 70-71). In this way, the relationship between researcher and researched not only exceeds the confines of a subject-object dichotomy, but the authoritative presence of the researcher in the social world of the researched is brought into question by learning that is uncertain, vulnerable and indirect (Besio, 2005, Jazeel and McFarlane, 2010).

In challenging boundaries between the ‘field’ and ‘home,’ and opening to considerations of how research not only “transforms social reality to text” but “also transforms the researcher” (De Carteret, 2008: 236), the bifurcation of relationships between the researcher and the researched along subject/object (and inside/outside) lines becomes insufficient. Indeed, shifting from doing research on to doing research with is perhaps premised on a fundamental recognition of the researched as knowledgeable contributors, and a concomitant need to engage “in a politics that actively seeks ways of displacing ourselves as the primary producers of geographical knowledge” (Mullings, 2005: 279). Besio (2005: 321), for example, understands the stories of women she met in Pakistan as ‘autoethnographic’ accounts “to describe the ways that the women in the stories co-produce what constitutes ‘my’ research, thus destabilizing my geographic authority.” Collaborative and participatory approaches to research similarly position the researcher as “someone who contributes one expertise among many as the identities of researcher and researched are more fluid and open” (Hosking and Pluut, 2010: 69). These approaches to inquiry can also work to legitimate knowledge systems that operate beyond the academy and create spaces for dialogue across difference, mutual reflection and learning, self-representation and new subjectivities (Benson and Nagar, 2006, Cahill, 2007, Watson and Till, 2010). Further, because collaborative research decentres the role of academics and is premised on shared authority and dialogue (Benson and Nagar,
2006), the “research has to matter: not simply to those who bring new ideas into a community but to the people within that community who help make research happen” (Davidson-Hunt and O'Flaherty, 2007: 303). Therefore, collaborative innovation may be a significant means for moving beyond the subject-object binary in research.

Yet collaborative and participatory innovation of academic research shares many of the dilemmas faced in development and environmental management (Chapter Two, Three). Just as comanagement or participatory development can covertly repeat and re-entrench power inequalities even as they purport to resolve them, inclusive approaches to research do not inherently resolve tricky questions of power and representation between the researcher and researched. As Kim (2008: 1352) points out, claims of empowering or giving voice to marginalised or oppressed peoples perpetuates the authority and agency of the researcher at the expense of the researched because:

…the researcher has the right to give the researched permission to speak and, therefore, the voice of the researched in the final product owes its presence to an invitation from the researcher who, as a privileged subject, possesses the authority to decide ‘who can speak and who cannot’.

Framing research in more ‘egalitarian terms’ does not necessarily disrupt unequal power relationships in research; such labels may work to obsfuscate authority and control rather than displace it (Benson and Nagar, 2006, Kim, 2008, Watson and Till, 2010). Academic privilege is difficult to shake; For instance, the arrogance and privilege of research is evident when we “speak of choosing, deciding, wanting, travelling, reasoning, finding compelling, and being intrigued” by the ‘field’ (Katz, 1994: 70). In my own work, I am often struck by the knowledge that Taranaki Māori struggles for self determination, recognition and justice are topics that I have chosen to explore, despite no apparent connection to Taranaki, and the (comparative) mobility that this implies (see Section 4.2.2). These issues raise important dilemmas for researchers seeking to learn and to work with others. As discussed in Section 4.1.1, power imbalances within the research relationship cannot be disentangled from wider inequalities (Noxolo, 2009). However, the representative work of academics – in publications, theses, lectures inter alia – and the apparent normative authority of academics as ‘experts’ is difficult (and perhaps naïve) to deny, and is also a privilege and responsibility of the research process (Doucet, 2008, Thomas et al., 2009). Therefore, as Besio (2005: 320) suggests, “Not
only do researchers need to find ways to practice research, we must also find ways of writing it up, locating ourselves within the text without reproducing essentializing epistemologies that hearken to colonialist representations."

Re-presenting the knowledge produced with others during fieldwork is inherently complex. Debates in critical geography and across the humanities reveal the problematic nature of representation, that it cannot help glossing over individuality and erasing and circumscribing meanings and identities, that it always ‘falls short’ of what it seeks to convey (Baker, 2006, Castree and MacMilan, 2004, Davies and Dwyer, 2007, Dewsbury, 2003, Harrison, 2007, Thomassen, 2007). For Castree and MacMilan (2004: 477) the political utility of representation means that academics have “little choice: use the resources of representation – make the subaltern heard...however imperfectly and impossibly – or else risk being a marginal force in worldly affairs.” Certainly, it is important to produce counter-hegemonic representations as an academic, or put differently, to wield our privilege as academics for social and political justice. Considering how we write up our experiences is also important because “all that hard work just wilts or even dies on the page” when academic writing fails to engage the reader (Smart, 2009: 304). Achieving the political goals of a postcolonial geography and genuinely opening up research in ways that promotes learning and working with others requires exploring different ways of doing and writing academic research. Some potential modes include equivocal and poly-vocal writing (For example: Watson and Huntington, 2008), ways of representing that reach beyond the confines of academic knowledge circulation, and writing tropes that enliven knowledge, keep a sense of the experiences of fieldwork, and that open space for new subjectivities, dialogues and imaginaries (Noxolo, 2009, Noxolo et al., 2008, Smart, 2009, Thomas et al., 2009).

Postcolonialising geographic research and learning to work with others perhaps also requires some un-learning. Thomas et al. (2009: 322), for example, observe that “[a]uthoritative univocal accounts not only have a persuasive appeal, giving the impression of certainty, expertise, and scientific rigor, they also have a comforting appeal.” Embracing uncertainty, humility and vulnerability as key aspects of research practice may require alternative ways of theorising (Jazeel and McFarlane, 2010), and surely also new ways of framing the ‘results’ of research. Similarly, postcolonial research should “promote a means of knowing in a way that denies distance and separation and
promotes commitment and engagement” between the researcher and the researched (Bishop, 1996: 23). In essence, rather than being authoritative, research should promote openings in an unequal and uneven world for dialogue across difference.

4.2 DOING RESEARCH IN TARANAKI

Place, local context and specificity are important considerations in postcolonial geographic research, and have conceptual, methodological, ethical and practical significance because “historical forms of colonial rule and therefore of their legacies are diverse and have specific local contexts” (Noxolo, 2009: 57). That I am writing from Aotearoa New Zealand carries significance in shaping my understanding of postcoloniality, development, environmental management and indigeneity (Ashcroft, 2001, Gilmartin and Berg, 2007). As Sidaway and McGregor (2008: 3) put it:

Aotearoa’s relatively marginal Pacific location, its post-colonial indigenous and non-indigenous histories, and diverse human and physical landscapes, suggest that there could well be distinctive New Zealand ways of not only seeing the world, but also of informing broader academic debates.

Writing in the periphery, ‘under the shadow’ of Anglo-American geographic theorisation, and yet also working within the centre of theoretical production, creates “a particularly subtle, complex and creatively empowering sense of the lack of fit between the language available and the place experienced” for New Zealand geographers (Ashcroft, 2001: 154). Theorising from our place – bringing academia and the field together in our work – is perhaps essential for making locally meaning knowledge through academic research, and presents the challenge and opportunity of working through the apparent binary of local specificity and international significance (Gilmartin and Berg, 2007, Sidaway and McGregor, 2008). In this section, I briefly outline the local context for the research, and how this informs methodological and ethical dilemmas, and the significance of the work.

Reconciliation and reparation processes between settler colony governments and Indigenous peoples are an increasingly common approach to (nominally) resolving historic grievances and contemporary inequalities for the good of the postcolonial nation (Byrnes and Ritter, 2008, Hill and Bonisch-Brednich, 2007). In New Zealand, the
work of the Waitangi Tribunal and settlement negotiations between the Office of Treaty Settlements (OTS) and ‘claimant groups’ form an important context for any consideration of and research into Māori rights, interests and ambitions. Treaty settlements allocate iwi economic assets and thereby influence prospects for iwi development and participation in environmental management (Chapter Two, Six). However, settlement processes are also an important forum for scholarship on Māori issues, because grievances are assessed through “the rubric of the promises” in the Treaty of Waitangi (1840), and must be ‘proven’ to have happened and to have been Treaty breaches (Hill and Bonisch-Brednich, 2007: 165). One interviewee noted that during the Waitangi Tribunal hearings in Taranaki in the 1990s, “you could see that what they were saying was actually true, but there was no evidence, so even when we’re having our hearings we had to employ an historian” (Puketapu hapu representative, TAIA, 19.06.09). Making legal truths from contested history enables the Crown to claim that financial disbursements were sanctioned by legal and historical experts (Byrnes and Ritter, 2008). This is suggestive of the real world implications and value of research for iwi engaging in Treaty Settlements. In the post-settlement phase as well, research is valuable for negotiating and working with Crown entities; one interviewee noted that:

…we actually need people doing research or presenting information, you know, we need the people actually doing the writing who can just turn up and say what’s your view on this…exploring and putting the question forward, cos the problem is that, yeah, we have [the] Iwi Chairs [Forum], but there’s no-one actually doing the grunt work (Chairperson, TRoNM, 27.05.09).

The potential utility of research as a vehicle for exploring, expressing, and supporting iwi concerns and aspirations in environmental management must be considered in my research, and I am both excited by and apprehensive of this responsibility and opportunity and the ways in which my research may unfold outside the research process and beyond my control (Doucet, 2008, Massey, 2008).

The Treaty settlement process and the gradual inclusion of Treaty principles and other acknowledgements of Māori rights, claims and culture into legislation and policy has attracted staunch critique from some politicians and members of the public, setting up a potentially hostile political climate for iwi aspirations in development and environmental management. For example, in 2004 the leader of the National Party (Opposition)
famously attacked contemporary Treaty rights, stating that the public has endured “the parade of race-based political correctness” such as “claims of taniwhas [water spirit, monster, chief] being used to block developments” and “consultations with iwi being required in relation to resource management consents and even to scientific research” (Brash, 2004). Such high profile critiques resonate with media discussion of a ‘Treaty industry’ formed by lawyers, researchers and negotiators that “is a bloated leech …gorging itself on a geyser of public money” (Winston Peters, MP in New Zealand Herald, 05.07.2002; see also Seuffert (2005) for a discussion of media portrayals of successful Maori businessmen). This political volatility is illustrated in Figure 4 which depicts the former Prime Minister attempting to balance competing demands.

**Figure 4: Maori Anger, Pakeha Anger**


This political context carries practical significance for iwi negotiators and representatives because – as was demonstrated in the 1970s in discussions about the ownership of

13 There is evidence of sympathy for such views in Taranaki; efforts in 2009 to change the spelling of a city’s name (Whanganui instead of Wanganui) were not supported by a majority of local residents, and the city’s Mayor labelled the Geographic Board’s support for the extra ‘h’ “wrong and racist” and an “anti-democratic injustice” by an “uncaring and unthinking” and “stupid” organisation “composed of particularly odd people” (NZPA, 17.09.2009). The Minister for Land Information eventually recommended dual usage (Whanganui and Wanganui).
Mount Taranaki—government action can be subject to public opinion (Chapter Five). Ruru (2004: 136-7) also notes that fuller recognition of Māori rights in environmental management would “require a substantial mind-shift for the majority of those living in Aotearoa/New Zealand” because there is “little evidence that the country has reached the maturity required to debate such notions of partnership.” Indeed, considerations of political possibility and public acceptance are frequently discussed by iwi representatives (Chapters Six and Seven), and I was aware of the potential for controversy throughout the research process.

It would be inaccurate to suggest that there is no Pakeha support for tangata whenua rights and interests; as I discuss in Chapters Six and Seven, there is a diverse range of opinions within both Māori and local government organisations that offer nuanced responses to complex questions of partnership, participation and authority, and attention to this diversity is required. However, understanding and reflecting on the potentially unfriendly political context that my research unfolds within and folds into is important. Doucet (2008: 82) suggests that the ‘epistemology of reception’ deserves reflexive analysis because “[m]etaphorically speaking, there are powerful political and community voices on the other side of gossamer walls—influencing, guiding and moving us towards particular ways of seeing and writing.” For Doucet (2008) the appropriation of her work by fathers’ rights groups led her to adopt a different writing style to make her research intentions clear. In my own work, I feel that respect for the diversity and legitimacy of viewpoints within tangata whenua and government agencies must be reflected in my writing. However, I also strive to achieve a kind of authorial humility that enables others, as well as me, to speak through the research. This probably reflects my dislike of controversy and uneasy relationship with such labels as ‘researcher’ and ‘expert.’ But it also reflects a genuine belief that research could be a space for thinking through, discussing, and bringing together different ideas about postcoloniality and relationships between Indigenous communities and government agencies, and the hope that this – as much as the probity of academic research for negotiations – might be useful.

Doing research and writing about development, environmental management and postcoloniality in Taranaki, Aotearoa New Zealand provides a particular context for my understanding of concepts and theories from elsewhere, and for the methodological and
CHAPTER FOUR: Politics, Research and Taranaki

Ethical dilemmas of my research. Yet, the research themes and concerns do hold wider relevance. Just as the regional history outlined in Chapter Five is unique but not unrelated to the colonial experiences of other places, debates of postcoloniality in Taranaki are distinctive, but connected to national and international debates. In the following sections I discuss how my methods and case studies address the academic requirements for my work and also the specific historical, political and cultural context of Taranaki. In the final section, I reflect on the dilemmas raised in my approach.

4.2.1 Methodology

To explore how iwi participate in environmental management in the context of iwi development and the Treaty Settlement era I have used a qualitative research methodology and worked with iwi and hapu representatives and staff at local government agencies. The various phases of my fieldwork are summarised in Table 3 below, and in the following discussion I briefly summarise how I conducted this research.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Phase of Research</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan – Feb 2008</td>
<td>Scoping Trip to Wellington and Taranaki to discuss potential topics and methods for the research.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb – June 2009</td>
<td>Fieldwork in Taranaki and Wellington. This included interviews, attending meetings and archival research.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Writing up in Taranaki and producing research outputs for iwi organisations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As discussed above, two key themes in the literature on postcolonial (and anti-colonial) geographic research include working beyond the subject/object binary by doing research with others (rather than on) (Bishop, 1996, Hosking and Pluut, 2010), and carefully considering the aims, benefits and purpose of doing research (Hale, 2006, Jazeel and McFarlane, 2010, Smith, 1999, Tipa and Panelli, 2009, Walker et al., 2006). I have sought to apply these ideas throughout the research process. Previous research in Taranaki for my Masters thesis in 2006 examined tangata whenua rights in the conservation estate in the context of Treaty settlement processes and provided a starting point for imagining the current project (Tofa, 2007). Indeed, doctoral study has become an opportunity to further develop this research and the relationships
established during my Masters, especially because the longer time frame for PhD research allowed greater scope for collaboratively determining the shape and foci for the research.

I initially discussed PhD research with iwi representatives via email and then in person in January-February 2008 during a scoping trip (see Table 3). In these discussions I sought to identify topics, themes and case studies for the research that iwi representatives felt would be useful, interesting and appropriate and also to explore how to make the research relevant, useful and appropriate (See Appendix C1). Our conversations over coffee, sponge cakes and biscuits on topics ranging from rugby, holidays and children to Treaty settlements and environmental management further developed the relationships established during my Masters research. Meeting *kanohi ki te kanohi* [face to face] to discuss the potential research was also important to several representatives (pers comm., Te Runanga o Ngāti Mutunga, 13.02.08). The generous, friendly and enthusiastic responses of iwi representatives (and the comfort of doing research with people I already knew) were a source of inspiration, especially because many people felt that the research could and should be mutually beneficial – as one iwi representative noted “We’re happy to help you with your research, but we’d be even happier if it helped us too” (pers comm., Manager, Ngati Ruanui Tahua, 15.04.09). Though the foci and themes of this research were further negotiated and considered throughout the research process, these initial discussions provided the basis for the research and the case studies outlined in Table 4.

**Table 4: Case Studies**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case Study</th>
<th>Main groups involved</th>
<th>Summary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parininihi Ki Waitotara Incorporation (PKW).</td>
<td>Māori shareholders, Ngā Ruahine, PKW directors.</td>
<td>I explore how this Māori-run corporate entity negotiates cultural and economic goals, and its relationship to the legacies of confiscation and colonisation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iwi Management Plans and Environmental Planning by Te Kāhui o Rauru and Ngāti Mutunga</td>
<td>Ngā Rauuru Kiitahi, Ngāti Mutunga, NPDC, TRC.</td>
<td>I analyse the use of planning to articulate and advance iwi aspirations in development and environmental management.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whareroa Outfall.</td>
<td>Ngāti Ruanui, Ngā Ruahine, Fonterra, TRC, STDC.</td>
<td>I explore the efforts of iwi and <em>hau pu</em> to contest this marine outfall and the operation of Resource Management Act (RMA) processes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water allocation in Taranaki.</td>
<td>Ngāti Tama, Ngāti Maru, Ngāti Mutunga, Te Ati Awa,</td>
<td>I examine iwi aspirations in water management in the context of an anticipated national-level</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
These early discussions also helped to define the scope of the ‘field’ for the purposes of this research. As Katz (1994) suggests, the ‘field’ as an object for inquiry does not exist external to the research process, rather it is conjured up as a discrete site by academics. Taking the Taranaki region as ‘the field’ has referents external to this research; it has long been administered as a coherent region (currently by the Taranaki Regional Council (TRC)) and its boundaries mostly align with the combined rohe [territory] of the eight (Crown recognised) iwi who share Mount Taranaki as their tupuna [ancestor]. The size of the region is relatively large and complex for a single researcher and research project. However, it is difficult to conceptually disentangle environmental issues and iwi politics from the regional context because of the complex ecological, historical, cultural and political links that exist. Significantly, during my first trip in early 2008, many tangata whenua representatives expressed the desire for greater regional co-operation between iwi (pers comm., former Te Atiawa Negotiator, Te Atiawa Historian and Researcher, 30.01.08, Kaiwhakahaere o TKoR, 11.02.08, Te Runanga o Ngāti Mutunga, 13.02.08). Completing the research at the regional scale, therefore, offered a space for exploring the opportunities for and barriers to greater inter-iwi co-operation, which is a topic of interest to many iwi and hapu representatives (See Chapter Six). By choosing the research foci in collaboration with tangata whenua representatives I hoped to design a research project that would help me to contribute ‘on the ground,’ even as I am aware that my status and agenda as a student limited the extent to which this research could be more genuinely participatory.

To explore the themes of environmental management and the Treaty settlement era, I interviewed representatives from iwi and government organisations, attended various hui [meetings] and analysed archived material along with contemporary policy and
government documents during my second and third trips to Taranaki (see Table 3). As mandated by the Macquarie University Human Research Ethics Committee, all participants were provided with a Participant Information and Consent Form in English or Māori (See Appendix C2, C3). Most interviews were digitally recorded with the permission of the interviewees; two interviewees chose not to be recorded, and others requested that the dictaphone be turned off at certain points in the discussion. Several people – often staff within local government – noted the delicacy and sensitivity of the issues under discussion and allowed me to record information that they did not want publically shared. For example, one interviewee noted that “I’ve probably been a bit too candid talking with you here, however, I’m picking you’re not going to use, you’re going to summarise what I’ve said pretty carefully,” and instructed me to “edit my words carefully, you know, you’re an intelligent woman, you know how to express that.” This reflects the significant level of trust and generosity extended to me during interviews, and the importance of respecting confidentiality. All the interviews were transcribed, and interviewees were offered copies of the transcription and the opportunity to edit, expand or delete their comments, and to choose how they are referred to in this text as outlined in the Participant Information and Consent Form. Although gaining ethics approval from my university suggests that the ethical dimensions of this research were adequately considered, as discussed in the following section, the realities of doing research are much more complex (Davidson-Hunt and O'Flaherty, 2007, Sultana, 2007).

I first met many of the tangata whenua representatives during Masters research in Taranaki. I approached interviewees from government agencies, such as local councils or DoC, based on their roles within the organisation. However, many interviewees – both from iwi and government agencies – also kindly introduced or recommended other people for me to speak with who they felt had valuable insights or interesting views on the issues discussed. Though ‘snowballing’ has been critiqued as un-objective and biased, I believe that being introduced by local community members sometimes lent greater credibility to my research, and certainly enabled me to meet with people that I may have been unable to otherwise meet (Browne, 2005, Sixsmith et al., 2003).

Table 5 lists the interviewees and their roles within various iwi and government organisations in Taranaki. Notably, there is significant overlap between Crown and Māori organisations with some interviewees working in government offices, while also
being involved in *iwi* politics, and others affiliating to and working for more than one *iwi*. This is indicative of the postcolonial complexity that characterises Taranaki, and perhaps further evinces the interconnectedness that necessitates completing this research at the regional scale.

I conducted unstructured interviews that focussed on the research themes of *tangata whenua* participation in environmental management, Treaty settlements, *iwi* development and regional collaboration, and on particular case studies as appropriate. In addition to interviews, I also met with some *iwi* representatives informally to catch up over coffee, attended events like a fundraising *hangi* [food cooked in an earth oven] for Te Kura o Ngaruahinerangi [Māori language School of Ngaruahinerangi] and spoke to Māori school students about my experiences at university. Invitations to attend Iwi Chairs Forum meetings and resource consent hearings enabled me a much greater understanding of some of the key topics in this research, and reflect the generosity and openness that *tangata whenua* gave me in this research.

### Table 5: Interviewees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name in Text</th>
<th>Iwi</th>
<th>Role/Organisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manager, Ngati Tama Development Trust</td>
<td>Ngāti Tama.</td>
<td>Ngati Tama Development Trust Manager; Ngati Tama Chief Negotiator.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chairman, TRoNM</td>
<td>Ngāti Mutunga, Taranaki.</td>
<td>Chairperson of Te Runanga o Ngāti Mutunga (TRoNM); Parininihi Ki Waitotara Director; Chairperson, Iwi Chairs Forum.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trustee, TRoNM</td>
<td>Ngāti Mutunga.</td>
<td>Trustee, Te Runanga o Ngāti Mutunga (TRoNM).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P. Haami, TRoNM</td>
<td>Ngāti Mutunga.</td>
<td>Trustee, Te Runanga o Ngāti Mutunga (TRoNM).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chairperson, TAIA</td>
<td>Te Ati Awa.</td>
<td>Chairperson, Te Ati Awa Iwi Authority (TAIA); Te Atiawa representative, Taranaki Māori Trust Board; Member, Taranaki/Whanganui Conservation Board.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puketapu hapu representative, TAIA</td>
<td>Te Ati Awa.</td>
<td>Puketapu hapu representative, Te Ati Awa Iwi Authority (TAIA); Director, Te Ati Awa Business Centre.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chairperson, Taranaki Iwi Authority</td>
<td>Taranaki.</td>
<td>Chairperson, Taranaki Iwi Authority; Iwi liaison officer, DoC, New Plymouth Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Paruwairua</td>
<td>Ngati Maru.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chairperson, Ngā Ruahine Iwi Authority</td>
<td>Ngā Ruahine.</td>
<td>Chairperson, Ngā Ruahine Iwi Authority.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M. Brooks, Okahu hapu, Ngā Ruahine</td>
<td>Ngā Ruahine.</td>
<td>Okahu hapu representative.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning Facilitator, Ngā Ruahine</td>
<td>Māngai Maniapoto.</td>
<td>Facilitator of Iwi Strategic Planning for Ngā Ruahine.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manager, Ngā Ruanui Tahua</td>
<td>Ngā Ruanui, Ngā Rauru Kītahī.</td>
<td>Ngā Ruanui Tahua Trust Manager; Ngā Ruanui Group Management Ltd Interim Manager; Former Kaiwhakahaere (Manager) o Te Kāhui o Rauru; Ngā Rauru Kītahī Chief Negotiator.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tumu Whakarae, TKoR</td>
<td>Ngā Rauru Kītahī.</td>
<td>Tumuwhakarae (Director) o Te Runanga o Te Kāhui o Rauru (TKoR).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Te Pepeke Mahiri, TKoR</td>
<td>Ngā Rauru Kītahī.</td>
<td>Te Pepeke Mahiri (Cultural Advisor), Te Kāhui o Rauru (TKoR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chairperson, Conservation Board; Deputy Chair, TKoR</td>
<td>Ngā Rauru Kītahī.</td>
<td>Deputy Chair, Te Kāhui o Rauru (TKoR); Chairperson, Taranaki/Whanganui Conservation Board.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. Waikerepuru, TMTB Member</td>
<td>Taranaki, Ngā Ruahine, Ngāti Ruanui</td>
<td>Kaumatua (respected elder); Member, Taranaki Māori Trust Board.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Rogers</td>
<td>Ngāti Ruanui, Te Atiawa, Ngāti Mutunga, Taranaki Tuturu and Ngāti Maniapoto</td>
<td>DoC Programme Manager Visitor/Historic Assets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservation Board Member, Former DoC Egmont Area Manager</td>
<td>Member, Taranaki/Whanganui Conservation Board; Former DoC Area Office Manager, Stratford Field Office.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAC Member, East Taranaki Environmental Trust</td>
<td>Member, Joint Advisor Committee for Whitecliffs Conservation Area; Former Member, Taranaki/Whanganui Conservation Board; Chairperson, East Taranaki Environmental Trust.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director, Resource Management, TRC</td>
<td>Director, Resource Management, Taranaki Regional Council (TRC).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manager, Environmental Policy and Strategy, NPDC</td>
<td>Manager of Environmental Policy and Strategy, New Plymouth District Council (NPDC).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iwi Relationships Manager, NPDC</td>
<td>Iwi Relationships Manager, New Plymouth District Council (NPDC).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land Use Consents and Monitoring, Team Leader, NPDC</td>
<td>Land Use Consents and Monitoring, Team Leader, New Plymouth District Council (NPDC).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subdivisions and Resource Consents Team Leader, NPDC</td>
<td>Subdivisions and Resource Consents Team Leader, New Plymouth District Council (NPDC).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental Planner, NPDC</td>
<td>Environmental Planner, Subdivisions and Resource Consents Team, New Plymouth District Council (NPDC).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Development Officer, SDC</td>
<td>Community Development Officer, Stratford District Council.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Developing an historicised understanding of contemporary Indigenous development and environmental management is well aligned with postdevelopment and postcolonial thought (Chapter Two, Five). Archival sources – though inherently partial – provide a useful means of exploring, imagining and learning about the past (Bailey et al., 2009, Dwyer and Davies, 2010, Moore, 2010, Roche, 2005). As Moore (2010: 263) puts it, archives present extant traces of past lives, places and happenings with which the researcher engages, “teasing out from them the ‘facts’ of all sorts: material circumstances, states of mind, motivations, decisions, assumptions and values.” In this sense, archival research is a “power-laden interplay of past and present frames of interpretation” that can enrich understandings of contemporary politics (Bailey et al., 2009: 260).

For this fieldwork I undertook archival research at the National Archives in Wellington for a week, and made extensive use of the archival and reference resources of Taranaki Research Centre in Puke Ariki, New Plymouth. I used both collections during my Masters research and this provided a familiarity with the databases and processes at these libraries and, for some topics, a starting point for my research. Both archive collections have searchable online databases, and I initially targeted relevant material by searching for key terms such as ‘Mount Taranaki’ or ‘Egmont National Park Board’ and around specific dates. While reading through the archives, I gradually took a more targeted approach to identifying material, searching within the records of particular agencies or selecting specific records based on cross-referencing within the records themselves. The historical narrative discussed in Chapter Five draws on this archival research; for convenience, the record number and document name (if appropriate) for archival sources are provided in footnotes and the full reference is listed in the reference

---

14 The National Archives collection currently exceeds the number of records that are digitally searchable. Records can also be manually identified by looking through folders, organised by government department.
list. I also use policy and discussion documents from various tangata whenua and government organisations to support the analysis developed through Chapters Six, Seven and Eight. Many of these documents are publically available, though several interviewees provided me with documents that supplemented their discussion or provided additional detail on their organisation that I would not have been otherwise able to obtain. I also kept several notebooks and folders, documenting meetings, ideas, references, and other miscellanea.

I digitally organised the interview transcripts, archival sources and other secondary sources using NVivo software. I used a practice called ‘coding’ to thematically organise the material. Coding is an “iterative analytic practice” where researchers “identify general patterns, clarify connections and relations, develop possible insights and refine ideas” (Watson and Till, 2010: 128). Using this technique, I first read over each document and ‘coded’ key themes that emerged during interviews (for example, ‘Settlements-aspirations/worries’ or ‘Councils-relationship building’) and topics that spanned a range of sources (such as ‘Egmont National Park – Tourism’). Next I reviewed each of my themes and topics – called ‘nodes’ in NVivo – looking for links, similarities and differences, and then using NVivo I organised the nodes into ‘trees’ that provided a structure for Chapters Five through Eight. I often combined this mode of digital ‘brainstorming’ with more pictorial mind-mapping (see Figure 5) which suggests (an irrepressible habit of doodling while thinking, but also) the difficulty of taming the myriad ideas into ‘trees’ of organised nodes and eventually a structured, linear narrative. There is, then, a ‘constructive friction’ that produces ‘findings’ and ‘conclusions.’ Reading over the artifices of my fieldwork provoked a form of dialogue between these texts, the memories they provoke, and the academic work of reflecting, theorising and drawing connections. The themes and findings that underpin the following Chapters emerge from my fieldwork, but they are also personal. As the preceding Sections argue, researchers are embedded in the places in which they research, and similarly, through interpretation and authorship, there is a kind of personal embedment as well (Walker, 2007).

In sum, this combination of qualitative approaches was chosen to enable me to explore rich narratives from a wide range of sources to construct this thesis. However, this text is only one output of my connection to Taranaki. While in Taranaki I have also
presented research findings to the Iwi Chairs Forum, reviewed documents and provided information based on my historical research. I am further committed to producing more targeted summaries of key findings and suggestions that emerged during this research to *iwi* organisations and Te Kupenga Mātauranga o Taranaki (an organisation that supports Māori tertiary education and research in Taranaki). In the context of Treaty settlement negotiations in Taranaki, there has also been some talk of further research to support *iwi* work in this regard. Currently, I feel that the generosity and support people in Taranaki have shown me exceeds what I have been able to give in return, but I hope that through work that builds on this research project in ways that are more focussed on the ambitions and needs of *tangata whenua* I will be able to contribute to relationship building and the work of *iwi* organisations in Taranaki.

**Figure 5: Mind-Mapping about Mount Taranaki for Chapter Eight**

4.2.2 Reflections on the Research Experience
Moving beyond objectivity in research brings into focus the identity and positionality of researchers, and frames the research findings as partial and situated knowledge, as the products of a specific research process. In this context, reflecting on the research process “can open up the research to more complex and nuanced understandings of issues,” and further, engaging ourselves in the research process may generate opportunities for learning and working differently (Sultana, 2007: 376). In thinking about my research experience, the main theme that emerges is the desire to identify where I speak from. This concern – though personal and specific – resonates with wider discussions in academic literature that interrogate the role and relationship between researchers and the researched (Section 4.1). Critical deconstruction of researchers as objective, distant and all-seeing experts problematises writing as if looking down from above. For me, it seems that bringing the researcher forth from the relative safety of invisibility, conceptualising knowledge as partial and situated also opens questions about where I am writing from; or put differently, what gives me the right and responsibility to represent.

As Doucet (2008) and Rose (1997) have argued, self-reflexivity is not unambiguous or unproblematic; the impact and influence of our selves – our identity and positionality – are too complex to be readily or entirely knowable. Yet opening the self to change and growth through the research process may be one method of fostering connections across difference (rather than embedding difference and distance in the research), and reflexive engagement, despite the impossibility of completely and perfectly knowing, is important (Section 4.1.2). In my research in Taranaki, I feel that my identity as a New Zealander of Samoan and Pakeha descent from (West) Auckland was perhaps the most influential aspect of my identity in the research process and has, to a certain extent, shaped my reading of the literature on research methodologies and ethics. My (personal) relationship to, right (and responsibility) to speak on and vested interest in postcoloniality and Māori-Crown relationships in New Zealand is perhaps not immediately obvious because I am non-White and non-Māori, and at times, I have been made aware that I am not visibly identifiable as a New Zealander.\footnote{For example, in Taranaki I have been approached by people in social situations and asked if I speak English or complimented on my English speaking ability, which suggests an implicit assumption that I did not grow up in New Zealand. Similarly, many who inquire where I am from expect an explanation of my ethnicity rather than the name my hometown. Mahtani (2002)} Particularly when
working with \textit{tangata whenua}, my Samoan background took on increased significance as a way of drawing connections across our differences. Some interviewees drew on the similarities between the socio-economic positioning of Māori and Pacific Island peoples in New Zealand or highlight linguistic and cultural similarities. Others have suggested that many \textit{tangata whenua} are more likely to trust a ‘brown face’ and a non-European name, even though I am not from Taranaki or Māori. These actions suggest a kind of cosmopolitan solidarity, and highlight the contingency of research interactions on aspects of the researchers’ (embodied) identity.

Despite being (visibly) Samoan, my research training is based in Western academic traditions and, alongside the potential evaluations by interviewees of this text and any other ripples this research sets in motion, my work will be evaluated against academic criteria. This research, then, is obviously cross-cultural, which as many scholars have noted, contains potential for misunderstandings and differing expectations and requires careful negotiation (Gibbs, 2001, Lloyd et al., 2005, Lyver, 2005, Stephenson and Moller, 2009, Thomas et al., 2009, Tipa and Panelli, 2009, Wesche et al., 2010). Authors have identified such principles as respect, confidentiality, trust, reciprocity and partnership as important when doing research with Indigenous peoples, particularly given the colonising history and potential of research (Gibbs, 2001, Hudson and Russell, 2009, Tipa and Panelli, 2009). In my own research, I sought to design and implement a project that reflects the research interests of \textit{tangata whenua} and that will serve more than just my academic career. Although there are real cultural differences between \textit{tikanga Māori} and Western research methods, I sometimes feel that the literature tacitly positions Indigenous communities as inherently naïve and unfamiliar with Western research methods. My experiences in Taranaki did not conform to this representation; many of the people I worked with were very familiar with research processes and academia, sharing their experiences of Masters research, doing development studies courses at university, and discussing the ‘publish or perish’ nature of academia (pers com. Chairperson, TRoNM, Chairperson, TAIA, Chairperson, Ngā Ruahine Iwi Authority, Manager, Ngāti Ruanui Tahua). This reflects a sort of futility in assuming strict cultural boundaries in contemporary New Zealand.

details similar experiences of mixed race women in Canada to argue that the veneer of multiculturalism has not displaced the correlation of Canadian-ness and whiteness.
These disjunctions – ‘white’ training/non-White body, not Pakeha and not Māori – somehow produce a tension and uncertainty about how I can or should write about ‘Māori issues’ in Taranaki. Like Choi (2006), I ‘straddle’ across privilege and other-ness. My education and position within Western academic institutions is also a form of privilege: By virtue of being a doctoral candidate I am allowed the time and funding to research and write about pieces of people’s lives in Taranaki and my representations carry the sanction of academic institutions. Yet, my embodied identity as non-White positions me as an ‘other’ within New Zealand. In a sense though, my discomfort in finding a (valid) place to write from subtly resonates with wider questions of postcolonial and multicultural belonging in New Zealand. The following anecdote, shared by a kaumatua [respected elder], illustrates his internalisation of the politics of Māori and English relations in contemporary New Zealand. When asked to speak on ‘critical consciousness’ to scientists at a conference, he recounts that:

…the thing I thought was, critical consciousness, do you have a Māori one, and do you have an English one, because of the two languages. And so, in the issue of analysis, then, who has priority? What values have priority, see? And I thought oh my goodness, how am I gonna explain to these 150 scientists? Anyway, I get up and I said well I’ve got a little story I wanna tell you because I think it’s important on this hui [meeting].

And, as I came in the door there was a rush of energy in my head and I couldn’t work out what it was till I got inside, and I realised that critical consciousness works on the value of language and culture, and so when you have two languages, then you’re likely to have rushes of blood at odd times in the head. And I suddenly realised that it was my two conscii debating with each other. Well, we’re at this conference, who’s going to speak first? And the Māori one thought and said, ‘oh, ko au. I will speak first.’ And the English language one was taken back a bit, ‘oh but why you?’ and the Māori one thought and said, ‘well because I’m the tangata whenua,’ and the English one moved back and said ‘oh by jove old chappy, you are so right!’ [spoken in an English accent] So that’s my little story I wanted to give you… (TMTB Member, Kaumatua, 21.07.09).

This story was intended to demonstrate to the scientists that “[what] they need to be aware of is tangata whenua, and that’s what’s been absent, is tangata whenua” (TMTB Member, Kaumatua, 21.07.09). Yet it also references an internalised dilemma based on the coexistence of different ways of thinking, which he resolves by drawing a fundamental statement about what it means to be tangata whenua in New Zealand. In framing my own work, finding my place to speak amongst and with the voices of tangata
whenua, council and DoC staff has been an ongoing dilemma that is not easily or readily resolved. Moving beyond narratives that render the author an omnipresent non-presence in the text requires writing that is embodied, emplaced and connected. It is, in a sense, understanding my place within Taranaki and thereby finding a way to speak that allows multiple voices to be heard, a way of writing that creates a space of resonance and amplification. The kaumatua said of this anecdote, “It’s yours now…So you can have my little story.” This is suggestive of the generosity shown to me and my research, but also emphasises that the sharing and giving of stories underpins research and generates a responsibility to share these stories again. Like Sultana (2007: 378), “[t]he important thing for me was to be as faithful to the relations in that space and time, and to the stories that were shared and the knowledge that was produced through the research, however partial.” Indeed, there are limits to my reading and re-telling of Taranaki; sculpting my findings and contributions through this text (and within this word limit), seems a limited means of conveying the dynamism, passion and generosity of the people I met, and the richness of my experiences and lessons in Taranaki. In this sense, my research presents opportunities to re-imagine development and environmental management in Taranaki and in academic theorisations, and has offered me the possibility of contributing to the world in which I work and live.
Although development and colonial discourses stem from different historical moments, they share a similar underlying logic (Chapter Two). In ‘postcolonial nations’ these ideas are often entwined: Assertions of the nations’ primacy stabilise colonial appropriation of territory and provide a rationale for development, improvement and progress that is then divested of colonial violence (Radcliffe, 1996, Wainwright, 2005). In New Zealand, for instance, settlement drew on “an enlightenment sensibility of unquestioned conquest and colonisation of indigenous peoples, modernisation, economic and cultural ‘progress,’ and demand[ed] the assimilation of difference and conformity to the narrative” (Pickles, 2002: 5). Colonisation and development work to reconfigure relationships between people, cultures, economies, resources and places, however, Indigenous peoples are affective agents within these histories, such that neither the coloniser nor colonised remain unchanged. The history of colonisation thus contains disquieting and haunting violences, but also yields a relationship, familiarity and a mutuality (Ashcroft, 2001, Mbembe, 2006). Therefore, negotiating postcoloniality requires an understanding of (local) histories that cannot be un-done as well as the way that contemporary politics and places are grounded in these histories.
This thesis explores how Māori in Taranaki engage with environmental management in the post-settlement era, and in this Chapter I contend that an historicised approach is required because colonial histories are embedded in contemporary places and politics. Drawing on archival research and a range of secondary sources I examine three themes in Taranaki history. Firstly, I briefly outline how the Crown asserted and exercised territorial control and sovereignty during the 1800s. These events foreground Māori-Pakeha coexistence and postcolonial politics. Secondly, I explore how attempts to settle colonial history and Māori grievances have been circumscribed by colonial and national ambitions. As I demonstrate in Section 5.2.3, Māori development has similarly been hemmed in by the colonial status quo, such that interventions and initiatives have often reinforced dispossession and colonial structures. Finally, I situate environmental management in Taranaki within this historical context.

5.1 Colonisation and Resistance at Taranaki

Colonisation and settlement of Taranaki was informed by a particular vision of the potential of this region. F.A. Carrington, who chose the site of New Plymouth (now the largest city in Taranaki), described the Taranaki region as “fertile waste and unoccupied country” with great potential for settlement and agriculture (Carrington, 1860: 4). Potential settlers were advised that the district is “the Garden of New Zealand” (Cooper, 1857: 79), and immigrants sought to establish a settlement that:

…would end in bringing great glories to this country, and would add another brilliant page to the records of our commercial greatness… [Settlers] would carry with them the blessings of civilization, and they would attain the dearest reward of all exertion – the consciousness of having achieved their own fortunes and independence (Wells, 1878: 66).

The region of Taranaki and the city of New Plymouth were thus defined by what settlers saw as their potential; in essence, these places were produced through particular colonial geographic imaginaries that privileged Western conceptions of appropriate land-use and tenurial structures over Māori practices (Marr et al., 2001, Park, 2001, Rossiter, 2008). The act of transposing these British sensibilities of place and land-use over Māori geographies in Taranaki was framed as improvement and progress that would convert “a waste into a paradise” (Wells, 1878: 68). In this guise, colonisation is
legitimised as benevolent and heroic work; it is simultaneously an economic, political, spatial and cultural endeavour. The pursuit of settlement and sovereignty over Taranaki combined (often dubious) land sales, military action and land confiscations, legitimised by the Crown’s own legislation. The legacies of these efforts to acquire territory and transform Taranaki into a colonial settlement are immense and ground subsequent Crown-Māori interactions in Taranaki.

### 5.1.1 Land Acquisition

Colonisation is driven by particular geographic imaginaries, but is realised through actual territorial control (Said, 1995). Throughout the 1800s in Taranaki, settler and governmental claims to land were contested by tangata whenua, and seldom coincided with actual territorial possession. These competing claims to the right to own or occupy land were intimately related to wider questions of sovereignty, authority and the relationship between Māori and Pakeha (Waitangi Tribunal, 1996). The fundamental assertion of Crown sovereignty and disregard for Māori tenure, autonomy and sovereignty produced tensions from the start of the organised settlement of Taranaki, and eventually lead to warfare in the 1860s. These interactions are outlined in Table 6.

#### TABLE 6: SELECTED EVENTS RELATING TO LAND ACQUISITION IN TARANAKI 1800-1860.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1821-1834</td>
<td>Waikato and Te Atiawa conflict; Te Atiawa ‘migration’ to Cook Strait area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 1839</td>
<td>Colonel Wakefield (The New Zealand Company) claims to have purchased 20 million acres of central New Zealand in the ‘New Zealand Central Transaction.’ The Company later withdrew this transaction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 January 1840</td>
<td>Lt. Governor Hobson issued a proclamation stating that private purchase of Māori land is null and void.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 February 1840</td>
<td>Treaty of Waitangi signed (See Chapter One and Appendix A).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 February 1840</td>
<td>Colonel Wakefield (The New Zealand Company) transacted two land ‘purchase’ deeds: The Ngā Motu Deed and an area of land south of New Plymouth.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 November 1840</td>
<td>Plymouth Company ship with settlers departs from England.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1841</td>
<td>Plymouth Company ship arrives and organised settlement begins. “Almost immediately, Māori interrupted survey work and disputed the settlers’ rights to land much beyond New Plymouth” (Waitangi Tribunal, 1996: 2.3.4).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
May 1844  |  * W. Spain (Land Commissioner) begins inquiry into the legitimacy of the Nga Motu deed (1840).

June 1844  |  * Spain Commission confirms the Nga Motu deed (1840), finding that the absentee owners had no interests in the land. Recommends the Crown award 60,500 acres of land to the Company and reserve one tenth as a Māori reserve.
  * Immediate Māori protest.
  * Governor FitzRoy did not accept the recommendation, bringing relief to Māori and ire to the settlers.

28 November 1844  |  * FitzRoy Block purchase was negotiated.

1845  |  * Governor Grey replaces Governor Fitzroy. Grey was less sympathetic to Māori.
  * There was also increasing pressure from settlers and the Company for land in Taranaki.
  * Grey sought to ‘recover’ Spain’s award of 60,500 acres.

1849  |  * Pouwhenua (40ft carved pole) erected at north bank of Waiwhakaiho River to mark outer boundary of settler expansion acceptable to Māori.

1855  |  * Governor Browne replaces Governor Grey.

1858  |  * Potatau Te Wherowhero of Waikato selected as Maori King.


Crown efforts to acquire land from Māori in Taranaki evince important points of difference between Māori and British understandings of land, property and ownership. In contrast to British concepts of individual property rights and fee simple tenure, hapu and iwi collectively held and controlled land. Their relationships with the land are both cultural-spiritual and geo-political, and in this context individual land sales and ownership of land were an anathema (Ballara, 1998, Banner, 1999, Keenan, 2002). Following the Treaty of Waitangi (1840), colonial officials “sought a process that would extinguish claims, locate Maori on clearly defined reserves, and allow settlement to proceed without legal or political interference from Maori claimants” (Belgrave, 2005: 230). Cross-cultural misunderstandings complicated attempts to legally divest Māori of their land, and various pieces of legislation (most notably, the Native Lands Act and subsequent amendments) sought to simplify Māori tenure to expedite and secure its acquisition (Ballara, 1998, Boast, 2001). Entrenching British tenure structures was a key mode of advancing colonial authority, and the disruption of Māori relationships with land and autonomy had far-reaching cultural and political consequences (Banner, 1999, Keenan, 2002).

In Taranaki, the legitimacy of land purchases by the New Zealand Company to be on sold to settlers in England and later by Crown agents was (and remains) contested,
especially because the New Zealand Company’s Nga Motu deed (1840) was obtained by trading an assortment of guns, blankets, clothing and other items (Belgrave, 2005, Ward, 1997). Further, many Māori with rights and interests in the land were absent during its sale, and commentators suggest that it is unlikely that the Māori ‘sellers’ fully comprehended the significance or meaning of the transaction (Waitangi Tribunal, 1996, Ward, 1997).

The legality of such early land transactions in Taranaki was affirmed in the New Zealand Land Claims Ordinance (Spain Commission of 1844) (Belgrave, 2005, Waitangi Tribunal, 1996). Largely as a political manoeuvre to assuage Māori protests and ensure future land sales in Wellington and Taranaki, Governor FitzRoy reversed this ordinance and negotiated the FitzRoy block purchase in 1844 as a form of ‘political settlement’ based on two conditions: “The first was that settlers still outside the FitzRoy block would be brought back into it…and the second was that the settlers would expand no further” (Waitangi Tribunal, 1996: 2.4.7). However, throughout the 1840s and 1850s local politicians and settlers generated increasing pressure on the government to alienate Māori land (Cooper, 1857), arguing that “the prosperity and progress of this Province [Taranaki] are very much impeded and the development of its resources retarded by… [the fact that] the Native Title to about half a million acres, available for agriculture…is still unextinguishable.” This is indicative of the political climate in which policy and responses to Māori reluctance to sell land were developed. Although land purchases occurred in Taranaki during this period, this did little to quell settler demands and Māori resistance to further sales became increasingly palpable – most obviously with the erection of Te Pou Tutake, a pouwhenua [carved pole] to mark the boundary for settler expansion (Waitangi Tribunal, 1996). Despite increasing tensions, land acquisition remained integral to establishing Crown sovereignty and settlement. For the Waitangi Tribunal (1996), these early interactions suggest that Māori were not inherently anti-settlement, but that respect for Māori autonomy and sovereignty was required. This essentially bicultural ideal is encapsulated in the Treaty, but the Tribunal

---

17 The Spain Commission argued that Māori who had moved away from Taranaki in the late 1830s as a result of fighting between Waikato and Te Atiawa iwi had forfeited all rights to their land.
18 IA 1/1861/1169, 1861. The council also felt that “the making of such provisions as would permit the beneficial occupation of Natives’ Lands would… lead [the Natives] to agree willingly to and assist in the individualisation of their titles.”
asserted that during this period “Anything that might restrict the ready acquisition of Maori land was likely to incur settler opposition; while, for contemporary administrators... the sharing of power was unthinkable” (Waitangi Tribunal, 1996: 3.4).

5.1.2 War and Confiscation: 1860-1890

Transforming Taranaki into a ‘civilised’ British settlement compelled the politico-economic assimilation of Māori under British structures and authority, and this point is exemplified by the Crown’s insistence on the individualisation of Māori property rights. In a climate of settler ‘land-hunger’ and Māori resistance to sales, the Crown’s attempt to purchase a 600 acre block at Waitara from Te Teira, a rangatira [chief], despite the objection of another rangatira, Wiremu Kingi, prompted the outbreak of war. The Crown insisted on the sale because abandoning it would give tacit support to the authority of Kingi, and was politically untenable (Belgrave, 2005):

The opposition of Wiremu Kingi to the sale of Teira’s land has been uniformly based by him...on his pretensions as chief, to control the sale of all lands belonging to his tribe. The exercise of such an authority...is incompatible with Her Majesty’s sovereignty in this Colony, and most fatal to the interests of both races.19

War was intended to quickly establish the power and authority of the Crown, but victory proved elusive. The first war, prompted by the Waitara sale, lasted from 1860-1861; the second war (1863-1866), triggered by soldier occupation of Tataraimaka block, ended in an uneasy peace that gave way to war again in 1868 (See Table 7). In these conflicts Māori who fought against the Crown were labelled ‘rebels’ against the Queen, which is suggestive of the ready association between these particular land transactions and British sovereignty in Taranaki (Belgrave, 2005). The satirist ‘Mr Punch,’ in the local publication Taranaki Punch, provides an indication of settler sentiment in the following verse:

Then hasten! Hasten! To the strife;
We fight for Country and for Life,
We fight for England free.
We’ll bear her power from shore to shore,
Till the round world shall own no more,

19 Letter to Colonel Browne from Settlers, 1860, IA/1/1860/2059 1860.
Aught else but liberty.  

Securing victory over the ‘rebels’ was positioned as essential to colonial ambitions; and in the absence of outright military victory for either side, the Crown sought to establish its authority via legislation (Waitangi Tribunal, 1996).

**TABLE 7: CONFLICT IN TARANAKI 1850-1890**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1859</td>
<td>8 March: Governor Browne visits Taranaki. Promises that “he would not buy land with a disputed title and ‘would buy no man’s land without his consent’, but he would allow no one to interfere in the sale of land, ‘unless he owned a part of it’” (Waitangi Tribunal, 1996: 3.6). May: Deposit of £500 paid for Waitotara block to 14 Māori.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1861</td>
<td>3 April: Ceasefire negotiated. British retained Pekapeka block; southern hapu retained Omata and Tataraimaka block.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1862</td>
<td>Native Lands Act: Individualised Māori land titles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1863</td>
<td>12 March: Troops occupy Omata block. 4 April: Troops occupy Tataraimaka block. 4 May: Second Taranaki War begins: Ambush on Māori land; nine soldiers killed. 11 May: Proclamation issued abandoning the Waitara purchase. 4 July: Waitotara block transaction completed; £2000 paid to 31 Māori, despite objections. 11 July: Proclamation that Waikato chiefs who waged war against the Queen had forfeited rights to possession of lands under the Treaty of Waitangi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1864</td>
<td>17 December: Grey signed proclamation confiscating all land in military occupation in Waikato and “as much rebel land in Taranaki as he should think fit’” (Riseborough, 2002: 43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1865</td>
<td>30 January: Order in Council to designate ‘Middle Taranaki’ a district under the NZSA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

*20 Taranaki Punch, October 31 1860. No 1, Vol 1: page 7, ARC2002-538, 1860-1861. See Appendix D1 for the full poem.*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1868</td>
<td>‘Creeping confiscation’ of land led to unrest &amp; interruptions and a fresh uprising under Ngatiruanui chief, Titokowaru. 9 June: ‘Titokowaru’s War’ between Ngatiruanui and the Crown begins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1869</td>
<td>25 March: End of ‘Titokowaru’s War.’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1872</td>
<td>January: Civil Commissioner for Taranaki instructed to begin negotiations with tribes regarding lands north of Waingongoro River to make them available for settlement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1876</td>
<td>Civil Commissioner for Taranaki instructed to continue ‘negotiations’, warned against ‘extravagant concessions,’ now perceived as vitally important for the Crown to acquire lands confiscated eleven years ago.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1876-1879</td>
<td>Various land blocks acquired by takoha: payments to “Maori who, in the agents’ opinions, had an interest in the land or could most influence the delivery of quiet possession” of apparently confiscated lands (Waitangi Tribunal, 1996: 7.10).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1878</td>
<td>December: Surveyors first turned back at Parihaka.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1879</td>
<td>May: Ploughman resistance begins at Parihaka: Over 420 ploughmen were imprisoned in this year, 216 fencers arrested in 1880; Survivors released in ‘batches’ during 1881.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1881</td>
<td>5 November: Invasion and ransacking of (unprotected) Parihaka. 11 November: Tohu and Te Whiti held for sedition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1882</td>
<td>West Coast Peace Preservation Act: Allowed for the indefinite incarceration of Tohu and Te Whiti without trial.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1883</td>
<td>Tohu and Te Whiti released – rebuilding of Parihaka begins. Continuance Act: Tohu and Te Whiti were subject to arrest without charge. Prohibition on Maori gatherings remained in force. Maori required a special pass to get into Parihaka.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The New Zealand Settlements Act (1863) was intended to ‘punish’ those Māori who had ‘rebelled’ against the Queen by confiscating their land for the purpose of settlement, and to also generate revenue for the government by way of land sales to settlers (Bauchop, 1993b, Belgrave, 2005, NZPD, 1861-1863b). Parliamentary debates
on the Bill reveal that politicians saw the suppression of rebellion and extension of European settlement as integral to empire and nation-building.\footnote{Some Members of Parliament also raised objections to the Bill. One argued, for instance, that “This Bill is a repeal, upon the face of it, of every engagement of every kind whatsoever which has been made by the British Crown with the Natives from the first day when this was a colony of the Crown…this great – what I call this enormous – crime is proposed to be perpetrated against a race to whom we have refused the right of representation in this House; who at this moment are totally and absolutely in ignorance that we are about to make this great invasion upon their privileges, and who are unable to appear at our bar to plead their cause (NZPD, 1861-1863a: 784 (Fitzgerald)).}

The primary feature of its policy is the suppressing of the existing rebellion... What is required is large population, practically outnumbering that of the Natives in those districts where rebellion exists, or may exist, to be permanently settled, with ownership of the land, so that they may not only have an interest, but the ability, to defend their homes from future aggression; and to effect this the Government looks to the lands of those tribes who have been in rebellion. There is no injustice in taking the lands of such tribes, not by way of punishment, or of reducing the tribes from the position they now hold, but simply as a substantial guarantee for the future peace and consolidation of the colony (NZPD, 1861-1863a: 782-783 (Fox)).

For the government, therefore, confiscation was assumed to ensure what war had not: the efficient acquisition of Māori land and peaceful settlement (Belgrave, 2005). Promises to compensate ‘loyal’ Māori (those who had not fought against the Queen) with money or land, and provide reserves for ‘rebel’ Māori assured the legislation’s fairness. Significantly, such labels position the Crown as a natural entity within New Zealand, referencing its (as yet unsecured) sovereignty over the territories concerned as innate and beyond question (Bauchop, 1993a).

In Taranaki, 1,199,622 acres of land were confiscated in 1864 and 1865 (See Table 8 and Map 2); this took in the majority of Taranaki and even included Mount Taranaki.\footnote{This perhaps demonstrates the lack of restraint in confiscating land as the mountain was certainly not viable for settlement – indeed, the Director General of Lands commented in 1978 that the mountain “would have been valueless from an agricultural point of view” (AANS 7613 W5491/495 6/1/1 1, 1975-1978). See Section 5.2.2 and 5.3.2 for further discussion on the significance of confiscating the mountain.} The confiscations dispossessed tangata whenua of their livelihoods, and continue to fundamentally impact current generations. For example, Te Miringa Hohaia stated to the Waitangi Tribunal that “before the various raupatu [confiscations] were enacted, we had a total economic base, a total political structure for Government, a total cultural...
foundation, spiritually charged, sustaining, holistic in every sense” (Waitangi Tribunal, 1990: 53). The confiscations form the basis for contemporary grievances, and have informed all interactions between Māori and the Crown since 1865.

**TABLE 8: STEPS TO CONFISCATION.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Proclamations/Order in Councils</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 26 October 1864 | • Threatened land confiscations, but would protect land rights of ‘loyal’ natives and those who surrendered by 10.12.1864.  
• Largely concerned with the Waikato region, maintains the intention to protect ‘loyal’ natives and “those who have rebelled but who shall at once submit to the Queen’s authority;” but also states that the Governor intended to confiscate “such land belonging to the rebels as he may think fit” in Taranaki (Rusden, 1974: 31). |
| 17 December 1864 | • Order in Council designating ‘Middle Taranaki’ a confiscation district (see Sources: Belgrave, 2005, Waitangi Tribunal, 1996, 2001). Map 2)  
• Order in Council designating ‘Ngati Awa’ a confiscation district (see Sources: Belgrave, 2005, Waitangi Tribunal, 1996, 2001). Map 2)  
• Order in Council designating ‘Ngatiruanui’ a confiscation district (see Sources: Belgrave, 2005, Waitangi Tribunal, 1996, 2001). Map 2) |
| 30 January 1865 | • Order in Council designating ‘Middle Taranaki’ a confiscation district (see Sources: Belgrave, 2005, Waitangi Tribunal, 1996, 2001). Map 2)  
• Order in Council designating ‘Ngati Awa’ a confiscation district (see Sources: Belgrave, 2005, Waitangi Tribunal, 1996, 2001). Map 2)  
• Order in Council designating ‘Ngatiruanui’ a confiscation district (see Sources: Belgrave, 2005, Waitangi Tribunal, 1996, 2001). Map 2) |
Confiscation by the pen was gradually implemented by surveyors, pegs and pastures (Bauchop, 1993a, Byrnes, 2001, Dominy, 2002). The government first purchased confiscated lands from Māori, and then later gave takoha [gratuity, money] in exchange for land (Harris, 1993). These practices – purchasing and bribing (Belgrave, 2005) – enabled the settlement of significant parts of Taranaki. Promises to reward ‘loyal’ Māori and provide reserves for ‘rebels’ remained essentially unfulfilled by the 1880s (Bauchop, 1993a, Waitangi Tribunal, 1996). The processes for compensation were convoluted and disorganised; they arbitrarily divided Māori into such groups as loyals, rebels, and absentees, and had no regard for pre-colonial history or differential status within iwi and hapū groups (Bauchop, 1993a). For colonial administrators, the confiscations were
neither efficient nor effective, and as later commissions of inquiry have noted (Section 5.2), the New Zealand Settlements Act, confiscations and compensation courts were all of questionable legality even within colonial parameters, and ultimately failed to meet the commitments made in the Treaty. The total land purchases and confiscations are summarised in Table 9.

**TABLE 9: LAND ACQUISITION IN TARANAKI AFTER THE CONFLICTS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tribe</th>
<th>Purchased</th>
<th>Returned</th>
<th>Confiscated</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ngatiawa Proclaimed District</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ngatitama</td>
<td>33000</td>
<td>18000</td>
<td>24000</td>
<td>75000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ngatimutungia</td>
<td>67000</td>
<td>6000</td>
<td>93000</td>
<td>166000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ngatiawa</td>
<td>11000</td>
<td>2300</td>
<td>20400</td>
<td>54400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ngatiruanui</td>
<td>27000</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>4300</td>
<td>32000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Taranaki Proclaimed District</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ngatiawa</td>
<td>98000</td>
<td>15000</td>
<td>17600</td>
<td>130600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taranaki</td>
<td>53000</td>
<td>103000</td>
<td>114000</td>
<td>270000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ngatiruanui</td>
<td>86000</td>
<td>31000</td>
<td>43000</td>
<td>160000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ngatiruanui Proclaimed District (Taranaki Land District)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ngatiruanui</td>
<td>101000</td>
<td>33000</td>
<td>25700</td>
<td>160000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ngarauru</td>
<td>33000</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>8000</td>
<td>43000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ngatiruanui Proclaimed District (Wellington Land District)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ngarauru</td>
<td>48000</td>
<td>21000</td>
<td>41000</td>
<td>110000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total across Taranaki</strong></td>
<td><strong>557000</strong></td>
<td><strong>256000</strong></td>
<td><strong>462000</strong></td>
<td><strong>1275000 acres</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During this period of gradual Māori land alienation in Taranaki, two leaders and prophets, Tohu Kakahi and Te Whiti o Rongomai, based in Parihaka rose to prominence. The village of Parihaka “became a haven for all dispossessed,” gained “a reputation for discipline, faith, organisation, and development” and peacefully grew throughout the 1860s and 1870s (Waitangi Tribunal, 1996: 8.1). Such unity among Māori and the successful cultivation of their lands confounded government strategies for land acquisition (Belgrave, 2005). As noted in Table 7, surveying of central Taranaki land from 1878 was met with peaceful resistance by Māori from Parihaka, even as hundreds of protestors were arrested and legislation enacted to allow the government to confine them without trial (Hohaia et al., 2005, Riseborough, 2002, Waitangi Tribunal, 1996).

---


24 MA 85/6, nd-a. These figures were used in the Sim Commission (1927). “Sales” represents land obtained by *takoha* and what many *tangata whenua* representatives regard as forced sales (Waitangi Tribunal, 1996).
CHAPTER FIVE: History, Development and Environment

1996). Although Tohu and Te Whiti sought to discuss and negotiate settlement, compensation and Māori reserves, the government continued with such aggressive actions as building roads through Māori cultivations and surveying.\(^{25}\)

Fed by rumour in the local press of war preparations and intentions, settler suspicion of Parihaka grew and by the 1880s “a mood for attack was in the air” in Taranaki. In 1881 the Chief Justice and Native Minister hastily organised the invasion of Parihaka to coincide with the Governor’s absence (See Figure 6). The Waitangi Tribunal (1996: 8.1) found that:

...Parihaka had been taken without resistance; that it was completely broken up; that about 1500 men, women, and children had been arrested; and that six were imprisoned, including Te Whiti and Tohu, who were held on charges of sedition... Images of a fuller picture escaped later to the public arena; images of assaults; rape; looting; pillage; theft... Parihaka provides a damning indictment of a government so freed of constitutional constraints as to be able to ignore with impunity the rule of law, make war on its own people, and turn its back on the principles on which the government of the country had been agreed.

---

\(^{25}\) Settlers in Taranaki perceived Tohu, Te Whiti and Parihaka as a threat, but a rather more sympathetic view was taken in other parts of the country and in England and the Parihaka situation attracted critiques in the press (Belgrave, 2005, Hohaia, O'Brien and Strongman, 2005, Riseborough, 2002, Waitangi Tribunal, 1996).
The invasion of Parihaka is emblematic of the violent colonial desire to impose Crown sovereignty over Taranaki. The land purchases, confiscations, *takoha* and military actions all evince the Crown’s determination that subsuming Māori land and polity within the new colony was legitimate, moral and necessary. Colonial discourses promulgated the superiority of British political and economic structures and these ideas were crystallised in colonial place-making projects that denigrated, but did not destroy, Māori structures. The legacies of such actions continue to unfold in contemporary politics, despite and because of successive attempts to resolve these historic grievances (Section 5.2).

## 5.2 Reconciliations and Settlements

As colonial claims to sovereignty gradually aligned with territorial control, attention turned to resolving the place of Māori *within* the nation. Since 1880 there have been several commissions and inquiries into the actions of the earlier colonial governments, and although each has noted injustices and breaches of the Treaty, the redress proffered
has been consistently restrained so that recognising injustices would not impede the settler interests. Hemmed in by such requirements, the rights and redress provided have themselves exacerbated and become part of the historic grievance against the Crown (Waitangi Tribunal, 1996). Like the violent assertions of Crown authority and power (Section 5.1), these attempts at settlement are similarly informed by a cultural hierarchy that privileges Western ideas of civilisation and development. Further, each of these settlements purports the naturalness of Crown sovereignty in New Zealand, and like contemporary settlements, attempts to position the violence of colonisation into a linear narrative of national development and growth (Blackburn, 2007).

5.2.1 West Coast Commissions and Reserves

In 1880, the West Coast Commission of Inquiry was charged with investigating claims that land within the confiscation districts had not been returned to (loyal) Māori and that reserves (for ‘rebels’) had not been created (Johnson, 1997). Its findings and resolutions, and subsequent legislation, have significantly shaped the development of the Taranaki region, and remain significant for contemporary politics and Māori development (See Table 10). Although both Commissions (1880, 1884) awarded land to Māori in the form of Crown-granted reserves (see Map 3), taken with the invasion and destruction of Parihaka, the Commissions actually facilitated the physical implementation of the 1865 confiscations and settlement of the region (Belgrave, 2005, Waitangi Tribunal, 1996, 2001).

Evincing a tangle of colonial ambition and benevolence, these commissions both transformed Māori property rights and opened land for settlement. The second

---

26 For example: “The path of civilisation passes over the lands of the smaller peoples and the graves of primitive mad, but the race which takes the path, trailing civilisation in its wake, bears as it goes the White Man’s Burden, and is bound by the ties of humanity to add, wherever possible, the nations it supplants to the roll of civilised communities, and ensure to them at least as much as he deprived them of” (The Maori Record 1(3): 12, ARC2003-469, 1905-1907).

27 As a pro-Māori commentator noted in 1906: “With the basal grievances, those which go to the very root of his position as a British subject, which should therefore receive the quickest and strictest investigation, the Maori has not the slightest chance of redress” (The Maori Record 2(13): 2, ARC2003-469).

28 Established under the Confiscated Lands Act and Maori Prisoners’ Trials Act (1879).

29 CL 179/179/20, nd.

30 Several politicians noted the rushed manner in which legislation relating to the West Coast was considered, the context of Māori dissatisfaction and disillusionment with the Crown, and the need to ‘settle’ the question of authority in Taranaki (NZPD, 1881).
Commission (1884) imposed a clear spatial order by mapping Crown land (acquired via confiscation or purchase) and identifying land for Māori; in effect, making the confiscation tangible and opening land for Pakeha settlement (Belgrave, 2005). In reserves created from 1881, Māori were granted interests as individuals (not hapū or iwi). This individualisation of titles facilitated the sale of the land because the:

…individual share or interest became a convertible property, which was liable to be seized as security for debt, and sold by action of the Courts… And thus for a debt, trivial, perhaps in origin or amount…land, which while the common property of the tribe was secure from seizure, became liable to be cut away altogether…”31

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>First West Coast Commission Report; West Coast Settlement (North Island) Act.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1881</td>
<td>West Coast Settlement Reserves Act; Created reserves for Māori and placed them under the control of the Public Trustee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1884</td>
<td>Second West Coast Commission Report; West Coast Settlement Reserves Act, Amendment Act.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>Joint Committee Upon the West Coast Settlement Reserves Report (The Stevens Committee).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1892</td>
<td>West Coast Settlement Reserves Act: perpetually renewable 21-year leases on reserve lands established.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Awarding this form of property right also references the presumption that “Maori would rapidly assimilate to the European economy, for which European land tenure was appropriate” (Murray, 1997: 9).32 Further, by placing the reserve under the control of the Public Trustee, their administration advanced Pakeha settlements in the area33 and worked to alienate Māori from their land. The Waitangi Tribunal (1996) found that the Crown was reluctant to let such high quality lands remain in Māori ownership and occupation, and the parliamentary debates also evince a paternalistic disregard of Māori

31 MA MT 6/25, nd.
32 Notably, the individualisation of titles to Crown reserves in Taranaki remains significant in contemporary discussions of the reserved lands as some people feel that the land should be returned to the relevant hapū rather than managed by a Māori-controlled incorporation on behalf of individual Māori shareholders (Chapter Six).
33 Public Trustee administration was justified because: “Its object is to provide for the manner in which the alienation of the reserves on the West Coast shall take place. It is part of the policy initiated under the West Coast Settlement Act, and it is of great importance to the settlement of the district” (NZPD, 1881: 728 (Rolleston)).
ability to manage their own lands (NZPD, 1881).\textsuperscript{34} Māori MPs (Members of Parliament) also critiqued Public Trustee administration, arguing that the Act meant “the Natives should have no voice in the control of their own affairs” (NZPD, 1881: 732 (Tomoana)).\textsuperscript{35}

\textsuperscript{34} For example, the Stevens Committee (1890) found that “nothing could be more injudicious in the best interest of the Natives than to remove the administration of these valuable estates from official control” *The Public Trustee's Leases*, pp. ii, ABRS 16208 W5358/5, 1890. MPs also asserted that “If proper restrictions were not imposed on alienation, the Native would be at liberty to deal with the lands the very next day in a reckless manner, and that would be taken advantage of by a large number of persons anxious to avail themselves of the opportunity of buying very valuable properties… (NZPD, 1881: 729 (Fox)).

\textsuperscript{35} Another MP noted that: “The principle – the whole object – of the West Coast Settlement Reserves Act was that the whole benefit to accrue from the reserves should be preserved to the natives and their descendants; but here they were asked to open the door to abuses, such as he had pointed out, which would undoubtedly lead to the impoverishment of the Natives, and to the abrogation of the object for which provision had been made on their behalf” NZPD, 1884: 271 (Pollen).
MAP 3: WEST COAST PLAN OF CONFISCATED TERRITORY\textsuperscript{36}

\textsuperscript{36} ARC2004-325, 1880. For reading ease, I have enlarged the reference key to this map.
In short time, the majority of the reserves became tied up in perpetual leases to European farmers (see Table 11), providing a small monetary return to the individual Māori owners yet also dispossessing them of their own land, and suggesting that “the West Coast Reserves are administered under a special code of Acts carefully calculated to deprive the Maori of his rights.” To the Crown, perpetual leasing of Māori land appeared a compromise between Māori calls for greater control in the administration of their land and demand from Pakeha settlers for greater security in their leases and ‘improvements’ (such as bush clearing, fence building), but for Māori this was essentially confiscation by another name (Johnson, 1997).

**TABLE 11: OCCUPANCY OF WEST COAST RESERVES IN 1912**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupancy Type</th>
<th>Acres</th>
<th>Percentage of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European occupancy under perpetual lease</td>
<td>120,110</td>
<td>61.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European occupancy under 30 year lease</td>
<td>18,400</td>
<td>9.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Māori occupancy under ‘occupation licences’</td>
<td>24,800</td>
<td>12.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Māori occupancy as <em>papakainga</em> [commonages, villages]</td>
<td>25,798</td>
<td>13.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Māori occupancy under ‘various tenures’</td>
<td>4890</td>
<td>2.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>193,996</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Importantly, not only did the work of the West Coast Commissions and legislation establish the means by which ‘confiscated’ land actually passed from Māori control into settler’s hands (Map 4 shows the extent on Māori land by 1902), it also imposed a spatial order across the south and central areas of Taranaki by dividing and allocating the land among Māori and settlers. Along with the violent destruction of Parihaka and Te Whiti – “the reigning power on that coast, the Maori centre of power” (NZPD, 1881: 732, Sheehan) – this period effected the gradual stabilisation of Crown claims to territorial control in Taranaki (Waitangi Tribunal, 1996). The reserved lands remained under Crown administration until 1977, during which time, 63 percent of the reserves were bought by the Crown and sold to the lessees (Ward, 1997). The Parininihi ki Waitotara Incorporation (PKW) was established by Māori shareholders in 1977 to administer the remaining 55,137 acres (Waitangi Tribunal, 2001). As discussed in Chapter Six, the role of PKW, the position of Māori as ‘shareholders’ in their lands, and the existence of perpetual leases are contentious issues in Māori-Crown-Pakeha relationships, and also in inter and intra-*iwi* politics in Taranaki today.

---

38 ABRS 16208 W5358/5, 1890.


**5.2.2 Incomplete Reconciliations**

While the history of war and confiscation forms the basis of historic grievances against the Crown, the settlements briefly outlined in this section compound this grievance by proffering ‘justice’ circumscribed by an overriding commitment to neither challenging the legitimacy of British sovereignty nor impeding development (Belgrave, 2005, Waitangi Tribunal, 1996). In 1926 the Royal Commission into Confiscated Lands and

---

39 ARC2004-290, 1902. For reading ease, I have enlarged the reference key to this map.
Other Grievances (Sim Commission) was formed in response to continuing Māori claims and petitions against the unfair confiscation of their lands (AJHR, 1928, Belgrave, 2005). Although limited, its brief required an investigation into whether the confiscations “exceeded in quantity what was fair and just,” whether any Natives were “justly entitled to claim compensation,” whether any of the confiscated lands should have been “excluded for special reason” and whether the reserves “made for the support and maintenance of Natives” were “inadequate for the purpose” (AJHR, 1928: 1). The Sim Commission found that the war was unjust and that Taranaki Māori “had no alternative but to fight in their own self-defence,” and “ought not to have been punished by the confiscation of any of their lands” (AJHR, 1928: 6). It recommended a one-off payment of £300 for Parihaka and the annual payment of £5,000 in perpetuity to Taranaki Maori. Such official recognition of the injustices was doubtless significant, but proposed justice via payments that were “far from generous” (Belgrave, 2005: 266).

The recommended payments, however, did not begin until the Taranaki Claims Settlement Act in 1944, demonstrating how reconciliations and grievances intersect in Taranaki. This legislation offered financial redress in a ‘full settlement’ intended to restore Crown-Māori relationships (NZPD, 1944: 750 (Mason, Native Minister)). Leaving aside the presumed adequacy of the financial redress, settling Taranaki claims as a single region glossed over the diversity within local histories and experiences and the geopolitical organisation of Māori as iwi and hapū. This attempt at simplifying local complexity required the establishment of a new entity to receive and administer the funds on behalf of all Taranaki Māori. The Taranaki Māori Trust Board (TMTB) was created for this purpose and consists of one representative elected by each iwi. This Board is at once a colonial creation for administrative convenience and a vehicle for advancing Māori interests (Hill and O'Malley, 2000), though it has often been

---

40 The Commission itself noted that the brief assumed “that in every case confiscation was justified, and directs an inquiry as to the extent only of the confiscation” AJHR, 1928: 6.
42 ABWN 6095/W5021 246 7/645/1 1, 1978-1987 This delay is one example of how the settlements have become part of the contemporary grievance.
43 A government solicitor noted in the late-1970s that if another commission were held “The amount of compensation to be awarded for confiscations which were made without statutory authority could well be considerably larger than the 1928 Royal Commission, with its limited terms of reference, was able to recommend” (Coubrough, Office Solicitor to Secretary (nd). Re: Taranaki Confiscations, in ABWN 6095/W5021 246 7/645/1 1, 1978-1987).
controversial with some Māori refuting the representativeness of the TMTB, claims of funding misuse and lack of consultation with iwi and hapū.\textsuperscript{44}

The issue of compensation for the confiscations was investigated again in the 1970s by the TMTB. They sought “the return of our sacred Mountain, Taranaki (Mt Egmont)” and “fair monetary compensation for the land unjustly confiscated which cannot without major disruptions be returned.”\textsuperscript{45} The first of these two issues – Mount Taranaki – was addressed in the Mount Egmont Vesting Act (1978) which vested the mountain in the TMTB, who immediately ‘gifted’ it back to the Crown (see also Section 5.3.2). This Act was (and remains) controversial and inspired little trust in the TMTB among Māori. One commentator noted that the lack of consultation and consensus among Taranaki Māori prior to the legislation meant “the Maori people had to abide by the legislation and as a result the transfer was considered little better than the 1860’s confiscations.”\textsuperscript{46} This attests the importance of settlement processes and practices, especially because the lingering challenge to Crown claims to the mountain complicates relationships between contemporary administrators and tangata whenua (See Chapter 8).

The second issue the TMTB raised was compensation. Based on the value of the land confiscated, the TMTB argued for a one-off $10 million dollar compensation payment (See Appendix D2).\textsuperscript{47} This was initially recommended for “favourable consideration” by a select committee under the Labour Government (1972-1975),\textsuperscript{48} but the government’s position hardened after the National Party were elected.\textsuperscript{49} Citing the 1944 settlement, officials questioned the need for further compensation and fretted that renegotiation could mean “many other previously settled claims may be reopened.”\textsuperscript{50} They also

\textsuperscript{44} AAMK 869 W3074/790A 26/5/2 2, 1948-1956.
\textsuperscript{45} P. Tamati (TMTB) and R. Ngatata Love (Leader, Negotiating Panel) to Right Hon. W Rowling, Prime Minister (nd), in AANS 7613 W5491/495 6/1/1/1 1, 1975-1978.
\textsuperscript{47} AANS 7613 W5491/495 6/1/1/1 1, 1975-1978, ABWN 6095/W5021 246 7/645/1 1, 1978-1987.
\textsuperscript{49} As will be discussed in Section 5.3.2, the National Party also modified the Labour government’s version of the Mount Egmont Vesting Act.
\textsuperscript{50} V. Young, Minister of Lands and B. Couch, Minister of Maori Affairs. (nd). \textit{Memorandum for Cabinet: Taranaki Lands Confiscation Claim}, in ABWN 6095/W5021 246 7/645/1 1, 1978-1987. Nationally consistent treatment of Māori claims remains a significant issue in contemporary settlements.
argued that “acceptance for over 30 years of the compensation earlier settled must be regarded as confirming and acquiescing in that agreement,” and a 1976 report to the Minister of Maori Affairs revealingly states that “The sum of $10,000,000 mentioned is, in any case altogether out of the question and could not be supported by any logical mathematics.” In 1979 the TMTB received notification that “there is obviously a difference of opinion on this matter.”

Cabinet’s decision is that the Taranaki Claims Settlement Act 1944 was in full and final settlement of the Taranaki Maoris’ claim to compensation in respect of the confiscation and purchase of their land by the Crown. Cabinet agreed that there is no obligation on the Government to recognise a further claim.

Māori representatives were not dissuaded by this decision, with activism around this issue being evident through the 1980s and work under the contemporary framework for Treaty Settlements (under the Treaty of Waitangi Act (Amendment) 1985) beginning in the early 1990s.

This history evinces a longstanding dissatisfaction with the settlements offered by successive governments, and generates a sceptical view of contemporary efforts to negotiate settlements that are just, equitable and ‘full and final’ (see Chapter 6). The institutions and models established by the various settlements have also become embedded in local politics; both the West Coast leases and the TMTB remain in operation today.

5.2.3 Māori Development and History

Escobar (1995) asserts that development discourse operates by identifying target groups (the ‘Natives’), labelling problems (poverty, poor land use), and prescribing development as a solution with little regard for local, cultural or historical contexts.
(Chapter Two). Working from a self-referential logic, development discourse assimilates diverse peoples, cultures and places within a standardised paradigm. These ideas and logics are also present in the Crown efforts to direct, manage and enable the Māori to develop as (British) citizens. Notably, just as development interventions in the ‘Third World’ have typically failed to empower or enrich the lives of their ‘target populations’ (Escobar, 1995, Esteva, 2001), government interventions in Māori development have seldom produced positive outcomes for Māori. The Maori Record magazine (published in Hawera, Taranaki) noted in 1905 that:

The native problem has taxed the stupidity of all grades of intellect for many years, with the lamentable result that, instead of solving it, these varied attempts have become an inextricable complication of conspicuous failures; and when common sense enquires for the reason of this, and receives for answer the common-sense reply, ‘Because it has never been understood.’

Colonial approaches to Māori land tenure and use illustrate the problematisation of ‘Māori development.’ Efforts to break down the ‘beastly communism’ of Māori geopolitical relationships (Hill and O’Malley, 2000) and define (and confine) Māori relationships to land as exclusive and individual land titles were certainly motivated by the desire to legally obtain land (Belgrave, 2005). But the presumed inevitability and legitimacy of Western social, political and economic processes was also influential (Brown, 2007, Murray, 1997, O’Sullivan and Dana, 2008). Such disregard for Indigenous cultural institutions resonates with postdevelopment critiques, and demonstrates that the ‘problem’ of Māori development was defined, at least in part, as a product of politico-cultural difference.

The Crown presumed the role of a parental guardian in the transition from savagery to civilisation, and cast the Māori race as children in need of education and guidance. This attitude was embedded in the colonial administration in trust of the West Coast Settlement Reserves (Section 5.2.1), where trusteeship divested Māori of any control in the management, leasing and use of their lands, and was justified by the assumption that Māori were incapable of managing their own lands with colonial pressure (Johnson, 1997).

---

56 IA 1/1861/1169, 1861.
57 For a discussion of this dynamic in British imperialism more generally, see Noxolo, 2006.
58 Provisions for (some) Māori input into the administration of their lands were even actively resisted by the government in 1844 and 1873 (Johnson, 1997).
CHAPTER FIVE: History, Development and Environment

1997, Murray, 1997). Notably, this ‘benevolent trusteeship’ forms part of contemporary grievances against the Crown because it served to alienate Māori from their lands.\(^{59}\)

Interventions in Māori development were thus driven by a paradoxical combination of ambitions: colonial appropriation and nation-building, and philanthropic assistance for the civilisation, development and betterment of the Māori race.

Johnson (1997: 131) asserts that administration of Māori land was “firmly directed at securing financial return as the benefit bestowed, not the continued occupation of land.”\(^{60}\) Such a system was not only counter to Māori aspirations and desires,\(^{61}\) but also positioned them as “pitiable pensioners of the State which administers their lands,”\(^{62}\) and attracted slurs against Māori as a lazy ‘native aristocracy’ (Johnson, 1997, Scholefield, 1909). Crown administration of Māori lands impeded opportunities for autonomous Māori development and use of lands and resources, and this mode of dispossession effectively rendered Māori economically dependent on the state (Waitangi Tribunal, 1990).

Many commentators during the late 1800s and early 1900s assumed that re-making Māori as ‘active, energetic, thrifty, industrious citizens’ would require security of tenure and education in farming (Scholefield, 1909). The apparent failure of the Māori to become fully integrated into a European style economy and the ‘wasteful’ and ‘unproductive’ condition of lands remaining under Māori control were defined as a problem of motivation and education (Scholefield, 1909). Interventions to Māori development from the early 1900s were guided by the idea that “the destiny of the Maori lies on the land as a tiller of the soil and grazier of the pastures he has inherited” (see Appendix D3).\(^{63}\) Under this premise, even where greater Māori control was

---

\(^{59}\) For example, a submission to the Waitangi Tribunal noted that: “By the late 1890s, many of our Great Grand Parents had surveyed sections out of the Crown grants and this land was being leased without them knowing the details of lease or rent. They still had no control. The Government’s excuse for its paternalism was to “protect the Māori against their own improvidence”’ (Milton (Te Miringa) Hohaia, Waitangi Tribunal, 1990).

\(^{60}\) This reflects an assumption not only that Pakeha settlers would make better and more profitable use of the land, but also that deriving income from leases (rather than occupying and using their land) would be most beneficial for Māori development and livelihoods.


\(^{62}\) The Maori Record 1(3): 2, ARC2003-469, 1905-1907.

\(^{63}\) The Maori Record 2(4): 18, ARC2003-469, 1905-1907 The view that the Māori race was apt for farming was expressed in official discourse (for example, the Stout-Ngata Commission (1907).
afforded in land administration, there was continued political, legal and popular pressure for ‘productive’ use of the land (Bennion, 1997, Nikora and Bennion, 1993).

Contemporary Māori development in Taranaki is steeped in the legacies of paternalistic and colonising policies. Because of individualised titles, Māori land ownership in Taranaki has fragmented. As lands were divided between multiple (individual) owners, many estates became ‘uneconomic’ and sold “leaving a scattering of Maori lands in small and dispersed titles” today (Waitangi Tribunal, 1996: 10.2.1). In combination with the land confiscations and perpetual leasing, the gradual dispersal of meaningful amounts of land in Māori ownership deprived tangata whenua in Taranaki of economic opportunities, prompting many to migrate to larger cities for employment. In a submission to the Waitangi Tribunal, Donald Hugh McDonald stated that:

> Economic and political systems imposed upon our people slowly but surely forced my people off ancestral lands often into towns and cities in other tribal areas, making us economically dependent on others…We used to have ample land to sustain all our families. To plant food was my father’s way of maintaining not only ongoing food for ourselves but it taught us how to co-operate one with another… The resources have gone. Why does my family have to live away from the place which sustained not only my father’s generation but all our ancestors before him? Ngati Mutunga is where we belong. It is our link to the LAND (Waitangi Tribunal, 1990).

In this context, contemporary settlements are often seen as an important opportunity to recover a local economic base and pursue development that strengthens and affirms iwi. The entanglement of colonialism and development in Taranaki is indelibly inscribed on the landscape, on history and in contemporary relationships between Māori and the Crown.

### 5.3 Environmental Management and History

In Chapter Three I argue that environmental management institutions, policies and practices transpose imaginative geographies over landscapes, enacting particular forms of spatial organisation and claims to geo-political authority (Dominy, 2002, Mohr, 2003,

---

64. The Waitangi Tribunal (1996: 10.2.1) noted that “The share of one owner when the land was first Crown granted could be held by over 100 today.”
65. This has been particularly relevant (and contentious) in contemporary settlements where the amount of redress provided is adjusted for the size of the population (see Chapters 5 and 6).
Rossiter, 2008). Discourses in the field of environmental management often privilege particular forms of knowledge, values and authority to render some resource uses legitimate, and others irrational or wasteful. Colonial ambitions in Taranaki were intimately related to the ecology of the district, and this is perhaps reflected in the emphasis on resource use and development that has characterised the regional economy post-1840 (Section 5.1). The politics and ambitions of *iwi* participation in environmental management as *tangata whenua* in the (post) Treaty settlement era cannot be separated from the local histories of environmental management. In this section I explore development and ecological change in Taranaki to provide an historical context for contemporary resource management tensions and debates. The management of Mount Taranaki and Egmont National Park is emblematic of the wider dynamics within Taranaki environmental management because of its cultural significance for all eight *iwi* and its iconic status and economic import within the region. In Section 5.3.2, I highlight the economic and cultural values that have been historically privileged in its management, and the contestation of the mountain name (Taranaki or Egmont) in the late 1980s as an example of (competing) Māori and Pakeha constructions of place.

5.3.1 Regional Development and Ecological Change

Regional development in Taranaki has been (and continues to be) predicated on the use of natural resources available in the region, as exemplified by two locally prominent industries: dairy farming and mineral extraction (oil, gas) (Statistics New Zealand Te Tari Tatau, 1999, Tullett, 1981). Farming, for example, has significantly shaped the development of the Taranaki region, and remains a major activity in Taranaki – in 1996, farmland accounted for 68 per cent of the region and the multinational dairy company, Fonterra, is a major part of the local economy (Statistics New Zealand Te Tari Tatau, 1999). Oil and gas production has been a long held local ambition, since the discovery of oil fields in the 1860s, and remains a major feature of the Taranaki economy (Tullett, 1981). The establishment and continuing operation of these industries has caused massive and irreversible changes to local ecologies, generally with little input from Māori and at times despite significant resistance. These histories of disempowerment in environment management and the significant transformations of the landscape provide an important context for tensions in contemporary resource management.
Colonisation and settlement were place-making projects based on developing and improving the land, and transforming the exotic and wild into safe, familiar environments (Ashcroft, 2001, Ginn, 2008a, Pawson and Brooking, 2002). As land sales and confiscations came into effect and new patterns of land ownership and use were etched into the ground, local ecologies were significantly changed to create farm land and bring ‘waste’ land into productivity (see Figure 7). Landscape transformation to enable farming remained an important goal well into the 1900s; In reference to north east Taranaki, the Minister of Lands stated in 1961 that “The Government is anxious, as part of its policy of development of land for settlement, to see the full farming potential of this region realised” (Department of Lands and Survey, 1961: i). Such ambitions evidently guided policy and practice relating to wetland areas. Despite their significance for tangata whenua, by 1998 in Taranaki “99.8 per cent of wetlands on privately owned

---

66 PHO2007-301, Date unknown.

67 McAlister (1976: 54) observes that: “The first industry established in Taranaki was sawmilling. For the pioneers the prime need was for shelter; the land was covered with timber trees of magnificent quality for house building, and the trees were the principal obstacle preventing the cultivation which would serve the permanent needs of the settlers.”

68 In the same report, it was also noted that “During the past 100 years of farming development and settlement, and under an onslaught of bush-felling, forest cover receded from nearly all land considered physically suitable for pastoral use” (Department of Lands and Survey, 1961: 5).
lands had been drained” (Allen et al., 2002: 318). This has created a “disjunction between the Māori community, landowners, wetlands and associated artefacts,” and forms part of contemporary grievances against the Crown (Allen et al., 2002: 318; See also Appendix D4). This provides an insight to the cultural specificity of the (colonial) place-making agendas that created a farming landscape and economy in Taranaki, and suggests that environmental management and permanent changes to the landscape it allowed have compounded colonial appropriation of land (Memon and Perkins, 2000, Waitangi Tribunal, 1996). In this regard, resource management and landscape transformation can be seen as an extension of colonial policies that alienated Māori from their land.  

Since the ‘Think Big’ schemes in the late 1970s, oil and natural gas extraction have also become increasingly significant for the regional economy (See Appendix D5 and Figure 8). Like farming, these industries presume the Crown’s rights to own, use, sell and exploit natural resources in Taranaki, and have become the subject of Treaty claims (Tullett, 1981). Nga Ruahine have contested the government’s right to the petroleum in their rohe, asserting that Crown only obtained the land from which petroleum is extracted through confiscation. The Tribunal found in favour of Nga Ruahine (and other claimants) because “legal rights [to petroleum were] lost by means that are inconsistent with Treaty principles” (Waitangi Tribunal, 1983: 6.1). This is suggestive of how land ownership disputes are invoked in resource use contestation, and how histories of confiscation remain pertinent in contemporary resource management.

---

69 Wetland areas are an important source of food, and site for mahinga kai [harvesting] and for storing cultural artefacts (Allen, Johns, Phillips, Day, O'Brien and Ngati Mutunga, 2002). Notably, current legislation also provides limited scope for wetland protection; protection of wetlands is based on ecological and scientific value (not cultural).

70 This is particularly true for land within the confiscation districts and on the West Coast Settlement Reserves (see Section 5.2.1).

71 ‘Think Big’ schemes were an intervention by the Muldoon government in the late 1970s intended to make New Zealand’s oil and energy supply more secure (Taranaki Catchment Commission and Regional Water Board, 1983a).
Managing the waste and environmental effects of farming and mineral extraction has often been problematic in Taranaki (See Appendix D6). Marine disposal of waste has typically been favoured in Taranaki, yet this method is particularly offensive to Māori, reflecting “a deep seated cultural and spiritual value that wastes generated by man be returned to the land.” The pollution of coastal reefs off the coast between Waitara and New Plymouth from a combination of industrial waste from the freezing works and sewage is one example of this. When an additional pipeline for waste from the synthetic fuel plant at Motunui was proposed (part of a ‘Think Big’ era project), Te Atiawa iwi took this issue to the Waitangi Tribunal in 1983 who found that “the pollution of the fishing grounds is inconsistent with the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi” (Waitangi Tribunal, 1983: 1.1). An inter-departmental committee established subsequent to the Tribunal’s findings ultimately recommended that waste be treated prior to marine disposal – noting that this “goes only part of the way towards satisfying Māori cultural and spiritual concerns.” Resource management, therefore, is a potent vehicle for tangibly, and often irreversibly, changing local land and seascapes. In Taranaki, Māori have challenged the Crown’s ownership and prerogative to use resources and the environmental effects of development on the rights guaranteed in the Treaty. These grievances are complex, and many are repeated in contemporary resource management.

---

72 In reference to ‘Think Big’ era developments, local government agencies noted their limited power to regulate, mitigate and prevent environmental damage by large companies with national government support.
74 The Tribunal recommended that construction of an additional pipeline be discontinued, further work in regional planning, and an interdepartmental committee to promote legislative protection of Māori fishing grounds.
75 AATJ 889 W5509/142 102/11/1/1 3, 1985
issues (Chapter Seven). Further, the exclusion of Māori from managerial institutions aligns with overseas experiences (Chapter Three), and suggests the significance of contemporary shifts towards more collaborative approaches.

5.3.2 Mount Taranaki: Focal Point of the Region

In Taranaki, the overlapping geographies of colonial histories – of heroic pioneering and illegitimate dispossession – are symbolised in Mount Taranaki. All eight iwi identify the mountain as their common tupuna and its cultural significance as “the most sacred symbol of the Taranaki tribes” is expressed in numerous waiata [songs], haka [chant, dance] and whakatauki [proverbs] (See Chapter One for an example). For settlers arriving from England, the mountain made an immediate impression, and Captain Cook named the mountain after Lord Egmont. Crown ownership of the mountain was asserted under the New Zealand Settlements Act (1863), and this confiscation remains a significant grievance for many Māori in Taranaki (see Chapter 8). In this section I outline key aspects of the Crown’s management of Egmont National Park (which contains the mountain), and previous negotiations of Māori rights to the maunga. This history provides an important background to contemporary managerial and ownership negotiations.

The Taranaki Provincial Government created a temporary forest reserve around the mountain in 1875 as development close to the mountain increased (Helm, 1963, Scanlan, 1955). This reserve was made permanent in 1881, and national park status was achieved in 1900 to protect the reserve from encroaching settlement (Scanlan, 1955). The economic significance of the mountain to the province was a clear motivation in its reservation. The first Egmont National Park Board (ENPB) stated that the mountain’s:

...contribution to Taranaki life and prosperity is beyond material calculation. It helps to provide a balanced climate for the light soil that comes from it; with its own healthy bush growth and arboreal life-cycle assured, it can continue to maintain a benign

---

76 TMTB (5.10.1977). *Submissions to the Lands and Agriculture Committee Regarding the National Parks Amendment Bill*, in AANS 7613 W5491/495 6/1/1/1 1, 1975-1978.
influence on pasture lands… (See also Appendix D7). Over time, protection became increasingly intertwined with recreational interests, particularly as early Park Boards and local committees sought revenue from hunting and tourism in the absence of secure or sufficient funding from government (Helm, 1963, Scanlan, 1961). Policies to facilitate these developments have irreversibly changed the flora and fauna on the mountain and often been offensive to Māori. The liberation of possums in the park by the Hawera and Taranaki Acclimatisation Societies in 1895 to develop a fur industry is perhaps the most potent example (Fullharton, 1976, Helm, 1963, Scanlan, 1961). Possums flourished in the park, consuming and damaging much indigenous vegetation, and have proved difficult to eradicate (DoC, 2002); Scanlan (1961: 155) describes them as “the most tragic mistake in the liberation of exotic animals.” However, from 1925 to 1943, the Board managed possum hunting as a profit-making venture and even restricted hunting some years for “fear that the revenue might vanish if the opossum was over-trapped” (Scanlan, 1961: 156). Acclimatisation Societies and park rangers also refuted the idea that possums were pests causing significant damage (Helm, 1963). Although largely unintentional, the introduction of animals to the park (and region) has impacted local flora and fauna and pest management remains a major aspect in park management (DoC, 2002). Tourism and recreational developments on Taranaki have also been significant. Skiing and mountaineering became popular among Taranaki residents from the late 1920s, although largely unintentional, the introduction of animals to

---

79 AANS 6095 W5491/1028 4/342, 1901-1921.
80 Common brushtail possum; *Trichosurus vulpecula*.
81 Initially, these societies sought to liberate and protect introduced animals. After the late 1880s, their focus shifted to protecting indigenous flora and fauna (Marr, Hodge and White, 2001, Park, 2001).
83 Responsibility for pest management is also an important consideration in land transfers under the current Treaty Settlement framework (see Chapter 8).
84 Scanlan (1961: 105) notes that “In quick succession the Mt Egmont Alpine Club (March 1928), the Stratford Mountain Club (February 1929), and the Taranaki Alpine Club (April 1930) were established, to be followed much later by the Eltham Alpine Club (1935)... Soon the clubs experienced an enthusiasm of endeavour as they began to build high huts, carrying heavy material up steep slopes.”
with tourism increasing from the 1930s (Scanlan, 1961). The economic potential of Mount Taranaki as a colonial tourist attraction was summarised by the Commissioner of Crown Lands in 1903:

...I look upon Mount Egmont as one of the finest assets the colony has, from the ease with which it can be reached, being practically on the main railway highway of the colony. The future success of the Mountain as a resort must depend on a broad and general scheme...to make Mount Egmont one of the sights worthy of inspection and circulating thereby foreign capital for the benefit not only for the district, but of the colony.

Accordingly, hostels, chalets, huts, tracks, roads and car-parks were built around the park to enable a range of activities for day visits and longer trips, and Park Board minutes evince efforts to ensure their powers to build, lease and manage tourist facilities and hydro-power systems. Much of this development was premised on climbs to the summit of Mount Taranaki, with the Park Board and committees promoting the climb to both residents and tourists and boasting that by the 1970s “Egmont [was] the most climbed mountain in New Zealand... As many as 600 have reached the summit one open climb” (Fullarton, 1976: 8). Like pioneering and settlement narratives of colonisation more generally, the development of an adventure and tourism landscape represents a culturally specific way of engaging with the mountain. Indeed, as discussed in Chapter 8, such practices as standing on the summit of Mount Taranaki are an affront to tangata whenua who liken it to standing on the head of their tupuna.

Despite the growth in recreational and touristic uses of the park, the goal of preserving and protecting nature remained central in park management. This preservationist stance is evident throughout New Zealand’s conservation legislation (see Chapter 7), and opposes cultural harvesting by Māori for food or weaving (see Appendix D8). To use the Park Board’s words, the national park is “is a place where man may come on

86 Commissioner of Crown Lands to Surveyor General (Lands and Survey, New Plymouth District Office). (5.8.1903). *Egmont National Park*, in AANS 6095 W5491/1028 4/342, 1901-1921. He also noted that “The time has come, however, when attention must be given to the larger or what may be termed the colonial scheme, and the more local ones will fall into line as a natural sequence.” This reflects the tensions between local and national control that is frequently evident in the Park Board’s documentation.
87 AANS 6095 W5491/294 4/342 1, 1921-1925.
nature’s terms” (ENPB, 1978: 19). Yet, the economic purpose for preservation was not forgotten:

While the Park was originally set aside as a conservation area because of its economic significance to the Province – and this aspect will always remain predominant – there is increasing emphasis on the conservation of aesthetic and recreational values. There is no doubt that the pressure of increasing population will inevitably place even greater importance on recreation.89

These managerial goals were implemented by local committees (from the North, East, South, West sections of the park) and Park Boards without any Māori representation until 1977. From 1952 (after the National Parks Act (1950)), the Park Board consisted of:

The Commissioner of Crown Lands for the Taranaki Land District; one person to be appointed by each of the four Local Committees; one representing the Federated Mountain Clubs90 of New Zealand; one representing the Taranaki Local Bodies [and] two persons to be appointed by the Minister on the recommendation of the Authority. The Local Committees consist of two representatives of each of the local authorities in the committee areas (Scanlan, 1955: 10, See also Appendix D9).

Park management, therefore, provided little opportunity for Māori input or control. Management plans were written by a subcommittee of the Board and then approved by the Board.91 Although TMTB representation on behalf of all Māori was provided after an amendment to the National Parks Act (1977) and general restructuring of the Park Board, this too was initially resisted with government officials asserting that “there is no justification for this and [the TMTB] are entitled along with any other organisation or individual to submit nominations for appointment” (see also Appendix D10).92

As part of its broader compensation claims in the 1970s, the TMTB argued for two representatives on the Park Board, (one from the TMTB, one representing the traditional owners), renaming the mountain and park as ‘Taranaki,’ and vesting park in

---

89 Department of Lands and Survey (17.03.1965). _Egmont Control Plan Revisions_, in F1 W3129 231/33/3 1, 1925-1974.

90 The Federated Mountain Clubs is a powerful political lobby group representing recreational interests.


92 AANS 7613 W5491/495 6/1/1/1 1, 1975-1978.
the TMTB (Section 5.2.2). These claims appear to have been received positively by Labour government ministers in 1975 and an agreement was reached (see Appendix D12), but legislation was not passed before the change of government. The new Minister of Lands promptly decided to “delete the provision within the programme for a special Bill” vesting the National Park in the TMTB. Demonstrating the caprice of government, this reluctance to recognise or provide for the TMTB’s requests was closely tied to public opinion and the potential for further claims. For example, officials argued that:

On the matter of the renaming of Egmont you will recall that public opinion showed an overwhelming opposition to any change. The Department considers that any attempt to transfer Mount Egmont National Park Board to the Trust Board even for immediate return to the Crown could well bring unfavourable reaction from the public. In light of the...Government’s gesture in appointing a representative of the Trust Board to the Park Board... the Department does not consider there is any justification now nor is there any need for the earlier proposals to return the mountain to be entertained.

The Minister of Lands made it clear last year that the transfer of Mount Egmont was not acceptable to Government and he may consider Mr Wetere’s suggestion of representation politically unacceptable as being an indication of government recognition of Maori ownership of Mount Egmont.

The government chose to proceed with “the symbolic re-vesting to be followed by the presentation of the mountain back to the nation...as a relatively costless but intensely significant exercise.” The Mount Egmont Vesting Act (1978) remains controversial, and these negotiations and the continuing dissatisfaction with the Vesting Act are

94 AANS 7613 W5491/495 NP 6/2/1 1, 1960-1977, AANS 7613 W5491/495 6/1/1/1 1, 1975-1978.
95 Director General of Lands to Minister of Lands. (2.11.1977) National Parks Amendment Bill 1977 Submission to Land and Agriculture Select Committee, in AANS 7613 W5491/495 6/1/1/1 1, 1975-1978
especially pertinent because the *maunga* will be renegotiated under the contemporary Treaty settlement framework (Chapter 8).

**FIGURE 9: EGمونT OR Taranaki?**

![Image of a newspaper poll about naming the mountain](Source: The Daily News, 07.08.1985: 1).

Debates over the name of the *maunga* are illustrative of the symbolic importance of the mountain to Pakeha and regional identity, and the extent to which place-naming is intimately tied into the assertion and naturalisation of national/colonial identities (Bauchop, 1993b, Moran, 2002, Myers, 1996, Porter, 2007). In 1985, the NZ Geographic Board considered the TMTB’s 1970s proposal to officially reinstate the name ‘Taranaki’ for the mountain and the park. As National MPs had feared, the issue was controversial and public opposition to the name change was strong (see Figure 9). Submitters to the Geographic Board asserted that even dual naming was “both

---

99 The Labour government agreed in 1975 that the national park should be named ‘Taranaki,’ in AANS 7613 W5491/495 6/1/1/1 1, 1975-1978.
unnecessarily confusing and heavily tainted with anti-European racism" and argued that it was “a calculated insult on all those living or those who have died creating Taranaki as we know it. What have the locals done wrong to be forced to submit to have another name, the embodiment of primitive superstition, take priority over Egmont?” That recognition of an Indigenous name was framed as an insult to Pakeha histories in Taranaki reveals a continuing cultural hierarchy and the extent to which Pakeha identities also coalesce around the mountain. Naming, then, is a way of ‘speaking with space’ (Myers, 1996), and of narrating postcolonial place and identity (Kearns and Berg, 2002). This debate – resolved through dual naming of the mountain and retaining ‘Egmont’ for the National Park – illustrates the multiplicity of relationships with landscapes and resources in Taranaki, and the passion attached to names and places. This is suggestive of the political tensions likely to confront contemporary discussions of a new settlement over the mountain that seek ownership and a managerial regime that is culturally acceptable to tangata whenua, yet more broadly, highlights the challenge of and need for negotiating a plural politics of place in postcolonial nations.

5.4 CONCLUSIONS

The historical narrative developed in this Chapter presents more than the “chronological unfolding of time and place” in Taranaki (Mirza, 2009: 2). Past and present are complexly interwoven (rather than linearly progressing); Contemporary contexts are thoroughly contingent on colonial histories of dispossession and exclusion, and the past maintains a presence even as new landscapes have been built over contested ground. For instance, the boundary-marker for European settlement desired by Māori in 1848 (Section 5.1.1) – Te Pou Tutake [Fitzroy Pole] – now stands against a commercial landscape (see Figure 10). As Keenan (2002: 248) notes: “[Māori] histories were always firmly located in specific historic landscapes, though these landscapes may have undergone marked and permanent change, and may even had slipped from the ownership of the people.” The history outlined in this Chapter foregrounds the politics of development and environmental management analysed in subsequent Chapters, and

101 Submission #29, Chairman, Save Mt. Egmont’s Name Committee, in ABGX W4536 21, 1986-1987. This submission also derisively noted the ‘mythological’ origins and ‘oral traditions’ that support the name Taranaki.
provides a means of situating contemporary debates within the broader historical context and empathetically understanding the passions and complexity that inform postcolonial relationships between *tangata whenua* and the Crown.

**FIGURE 10: TE POU TUTAKE**
Although colonial agendas were informed by particular geographical imaginaries that designated Māori uses of and relationships with land as wasteful, the transformation of Taranaki into a British settlement did not proceed unaffected by Māori actions. In Chapter Two I assert that in anxiously postcolonial nations, Indigenous development and self-determination are intimately entwined with broader questions of sovereignty, territoriality and authority. Current efforts to reconcile and include difference within the postcolonial nation in tandem with neoliberal reforms create a context where colonial and development discourses can be subverted and reworked in service of Indigenous ambitions. However, these opportunities are attached to significant risks. In this Chapter I argue that the Treaty settlement era and neoliberal reforms modify and subtly perpetuate the dynamics of Indigenous-government relations, creating conditions that can be exploited and exploitative. In this context, iwi organisations in Taranaki are striving to articulate and implement their own development strategies that achieve economic and cultural goals, and that support and are part of wider efforts to reconfigure relationships between iwi and government organisations. This Chapter explores three themes. The following section discusses the complex negotiations of the past, present and future of the Treaty settlement era (Chapter Five). Next, iwi conceptions and strategies for development in the Treaty settlement era are examined to highlight the complexity and diversity within
Taranaki. Finally, relationships between Māori organisations and with the Crown in Taranaki are explored. Taken together, these three aspects suggest the complexity of Māori development aspirations and the unsettled nature of coexistence in Taranaki. Negotiations and transformations are ongoing, drawn through complex historical, political and cultural terrain. This Chapter provides a kind of vantage point from which the dilemmas and politics of contemporary environmental management can be viewed and understood. In essence, the challenges and opportunities analysed in this Chapter are woven around and through the environmental management politics explored in Chapters Seven and Eight.

6.1 Contemporary Politics and Historical Legacies

Contemporary negotiations of sovereignty, nation and development in Taranaki occur in a landscape saturated with histories of conquest, resistance and interaction. Crown-Māori relationships in Taranaki have been shaped by the severity and injustice of colonial acts, and subsequent efforts to resolve these grievances without disrupting national and regional progress (Chapter Five). Many tangata whenua representatives draw a direct link between the issues and challenges of contemporary iwi governance and the history of war and confiscation and the consequences of those initial acts of excessive force – displacement, migration, and settlements with the Crown:

Everyone that died after the war was as a result of the war. They died of despair, broken hearted, because they had nothing to hand down to future generations. Two million acres of land, just taken… Plus loss of language and culture, displacement, you know, all that. Social disorder, what we talk about when we're beating each other up, beating our kids, beating our babies, what else!? I mean we've come out of war, we've come out of destruction, and we know no better. So, that's my view on the situation and there's a lot to be done to rectify that… (TMTB Member, Kaumatua, 21.07.09).

The colonial past remains in the anxiously postcolonial present in Taranaki; the Waitangi Tribunal’s (1996: 1.2) potent phrase – “If war is the absence of peace, the war has never ended in Taranaki” – was mentioned by several interviewees to emphasise colonial continuities and inequality in Taranaki (Manager, Ngati Tama Development Trust, 13.05.09; Chairperson Ngā Ruahine Iwi Authority, 15.05.09; TMTB Member, Kaumatua, 21.07.09). In this context, iwi organisations attempt to assert, define and
implement aspirations, yet frequently confront challenges that stem from colonial dispossession:

And unfortunately, Taranaki, *raupatu* [confiscations] it’s almost as if we were cursed, because we’re not only sort of jeopardy we’re not at sort of double jeopardy we’re in that quadruple whatever, where everything you look at, we’re just sort of, we get pinged again (Manager, Ngati Tama Development Trust, 13.05.09).

Thus, Treaty settlements are a potent opportunity to discuss historical injustices and gain access to resources, yet substantial limitations and risks are attached. The circumference of ‘justice,’ tellingly, remains drawn by the Crown, and for many *iwi* representatives, settlements also confer an acceptance of the colonial antecedents of postcolonial nationhood. In this Section I outline the dilemmas and possibilities of the Treaty settlement era – and emerging post-settlement era – in Taranaki.

### 6.1.1 Closure and Possibility in Treaty Settlements

Contemporary reconciliation processes position colonial wrongs as the unhappy origin of a unified, postcolonial nation and locate historical justice within the limits of acceptability for the sovereign state (Bhandar, 2004, Blackburn, 2007). Just as participatory innovations of development can re-entrench and lend legitimacy to particular discourses (Ziai, 2009), augmenting the national history with acknowledgements of historic wrongs and Indigenous rights can affirm the naturalness and legitimacy of the existing nation-state. In Taranaki, Treaty settlements have been contentious. Although four *iwi* (Ngāti Tama, Ngāti Mutunga, Ngāti Ruanui and Ngā Rauru Kitahi) have negotiated settlements (see Table 12 below, and Appendix B2 for more detail), questions and critiques of the processes and concept of ‘Treaty settlements’ persist.
### Table 12: Summary of Treaty Settlement Negotiations in Taranaki

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Iwi</th>
<th>Settlement Negotiations</th>
<th>Quantum in NZ Dollars</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ngāti Tama</td>
<td>• Deed of Settlement (December 2001).</td>
<td>$14,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Ngāti Tama Claims Settlement Act (November 2003).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ngāti Mutunga</td>
<td>• Deed of Settlement (July 2005).</td>
<td>$14,900,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Ngāti Mutunga Claims Settlement Act (November 2006).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ngāti Maru</td>
<td>• No negotiations as yet because there is no mandated representative body to work on behalf of the iwi.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Te Ati Awa</td>
<td>• Heads of Agreement signed in 1999.</td>
<td>$34,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Negotiations currently in progress.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taranaki</td>
<td>• Negotiations currently in progress.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ngā Ruahine</td>
<td>• Negotiations currently in progress.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ngāti Ruanui</td>
<td>• Deed of Settlement (May 2001).</td>
<td>$41,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Ngāti Ruanui Claims Settlement Act (2003).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ngā Rauru Kiitihi</td>
<td>• Deed of Settlement (November 2003).</td>
<td>$31,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Ngā Rauru Kiitihi Claims Settlement Act (2005).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: OTS, 23.10.2010).

The Crown intends Treaty Settlements as a form of restorative justice that affirms and strengthens the nation, expressing a desire to ‘rebuild’ relationships between the Crown and claimant groups and “remove the sense of grievance” to enable both sides to “move on to a more positive future” (OTS, 2004: 30). Early discussions of Treaty settlement processes indicated awareness that settlements would reconfigure, and hopefully strengthen, iwi organisations and representation:

[Settlement] will encourage a restoration of the traditional collective identity [sic]… It is quite possible that the settlement of grievances on the basis of comprehensive tribal claims will galvanise the various elements within the iwi to further develop mechanisms for internal cohesion and effective liaison with the different tiers of government.105

In Taranaki, consolidating iwi organisations and how they interface with local government has been particularly significant (Section 6.3.1, Chapter Seven). Notably,

---

103 Establishing a ‘mandated iwi organisation’ is a prerequisite for entering into Treaty negotiations (OTS, 2004). Representation of Ngāti Maru has often been contested – see, for example, Matuku v Ngati Maru Wharanui Pukehou Trust (2009) 245 Aotea MB 15 (245 AOT 15).
104 This figure is from the Heads of Agreement (1999); it is has not yet been paid and is unlikely to substantially change in up-coming negotiations.
Crown considerations of Treaty settlement policy are also influenced by considerations of voter acceptability (see Figure 11), and recognise public antipathy and resistance towards Māori grievances. One official noted that:

… unless a massive, earnest and urgent education program is undertaken which gives an outline and detail of our history and of the activities (eg raupatu [confiscation] etc) that led to Maori grievances and the structure of present-day Society [sic] where power is held by the dominant Pakeha, then most people will not accept that Maori have been wronged or have legitimate grievances under the Treaty of Waitangi and this will lead to the present initiatives and government being ‘out on a limb’, losing political power and thus being unable to rectify Maori grievances.106

FIGURE 11: “YES BUT WON’T THIS CONCEPT FRIGHTEN THE PAKEHA AND GOVT [GOVERNMENT] INTO LEANING AWAY FROM IT?”107

As discussed in Chapter Eight, public opinion is a prominent consideration in potential settlements over water and Taranaki maunga [mountain]. The Crown’s approach, therefore, appears to be motivated by appeasing voters, and balancing “present-day social and economic realities” with the desire to “remove the sense of grievance” (OTS, 2004: 30).

For iwi representatives, engaging with Treaty Settlement processes is neither an obvious nor easy choice, but is increasingly expected even within that have previously resisted


settlements (Tofa, 2007). Although the Crown seeks to ensure that “claimant groups agree that their grievances will be finally settled” and that “both parties are satisfied” that the settlement is fair (OTS, 2004: 30), negotiating settlements around the towns, farms and private land rights that have been established over confiscated lands precludes the return of substantial parcels of land to iwi in Treaty settlements:

...when you look at it [the Crown has] got very little in the returning cupboard. Ah, they’ve got little wee cupboards here and there, i.e., the old schools...when they were taken they actually had standing bush, i.e., birds, plenty to live off, now you’ve only got ten acres and dilapidated buildings that you’ve got to look at doing something with. So, yeah, you end up feeling, atu ka hoki mai – yes. Kua nga te whakaaro – yes – but how’s the Crown going to do it? [So, yeah, you end up feeling, the land will be returned – yes. They will consider it – yes – but how’s the Crown going to do it?] (Ngā Ruahine Iwi Authority Chairperson, 15.05.09).

Though the Crown recognises this fact (OTS, 2004), for iwi representatives the absence of lands available for use in settlements and the disparity of financial compensation offered in comparison to what was lost means that the “question that you look at is: why bother? One tenth of a percent [of the land value] is not exactly something to go, you know, yelling [about] from the roof tops” (Ngā Ruahine Iwi Authority Chairperson, 15.05.09). Postcolonial justice appears aporetic – because in this context, “What does ‘fair’ mean? What does ‘equitable’ mean?” (Chairperson, Taranaki Iwi Authority, 10.07.09); and this raises questions about the durability of settlements.

Chapter Two argues that because settlements and reconciliations are a government-controlled mechanism, processes and possibilities for postcolonial justice are shaped by the government and tethered to the exigencies of the nation-state (Gibbs, 2006, Muldoon, 2008). Crown authority is a fundamental inequality that permeates the settlement process and produces a somewhat nonsensical situation:

...so, look at the overview. One, who’s the thief? Gotta ask that question first. Two, who currently has the resources? Three, who’s the aggrieved party? And four, what resources does that party have? And this process is an attempt to reconcile those two issues. And the interesting part about the Treaty settlements [is] they’re requiring you to sort of resource significant amounts of work without resource and then pay you retrospectively. Very interesting approach! Like going to court, “Yes, your Honour, I’ve pinched Mr Brown’s car. However, before he can actually have it back, he needs to
prove that he can pay his lawyer, you know. And once, possibly, when he’s paid his lawyer, we may look at meeting his costs, but as to the return of the car, oh, we don’t know. Oh, maybe we can have co-management of the passenger door,” you know. So that’s part of the example that we’re looking at. Very interesting (Ngā Ruahine Iwi Authority Chairperson, 15.05.09, See Appendix E1 for further discussion on Crown eminence in settlement processes).

Reflecting the unequal context for settlement processes, for many iwi representatives one of the most compelling reasons to settle is to provide an economic base for future generations (Tofa, 2007). However, settling with the Crown is potent laden with historic, cultural and symbolic significance, and for some tangata whenua contemporary settlements do not do justice to the losses borne by their ancestors. One kaumatua [elder], for instance, expressed disappointment in the settlements offered and in iwi representatives for accepting them:

Yeah, it’s rubbish. And our people are soaking it up like nobody’s business. But they got forty million, twenty million, fifteen million, for what?! The value of land confiscation in Taranaki runs into billions and billions of dollars as an asset, runs into billions and billions… But to top it off is that during their war, 1860 in Taranaki, they introduced martial law, which was that people died. But nobody’s claiming for those Maoris that died during that war (TMTB Member, Kaumatua, 21.07.09).

The Treaty settlement era, therefore, conjures a denouement to colonial history, offering opportunities in exchange for resolution and positing difficult choices for iwi representatives.

In Chapter Two I argue that reconciliations work to naturalise government sovereignty and attempts close off the past as a valid position for interrogating contemporary polity and inequalities (Bhandar, 2004, Blackburn, 2005, Short, 2005). In Treaty settlements, this is embodied in the ‘full and final’ clause that prevents historic injustices from being re-examined, and states that “the Crown is released and discharged from all obligations and liabilities in respect of’ the historic claims (Ngati Tama Claims Settlement Act, 2003, s12(1), see also Appendix E2). Tangata whenua are critical of this effort to buttress the Crown from future examinations:

…it’s a continuation of the theft, there’s no consideration of mana tangata whenua [indigenous rights] according to the Treaty, nothing. Forty million dollars and [the
Crown] have all the authority (TMTB Member, Kaumatua, 21.07.09).

…it’s not really a redress, it’s sort of like a ‘oh there it is there, now we’ll seal it up with plastic now, we’ll give you an apology and that’ll be the seal that we’ll put on the outside of the plastic, and the problem goes away,’ but it doesn’t really go away (Ngā Ruahine Iwi Authority Chairperson, 15.05.09).

The history of settlements in Taranaki (Chapter Five) and the injustices of the current reconciliations mean that many iwi representatives are both suspicious and dubious of the finality of these settlements (Manager, Ngati Tama Development Trust, 13.05.09, Chairperson, TRoNM, 27.05.09, P. Haami, TRoNM, 10.06.09).

Despite these substantial critiques, the Treaty settlement era presents an opportunity that may greatly influence the future of tangata whenua in Taranaki. For the Chairperson of Taranaki Iwi Authority (10.07.09), Treaty settlements fall short of justice but may contribute to building a better future:

I just said to our people, ‘hey, let’s start looking towards our future for our moko’s [grandchildren] and stuff, it’s not gonna make a difference for our lives, but it can make a difference for generations to come’… [Settlement will give] some resolve within people to say ‘look yeah, nah we have done a deal with the Crown. We know that they owe us a lot more than what they’ve given us, but there’s some resolve in terms of the breaches and the injustices’… An apology from the Crown will be huge… Taranaki iwi got raped and pillaged and stuff like that, you know, they got done over, you know. We wanna sorta see a bloody apology. And again, it’s hard for me to express how our kaumatua [male elders] in the past felt towards the land and the land being, you know, taken away from them and the economic base being eroded which impacted on our social structures and political structures up to where we are today…the other one is to move on. I think there’s gotta come a time and I think people wanna see benefits of a settlement, whatever that means, education health whatever…

The enormity of this historical moment weighs heavily for many representatives, and the decision to engage in settlement processes, to negotiate and to sign an agreement with the Crown is a responsibility that is carefully considered. For example, a representative for Kanihi hapu (Ngā Ruahine) mused that the choice to sign would
reflect a desire to provide for her grandchildren, more than acceding to the Crown’s idea of settlements:

…if I did [sign a settlement] it wouldn’t [be] because I had reconciled myself with the past, it would be because, who am I to stop the growth of the future?…[because] I’m from a generation, we’re still on the tail end of what our old people suffered; I always liken our generation…as being the last of the ones who feel the effects of that…my children below me, and they don’t feel the same effects that I did because we’ve made sure of that, I’ve made sure of that… [So] the buck stops with me as far as I’m concerned… And you’re gonna be remembered for either signing or not, agreeing or not agreeing… So we’ve got two things that we’ve gotta worry about; what happened in the past and what happens in the future, and that’s why I say the buck stops with me… hopefully that’s the last choice that needs to be made for us as a people, and then our kids can go forward, that’s what I hope. And I keep my fingers crossed everyday about that haha! (D. Noble, Kanihi hapu, Ngā Ruahine, 13.07.09).

Treaty settlements, therefore, carry particular significance not only because reconciliations are apparently full and final, but also because through the disbursal of resources, settlements may provide means for iwi to create a significantly different future for their descendents. As discussed in Section 6.2, a similar sense of responsibility is felt by iwi leaders in post-settlement entities working to establish a solid economic, cultural and political base for their communities.

6.1.2 Shifting Geopolitical Landscapes

The Treaty settlement era informs the political climate in which iwi organisations operate, the relationships within and between iwi and other Māori organisations, and with the Crown and its agencies. Exploring iwi development and participation in environmental management, therefore, requires considering how contemporary reconfigurations of Māori polities intersect with the legacies of colonisation, the agreements and representative bodies that have accumulated since the confiscations, and iwi structures.

In Taranaki there is an increasing sense that settlements are inevitable, something akin to a stage that iwi must go through. One example of this is the National government’s election promise to conclude all historic Treaty settlements by 2014. As Prime Minister
CHAPTER SIX: Iwi Development and Postcoloniality in Taranaki

Key explained in his Waitangi Day\textsuperscript{108} speech (06.02.2010), setting a deadline for settlements is necessary for the nation to move on as a unified entity:

[Completing all historic Treaty settlements] is also about performing what for all of us can be the hardest task of all, choosing to close the door, move on from failure, forgive each other and seek a better tomorrow… We are impatient to stop looking in the rear-view mirror at grievances past, and to instead shift our eyes to the challenges of our shared future as New Zealanders… I believe it is to the benefit of all New Zealanders that we move beyond the settlement phase of our history and into the brighter future we all seek. I want to shift our focus and energy from the settling of historic claims and the sense of grievance it conjures, so that we can instead throw ourselves at the next phase in our history (Key, 2010).

This speech reflects a strong desire from the Crown to weave colonial history into a narrative that affirms and strengthens the legitimacy of the contemporary nation-state. Notably, many iwi representatives share this sense of ‘moving beyond’ historic grievances to build a stronger and more secure future. The Chairperson of Taranaki Iwi Authority (10.07.09) approaches settlement negotiations with the mind-set that:

…the opportunity’s right now, we need to get on with it, with the Treaty settlement claim, we need to look at basically how we’re gonna do that…we think with our heads, not with our hearts so that we can actually progress this, and too many of our people have passed on without seeing a result, you know, we say the time’s right now that we need to resolve, we need resolution for our people. We know that it’s not gonna be the full compensation but we need to get into it, into the discussions anyway.

However, meeting a 2014 deadline requires a significantly faster rate of settlements, and to achieve this, the Crown is modifying its approach to negotiations.\textsuperscript{109} This deadline is ambivalently regarded by most iwi representatives – one noted that any “Treaty breach the Crown makes after 1992 becomes a breach, so this whole idea of ‘everything’s gonna be done by 2014,’ it’s a breach in itself” (Manager, Ngati Tama Development

\textsuperscript{108} Waitangi Day is a public holiday commemorating the Treaty of Waitangi (06.02.1840).
\textsuperscript{109} In 2009 the Crown set out seven ways of accelerating settlement negotiations. These were: More use of mediation before existing legal action options; Support iwi preparedness for negotiations; Continue to recognise iwi coming together for joint or parallel negotiations; Increased Crown transparency on who it intends to negotiate with and quantum; More systematic use of Crown-funded facilitators and more senior Crown Chief Negotiators; Reduce the role of the Crown in allocation of redress – where requested; and Streamlining the legislative process (MICTOW, 2009).
Trust, 13.05.09). Yet others have noted a renewed enthusiasm and flexibility in negotiations by the Crown, and this is regarded as a positive development:

… the view I get from this government is that they’re open to anything, they’ll actually listen to anything, and I think that in itself is actually really good because it gives us more freedom… and it sounds like they’d be happy for us to work out regionally together how we’ll work rather than determine the process, and I think that’s really good too… They’re serious about settling… and I think they’re actually realising that we’re not little kids anymore you know that we can make decisions for ourselves, and they can be good decisions and it’s probably better if we make them for ourselves anyway (Chairperson, TAIA, 09.06.09).[110]

Among the iwi that have not settled, discussions and work for Treaty settlements has increased in 2009 and 2010 (OTS, 23.10.2010). The Crown’s eagerness to resolve all historic grievances sets up a particular political climate for Crown-Māori relations in Taranaki and for the advancement of iwi development goals.

On a national level there is also increased activity around ‘generic’ settlements, such as ownership and management of water (see Chapter Eight). These national discussions, often led by representatives of larger iwi (such as Waikato-Tainui and Ngāi Tahu)[111], are also a focus for tangata whenua representatives in Taranaki. In meetings there was a shared concern that Taranaki interests may be excluded or inadequately represented by representatives from other larger iwi, highlighting the need to collaborate because the Crown is unlikely to interact with smaller iwi individually in ‘generic’ settlements (Iwi Chairs Forum, Water Hui, 22.05.09). This sentiment is exacerbated by recent experience with population-based allocation model in the Fisheries settlement (Maori Fisheries Act, 2004). Taranaki tangata whenua are suspicious of slippage between ideas of historic justice for Treaty breaches and addressing contemporary inequalities between Māori (as citizens) and other New Zealanders (Manager, Ngati Tama Development Trust, 13.05.09).[112] Any shift towards a per capita based regime is unfavourably perceived

---

[110] This sentiment is affirmed in Crown documents that call for “evolutionary change” to generate “much faster momentum in the settlement process generally” (MICTOW, 2009).
[111] In 2006 the population of Ngai Tahu was 49,185; the total Māori population in Taranaki was 15,798 (Statistics New Zealand Te Tari Tatau, 2006).
[112] Crown discussions evoke the need to address inequalities and historical injustices: “We do not see the needs-based approach as an alternative to one based on the attainment of justice… but we consider that the perceived justice of the exercise would suffer adversely if there were no weighting given to the relative amounts of land lost. Accordingly, we envisage compensation...
because Taranaki iwi would accrue a proportionately smaller allocation, despite (and because of) the violence of colonial activity:

…it’s like a double raupatu, yeah. First, take the land and then because we haven’t got the population on the land decrease the rights accruing to that there as well, so, sort of like a double whammy or double jeopardy (Ngā Ruahine Iwi Authority Chairperson, 15.05.09).

Thus, the opportunities of this historical conjuncture evoke a sort of pressure and urgency for iwi representatives in Taranaki to participate, and to participate as a unified region, in national debates.

The Treaty settlement era has brought shifts in the relationships within and between iwi, and with pre-existing Māori organisations in Taranaki. Requirements to establish a mandated iwi organisation to negotiate settlements have often revealed and exacerbated differences within iwi (Tofa, 2007). For iwi seeking to engage in negotiations, building a representative body and widespread support and understanding of the Treaty settlement process is often a key issue. Settlement processes therefore require significant work within the iwi before they can engage with the Crown:

From 2006 I’ve been chairperson of the trust. We’ve had to put policies and systems in place. As you’d know, any assets returned from the Crown, there’s quite a strict compliance. And we’ve worked hard to get all those systems and structures in place. We realise the importance of it, and purely for accountability, transparency, not only back to the Crown but also back to our own people... We run an annual general meeting every year where we present the accounts [from the fisheries settlement]. We also have a communication strategy in place where we report to our members on a reasonably regular basis, probably quarterly... Also, we’ve got our website, and that’s been really good in terms of being able to let our people know not only in Taranaki but

being largely based on need with some variation to take account of exceptional losses” (M. Prebble, Secretary to the Treasury to The Minister of Finance, The Chairman, Cabinet Policy Committee, The Minister of Maori Affairs, The Minister of Justice (13.05.1988) General Policy on the Settlement of Māori Land Claims, in ABJZ 869 W4644/256 86/1/1 1, 1988).


114 For example, “a lot of people think you have to form a group and it's gonna run the iwi forever and ever, but it's not allowed to” because after settlement, iwi must form a new organisation to receive and administer settlement assets (D. Patuwairua, Ngāti Maru, 09.06.09).
outside of Taranaki, who we are and what we’re doing for them. So that’s a big movement forward for us (Chairperson, Taranaki Iwi Authority, 10.07.09).

This work is often complicated and intensified by personality politics and distrust within iwi and hapu, and contestations of identities, histories and culture. For example, within Te Ati Awa multiple groups representing hapu have emerged:

...one of the things that has happened to us after the claims, I suppose, is the re-emergence of different people and organisations, like Ngāti Te Whiti, and Ngāti Te Whiti had an ahi kā [title to land through occupation]. And people say ‘well, this is who we are, you know,’ I say, ‘well, didn’t you know who you were before?’ You know, it’s just in your head stuff, and that, you know, who are you trying to tell? Are you telling some other pakeha fella over there, ‘this is who I am,’ and he’ll go, ‘oh yeah, so what?’ haha! ...It’s only in their heads, you know, if we could just walk past it and be confident in who we are, we could do a lot more... (Puketapu hapu representative, TAIA, 19.06.09).

These debates within iwi, and the efforts to resolve them to produce a single, unified iwi representative body are indicative of the influence of settlements on the political representation and organisation of tangata whenua. These reconfigurations of Māori organisations suggest the extent and profundity of contemporary activity in defining postcolonial Crown-Māori relationships and iwi organisation. Indeed, differences between iwi – in particular, those who have settled and those who have not – are also forming through the settlement era (see Section 6.3.3).

Māori organisations established in previous settlements in Taranaki (see Chapter Five), such as the Taranaki Māori Trust Board (TMTB) and Parininihi-Ki-Waitotara (PKW) Incorporation, stand in an interesting relationship to recently mandated iwi authorities. As outlined in Table 13, PKW inherited confiscated lands and currently manages them on behalf of tangata whenua shareholders, and some tangata whenua expect that these lands will be returned to iwi and hapu through the Treaty settlement process. The Chairperson of Ngā Ruahine Iwi Authority (15.05.09), for example, stated that “the Ngā Ruahine viewpoint is that PKW is only the rent collector, they are not the owners, and that we intend for every last acre within Ngā Ruahine rohe to be returned not to iwi, to hapu.” PKW and leaseholders are therefore entangled in the Treaty settlement process, and PKW as a Māori organisation and corporate entity has an especially complex
positionality. Navigating this issue is certain to produce “an interesting dynamic” of (Chairperson, Ngā Ruahine Iwi Authority, 15.05.09) and is suggestive of the complex unfolding of previous settlements in contemporary debates (see Appendix E3 for a discussion of the TMTB).

**Table 13: Parininihi Ki Waitotara Incorporation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Historical and legislative background</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>▪ The West Coast Settlement Reserves Act (1881) ‘returned’ 214,675 acres of confiscated land to Māori under individualised titles and with management vested in the Public Trustee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ This legislation established ‘perpetual leases’ over much of the Reserve lands. Under this scheme, Māori land owners owned the ‘unimproved value’ of the land (“everything below the roots of the grass” (Leung-Wai and Sanderson, 2008: 42)), and the lessees owned the value of their improvements. The lease terms were modified several times. The Māori Reserved Land Act (1955) standardised the terms, setting rent at 5% of the unimproved land value and establishing perpetually renewable 21 year terms. Inflation during the 1970s rendered these essentially peppercorn rentals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Under Public Trustee administration, much of the land was sold. In 1976, the PKW was established as a result of campaigning by the owners to administer the remaining 20,000ha.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ In 1997 PKW and other Māori Incorporations secured changes to legislation regarding lease terms. The Māori Reserved Land Amendment Act (1997) continued the perpetual leases, but includes provisions for phasing in market rents, rent reviews every seven years and gives PKW the right of first refusal if a lessee decides to sell.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Current Commercial Interests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>▪ Currently manages 20,354ha of land (343 properties); it owns the unimproved value of approximately 18,000ha and the land and improvements of approximately 2,400ha.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Approximately 14,000ha are in dairy farms; the 2,400ha owned by the PKW are operated by 50/50 sharemilkers.(^{115})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Currently also has interests in: “equities and bonds; US-based investments in biotechnology and agricultural technology; Australian-based dairy farming partnerships; joint venture fishing interests with New Zealand and Australian quota ownership; Taranaki-based commercial properties; and modest interests in forestry” (PKW, nd).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Net assets in 2007 were stated as $186 million (Leung-Wai and Sanderson, 2008).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Overall, there has been significant movement in the geopolitical context in which efforts to advance Indigenous self-determination and development and to negotiate relationships with the Crown and its agencies are undertaken. The reconfigurations of **iwi** organisations and relationships between **iwi** and other organisations are an important effect of the Treaty settlement era.

\(^{115}\) ‘50/50 sharemilking’ is a contractual arrangement where the farmer owns the herd and is responsible for production on the farm. The farmer receives 50 per cent of the income and pays a negotiated percentage of costs.
6.2 ARTICULATING AND BUILDING FUTURES

Postdevelopment theorists assert that development discourse operates through the systematisation of particular representations, labels and knowledges to restrict ways of conceptualising social, economic and cultural interrelationships (Escobar, 1995, Ziai, 2009). Indigenous cultures were positioned as ‘illegitimate’ and ‘backwards,’ and thus development interventions in the Third World worked to embed Westernised development (Chapter Two). In Taranaki, the coalescence of colonialism and development worked to dispossess Māori of their lands and establish political infrastructures that have privileged national development over Indigenous rights and frequently proven hostile to Māori culture and aspirations (Chapter Five). Contemporary discussions of Māori development, however, are somewhat more ambiguous, reworking ideas about development through neoliberal and multicultural filters and emphasising the idea of “Māori succeeding as Māori” (TPK, 2008b: 4). Although Indigenous peoples can exploit such shifts in official rhetoric, the intersection of neoliberalism, Indigenous culture and development must be critically examined because inherited political structures are not often aligned with Indigenous movements (Escobar, 2010b). In this section I outline ideas about Māori culture and development in the Treaty settlement era, and how iwi representatives are negotiating these currents.

6.2.1 Māori Development and Settlements

Chapter Two argues that neoliberal regimes tend to emphasise the capacity and agency of Indigenous people to develop and participate in the mainstream economy (Humpage, 2008, Lawrence and Gibson, 2007). Te Puni Kōkiri (TPK), the Ministry of Māori Development (see Appendix E4 for a full description of its role), captures this idea in the “Māori Potential Approach:”

It is a forward looking, innovative approach that seeks to accelerate Māori from intergenerational dependency to being high performing contributors to the New Zealand economy and society...[it focuses] on Māori people being the key catalyst for achieving exceptional life quality for themselves, their whānau [family] and their other communities of interest. It affirms that Māori have the capability, initiative and aspiration to make choices for themselves, and seeks opportunities for Māori to make choices in ways that support their cultural identity and contribute to exceptional life
However, assumptions that economic activity is acultural persist: The NZIER\textsuperscript{116} (2007: 13) asserts that “the goals and objectives of Māori businesses are little different to those of non-Māori. This is not surprising. No organisation sets out with the intention of not making profits or looking to grow.” Positioning Māori as neoliberal citizens capable of making rational economic choices responds to calls to frame Māori issues more positively (Durie, 2005), but also protects economic development from tricky issues of sovereignty and cross-cultural negotiation (Kelsey, 2005).

Further, contemporary socio-economic inequality is frequently considered in isolation from histories of colonisation, culture and politics. Gershon (2008: 425) notes that the National Party often defines Māori as a ‘race,’ rather than Indigenous people, to “sidestep obligations arising from historical injustices… [and try] to eliminate Māori as a population requiring special legislation.”

Defining socio-economic disparity through the ‘race neutral’ lens of statistics presents another strategy by positioning Māori as recipients of assistance based on income levels, rather than the relationships and rights guaranteed in the Treaty. The Chairperson of Ngā Ruahine Iwi Authority (15.05.09) recounts that:

\ldots when Don Brash made his \textit{korero} \textsuperscript{117} [speech] and Labour was in government…Labour did a full swing across like that, right into right wing territory, and really ‘out right-winged’ National… the way it was going to deal with Māori issues, right across the board, education, Ministry of Social Development, all of the key government departments, they wanted [to] desanitise anything Māori… at one stage there in the Education Department they had strong pro Māori, \textit{iwi, hapu, whanau} thrust in a lot of areas. And they then found in the post-Brash knee jerk reaction they actually said ‘no, we’re now going to direct on a needs base to the lower socioeconomic areas.’ OK…those were us anyway…but they went right through and slashed and burned a whole lot of areas that they’d already set up.

This quotation highlights the extent to which funding for Māori social programmes can be contingent on the whims of the government, and also suggests that being positioned...

\textsuperscript{116} The New Zealand Institute of Economic Research Inc. – an independent, and arguably right-wing (Kelsey, 2005) research institute – were commissioned by TPK to examine Māori development.

\textsuperscript{117} See Chapter Five for further discussion.
as individual, neoliberal citizens in economic policy is not necessarily advantageous. Indeed, framing economic inequalities in New Zealand without reference to histories of colonisation, culturally-specific ambitions in development or the position of Māori as tangata whenua circumvents questions of self-determination and sovereignty in Indigenous development (Durie, 2005).

Countering these ideas of sameness and individualism, essentialised cultural differences are also privileged in neoliberal visions of development (Kowal, 2008). The idea that “culture is a useful skill set that can assist people in their market relations” has significant political purchase in New Zealand (Gershon, 2008: 422), and policies relating to Māori development often invoke Māori culture as a tool for advancing economic achievement:

> Viewed in light of the push towards sustainable business, Māori views as applied to business may be considered enlightened. In addition, the high context culture that favours relationship building and putting faces to names suggests that Māori are well suited to play a leading role in negotiating and securing potentially lucrative deals with overseas trading groups. Many Asian groups have similar high context cultures and have often proven hard nuts to crack in the past. Māori may be the key to unlocking some of the wealth creating opportunities that have remained elusive... Capturing the positive demand for aspects of Māori culture, particularly internationally in the creative industries, would provide the catalytic spur for broadening the appeal more widely. In simple terms, it appears ‘cool’ to be Māori. Such ‘coolness,’ however ephemeral, is an important aspect underpinning the concept of the “Māori edge” which will drive further progress (NZIER, 2007: 30).

Utilitarian conceptions of Māori culture evince the fluctuation between acultural notions of Māori as neoliberal citizens and celebratory multiculturalism that affirms essentialised differences between Western norms and Indigenous culture (Gershon, 2008). Significantly, the idea of culture as a skill reduces culture to something marketable, deployable and ‘cool,’ abstracted from its political, territorial and historical referents.

In recent government policy, therefore, Māori are positioned as individual citizens and as cultural others within the New Zealand economy. Māori development objectives, like “equitable outcomes for Māori” (TPK, 2008b: 8) and success as “New Zealanders,
chapter six: Iwi Development and Postcoloniality in Taranaki

global citizens, and as Māori” (TPK, 2008b: 4) assume that Māori aspirations can be met through (neoliberal) economic development and promulgate an idea of cultural difference that is isolated from ideas of tino rangatiratanga or self-determination (Bargh, 2007b, Kelsey, 2005). Government narratives also frequently emphasise the symbiosis of Māori and New Zealand economic development, asserting that “the intertwined nature of New Zealand relations means that what delivers results for Māori also delivers results for New Zealand as a whole” (NZIER, 2007: 30). This finds easy synergy with the rhetoric of Treaty Settlements and the idea of postcolonial national unity (TPK, 2007). The intersection of neoliberalism and multiculturalism with Treaty settlements suggests the potential and risk of this historical moment. For instance, transforming historic grievances and customary rights into commercial redress obfuscates the need to negotiate and work with genuine cultural differences because “neoliberal notions of private property rights became homogenised, and Maori common property rights were eliminated” (McCormack, 2010: 27). Though postcolonial nationhood is certainly shaped through dialogue with Māori interlocutors, the needs of the governmental sovereignty and the primacy of the nation tend to direct the terms and scope of negotiations.

Development discourse is mutated through contemporary innovations, but fundamental tropes of individualism, capitalism and the state often remain unchanged (Escobar, 2010b). Further, recognition of Māori culture is limited by the circumference of understanding allowed in neoliberal development discourse, producing the view of Indigenous peoples as citizens whose culture is a commodity or skill to be utilised in the global economy (Bargh, 2007b). In Taranaki, the reconfiguration of iwi organisations through the Treaty settlement processes corresponds with iwi efforts to pursue development and negotiate currents of neoliberal, multicultural and postcolonial agendas.

6.2.2 Iwi Governance and Culture

In the Crown’s framing of Māori development, the need for Māori to find culturally acceptable modes of economic development and the potential of Māori culture as an economic tool emerge as two clear themes. Within iwi organisations in Taranaki defining, configuring and implementing the interface between the capitalist economy
and tikanga [correct procedure, custom, right] is an important and complex task. Arguments contrasting the value systems articulated in capitalist development and tikanga have been well rehearsed in Taranaki, frequently with the PKW Incorporation as a focal point. Critiques of the commercial priorities of PKW throughout the 1990s were especially acerbic, suggesting a strong contrast between Western economic relations and Māori ways of being:

The question we must ask ourselves is: Do we really want to become part of this pakeha world, this world of greed and materialism? …It is totally wrong to see the salvation of the Maori people in the adoption of pakeha culture. The pursuit of wealth and possessions, through capitalist ideals, is just another dead-end road. And while Maori people recognise the fact that we can never isolate ourselves from the global economy, we must temper it with our own unique identity and culture. Those capitalist ideals expounded by [Director of PKW] and the PKW seem to have overruled the principles of natural justice (Neilson, 10.12.1997; see also Appendix E5).

Certainly, the administration of confiscated lands by a Māori corporation (rather than by iwi or hapu), the designation of Māori as shareholders, and the desire for land to be returned to iwi in settlements are significant points of tension. However, debates about the role of PKW as a Māori organisation and as a corporate entity are also illustrative of the challenges of iwi governance – especially in a post-settlement context (pers comm., Chairperson, TRoNM, 29.04.09).

The current management of PKW also recognises these multiple demands and roles, and the potential differing values and priorities among its shareholders (see also Appendix E6). The desire to combine cultural imperatives with economic goals is clearly articulated as the strategic direction for PKW:

We must respect the past for what our tupuna [ancestors] endured to protect and preserve our lands from confiscation and sale. We must consider the realities of the present and the needs of today’s owners who often rely on the material and sometimes spiritual benefits the land can provide. And we must be ever mindful of the future, and the legacy we are to hand on to future generations…Parininihi ki Waitotara Incorporation will work towards growing the value of the Incorporation through

---

118 The Chairperson of Nga Ruahine Iwi Authority (15.05.09) commented: “we’re always edgy about being called a shareholder in someone else’s land…We don’t want to be a shareholder in someone else’s tupuna [ancestor].”
prudent management and investment of nga taonga tuku iho [treasures from our heritage/past] to benefit present and future generations of PKW shareholders in a manner our tupuna would be proud of. With our tupuna ever in mind, we are concerned to ensure that the legacy the Incorporation passes to the next generation is more than just a valuable financial asset, but includes our unique world view and system of belief as Maori and descendants of Taranaki (PKW, 2008: 13).

In this way, PKW – nominally a corporate body that operates within legislative boundaries¹¹⁹ – seeks to reconcile Māori values with contemporary economic goals and needs. PKW’s recent efforts to engage with cultural and economic have prompted a softening in tangata whenua perceptions and critiques. The Chairperson of TAIA (09.06.09), for instance, mused that:

…in the past I was actually a real objector...because I thought that they’re an organisation that’s picked up this land and now they own it and they’re making money off it. And at the time hapu like Ngati Tu wanted land back, and I didn’t see why they couldn’t give it back. ‘Cos I mean, sure they’ve got economic things, but the thing is, to me, they also had a moral duty too… [but now] you’ve got younger people in there, who’ve got a different vision about what should happen. I still believe that some of the land they should give back to iwi...and I think they should be more aware of cultural issues… but I know they’re trying to do that now…so I think that’s a move in the right direction…’cos the other thing is my family’s shareholders as well. So, yeah so I look at it from that point of view. And I mean, I don’t really care if we get money or not, because… it’s not gonna make any of us rich. So I’d be much more in favour of them, of PKW, trying to achieve some more cultural outputs…

Discussions about the role of PKW are suggestive of the complexity and dynamism of negotiations of economic development and culture in postcolonial Taranaki. Notably, PKW and iwi are not seen as mutually exclusive, and some interviewees highlighted the potential of PKW to politically and economically enhance and support iwi interests:

I think what [PKW have] tended to become is a ‘funder’ of things, and I think that’s part of that cultural thing. I mean, a lot of organisations apply to them as a funder, and I think it’s quite good that they do that actually...because they've picked up in the absence of other iwi organisations, I mean, like Te Atiawa for example, when people apply to us, we can’t give them any money because we haven’t got any to give… as long

as they look after their lands and don’t try and take the place of iwi, I think that they have got a place. Well, as long as they’ve got good people on the board… and they’re probably one of the bigger asset bases around, you know, that’s the other thing. So they could be quite a big lobby group if they would just support iwi, they could be quite good in the right places. And I think even the fact that when [Prime Minister] John Key came, PKW invited him and he came up. And we’re able to sort of use that. So that’s the advantage I think, because the clout they have got [iwi] can actually kind of, latch on to them… (Chairperson, TAIA, 09.06.09)

[Post-settlement] I’d say there’d still be a role for PKW utilising some of its corporate strengths, cos I wouldn’t be in favour of unbundling all of the PKW assets, it still makes sense, just like with the hapu and the iwi model to have some collective assets. And there are some areas that it would make sense to go joint venture with PKW on and utilise their expertise (Chairperson, Ngā Ruahine Iwi Authority, 15.05.09).

These quotations evince the strategic possibilities for PKW from an iwi perspective, a sort of interleaving of colonial legacies with postcolonial needs and aspirations. This also suggests considerable support for the current management of PKW and the potential for collaboration with iwi.

Within post-settlement iwi governance bodies, managing their asset base and revitalising culture are frequently discussed as key objectives. For example, the role of Te Kāhui o Rauru was described as “the revitalisation of Ngā Rauru Kiitahitanga, through particular means, through being kaitiaki [guardians], and the values that we have to be implemented and governed as best we can” (Tumu Whakarae, TKoR 03.06.09). Yet the interaction between economic ambitions and cultural revitalisation is complex, and many iwi representatives highlighted the differing rules and values that govern economic and cultural spheres (Tumu Whakarae, TKoR 03.06.09; Trustees, TRoNM, 10.06.09). A common strategy within many post-settlement governance bodies has been to assign economic development and cultural revitalisation to different bodies within the iwi (see Figure 12). Following settlement requirements, iwi have established trusts (charitable or private) as their primary governance entity to receive and administer settlement assets.\(^\text{121}\)

\(^{120}\) The suffix ‘-tanga’ forms a new noun (Ngā Rauru Kiitahitanga) that describes the quality derived from the base noun (Ngā Rauru Kiitahi). Ngā Rauru Kiitahitanga, therefore, encompasses the culture, beliefs, practices, identity \textit{inter alia} that come from being Ngā Rauru Kiitahi.

\(^{121}\) These organisations are also the ‘mandated iwi organisation’ under the Māori Fisheries Act (2004) and recognised as the ‘iwi authority’ under the Resource Management Act (1991).
As shown in Figure 12, Ngāti Mutunga has a Runanga of elected representatives, and three subsidiary organisations that are each responsible for different spheres of iwi governance.

For Ngāti Mutunga, this structure keeps Mutungatanga separate from economic and political activity:

…we’re very clear about when you look at the runanga [council, board], the charter, like, its purposes and objectives, it’s actually said it’s more of a political voice, responsible for growing the settlement assets and supporting and facilitating cultural endeavours of the people. So it’s not sort of tasked with being the sort of holder and protector of those [cultural] things, but more so to facilitate, to develop and grow and support where possible (Chairperson, TRoNM, 27.05.09).

**Figure 12: Ngāti Mutunga Governance Structure**

| **Ngā Uri o Ngā Tupuna o Ngāti Mutunga**  
[The Descendents of Ngāti Mutunga Tupuna]  
Five trustees are elected from the adult registered members; Trustees serve for three years. |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Runanga appoints trustees and directors to subsidiary entities.</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Te Runanga o Ngāti Mutunga**  
(Private Trust) |
| **Ngāti Mutunga Community Development Trust**  
(Charity):  
Activities include:  
(a) fostering Ngāti Mutunga tikanga, reo, kawa and korero;  
(b) support and assistance in education, housing, health care etc;  
(c) development and enhancement of community facilities;  
(d) providing funding for cultural and social development of the iwi. |
| **Ngāti Mutunga Investment Trust**  
(Charity):  
Purpose: “to receive, hold, manage and administer the Trust Fund for Investment Activities…” (TRoNM, 2007b: 4). |
| **Maruehi Fisheries Ltd**  
(Māori Authority):  

(After: TRoNM, 2007a, b, TRoNM, 2010, nd).
CHAPTER SIX: Iwi Development and Postcoloniality in Taranaki

However, managing the balance and boundaries between Westernised approaches to operating and the tikanga values is difficult. Despite delegating economic functions to subsidiary entities within Te Kāhui o Rauru (TKoR), tensions persist:

...in terms of our subsidiary companies, (TKoR is) struggling in terms of, they apply Westernised versions of a lot of things because their constitution says that, whereas our constitution has the values straight up front: tika [truth, correctness, justice], pono [truth, valid, honest], environment, those sorts of things. Whereas theirs is cover my ass, cover my ass, cover my ass... And that's where the difference is... So yeah tikanga and Westernised version, those clash. It clashes right throughout. And it's defining both, the Westernised version is quite easy to define, but when you get into the tikanga based issues and the cultural realm, I think it's easy to define, but some people think that they intertwine and marry when they don't (Tumu Whakarae, TKoR, 03.06.09).

I think we’ve got these subsidiaries in place [and] their job is to get on and do the bizo, you know, let them do it. From my perspective what you’ve got at the moment is you’ve got a whole heap of stuff still sitting in the iwi management when it should be in the subsidiaries. So I said I’m starting to look at how you shove that back down where it should be. And our job [at the runanga] is actually to look after our culture, that’s what our role is (Chairperson, Conservation Board; Representative, TKoR, 15.06.09).

Although Māori organisations are encouraged to utilise both Western and Māori ideas (Sharples, 2009); contemporary iwi administrations in Taranaki often seek to negotiate and manage the extent to which Western ideas and tikanga are ‘married’ or kept separate.

In Chapter Two I argue that rigid boundaries between Indigenous and Western cultures are problematic because neither remains completely unchanged after years of interaction. Such hybridity is a product of colonisation and development interventions, but it is also an avenue for exploring and articulating alternatives to hegemonic development processes that resist essentialism (Dirlik, 1997, Harris, 2008b, Wainwright, 2008). This complexity is evident in Taranaki:

... [take] something like a high school, for example. Well, what we said to our people is, well how do you wanna treat it? Is it an economic asset or is it a cultural asset? What they said to us is the land is cultural, the buildings are economic. So they tend to link together in many cases... [so] when you say like is the economic quite separate from
the cultural, yes and no. Yes, in that you don’t necessarily want the political stuff interfering and making rash decisions around the economic stuff, and no in that there’s some aspects of the economic development [that] are actually culturally linked… So, they can’t be completely removed, there’s gotta be some linking but you also don’t want it exposed to the ‘wheeling’s and dealings’ of what is essentially a colonial environment… (Chairperson, Conservation Board; Representative, TKoR, 15.06.09; see also Appendix E4).

This quotation highlights the futility of attempting to treat cultural and economic values as mutually exclusive, and of assuming firm boundaries between Western and Indigenous cultures and lifeworlds. In this context, one interviewee framed determining the intersection of economic and cultural-environmental values as a challenge for iwi:

Anything that we become economically involved in as an iwi, where it impacts on the environment in some way, there’s always gonna be those huge questions that we’re going to have to ask ourselves as an iwi… Because 90% of our people have an economic sense of you know…I mean you can’t do anything without some bloody form of bloody money, but at the end of the day the environment is just as important, and for me it sits alongside the economic value that I have. They’re one and the same as far as I’m concerned; for a lot of people it’s not. And it’s the same in the Māori world, Māori too are gonna be faced with the same challenges (D. Noble, Kanihi hapu, Ngā Ruahine, 13.07.09).

Culture and economy are jumbled together, producing an hybridity and dynamism that exceeds both acultural neoliberal and essentialised multicultural tropes, but also poses a predicament for iwi governance entities.

Advancing development and self-determination agendas that are shaped by local culture is complicated by the realities of postcolonial Māori communities in Taranaki. Several representatives discussed the cultural legacies of raupatu and colonisation (Section 6.1), and the disjunction between tikanga and the contemporary political and economic structures in which iwi organisations operate. One kaumatua observed that cultural knowledge is:

…being buried under bureaucracy, laws, and coercion, I guess…of government. Inundation, cultural inundation, being drowned, culturally drowned, you know. Yeah, sometimes we do it willingly, you know, because we don’t know any better (TMTB
In this sense, “the colonial past [is] constitutive of the (post)colonial present” (Mawani, 2005: 335), and is perpetuated in contemporary political fora and legal structures that require iwi organisations’ structures and processes to be, at least somewhat, analogous. Finding means for cultural expression amongst the landscapes and infrastructures that have accumulated and been established is therefore part of the challenge – as the Manager, Ngati Tama Development Trust (13.05.09) notes, “it’s concepts, it’s, how do you provide for customary practices in the reality of 2000 and whenever?” The Tumu Whakarae of TKoR (03.06.09) also suggests that:

… applying those tikanga rules, I don’t think is as hard a thing as defining them into more detail…because we’re still going through an evolutionary stage of defining that tikanga and defining what it means and grasping back those teachings of the past, or the intent of those teachings of the past and trying to live it in a global world…and that’s about being citizens in the world, all those sorts of things.

Much like seeking a predefined postdevelopment alternative, then, postcolonial Indigenous alternatives to colonial models of development cannot be simply based on extant traditions or predetermined by fixed and essentialised cultural differences.

Therefore, iwi organisations in Taranaki are working the spaces of postcolonial opportunities to explore and create ways of developing that draw on multiple, dynamic traditions. As discussed in the next section, part of this work requires finding out and working with the expectations and priorities amongst iwi members and working out “what it is, and firstly who ourselves are, and whether or not we all sort of agree that this is more appropriate than that” (Manager, Ngati Tama Development Trust, 13.05.09). Iwi governance and development, therefore, is marked by the dilemmas of postcoloniality and hybridity.

### 6.2.3 Planning and Managing Development

For postdevelopment scholars, focussing on local cultures of development and relationships between communities and resources is an important mode of building futures that go exceed development discourse and making space for multiplicity and diversity (Escobar, 2005, 2010a, Ziai, 2007). In Taranaki iwi management plans have
emerged as a strategy for exploring and articulating *iwi* development aspirations, while strengthening relationships within *iwi*. This focus on identifying *iwi* goals and strategies for self-determination reflects the wider context of negotiating history, and suggests the potential of using “the state’s language and tools to identify and reclaim their own uses of landscape” (Pinkerton et al., 2008: 352).

Although *iwi* governance entities formed through the settlement process are influenced by the Crown’s requirements (Tofa, 2007), many *iwi* representatives perceived the need to strengthen and rebuild *iwi* governance structures and the settlement process as a vehicle for this:

…the settlement process was more about getting ourselves organised so we could actually engage, more so than the money. So if you look at the benefits, yeah the money’s good cos you’ve got something to grow, and some crumbs to sort of work with, but at the end of the day it’s about becoming organised and having a structure and being a little more active and having a better ability to engage (Chairperson, TRoNM, 27.05.09).

*iwi* management plans are an extension of this process. As a representative of Ngāti Ruanui and Ngā Rauru Kiitahi (Manager, Ngāti Ruanui Tahua, 04.05.09) notes, building alternative futures requires developing a vision of what is desired:

…capitalism essentially is rampant at the expense of all else and…it’s taken a big hit over the last twelve months and it’ll make people rethink capitalism. I think the time is absolutely brilliant for Indigenous paradigms to be part of the new order of thinking. But you can’t do any of that if you don’t have your own planning, have your own aspirations sort of lined up and decide on what you might wanna do.

In Taranaki, several *iwi* have undertaken planning work to form strategic plans. Notably, strengthening intra-*iwi* relationships and understanding often forms a key motivation for strategic planning:

…we wanted to use that [planning exercise] for Ngā Ruahine to see ‘oh it’s costing us,’ ‘what opportunities are there for us to look at in the future?’ ‘how are we now?’ and yeah, just to get us talking to each other, that’s the reason why we did it…it’s just sort of gearing ourselves up for the next step [Treaty Settlement], that’s if we do decide to take that…and also ’cos we’ve actually had a lot of internal strife… the positive things are was the fact that it was a forum for positive engagement for Ngā Ruahine *uri*
[descendents], you know and they could see discuss positive values, positive pathways. Yeah, so instead of getting involved in a circular backbiting negative approach, yes we wanted to sort of start fostering positive relationships internally… (Chairperson, Ngā Ruahine Iwi Authority, 15.05.09, see also Appendix E7).

To this end, involving as many iwi members as possible in the planning work was also a priority (Chairperson, Taranaki Iwi Authority, 10.07.09).

Mawani (2005: 335-336) asserts that in the shadows of colonial policies “Aboriginality can never live up to…expectations of authenticity,” and that while government institutions seek to ‘adjudicate’ Aboriginal identities, “many communities are also contemplating similar questions.” In Taranaki, strategic planning provides a forum for exploring postcolonial Māori identities and values, and how iwi members understand development. Taranaki iwi engaged a consultant firm to help write their management plan, but:

…something we were really mindful of is that we wanna be in control of the process. [The consulting firm are] not gonna lead the process or tell us what we want and what our people want. It was really to try and pull it together and have a plan for a five, ten year period that gives us a direction. And people, our members have been involved in that, but it’s not [the iwi authority’s] plan. Yeah, it actually belongs to the people…but that was more to get to finding the direction of where we’re going, you know, where our people want us to go (Chairperson, Taranaki Iwi Authority, 10.07.09).

The Chairperson of TRoNM (27.05.09) similarly reflects that planning “was good because it actually gets you thinking about well, ‘I don’t know, that sounds a bit stupid, how practical is this?’ And do we really think, you know, is that really the approach we wanna take?” Strategic planning, therefore, has been a vehicle for eliciting ideas about economic development, participation in Western economic structures and kaupapa Māori, and in a sense, ‘reclaim modernity’ by thinking through participation in national and global political and economic fora in terms of cultural goals (Goodale, 2006).

Recently produced iwi management plans articulate values and goals, and evoke approaches to development motivated by cultural revitalisation, rather than the pursuit of profit. The ambit of iwi governance bodies thus encompasses a diverse range of
activities to advance *iwi* (see, for example, Figure 13) and addresses the combination of economic, cultural and political ambitions:

> We want to be culturally strong, economically secure...the focus was in terms of, the balance between the two and how we facilitate and support those cultural things and that’s, you know, the environment and stuff is part of our culture (Chairperson, TRoNM, 27.05.09).

What emerges, then, is neither a complete rejection nor embrace of the Crown or ‘development’ (as an exogenously defined logic), but a negotiation in which economic security – achieved through investments, stocks, fisheries, asset management *inter alia* – and cultural security are intertwined. The Chairperson of Taranaki Iwi (10.07.09) looks to successful business development as “something that’s gonna, you know, basically make some money for us so that we can put it back in to basically drive where we’re wanting to go.” Embedded in this approach is the view that “if you’ve got economic clout, you can do whatever you like” (Chairperson, TAIA, 09.06.09) and that “economic clout that will actually sort of force changes” (Manager, Ngati Tama Development Trust, 13.05.09).

**Figure 13: Strategic Vision of Te Runanga o Ngāti Mutunga**

(Source: TRoNM, 2008: 4)
Although Indigenous self-determination and development is often framed as ‘separatist’ (Carter and Hollinsworth, 2009, Robbins, 2010), in Taranaki ‘development’ is often understood through the rubric of the Treaty of Waitangi and the postcolonial nation. As the Tumu Whakarae of TKoR (03.06.09) explained:

…we didn’t settle on the quantum that we [would need] to be wealth creators for our people, you know, revitalisation of Ngā Rauru people through whichever means, through education through health, through environment, through marae development, through reo development, is a big task. And it’s some of the core functions of this government so we need to get into bed with the government…

However, interactions with the Crown must support the security of iwi, because “it’s about our self determination, it’s not about theirs. We can tick their box if they want that top box to be ticked, but the real investment for us is what we’re investing in within our people” (Tumu Whakarae, TKoR, 03.06.09). Recent experience with contract-based service delivery by iwi organisations is unfavourably viewed because “you’re sort of forever wavering on the favour of a government department to get resources” (Chairperson, Ngā Ruahine Iwi Authority, 15.05.09). For this reason, the Chairperson of Taranaki Iwi (10.07.09) suggests that “I think we need to work out how we can actually make ourselves more sustainable, rather than just being part of a service that the Crown should be providing anyway.” These discussions are suggestive of the potential of collaboration and partnership in reconfiguring Crown-Māori relationships (Section 6.3.1), and support academic analyses that argue for mutuality as a basis for Indigenous self-determination and postcolonial nationhood (Chapter Two).

Planning as a strategy brings its own challenges. Several interviewees critiqued the increasing bureaucratisation of iwi governance (Te Pepeke Mahiri, TKoR, 15.06.09; TMTB Member, Kaumatua, 21.07.09; P. Haami, TRoNM, 10.06.09). Iwi chairpersons were cognisant of this issue, for instance, noting that:

… I wouldn’t want us to lose our grass roots people for delivering what is essentially a Westernised version of a lot of things and that’s why we’ve got directors in there to provide that expertise… (Tumu Whakarae, TKoR, 03.06.09).

That’s been the challenge because one of the initial objectives was to ensure that the plan was written in a language that our people would understand so we tried to avoid
the planning type language, but then...there's only certain ways you can word something (Chairperson, TRoNM, 27.05.09).

Recent planning work is thus a ‘cross-cultural’ endeavour; and it is consequential, though the consequences are yet unknown. Wainwright and Bryan (2009) have observed that cartographic-legal strategies to Indigenous property rights ‘reoriented’ the debate towards litigation; \textit{iwi} planning work may forge a similar re-orientation by appropriating a lexicon associated with councils and businesses for \textit{iwi} development. \textit{iwi} plans certainly evince a cultural hybridity and ambiguity; they reveal essentialised cultural boundaries as dehisced, while pursuing cultural revitalisation, they articulate ambitions for autonomy and self-determination, while affirming postcolonial partnership with the Crown. As Dirlik (1997) noted, hybridity is a predicament, and contemporary \textit{iwi} governance is an effort to grapple with this predicament, combining at times discordant elements in ways that reflect and produce a fluid conception of both culture and development. Yet just as documentation does not secure justice (Wainwright and Bryan, 2009); in \textit{iwi} planning, “it’s identifying our stance on a lot of issues, and then it’s about communicating that, it’s about us being active and proactive in implementing it” (Tumu Whakarae, TKoR, 03.06.09). Taken in the wider context of the Treaty settlement era, contemporary work in \textit{iwi} development may promote significant transformations.

### 6.3 Postcolonial Relationships

The history that precedes contemporary relationships within and between \textit{iwi}, and with the Crown, yields a difficult terrain for partnership and consensus. The \textit{raupatu}, and the cascade of political, cultural, economic and social consequences it triggered, “still lingers with us. I mean, we still sort of have those, the disadvantages of the \textit{raupatu}, and they rise up sort of every week” (Chairperson, TRoNM, 27.05.09). In this section I explore the negotiation of relationships, collaborations and alliances to advance \textit{iwi} interests and postcolonial partnership in Taranaki.

#### 6.3.1 Crown-Māori Relations in the Treaty Settlement Era

Chapter Two argues that Indigenous development is entwined with such issues as Indigenous-government relationships and ideas of Indigenous self-determination and
nationhood. In New Zealand, the Treaty settlement era and bi/multicultural policies ostensibly change Crown-Māori relationships. However, these changes tend to be ambiguous and incidental; political tinkering, not substantive and innately positive change. As one iwi representative put it, changes “are happening but very slowly, extremely slowly. Yes, it’s like watching paint dry” (Chairman, Ngā Ruahine Iwi Authority, 15.05.09). In essence, tensions persist despite Treaty settlements because the terms of postcolonial sovereignty, territoriality and plurality remain unsettled.

For some critics, precisely because reconciliations operate within the boundaries of absolute Crown sovereignty, Indigenous peoples remain subjugated (Muldoon, 2008). Taiaiake Alfred (2006: 325), for example, asserts that “sovereignty is an exclusionary concept rooted in an adversarial and coercive Western notion of power” and so “Acceptance of ‘Aboriginal rights’ in the context of state sovereignty represents the culmination of white society’s efforts to assimilate indigenous peoples.” In New Zealand, settlement processes emphasise ‘moving on’ from grievances and contemporary ‘mutuality’ (OTS, 2004). Yet, even Crown officials have acknowledged the difficulty of harmonising Indigeneity and Crown sovereignty:

…any recognition by the state of tangata whenua, as an ethnic sub-group with a special relationship to the state is inconsistent with the theory of popular sovereignty… The nation-state ideology insists that the highest expression of a people’s collective identity is statehood. In New Zealand this idea is incapable of meeting the expectations of the Treaty of Waitangi… The nation state idea is part of the colonial legacy and not surprisingly does not correspond to the realities and needs of the Maori. 122

It is precisely this tension between Indigeneity and Crown sovereignty that is being negotiated, contested and configured through such processes as Treaty settlements, but also in the political, economic and cultural development work by iwi organisations.

Although the Crown asserts that Treaty settlements are “a necessary first step towards establishing the healthy and robust relationships” (OTS, 2004: 4), many iwi representatives are sceptical of the extent to which settlements change the Crown-iwi relationship in a practical sense. For post-settlement entities, advancing iwi aspirations is

---

frequently contingent on working within the Crown’s frameworks and advocacy that
attracts the attention and support of the Crown:

… in terms of engaging on those sorts of levels [with the Crown], it’s also dependent
on the relationship you create because they can like it, they can’t like it and they can just
fob you off if you create, well, if you create too much tension. You can address the
issues, negotiate about the issues, but I think you’ve gotta be really concise about what
your position is on those issues (Tumu Whakarae, TKoR, 03.06.09).

This issue is further compounded by diversity and hierarchies within the Crown, such
that agreements and negotiations can vary:

But we still come across a lot of stumbling blocks with the direct relationships, like we
can ring the Minister of Treaty Settlements, Minister of Māori affairs, and [say] we’ve
got āwangawanga [concerns, issues] with you, please come hither and let’s talk about it
and then see what the issue is. But when it subsequently gets to the bureaucracy or to
the departments it gets somewhat nullified because we don’t tick the box that they want
to tick (Tumu Whakarae, TKoR, 03.06.09).

Several iwi representatives also noted that the ‘full and final’ nature of Treaty
settlements and perceived improvement in socio-economic positioning has produced
ambiguity in post-settlement relationships with the Crown:

…yeah, especially outfits like the Department of Conservation, I think the councils and
the Crown, yeah no, this is the end of it, you’ve had your settlement and so anything
commercial don’t come and talk to us, but we might look at some of this customary
stuff that’s not going to cost us any money and your rights are limited to custom
(Manager, Ngati Tama Development Trust, 13.05.09).

These quotations suggest that it is unlikely that Treaty settlements have restored a
partnership relationship between Māori and the Crown, because – like in the Treaty
settlement process itself – the Crown continues to define the terms of interaction. As
the Manager, Ngati Tama Development Trust (13.05.09) commented:

…the Waitangi Tribunal report talks about the never ending war, and I think that it is
today as it was, and it’s continuing and it pervades. And it’s never ending, just because
you’ve been through a settlement process doesn’t mean that the Crown automatically
changes its spots and starts behaving. It’s like any recidivist criminal, they’ll carry on
doing what they've done for as long as they can get away with it without getting held to account or brought to task.

Instead of closure, then, settlements seem to produce a series of incompletes; an incomplete interrogation of history (Muldoon, 2005), an incomplete reconciliation of indigeneity and nationhood, and an unsettled and unsettling foundation for postcolonial nationhood.

6.3.2  Treaty Partnership: Negotiating the Relationship

In Taranaki and New Zealand the potential of bicultural nationhood and a genuine Treaty partnership between Māori and the Crown/Pakeha remains an important idea (Gagne, 2009, Johnson, 2008). Though ideas of *tino rangatiratanga* and *mana whenua* are often treated as a threat to national unity, in Taranaki there is a magnanimous willingness among *tangata whenua* to work towards a more genuine partnership with the Crown. The Tumu Whakarae of TKoR (03.06.09), for instance, stated that “we wanna restore honour to the Crown, we wanna do that. It’s whether they want to do it or not. We can only help them if they wanna be helped.” This indicates that many *iwi* representatives perceive that the institutions and spatialities established through colonialism can be hybridised to make space for indigeneity and a more genuine Treaty partnership.

The idea of partnership between the Crown and Māori is founded in the Treaty of Waitangi (see Chapter One); the three Treaty articles form the basis for *iwi* conceptualisations of their relationship with the Crown. Ngā Rauru Kiitahi summarise the Treaty as providing the Crown authority to govern, and providing *iwi* the authority to determine their future, and the authority for all to belong as equals (Te Kahui o Rauru, nd). *Iwi* development and self-determination, therefore, does not obviate the Crown’s obligations to Māori as New Zealanders; and post-settlement entities do not aspire to “do what the government is already supposed to be doing and what we pay taxes for the government to do” (Chairperson, Conservation Board; Representative, TKoR, 15.06.09). Much like the Crown, most *iwi* representatives positioned Māori as part of New Zealand, treating national and Indigenous identities as compatible. Indeed, asserting an identity as New Zealanders challenges stereotypes of Māori as separate from and different to other New Zealanders:
… we just want what’s best for us, and they probably want what’s best for the community as well. And I keep saying to people, you know, we’re part of the community too, you know, we want what you want. We want our kids educated, we want good roads, we want all that sorta stuff that they want (Chairperson, TAIA, 09.06.09).

Improving the Treaty relationship, and working out answers to tricky questions like “How does the Crown view Rangātiratanga?”, is a key part of postcolonialisation in New Zealand (Te Kahui o Rauru, nd: 3). This willingness for partnership may partly stem from a “convivial tension” between coloniser and colonised in postcolonial communities based on the shared history and anticipated future of coexistence (Mbembe, 2006: 382). For example, when considering issues of environmental management and development, there is a fundamental difference between the Crown, tangata whenua and companies: “we’re there not to make a profit; we’re here forever and a day. The only like minds for us in forever and a day is the Crown [and] local government” (Tumu Whakarae, TKoR, 03.06.09).

In New Zealand the term ‘Treaty partnership’ often features in political rhetoric, but iwi representatives questioned the nature of this partnership and the Crown’s willingness to develop a relationship that more genuinely reflects the Treaty:

… [the Crown] believe that they’re born to rule, they’ve been put there by a process that suits them... There are individual politicians who are genuine in their commitment to wanting to do better, but collective behaviour, you can get away with a lot you know, blame everyone else. And I think not too many people want to put their head too far over the parapet when the natives are throwing stones (Manager, Ngati Tama Development Trust, 13.05.09).

For some iwi contemplating settlements, the future relationship with the Crown – and the continued relevance and recourse to the Treaty – is also key issue. A member of Ngā Ruahine wonders:

…whether or not the settlements are a good thing for our people, for us as a whole, I don’t know…the settlements are supposed to make us able to look after ourselves in an economic sense, ’cos that’s all it is, economically it’s supposed to be able to look after Māori. For me, it also means this, that the government no longer has an obligation to
Māori, yeah. That’s what I see… that they’re saying ‘we’ve now given you the ability and the opportunity to be able to look after yourself, as a people, not as an individual, but as a people, as a group of people who can do A, B, C and D. So, we no longer have to make things available to you’…I mean the Crown has said that they would like all settlements to be completed by 2014. That’s OK, but after the 2014 finishes, and you’ve all got your little settlements, no matter how big or small they are, what obligations then does the Crown have, to continue to say ‘this is Māori education, we’re gonna continue to fund that,’ or your marae’s ‘we will continue to make funding available.’ Because then everything will become mainstream, that’s the picture that I see is gonna happen to us… where does Maori go after 2014?…yeah, cos at the moment we are a unique group (D. Noble, Kanihi hapu, Ngā Ruahine, 13.07.09).

This anxiety and uncertainty about the post-settlement future indicates the significance of the Treaty relationship and notion of partnership for iwi conceptions of New Zealand and their place within it.

That the Treaty partnership is a key rubric for conceptualising Crown-Māori relationships suggests an important point of difference with international critiques of settlements and Indigenous rights: Even though contemporary regimes strengthen and entrench the institutions and sovereignty claimed via colonialism, many Māori in New Zealand ascribe to ideas of nationhood. Negotiating the relationship between Indigenous peoples and the Crown, and prising open the connections between nation, territoriality and sovereignty to make spaces for indigeneity becomes the key task for postcolonialisation. As Gagne (2009) and Robbins (2010) have noted, Indigenous development is seldom aimed at separatism. Indeed, though economic development ambitions are frequently aligned with the desire to have a stronger political voice in Taranaki, such strengthening of iwi is seen as necessary to have a more equitable relationship. Te Kāhui o Rauru, for example, have generated the model below to conceptualise their relationship with the Crown (see Figure 14).
The Tumu Whakarae at TKoR (03.06.09) explained that, despite settlement, the *iwi* position on this scale had changed little:

Hmm it’s our dependency, we haven’t moved. Because a lot of little things, joint decision making on a lot of stuff, we’re dependent on the Crown on lots of things. Our people in general, we’re dependent on them in a lot of areas for social delivery, for a lot of delivery… We’re not going to be able to be, as an individual *iwi*, competitive in a lot of areas in the formation or the delivery, but we’re definitely able to participate with *iwi*, of like-mind *iwi*, and get a lot of things, a lot of things through, a lot of things done. We could be policy makers, policy setters, of a lot of health initiatives and environmental initiatives and all those sorts of things. And I think that, well I think that and developing top end relationships is the key for any of this stuff.

Therefore, Te Kāhui o Rauru invoke collaboration and partnership with the Crown as a modality for advancing *iwi* aspirations and as a goal in their work as *iwi* representatives (see also Appendix E7).

In sum, the Treaty settlement era promotes a shift in the Crown-Māori relationship away from being “based on a right to be and a grievance that we had against the Crown” (Tumu Whakarae, TKoR, 03.06.09), but may not secure a genuinely postcolonial partnership or mutuality between *iwi* and the Crown. Yet it also indicates that the Crown and *iwi* are not bound together (and apart) through lines of opposition; instead, they are complexly entangled.
6.3.3 Regional Collaboration and Strategism

The Crown has long attempted to deal with Taranaki at a regional scale to reduce the complexity of multiple hapu and iwi – regional bodies like the Taranaki Māori Trust Board (TMTB) evince such a strategy, and service delivery organisations frequently operate at a pan-iwi level (see Appendix E8 for details). Indeed, the complexity of iwi and hapu networks and relationships within Taranaki are perhaps poorly understood by those outside the region: “a lot of people outside of the region or other iwi don’t fully understand the nature of our iwi, sort of, that we’ve got eight iwi and three waka [canoes], they just think oh Taranaki’s Taranaki” (Chairperson, TRoNM, 27.05.09). Past regional organisations have seldom had authority to represent iwi and hapu, and there is a distinct difference between these Māori organisations and the runanga that are formed for Treaty settlement processes:

...we’re promoting people to talk to iwi... because Māori organisations, I mean, you know they’ll usually be there just for a kaupapa [particular purpose, topic, scheme], you know, like health or whatever, and you know the iwi are gonna be there forever… (Chairperson, TAIA, 09.06.09).

Developing a regional voice to represent Taranaki in regional and national fora has been a focus, particularly for settlement negotiations over water and Mount Taranaki. The idea of regional collaboration draws on clear ties between the eight iwi that exist before and beyond contemporary demands on iwi governance bodies – the relationship between iwi in Taranaki “is a carpet right around the mountain of whanaungatanga [relationship, kinship], interrelationships” (Interview, TMTB member, Kaumatua, 31.08.2006 in Tofa, 2007: 119). A recent innovation in Taranaki has been the formation of the Iwi Chairs Forum (ICF). This body was established via the Department of Conservation (DoC) “but of course the issues that they discuss are far broader than conservation” (Chairperson, Conservation Board; Representative, TKoR, 15.06.09). The ICF seeks to “provide a collective voice for all Taranaki Iwi in order to influence the social, cultural, economic, environmental and political development and direction for

123 Whanaungatanga refers to: “a relationship through shared experiences and working together which provides people with a sense of belonging. It develops as a result of kinship rights and obligations, which also serve to strengthen each member of the kin group. It also extends to others to whom one develops a close familial, friendship or reciprocal relationship” (Te Whanake, 2003-2010).
CHAPTER SIX: Iwi Development and Postcoloniality in Taranaki

the Taranaki Region.” Using the regional scale suggests an attempt to present a stronger voice politically and explore economies of scale, but also presents dilemmas.

The drive for regional collaboration in Taranaki has become increasingly strong, especially as iwi entities have become stabilised in post-settlement bureaucracies. Ngā Rauru Kiitahi, for instance, have “been quite deliberate about the need to be more regional focused, more national focused and potentially more international focused, rather than looking at ourselves, navel gazing all the time” (Chairperson, Conservation Board; Representative, TKoR, 15.06.09). This partly reflects the disparity between the multiple demands on iwi governance bodies and the available resources and capacity to engage with various institutions:

…we get bloody letters from all sorts of government entities about consultation or new documents or policies, and all that… I think [another Chairperson’s] approach is he just throws it in the bin, I sort of look at some of them and think, you know, ideally I’d love to respond to this because it’s an issue that’s going to have an impact on us next couple of years. But yeah, you’ve just gotta get, sort of, yeah, get hard really and just say look we can’t deal with that now (Chairperson, TRoNM, 27.05.09).

In this context, many iwi representatives identified potential benefits of strengthening ties between iwi and the possibility of sharing work. This is particularly true in terms of environmental management, where ecological connections traverse iwi boundaries, and inter-iwi collaboration may yield a stronger political voice (Chapter Seven). The need to participate at a national level is also a powerful motivation for regional collaboration (see also Chapter Eight).

Creating a unified political voice for iwi in Taranaki is not without potential difficulties. Reconciling differences within and between iwi is both delicate and time-consuming, and often confronts ‘historical baggage’ (Tumu Whakarae, TKoR, 03.06.09). As the Manager of Ngati Tama Development Trust (13.05.09) observes:

…one of the outcomes or results of the raupatu is lack of resource people, lack of resources, and a whole lot of mistrust and so...and it’s building those, I suppose, that trust within whanau, within hapu, within iwi and then within the collective, collectives of iwi. It’s gonna take some time.

Differences between and within *iwi* are somewhat amplified through the Treaty settlement process, especially between settled and ‘non-settled’ *iwi*. Although many critique the limited quantum returned through settlements, these assets do make a significant difference for *iwi* organisations. The Manager of Ngati Ruanui Tahua (04.05.09) commented that post-settlement *iwi*:

...have got enablement which allows them to sit down and think a little bit, and pick up the knowledge that’s required to operate *i te ao hurihuri*, in today’s world. So we’re able to get people away to listen to all this good knowledge that’s going on and then sort of re-gauge our thinking. We still have to deal to the day-to-day needs and wants of our shareholders but basically we’ve got breathing space to do other things...whereas pre-settlement *iwi* don’t have that luxury. So you’ll get central local government and NGOs...they’re less likely to actually do the bizo with ‘em because they don’t know what the nature of the partnership is, they don’t have a clear indication where they might go as an entity, as a pre-settlement entity. So you have all of those fundamental things in the post-settlement entity.

The Chairperson of TAIA (09.06.09) confirms this view, noting that settlement:

...just gives the *iwi* the freedom to plan and do things that we don’t. We don’t have the money for a start, the resourcing. But the other thing that we don’t have is that common *kaupapa*, you know, that they’ve sorted out... As I see it, that’d probably be our first sort of job as an *iwi* is to figure out what our *kaupapa* is, get a buy in from everyone and then work out how we’re gonna work it. 'Cos I think that without that shared vision, if you like, then get people running round trying to do all sorts of things but without achieving anything.

In terms of political alignments, the absence of a shared *kaupapa* and stable mandate for ‘non-settled’ *iwi* representatives was perceived as the greatest potential issue (Chairperson, TRoNM, 27.05.09; Tumu Whakarae, TKoR, 03.06.09), but as the quotation below attests, differing approaches to the settlement era relationship building are not an insuperable barrier to regional collaboration:

...being in a pre-settlement governance entity you’re more likely to be concerned that your brothers might be running away before you can get to base one. So that’s an ongoing responsibility of post-settlement governance entities to be communicating with their pre-settlement neighbours...Trust is high on the agenda and, you know, trust
is only afforded when you’re speaking face to face with them all the time…I’d say overall generally no, it wouldn’t be an issue because we’re all linked by whakapapa, it’s probably the biggest saving grace for us. That’s tempered somewhat by the modern day gladiator or commercial gladiator that some iwi have had and their trust hasn’t been their bond which has caused some friction, but step out of the corporate settings back on to your marae, where we all come from at the end of the day, we’re all one people…
(Manager of Ngati Ruanui Tahua, 04.05.09).

Therefore, intra-iwi and inter-iwi differences play out at a regional level, potentially complicating but not preventing collaborative efforts. In a way, these tensions suggest an innate friction in re-scaling iwi governance and transforming how iwi represent and interact with other organisations. As the Manager, Ngati Tama Development Trust (13.05.09) observes:

…there’s a need for us to collectivise, but by doing that each of the iwi either relinquish some of this rangatiratanga, delegate it somewhere else, or it’s a cumbersome machine to get pan iwi or multi iwi organisations functioning. It’s all that sort of rights and responsibilities, and there will always be the disgruntled when it comes to Māori issues; everyone spooks at a noisy Māori now, including Māori organisations.

Collaboration between iwi then requires significant trust, and in this context the ICF has become a particularly important addition to the geopolitical landscape in Taranaki, especially as it is widely viewed as a template for regional collaboration in any settlement for Mount Taranaki (Chapter Eight). It provides opportunities for “us all to come together… [and] we can, not only keep up with issues and what’s going on, but also that’s that relationship [with] each other that [we] really haven’t had to that extent” (Chairperson, TAIA, 09.06.09). The Chairperson of the TRoNM (27.05.09) similarly observed that:

I think we’ve come a long way the last sorta year or so…like we talk about manakitanga, and manakitanga goes both ways you know. It’s, to be greedy and selfish is going to be something that undermines any collaborative effort because you know when you enter into relationships or when you’re working with people in other groups you’ve gotta have a certain level of manakitanga.
When considering such topics as the mountain or freshwater, trust and magnanimity between *iwi* will be central to utilising the combined political and economic strength as a region to negotiate with the Crown.

### 6.4 Entanglements and Possibility in Postcolonial Spaces

This Chapter explores *iwi* approaches to development in the Treaty settlement era. Despite the apparently ‘full and final’ nature of settlements, postcolonial coexistence in Taranaki is an ongoing relationship that remains fundamentally unsettled. *Iwi* negotiations of the settlement era complexly entangle Indigenous agency and (arguably) neocolonial processes creating fragile openings that challenge colonial structures and assert interdependence and plurality. This context frames the prospects, potential and dilemmas in current efforts towards greater collaboration between *iwi* organisations and local government and DoC in environmental management.
In Chapter Three I argue that government strategies for environmental management assert and produce particular sets of relationships between government, citizens, nature and resources *inter alia*, rendering some actions and voices more legitimate than others in environmental decision-making. In Taranaki, the inscription of colonial geographical imaginaries transformed ‘wastelands’ to pastures under free-hold title, and some forests to ‘conservation lands,’ all under the auspices of Crown ownership and management (Chapter Five). Under this regime, opportunities for Māori participation and the expression of Indigenous relationships with the land and resources have been severely limited. This Chapter explores three themes. Firstly, I argue that current iterations of participation tend to operate within pre-existing politico-legal frameworks, enervating Māori participation and efforts to protect and assert their interests. This is exacerbated by historical, political and economic inequalities that permeate relationships between *iwi*, *hapu*, government organisations and developers. However, increased interaction and relationship-building between Crown and *iwi* organisations has promoted mutual learning and areas of commonality. In Section 7.2 I explore this process and the strategic building of relationships. Finally, I argue that wider questions of postcolonial governance, authority and control pervade environmental management dilemmas. In essence, the roles of
tangata whenua and government organisations are continually reshaped through quotidian processes like resource consents and in larger scale processes like settlements. Environmental management, then, becomes a site for the ongoing negotiation of postcolonial coexistence within the Treaty settlement era and broader context of iwi development.

7.1 Participating in Environmental Management in Taranaki

In Taranaki, Crown ownership of land and resources was achieved through confiscations and reinforced through managerial processes that exclude “iwi physically from their natural resources, then from planning decisions and even the development rights over these resources” (Memon and Perkins, 2000: 39). In this section I explore recent efforts at participatory approaches to environmental management deployed by various government bodies in Taranaki (see Table 14 and Map 5). I argue that such inclusion is limited so as to affirm and perpetuate Crown sovereignty and authority over the environment.

**Table 14: Local Government Agencies in Taranaki**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation Name</th>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Functions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taranaki Regional Council</td>
<td>TRC</td>
<td>Regional Councils’ functions include:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• “the establishment, implementation, and review of objectives, policies, and methods to achieve integrated management of the natural and physical resources of the region;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• “the preparation of objectives and policies in relation to any actual or potential effects of the use, development, or protection of land which are of regional significance…</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• “the control of the taking, use, damming, and diversion of water, and the control of the quantity, level, and flow of water in any water body…” (RMA, 1991b, s30(1)(a,b,c)).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Plymouth District Council</td>
<td>NPDC</td>
<td>District Councils’ functions include:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Taranaki District Council</td>
<td>STDC</td>
<td>• “the establishment, implementation, and review of objectives, policies, and methods to achieve integrated management of the effects of the use, development, or protection of land and associated natural and physical resources of the district;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stratford District Council</td>
<td></td>
<td>• “the control of any actual or potential effects of the use, development, or protection of land… (RMA, 1991b, s31(1)(a,b)).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Conservation</td>
<td>DoC</td>
<td>DoC’s administers the Conservation Act (1987), and its functions include managing “for conservation purposes, all land, and all other natural and historic resources, for the time being held under this Act, and</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER SEVEN: Environmental Management and Postcoloniality

all other land and natural and historic resources whose owner agrees with the Minister that they should be managed by the Department” (Conservation Act, 1987, s6(a)).

MAP 5: LOCAL GOVERNMENT BOUNDARIES IN Taranaki

Kindly provided by Taranaki Regional Council.

125 Kindly provided by Taranaki Regional Council.
Chapter Seven: Environmental Management and Postcoloniality

7.1.1 Values and Frameworks

Legislation directs the management of resources by local agencies, and consequentially, opportunities for Māori involvement. Taking Escobar’s (1995) idea of systemic relationships between institutions, resources and discourses, legislation and the policies developed under it, provide insight to the ‘rules of the game’ and the ties that bring together particular resources and sites to specific managers and policies. Legislative reforms since the late 1980s infer a (belated) recognition of Māori rights under the Treaty (see Table 15) and have prompted significant changes in environmental management. The Resource Management Act (RMA, 1991), for example, re-defined the purpose of management as promoting “the sustainable management of natural and physical resources” and introduced an effects-based resource management system characterised by devolution to district and regional councils (RMA, 1991b, s5(1)).

Table 15: Excerpts from Relevant Legislation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legislation</th>
<th>Notable Sections</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conservation Act (1987)</td>
<td>Section 4 states that: “This Act shall so be interpreted and administered as to give effect to the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi.” This is arguably the strongest requirement to recognise and provide for Māori rights and interests and has had a significant influence on the DoC (Chapter Seven).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Resource Management Act (1991) | Section 6 includes “the relationship of Māori and their culture and traditions with their ancestral lands, water, sites, waahi tapu [sacred sites], and other taonga [treasured resources]” as a matter of ‘national importance’ that councils must ‘recognise and provide for.’  
Section 7 requires councils to “have particular regard to” kaitiakitanga and the ‘ethic of stewardship’ amongst a range of other values.  
Section 8 states: “In achieving the purpose of this Act, all persons exercising functions and powers under it, in relation to managing the use, development, and protection of natural and physical resources, shall take into account the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi (Te Tiriti o Waitangi).” |
| Local Government Act (2002)    | Section 14(1)(d) states that “a local authority should provide opportunities for Māori to contribute to its decision-making processes.”  
Section 81(1) further requires local government to: “(a) establish and maintain processes to provide opportunities for Māori to contribute to the decision-making processes of the local authority; and (b) consider ways in which it may foster the development of Māori capacity to contribute to the decision-making processes of the local authority.” |

Under the Town and Country Planning Act, a prescriptive, activities-based zoning approach was used.

126
Under the RMA environmental management is a circular process which involves several steps, each of which is very important. As the Director of Resource Management, TRC (08.07.09) explains, “you have your policy, implemented through consents, compliance monitoring, ‘State of the Environment’ monitoring which is the general monitoring...then you have effectiveness monitoring and then you’re back to the policy, you go around and around with community input at the policy setting stage.” Provisions within the RMA specify opportunities for Māori values and interests to be considered within this process (see Table 15). Following these requirements, councils are obliged to consult tangata whenua during plan and policy preparation and it is considered ‘good practice’ (rather than a legal duty) to consult tangata whenua “where their proposals may affect the matters referred to in” Sections 6, 7 and 8 (MfE, 2003: 3)). In response to the RMA and Local Government Act (2002), councils in Taranaki have developed procedures to ensure consultation meets legal requirements, enhances relationships and provides ‘genuine two-way communication’ (Manager, Community Services and Development, STDC, 27.05.09).

However, provisions in the RMA have often fallen short of iwi expectations. Differing perceptions of the meaning and frequency of consultation and influence of tangata whenua have been, and continue to be, a source of tension in Taranaki (Manager, Environment and Information Services, STDC, 27.05.09; Subdivision and Resource Consent Team Leader and Environmental Planner, NPDC, 22.07.09). Because requirements to consult Māori “are discretionary in nature” (Solomon and Schofield, 1992: 28), council officers determine whether tangata whenua are affected by proposed developments and whether they should be consulted:

…we make calls here about who is an affected party for those resource consents for the non-notified consents. But, you know, 97 or 98% of our consents each year are non-notified. That’s because the plans allow that…and we have the written approval of affected parties. And sometimes that is tangata whenua and sometimes it’s not, because we say you’re not automatically an affected party on everything (Director, Resource Management, TRC, 08.07.09).

Opportunities for participation in resource consenting processes are mostly limited to developments that involve wahi tapu [sacred site]. The NPDC, for example, consults with iwi or hapu if a proposed development is within 50 metres of a wahi tapu that is
marked on the District Plan. While protection and maintenance of wahi tapu is certainly a priority for many iwi and hapu (see Appendix F1 for a discussion on the significance of wahi tapu), they are effectively disenfranchised from decisions that affect their rohe in general:

…the Resource Management Act is the most significant document for management of the land resource, [an] issue that tangata whenua are most concerned about, and yet they’re sort of shut out of it 99.5% of the time… a lot of the activities that go on, if there’s not a wahi tapu on the land, then we say well sorry there’s nothing we can do. We’re doing that all the time; I’m, we’re doing it all the time in subdivision… And if you monitored iwi’s feelings on all of this, or interviewed iwi they would be less than happy with our processes (Subdivisions and Resource Consents Team Leader, NPDC, 22.07.09).

Thus, current laws, plans and policies determine the right to participate, and often delimit this right to sacred sites. Participation under the RMA fails to recognise Indigenous territoriality over their rohe and does not displace the authority or operation of Crown institutions and systems (Porter, 2007).

Requirements to consult with tangata whenua and ‘take into account’ various values have definitely changed the decision-making processes of local government (Section 7.2.1). Several council officers, for example, spoke highly of consultation and the RMA; one noted that “I am a firm believer that RMA has lead to better development, better outcomes for the environment and for iwi” (Land Use Consents and Monitoring, Team Leader, NPDC, 17.07.09). However, recognition and protection offered to tangata whenua is filtered through a decision-making process that must take into account numerous other values. The Director of Resource Management (TRC, 08.07.09) states that, colonial history notwithstanding, Māori values are always considered alongside other interests identified in the Act:

The other thing that [I] need to really stress here too is because of the history of occupation in New Zealand and the whole Treaty settlement, right, process and it acknowledging that there were wrongs and settlements have to be made and looking at the parts in the Resource Management Act that refer to tangata whenua, tangata whenua often have a view that they have the right of veto. Tangata whenua values are a few of those that regional and district councils have to provide for; there’s a whole lot of things. You look at Part Two of the Act, right, in Part Two there are three specific
parts [that refer to *tangata whenua* values] out of many.\textsuperscript{127} So it’s hard work sometimes without causing offense, again, given that whole, that understanding Treaty grievance and right, to say to people look ‘yours are one of the many values this organisation has to weigh up,’ you know, we have…a whole raft of people and their values that have to be weighed up and that’s what the RMA that’s what you try and do in the Act… [it’s] a bit of a misconception sometimes. And as a result, often I think, in their anecdotal feedback to me, *tangata whenua* get quite… [frustrated that they] go along to all these processes and they don’t get what they want.

Under the framework of the RMA, the role of council officers is to make resource management decisions following neutral and objective consideration of all the affected parties (Land Use Consents and Monitoring, Team Leader, NPDC, 17.07.09; Director, Resource Management TRC, 08.07.09; Manager, Environment and Information Services, STDC, 27.05.09). As the Manager of Environmental Policy and Strategy for the NPDC (17.06.09) explains, “interests are always having to be balanced and weighed,” so consultation with *tangata whenua* provides an opportunity for input that is taken into consideration amongst other values by council officers. This is problematic for many *tangata whenua* representatives who feel that participation via consultation is insufficient recognition of Indigenous rights, and who also note that such ‘weighing’ and ‘balancing’ “somewhat circumvents our opinion because we’re still a minority within the collective of the community” (Tumu Whakarae, TKoR, 03.06.09). This is exacerbated by slippage between the rights of *tangata whenua* and interest groups in resource management processes, such that *iwi* are treated as “just another interest group” (Chairperson, TAIA, 09.06.09) and local government recognition of *iwi* becomes dissociated from Indigenous claims to sovereignty and territoriality. Another interviewee suggested that councils and DoC act as ‘gatekeepers’ in environmental management: They open the gate a little for consultation, but always maintain control, leaving *tangata whenua* representatives ‘push on the gate’ to get inside the process (M. Brooks, Okahu hapu, Ngā Ruahine, 23.03.09).

\footnote{Part Two outlines the purpose and principles of the RMA (1991); it includes Sections 6, 7 and 8 which identify *tangata whenua* values among others that must be taken into account (see Table 15).}
7.1.2 Whareroa Marine Outfall

Resource consenting processes for a marine wastewater outfall at Whareroa illustrate tensions in resource management in Taranaki. Fonterra – New Zealand’s largest dairy company – operates a dairy processing plant at Whareroa, near Hawera (see Figure 15: Whareroa Outfall). Wastewater from Fonterra and STDC’s Hawera oxidation ponds are disposed through a “marine outfall and diffuser structure of approximately 1845 metres length in the coastal marine area” (TRC, 2009a: 10). Marine disposal of wastewater has long been contentious in Taranaki (Chapter Five, Quality Planning New Zealand, 2005), and this issue recently came to the fore in consenting processes for transferring waste from Eltham to be treated in Hawera and disposed through the existing outfall. Eltham’s waste was previously “treated and disposed of locally to the Mangawhero Stream” (Harrison Grierson Consultants Limited, 2009: v), but has required upgrades since the mid-1990s to address pollution and overloading concerns (TRC, 2009b). Subsequent investigations by the STDC favoured diverting Eltham’s waste to the Hawera plant for treatment and marine disposal, rather than upgrading (Harrison Grierson Consultants Limited, 2009, TRC, 2009b). STDC sought resource consent for a new pipeline between Eltham and Hawera treatment plants and marine disposal in 2006 and, after hearings and negotiations with tangata whenua objectors, consent was granted and construction began in 2009 (TRC, 2009b).

For Ngā Ruahine representatives, the Whareroa outfall case demonstrates some of the limitations of resource consenting processes. Disposal of effluent into streams or coastal waters are both viewed as grossly inappropriate, and proposals to shift Eltham’s wastewater from Mangawhero stream to the coast solely “shifted the crap from there to there” without addressing the original issue of tangata whenua objections to marine or fluvial disposal of sewage (D. Noble, Kanihi hapu, Ngā Ruahine, 13.07.09). As the Chairperson of Ngā Ruahine Iwi Authority (15.05.09) explained:

128 Prior to Fonterra’s creation in 2001, Kiwi Co-operative Dairies Ltd operated a dairy processing factory on the same site. It discharged water into the sea from 1980; initially via streams and after 1989 through a marine outfall (Quality Planning New Zealand, 2005).

129 A resource consent monitoring report notes that current wastewater treatment in Eltham has caused: “(i) milky, turbid appearance of the primary [oxidation] pond; (ii) abundance/domination of filamentous bacteria in the microflora of the pond(s); (iii) intermittent odour problems associated with the primary pond; (iv) absence of dissolved oxygen in the primary pond; (v) marked detrimental impacts on the physicochemical water quality and biological communities of the Mangawhero Stream” (TRC, 2009b: 4).
…we objected because [STDC’s] idea of solving the problem was taking the paru [sewage] out of the river from Waingongoro and just trucking it, piping it…straight out to sea. But from our point of view, both were abhorrent. You’re polluting our river and then making our kai [food] in there unsafe to eat. And from there you take it and just putting it into the moana [sea] there and making our seafood unsafe to eat.

Indeed, marine disposal at Whareroa has a history of pollution. In the late 1990s, Ngāti Ruanui critiqued discharges to Tasman Sea, because of “the loss of maataitai [seafood, shellfish] from the Pukeroa Reef and the sea around it in less than a generation…[and] not only suggested that kaimoana [seafood] was in short supply on the reef, but also felt that any present had an unacceptable dairy taint” (Quality Planning New Zealand, 2005: 3). These concerns about the pollution of kaimoana are reiterated by Ngā Ruahine representatives, and form a significant rationale for objecting to marine disposal of Eltham’s waste. Further, occasional spills and discharges of miscellaneous dairy products from Fonterra have washed up on nearby beaches (see Figure 15: Whareroa Outfall), fostering potent doubts that the adverse effects of greater marine disposal will be ‘minor’ (M. Brooks, Okahu hapu, Ngā Ruahine, 23.03.09; Chairperson, Ngā Ruahine Iwi Authority, 15.05.09; D. Noble, Kanihi hapu, Ngā Ruahine, 13.07.09). These objections, though framed in terms of environmental quality, stem from a cultural matrix in which such pollution is a “desecration of the wairua [soul, spirit] and the mauri [life principle] of the sea” (Ngā Ruahine representatives cited in Maetzig, 25.11.2006). In this context, Ngā Ruahine representatives advocated land-based disposal as the most culturally appropriate and environment-friendly option.
To obtain resource consent, STDC explored various options for wastewater disposal and concluded that disposing Eltham’s waste via the Whareroa outfall is the “most cost
effective and feasible option by a considerable margin” (Harrison Grierson Consultants Limited, 2009: 49). Although consultation and consideration for *tangata whenua* cultural and spiritual values were required, Ngā Ruahine representatives felt that economic concerns outweighed their perspectives:

So that’s the problem see it’s all about scales and economics, it’s not about whether or not it’s good for the environment, and it’s not about satisfying Māori concerns. It is about economics, if it’s economically viable we’ll do it, if it’s not, go to hell. End of story. That’s what it’s about (D. Noble, Kanihi hapu, Ngā Ruahine, 13.07.09).

At Whareroa the primacy of economic concerns filtered through assumptions about the relative values of land and sea, constructed an argument for the transfer and marine disposal of Eltham’s wastewater that Ngā Ruahine contest:

…we still felt that they haven’t looked aggressively or intelligently at land based options… why pipe it from there to there whereas you could easily pipe it over that way there. And the argument is that they didn’t want to put it on to land with very high economic usages. Ok, *ka pai* [good], yes excellent, good thinking… Some of their economic values as well, like them allocating a high value for the land but low economic values for the sea really just doesn’t show there’s quite, even if you look at it from an economic point of view there are quite high economic values per hectare of ocean. Ok we’ve got the likes of the tourism dollar coming in, eight billion dollars a year, the surf highway and also they were talking about a coastal walkway, and also we’ve got quite an extensive fisheries regime operating in those hectares of *tangaroa* [sea]. And so it’s absurd to allocate zero economic values for something there as against highest and best usage on land based values, so some of their basic assumptions were extremely flawed (Chairperson, Ngā Ruahine Iwi Authority, 15.05.09).

Like colonial narratives of Taranaki that identified ‘wastelands,’ ascribing sea-scapes lesser economic value than land is a potent example of how description functions as prescription because such valuations inform and legitimate managerial decisions.

For Ngā Ruahine representatives, the process of consultation, considering alternatives and objections ultimately had a hollow ring because “they never took any notice of us, at all, because if they had, there would already be changes, [and] there’s not” (D. Noble,

---

130 Options considered included: upgrading Eltham’s treatment plant and discharging to wetland areas, land-based disposal via irrigation, land treatment by floating wetlands, and effluent reuse as non-potable water (Harrison Grierson Consultants Limited, 2009).
Kanihi hapu, Ngā Ruahine, 13.07.09). This sentiment is exacerbated by the council’s decision that “we were only an interested party, we’re not affected as far as they’re concerned” so the “council still believes that all they need to do is get a tick off from [Ngāti] Ruanui” (D. Noble, Kanihi hapu, Ngā Ruahine, 13.07.09). However, there are no easy solutions to wastewater treatment, and to some, the marine disposal was the most viable option:

…I mean, there were no real other alternatives, so the discharge to land was all looked at, I mean that’s more culturally acceptable but it’s usually expensive, and it comes down to that reasonableness thing again. And again, let’s just take that for example, people think that you pour wastewater onto land and mother earth treats it. There are adverse environmental effects of doing that, right…and indeed we’ve had quite a few irrigation systems in this region where people have gone away from them because it rains, the stuff washes off the surface into streams. You can, it can contaminate ground water and soil quality. It can increase coastal erosion because you’ve got more water lubricating, coming down and causing instability. It’s not necessarily the panacea of everything, right (Director, Resource Management at TRC, 08.07.09).

In a way, resource consenting at Whareroa came to an impasse that was resolved using the council’s values and frameworks, and thus reflects the sense of tangata whenua inclusion without influence that I often heard and felt anecdotally while in Taranaki. Although the conclusion that “the effects of an ocean outfall discharge are no more than minor, except for the cultural impact” suggests a subtle marginalisation of cultural factors (Harrison Grierson Consultants Limited, 2009: 43), consenting processes for the Whareroa outfall have also created possibilities for collaboration and participation with collaborative monitoring of the seabed by Fonterra and Ngāti Ruanui and annual meetings with all the various stakeholders to discuss concerns and consent compliance (Director, Resource Management at TRC, 08.07.09). Therefore, this example illustrates that resource consenting processes in Taranaki foster both confrontation and conversation across different values in environmental management, but also that these negotiations occur within the Crown’s frameworks.
7.1.3 The Ability to Collaborate

Tangata whenua representatives viewed participating in environmental management as a necessity for securing their futures as iwi and hapu because “this is where we live, this where our children grown up, [and] their children. I mean, we don’t need to draw big pictures for them” (D. Noble, Kanihi hapu, Ngā Ruahine, 13.07.09). Moreover, not participating lends tacit consent to developments and Crown processes:

… [it] puts a whole lot of compliance on us to participate or not to participate. I suppose it was Bolger\textsuperscript{131} who said to us, well, not saying anything is a yes…in actual fact it really worries you, because in actual fact it could be used against us, as ‘well, you fellas never said nothing, so \textit{kei te pai}, init? [it’s OK, isn’t it?]. In actual fact he’s probably right, so he’s not too far off the mark, in my view (Puketapu hapu representative, TAIA, 19.06.09).

In this section I argue that the burden to participate points to the irony of collaborative offerings in postcolonial contexts. In Taranaki, colonial histories of dispossession yield inequalities between Māori organisations and local government (and developers) that simultaneously form a barrier to iwi participation and enable the Crown to design the terms of inclusion.

A key contention in this thesis is that collaborative environmental management cannot be separated from the wider context of contemporary iwi development and the inequalities that stem from colonial histories of dispossession (Chapter Five, Six). As one Ngā Ruahine representative commented:

… in consenting processes the unbalance is there at the beginning because the thing is that Māori are not able to sit on the level as any person who’s applying for a resource consent basically because Māori don’t have the resources… So Māori is already at a disadvantage. Two key things that we need in order to be able to sit with an applicant and say look this is what I think should happen, is that we don’t have the resources and we don’t have the equity. There you go [clap!] (D. Noble, Kanihi hapu, Ngā Ruahine, 13.07.09).\textsuperscript{132}

\textsuperscript{131} Jim Bolger was Prime Minister of New Zealand (1990-1997).
\textsuperscript{132} This is recognised in the Local Government Act (2002, s81(1)(b)), which requires councils to “consider ways in which it may foster the development of Māori capacity to contribute to the decision-making processes of the local authority.”
Further, the ability of iwi and hapu representatives to successfully and effectively participate in RMA processes is often limited by the technical legal and scientific knowledge that is assumed:

The problem that we have, and I know that all that our hapu right across the board have the same problem, is that we don’t have the skills. We have a driving passion, that’s what we have. We have a passion to say ‘this is wrong, and this is how we want it,’ but as far as knowing what the RMA can and cannot do for us, we don’t have that. I certainly don’t. And, you know, it’s as the need arises, and I go ‘shit I need to look that up,’ so we’re learning as we go, we learn on the trot…and that’s basically how we manage the stuff, it’s as the needs arise for us, as our needs arise, whatever issue comes out from the district council, then we deal with it… (D. Noble, Kanihi hapu, Ngā Ruahine, 13.07.09).

The issue of ‘capacity and capability’ within iwi and hapu organisations is perceived as a significant barrier to tangata whenua having a greater role in environmental management in Taranaki (Chairperson, TRoNM, 27.05.09). This reveals an important limitation to the utility of collaborative models in postcolonial contexts to address historic injustices and establish more equitable relationships between state administrations and Indigenous communities (Lane and Williams, 2008). The ability to collaborate is often assumed in the literature and policy suggesting a somewhat amnesic response to colonial displacement and dispossession and invoking tropes of Indigenous communities as inherently environmentally conscious (Carter and Hollinsworth, 2009, Willow, 2009).

Many iwi and hapu representatives also identified an issue-based, ad-hoc style of participation in environmental management as a consequence of limited financial and technical resources:

Yes, hmm, it’s more a reactive instead of proactive yeah. It’s making sure that ok there are Ngā Ruahine values, Ngā Ruahine environmental values, cultural values, applied to those waterways, applied to that land, applied to tangaroa [sea and fish] (Chairperson, Ngā Ruahine Iwi Authority, 15.05.09).

This ‘fire-fighting’ approach to participation is illustrative of the inequalities between Māori organisations, councils and developers, and falls short of the role tangata whenua would like to assert in environmental management (pers comm., Planning Facilitator,
Ngā Ruahine, 14.03.09; M. Brooks, Okahu hapu, Ngā Ruahine, 23.03.09). But it also reveals that providing opportunities to participate does not resolve injustices; the current structure is unsatisfactory because “it’s little by little taking the management of scarce resources out of the hands of the iwi if we don’t deal to them. And one of the reasons why we can’t deal to them is that we don’t have the capacity or capability inside the organisation” (Manager, Ngāti Ruanui Tahua, 04.05.09). Demonstrating the understanding and knowledge gained through consulting with iwi and hapu, many council officers were also aware of the discrepancies in finance, staffing and training, noting for example that:

…it’s easy for us. We come to work, we’ve got all day to do our work [laughter]… [but] if you don’t have money to, you need money, really do need money and resources to participate… You go and ask any tangata whenua or iwi group within our district if they have that resource, and they don’t (Subdivisions and Resource Consents Team Leader, NPDC, 22.07.09).

Significantly, even though Treaty settlements are anticipated to make resource management a more ‘level playing field’ by redistributing economic resources to iwi, post-settlement organisations in Taranaki continue to identify the lack of resources as a barrier to realising the role they desire to have in contemporary environmental management (Iwi Relationships Manager, NPDC, 22.05.09). The challenge remains finding “the right people, [with the] right amount of time, [and] the skill set within the constrained budget that we do have” (Chairperson, TRoNM, 27.05.09).

For councils, difficulty identifying appropriate Māori representatives has often impeded efforts at collaboration (Director, Resource Management TRC, 08.07.09; Manager, Community Services and Development, STDC, 27.05.09; Manager, Environment and Information Services, STDC, 27.05.09). This highlights that it may be unwise to assume that an Indigenous partner with the political mandate to collaborate with government organisations exists (Coombes and Hill, 2005). As noted in Chapter Six, a major effect of the Treaty settlement process is the stabilisation of iwi governance and administration in a Crown-recognised body. The Crown notes this as a positive outcome, suggesting

---

133 The Director of Resource Management at TRC (08.07.09) also noted that when “the RMA came in, it was promised by Ministry for the Environment to be the first sort of co-management piece of legislation but there were no resources provided for tangata whenua, none…there was over promise and under delivery.”
that greater stability within *iwi* bodies would enable “Maori [to] exert a substantial measure of control over their natural and physical resources.”\(^\text{134}\) Although the extent to which greater control over resources has occurred is debatable, both *iwi* and council representatives suggested the increased comprehensibility *iwi* structures post-settlement does aid relationship building:

> I think even with the regional council and district council, because you’ve settled and stuff, they view you a bit differently and so…you’re ready to sort of talk to them… you have some mandate, you’ve got an accountable organisation, there’s transparency, it’s actually representative of your tribe and so you know. It doesn’t sort of create any issues for them downstream, you know when you’re not settled, and there’s two or three or four groups, it makes it difficult for them… (Chairperson of Te Runanga o Ngāti Mutunga, 27.05.09).

…that’s why in places like the TRC and other parts of local government that a positive outcome of the Treaty settlement process has been establishing who has mana whenua, point of contact, so that we don’t get into a lot of that, because that was actually wasting a lot of time and energy for Councils and applicants… there’s a big difference [between settled and non-settled *iwi*] because you know who has the right to speak (Director, Resource Management, TRC, 08.07.09).

In this sense, the Treaty settlement process seems to strengthen prospects for collaboration by making the *iwi* partner more comprehensible to government agencies. This suggests an intimate relationship between participation in environmental management and Treaty settlements and *iwi* and *hapu* development in a more general sense. Notably this apparent benefit of settlement arises from the increased bureaucratisation which is also a potential source of tension within *iwi* organisations (Chapter Six). Environmental management in the Treaty settlement era, therefore, potently intersects with histories of dispossession, Crown assertions of sovereignty, *iwi* governance and aspirations. The critiques this section explores reveal the challenge and significance of relationship building between *tangata whenua* and government agencies for environmental management.

7.2 STRATEGISM, LEARNING AND RELATIONSHIP BUILDING

Recent postdevelopment research explores efforts of Indigenous communities and development professionals to rework the apparent opposition of development and Indigenous cultures into a relational engagement, in which neither development nor Indigenous communities are static, unchanging entities. Such hybridity is suggestive of the potential of changing existing systems by working from ‘the inside’ (Chapter Two). In an environmental management context, this suggests that working through and negotiating existing structures may be a potent mode of advancing Indigenous goals. Indeed, moving beyond essentialised ideas of resistance to the status quo perhaps requires looking at the complex and powerful entanglements of government and Indigenous representatives and the ways that such entanglements may promote mutuality, strategism and contestation. In Taranaki, while participatory innovation has certainly not displaced government authority (Section 7.1), government authority has similarly not remained in place unchanged. I argue here that negotiating the rights and the roles of tangata whenua in environmental management, though adversarial, also highlights the potential for common ground and partnership in Taranaki.

7.2.1 Learning and Institutional Change

In Chapter Three I argue that many scholars understand collaboration in environmental management as an iterative approach that relies on learning, reflection, co-operation and adaptation (Armitage, 2005, Armitage et al., 2008, Carlsson and Berkes, 2005, Davidson-Hunt, 2006, Olsson et al., 2004). In Taranaki, increased interaction between government staff and tangata whenua mandated by legislation shown in Table 15 has prompted relationship building and learning that has enabled greater mutual understanding and a shared basis for negotiating environmental management decisions. In essence, by engaging with each other – even in an adversarial way – neither iwi organisations nor government organisations have remained unchanged. For many iwi representatives, therefore, working with Crown agencies is not simply a pragmatic attempt to influence decisions, but also an opportunity to learn from them and to eventually become inter-dependent or more independent. However, experiences in Taranaki also demonstrate the potential for positive relationships to develop in
imperfect and unresolved contexts, and interestingly also highlight the pivotal importance of personalities in developing relationships and collaborating.

Despite the limitations of recent iterations of consultation and participation, many council officers (particularly in the NPDC) noted significant changes within their organisation. The Manager of Environmental Strategy and Policy (NPDC, 17.06.09) felt that the RMA (1991) had a significant impact on council activities. In 1991:

…the organisation had no relationship with iwi or hapu in the district, and we basically had to go out and discover who the tangata whenua of the district were… [The] RMA was a very far reaching piece of legislation for bicultural relationships in New Zealand… [because] it actually forced councils…to engage with local iwi and hapu and I think that’s probably the first time in our whole history where the local government has been obligated to do that…

Notably, these efforts to meet and build a relationship with tangata whenua confronted the legacies of confiscations and managerial exclusion in Taranaki, prompting a new awareness amongst some council staff about the history and complexity of postcolonial governance:

…it was a fairly painful process…we were hearing grievances being expressed firsthand…grown men crying …the expressions were heartfelt… but without the RMA at a local level those things would never have been shared. And ok, we have the Treaty of Waitangi but that’s a higher level, nationally driven process, whereas this one’s at a local level. So I think that’s been good for the health of the community in that regard… it was certainly it was powerful on both sides, particularly for me … when we realised as staff what the obligation was and, you know, we developed a core of people in here who really took that to heart and said, without stating it out loud, we’re here to make this thing work (Manager, Environmental Strategy and Policy, NPDC, 17.06.09).

Interaction – even in the limited form of consultation – has engendered a deeper understanding of the issues facing tangata whenua among many council staff, which has then led to a ‘cultural shift’ within the organisation (Manager, Environmental Strategy and Policy, NPDC, 17.06.09; Iwi Relationships Manager, NPDC, 22.05.09). Within the
NPDC, for example, initiatives like cultural awareness training and *waiata* [singing] practice\(^{135}\) suggest a desire to learn and to better engage with *tangata whenua* in Taranaki.

Council officers note the importance of such training and knowledge for relationships more generally (Environmental Planner, NPDC, 22.07.09), and suggest that such initiatives as cultural awareness training have contributed to changes within the organisation:

… it was through those processes, particularly the *marae* based training, Treaty of Waitangi awareness training, that over time we became a more culturally safe environment, both for ourselves and for the people that we were engaging with. But that training wasn’t mandatory, it was always voluntary… I remember distinctly [someone]… who said ‘you’ll never get me on a *marae*, you’ll never get me sleeping on a *marae*.’ She ultimately did go but that was only because the stone was thrown into the pool and the ripples come out and over time people softened their views… And it’s that very gentle sort of process that takes place over time that… that’s how the culture has changed here (Manager, Environmental Strategy and Policy, NPDC, 17.06.09).

As the Land Use Team Leader of NPDC (17.07.09) noted, empathy is central to understanding the position of those involved in resource management issues. This learning on an individual level, and its cumulative effect, has received relatively little attention in literature on collaboration in environmental management; however, in Taranaki, such shifts in attitude are perhaps fundamental to improving relationships and negotiating the role of *tangata whenua*. Many *iwi* representatives similarly value education as a means of building better working relationships:

…getting the mind shift from the likes of local government, that their way is not the only way in which you actually communicate and engage and make relationships, so it requires a bit of a culture shift to the centre ground… [because] we’re coming at it from different points… [The other] thing is about educating which brings awareness which brings balance over time… I mean, we’ve had a hundred odd years, 160 years of being educated by them so we understand them pretty well. So I think they need some more education about there’s more than one way to skin a cat. Get through that stuff and then we get to the meat of enablement [of *iwi* to collaborate]… So let the political

\(^{135}\) *Waiata* are often sung on *marae*. The Iwi Relationships Manager (NPDC, 22.05.09) notes that, “the *waiata*, because they’re all Taranaki, they’re all very much Taranaki focused *waiata*, then [the staff] learn a lot about the history as well as the *waiata* themselves and it helps with pronunciation… [it] covers a few different things not just, it’s not just singing…”
stuff bubble away there, we will concentrate on being really organised and educating those people (Manager, Ngāti Ruanui Tahua, 04.05.09).

Yet, there are limits to the effectiveness of such training in changing attitudes and practices. The Iwi Relationships Manager (NPDC, 22.05.09) for instance, recalls that:

…one of the recommendations [tangata whenua submitted] was that our staff need to be better trained in knowing a Māori world view, and I totally agree with them. One of the other things they said was we they need to respect and understand a Māori world view. Well, you can train them all you like, you can’t make them respect a Māori world view, there’s no way you can. So, you know, sometimes the, maybe the expectations from iwi and hapu are, maybe there’s too much expectation that you’re not going to be able to change an individual council’s officers’ respect… like you can educate them, you can train them and show them, but you can’t change their attitudes or their what they fundamentally feel or know…

In this sense, cultural change within government organisations is a slow and gradual process – not least because policies and plans are authorised by elected officials, rather than council staff (Manager, Environmental Strategy and Policy, NPDC, 17.06.09).

In the context of cultural differences and historical distrust, many interviewees stressed the importance of organisations learning to work together, and relationship building between individuals as a means to overcome the impersonal histories of governmental disregard. Meeting with tangata whenua ‘kanohi ki te kanohi’ [face to face] is key to forming and maintaining relationships, and attending meetings and interacting with tangata whenua was also seen as beneficial for relationships:

…I try to go [to Iwi Liaison Committee], as does [the Subdivisions Team Leader], whether we’ve got anything on the agenda or not…It’s only been in the last year that I’ve attended Iwi Liaison, I don’t think I was fully aware that I should be attending, and as my personal relationships have grown, I’ve been like ‘what a dumb ass’… and that’s something you need to learn, that you do need to go out of your comfort zone and go, and go and visit them… (Land Use Team Leader, NPDC, 17.07.09).

Significantly, several council officers and tangata whenua noted reluctance among some staff to visit iwi or hapu in person instead of posting out documents and requesting
feedback, which suggests the importance of individual learning and development to successful collaboration between organisations.

Council officers also identified navigating Māori geopolitical structures as a complex issue – especially because there are sometimes multiple organisations claiming to represent a single iwi and hapu (Manager, Community Services and Development, STDC, 27.05.09; Manager, Environment and Information Services, STDC, 27.05.09; Director, Resource Management, TRC, 08.07.09). The role of the Crown – both direct and indirect – in shaping structures of Māori representation can be significant (see Appendix F3). Certainly, Treaty settlement processes perforce lead to the formalisation of iwi authority and governance, and the position of iwi as representing member hapu.

In contrast, council officers at the NPDC that importance of respectively engaging with iwi and hapu:

…the tangata whenua locally assert themselves most strongly at a hapu level and so we respect that. While from an organisational perspective it would be a lot easier to deal with it at an iwi level, it doesn’t work because that not how the local people, have organised themselves, that is, within hapu. At the local level like this, it’s very much about relationships, personal relationships…for the personal relationships to work you have to respect where people are coming from and how they wish to be treated with. So there’s no point in us sort of saying ‘this is how the organisations are going to relate’… (Manager, Environmental Strategy and Policy, NPDC, 17.06.09).

We don’t pick and choose winners if you like, and so until such time as they decide to speak as one voice then we will continue to allow them to have that representation around the table (Iwi Relationships Manager, NPDC, 22.05.09).

Iwi and hapu representatives similarly expressed the need for government organisations to understand and respect geopolitical structures within Māori communities. The Chairman of Ngā Ruahine Iwi Authority (15.05.09), for example, recounted the recent controversy about the location for ‘Tutunui’s Garden’ (a whale bone sculpture) that arose from the failure to adequately consult with the appropriate representatives in potential sites. As he observes,

…it’s a bit of a red herring really, but it’s quite interesting because it’s flushed the

---

136 This issue is particularly contentious for Ngā Ruahine, but many settlements have been complicated by one or more hapu contesting the right of the iwi to represent their interests.
council out to make a recognised effect of *hau kainga o mana whenua*…. But that whale has made [STDC] now bring a new *kapu* [word] into its thinking: ‘mana whenua.’ Yes, they now know the difference between *whanau*, *hapu* and *iwi*, and even though some at the *iwi* level gave a yay, there’s also a *hapu* level that has its *mana* as well.

Learning to consult with Māori, therefore, also requires engaging with different and overlapping geopolitical structures and methods of political representation – even within participatory systems that are based around state sovereignty. The experiences in Taranaki suggest that collaborative approaches must negotiate differences in geopolitical structures; put differently, “You just respect it, and that’s what it’s all about, respecting that there’s more than one involvement” (JAC member; East Taranaki Environmental Trust, 15.07.09).

A key finding of this thesis is the centrality of personalities and relationships between individuals to collaboration between government entities and *iwi* and *hapu* organisations (Manager, Environmental Strategy and Policy, NPDC, 17.06.09). This point is perhaps exemplified in the relationships between DoC and *iwi*. For example, a former Stratford Area Manager noted a change in relationships during his tenure that was primarily based on personalities:

… I didn’t think the relationship between the Department and *iwi* was very good at all [when I arrived]. But I think that came down to personalities of previous field centre managers… previous managers basically just didn’t do the face to face thing… I believe, the relationship improved dramatically in that seven or eight years because I spent quite a lot of time out on the road and talking and meeting with people, which didn’t seem to be happening before… even in the first year that I was there I’d just hop in the car and make an excuse to go and visit somebody and then go and say giddy and, you know, sit down and have a chat and a few issues come up, or may not even come up, and then next we met and if it was around the table over something, that relationship was in place and, you know, and it seemed to work… I think there was, for the Department there was quite a few issues and a couple of paradigm changes required (Conservation Board Member, 07.07.09).

---

137 The Conservancy has since been re-structured to combine Stratford and New Plymouth into one Area Office.
More recently, many iwi representatives have observed “a huge change in terms of the conservancy” following the appointment of a new Conservator (Chairperson, TRoNM, 27.05.09; Manager, Ngāti Tama Development Trust, 13.05.09). The Tumu Whakarae of Te Kāhui o Rauru (03.06.09) for example, stated that DoC previously lacked a:

…person [who was] able to break those barriers [between iwi and DoC] down. We do now… we have a good relationship with the local area management, and Pete the local area manager. We have a good relationship with the conservator…he’s willing to engage which is so much better than the last one…

However, the centrality of personalities to effective relationships is also something of a risk because “if they go, you’re hoping like hell that they replace with someone with a similar approach, rather than what we’ve had in the past…” (Chairperson, Conservation Board; Representative, TKoR, 15.06.09).

Increased interaction between Māori organisations and government bodies has improved relationships and made evident areas of commonality and spaces for greater collaboration. For DoC and iwi, shared interests are perhaps more readily identifiable; as the Tumu Whakarae (TKoR, 04.06.09) notes:

I don’t distrust DoC, well, some people do, [but] I don’t distrust DoC for the natural fact that a lot of our top end policy and environment actually align better than any other place, because we’re there for the same reasons: to protect the resource… And working with [DoC], I dare say I need to take my hat off to those guys because they’re passionate about the trees…they get a sense of satisfaction about a lot of things, they fight the fight, you know… And I think some of the base philosophy of what they’re fighting for is quite good, some of the workings in between that, some of the decision making is not so good, and I think we need to be a part of that.

Similarly, the Chairperson of TAIA (09.06.09) explains, councils and iwi also have significant shared interests, and meeting face to face and overcoming any misperceptions or barriers is essential to realising and building on common ground:

I think regional councils, I think they need to get out more, same with the district

---

138 The previous conservator was described as a ‘red neck,’ ‘a prick’ and ‘cowboy’ and was generally perceived as unreceptive to tangata whenua concerns in conservation.
councils, the people that work there, a lot of them, they’re reluctant to get out and see hapū or iwi about things and I think the more they did it, the more they’d realise that there’s nothing wrong, you know, it’s actually quite a good thing... and if they’re serious about a relationship they need to do that anyway... Because I think the more they do [come and speak with us], then they get to know us, they know that we’re no threat...

This suggests the potential common ground between iwi and government entities, and a sense of mutuality that may prove critical to successful collaboration and postcolonial coexistence more broadly.

Importantly, many iwi representatives view collaboration as a means to learn from agencies like DoC and build their capacity to eventually enable the iwi to manage areas of land independently or interdependently with the Crown (This is particularly true in relation to managing water and the maunga, see Chapter Eight). This perhaps reflects the historical moment in which collaboration is being considered, and the effects of confiscation and dispossession on iwi structures and capacity:

I think part of it is actually understanding and growing and developing, you know, growing and understanding what the role is. It’s a bit like DoC, you know, once we get our head around what DoC are currently doing and what they’re not doing and what it takes to actually manage an area then I think we’re better positioned to [manage it]. It’s all part of risk management as well. You don’t sorta say ‘yeah we’ll take over that 30,000 hectares, sweet as’ and then you find that…it’s quite hard, it’s not that easy, and it’s resource intensive...that, for me, is just a sensible approach (Chairperson, TRoNM, 27.05.09).

This openness to learning from government departments also highlights the deficiency of viewing environmental management approaches as strictly either Western or Indigenous, and overlooking the potential – and desire for – environmental management that draws on both Western and Indigenous knowledges. Wainwright (2008) suggested that creating postdevelopment alternatives requires moving beyond analytics that only accept or reject Western influences and that reduce possibilities to essentialised options. In an environmental management context, this suggests that it may also be myopic to overlook the potential for hybrid approaches. Further, although adaptive management scholars frequently site the importance of learning for
collaboration, this perhaps neglects the extent to which collaboration and learning may be seen as a temporary process to facilitate greater Indigenous control:

…I think DoC have a role, but…I think it needs to be managed at critical stages. In the long term, say twenty years DoC should go, [when] we know that we’ve built the capability within the whole of Taranaki to be able to deal with the issues on the ground… That’s one department the Crown don’t need to have, but know that they need to allocate a resource to it cos…it’s of national importance. It’s just that it’s being managed by iwi, and they’re the right people to manage [it], with the best philosophy to be able to manage an estate at the top end. But we’ve got a lot of knowledge to learn about the sciences with inside of those things (Tumu Whakarae, TKoR, 03.06.09).

Interaction and collaboration between tangata whenua and government agencies, therefore, can be a means of learning and relationship building that opens opportunities for a range of possibilities within environmental management. Fostering mutuality and commonality amongst cultural and historical differences is complex and uncertain and, although worked out within context of legal and political structures, is intimately tied to the personalities and efforts of individuals. Relationship building in Taranaki, therefore, is an ongoing process of negotiation and learning that demonstrates the challenges and promise of postcoloniality.

### 7.2.2 Formalising Relationships

In Taranaki, the settlement era has generated “a more defined relationship” between iwi and government organisations (Manager, Environmental Strategy and Policy, NPDC, 17.06.09). Cultural redress in Treaty settlements, such as protocols between an iwi entity and DoC or a local council, articulate

…how a particular government agency intends to: interact with a claimant group on a continuing basis and enable that group to have input into its decision-making process, and exercise its functions, powers and duties in relation to specified matters within its control in the claimant group’s area of interest (OTS, 2004: 134).

Settlements also include statutory acknowledgements that recognise “the particular cultural, spiritual, historical, and traditional association of” iwi to particular sites (Ngati Tama Claims Settlement Act, 2003, s53; see also Appendix F4). This increasing
formalisation of relationships between *iwi* and government agencies indicates the importance of this historical moment for shaping the role of *tangata whenua* in environmental management. It represents both security and stability in the relationship, and suggests the closure of possibilities for alternative arrangements.

The history of mistrust between *iwi* and Crown organisations provides a difficult backdrop for contemporary efforts at collaboration. Recent relationship building, discussed in Section 7.2.1, enables both parties to enter into agreements with greater comfort, which is symbolised in the recent signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between Te Runanga o Ngāti Mutunga and the NPDC (Chairperson, TRoNM, 27.05.09; Manager, Environmental Strategy and Policy, NPDC, 17.06.09). The MOU details how NPDC and Ngāti Mutunga will interact, clarifying expectations and ensuring that the relationship will function in a certain way:

> I think we set out, you know, those different aspects that we wanted addressed in that, in the council. But it’s just quite broad and basic, it’s things like the long term community council plan, that the reserves, that we will meet with the mayor and councillors twice a year and have four meetings with the operational people, and all of those things should be happening anyway, but it just sort of codifies some of those aspects… saying, here’s the values, here’s the principles, and that we’re going to you know work together in good faith and ladidadida. And there’s a whole section on all of their pieces of legislation that may constrain their ability to ah do certain things [laughter]… And so it basically sets out that relationship, so saying yeah we’ll meet and if there are any issues, then we have the ability to discuss them openly and yeah (Chairperson of TRoNM, 27.05.09).

For Ngāti Mutunga and NPDC, signing an MOU largely formalises a pre-existing relationship between the two organisations and reflects several years of relationship building between the two organisations:

> We started out in about 1993 talking about MOUs. And we actually had them drafted, we drafted them here. And, basically when you look back on that, that’s like going out on your first date with the wedding license in your pocket. And it was never going to

---

139 Many council officers noted the willingness of their organisation to enter into such agreements with *iwi* and *hapū*, and so negotiating an MOU is “really about the comfort level on the other side… [and] the council respects that because it actually isn’t forcing the issue. We understand that it’ll happen in the fullness of time” (Manager, Environmental Strategy and Policy, NPDC, 17.06.09).
work because the relationship hadn’t been established. So it’s taken that length of time, fifteen years or so, for that relationship to be formalised through an MOU. And that’s about an organisational relationship recognising that the glue of the relationship is actually the personalities in an organisation… and those personalities change over time… [So,] where there’s a cultural difference and there’s a history behind it… it obviously it takes a wee while to work through to a position where the relationship will actually be authenticated and work well (Manager, Environmental Strategy and Policy, NPDC, 17.06.09).

The MOU, therefore, “is basically just the meaning of a handshake” (Director, Resource Management, TRC, 08.07.09), and guarantees the existence of a working relationship and methods for dialogue (Manager, Environmental Strategy and Policy, NPDC, 17.06.09). This is particularly important for iwi because, as discussed above, the quality of interactions with government agencies is often determined by the personalities of staff and managers. Thus, even if – or especially if – a relationship is working well, an MOU may still be desired to confirm and protect that relationship:

So the Area Manager came to me and he said, ‘well how bout we just flag [the MOU]?’ And I said well, no actually, because it’s ok while you’re there…if the current Conservator leaves, and then you get another [person like the previous Conservator] in, we’ll start from back to square one again. So part of the MOU, it’s a document to say well here’s our expectations jointly, how do we achieve that, and focus it. You only pull it out, with any MOU, you pull it out when you need it… if the relationship is already strong you don’t need it. It’s when it falls down that you go back to it and say well hang on this is what we’ve agreed, this is what’s in the legislation. And then if it gets to that point you gotta ask yourself, well what’s going wrong because you shouldn’t really need it…it’s like an insurance policy from my perspective (Chairperson, Conservation Board; Representative, TKoR, 15.06.09).

Importantly, protocols and MOUs can also strengthen the voice and rights of tangata whenua, because “Post-settlement you get a set of protocols that you can work to and they hear them because it’s in their work plan that they have to ‘oh you have to go listen to these Māoris,’ you know” (Tumu Whakarae, TKoR, 03.06.09). This suggests that formal recognition of tangata whenua rights and interests is valued by iwi organisations, especially in the context of significant historical mistrust.
7.2.3  Iwi Environmental Planning

Chapter Six explores *iwi* planning as an appropriation and use of such government techniques to advance and assert *tangata whenua* values and rights in postcolonial contexts. Some post-settlement *iwi* organisations in Taranaki similarly utilise planning in environmental management in an effort to ensure their values and ideas are recognised. Like planning for *iwi* governance more generally, environmental planning is not simply the translation of extant values into the language of councils and government departments. It is also a mode of exploring and articulating postcolonial ambitions in environmental management. The adoption of planning and mapping as strategies for Indigenous rights may not inherently resolve tensions and injustices in environmental management; rather, such approaches work within and against techniques of state control. In this section I argue that *iwi* management plans illustrate the complexity of asserting an Indigenous role in environmental management in postcolonial contexts, and the interweaving of Indigenous ambitions, mutuality and uncertainty.

Te Kāhui o Rauru (TKoR) has placed particular emphasis on environmental planning work in its post-settlement work. The development of plans is understood as a mechanism for fulfilling the organisational goal: the “revitalisation of Ngā Rauru Kītahitanga by honouring our tūpuna [ancestors] and providing a future for our tamariki mokopuna [future generations]” (Te Kahui o Rauru, 2008, 2009). These ‘first generation’ plans describe “how Ngaa Rauru Kītahi intends to fulfil its *kaitiakitanga* responsibilities” for both Ngā Rauru *uri* [descendents] and non-*iwi* organisations (Te Kahui o Rauru, 2008: 3, emphasis in original). Planning work by TKoR emphasises building knowledge within the *iwi* and its representative body. Research about the environment and the views of their people is “a part of our programme to gain the *matauranga* [knowledge, understanding] that we need to be able to tell our story, protect our *taonga*, and all those sorts of things” (Tumu Whakarae, TKoR, 03.06.09). Developing knowledge about the contemporary environmental values of whanau, hapu and *iwi* is an important aspect of planning. As the former *Kainwhakahaere* [CEO] of TKoR explains, developing plans gives representatives of TKoR clarity on how the *iwi* views the environment:

…these [first generation] plans actually only provide the high level thinking...about how relationship works, responsibilities, conditions of relationships bla bla bla. That
then has to be placed down at another level, which is the individual, the *marae*, the *hapu*, where the rubber hits the road and says right there’s all our responsibilities, this is all what we gotta do, how do you wish to proceed? So, for Ngā Rauru, we haven’t got to the implementation stage. At least we’ve got a wide framework from which to launch from and...we have a 45, 46 page survey that will really inform the action points for implementation. So that’s the step that’s missing... That’s exactly where we’re at now... So, there’s some of those fundamental questions that need to be asked, how do you wish to proceed? (Manager, Ngāti Ruanui Tahua, 04.05.09).

Indeed, many representatives noted the importance of articulating environmental values for *iwi* and *hapu* members. For Ngāti Mutunga, planning work “was more of a tool for Ngāti Mutunga in terms of teaching us...well, recording it for our people, more so than for the council” (Chairman, TRoNM, 27.05.09). Further, as the quotation below attests, the specific environmental values of *iwi* and *hapu* cannot be assumed by representative organisations:

Well, is sustainability a biggie for us? Is *kaitiakitanga* real or is it perceived? You know, should we forsake *kaitiakitanga* for commercial gain? You know, whereas fundamentally you would say well no, you want sustainability, *mo āke tonu atu* [for all time], that’s what some of us might say. Some of them will say ‘bugger off...we need some money, we need a toilet on our *marae*, so let’s sell the fish.’ So those questions all have to be re-asked... it’s really important that there’s the final level of that gives enablement to the plan. Although the *iwi* have signed off on the big picture stuff contained in the plan or the general feel of the plans there’s still, sort of, a little bit more work to do (Manager, Ngāti Ruanui Tahua, 04.05.09).

This discussion is illustrative of the postcolonial moment in which *iwi* environmental plans are developed; but it also demonstrates that the cultural matrix of Indigenous communities is not static. In Chapter Two, I argue that oppositional binaries that frame development in terms of mutually exclusive Western or postdevelopment (Indigenous) options fall short of the possibilities and potential made possible by recognising cultural change and hybridity. In an environmental management context, holding Indigenous values and policies hostage to ‘traditional’ and ‘ecologically noble’ positions may overlook spaces for agreement and compromise, and also undermine the reality of Māori communities working through the legacies of displacement. Willow (2009: 57) similarly suggests that Indigenous communities:
...are real people who make difficult (and sometimes incongruous) decisions within (and occasionally against) a dynamic and unbounded cultural framework. Their relationship to the [environment]...is mediated not only by culture but also by cross-woven strands of history, politics, and individual agency.

The work and experiences of TKoR and TRoNM demonstrate that articulating Indigenous environmental values through planning documents – itself a hybrid strategy – may offer a way to explore, learn and develop contemporary iwi relationships with the environment.

As a corollary, iwi representatives emphasised the importance of iwi controlling and owning the planning process and outcomes, and the inability of councils to articulate tangata whenua values on their behalf. The Chairman of TRoNM (27.05.09), for instance, recounted that:

One of the issues in Taranaki is that this whole notion of iwi management plans is quite new to them. The regional council, through [the Director of Resource Management] [clicked fingers], you know [him], said ‘look nah, nah, we’ve already done this [click], you know, here it is here, we’ve got a document which sets out, you know, tangata whenua views.’ And I said, ‘well, that’s cool Fred but that’s your interpretation of it. I’ve read it, and nah, it sounds pretty good. But this is a process we want to undertake, so how can you support us financially or otherwise? (See also Appendix F5).

Like the planning work described in Chapter Six, iwi ownership of processes and outcomes is essential; the right to authorship of tangata whenua values and roles in environmental management is firmly located with tangata whenua.

While planning documents articulate iwi environmental values for iwi, communicating these values to external groups is also a priority. TKoR describe the purpose of their environmental plan as to:

- provide focus and direction to TKoR to fulfil our kaitiaki responsibilities to te ao maaori ake [the natural world];
- improve public awareness of the natural and physical resource values, concerns and issues of Ngaa Rauru Kiitahi;
- ensure Ngaa Rauru Kiitahi environmental values, concerns and issues are incorporated into local and national decision making processes;
- demonstrate our commitment to work alongside resource users and decision makers; and
- guide resource users and decision makers on how to consult and include Ngaa Rauru Kiitahi in their environmental activities (Te Kahui o Rauru, 2008: 6).

This emphasis on ensuring inclusion and awareness is indicative of the challenges and aspirations of TKoR, and the intimate links between iwi development and environmental management. The stabilisation of Māori political representation in mandated, post-settlement organisations, for example, engenders bureaucratic structures with (some) resources and responsibilities to work on behalf of the iwi as a collective. However, because contemporary iwi organisations work in the context of dispossession and exclusion, there is limited capacity and resources within iwi to take on ownership and autonomous management of large areas (Chapter Eight further discusses this point in relation to the maunga and water). Thus, for many iwi representatives, concerns about iwi capacity form a motive for collaboration, noting that management needs to be “fifty, fifty. Tangata whenua, bureaucracy. Because [tangata whenua] can’t manage it on your own, you’re not up to it, [and] they’re not up to it” (TMTB Member, Kaumatua, 21.07.09).

One of the main goals of such planning work, then, is to advance iwi values and positions within existing environmental management frameworks, which suggests that the influence of iwi in environmental management remains contingent on government largesse. The TKoR environmental management plan, for instance, seeks to “improve Ngaa Rauru Kiitahi’s participation in the management of our natural and physical resources at both local and national levels” (Te Kahui o Rauru, 2008: 33), and identifies relationships as a key issue to be addressed:

Previously, relationships with key stakeholders have been ad hoc and issues based with little effort being placed into developing or growing relationships by all parties. Further, our ability to participate and influence environmental management decision making processes has been limited. This has meant our environmental values and objectives have rarely been included or provided for in local, regional or national environmental decision making processes, documents and outcomes (Te Kahui o Rauru, 2008: 17).

Significantly, many iwi representatives see plans as a pro-active and strategic method of interfacing with local government and moving away from only responding to resource consents or government documents:
… ideally you’d wanna be proactive about everything but it’s always sort of putting out fires most of the time. Having to respond, you know. And that was, for us, for the Iwi Management Plan to at least have something there and say shit, if it’s about air… we’ve got it there, we don’t want bloody bail wraps being burnt, that’s our position (Chairman, TRoNM, 27.05.09).

However, understanding the context into which iwi plans are inserted forms an important consideration. Several interviewees noted that under the RMA councils are required to ‘take into account’ iwi plans; as the Director of Resource Management at TRC (08.07.09) put it, “plans go into plans, not iwi plans into consents.” Precisely because iwi plans may inform or be ‘taken into account’ by councils, such planning work may illustrate, rather than alleviate, the limitations to Indigenous participation and authority in environmental management. The Tumu Whakarae of TKoR (03.06.09) asserts that:

… it’s alright having an environmental plan, it’s alright lodging it with the councils, but we lodge it with the councils and they take no notice of it. They’re not gonna come to us for any consents. We need to go in there and teach them, teach them how to use our environmental plan, what it is that most of these policies mean to us and how they can be better implemented on their end, that’s some of the ways that we can move those forward.

This idea is illustrated in the plans developed by TKoR. The Fisheries Plan, for instance, states that: “We welcome and expect opportunities to participate as partners in the management of fisheries in our pahuki [area/boundary] and will ensure we communicate directly with MFish and other agencies in order to achieve our vision” (Te Kahui o Rauru, 2009: 7).

Significantly, iwi plans may also promote increased understanding and common ground between iwi and council organisations. Indeed, making iwi positions and ideas more comprehensible for government agencies is often an anticipated outcome of planning documents:

This Plan is also for non-Iwi members as a tool to improve their understanding of our heritage, relationship and connection to te ao maaori ake [the natural world]. Through increased understanding of each others [sic.] environmental philosophies, we are
working to eliminate poor decision making processes, which result in poorer environmental outcomes (Te Kahui o Rauru, 2008: 7).

The former Kaiwhakahaere of TKoR feels that researching *īwi* understandings of *kaitiakitanga* and environmental interrelationships enables TKoR to better enter into relationships with other entities:

…we are now confident that when we do go and engage across a number of entities that we will, we’ll be in a position to say ‘yes this is exactly what they want; we know that.’ It’s better than saying ‘yes, we’re gonna do this’ and then get back out to our communities and they go ‘uh-ah, you ain’t doing that [name]’ and you go ‘huh?’ It’s a mana thing at stake too. I think we need to go into these partnerships, into these liaisons [with] …councils, central, local government, NGOs, all sorts of people knowing what our people exactly want. Not guessing (Manager, Ngāti Ruanui Tahua, 04.05.09).

Further, the development of the plans often involves significant collaboration between council and *īwi* staff, as well as resource sharing. For example, the Ngāti Mutunga *īwi* plan draws on the expertise of local government bodies:

…so [the Director of Resource Management TRC] said they’re happy to review aspects of the plan to make sure they understand if, any questions they have they can pose those at the outset rather than wait till we’re finished and say ‘ah that’s not relevant.’ And we talked about things like, well if, when we do complete the plan how will you view it? How will it fit within your planning instruments or whatever and the RMA and so forth. And [he] said, look, he didn’t have any cash but he was more than happy to print, a hundred copies if we want… he offered to review, to provide access to their policy analysts and planners, and yeah, just sort of [an] open line of communication. And he also said that they could do the desk topping and all that if we liked and I said no your stuff looks ugly, we want something nicer. So, you know, and he was really good, and he came up a couple of times and [the staff member]…writing it for us was constantly interacting with him. NPDC they provided, you know, they said basically advice, any planners and stuff to sort of sit down and talk about issues and...[the Iwi Relationships Manager has] come through now and said, ‘look we might have ten grand for you’...they also offered to sort of promote the plan within their planning instruments and stuff… (Chairman TRoNM, 27.05.09).
Iwi planning work is a fundamental statement about the role iwi organisations seek as tangata whenua of Taranaki, and perhaps most notably, rather than advancing an alternative regime to the status quo, the planning documents thus far articulate how iwi organisations intend to work within the current systems to advance their aspirations. In this sense, planning documents simultaneously work within and disrupt existing structures, and form an insistent statement that multiple geopolitical relationships exist in Taranaki.

7.3 NEGOTIATING ROLES AND RIGHTS

Fundamental to Crown-Māori relationships in environmental management are the roles, rights and responsibilities of Indigenous and state bodies. Questions of authority and control in environmental management seemingly form a juncture at which geopolitical and sovereign claims unfold, and ideas of justice, fairness and balance intersect with more prosaic issues of resourcing and liability. This jumble of claims and responsibilities and their entanglement with structures and rights sedimented by histories of colonial/Crown control suggest a messy complexity and complicity in postcolonial negotiations of Indigenous participation and influence.

7.3.1 Economic Inequality and Responsibility

Many interviewees noted that economic inequalities permeate environmental management processes and limit the effectiveness (and opportunities for) tangata whenua participation (Section 7.1). Postcolonial responsibility for enabling and recognising tangata whenua involvement in resource management thus emerges as an important question. Reimbursement for consultation or wahi tapu site visits is increasingly common and expected;\textsuperscript{140} TKoR, for instance, include a schedule of fees for their participation in their environmental management (Te Kahui o Rauru, 2008). Such payments, even if only a nominal sum (Chairman, TRoNM, 27.05.09), affirm that consultation is required and incurs costs to iwi and hapu, and subtly frame it as a ‘professional’ or ‘expert’ service (Subdivisions and Resource Consents Team Leader, NPDC, 22.07.09). Some council officers noted that payment for wahi tapu site visits was generally not contentious among resource consent applicants (Land Use Consents and Monitoring, Team Leader, NPDC, 22.07.09).

\textsuperscript{140} Resource consent applicants must pay for the processing of their applications. Although payment to tangata whenua is usually managed by the council, ultimately the applicant pays.
17.07.09; Subdivisions and Resource Consents Team Leader, NPDC, 22.07.09). However, ‘striking the balance’ and determining when and how much payment should be provided to *tangata whenua* was seen as a serious issue by the Director of Resource Management at TRC:

…to be blunt it’s whether there should be payment for involvement in resource management or not, it’s as blunt as that. And it hangs on this. In order to… implement the RMA…staff at councils can use existing *wahi tapu* databases and knowledge of the region…or applicants and/or staff can go to *tangata whenua*. Now to connect with that knowledge and get a cultural perspective involves some time…and the challenge there is whether that sort of cultural impact report, or that sort of approach is required for every consent…so there’s an issue of scale and effect, as to whether you need a cultural impact assessment on everything. If the Council planning process has established an activity as a controlled activity (and in law the consent has to be granted) then there is no point. However, on those bigger consents where impacts can be greater I certainly think you do need an assessment. But seriously I don’t think you need a cultural impact assessment on a simple culvert. So it’s a matter of striking the balance around that, and then recognising how much work is required, how much it will cost and who should pay, and whether it’s reasonable… And again, it’s like a lot of things in resource management it’s about achieving that balance…

*Do you feel that it’s the council’s role to kind of determine that balance?*

Absolutely, in law that is our job and it can be very difficult as there are winners and losers, with some parties considering their values have not been heard and/or given the weight they deserve.

Thus, the values, rights and interests of *tangata whenua*, other community members and resource consent applicants are weighed against each other throughout consenting processes, especially where some council officers are wary of facilitating financially driven participation, and must also ensure that it does not “look like *iwi* are trying to control the process” (Land Use Consents and Monitoring, Team Leader, NPDC, 17.07.09). The politics of facilitating *tangata whenua* participation in resource management may compromise the ability of *hapu* and *iwi* representatives to participate and provide support or opposition to their resource consent applications:

… there are some [applications] where we really put our foot down and say ‘well, look, this is not good enough, I don’t understand any of this stuff, we need to get someone
who can help us.’ Now, District Council doesn’t care about that part of the process. They say ‘oh well, you need to go away and talk to the companies about that.’ All they’re dealing with is an application in front of them that says, we would like to go in there and dig a hole.

So it’s like they don’t see it as their responsibility to enable you to be a part of that conversation?

Nope. Nope. Absolutely not. Never have. All they do is say, ‘this is where our, you know, this is the parameter we work within Daisy and we don’t go outside of that. We could recommend that they came see you, we could say to them well look it would be really nice if you could go and talk to Daisy because she could make your life easier.’ They don’t have to do that, not even that… I guess this is the main argument that we have. We should not have to find, [to] finance ourselves to protect our areas. Any applicant that wants to do anything in Ngā Ruahine, should be paying to do that, they should be paid to have a relationship, not with the bloody council, but with us (D. Noble, Kanihi hapu, Ngā Ruahine, 13.07.09).

This quotation cites the idea of financial disparity and scientific knowledge as barriers to tangata whenua participation – an issue of which many council officers are cognisant, and several advocated providing training for iwi and hapu members about the RMA or internships as a key mechanism for improving relationships (see Appendix F6). The above quotation also suggests an important inversion of current resource management processes that would require applicants and councils to prioritise the territoriality of tangata whenua, and work with hapu as a sovereign entity rather than a legally mandated submitter or advisor in the process.

Facilitating Māori participation in environmental management, therefore, emerges as a key barrier to greater collaboration and more effective advocacy of Māori values. This is exacerbated by the financial limitations of councils and government departments, such that developing closer relationships and more effective modes of participation and advocacy is contingent on financial resources. As the Chairperson of Ngā Ruahine

141 For example: “The Department’s [DoC] challenge is lack of resourcing [which] means they have to prioritise hugely…And it’s not that the Department doesn’t recognise that [an iwi’s] project is important, but if they’re going to help that iwi group there, where are they taking the money off” (JAC member; East Taranaki Environmental Trust, 15.07.09). Other interviewees also noted the recent cut in DoC’s funding as a potential issue for relationship building in the future (Tumu Whakarae, TKoR, 03.06.09; Conservation Board Member and former Stratford Area Manager, 07.07.09). Similarly, the Iwi Relationships Manager at NPDC (22.05.09) noted
Iwi Authority (15.05.09) put it, “The wills there, but it’s, ok, who’s going to do it? Who’s going to bake the cake? Who’s gonna get the ingredients for the cake?” As Lane and Williams (2009: 103) observe without investment in Indigenous capability, “Indigenous marginality will not be ameliorated but, quite possibly, further entrenched” through participatory or devolved governance. Similarly, government departments and councils’ capacity for relationship building, cross-cultural learning and engagement is impeded by funding issues, which necessitates a level of nuance that goes beyond caricatures of institutional apathy towards Indigenous rights.

**7.3.2 Invitation and Inclusion**

In Chapter Three I argue that the dynamics of territorial politics and the directionality of invitations to participate in environmental decision-making are also significant issues in collaborative models (Walker et al., 2007). Invitations to participate in the Crown’s management processes may assert the Crown’s prerogative and managerial legitimacy over the environment, and fail to recognise *tino rangatiratanga* and Māori relationships with the environment. *Iwi* liaison committees established in Taranaki illustrate these tensions. Various iterations of pan-*iwi* and *hapu* committees have been created at each of the councils in Taranaki to facilitate information sharing and enable *tangata whenua* to provide advice and feedback to council officers and councillors (see Table 16). Council officers spoke highly of liaison committees, noting they provide opportunities for relationship-building, educating councillors about *iwi* issues (Iwi Relationships Manager, NPDC, 22.05.09), and enable staff to “get a feeling for how *iwi* feel about certain issues going on at the council” (Subdivisions and Resource Consents Team Leader, NPDC, 22.07.09). However, like consultation more generally, *iwi* liaison committees have little authority: “it’s a useful vehicle, that’s all it is…it has no power…It can make recommendations but they’re non-binding…” (Councillor, STDC, 10.06.09). Given such limitations, some *tangata whenua* are ambivalent about this mode of participation, noting that it is no substitute for relationships with *iwi* and *hapu* individually. The Chairperson of Te Ati Awa Iwi Authority (TAIA, 09.06.09), for instance, stated that the NPDC committee is “quite a good model” because of the information provided and the opportunity to discuss issues with council staff and other *hapu*; yet she also noted that:

> that: “local government struggles, truly struggles to deal with all the things that they have to deal with anyway.”
I actually feel that the council looks upon that as a short cut, because quite often I think that a lot of the officers particularly feel that if they come along to that Iwi Liaison Committee and explain everything, then it stops, that they don’t need to go to hapu...you have to be pretty vigilant like that because they’re forever trying to circumvent everything, you know, they just see it as a process for themselves.

This ambivalence reflects the value placed on representing Māori interests in council business, but the concomitant sense that such committees may work to affirm the position of iwi as a stakeholder included within the council’s considerations. Some tangata whenua interpret such committees as essentially a part of council: “[It’s] one of their committees. But they’ve got Māori’s on it. The yellow ones are the Maoris and the others are Pakcha. So they have an Iwi Liaison Committee now (TMTB Member, Kaumatua, 21.07.09). Following this understanding, some iwi and hapu refuse to participate in liaison committees, arguing that “they just wanted to deal with the council on a one-to-one, you know, [they] want the council to have the relationship with them” (Chairperson, TAIA, 09.06.09). Therefore, despite their utility, Iwi Liaison Committees may fall short of recognising that “an iwi is a sovereign body in its own right” (Councillor, STDC, 10.06.09). Notably, this issue is repeated in governmental consultation with iwi, which is becoming increasingly unacceptable to representatives: “I don’t like submitting to any bugger, those days are gone. This is our view, you’ve got your view [and] this is our view” (CEO, Ngāti Tama, 13.05.09).

**Table 16: Boards and Committees in Taranaki**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Government Organisation</th>
<th>Membership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Te Putaitanga o Taranaki (currently inactive)</td>
<td>TRC</td>
<td>Representatives from all eight iwi, council officers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iwi Liaison Sub-Committee</td>
<td>NPDC</td>
<td>Some hapu from Te Atiawa, Ngāti Mutunga; Four Councillors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iwi Forum</td>
<td>NPDC</td>
<td>Some hapu from Te Atiawa, Ngāti Mutunga. Also attended by some council staff.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iwi Liaison Committee</td>
<td>STDC</td>
<td>Ngā Ruahine, Ngāti Ruanui, Ngā Rauru Kūtahi, Mayor, Deputy Mayor, Chair of the Environmental Hearings Committee.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Collaborative models that assume the eminence of Crown sovereignty over the territorial and cultural relations of *tangata whenua* may be fundamentally unacceptable. For example, requests from Crown organisations to identify culturally significant sites invoke an innateness and legitimacy of the Crown’s sovereignty over the entire landscape:

> Why is it that they continue to think that we have to prove [the cultural and spiritual significance of sites]? You know, go to ya damn libraries, it’s full of it. You don’t need us to keep standing from the cliff tops and yelling it to ya. If anything, prove to us why you should be there. That’s what I’d like to hear and see. You prove to Māori why you want to be here, and how you’re going to make it better? You know, are you going to improve that area for us? If you are, how are you going to do that? Tell us what you’re gonna do. We shouldn’t have to tell you what’s deeply significant so that you don’t touch it. You shouldn’t be there (D. Noble, Kanihi hapu, Ngā Ruahine, 13.07.09).

In Chapter Eight I discuss how these issues are brought into play when contemplating settlement or collaboration in the management of water and the *maunga* [mountain]. Articulating a role for Māori in environmental management that gives meaning to such concepts as *mana whenua* and *kaitiakitanga* is therefore intertwined with complex patterns of territoriality and authority. The spatial imaginaries that currently inform environmental management offer limited scope for a more ‘genuine commitment’ to bicultural practices that would “entertain notions of self-determination” (Ginn, 2008a: 350).

### 7.3.3 Sovereignty and Authority in Environmental Management

The tensions in environmental management identified in the preceding sections suggest that recent moves to include *tangata whenua* fall short of the roles desired. In essence, the perpetuation of absolute state authority in and through environmental management conflates nation and territory at the expense of spaces for Indigenous territoriality and *tino rangatiratanga* [sovereignty]. Sidaway (2007) suggests that postdevelopment challenges the congruence of territory-economy-nation which twentieth century development models assumed. Environmental management infrastructures in Taranaki (and New Zealand) invoke a similar homology of territory, nation and government that is disrupted by Indigenous assertions of territoriality or sovereignty (Johnson, 2008). I argue that contrasting understandings of the relative roles and authority of councils,
DoC and iwi organisations in environmental management raise questions about Indigenous and state territoriality in Taranaki. This suggests the importance of environmental management as an arena for conceptualising Crown-Māori relationships and the positioning of Indigenous peoples in relation to postcolonial nationhood.

Council officers that I met described their role in resource management as providing a neutral and objective assessment of environmental effects, weighing up the various interests of submitters and mediating between developers and interested parties (Manager, Community Services and Development, STDC, 27.05.09; Manager, Environment and Information Services, STDC, 27.05.09; Land Use Team Leader, NPDC, 17.07.09). In this way, resource management is akin to “fighting for resources” where the council is the ‘referee’ and “with appropriate third umpire as it were…the video ref off to one side” (Director, Resource Management, TRC, 08.07.09). The frameworks established in legislation form the circumference for considering the role of tangata whenua in environmental management, and work to preclude thinking beyond the current systems of resource management because “it’s the law; you can’t change the law” (Director of Resource Management, TRC, 08.07.09). The Iwi Relationships Coordinator at NPDC (22.05.09) notes that:

...we tend to treat tangata whenua like any other stakeholder...but that’s actually, that should not be the way that it is, you know, we do need to give far more weight to their views than we do for the rest of the public. But, fundamentally, I think that’s really hard for local government because...it’s not only what they’re not used to doing, but it’s also, within the legislation of the Local Government Act and the RMA, it doesn't allow for that, you know, almost.

Similarly in the conservation estate, although the Treaty principles are central to DoC’s mandate, the Conservation Act (1987) allocates authority in conservation to DoC. Despite willingness among some DoC staff to work closer with tangata whenua and Māori desire for co-management in conservation (Chairperson, Conservation Board; Representative, TKoR, 15.06.09), current legislation impedes an equal partnership:

DoC, being a government department and bureaucratic, through no fault, I mean they’ve got some tremendous people on board there, but it’s just that sign in the front – Department of Conservation – managing land. And by statute the Department has the primary role. They can consult, they can give consideration but the ultimate
responsibility they can’t delegate out of it, out of what’s in legislation. And for iwi, in particular, especially here in Taranaki where the Taranaki Māori wars were and confiscation land, they would rather have a partnership that is equal. But DoC’s legislation doesn’t allow that totally to happen… (JAC member; East Taranaki Environmental Trust, 15.07.09).

Many tangata whenua representatives also noted the frequent recourse to legislation to justify and legitimate decisions and the authority of local government. In reflecting on her participation in resource consenting processes, one interviewee described the sense that laws made it possible to essentially ignore Māori values:

... when I have a good read of the reports of why they’ve given their consent, their go ahead, it has totally ignored the reasons why you challenged in the first place. All those reasons or concerns that you had, have been totally, totally ignored...you sit there and you read it and you think, well, how could look at it like that?! ...they’ve taken into account what we’ve said, and they understand that our concerns are there. However, they’ve given their consent because this [law] allows them to do this, that law allows them to do that, and under section so and so it says we can do it this way and that way (D. Noble, Kanihi hapu, Ngā Ruahine, 13.07.09).

Under the RMA (1991) and Local Government Act (2002), then, deeper consideration of postcolonial tangata whenua rights in environmental management is obviated by the perpetuation of state eminence. Articulating Indigenous rights through legislation creates and delimits scope for Indigenous viewpoints in government processes, and can also work to close down discussions and exclude considerations that tangata whenua feel are essential (Alfred, 2006, Roughan, 2009).

Control and authority in environmental management are intimately related to debates about postcolonial governance and the powers of local government, Indigenous groups and the Crown. The Director of Resource Management at TRC (08.07.09) suggests that the role tangata whenua (seek to) assert in environmental management and the council’s mandated role are similar:
And I’ve found generally dealing with *tangata whenua* it’s…about the *kaitiakitanga* role which is very important for Maori and the basis of much of what the council does. I mean resource management is about *kaitiakitanga* or stewardship, so we’re actually on the same page regarding the environment (Director, Resource Management, TRC, 08.07.09).

This similarity of purpose between DoC, local government and *iwi* suggests significant scope for collaboration. However, as the quotation below indicates, *iwi* assertions of a parallel role to councils in environmental governance may also be a source of tension:

…I get a bit concerned when I hear comments from the community though that the council is not neutral and that, for example, *tangata whenua* have to have their own monitors and samplers and everything else. Personally I find that quite concerning because I’ve just described to you the system we have around planning, consenting, and public involvement, I’ve presented data on *iwi* involvement, all our monitoring procedures are all QA’d, they’re all published each year and there is a very publically accountable process in place. The councillors themselves who are publically elected every three years get to see it all, so there is no intrigue or anything going on. We even get work peer reviewed by independent experts. There is no need for people to check, because we’re actually doing it correctly…we have a consent condition which requires Fonterra to involve *iwi* in coastal monitoring where payment is made if the monitoring is undertaken…and that seems to work. But to extend that everywhere is seriously inefficient because under the RMA the council has monitoring powers. So, there’s no place in law or practice to have too much of the dual monitoring. And again you have to be clear as to the actual issues that are being raised are and address them (Director, Resource Management, TRC, 08.07.09).

This view is supported in Crown memos which note that:

Environmental protection is also a legitimate function of modern government and this may require action to limit the rights of property-holders. We definitely do not wish to undercut the clear assurances contained in the Treaty that Maori lands are to be protected but we do consider that the principles of the Treaty can be used to justify a reasonable balancing of Maori and national interests provided that both partners act in good faith.\(^{142}\)

---

The strategy of the Crown addressing īwi concerns within its own structures – rather than devolving or disbursing authority and control – has a long history in both Treaty settlements and resource management. The durability of such ‘solutions’ is perhaps questionable, partly because of mistrust, but also because tangata whenua aspirations for a greater role in environmental management stem from a cultural matrix of kaitiakitanga responsibilities and their status as mana whenua.

Conceptualisations of the relative roles between of councils, DoC, īwi organisations and the Crown in environmental management are fundamental to understanding tensions and collaborative possibilities, and to creating genuinely postcolonial relationships. Because the Treaty relationship is between the Crown and Māori, local government and DoC are somewhat ambiguously positioned as both part of the Crown, and not the Crown. In the Treaty “it’s actually about Crown–Maori. And if you have a look at that relationship then, yes, it is actually above local government. But local government see themselves very much on a par, if not above tangata whenua” (Iwi Relationships Manager, NPDC, 22.05.09). Understanding councils as operating within the Crown’s hierarchy opens questions of how īwi organisations sit alongside councils. In this context, Treaty settlements and Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) provide important opportunities for articulating and re-configuring these īwi-council relationships. Augmenting the inclusion of Māori in government processes with a legislated ability to genuinely influence decision-making, for example, may engender a more appropriate role for tangata whenua.

I think that local government has, through the powers of central government, been given this authority if you like. Īwi and hapu to date have not been given any authority. It’s all been taken away and perhaps that’s exactly where things need to go; that authority needs to be given back…it is that decision making at a governance level that…doesn’t happen at the moment for īwi and hapu and so needs to… (Iwi Relationships Manager, NPDC, 22.05.09).

Some interviewees also suggested that existing provisions within the LGA (2002) should be used to “emplace Māori seats, say, in the territorial local authorities and the…Taranaki Regional Council” (Chairperson, Ngā Ruahine Iwi Authority,

---

143 Tangata whenua representatives noted a disjunction between colonial history and the Crown’s responsibilities to Māori and those of councils (Manager of the Ngāti Tama Development Trust, 13.05.09; Puketapu hapu representative, TAIA, 19.06.09).
Statutory representation, and the reconfiguration of local government-tangata whenua relationships, is seen to offer a means of going beyond consideration qua collaboration. In essence, acknowledging that territorial assertions and kaitiakitanga responsibilities cannot be satisfied by including abstracted cultural concerns and sites within the council’s managerial processes requires aligning Indigenous participation with control and influence. Settlements may provide the only legal mechanism for achieving such a shift:

I think the only way that the Crown can actually ensure that tangata whenua have a true input into environmental issues is through those settlements, yeah, and I think that they’re learning that… but sooner or later they actually need to actually make local government understand about where their settlement acts actually sit within the whole gamut of legislation. And it’s not that the…two sets of legislation actually disagree…but when it comes down to decision making, it is about decision making and it is about who maybe [has] more power than others (Iwi Relationships Manager, NPDC, 22.05.09).

Although settlements are complex, controversial and flawed, they may also offer the greatest potential for fundamentally reshaping the role of tangata whenua in environmental management within the existing legal and political structure.

Decision-making in environmental management, therefore, is intimately related to the spatiality of power and authority within postcolonial New Zealand. As the Manager of Environmental Strategy and Policy (NPDC, 17.06.09) similarly noted this mechanism as something “politically we should really consider” because it would be a “useful model” that may “enhance the mana of local tangata whenua.”

The principles of the Treaty of Waitangi were announced in 1989 and were intended to modernise the Treaty. They are summarised in Appendix A4.

\footnote{144}{The Manager of Environmental Strategy and Policy, NPDC (17.06.09) similarly noted this mechanism as something “politically we should really consider” because it would be a “useful model” that may “enhance the mana of local tangata whenua.”}

\footnote{145}{The principles of the Treaty of Waitangi were announced in 1989 and were intended to modernise the Treaty. They are summarised in Appendix A4.}
because if you don’t start from that position you might end up regarding them as advisors, but they’re not.

Do you feel like the two are quite compatible though, like hapu and their rangatiratanga and the role of council? Do you feel like they can work together and sit together quite comfortably?

They can, they can, it’s an interesting one, because it’s a very fundamental issue that and because, you know, what school are you in when you answer that question? Are you in the school which says, well, there’s provision for two sovereignties to exist, or is there only provision for one? And in a way that question doesn’t arise when you’re in local government because there can only be one, because we have the mandate under the Local Government Act, rightly or wrongly we’ve gotta act within that framework. Just as the court in New Zealand in administering justice has to assert itself as the, you know, as the sole arbiter and dispenser of justice. That’s certainly the environment that we find ourselves in in local government.146

Indigenous development and self-determination rest somewhat uneasily with postcolonial nationhood and are frequently perceived as a challenge to the solidity of state-nation-territory nexus (Chapter Two). The rights and authority of tangata whenua in environmental management of their rohe similarly invoke these fundamental questions about indigeneity and postcolonial nationhood. Yet, under the current legislation the “state system assumes control and retains some de facto capacity to shift away from respecting pluralism and tikanga [Māori customary values] whenever it chooses” even as it explicitly provides for Indigenous concerns (Roughan, 2009: 177). While Māori are included in the Crown’s managerial processes, the unjust foundations of the system remain (arguably) unaddressed. That some positive personal relationships have been built around these limitations suggests both the centrality of personalities to collaboration and the complexity of relationships between Indigenous and government groups.

---

146 Interestingly, for some tangata whenua representatives, this question is very much alive: “But kawanatanga [government] has ignored [Māori culture] because its laws are based on parliamentary law or parliamentary sovereignty, well, you know that’s only chicken feed, really. Like going to the fowl house to get eggs, you see, so it’s got nothing to do with authority, mana” (Kaumatua, TMTB Member, 21.07.09).
7.4 CONCLUSIONS

Chapter Six notes that resistance to settlements often hinges around ideas of becoming entangled with the remnants and progeny of colonial violence. In environmental management, such entanglements are variously seen as a ‘stepping stone’ to greater autonomy, a sign of goodwill and a political necessity. Articulating a role for *tangata whenua* with and through Crown structures is both risky and subversive; yet it also invokes the idea of shared responsibility for the environment. Current iterations of collaboration in Taranaki, though often mobilised around counter-colonial statements of Indigenous territoriality and relationships with the environment, frequently work to intertwine *iwi* and government organisations. Advancing Indigenous agendas through government processes certainly risks their dilution through government practices and whims, but it also provides a foundation for reshaping how environmental governance is performed by government agencies and negotiating government-Indigenous relationships. Yet the politics of collaboration are also contingent on the rather more prosaic issue of funding and the facilitation of capacity-building within *tangata whenua* and cultural capacity within government. The willingness of all parties to work closer together is somewhat stifled by the absence of funds to enable such changes. While Treaty settlement processes intended to redress the injustices of the past delineate a clear line of responsibility to the Crown, a certain ambivalence remains towards responsibility for addressing contemporary injustices and inequalities in environmental management. The development of meaningful relationships between *tangata whenua*, local government and DoC officers around these tricky and unresolved questions of postcoloniality indicates that collaboration is worked through and made possible by individuals and their everyday interactions. The intersection of the roles, responsibilities and relationships of government and *tangata whenua* across common ground also reveals the potential for mutuality, compromise and a genuinely plural approach to environmental management and place.
Considerations of Māori rights and responsibilities in environmental management are further refracted through Treaty settlement processes. Prospects for a national settlement over water ownership and management, and debates about a settlement over Mount Taranaki illustrate the challenges and possibilities of the settlement era for collaborative environmental management. These two case studies encompass all eight iwi in Taranaki, and are suggestive of the intricacies of inter-iwi collaboration regionally and nationally. They also illustrate the uncertain and dynamic context in which contemporary relationships between iwi and government agencies are negotiated.

8.1 Water: Roles, Rights and Interests

Indigenous rights to water are a complex issue in environmental management. Internationally, addressing water scarcity through neoliberalisation and privatisation has often disregarded Indigenous uses and rights, reduced local water security, and undermined the ability of Indigenous communities to assert a role in water management (Mascarenhas, 2007, Perreault, 2005, 2006). In New Zealand recent discussions about water management reform focus on developing management tools that “get the most
value from finite water resources”147 because water “is central to New Zealand’s biologically based export economy and our competitive advantage”148 and “is part of our brand” (Land and Water Forum, 2010: 7). The SWPoA (Sustainable Water Programme of Action) was formed in 2003149 to investigate how to improve water management in New Zealand and provide national level strategic direction (its objectives are summarised in Appendix G1). Many predict a shift away from the current ‘first-in, first-served’ approach to water allocation, towards market allocation models, based on the idea that “greater flexibility and transferability of water rights would provide a strong financial incentive for greater efficiency” (Makgill, 2010: 10). However, the Crown recognises that Māori have rights and interests in freshwater. They have sought input from an ‘Iwi Leaders Group,’ consisting of representatives from large iwi, which does not include Taranaki iwi.151 The roles and rights in water management of Taranaki iwi are essentially contingent on national-level discussions, which provides impetus for regional-level consensus and cooperation. Settlement over water is risky, but holds the potential to reconfigure managerial and ownership regimes in ways that may be more acceptable for tangata whenua.

Water ownership remains curiously ambiguous in New Zealand’s legislation. Under (British) common law, rivers and lakes are compartmentalised into water, the beds and the banks; while the beds and banks can be owned, water cannot because it is belongs to the public (Ruru, 2009). The common law doctrine of native title and the Treaty of Waitangi offer legal (and moral) arguments for recognising Māori customary rights to freshwater, and these have been pursued by various hapu and iwi (Iwi Leaders Group, 2009, Ruru, 2009, Waitangi Tribunal, 1998). Litigating rights is costly, somewhat ad hoc, and as Ruru (2009: 89) points out: “If Parliament does not like this possibility [of affirming Māori customary rights], it has the right to pass clear and plain legislation that extinguishes native title in fresh water.”152 Given such limitations, the Iwi Leaders

147 Cabinet Office, 2009 at (79)(4.5.1).
148 Cabinet Office, 2009 at (3).
149 Formed under the Labour Government; led by the Minister for the Environment and the Minister of Agriculture.
150 Australian reforms and experiences are particularly influential (Hawke, 2006).
151 Representatives are from: Tuwharetoa Māori Trust Board, Te Runanga o Ngai Tahu, Te Kauhanganui o Waikato Inc., Te Arawa Lakes Trust and Whanganui River Trust Board. The Chairman of TRONM often interacts with this group.
152 The controversial Foreshore and Seabed Act (2004) is a recent example of this.
Group (2009: 12) states that its ‘preferred strategy’ is “to pursue a negotiated outcome” for freshwater.

Though water ownership is ambiguous, the Crown has assumed managerial rights (Ruru, 2009, Waitangi Tribunal, 1998). The RMA (1991, s(14)) currently gives local government the authority to allocate water and set and enforce guidelines and limits in relation to taking and using fresh water. Such control effectively generates a form of ownership and positions tangata whenua as stakeholders within the Crown’s managerial regime (Iwi Leaders Group, 2009). Notably, freshwater reform is similarly premised on the presumption that “It is the proper role of government to set the overall policy direction.”

Tangata whenua in Taranaki generally view this management qua ownership as illegitimate; the Chairperson of Ngā Ruahine (15.05.09) stated, “We like to just remind them from time to time that no, you don’t own it.” The Crown’s prerogative to manage, and its previous reluctance to resolve ownership issues or address Treaty rights is also unsatisfactory for tangata whenua in Taranaki:

They’ve chosen to do [water management] and take it, but it doesn’t really belong [to them], and they know it. But it’s simply a process of a so-called sovereignty which they use every now and again…it’s a breach of the Treaty, so they can’t do that and yet they do it all the time. And so we have to say, ‘well hang on, hang on, there’s a breach of the Treaty here, what do you propose to do about that?’ Um...umm... Well, they get into the ‘um um’ game; there’s no answers (TMTB Member, Kaumatua, 21.07.09).

Like settlements more generally, such interrogations of the postcolonial status quo reveal the anxious basis of governmental authority.

Legal and Treaty-based arguments often inform tangata whenua claims to freshwater, yet many understand their relationship to water as part of a cultural matrix that exists outside of Western legal structures. A kaumatua [elder] provided Figure 16 to explain the origin of Māori relationships with water. This figure depicts the whakapapa [genealogy] that creates mutuality between Māori and the environment, and the “mana for us, or the so called authority, comes from the interrelationship with nature” (TMTB Member, Kaumatua, 21.07.09). In this sense, Māori rights to water are “a consequence of

---

153 Prior to the RMA, managerial rights were stated in the Water and Soil Conservation Act (1967).
Chapter Eight: Settlements, Water and Taranaki Maunga

"whakapapa, tikanga [customs] and mana whakahaere [inherited status]" (Iwi Leaders Group, 2009: 5).

Figure 16: Diagram of the Relationship between Māori and Water (in English and Māori).155

As the quotations below indicate, tangata whenua understand their relationship as conferring rights to access, benefit from and develop as well as a responsibility to protect the water:

...we don’t think we own the water; we think that we have a relationship to the water. We think that we have the right to protect the water, and we think that we have a right to the benefits that the Crown get off the water as well...We’ve never given up our right to our resources, and we need to be strong to protecting those rights and getting those rights back going forward (Tumu Whakarae, TKoR, 03.06.09).

155 Kindly provided by TMTB Member, Kaumatua (21.07.09) during the interview.
…we’ve always sort of maintained that this whole notion of *kaitiakitanga* – to protect, preserve, care for look after and so forth – it’s not really, you don’t have to own something. Just because I don’t own a piece of land or in Western terms doesn’t mean I can’t express my *kaitiakitanga* over that area or those species with it (Chairperson, TRoNM, 22.05.09).

Western instruments for recognising and protecting resource rights are often an uncomfortable reconfiguration of the cultural values and concepts that inform the relationship between *iwi*, *hapu* and water. Though the idea of water as ‘property’ that can be owned is an anachronism for many *tangata whenua*, the relationship between Māori and water holds some similarity with ownership: “you cannot go past *kaitiakitanga*, which virtually says ownership, responsibility, sovereignty, authority, number one. No questions. And to me, that’s where it’s got to go” (TMTB Member, Kaumatua, 21.07.09). In the context of upcoming reforms to water management, *iwi* representatives and the Crown have indicated the desirability of resolving ownership (MfE, 2006, Land and Water Forum, 2010, Ruru, 2009).

Māori dissatisfaction with the existing regime extends to substantive differences in ideas about water and its management, especially in Taranaki where dairy farming and petrochemical developments underpin the regional economy. Following the RMA, water in Taranaki is managed by the TRC, and the Director of Resource Management (08.07.09) defended the quality and validity of their work:

> …we’re doing [water management] through the plans and operationally through the consents. We can stand by the work we’ve done in terms of environmental quality. I mean, we’re being beaten up by a few things at the moment…[but] generally the environmental quality here is very good, right, so we’ve actually achieved quite a bit…[even] with the doubling of the dairy cow numbers in the last 25 years, we’ve maintained and or enhanced our water quality, right…

However, *iwi* representatives identified several areas of concern. Firstly, consenting processes that designate water allocation as a non-notified activity (allowing councils to allocate water rights without consulting *tangata whenua*) restrict *iwi* participation and enable water use decisions that *iwi* disagree with:

> Well, I think that our policy clashes because we’re not involved in the consenting process; some of those consents are non-notifiable consents because they don’t think
we have an issue with it. And, of course, we have an issue because it’s degrading some
of the quality of the water, it’s not proper management of the water, it’s not in taking
into consideration our tikanga around the treatment of the water, it’s not taking into
consideration even about notifying us in the first place that they’d like to take water
(Tumu Whakarae, TKoR, 03.06.09).

Well, I think in the case of the water allocation and water take policy generally for
Taranaki, we do note that up to now those, permission to take I suppose, have been
non-notifiable. It’s a major issue for us because we don’t know what that means in
terms of effects on the environment, the ecology, so on so forth. Obviously the
reasoning for this iwi anyway is around the health and sustainability of taonga [prized,
treasured] species, such as tuna [eels] and all of the other ika [fish] that are provided in
our water ways so that’s the first thing… I can tell you from my iwi perspective is that,
just the pure process of having non-notifiable consents for water take is problematic
for us, given that Taranaki is a high dairy industry user water user (Manager, Ngati
Ruanui Tahua, 04.05.09).

This reflects a wider tension whereby local government responsibilities to iwi and the
Treaty relationship in relation to water remain ill-defined (Land and Water Forum,
2010). Iwi members also identified water quality and pollution as a concern, and many
felt that the council had allowed extensive industrial and agricultural use at the expense
of protecting water quality and sustainability. As the earlier examples of marine waste
disposal at the Whareroa outfall and at Motunui (Chapter Five, Seven) demonstrate,
there are significant differences between acceptable uses of water for iwi and
government agencies in Taranaki. Many tangata whenua representatives identified
protecting water quality as a priority of water management, suggesting that this has
previously been neglected in Taranaki:

Well, they’re supposed to be managing it which, [to me] managing means also to
protect, obviously, doesn’t it? It’s not within [their] framework of that concept of
management; it’s acquisition of resource and utilisation of resource without protections
for water, people, and future sustainability (TMTB Member, Kaumatua, 21.07.09).

… [when] they took away the [Regional Water] board…the regional councils didn’t

156 The Iwi Leaders Group (2009: 4) notes that: “it is thought that the mauri [life principle] of
different water should not be mixed – if they come into contact with another, both are placed at
risk and the ecosystem equilibrium is disturbed.” Following this idea, disposing wastewater into
the ocean or pumping wastewater from one area into another are both culturally unacceptable.
bother about the rivers, and they didn’t have any resourcing to be able to monitor and measure the quality, the anything about the waterways, especially in Taranaki, and it just sort of fell by the wayside really, and it was a lot of neglect, a lot of clogging up on the waterways (Tumu Whakarae, TKnR, 03.06.09, see Appendix G2 for further discussion).

Several iwi representatives also expressed concern at the extent of water allocation in Taranaki (pers. comm. ICF Meeting, 22.05.09; Freshwater Wananga [conference], 21.07.09). Indeed, the impact of industrial, agricultural and urban development on water supply in Taranaki has long been considered problematic (Taranaki Catchment Commission and Regional Water Board, 1983b), and the effects of this are beginning to be felt at some marae [meeting house] in Taranaki. At one marae in North Taranaki:

…all of their springs are all drying up and they’re sure it’s a result of the drawing ground water by farmers but also all the seismic oil exploration that they’ve put through there... So this marae, for the first time, is having to truck in water. And they’re saying, ‘why should we? We’ve always had springs that have traditionally been enough to keep the marae going.’ So I think water’s a key issue for Māori… (STDC Councillor, 10.07.09).

Ensuring continued access to water for marae and the community more generally is seen as both a responsibility and a motivation for greater iwi participation in water management because “What we’re not confident of is that there will be water for all communities, or certainly water access for communities at an affordable rate going forward…So we have a high social responsibility to make sure that that occurs” (Manager, Ngati Ruanui Tahua, 04.05.09). Current dissatisfaction with water management, therefore, reflects differing conceptions of water and management, but also a strong responsibility to secure water for tangata whenua.

One of the most controversial proposals in the freshwater reform discussions is the introduction of tradable water rights to promote greater efficiency (MfE, 2006, Makgill, 2010). Tangata whenua in Taranaki are wary of these proposals (pers. comm. Chairperson, TRoNM, Chairperson, Ngā Ruahine Iwi Authority, ICF Meeting, 22.05.09; pers. comm. Freshwater Wananga, 21.07.09),157 and one kaumatua expressed

157 The Crown have stated that “there shall be no disposition or creation of a property right in water without prior engagement and agreement with iwi” (Cabinet Office, 2009 at (48)(c)).
significant opposition to the marketisation of water rights and their potential to disenfranchise Māori:

They’re driven by colonial psyche, and global acquisition. Global acquisition and distribution of that resource through water rights, transfer of water rights from here to the USA. That’s all pigs bum, absolute pigs bum! All in the name of progress, no honesty, nothing about protection of or respect of water (TMTB Member, Kaumatau, 21.07.09).

Under the RMA (1991) permits already exist that “are neither real nor personal property, [but] the fact a permit has considerable value means it has some of the characteristics of property” (Hawke, 2006: 10). Reshaping the way water is allocated in Taranaki will require consideration of the matrix of pseudo-property rights to water already granted:

… you’ve got lessees that have water consents…it’s a little complex because some people are saying well without water then your land is virtually useless...[so] if you were to remove those 35 year permits that someone might have, what’s that going to do to them? (Chairperson, TRoNM, 27.05.09).

This is indicative of the postcolonial challenge of just and appropriate ways to recognise Indigenous rights in a landscape where rights have already promised to others. For iwi representatives, privatisation of water is especially risky because the Crown is the only organisation that has any (legal) responsibility towards Māori. In this context, a negotiated settlement may offer the most potential for protecting Māori customary interests.

Resolving rights to water at a national scale renders the interface between national and regional negotiations critically important. Iwi representatives in Taranaki are keenly aware of the need to participate in national level discussions because:

I can see in terms of the political leverage as Maori, as iwi, the only way we would get some sort of traction is to work collaboratively or collectively at a national level…the national sort of settlements haven’t worked for us in the past…but I think we have to participate in the national conversation…cos if we don’t we get left out and something might get resolved that’s not really in the best interest for us. But I think with that we’ve gotta understand that if it is national type settlement then you’ve gotta expect
Regional collaboration on water issues is seen as necessary to effectively liaise with the national collective of *iwi*, and to strengthen regional-level advocacy. Within Taranaki there is strong motivation for greater regional collaboration (Chapter Six), especially for ecologically interlinked and shared resources like water:

…it makes sense given the geography of our region to work together, you know issues like water because of catchments and all that sort of stuff… they are all interrelated, so it just makes sense to do so. And so you come back to sort of key drivers for collaboration. Well, there’s efficiencies, so we don’t duplicate…you know, you’re maximising the sort of capability available. There’s a whole lot of things, you’re using other people’s networks, so you know, I might know someone that Ngā Rauru don’t know and so we can share information and experiences and so forth… And yeah having a stronger political voice, collectively we’re going, we’ll have more leverage, rather than individually (Chairperson, TRoNM, 27.05.09).

Developing and mobilising a regional position for Taranaki on water that can be pursued through national-level settlements is a priority not only because “if you don’t put your stick in the sand, and if you don’t put your hand up, you’ll get impositioned” (Manager, Ngati Ruanui Tahua, 04.05.09), but also because “we’re dealing with it locally with our own councils, this is where we’ve gotta make it work” (TMTB Member, Kaumatua, 21.07.09). Therefore, national and local scale considerations are complexly woven through water management debates; Taranaki experiences are simultaneously unique and connected, and negotiated on a political terrain that extends far beyond the region and through local, personal relationships.

During Iwi Chairs Forum (ICF) *hui* [meetings] aimed at developing regional awareness of water management reform and consensus, the desire for management and control – rather than ownership of water – emerged as a key theme. Although there is some concern that the Crown will claim ownership of water if it is not asserted by *iwi* (pers. comm. Manager, Ngati Tama Development Trust, ICF Meeting, 22.05.09), many feel that securing control over water is most important:

[I said,] ‘I wouldn’t be arguing about ownerships issues, I’d be arguing about management issues,’ I said, ‘cos whoever manages the bloody thing owns it! ...I said ‘so, we’re not going to beat the government down with an ownership issue. What we beat
them with, is hey don’t forget we’re here, and don’t forget we should be managing that water along with you.’ … [because] I am one of those Māori who says in here [points to her heart], I own it anyway. And regardless, and you can put any legislation that you like in place (D. Noble, Kanihi hapu, Ngā Ruahine, 13.07.09).

…one of the objectives of settling was to have greater control over our future, over our rohe, over our sort of our destiny, I guess. And that’s for me, in terms of water, you don’t need to own the water, you just need to have that control or the right to manage it…and so it’s, how do we describe it in our terms? And so, you know, it’s that whole notion of whether it’s te mana o te wai [the authority over water], oh what does that mean? And then so if it’s mana whakahaere [inherited rights]…and when you look at the right, mana, te mana, the right to regulate, control, manage… (Chairperson, TRoNM, 27.05.09).

These discussions suggest that even though engaging in settlement negotiations requires using Crown fora and instruments to shape provisions for Māori rights, tangata whenua in Taranaki engage and refract the Crown’s processes through their own cultural lens. It also demonstrates the magnanimous will of iwi to work collaboratively and seek ways to transpose and translate Māori concepts and rights into forms compatible with the Crown. In part, such compromises are rendered expedient by other considerations that may impede rather than support justice. One iwi representative noted that:

... I think iwi should say that [we own water] but…because we’re not the only ones in the country…we probably, we have to be careful I think, how we word it. I mean, we can word it so that it means the same thing but so that pakeha people won’t think that we’re owning everything… and I think that’s the problem we have at the moment…there’s still a lot of rednecks out there (Chairperson, TAIA, 09.06.09).

The Chairman of TRoNM (27.05.09) similarly suggested that “over time we might wanna take over but I think we’ve gotta be realistic about the fact that we’re probably limited ourselves in terms of having that skill set and that capacity.”

In this context many iwi representatives are supportive of a co-management arrangement for water allocation and management, although many expressed concerns about the potential for tokenism. A kaumatua (TMTB Member, 21.07.09) suggested that

---

158 This quotation also demonstrates the link between environmental management and development for contemporary iwi organisations.
comanagement can be acceptable, as long as fundamental Māori rights in water allocation are recognised:

…from a Māori perspective, we’re then going back to these rights here, mana tangata whenua, mana ahu, mana whenua, mana tangata [indigenous rights, inherited rights, territorial rights, human rights]. So that’s where the allocations should be being made. But that could still be a combined committee, but the recognition that the water right is actually Māori, not government.

The directionality of collaboration or ‘politics of invitation’ is key to postcolonial co-management regimes (Chapter Three). In Taranaki, when considering water management (or the maunga), inverting current structures of inclusion and embedding Indigenous rights as fundamental to the right to invite, participate and manage resources may make co-management more acceptable for tangata whenua. Indeed, RMA processes have often failed to satisfy the demands and aspirations of tangata whenua because Crown eminence over environmental management is assumed, affirmed and protected, despite provisions for Māori participation (Chapter Seven).

Further, many interviewees cited the need to ensure that Māori have control over decision-making within any co-management structure, perhaps reflecting dissatisfaction with previous iterations of Māori representation on government boards:

… for us we wanna be involved in the outset, we wanna have a look at co-management with the regional council...We wanna be more involved in the decision-making, the consents, and the consenting of applications. It’s gotta be a joint thing, 50-50 decision-making ability between the iwi, the collective iwi of Taranaki that sit inside the TRC region, and TRC itself (Tumu Whakarae, TKoR, 03.06.09).

The recent Waikato-Tainui settlement\(^{159}\) over the Waikato River provides an example of how co-management in resource management could be structured, and has been viewed with much interest in Taranaki. The settlement established a statutory board with equal membership from iwi and local government. Its functions include setting “the primary direction through the vision and strategy to achieve the restoration and protection of the health and wellbeing of the Waikato River for future generations” (Waikato-Tainui Raupatu Claims Settlement Act, 2010, s(22)(a)). Within local government in Taranaki,

---

\(^{159}\) Waikato-Tainui Raupatu Claims (Waikato River) Settlement Act (2010).
this model has attracted some support: “if you have a look at it, in fact those statutory boards have a degree of power over local government. Now, to me that’s where we need to get to” (Iwi Relationships Manager, NPDC, 22.05.09). But the Director of Resource Management, TRC (08.07.09) critiqued the settlement because iwi are “coming in through the back door through a Treaty settlement process…and that is actually constitutionally wrong…it’s actually not good law as locals should elect who represents them in environmental management. Currently the Council Chair is Maori and previously councilors have been Maori so these values are not missing in decision making.” These differing levels of support for co-management and tangata whenua authority over water illustrate the diversity of opinions within local government, and indicate the potential difficulties of implementing nationally negotiated settlements at the regional level, especially without greater clarity around the responsibilities of local government to the Treaty partnership (Land and Water Forum, 2010).

This case study reflects many issues that are common to environmental management more generally in Taranaki. Tangata whenua representatives seek a fundamental reconfiguration of water management, and positively view collaboration with the Crown. This echoes themes identified in Chapter Seven; that the desire for greater control and to exercise kaitiakitanga is compatible with collaboration based on the Treaty partnership and that collaboration may be a means of protecting Māori values and developing the capacity for greater autonomy. Discussions about a water settlement also evince the pressure on iwi in Taranaki to develop regional consensus in order to participate in national discussions. Taranaki iwi, therefore, seek to embed mana tangata whenua in any new water settlement and managerial regime, and pursue this goal via regional and national interaction.

8.2 TARANAKI MAUNGA: PROSPECTS FOR COLLABORATION

A second issue that encompasses all eight iwi in Taranaki is ownership and management of Mount Taranaki and Egmont National Park (see Figure 17). Treaty settlements to date have excluded Taranaki maunga, with the Crown stating that because maunga is the common tupuna for all eight iwi in Taranaki negotiations will only occur when all iwi are able to negotiate (Hon. M. Ririnui, NZPD, 2006, see also Appendix G3). As more iwi prepare to settle in Taranaki, there is increasing anticipation that a settlement for
Taranaki maunga may be negotiated soon (pers comm., Chairperson, TRoNM, 29.04.09). Among tangata whenua representatives, discussions of ownership and management are informed by the unsettled history of confiscation and the historical conjuncture in which they occur. Because of the cultural significance of the maunga, negotiating a durable and well-accepted settlement is critical to improving relationships between iwi and the Crown.

**Figure 17: Mount Taranaki**

Crown ownership of the Taranaki maunga was originally asserted through confiscation and claimed again through the Mount Egmont Vesting Act (1978) (Chapter Five). Any settlement over the mountain cannot ignore the dubious Crown ownership that this history delivers. However, returning the mountain to tangata whenua confronts national-scale politics because the Crown must ensure redress is nationally equitable (OTS, 2004). Use of conservation lands, and especially national parks, in settlements often triggers vociferous anxiety about protecting public rights of access and conservation values and “the Crown has an explicit policy that no large tracts of conservation land can be returned to Maori” in settlements (Ruru, 2008: 108). The Prime Minister recently rejected Tuhoe iwi ownership of Urewera National Park precisely because it “could have opened the way for other iwi to put strong cases for ownership of national parks, including Whanganui, Egmont, Ngauruhoe and possibly Aoraki/Mt Cook” (Trevett, 18.05.2010). Although the history of confiscation suggests powerful justification for
returning the *maunga* to *iwi*, such rationale may prove insufficient to convince Crown officials and voters.

For many *tangata whenua*, and especially *kaumatua*, the history of violent conflict, confiscation, legislation that ensured physical and managerial exclusion, and then the tokenistic return of the *maunga* in 1978 can only be resolved by restoring Māori ownership. This forms an insistent call – “*I haere whenua muru raupatu atu! Me hoki whenua mārire mai!*” [Land taken under illegal war and confiscation! Land be returned peacefully!] (pers comm., (email) TMTB Member, Kaumatua, 22.07.09). As the Manager, Ngati Tama Development Trust (13.05.09) put it, “I think *iwi* have been through so much I think that ownership is probably the bottom line here now.” Yet the idea of ‘ownership’ evokes several parallel lines of thought among *iwi* representatives. Several interviewees explained that the Western concept of ‘ownership’ is incongruous with their inter-relationship with the *maunga*: “I think we all realise it owns us, we don’t own it, but we don’t think we own it, we’re just the people that look after it, *kaitiaki* [guardians]” (D. Patuwairua, Ngāti Maru, 09.06.09). Here, the Western idea of ownership is inverted, presenting a fundamentally different way of understanding and interacting with the landscape. As the Tumu Whakarae of TKoR [Te Kāhui o Rauru] (03.06.09) notes, the “Westernised version of ownership of the *maunga* is different because it’s an asset, whereas the *maunga* for us is the person.”

This inter-relationship is expressed through calling Taranaki *maunga ‘koro’* [grandfather] and *tanweke* [old man]. As D. Noble (Kanihi hapu, Ngā Ruahine, 13.06.09) explains, “to me he’s *koro*, and that’s how I really talk about it. Like every morning I get up and I go ‘oh *koro*, you look good today’ or whatever the case may be.” Because of this relationship and the idea that ‘the mountain owns me, I don’t own him’ (pers comm., H. Haami, TRoNM, 10.06.09), there is a certain ambivalence towards securing ownership in a Western sense. The radical difference in understanding can mean that Crown claims to ownership do not diminish Māori interrelationships with their *tupuna* because “Laws are only things that they can use and put over people” (TMTB Member, Kaumatua, 21.07.09):

160 Perhaps reflecting the cultural disruption from confiscation and managerial exclusion, speaking of and to Taranaki *maunga* this way is less common nowadays. The Chairperson of TRoNM (27.05.09) noted that: “I think we’ve gotta get back to sort of seeing him as a person...I think we’ve moved away from calling him our *tanweke* and *koro*...I think a couple of generations now...They’re saying oh just the *maunga*, the mountain, you know, ‘it.’”
...no matter what happens, the Crown can say whatever they please, but at the end of the day Māori own it, and I know what I own. And although that’s not ideal, for me, what the Crown can’t take away from me is that they can’t take away my ability to be able to say that I own it because I am a Māori, and that’s enough from me...I don’t own him, he owns me because my ability to be able to say that no matter what happens, you’re ours, is enough for me (D. Noble, Kanihi hapu, Ngā Ruahine, 13.06.09).

Crown ownership of the mountain cannot extinguish the relationship of tangata whenua and their maunga, but it has complicated and disrupted Māori relationships and interactions because ownership in a Western sense confers the right to exclude (Chairperson, Chairperson, Taranaki Iwi Authority, 10.07.09). The history of exclusion and significance of the maunga means that, unlike with water, many felt that “the mountain's probably different; I'd like to probably see the title in iwi” (Chairperson, TRoNM, 27.05.09).

Tangata whenua ambitions to take over DoC’s role and ownership of the mountain are tempered by economic considerations. The Tumu Whakarae at TKoR (03.06.09), for instance, noted that the goal of replacing DoC “was my first view on our first interview [during Masters thesis research]; it was power and control haha! But over the past I realised that with great responsibility, there comes a lot a liability [laughter].” Several interviewees felt that along with financial responsibility for caring for the mountain, liability for any natural events needs to be explored before ownership could be accepted:

...I think the ownership issue with regard to water is a hot topic because it the liabilities associated with flooding and the like, and the same would go for the maunga but, ideally the iwi would want ownership provided there is no liability...so indemnify iwi against themselves...I don’t know what happens if that explodes, erupts or whatever... how does [the Earthquake Commission] fit in with Māori ownership? I don’t know, provided that we can get the same indemnity I suppose we’re looking for [ownership] (Manager, Ngati Tama Development Trust, 13.05.09).

161 This commission is a government owned body that provides a form of free insurance to all landowners in New Zealand in the event of a natural disaster, such as an eruption or earthquake.
Like environmental management more generally, resourcing forms a key issue for new arrangements of ownership and management (Chapter Seven). Based on recent experiences of Ngāti Tama with collaborative management (see Appendix G4), many felt that the legal and economic details of ownership must be considered:

[I’ve] been asked by a lot of kaumatua, get that maunga back, [but] in what context do you want it back? In the context of managing it, or in the context of owning it and owning the liability with it as well? (Tumu Whakarae, TKoR, 03.06.09).

I think there’s been a lot of words thrown around and iwi need to get down to the nitty gritty, what does that actually mean? …What sort of model are we wanting? What would it look like if we had the maunga returned to us? (Chairperson, Taranaki Iwi Authority, 10.07.09).

Viewing iwi ownership and management of the maunga in all its particularities and details thus reveals another layer of complexity to realising the desire for ownership and formulating justice in contemporary contexts.

Although Crown ownership of the maunga is widely considered incompatible with tangata whenua relationships, there is broad support for collaborative management of the national park by DoC and the eight iwi. This reflects the generally improved relationships between DoC and iwi; previously such collaborative proposals would have received “a resounding response…and it would’ve only been two syllables [hell no], or in Māori three, but starting with a ‘k’ [kāore, no]” (Chairperson, Ngā Ruahine Iwi Authority, 15.05.09). Even though co-management can only be formalised through legislation, prospects for collaboration are advancing through informal relationship-building. The Chairperson of TRoNM (27.05.09) recounts that:

...DOC have been relatively good lately in terms of saying ‘this is what we’re doing on the maunga.’ Damien Coutts, the conservator, has always maintained that ‘look we know there’s an unresolved issue around ownership and the ongoing management,’ and that he’s quite clear and comfortable about us having that conversation at some point in time whereby he said look if it’s co-management or whatever…I’ll provide all of the costing, and what we’re doing…the books will be open to you. However, until we get to that stage, there’s the interim things that we’re doing, we’d like your input and involvement, cos we wouldn’t want to do something that’s going to be offensive to you.
However, *tangata whenua* support for co-management of the *maunga* highlights issues of learning and capacity building that underlie the practicalities of collaboration more generally (Chapter Seven). *Iwi* representatives noted that “we don’t have all of the expertise and capability and so it just doesn’t make sense for us to sort of say ‘yeah we’re ready to take over and manage it’” (Chairperson, TRoNM, 27.05.09). These concerns are perhaps heightened because of the significance of Taranaki *maunga*. One interviewee explained that despite her discomfort with DoC’s role in managing the National Park, she saw little alternative but DoC’s continued involved on the *maunga*:

> …definitely, ownership has to be returned. Whether or not we have the ability to look after him, no we don’t. And that’s a sad fact to recognise. I recognise that fact for me, we don’t have that capacity to look after him because we don’t have the funding, we don’t have the resources to do that unfortunately. And that’s very, very sad when we have to accept that although we may own him, we can’t look after him, but it happens to be true… And that’s why we always say, with ownership comes responsibility. Are we prepared to carry that responsibility? Certainly we are, but we don’t have the ability to. And the *iwi* in Taranaki have to recognise that, we can’t look after him the way he should be looked after, and he has to be looked after… And I hope that the rest of my counterparts in Taranaki actually recognise that as well…I hope we do what’s best for *koro* and not what we ourselves might want (D. Noble, Kanihi hapu, Ngā Ruahine, 13.07.09).

This discussion traces the legacies of the confiscations on to contemporary *iwi* aspirations; the rationale for *not* seeking full restitution of the mountain today stems from the history of dispossession and managerial exclusion. Yet this also suggests that co-management may only be acceptable as a temporary arrangement until the *iwi* of Taranaki are able to take care of the *maunga*. The Chairperson of Taranaki Iwi (10.07.09) expressed support for joint management because:

> …[DoC have] got the resources, at the moment, they’ve got the capability and the expertise and we don’t have that, so how can we work together to grow that for our people so that eventually one day they might have that opportunity to say hey look we can do this ourselves…

Collaboration, therefore, may not be the end-point of negotiations about the *maunga*, but rather be a starting point for developing *tangata whenua* alternatives to DoC management.
Co-management of Taranaki maunga also requires significant inter-iwi collaboration. Though the Crown tends to treat the eight iwi as having equal interests in the maunga, unity among iwi is not assured. Taranaki maunga is the common tupuna of all eight iwi, but rests in the rohe of four iwi (Ngāti Maru, Te Atiawa, Taranaki and Ngā Ruahine), with the other four iwi (Ngāti Tama, Ngāti Mutunga, Ngāti Ruanui and Ngā Rauru Kiitahi) based further away (see Figure 18).

**FIGURE 18: ‘MOUNT TARANAKI, THE TERRITORY OF TE ATIWA,’ SIGN AT ONE PARK ENTRANCE**

Although there is broad consensus that “we have to think collectively as Taranaki and then everyone has a right to the mountain” (TMTB Member, Kaumatua, 21.07.09), the differences between iwi cannot be discounted. Some representatives hold the view that:

There is some iwi that have a very close tie to him, and there is some iwi that have a lesser one...although the Crown has deemed that it has to be the eight iwi that have that discussion... [it should be] those iwi that actually have the right to talk on it. And when you think about it, it’s the four iwi that haven’t settled...they have the strongest links to him...so that’s gonna be interesting when we get around that table... I should
imagine that [the other īwi] will not be as vocal… (D. Noble, Kanihi hapu, Ngā Ruahine, 13.07.09).

These nuances in the relationship between the different īwi and the maunga require delicate discussion “with the aim to find out who’s gonna be in the debate, and to find out if people are comfortable with that” and determining “is it for our whakapapa? Or is it about the land that abuts the maunga and gives those īwi the rights over those other īwi who are distant from the maunga?” (Chairperson, Taranaki Iwi Authority, 10.07.09). Representatives of īwi that are further away from the maunga assert that distance does not weaken their connection to the maunga, and highlight the potential for inter-īwi collaboration to protect the maunga:

We all whakapapa [genealogically link] to the maunga…he’s our tauheke [old man], so he’s our tupuna, so I mean I think internally we’ve gotta sort of discuss that issue around well what is the relationship of all īwi? I think everyone acknowledges that he’s all of our tupuna, and just because I have to look over…Te Atiawa doesn’t mean I have any less right to acknowledge my tupuna. But then it’s sort of, well, what does that mean in practice? ...I understand that Taranaki, Te Atiawa, Ngā Ruahine sort of live next to the maunga and potentially have sites on the maunga and it’s a matter of respecting that and accommodating those special interests as well, but I think you can’t [say]…that an īwi doesn’t have a connection just by the fact that you don’t sorta live next to him, you know, ko Taranaki te maunga, ko Urenui [te awa] [Taranaki is the mountain, Urenui is the river], so that’s actually part of my whakapapa [genealogy] (Chairperson, TRoNM, 27.05.09).

Developing relationships and consensus between the eight īwi before engaging with the Crown is seen as both prudent and desirable (pers comm., ICF meeting 11.05.09). The Chairperson of TRoNM (27.05.09), for example, suggests that:

I think that’s probably the first step, is that all īwi need to understand what, we need to collectively agree what the deal is, if you like, around him when we start, when we’re going to manage him because if we don’t do that from the outset…it’s not worth going forward.

---

162 A mihi is a speech of greeting, acknowledgement and introduction, and usually includes the name of one’s mountain, river, ancestors, īwi, hapu and marae. It is a fundamental statement of identity and belonging.
These discussions evince the complexity of postcolonial territoriality in Taranaki. Instead of two (relatively) fixed geographical imaginaries – the Crown and Māori – there are multiple geopolitical relationships that interweave iwi and hapu and landscapes and produce differing ideas about who can legitimately speak for and about places (See also Appendix G5). Co-management in Taranaki, therefore, is not only contingent on the political will of governments to enter into such arrangements, but also on the willingness of iwi to create common ground from which to engage with the Crown.

Many iwi representatives also suggested that preparing to engage in co-management with DoC should include developing their own perspectives and positions on conservation management issues in Egmont National Park. Much like iwi environmental management planning (Chapter Seven), before decisions over the maunga can be made:

…the high end management stuff needs to be worked on in terms of the relationship development, the planning beside that, the collective nature of Taranaki, what does that mean? How can we work together better, more effectively for that common purpose? We need to do all that groundwork first and [reach] agreement on how we will be treating the maunga, and treat it in such a way it deserves [and] that discussion needs to go out as well (Tumu Whakarae, TKoR, 03.06.09).

The history of managerial exclusion and limited participation has produced many decisions on the maunga that are widely considered culturally inappropriate among tangata whenua (for example, climbers standing on the summit, or the use of 1080 poison to kill possums, see Chapter Five). When contemplating a greater role in decision-making, determining what is culturally acceptable is an important task:

…I think for us it’s understanding, well what have they done in the past, what are they now doing, what are they looking at doing?…DoC can say what they’re doing, and then we’ve gotta be clear about, well what are we? What’s our, sort of, perspective and view? …and then say ideally, if we could have a blank sheet of paper, what we want. Some might say well just shut [the Park] up, you know… And then saying, OK, now here’s the next sheet of paper where it says there’s going to be a ski field dadadada or some tracks and working through that process. But that’s all part of educating ourselves (Chairman, TRoNM, 27.05.09).

Indeed, national parks are nominally sites of nature to be “preserved as far as possible in their natural state” (National Parks Act, 1980, s4(2)(a)), but are overlain by a collage
of cultural relationships and uses that configure park spaces as recreational, tourist, scientific and nature sites. Iwi reclaiming a decision-making role and determining what is culturally acceptable over lands confiscated long ago must also engage with and negotiate contemporary uses and interests. This is perhaps especially true for Mount Taranaki and Egmont National Park, which are taken as iconic symbols for the region; and as one interviewee noted, “there’s a lot of New Zealanders who are not Māori who equally feel a spiritual connection and a cultural connection to the mountain. So it has a strong spiritual feeling to the community of Taranaki” (JAC member; East Taranaki Environmental Trust, 15.07.09). Asserting their role as tangata whenua will require negotiating and educating other interested stakeholders:

…it really sort of grates me when we get lumped in as a stakeholder and it’s like well no, no, we’re a Treaty partner. We’re actually tangata whenua, we’re over and above all of these other interest groups. And I think a lot of these stakeholders or interest groups have got to understand that themselves. And we’ve just gotta take a hard line I think and just put them in their place and say well this is why. Like Egmont Tramping Club, I don’t know, who are you? What rights do you have? And this is, in terms of, there’s going to be a political aspect to it, but it’s the difficulty in now trying to unravel all of this crap that’s been going on for [so long]. And so I think now we’re finally getting into a position where we can do some of that. But in order to do it we’ve gotta be working together (Chairman, TRoNM, 27.05.09).

Precisely because “For many people, Taranaki is the mountain, and the mountain is Taranaki,”163 any change of ownership or management is likely to also be controversial, especially if arriving at culturally acceptable activities in the National Park disrupts the activities of other users.

The significance of Taranaki maunga for Crown-iwi relationships more broadly in Taranaki cannot be underestimated, and tensions around ownership, management and appropriate uses of the park are illustrative of wider questions of postcolonial authority and belonging. DoC’s managerial legitimacy on the mountain is haunted by the absence of legitimate Crown ownership, and a negotiated settlement may be the only way of resolving this issue.


8.3 Negotiating Settlements and Environmental Management

For *iwi* representatives, settlements over the water and the mountain are inherently connected. Several noted the ecological inter-relationship between the *maunga* and water – essentially that “if you flatten the *maunga* you wouldn’t get water” (Interview, Chairman, Ngā Ruahine Iwi Authority, 15.05.09).\(^\text{164}\) These two potential settlements also point to larger themes of ownership, sovereignty and the Crown-Māori relationship within New Zealand. Settlements do offer real opportunities to effect change and establish more culturally appropriate models for managing resources in New Zealand. However, the durability of settlements may be uncertain where absolute Crown authority is not replaced with genuine partnership and an understanding of *iwi* as *tangata whenua* rather than stakeholders. These case studies reveal the interweaving of local and national politics, the entanglement of past, present and future and the complex negotiation of *iwi* relationships for settlements that enmesh legislative certainty with injustice. This historical conjuncture, and the jumble of issues it hosts, is simultaneously potent with opportunity and laden with ironic inequalities, producing complex dilemmas that *iwi* representatives must negotiate over water and the *maunga*.

\(^{164}\) Indeed, the Crown has long recognised the influence of the mountain on local rainfall, the Park Board noted in 1978 that “Mount Egmont is the source of town water supplies and power generation for the city of New Plymouth and for practically all the Borough and County districts in Taranaki” (ENPB, 1978: 37).
his thesis explores how iwi in Taranaki, New Zealand negotiate environmental management processes while also pursuing self-determination aspirations through iwi development and negotiated settlements with the government. Drawing on the analytical tools of postdevelopment and postcolonial theories constructs an understanding of Indigenous approaches to development and environmental management that is attentive to neo-colonial structures, Indigenous action and spaces of tension and optimism. I argue that relationships and aspirations in environmental management and development are drawn through uneven terrain, and unfold in ways that reveal postcoloniality as fundamentally unsettled. Collaboration, settlements and development – rather than panacean or utopian resolutions to historical, cultural and political tensions – are but a part of ongoing transformations, through which relationships and aspirations can be realised and disappointed. What is required, then, is a profound unsettling of oft taken for granted colonial structures to create spaces for alternatives and a politics that holds open structures and trajectories to ongoing negotiations suffused with possibility and potential (Escobar, 2010b, Gidwani, 2006, Howitt, 2010, Raghuram et al., 2009). In this Chapter I synthesise the main findings of this research, discuss the limitations of this work and future directions for research in this area and finally highlight the implications of this thesis.
Critical analysis of development and colonial discourses, and their expression through environmental management, is a key task for postcolonial and postdevelopment scholars (Wainwright, 2008). Recent work in postdevelopment explores alternatives that are more than antitheses to dominant discourses, and engages with the complex unfolding of discourses across cultural differences, inequalities and histories of hegemony (Chapter Two). This is a subversive negotiation of the cultural hubris of development that works with the very object of its critique to produce different modes of thought and practice. In place of clear cut alternatives and oppositions, progress and risk are bound together through compromises, uncertainty and potential. The interaction of Indigenous and exogenous discourses, cultures and practices yields a nuanced and mutually affective dialogue that is unequal, but also unsettling.

In Taranaki, colonial confiscation of land, and most poignantly the maunga, has yielded a deep mistrust of the Crown by tangata whenua and a history of injustice and displacement. Indeed, the legitimacy of the Crown’s sovereignty is haunted by the injustices that enabled its establishment, and Indigenous geopolitical relationships reveal that extant alternative territorialities traverse the nation. Against these issues, the accretion of time and the establishment of legal infrastructures, systems, relationships inter alia has conferred a certain familiarity, a ‘convivial tension’ between coloniser and colonised (Mbembe, 2006). In this context, Māori aspirations for self-determination in development and environmental management are not inherently oppositional to the Crown and the postcolonial nation. Rather, the contested ground through which Māori and the Crown are bound together is both the basis of tensions in postcolonial governance and environmental management, and the basis for mutuality, negotiation and partnership.

Indigenous engagement with state environmental management processes, therefore, is a fundamental assertion of the plurality of place and territoriality in postcolonial Taranaki. Put differently, it is neither a complete rejection nor embrace of the Crown’s role, but an insistent demand for the reconfiguration of postcolonial territoriality, place and nation. This is reflected in discussions about the management and ownership of water and Taranaki maunga where tangata whenua indicated that collaborative management
could be acceptable provided it is grounded in their *mana whakahaere* and *mana whenua* (Chapter Eight). Similarly, many *tangata whenua* articulated an expectation of involvement and influence in the Crown’s managerial processes beyond that of other stakeholders (Chapter Seven). These findings are indicative of the promise and potential of collaboration in Taranaki. They also suggest that a genuinely postcolonial coexistence must recognise Indigenous territoriality and not simply affirm Crown eminence.

Questions of legitimacy, authority and sovereignty are intimately related to tensions in contemporary environmental management. In Chapter Seven I argue that participatory innovation of environmental management legislation in New Zealand has engendered improved relationships between councils, DoC and *iwi* organisations. However, current processes tend to entrench and affirm the Crown’s authority rather than the *mana whenua* of the *tangata whenua*. Postdevelopment theorists assert that cultural and participatory augmentation of existing systems demonstrates an inability to think in different registers and imagine worlds otherwise (Escobar, 1992). This produces a subtle irony to inclusion and recognition; explicitly providing for Indigenous difference evades radical interrogation of current structures, and indeed strengthens them by providing a place for the excluded *within* their order (Dikeç, 2005, Palmer, 2006).

Many *tangata whenua* representatives expressed dissatisfaction with inclusion *qua* collaboration in environmental management, noting that granting resource consents without consultation and being treated as an ‘interested party’ or ‘stakeholder’ are particularly offensive and insufficient recognition of their role as *tangata whenua* (Chapter Seven, Eight). Perhaps illustrating the risks of basing Indigenous rights in legislation, council officers and *tangata whenua* alike asserted that legislation both compels the inclusion and contains the impact of Māori perspectives in environmental management. Further, to *tangata whenua*, legislative justification of the Crown’s eminence in decision-making evinces a self-referential logic that is ultimately tainted by the colonial lineage of contemporary Crown authority. That the roles and powers of councils and DoC are enacted and justified in the Crown’s legislation is “Like going to the fowl house to get eggs, you see, so it’s got nothing to do with authority, *mana*” (TMTB Member, Kaumatua, 21.07.09). Therefore, inclusion in the Crown’s process frustrates Māori aspirations not only because entrenching current power structures allows tokenistic recognition of *tangata whenua* concerns, but also because it falls short of recognising the
territoriality of *iwi* and *hapu*. The presumed directionality of current efforts at collaboration in Taranaki substitutes benevolent inclusion within the Crown’s regime for a genuine engagement with Indigenous sovereignty. In essence, the acceptability of comanagement – especially in the case of Taranaki *maunga* – may hinge on the Crown recognising that the right to invite and to include belongs to *tangata whenua*. Such an inversion calls for a fundamental re-conceptualisation of the postcolonial nation, positing Indigenous concepts as a legitimate source of authority and sovereignty and calling for a ‘pluralism of place’ that moves beyond the saturation of nationhood by (colonial) government (Pickerill, 2009).

A key goal of postdevelopment theory is to think beyond inherited structures and pursue “an immanent politics of opening” (Gidwani, 2006: 17). Instead of striving for a utopian ideal or a fixed alternative, the emphasis is on holding open structures and spaces for creativity, for a ‘politics of the possible’ (Raghuram et al., 2009). In an environmental management context, this suggests that although searching for an ideal model or ‘best practice’ for collaboration is important, pursuing iterative and open-ended negotiations of collaboration that are not bound by existing managerial norms is also useful. In Taranaki, current mechanisms for recognising Indigenous rights tend to focus on resolution and closure. Settlements to address the colonial past, for instance, seek a cadence that brings closure to historical interrogations of the state and harmonises Indigenous difference within the nation-state-territory triad (Chapters Two, Six). Legislative definitions of Indigenous customary rights similarly induce stasis through definition, and transpose Indigenous ideas into a register compatible with the existing structures of the nation-state. In the context of significant distrust, the certainty of defined rights within the Crown’s structures is valuable; however, opening the Crown’s processes to alternatives and different ways of thinking and doing may also form an important part of developing postcolonial environmental management. Issues such as marine disposal of wastewater evince fundamentally different ways of relating to and understanding the environment. This reveals current managerial norms as one possibility, the dominance of which is contingent on colonial history. Opening managerial systems to creative dialogue and multiple understandings, rather than enclosing Indigenous values within them, may therefore be central to advancing Indigenous aspirations in environmental management. The idea of imagining the world differently advocated by postdevelopment theorists holds potential in postcolonial
contexts such as Taranaki where the absence of genuine dialogue and negotiation characterised the assertion and entrenchment of governmental power. Further, pursuing a ‘politics of possibility’ – rather than a predetermined, utopian alternative – aligns with recent planning work by iwi in Taranaki that emphasises cultural revitalisation and creative exploration of how cultural ideas can be expressed and advanced in contemporary contexts.

One of the aims of this research was to contextualise Māori participation in environmental management and development within the context of postcolonial (re)configurations of iwi governance in Treaty settlements. The increasing stabilisation of iwi governance through its bureaucratisation is a key outcome of Treaty settlements, and often enables greater interaction between iwi and government organisations (Chapter Six). Post-settlement iwi entities indubitably operate in a hybrid way; advancing Indigenous values and goals while engaging with government departments, planning mechanisms and capitalist economic development and, as Chapter Six reveals, approaches to negotiating this context vary among and within iwi and hapu. Indeed, there is some ambivalence to the reconfigurations of iwi governance required in Treaty settlements; several iwi representatives discussed the separation of cultural values and activities from the political and economic roles of iwi governance entities and others identified tensions arising from the complex and contradictory influences and conditions under which iwi governance entities work. Yet the idea of a Treaty partnership, the positioning of Māori as the Indigenous peoples of the nation and the Crown’s responsibility to Māori as citizens were also prominent in discussions of iwi governance, indicating a firm assertion of mutual responsibility for the social, cultural and economic well-being of Māori with the Crown.

Postdevelopment scholars advocate focussing on local cultures of development to decentre the canon of Western thought and advance alternatives (Escobar, 2005, 2007, 2010a). Critics of postdevelopment assert that rejecting development is capricious and that ideas of ‘pure’ resistance and alternatives to hegemonic discourse romanticise the Third World and restrict possible ways of developing and negotiating Western development ideals (Chapter Two). Recent work in postdevelopment goes some way to addressing these critiques by examining the hybrid and cosmopolitan nature of Indigenous development ambitions, and their complex articulation through endogenous
and exogenous fora and methods (Goodale, 2006, Robins, 2003). For postcolonial theorists, claims to hegemony are subverted through their articulation; colonial and development discourses unfold and take hold through their interaction with (not destruction of) local cultural specificities (Chapter Two). This process of uneven dialogue across difference leaves neither coloniser nor colonised unchanged such that the postcolonial experience, so contingent on local histories and contexts, is often characterised by the amorphous interplay of different cultures and ideas (Nash, 2002). Hybridity unsettles hegemony through its mutation and thereby is a mode for advancing Indigenous ambitions within imperfect structures and contexts.

In Taranaki, the development ambitions of iwi governance entities evince a complex engagement with economic development and the Crown’s structures. The facile synthesis of development and self-determination identified in government documents proffers a reduced and economistic notion of Māori aspirations. As discussed in Chapter Six, for tangata whenua representatives in Taranaki the ideas of development and self-determination – although certainly advanced through economic development – are situated within a matrix of cultural and political goals. In this way, securing control in environmental management is fundamentally linked to securing the self-determination and development of iwi. However, there was broad consensus that iwi development goals can be advanced through interaction with – not withdrawal from – state infrastructures and economic development. This supports the idea of negotiating discourse and working from inside the very structures of critique advocated by postcolonial theorists. In an environmental management context, though participatory innovation of the state’s managerial processes has often disappointed tangata whenua expectations, the relationship building and mutual learning between councils, DoC and iwi organisations engendered by consultation requirements points at the potential of hybridisation (Chapter Seven). Greater mutual understanding of the values, capacities and desires of government and iwi organisations is expressed through changes in operating procedures, familiarity with respective processes, and empathy for the challenges and limitations of each organisation. Planning work by iwi organisations perhaps epitomises the utility of hybridity. Here iwi organisations are adopting and adapting a method typical of government organisations to articulate and explore their aspirations and communicate with government organisations (Chapter Six, Seven).
Significantly, many interviewees identified personal relationships and personalities as the ‘glue’ for relationships between their organisations and the means for improving these relationships (Chapter Seven). This is indicative of the very ‘humanness’ of collaboration; it is a reminder that abstract ideas of hybridity, partnership and mutuality are animated through the personalities, lives and quotidian experiences of individuals within organisations. In a practical sense, this suggests that advancing Indigenous aspirations and negotiating the shape and form of relationships across difference is contingent to a large extent on the personalities and values of staff and representatives. This also indicates a potential role for research as a mode for promoting empathy and understanding; as Noxolo (2009: 63) concludes, “postcolonial geographical writers have a responsibility to refuse to offer solutions… [because] an embodied politics of writing should recognise the need to work towards genuine dialogue across identity and difference with living, breathing people.” Therefore, the process of doing this research, sharing what I have learnt and continuing to build and honour my connections to people in Taranaki after this thesis is completed holds the potential to influence relationships in Taranaki in ways both deliberate and incidental, knowable and unknowable.

This study also reveals the importance of context to understanding how Indigenous communities engage with environmental management processes. In Taranaki, contemporary political, economic and social inequalities can be traced to the history of war and confiscation; the present is contingent on the past and the past is woven through the present. This context informs the positions and actions taken by iwi organisations. For example, addressing development and securing the economic and political future of iwi is often a priority for iwi organisations, and many interviewees identified a close relationship between iwi development and the ability to collaborate or participate in environmental management. The acceptability of collaboration for iwi organisations is contingent on the circumstances of this historical moment. Comanagement of the DoC estate, and in particular of Taranaki maunga, is considered appropriate because the demands of caring for these landscapes currently exceed the experience, knowledge and capacity of iwi organisations (Chapter Eight). This suggests that collaboration as a mechanism to address postcolonial tensions may only be viable as a step towards restoring greater autonomy to Indigenous communities, and highlights the centrality of context to understanding how iwi participate in environmental
management. The ‘full and final’ nature of contemporary settlements is also suggestive of the potency and responsibility of this historical moment. In Chapter Two I argue that the opportunities of postcolonial politics are encumbered with risks and limitations; in Taranaki the uncertain but long-lasting effects of settlements and other negotiations produce an exciting and intense political context. Therefore, development, environmental management and governance inter alia are intricately entwined, and cannot be considered separately in policy or theory.

Resourcing collaborative approaches was also identified as a key issue in Taranaki. It is a relatively simple observation that participation and relationship building incur costs for organisations and individuals (Chapter Seven). This finding underscores the importance of iwi development and reducing economic disparity between Māori and government organisations, and also reveals that historic land confiscations manifest as contemporary economic injustice and inequality. Although postcolonial negotiation and relationship building certainly are contingent on abstract ideas of political will and imagination, more prosaic issues, like funding, may also prove critical (Lane and Williams, 2009).

The experiences of Taranaki iwi and hapu must also be contextualised within national discussions. The rights of tangata whenua in Taranaki are negotiated in a dialogue that weaves national, regional and local actors and issues together. In this context, regional collaboration between iwi in Taranaki has become increasingly prominent. Operating at a regional scale has significant historical and cultural antecedents: The eight iwi share Taranaki maunga as their tupuna and hold broadly similar values, there are numerous prior instances of inter-iwi collaboration, and the Crown has historically administered Taranaki as a region. Yet, collaboration between iwi is not without tension. There are multiple positions and opinions within and between iwi and hapu, and many representatives identified the need to build trust within and between iwi to enable greater collaboration. Treaty settlements have perhaps exacerbated these ‘internal’ politics, and there are some significant differences between iwi who have and have not settled. However, regional iwi collaboration is also an effort by iwi representatives to transcend power asymmetries within the region and nation by utilising combined resources and unity to increase their political voice. In the example of a national water settlement, regional alliance is seen as the best way to advance the interests of Taranaki as relatively small iwi amongst advocacy by representatives from larger iwi (Chapter
The emphasis on working at a regional scale in Taranaki suggests that attention to how Indigenous communities assert themselves politically may generate greater understanding of the ambitions, tensions and pressures that inform iwi participation in environmental politics.

Therefore, exploring a postdevelopment and postcolonial analysis of tangata whenua negotiations of environmental management in Taranaki reveals the importance of iterative, open-ended approaches to understanding tangata whenua aspirations and histories, and the need to avoid romanticised or essentialised ideals that circumvent possibilities for hybridity and mutuality.

9.2 LIMITATIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

This thesis draws on postdevelopment and postcolonial theories to contribute to analyses of collaborative environmental management models. In this section, I situate the findings within these literatures, and use this and the limitations of this project as a basis for identifying potential avenues for future research. In Taranaki, territoriality and sovereignty remain central to tensions in Indigenous-state relationships. Therefore, the potential for collaboration with the Crown in the context of Māori self-determination and development hinges on negotiations of coexistence and mutuality. This finding contributes to recent work that seeks to add nuance to the postdevelopment canon by exploring the spatialities of development (Radcliffe, 2007b, Sidaway, 2007a, b), and by bringing postdevelopment and postcolonial literatures together based on common goals of “decentring and challenging Eurocentric constructions of identity, history, moral community and development aspirations” (Simon, 2006: 18). Indeed, Power (2010: 436) highlights symmetry between critiques of “the colonial construction of ‘development’ and its key concepts” and “the colonial construction of the entire framework of geopolitics and its key categories.” The experiences and aspirations of iwi in Taranaki support the idea that “It is in the interest of aboriginal people to explore all possible reconfigurations of sovereignty and the spaces within it” (Blackburn, 2009: 76). This suggests that further research exploring the negotiation of sovereignty and coexistence in postcolonial contexts and how such ideas as pluralism and mutuality manifest would be useful. Work in geographies of belonging provides useful inspiration to this endeavour (Antonsich, 2009, 2010, Mee and Wright, 2009, Trudeau, 2006).
Emphasising such concepts as place, space, sovereignty and territory to Indigenous engagements with development and environmental management also highlights a key challenge in creating postdevelopment alternatives. Escobar (2010: 47) recently stated that ‘alternative modernities’ require “a space of thought and practice in which the dominance of a single modernity has been suspended” which enables “the examination of concrete decolonial and pluriversal projects…in earnest from a deessentialized perspective.” In places like Taranaki, advancing multiplicity and difference on ground shared by Indigenous and state polities may require seeking common ground within the aspirations and goals of Indigenous and state polities. This indicates the potential utility of research into partnership and collaboration in postcolonial contexts for advancing postdevelopment agendas. It also evinces the need for research approaches that seek “to move from the implacable differences…towards an understanding – yes, ambiguous; yes, complicated; but also effective – of potential spaces of hope, justice, and democracy” (Thiem and Robertson, 2010: 6, emphasis in original). Research on Indigenous-government relationships, environmental management and development that focuses on the ideas and aspirations of political elites, corporations and government officials could also be illuminative.

The synthesis of postdevelopment and postcolonial theories inspires review of the rejection of development advocated in early postdevelopment work. This study indicates that tangata whenua in Taranaki often seek to negotiate and reconfigure dominant structures of environmental management and development, rather than assert completely separate and autonomous structures. Further, as the experiences discussed in Chapter Seven attest, Indigenous ambitions can be advanced by negotiating and effectively hybridising dominant practices and ideas. Stated in postcolonial terms: “It is possible to work within the belly of the beast and still engage in persistent critique of hegemonic representations” (Kapoor, 2004: 640). Reading Indigenous participation as a mode of negotiating with dominant structures of development and environmental management allows analytic consideration of the compromises, entanglements and hybridity produced (Kesby, 2007, Li, 2007). This indicates the need for research that engages with the “numerous complex and locally negotiated syncretic practices that constitute people’s lived realities and aspirations” (Simon, 2006: 18); in essence, research that eschews romanticised tropes about Indigenous peoples and engages with the
complexity, ambiguity and responsibilities that shape postcolonial negotiations of dominant structures. Further research and theorisation on how hybridity is negotiated by Indigenous communities would also be valuable.

The potency of negotiating existing structures in order to advance Indigenous aspirations is perhaps demonstrated by the gradual shifts in institutional culture and understanding evident within government entities in Taranaki. This supports the focus on learning in adaptive management literature – as an effect of joint problem-solving, learning-by-doing or the deliberate efforts of ‘learning communities’ or ‘communities of practice’ – and the claim that learning is a key indicator of collaborative success and tenability (Armitage et al., 2008, Berkes, 2009, Davidson-Hunt, 2006). Notably, recent literature in development studies and qualitative research methodologies advocates reflexivity as an important mode of learning by practitioners that has the potential to remake development and research practices (Chapter Four). Extending these parallel discussions of reflexivity to environmental management research may engender greater understanding of how environmental managers conceptualise their work because, as Brigg (2009: 1423) notes of development professionals: “who we are may be one of the most important and pervasive motivating and organising forces in how we conceptualise and undertake development efforts.” This also suggests the potential of research – and perhaps, participatory action research in particular – to contribute to such learning by functioning as a space for reflexive discussion and contemplation.

The limitations of this study also indicate potential areas for future research. Firstly, this research primarily focussed on the roles, aspirations and challenges of iwi organisations in Taranaki; however, as council and DoC officers noted, there are numerous other stakeholders in environmental management processes. These include associations such as tramping and mountain climbing clubs, farmers, private landowners, and businesses. The views of these various groups have not been explored in this thesis and exploration of the relationships between these groups, councils and Indigenous communities would provide further insight into the tensions and possibilities in postcolonial environmental management. Similarly, although I was fortunate to meet with many iwi, council and DoC representatives during this study (Chapter Four), there are doubtless numerous other people in Taranaki whose insights would have benefited this research.
Secondly, this research has investigated development and environmental management at a regional level. This approach was chosen because of the relationship between the eight iwi and the ecological and political connections throughout the region; yet the size of this project has limited the depth of analysis of the experiences of individual iwi and hapu in Taranaki. Exploring questions of postcoloniality, development and environmental management with one iwi or hapu would likely yield a richer level of detail. As a corollary, there was limited space in this research to examine national-level experiences and negotiations by Māori or compare the experiences of iwi in Taranaki to those of other iwi. Given the significance and uncertainty of the Treaty settlement era, research that analyses approaches to iwi development and collaboration in different parts of the country may prove especially useful to other iwi as they approach settlement negotiations.

While the experiences of iwi in Taranaki are certainly a product of local histories and politics, teasing out connections, similarities and differences between New Zealand and other settler-colonies, such as Australia and Canada, would also provide insights to the operation of dominant discourses of environmental management and development and point to potential modes of Indigenous agency. These international comparisons are salient not only because of similarities in legislation and jurisprudence, but also because globalised Indigenous activism and collaboration is becoming increasingly prominent. Further, such comparisons could offer tools for re-reading different approaches to reconciliation, settlement and postcolonial partnership. For example, Australia and New Zealand governments have pursued profoundly different conceptualisations of Indigenous sovereignty, and comparisons could elicit a better understanding of the possibilities and limitations of each approach (Agius et al., 2007).

Finally, several iwi representatives identified areas where further research in Taranaki would be useful. These included scientific studies on such issues as water quality, allocation and supplies, as well as research into technologies that may reduce the ecological effects of agricultural and industrial developments. Others highlighted the need for further research into the opinions, aspirations and values of iwi and hapu members to facilitate the work of iwi organisations and enable the development of planning documents. Many interviewees also expressed interest in historical research as a means of understanding the Crown’s position (for example, archival research revealed
discussions of the mountain as an economic asset) and understanding how previous agreements, such as the Mount Egmont Vesting Act (1978) were negotiated. These discussions reveal the value placed on research by many tangata whenua in Taranaki and reflect the current needs and goals of iwi representatives.

9.3 CLOSURES AND OPENINGS

One of the goals of postcolonial geographic research is to interrogate and challenge the borders that hold the ‘field,’ academia and ‘real life’ apart, that dislocate theory and knowledge creation from the places in which research occurs and ultimately promote distance and separation between the researcher and the researched (Chapter Four). Such an approach to research evokes a style of learning characterised by humility, vulnerability and connection, and requires tracing the knowledge and theoretical productions through the places of research to suggest possibilities. In closing this project, I therefore seek to identify some openings for a ‘politics of possibility’ and mutuality in Taranaki.

For council and DoC officers and tangata whenua representatives in Taranaki, the findings of this thesis indicate that despite significant improvements in working relationships, the injustices of colonialism remain woven through the tensions and limitations to contemporary interactions. Yet, there is wide support for collaboration and partnership between Māori and governmental organisations in Taranaki, reflecting significant magnanimity on the part of tangata whenua and also the complex entanglements that characterise postcolonial society. A key finding of this research is the centrality of ideas of sovereignty, territory and coexistence to understanding environmental management dilemmas in the critical context of postcolonial Indigenous development and self-determination. In Taranaki, such tools as negotiated settlements, Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) and the paepae rangatira hold potential for locally restoring and promoting a ‘chief-to-chief’ relationship between iwi and government bodies. However, the terms of postcolonial coexistence and Indigenous territoriality are largely directed by negotiations at a national level. This study suggests that the acceptability and durability of negotiated settlements – and in particular, collaborative management – may be contingent on a fundamental engagement with and recognition of mana whenua. Legislation and policies that entrench Crown eminence and absolute
sovereignty may legally buttress the Crown from future interrogation, but a more nuanced discussion and consideration of indigeneity and postcolonial nationhood may provide a stronger basis for partnership and moving forward.

A related issue is the ambiguity that surrounds responsibility and relationships between different parts of government and Māori. This uncertainty finds local expression in discussions about the (limits of) responsibilities of local government towards Māori, particularly in regard to resourcing participation (Chapter Seven). As the Iwi Relationships Manager at NPDC (22.05.09) suggested, greater clarity in how the Treaty partnership between the Crown and Māori should be expressed at the local level in relationships between local government and tangata whenua would be useful. Further, the issue of funding may prove critical to the long-term development and strengthening of relationships. Participation and collaboration incurs time and financial costs to iwi representatives, and because of the economic legacies of confiscation and dispossession, this can often be a barrier to more effective, efficient and prompt involvement. In Taranaki, iwi representatives are generally reimbursed for wahi tapu visits in resource consenting processes and funding is available for larger projects, but economic disparity remained a significant issue for many tangata whenua. Collaborative approaches are also more expensive for councils and DoC, and ensuring that these local government bodies have sufficient funding to enable their staff to visit tangata whenua and discuss issues kanohi ki te kanohi [face to face] in the future is also a significant issue. This suggests that securing funding to enable collaboration and relationship building may be an important goal for government staff to consider – although, this too is largely determined at the national level by the Crown – but it also indicates the need for local discussion of the contours of postcolonial responsibility, of who should pay and what expectations are realistic and fair in the context of historical injustices and contemporary limitations.

The contingency of local issues on national politics is indicative of the challenges facing local council and DoC officers and tangata whenua. Although the above discussion might suggest that staff and representatives in Taranaki have limited scope to address postcolonial tensions, learning to work together despite this imperfect context and the historical, political and economic currents that traverse it holds significant potential for improving the prospects for partnership in the future and strengthening contemporary relationships. Many interviewees described reciprocal learning about Māori culture and
government processes as a key mode through which relationships and interactions could be improved. For government organisations continued investment in training for staff, and making such training available for *tangata whenua*, may enhance understanding of the geopolitical structures within *iwi* and engender a greater ability to empathise with and therefore address the concerns of Māori. *Tangata whenua* representatives also identified regular interaction between *iwi* and *hapu* representatives and government staff, rather than solely mail or phone correspondence, as an important means of increasing mutual understanding and comfort.

For *iwi* representatives, the goal of postcolonial self-determination is contingent on both environmental management and *iwi* development, and many view regional collaboration among *iwi* as a key mode of strengthening their economic and political influence, and vital to ensuring that Taranaki is adequately considered in national-level discussions. Current *iwi* aspirations, though intimately related to this historical conjuncture, are generally supportive of collaboration as a more acceptable and just form of environmental management, and this is entwined with the ideal of a Crown-Māori partnership as the basis for the postcolonial nation. Arriving at modes of collaboration that move beyond repeating Crown eminence and empower a pluralism of place in Taranaki is contingent on full recognition of the geopolitical and cultural relationships between *iwi* and *whenua* [land] in Taranaki.

The interweaving of postdevelopment and postcolonial analyses with the experiences of *tangata whenua* in Taranaki, therefore, opens ways of thinking about development and environmental management in Taranaki and beyond. Entering into these issues in all their local particularities and contradictions dispels romantic and utopian interpretations of the cultural and political projects at play in contemporary negotiations of environmental management and development. It suggests an immutable complexity and contingency to current interactions and aspirations, and calls for interpretations and contributions “that neither shortcut their potential by interpreting them through worn out categories, nor that aggrandize their scope by imputing to them utopias that might be far from the desires and actions of the main actors involved” (Escobar, 2010b: 2-3). In this sense, the work of *iwi* organisations in environmental management in Taranaki indicates a commitment to ongoing transformations and a politics that unfolds and
grows beyond colonial discourses and beyond prescribed solutions to contemporary problems towards plurality.

In Taranaki, land – *whenua* – remains central to understanding the politics of coexistence. Colonial ambitions were based on and realised through the appropriation and control of land, and have yielded an irretrievable history of dispossessions, exclusion and ecological transformation. For the *tangata whenua* of Taranaki, Indigenous territoriality, *mana whenua* and *mana whakahaere* remain fundamental points of reference for coexistence and partnership. Environmental management, therefore, cannot escape questions of territoriality, development and self-determination; and this suggests that engaging with Indigenous geopolitical and territorial claims may form a crucial part of postcolonial negotiations more generally. This challenges state claims to sovereignty that depict “Indigenous agency as absent, archaic or insignificant in the dominant practices of economic, legal and political place-making” (Agius et al., 2007: 195). Yet it also brings new worlds of semantic reach to the idea of ‘nationhood,’ highlighting plurality and revealing the potential to take common ground in a physical sense as a basis for creating common ground in a political sense. Thus, from mutuality and difference come unsettling and unsettled openings that contribute to ongoing relationships of coexistence.
APPENDIX A: THE TREATY OF WAITANGI – TE TIRITI O WAITANGI (1840)

Three versions of the Treaty follow. These are the Māori and English texts recognised in the Treaty of Waitangi Act (1975), followed by Professor Sir Hugh Kawharu’s English translation of the Māori text (OTS, 2004: 5-7).

A1. Te Tiriti o Waitangi

Ko Wikitoria, te Kuini o Ingarani, i tana mahara atawai ki nga Rangatira me nga Hapu o Nu Tirani i tana hiahia hoki kia tohungia ki a ratou o ratou rangatiratanga, me to ratou wenua, a kia mau tonu hoki te Rongo ki a ratou me te Atanoho hoki kua wakaaro ia he mea tika kia tukua mai tetahi Rangatira – hei kai wakarite ki nga Tangata Maori o Nu Tirani – kia wakaaetia e nga Rangatira Maori te Kawanatanga o te Kuini ki nga wahikatoa o te wenua nei me nga motu – na te mea hoki he tokomaha ke nga tangata o tona Iwi Kua noho ki tenei wenua, a, e haere mai nei. Na ko te Kuini e hiahia ana kia wakaritea te Kawanatanga kia kaua ai nga kino e puta mai ki te tangata Maori ki te Pakeha e noho ture kore ana. Na, kua pai te Kuini kia tukua a hau a Wiremu Hopihona, he Kapitana i te Roiara Nawi hei Kawana mo nga wahi katoa o Un Tirani e tukua aiane, amua atu ki te Kuini e mea atu ana ia ki nga Rangatira o te wakaminenga o nga hapu o Nu Tirani me era Rangatira atu enei ture ka korerotia nei.

Ko te Tuatahi

Ko nga Rangatira o te Wakaminenga me nga Rangatira katoa hoki ki hai i uru ki taua wakaminenga ka tuku rawa atu ke te Kuini o Ingarani ake tonu atu – te Kawanatanga katoa o o ratou wenua.

Ko te Tuarua

Ko te Kuini o Ingarani ka wakarite ka wakaae ki nga Rangatira ki nga hapu — ki nga tangata katoa o Nu Tirani te tino Rangatiratanga o o ratou wenua o ratou kainga me o ratou taonga katoa. Otiia ko nga Rangatira o te Wakaminenga me nga Rangatira katoa atu ka tuku ki te Kuini te hokonga o era wahi wenua e pai ai te tangata nona te wenua – ki te ritenga o te utu e wakaritea ai e ratou ko te kaihoko e meatia nei e te Kuini hei kai hoko mona.

Ko te Tuatoru
A2. The Treaty of Waitangi

HER MAJESTY VICTORIA Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland regarding with Her Royal Favour the Native Chiefs and Tribes of New Zealand and anxious to protect their just Rights and Property and to secure to them the enjoyment of Peace and Good Order has deemed it necessary in consequence of the great number of Her Majesty’s Subjects who have already settled in New Zealand and the rapid extension of Emigration both from Europe and Australia which is still in progress to constitute and appoint a functionary properly authorised to treat with the Aborigines of New Zealand for the recognition of Her Majesty’s Sovereign authority over the whole or any part of those islands — Her Majesty therefore being desirous to establish a settled form of Civil Government with a view to avert the evil consequences which must result from the absence of the necessary Laws and Institutions alike to the native population and to Her subjects has been graciously pleased to empower and to authorise me William Hobson a Captain in Her Majesty’s Royal Navy Consul and Lieutenant Governor of such parts of New Zealand as may be or hereafter shall be ceded to Her Majesty to invite the confederated and independent Chiefs of New Zealand to concur in the following Articles and Conditions.
Article the First
The Chiefs of the Confederation of the United Tribes of New Zealand and the separate and independent Chiefs who have not become members of the Confederation cede to Her Majesty the Queen of England absolutely and without reservation all the rights and powers of Sovereignty which the said Confederation or Individual Chiefs respectively exercise or possess, or may be supposed to exercise or to possess over their respective Territories as the sole Sovereigns thereof.

Article the Second
Her Majesty the Queen of England confirms and guarantees to the Chiefs and Tribes of New Zealand and to the respective families and individuals thereof the full exclusive and undisturbed possession of their Lands and Estates Forests Fisheries and other properties which they may collectively or individually possess so long as it is their wish and desire to retain the same in their possession; but the Chiefs of the United Tribes and the individual Chiefs yield to Her Majesty the exclusive right of Preemption over such lands as the proprietors thereof may be disposed to alienate at such prices as may be agreed upon between the respective Proprietors and persons appointed by Her Majesty to treat with them in that behalf.

Article the Third
In consideration thereof Her Majesty the Queen of England extends to the Natives of New Zealand Her royal protection and imparts to them all the Rights and Privileges of British Subjects. W. HOBSON, Lieutenant Governor.

Now therefore We the Chiefs of the Confederation of the United Tribes of New Zealand being assembled in Congress at Victoria in Waitangi and We the Separate and Independent Chiefs of New Zealand claiming authority over the Tribes and Territories which are specified after our respective names, having been made fully to understand the Provisions of the foregoing Treaty, accept and enter into the same in the full spirit and meaning thereof: in witness of which we have attached our signatures or marks at the places and the dates respectively specified. Done at Waitangi this Sixth day of February in the year of Our Lord One thousand eight hundred and forty. [Here follow signatures, dates, etc.]
A3. English Translation of the Māori Text by Professor Sir H. Kawharu

Victoria, the Queen of England, in her concern to protect the chiefs and subtribes of New Zealand and in her desire to preserve their chieftainship and their lands to them and to maintain peace and good order considers it just to appoint an administrator one who will negotiate with the people of New Zealand to the end that their chiefs will agree to the Queen’s Government being established over all parts of this land and (adjoining) islands and also because there are many of her subjects already living on this land and others yet to come.

So the Queen desires to establish a government so that no evil will come to Māori and European living in a state of lawlessness. So the Queen has appointed me, William Hobson a Captain in the Royal Navy to be Governor for all parts of New Zealand (both those) shortly to be received by the Queen and (those) to be received hereafter and presents to the chiefs of the Confederation chiefs of the subtribes of New Zealand and other chiefs these laws set out here.

The First
The Chiefs of the Confederation and all the chiefs who have not joined that Confederation give absolutely to the Queen of England for ever the complete government over their land.

The Second
The Queen of England agrees to protect the chiefs, the subtribes and all the people of New Zealand in the unqualified exercise of their chieftainship over their lands, villages and all their treasures. But on the other hand the Chiefs of the Confederation and all the Chiefs will sell land to the Queen at a price agreed to by the person owning it and by the person buying it (the latter being) appointed by the Queen as her purchase agent.

The Third
For this agreed arrangement therefore concerning the Government of the Queen, the Queen of England will protect all the ordinary people of New Zealand and will give them the same rights and duties of citizenship as the people of England.
(Signed) W. Hobson
Consul and Lieutenant-Governor

So we, the Chiefs of the Confederation and of the subtribes of New Zealand meeting here at Waitangi having seen the shape of these words which we accept and agree to record our names and our marks thus. Was done at Waitangi on the sixth of February in the year of our Lord 1840.


There is extensive discussion of the ‘principles of the Treaty’ in jurisprudence, government documents and in Waitangi Tribunal reports. One of the most prominent definitions of the principles of the Treaty was produced by the 1989 Labour government. They developed the following principles to express the terms and intent of the Treaty: The Principle of Government; The Principle of Self Management; The Principle of Equality; The Principle of Reasonable Cooperation; The Principle of Redress.

ESTABLISHING A CLAIM:
Need to demonstrate ToW breach, and how this harmed iwi/tupuna. Must provide research for claim.

WAITANGI TRIBUNAL (WT):
Iwi do not need to go through the WT. WT research/report can be basis for following negotiations.

DEED OF MANDATE:
Representatives need to prove they are mandated by and accountable to claimant group, define the claimant group, area and issues of the claim. Mandate is assessed by OTS and TPK, when accepted is advertised in newspapers with opportunity for public comment. The Minister of ToW and Maori Affairs give final approval of mandate (which may have conditions).

TERMS OF NEGOTIATION

NEGOTIATIONS:
Negotiation of ‘settlement quantum’ and basic scope and nature of cultural redress. Crown makes a contribution (via OTS) to negotiation and Deed of Mandate costs.

HEADS OF AGREEMENT

AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE

Iwi can opt to only negotiate a Deed of Settlement.

NEGOTIATIONS:
An historical account and formal Crown apology is negotiated. The details of commercial settlement and cultural redress are negotiated.

DRAFT DEED OF SETTLEMENT

RATIFICATION:
Ballot held for all members of claimant group >18yrs.

DEED OF SETTLEMENT

LEGISLATIVE PROCESS:
Removes ability of Courts & WT to re-examine claims.

MAORI AFFAIRS SELECT COMMITTEE:
Opportunity for public submissions. Examines the Settlement, and either approves (with technical changes as needed) or rejects.

BILL AND LEGISLATION

GOVERNANCE ENTITY:
To manage assets transferred via settlement. Must be established and approved by Government before settlement occurs.

ASSET TRANSFERAL TO GOVERNANCE ENTITY AND CULTURAL REDRESS
The Crown’s negotiating principles are summarised below (OTS, 2004: 30):

- the Crown will explicitly acknowledge historical injustices – that is, grievances arising from Crown actions or omissions before 21 September 1992;
- Treaty settlements should not create further injustices;
- the Crown has a duty to act in the best interests of all New Zealanders;
- as settlements are to be durable, they must be fair, achievable and remove the sense of grievance;
- the Crown must deal fairly and equitably with all claimant groups;
- settlements do not affect Māori entitlements as New Zealand citizens, nor do they affect their ongoing rights arising out of the Treaty or under the law, and;
- settlements will take into account fiscal and economic constraints and the ability of the Crown to pay compensation.
B2.

This table summarises the Treaty Settlements negotiated by August 2010 in Taranaki (OTS, 23.10.2010).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Iwi Claimant Group</th>
<th>Negotiation Status</th>
<th>Key Aspects of Agreements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Ngati Tama         | Ngati Tama Claims Settlement Act 2003 | **Statutory Acknowledgement for:** part of Mimi-Pukearuhe Coastal Margin strip; part of Mt Messenger Conservation Area, Moki Conservation Area, Pou Tehia Historic Reserve, Mohakatino River Marginal strip, Mahakatino Coastal marginal strip, Coastal Marine Area adjacent to NT area of interest, Mahakatino River, Tongaporutu River.  

**Deeds of Recognition for:** Part of the Mimi-Pukearuhe Coast Marginal Strip, part of Mt Messenger Conservation Area, Moki Conservation Area, Pou Tehia Historic Reserve, Tongaporutu Conservation Area, Mohakatino Swamp Conservation Area, Mohakatino River and Tongaporutu River.  

**Sites transferred to NT:** Pukeruhe site (4.3h), part of Tongaporutu Conservation Area (6h), Uruti Conservation Area (252.9h), part of Whitecliffs Conservation Area (1308h), Mt Messenger Scenic Reserve & part of Mt Messenger Conservation Area (295h).  

**3/6 members on Joint Advisory Committee** for Whitecliffs Conservation Area.  

**Administer:** Umukaha Point Recreation Reserve, with advice from DoC.  

**Commercial Redress:** $14.5 million; right of first refusal to purchase Crown land and Tongaporutu Recreation Reserve (if reserve status is lifted).  

**Protocols with third parties.** |
| Ngati Mutunga      | Ngati Mutunga Claims Settlement Act 2005 | **Statutory Acknowledgements:** Part of Mimi – Pukearuhe Coast Marginal Strip; Waitoetoe Beach; Recreation Reserve; Mimi Scenic Reserve; Mimi Gorge Scientific Reserve; Mataro Scenic Reserve; Mt Messenger Conservation Area within the Area of Interest; Taramoukou Conservation Area; Onaero River Scenic Reserve; Onaero Coast Marginal Strip; Onaero River Marginal Strip; Urenui River Marginal Strip; Coastal Marine Area adjoining the Area of Interest; Tangitu Conservation Area and Miro Scenic Reserve; Onaero River; Urenui River; Waitara River within the Area of Interest; and Mimi River within the Area of Interest.  

**Deeds of Recognition:** Part of Mimi Pukearuhe Coast Marginal Strip; Waitoetoe Beach Recreation Reserve; Mimi Scenic Reserve; Mimi Gorge Scientific Reserve; Mataro Scenic Reserve; Mt Messenger Conservation Area within the Area of Interest; Taramoukou Conservation Area; Onaero River Scenic Reserve; Onaero River; Urenui River; Waitara... |
| Ngati Ruanui [includes Tangahoe and Pakakohi] | Ngati Ruanui Claims Settlement Act 2003 | **Statutory Acknowledgement:** Otoki Gorge Scenic Reserve, Tangahoe River, Whenuakura River, Patea River, Te Moananui A Kupe  
**Deeds of Recognition:** Otoki Gorge Scenic Reserve, the Tangahoe River, the Whenuakura River, and the Patea River.  
**Special Area Status:** Wai-ariki, part of the Waitotara Conservation Area (10h)  
**Sites Transferred to Ngati Ruanui:** 1h of the Tarere Conservation Area, the Maiben Conservation Area (subject to an easement in favour of Trustpower for hydro purposes), the Pukemoko Pa site within the Otoki Gorge Scenic Reserve, and the Kaikura Conservation Area. These sites total approximately 10 ha. Part of the bed of Lake Kaikura owned by the Crown (subject to protection for existing lawful use and access) will also be returned to Ngati Ruanui. |
| Te Atiawa | Heads of Agreement signed in 1999. | **NOT LEGALLY BINDING**  
**Sites transferred to TA:** Taumata Historic Reserve, Omata Road Conservation Area, Kerekeringa Conservation Area and Waionganga Conservation Area. Two of these sites will be used by TA as nohoanga or camping sites. The combined area of these sites is 1.5 hectares. Awa-te-take Pa Historic Reserve and Pukerangiora Pa Historic Reserve will be returned to TA and will be managed by TA as historic reserves under the Reserves Act.  
**Administer:** Ngangana Pa Historic Reserve and Rewa Rewa Historic Reserve, Sentry Hill Redoubt Historic Reserve, the Puketarata-Parihamore Pa Historic Reserve and the Puketekauere Pa Historic Reserve under the provisions of the Reserves Act.  
**Protocols** setting out DOC/TA relationship  
**Deeds of Recognition:** Tarata Conservation Area, Meeting of the Waters Scenic Reserve, Ratapihipihi Scenic Reserve, Awa-take Scenic Reserve, Mahoetahi Historic Reserve, Katere Scenic Reserve, Waitara River Scenic Reserve and Waitara River.  
**Special Area Status:** over the Sugar Loaf Islands/Nga Motu - similar to topuni |

**Appendix B: Contemporary Treaty Settlements Notes**

- River within the Area of Interest; and Mimi River within the Area of Interest
- **Sites transferred to NM:** the Onaero Site; the Pukemiro Site; the Te Rau o Te Huia Pā Site; the Ngapapa Site; the Urenui Site; the Te Urenui Pā Site; the Okoki Pā Site; the Okoki Pā Historic Reserve; Onaero Domain Recreation Reserve; and Urenui Domain Recreation Reserve.
- **Protocols** with third parties
- **Commercial Redress:** $14.9 million; 2 commercial properties leased back to the Crown, right of first refusal on Crown land
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Nga Rauru Kiitahi</strong></th>
<th><strong>Notes</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Administer</strong> Makino Scenic Reserve under the Reserves Act, Turuturu Mokai Historic Reserve subject to public access and maintenance of memorial. <strong>Ukaipo sites</strong> in the Tarere Conservation Area. <strong>Protocols</strong> with third parties. <strong>Commercial Redress:</strong> $41 million (combination of cash &amp; Crown land); Right of first refusal to Crown owned properties in Area of Interest.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Statutory Acknowledgement:</strong> Nukumaru Recreation Reserve (Wellington Land District); Ototoka Scenic Reserve (Wellington Land District); Coastal Marine Area adjoining the NRK area of interest (Wellington Land District). <strong>Statutory areas with both Deed of Recognition and Statutory Acknowledgement:</strong> Hawkens Lagoon Conservation Area (Wellington Land District) (to be renamed Tapuarau Conservation Area); Lake Beds Conservation Area (Wellington Land District); Patea River (Taranaki Land District); Whenuakura River (Taranaki Land District and Wellington Land District); Waitotara River (Taranaki Land District and Wellington Land District). <strong>Protocols</strong> with third parties. <strong>Commercial Redress:</strong> $31 million</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
C1.

**PhD Project Proposal**

Matalena Tofa – Macquarie University, Australia

My name is Matalena Tofa and I am currently in the early stages of preparation for my PhD in Human Geography at Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia. Last year I did my Masters Thesis (supervised by Dr. Brad Coombes, University of Auckland) on collaborative conservation and Treaty settlements at Taranaki.

I have approximately two and a half years to complete this project, and I am keen to design and implement this research work in a way that can be mutually beneficial. Some of the issues that I am interested in are:

- Māori participation in environmental management across urban, rural and conservation landscapes in Taranaki.
- How greater representation of Māori in planning and environmental management affects historical/cross-cultural relationships between Māori and government agencies.
- The ways in which Crown requirements, and consultation with government agencies, affect relationships within (and possibly between) iwi.
- How Māori organisations negotiate government requirements and cultural needs.
- How Māori organisations envision culturally appropriate environmental management and development.

If you have any questions, ideas or would like more information, please contact myself or my supervisor. Our contact details are below.

Thank you very much for your time and support,
Matalena Tofa
Name of Project: Postcolonial Environmental Management and Maori

My name is Matalena Tofa. I am a student at Macquarie University, Sydney, enrolled in a PhD at the Department of Human Geography. You are invited to participate in a study of how tangata whenua engage with and negotiate environmental management processes. I am interested in relationships between tangata whenua and government agencies in environmental management in Taranaki. The purpose of the study is to situate the politics of Maori participation in environmental management in the context of iwi governance in the Treaty settlement era.

The study is being conducted by:
Matalena Tofa
PhD Candidate, Department of Human Geography, Macquarie University, Sydney.
Ph: 64 6 753 2478 or 64 21 110 9572
Email: mtofa@els.mq.edu.au

This research is being conducted to meet the requirements for the degree of PhD degree under the supervision of:
Dr. Sandie Suchet-Pearson
Lecturer, Department of Human Geography, Macquarie University, Sydney.
Ph: 61 2 9850 8393
Email: ssuchet@els.mq.edu.au

Peter Adds (Victoria University, Wellington) can also assist with any queries or concerns about the project. His contact details are:
Head of School, Te Kawa a Māui/School of Māori Studies, Victoria University of Wellington
Ph: 04 463 5158
Email: peter.adds@vuw.ac.nz

I would appreciate the opportunity to interview you, but you are under no obligation at all to be interviewed. Interviews usually last one to two hours, but I will interview for a duration that suits your time schedule for the day. This would be during work time, unless a time outside of working hours would be more convenient for you. I would prefer to audiotape the interview to facilitate note-taking, but this would only be done with your consent and could be turned off at any time. Should you be interested, a copy of your transcript will be made available, and you can edit or withdraw information. Your confidentiality and privacy will be maintained during this process. Any information or personal details gathered in the course of the study are confidential, and will only be accessed by the researcher (Matalena Tofa) and supervisor (Dr. Sandie.
Suchet-Pearson). You will not be mentioned by name in any publication of the results unless you give specific approval for this to occur. If you decide to participate, you are free to withdraw from further participation in the research at any time without having to give a reason and without consequence. Should you be interested in the results of this research, a copy of the thesis and a short summary of the findings will be made available to you.

I, (participant’s name) have read and understand the information above and any questions I have asked have been answered to my satisfaction. I agree to participate in this research, knowing that I can withdraw from further participation in the research at any time without consequence. I have been given a copy of this form to keep.

I consent to audio-recording of this interview: YES ☐ NO ☐

Participant’s Name:  
(block letters)

Participant’s Signature:  Date:

Investigator’s Name:  
(block letters)

Investigator’s Signature:  Date:

The ethical aspects of this study have been approved by the Macquarie University Ethics Review Committee (Human Research). If you have any complaints or reservations about any ethical aspect of your participation in this research, you may contact the Ethics Review Committee through its Secretary (telephone 61 2 9850 7854; email ethics@mq.edu.au). Any complaint you make will be treated in confidence and investigated, and you will be informed of the outcome.
HE PEPA WHAKAMĀRAMA KORERO

Te Karangatanga o te Kaupapa Rangahau: Nga Iwi Taketake me Penapena Taiao i muri i Taiwhenuatanga.

Ko Matalena Tofa toku ingoa. He tauira ahau i Te Tari Takotoranga Papa o Te Whare Wananga o Macquarie, Sydney. Ko te kaupapa o toku tuhinga whakapae ki te tirotiro nga hononga o tangata whenua ki nga kaunihera-ā-rohe me te Papa Atawhai ki penapena rawa me rahuitanga. He hira tenei kaupapa rangahau ki te whakarite nga takohanga o te Karaune i raro Te Tiriti o Waitangi. He pohiri tenei kia koe, hei whakau ru mai ki ngā mahi, o tuku kaupapa rangahau.

Mehemea he pai kia uiuitia koe, ma to whakaae-a-tuhi, e whakaatu mai te waea: 64 21 110 9572 rānei 64 6 753 2478. Te karere rorohiko: mtofa@els.mq.edu.au

E mahi ana ahau mo te tohu mātauranga paerua, ma i roto i te whakarotuwhanga o toku kia tiroiro – a Takuta Sandie Suchet-Pearson. He nama waea tonā: 61 2 9850 8393. He karere rorohiko tonā: ssuchet@els.mq.edu

Mehemea he pai kia uiuitia koe, ma to whakaae-a-tuhi, Peter Adds e āhei ki te āwhina i te wahi kē. He nama waea tonā: 04 463 5158. He karere rorohiko tonā: peter.adds@vuw.ac.nz

E hiahia ana ahau ki te uiui i a koe. Ko tuku hiahia kia whakamaua au korero ki rungo ripene, heoi anō kei a koe tena. Ko taa te whakahanguku mō hūnui hōpu reo, i te wa hiahia ai koe. Ko tetahi atu, mehemea e pirangi ana koe kia whakakorea au korero, kei te pai. Ko au kou korero katoa ka homaitia ki ahau, he tikanga muna, a, e kore to ingoa e mahiotia e te tangata. Mehe mea e pirangi ana koe i nga hua o te kaupapa rangahau ke whakawatea ahau enei hua.

KA PURITIA TĒNEI PEPA WHAKAAE - A- TUHI MO NGĀ TAU E ONO

Kua homaihia he whakamāramatanga mo tēnei kaupapa rangahau, a, kei te mārama rawa atu ahau. E whakaae ana ahau kia e whakau ru mai ki tēnei kaupapa rangahau. Kua whai wā ahau he whiuwhiu pāati me te rongo hoki i ngā whakaututanga. E mārama nei ahai kei a au anō te tikanga ki te puta ki waho, ki te tango hoki i aku kōrero. Mo ngā kōrero nei, kei te mārama ahau e kore e mōhioto i ahu mai i ahau, ahakoa haere ai te wā. Kei te mōhio ahau, kaore he kōrero whakamārama māku mo tēnei.

Tuhia tō mokotā: ______________________________________________________

Tō ingoa: (Kia mārama te tuhi, kia ora) _____________________________________
The ethical aspects of this study have been approved by the Macquarie University Ethics Review Committee (Human Research). If you have any complaints or reservations about any ethical aspect of your participation in this research, you may contact the Ethics Review Committee through its Secretary (telephone 61 2 9850 7854; email ethics@mq.edu.au). Any complaint you make will be treated in confidence and investigated, and you will be informed of the outcome.
The following poem, published in 1860, is suggestive of settler sentiment during the first Taranaki War (1860-1861):

Mr Punch’s New Song for All Hands

New Plymouth! Soul inspiring sound!
T’will force the most colonial hound
To come from out his lair.
T’will arm the sons of British land,
And bid them in the fray to stand,
And win her battles there.

Then hasten! Hasten! To the strife;
We fight for Country and for Life,
We fight for England free.
We’ll bear her power from shore to shore,
Till the round world shall own no more,
Aught else but liberty.

Let Country! Soul inspiring name!
Fill all our hearts with patriot flame,
And make us fear above.
And Comrades, Comrades, join we in
One toast for friendship, one for kin;
One for the land we love.

Now Mr Punch is come to fight;
Let us with him in bond unite,
And rebels soon must fall.
And when triumphant we return,
From empty pas that we can burn,
We’ll own he did it all.

D2.
The figure of $10 million dollars is based on:

- 462,000 acres land unjustly confiscated at $2 per acre = $924,000
- 557,000 acres land purchased by forced sales at $1.75 per acre = $974,750
- Refund of $118,360 for forced payment of compensation on returned land = $118,360

Total = $2,017,110

The TMTB converted this total to a 1975 value of $10,085,550.\(^{166}\)

D3.
The view that the salvation and development of Māori would be achieved by teaching them to farm their land was often closely associated with stereotypes of the character and ability of the Māori race, for example:

Separated from their lands, there would be no prospect whatever for the Maori. They have little mechanical aptitude, and any attempt to utilise them in mechanical industries would be foredoomed to failure. Their whole disposition is naturally towards an open-air life. They make expert bushmen, flaxmill hands, and shearers, and if the necessity for work could be forced upon them they would undoubtedly become once more as fine sailors as their forefathers were. But the regeneration of the Maori, if it is ever accomplished, will be through their development as agriculturalists and graziers. That is the only way in which they will be able to utilise the one weapon which they possess in competition with the whites (Scholefield, 1909: 343).

D4.
Ecological change forms part of the grievance against the Crown and is also a source of tension between local Māori and Pakeha land owners. For example, Donald Hugh MacDonald stated to the Waitangi Tribunal in 1990 that:

The bush which we played in during our childhood, places where we used to gather food at certain times of the year are no longer places of sustenance and support. One is made to feel like an intruder when we have to ask a pakeha if we could have ready access to the places where we used to go for generations, to gather watercress, preserve our corn, fish for eels, or dye our harakeke in the black mud, a process which is far

\(^{166}\) P. Tamati and R. Ngatata Love, TMTB to Prime Minister Rowling (nd), in AANS 7613 W5491/495 6/1/1/1 1, 1975-1978.
more superior than modern dyes. We don’t have enough land resource to be self sufficient (Waitangi Tribunal, 1990: 24-25).

D5.

The table below summarises industrial development in Taranaki.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Development</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1865</td>
<td>First oil well (Alpha) at Moturoa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1885</td>
<td>Freezing works built at Waitara.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>Oil refinery commissioned for New Plymouth.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>Small oil/gas field discovered at Kapuni, South Taranaki.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>Maui natural gas field discovered offshore from South Taranaki.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Ammonia urea fertiliser plant constructed at Kapuni. Petroleum discovered at McKee site, North Taranaki.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985-86</td>
<td>Methanol and synthetic fuel plants commissioned.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996-97</td>
<td>Commercial volumes of hydrocarbons discovered in the Managheura structure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Dairy processing site at Whareroa becomes the largest single-site milk processing plant in the world.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


D6.

During the ‘Think Big’ era, the manager of the TCC and Regional Water Board complained of unsatisfactory consideration given to local environmental effects:

…within their own defined limits of reasonableness, both the Government and the developer will co-operate to achieve environmental standards… As the major cost increase of projects is caused by delays, it can be seen that the New Zealand Government has responded by introducing the National Development Act to limit hearing delays… Neither the Government nor the developer will go out of its way to introduce additional costs into any proposal. In fact, the full consequences of the proposal are often not fully known (Taranaki Catchment Commission and Regional Water Board, 1983b: 8-9).

This quotation evidences a blithe disregard of environmental effects in favour of time and cost-efficient development by developers and national government, and the limited power and ability of local authorities to influence or control major developments. One officer further lamented that “The main benefits of such projects go to the nation and the main environmental costs fall to the region” (Taranaki Catchment Commission and
Regional Water Board, 1983b: 8). He also noted the lack of public consultation on site-
selection for petrochemical developments.

D7.
The economic significance of the mountain to the region is further affirmed in the 1978
Egmont National Park Board management plan:

[The mountain’s waterways] influence the productivity of the surrounding dairying,
stock grazing, and nursery and market gardening farmlands.... Almost all of this
region’s local authority water supplies and power schemes depend on Egmont’s
mountain and vegetative resources to retain this moisture. Egmont National Park is
thus of prime importance as a water supply area despite its general lack of restrictions
on human use of the area (ENPB, 1978: 3).

The case for its protection is stated as:

Mt Egmont has frequently been referred to as “unique” and, while this term has been
used chiefly in regard to its scenic grandeur it is also unique in its relation to the
economic welfare of the country surrounding it. Frequent mention has also been made
of the value of the mountain itself and its forest covering from the climatic point of
view as the prosperity of the whole of Taranaki is dependent upon the abundance of
the rainfall which it induces. These references to the benefit bestowed by the mountain
must be considered, however, in conjunction with a knowledge and recognition of its
potentialities for waste and destruction throughout the land which it now serves, but
dominates, if its covering of forest is not zealously preserved. While travelling round
the mountain one is struck by the fact that a swift flowing and rapidly-falling river or
stream is crossed every few hundred yards and, while these are now sources of benefit
only, owing to their flowing between high and intact banks, their beds will inevitably fill
with boulders and shingle and they will over-flow their banks if extensive erosion
occurs in their upper reaches on the high steep slopes of the mountain.\footnote{167}

Seen in this light, the mountain is not only an important cultural symbol but also an
economically and strategically important asset. It also highlights the ecological
connections between the mountain and Taranaki’s water supply, which are treated as

\footnote{167}{Inspector, Animals Protection and Game Act. (15.10.1935). \textit{Egmont National Park, Memorandum for the Under-Secretary}, in F 1 W1329/231 33/3 1, 1925-1974.}
distinct issues in Treaty settlement negotiations. See Chapter 8 for further discussion on this topic.

D8.
Prior to the reserve being enacted, *tangata whenua* activities in the National Park area included:

The Maori people got food such as piharau (lamprey eel), tuna (eels), kokopu (native trout), inanga (white bait), koura (freshwater crayfish), patiki (flounder), introduced trout and herrings from the rivers and streams that had their origins from the mountain. The natural resources of “Taranaki’s” bush-covered slopes provided an abundance of birds, fern roots, ake (vines) barks and berries. Kie kie (flax fibre growing on trees) was used for craftwork, and it bore a sweet tasting fruit called piroi, tiori or tirori. Certain muds (paru) were used for pigments in painting canoes, houses, bodies and craftwork. Kokowai stream, a branch of the upper Waiwhakaiho River, was the source of kokowai (red ochre) – used as a dye. Trees such as totara were sought for carving. Swamps were important as a source of flax, raupo and watercress; and to season and treat wood for carving.”

National Park status made almost all of these activities illegal. Such restrictions are particularly significant in the broader context of land loss and transformation of forests to pasture throughout much of Taranaki.

D9.
Discussion of Park Board membership frequently elicited concerns regarding appropriate local representation and control (from the Park Board), the unwieldiness of the committees and Park Board structure (generally from Government officers) and by the 1970s, the need to appoint “younger people and women when persons with the necessary attributes are available,” and to ensure that recreational users were well represented. For example:

On the question of direct representation of park interest groups on the Authority and Park boards, various submissions suggested that as well as having scientific,

---

169 Minister of Lands to Chairman, Egmont National Park Board, Department of Lands and Survey (nd), in AANS 7613 W5491/495 NP 6/2/1 1, 1960-1977
conservation and mountain club interests represented, there was a case for nominees of the private tourist industry, of fishermen and of deer-stalkers to sit as members. The fact that Automobile Associations probably represent the largest single group of park users was also mentioned, while various suggestions were made that the Authority include all park board chairmen, the chairman of the nature conservation council and men of proven ability in the business world (Department of Lands and Survey, 1966).

D10.

It is often noted in government documentation that TMTB representation on the Board would be possible “should a suitable person be available, but this is not an appointment as of right.” Governmental reluctance to provide any special or specific rights to tangata whenua is evident throughout public and official documents. After an opposition MP noted that “There was a blatant disregard of the Maori interests which owned Mt Taranaki. It was plain from interjections by the MP for New Plymouth that he had been instrumental in seeing that Maori interests were left out,” government MPs countered that “They can be nominated like anyone else” and that “there was no statutory division between Maori and Pakeha and it should be left at that.”

D11.

Negotiations and meetings between the TMTB, National Parks Authority, Department of Lands and Survey representatives and Ministers of Lands and Maori Affairs in 1975 appear to have agreed on the following points to be enacted through special legislation. Points in italics were removed from the final legislation.

1. All land within the park to vest in the Taranaki Maori Trust Board.
2. All acts of authority to continue to ensure contracts, leases, licences etc are not invalidated.
3. All vested land to be gifted by the Trust Board to all the people of New Zealand to be held in trust in perpetuity as and for a national park.
4. The park to be named “Taranaki National Park”.
5. All assets of every kind owned by the existing Board to vest in the new Board constituted in the special legislation.
6. All the land in the park to be exempt from all mining to safeguard park values.

170 Minister of Lands to Chairman, Egmont National Park Board, Department of Lands and Survey (nd), in AANS 7613 W5491/495 NP 6/2/1 1, 1960-1977
7. The appropriate provisions of the National Parks Act 1952 relating to Egmont National Park Board to be amended or repealed. A new Board to be constituted with a term commencing 1 January 1976 under the name of the Taranaki National Park Board.

8. The Board to include a nominee of the Trust Board and a person to represent the tribal owners, both to be appointed by the Minister.\textsuperscript{172}

\textsuperscript{172} Extract from Minutes of Meeting of National Parks Authority (26.11.1975), in AANS 7613 W5491/495 6/1/1/1 1, 1975-1978.
E1.
Similarly, as Mawani (2005) has identified in the Canadian context, governments frequently assert the right to determine the legitimacy of claimants. In Taranaki, the Crown’s preference to negotiate with ‘large natural groupings’ (OTS, 2004) has proven controversial; for example, the right of Ngāti Ruanui to negotiate on behalf of two hapu (Tangahoe and Pakakohi) was strongly contested (Tofa, 2007). For Taranaki iwi, the relationship between the iwi claim and claims regarding the events at Parihaka (see Chapter Five) is similarly controversial, but as the Chairperson of Taranaki Iwi Authority suggests, the authority to decide whose and which claims are heard together remains with the Crown:

… any of the settlements that the Crown will negotiate, they're negotiating with iwi so our people need to get on board with that if they want a settlement so...

Would you rather that Parihaka was dealt with separately?

Well, that’s the question, what’s the Crown gonna do with it, you know that’s my question, What’s the position of the Crown? We’ve asked that question of Toko Kamea, said to Toko, well you know, what’s the Crown’s position? Are they wanting large natural groupings? I don’t think they want another separate claim, isolated claim, so we need to know what their thinking is as well, whether the Crown will say ‘nah we’re gonna treat you separately,’ or ‘nah we want it part of a large natural grouping.’ You know, put your stake in the ground so that our people might say ‘we don’t want that,’ but we’re saying well if we’re gonna get a claim, this is the way. So, I suspect there’ll be a lot of tension there (Interview, 10.07.09).

E2.
All Treaty settlement legislation includes a similar statement to the example below from the Ngati Tama settlement that prevents the historical claims from being examined again:

12. Settlement of Ngati Tama historical claims final
(1) The settlement of Ngati Tama historical claims effected under the deed of settlement and this Act is final, and on and from the settlement date the Crown is
(2) Subsection (1) does not limit the acknowledgements expressed in, or the provisions of, the deed of settlement.

(3) Despite any other enactment or rule of law, on and from the settlement date, no court, tribunal, or other judicial body has jurisdiction (including, without limitation, the jurisdiction to inquire or further inquire into, or to make a finding or recommendation) in respect of—

(a) any or all of the Ngati Tama historical claims; or
(b) the deed of settlement; or
(c) the redress provided to the governance entity under the deed of settlement or under this Act; or
(d) this Act.

(4) Subsection (3) does not exclude the jurisdiction of a court, tribunal, or other judicial body in respect of the interpretation or enforcement of the deed of settlement or this Act (Ngati Tama Claims Settlement Act, 2003, s12).

E3.
The relevance and role of the TMTB, for instance, has been questioned for several years and, as the Chairman of Ngā Ruahine Iwi Authority (15.05.09) notes, “the recent election was quite interesting, and the main reason why many iwi put their people in was to dissolve the trust board, and let more power go back to individual iwi.” This evidences a shift not only within iwi but also in how regional collaboration and interaction occurs (see Section 6.3.3).

E4.
Te Puni Kōkiri is the Ministry of Māori Development. It “exists to help achieve the government’s vision for New Zealand, as it applies to Māori” (TPK, 2008b: 4) and is required to:

The responsibilities of the Ministry of Maori Development include—
(a) Promoting increases in the levels of achievement attained by Maori with respect to—
(i) Education:
(ii) Training and employment:
(iii) Health:
(iv) Economic resource development:
(b) Monitoring, and liaising with, each department and agency that provides or has a responsibility to provide services to or for Maori for the purpose of ensuring the adequacy of those services (Ministry of Maori Development Act, 1991a).

E5.
As the following quotation from the current Chairperson of TAIA and a PKW shareholder suggests, PKW is held accountable to commercial, social and cultural aspirations:

All Maori organisations should contribute to iwi development and actively assist iwi to achieve their aspirations… Iwi development is all about restoring and enhancing collective rights and servicing the needs of whanau, hapu and iwi through collective and centralised action and support. PKW has an opportunity to be both the market leader it so desperately wants and to have a social conscience par excellence, through assisting iwi to the maximum, rather than, as it does at present, usurping or cutting across iwi development and aspirations (Keenan, 6.12.1997).

E6.
For example, in the PKW Draft Strategic Plan (2008), it is stated that:

To a large extent our cultural thinking and identity as Maori helps determine how the Incorporation manages the land. For example, our cultural heritage as Taranaki Maori, combined with the history of the land creates an aversion to the sale of land which can slow or constrain our economic growth as an Incorporation. For some, the Incorporation is simply a company which should use the land as a commercial asset to benefit shareholders financially. For others the Incorporation has cultural responsibilities akin to Iwi and Hapu which are above and beyond those of a non-Maori organisation. For some the Incorporation may be seen as an organisation which holds their lands in trust until such time as they are ready to resume direct ownership and control (PKW, 2008: 5).

E7.
Similarly, the document outlining the planning strategy for Ngā Ruahine iwi notes that:

One of the benefits of such planning is that it can be a powerful tool to bring groups of diverse people together, helping the rise above old differences and focusing in on
common [sic.] and a shared vision for the future. This leading to a positive convergence of ideas, efforts and thinking. Moving forward and making progress is no longer a battle of personalities and wills but more a united front drawn together to achieve common and agreed upon goals (Tai, 2008: 10).

E7.
In their Treaty settlement, Ngā Rauru negotiated two mechanisms for developing relationships between Ngā Rauru and the Crown called the *paepae rangātira* and the *paepae whakapakari*. These provide for meetings between the *rangātira* of Ngā Rauru Kiitahi and the Crown, and between Ngā Rauru Kiitahi and Mayors and senior managers with Crown and business respectively, to discuss the relationship and any pertinent issues (NZPD, 23.06.2005). Like Treaty settlements, the effects of these initiatives are uncertain:

The results of those relationships are in the pudding of course…it’s certainly a mechanism where we can assert influence, and that’s what it was about, and of course *paepae whakapakari* was about holding government agencies accountable for what they should be delivering to our people…but I think I’m not sure necessarily that we as an iwi at this stage, are really clear about what we want out of it…and how we hold the Crown accountable for what they should be doing (Chairperson, Conservation Board; Representative, TKoR, 15.06.09).

E8.
Pan-iwi organisations currently in Taranaki include: Te Whare Punanga Kōrero, Te Korimako o Taranaki Trust, Taranaki Māori Trust Board (TMTB), Te Tai Hauāuru Forum (Fisheries), NPDC and STDC Iwi liaison Committees, Tuiora Limited (to an extent), Iwi Chairs Forum (ICF) (DOCDM-272207, 2008).

E9.
As noted in an initial discussion paper, the Iwi Chairs Forum is intended to advance work in the areas listed below:

- An opportunity for iwi to meet regularly to share experiences and issues they face;
- A collective regional voice with greater regional and national influence with direct access to Cabinet and key Crown Minister’s

---

A step towards developing a cohesive Taranaki Iwi strategy to manage and influence Departments of the Crown and Territorial Authorities (District & Regional Councils): on generic issues

A collective Iwi lobby group to position Taranaki Iwi and provide leverage and a strong negotiation position when dealing with the Crown.

To develop and establish strategic alliances for Commercial opportunities

Joint ventures, co investing, sharing investment opportunities

To facilitate collaboration on generic kaupapa that impact on all iwi, such as Water, Mouna Taranaki, National Park, fisheries, marine reserves, Carbon Credits, bio prospecting, bio security.

Economic opportunities such as concessions, RMA development matters, coastal subdivision etc.
Appendix F: Chapter Seven Notes

F1.
Development around wahi tapu [sacred sites] has been one of the most contentious aspects of resource management in Taranaki. Tangata whenua representatives identify a strong obligation and responsibility to protect their wahi tapu because:

...tino rangatiratanga is about, you know, looking after our people's mana, and you know, some of them are dead, and so whether we like it or not we continue to be responsible for them...and we have responsible people around today and we should be looking at our successes and making sure that there’s a mechanism around us and around the council to make sure that they know who are the appropriate people that should deal with those matters... they [our ancestors] may not have given us a huge amount of wealth, but they gave us the breath in our bodies (Puketapu hapu representative, TAIA, 19.06.09).

Further, as the Chairman of TRoNM (27.05.09) explains, maintaining these sites is a priority for many people because of colonial dispossession and cultural disruption in Taranaki:

...the [thing] that’s given us the most grief, and what people are most passionate about, has been the issue of wahi tapu and consents... I sorta sat back and thought, well why are they, sort of, that way inclined? Why are these wahi tapu so important to them? And essentially it’s the last sort of the tangible cultural markers, you know, it’s actually something tangible you know, like you can see a pa [fortified village or place] site and so that to me, it means a lot to me. And when you don’t have sort of the reo [Māori language] and the other sort of tikanga [customary values] competencies if you like, you know, that was their way of contributing of sort of contributing to Ngati Mutunga and expressing their Ngati Mutungatanga. It was like, well, we’ll protect this at all costs, you know, and so well, why? ...I know why they’re important for us in terms of being cultural and historical markers of our tupuna and representing certain stories and depending on the site and the human contact with that site I’d sort of consider some to be more significant than others because of, you know, the human interaction with that site and then there’s the archeological sort of aspects of it as well. And then we’d find like wahi tapu was the, we’d have ini meetings every month, you know, and when we get to wahi tapu that’s when everyone was like...just sort of vehemently opposed to certain things and passionate and they’d erupt, you know, it was just crazy... and really that's a
consequence of not having control over your land. But yeah I think it was cos it was they were the remaining sort of tangible things that people could actually relate to.

F2.
Although tensions in authority and decision-making powers in the conservation estate remain, Section 4 of the Conservation Act (1987) – which requires DoC to give effect to the principles of the Treaty – has influenced the agency’s development, and is an important point of distinction between DoC and local government:

And, you know, I think particularly, something like the Local Government Act should be changed accordingly, cos I don’t know how the Local Government Act reads at the moment, it’s probably, you know, ‘recognition of’ or something, but it certainly, yeah no. You know, I think local authorities, particularly at the regional council level, they can be quite, you know, their processes can be quite, a little flippant in some cases, in terms of acknowledgement of iwi and the environment and those relationships. So, you know, where if their legislation was a little different, they might have to roll their sleeves up [and] engage a little bit more constructively (Conservation Board Member, Former DoC Egmont Area Manager, 07.07.09).

F3.
Consultation with Māori about resource consents has frequently been controversial in Taranaki. One of the key issues is who is notified and consulted – iwi representatives or hapu representatives. A Ngā Ruahine representative lamented that hapu are ‘the last to know,’ arguing that:

…in our case the South Taranaki District Council, they also have a set of rules that says ‘we do not have to go outside of this.’ The RMA act says this is what it is, and then they build some parameters around that to meet their needs locally and then they say well, this is the only doorway you need to go through, which is generally the iwi door…what generally happens in Ngā Ruahine is that a letter gets sent out by the consenting authorities to say that an application has been received and that these are the people…are applying, and if you have any concerns dadadada these are the contact details. That’s generally the process...Alternatively, companies or organizations who are seeking the consent, generally get in touch with the iwi office, and they say ‘we’re applying for a consent in Ngā Ruahine.’ They don’t say in the hapu within the area of Kanihi or Okahu or whatever, they always say we have applied for a resource consent within the boundaries of Ngā Ruahine and that’s how it’s presented to us. And so
already it’s here, rather than there, yeah that’s what it’s like (D. Noble, Kanihi hapu, Ngā Ruahine, 13.07.09).

Indicating the complexity of postcolonial Māori geopolitical relationships, the CEO of Ngāti Tama Iwi Authority (13.05.09) argued the opposite, suggesting that RMA processes legitimate groups other than the mandated iwi authority established through their Treaty settlement:

… because of the RMA and the consultation requirements of the RMA…councils or developers, whoever, tend to work with the affected, well, almost whanau [family], those immediately next to whatever they’re wanting consents for or over…and so they tend to legitimise whanau groupings, and I don’t think the whanau should be kept out of the discussion, but I think the RMA should reflect the reality of Māori organisations and they should either go through the iwi authority, direct them down to the hapu [who can] direct them down to the whanau, so there’s a process… so it’s a bit complex and one of the ways that the Crown tried to mitigate some of those situations, they employ these Māori in their systems… the Crown thinks that if they’ve got these people on board then they’re doing it right and then…they’re the interface…

F4.

The purpose of statutory acknowledgements is described as:

(1) The only purposes of the statutory acknowledgements are—

(a) to require consent authorities, the Environment Court, and the Historic Places Trust to have regard to the statutory acknowledgements, as provided for in sections 55 to 57; and

(b) to require relevant consent authorities to forward summaries of resource consent applications to the governance entity, as provided for in section 59; and

(c) to enable the governance entity and a member of Ngati Tama to cite the statutory acknowledgements as evidence of the association of Ngati Tama with the relevant statutory areas, as provided for in section 60; and

(d) to provide a statement by Ngati Tama, for inclusion in a deed of recognition, of the association of Ngati Tama with a statutory area (Ngati Tama Claims Settlement Act, 2003, s54).
F5.
Similarly, Ngā Ruahine have previously objected to planning work where ownership of the data and plans was assumed by the council:

…because what they’ve wanted to do in the past is, but it’s sorted managed really from their point of view, is us identify historic sites, but we’ve been very loathe to do that there, cos we view a lot of the historic sites as either being not necessarily with an iwi overview on it, as having either a whanau overview, say like urupa, or hapu overview, and… the council wanted to actually have ownership of data of where all those sites were. And we didn’t really want to buy into that there, but possibly if we had an overall environmental plan or an overarching say heritage plan, that could possibly identify some of those things whereby the ownership of the data is the iwi, and we can release certain layers of data to other interested parties (Interview, Chairperson of Ngā Ruahine Iwi Authority, 15.05.09).

F6.
Several council staff identified providing training for tangata whenua as a key method for improving relationships:

One of the things we are looking at now is how we provide the ability to build their capacity by providing training and we’ve run some RMA courses and but we actually need to run more, and more regularly… And I think that’s one of the things that council can do that could really support iwi and hapu, and it helps them for their planning processes as well, and also they understand how I suppose the constraints and the challenges that council has in dealing with the whole range of issues that we deal with, not just iwi and hapu issues, but public issues as well… I think that iwi and hapu need to be more informed about how council works and how just if we’re talking environmental issues, just basically how our plans work on the ground like our district plan for example…I think that if they, if they were more informed about how those things work they would be it would assist them in better responding to the things that council does and the plans and policies that we put out for their input… (Iwi Relationships Manager, NPDC, 22.05.09).

… just as iwi pass on knowledge, I think we have as planners have got a lot of knowledge that we could pass on to iwi… there’s a lot of young Māori graduates coming through… and there a lot of them are taking up RMA law or environmental planning, ultimately because that really effects the core of their existence. And what I would like to see is almost internships… it would be nice to see a commitment made to
iwi in the relevant regions to fostering knowledge. So that we could say right, every year we’re going to take on one young Māori graduate specifically in planning to train them up so that they can represent their iwi... that would be a cool idea and I don’t believe that’s out of reach for most councils. And then in terms of what you get is a greater understanding on both sides. The iwi then understands how council works because they’ve got someone there working within their group who has been there, seen that done that, and the council then have someone they know intimately who they can then have this relationship with that they can ring up and go ‘hey, I’ve got this application...’ (Land Use Consents and Monitoring, Team Leader, NPDC, 17.07.09).
APPENDIX G: CHAPTER EIGHT NOTES

G1.
Following initial discussions and documents, the outcomes below are now sought in New Zealand’s water management system:

- Improve the quality and efficient use of freshwater by building and enhancing partnerships with local government, industry, Māori, science agencies and providers, and rural and urban communities.
- Improve the management of the undesirable effects of land use on water quality through increased national direction and partnerships with communities and resource users.
- Provide for the increasing demands on water resources and encourage efficient water management through increased national direction, working with local government on options for supporting and enhancing local decision making, and developing best practice (MfE, 2006: 1).

G2.
Interestingly, the TCC itself noted that during the ‘Think Big’ era of the late 1970s and 1980s it “had to downgrade other works it would like to see done… comprehensive river control and erosion control projects in other areas have suffered” (Taranaki Catchment Commission and Regional Water Board, 1983a: 12). Further, the TCC characterised its management of water as “an area wherein water users are somewhat vague (and unpoliced to any significant extent) about water abstraction rates, times, frequencies and volumes, and a certain [sic] amount of informality exists. Pollution problems are normally dealt with by discussion, arbitration and generally there is no emphasis on urgency. It may take a local body up to ten years to recognise a problem, devise solutions, obtain licenses and construct works. Discussions with Regional Water Boards are usually marked by a lack of urgency and a clear lack of finance to do any investigative research into aspects of water management” (Taranaki Catchment Commission and Regional Water Board, 1983b: 4).
G3.
This approach to settlement is generally accepted among iwi representatives; however, some find it difficult to understand any Treaty settlement that excludes the maunga [mountain]:

…the Crown have declared that they will not deal with the ownership issue of kuro [the mountain] until all iwi of Taranaki have settled, and so, four iwi continued on through that process, and my personal view is that that should never have happened, those four iwi. Those iwi should have fought…And the reason why, and this is a personal view, the reason why I say that is because the Crown has said that once you sign off your settlement is full and final, now if the eight iwi have signed off as full and final and then we deal with the ownership issue afterwards, to me is crap because the Crown doesn’t have to deal with you, once you’ve signed off on the dotted line…And I don’t trust them, I mean the Treaty tells us that, doesn’t it. So that’s that old habit, that old thinking of mine in that regard (D. Noble, Kanihi hapu, Ngā Ruahine, 13.07.09).

G4.
The experiences of Ngāti Tama of collaboratively managing the Mount Messenger Conservation area returned through their Treaty settlement provide the basis for these concerns about liability. Through the settlement conservation covenants were placed over the land, meaning that this land which “belonged to Ngāti Tama, wrongly through the Taranaki Māori wars it was taken off them, finally they got it back, with all these strings on it…[and] with the Department still there” (JAC member; East Taranaki Environmental Trust, 15.07.09). For Ngāti Tama, a key motivation for the JAC was to secure access to ‘the DoC budget’ for the pest control required by conservation covenants (Manager, Ngati Tama Development Trust, 13.05.09). However, “getting access to the funds is another step that DoC are having difficulty with,” prompting the realisation “that getting land back is not free of liability” (Manager, Ngati Tama Development Trust, 13.05.09), and leading other iwi representatives to note that “given Ngāti Tama’s experience…I just wonder if [land] ownership’s a good idea…we really have to think hard about it” (Chairperson, TAIA, 09.06.09).

G5.
For example, the Chairperson of Taranaki Iwi Authority (10.07.09) commented that:
My personal opinion…is based on whakapapa, it’s based on being inclusive, and the
more people involved in the settlement the more resolve that we can get, and maybe even a better redress... so cos you’re bringing a lot more people with some intelligence and some ability to negotiate so we’re not cutting people out, we’re bringing people in. Yeah.

Another interviewee also pointed out that descendents who are now based in other parts of the country continue to mībi to Taranaki maunga:
REFERENCES

Archival Sources


AAMK 869 W3074/790A 26/5/2 2. (1948-1956) Trust Boards - Taranaki Maori Trust Board Members. Wellington, National Archives.


REFERENCES


AATJ 889 W5509/142 102/11/1/1 3. (1985) *Development and Programming Branch - Regional Infrastructure - Taranaki Committee on Regional Planning and Outfall*. Wellington, National Archives.


ABRS 16208 W5358/5. (1890) *Report of the Joint Committee upon West Coast Reserves 1890*. Ministry of Justice, Waitangi Tribunal Division, Wellington, National Archives.


References


IA 1/1861/1169. (1861) Provincial Council seeking methods by which further land may be acquired from the Natives. Internal Affairs, Wellington, National Archives.

IA/1/1860/2059 (1860) Addresses on Native disturbances at Taranaki. Internal Affairs, Wellington, National Archives.


Academic References


REFERENCES


REFERENCES


Carrington, F. A. (1860) The Land Question of Taranaki with suggestions for improving the condition of the Aboriginal inhabitants and developing the resources of New Zealand, New Plymouth, Taranaki News.


Department of Lands and Survey (1961) *The land utilisation survey of north east Taranaki*, Wellington, Land Utilisation Division, Department of Lands and Survey.


Doucet, A. (2008) "From her side of the gossamer wall(s)"; Reflexivity and relational knowing. *Qualitative Sociology*, 31(1), 73-87.


REFERENCES


Fuller, D. (1999) Part of the action, or 'going native'? Learning to cope with the 'politics of integration'. Area, 31(3), 221-227.


Helm, A. S. (1963) *Egmont National Park: A Short History and Bibliography*.


NZPD (1944) Taranaki Maori Claims Settlement Bill. *New Zealand Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) 1944*, 267, 748-754.


Taranaki Catchment Commission and Regional Water Board (1983a) *Effects of 'Think Big' Projects on Soil Conservation, River Control, Pollution and Water Levels*, Miscellaneous Report 83-2, Stratford, Taranaki Catchment Commission and Regional Water Board.


REFERENCES


