Transcendence is by no means totally absent from the literature on Heidegger yet, to the extent that this discussion of transcendence does not result in a fundamental confrontation with it, transcendence has nonetheless been continually passed over. Accordingly, transcendence has not been ‘passed over’ in the sense that it has been ignored, rather, it has been passed over in the sense that it is discussed in the mode of ‘skirmishing with the question.’ In each case this lack of a complete and fundamental engagement with transcendence is justifiable in varying degrees but with respect to the whole of Heidegger scholarship it is a significant deficiency.

To skirmish with the problem of fundamental ontological transcendence bears no weight against the severity of the problem itself. On those occasions where a more sustained attempt is made to pose the problem, these attempts have remained more summaries than re-petitions (Wiederholungen). Accordingly, these approaches pass over (reasonably or unreasonably) what is worthy of questioning in the summarised texts, namely, what the latter aim at. Accordingly, these summaries appear to offer a more sustained analysis but essentially, they too merely skirmish with the basic question. In these cases, to offer a summary is more a way of coping with the essential and severe difficulty of the question than a way of confronting that difficulty.

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1 For analyses of transcendence which are more accurately summaries of MFL cf. Emad (1981) 25ff. (albeit interspersed with sundry principles from SZ §69 at 35ff.) & Hopkins (1993) chapter 8. Conversely, Hanley (2000) 169ff. does this with multiple texts and with considerable paraphrasing (what is original here is more the order than the content). Raffoul (1998) 145-165 does much the same, in a way which is mostly, but not perfectly accurate (this points to both the boon and the problem of a summarising style: one can be mostly accurate without being foundationally accurate, and perhaps more importantly, without bringing one’s foundations into a unity). On the other hand, a text such as Kisiel (2005[2001]), knowing its bounds and not having the goal of ‘answering’ the question about transcendence so much as displaying the development of the problem in Heidegger’s thought is characterised by a summary presentation of the problem in each relevant text.
This treatment of transcendence is all the more confusing when we find in the *Vom Wesen des Grundes* (which was first released in 1929) statements such as “the portion of the investigations concerning “Being and Time” published so far has as its task nothing more than a concrete, revealing project of transcendence (cf. §§12-83, esp. §69).” In order to pass this over one must assume that transcendence is used in a vacuous sense here. Yet that is entirely impossible when one listens in to what *Vom Wesen des Grundes* has to say. Conversely, it is possible, at least at first, to pass over §69 of *Being and Time*, ‘The Temporality of Being-in-the-World and Problem of the Transcendence of the World.’ After all, in accordance with the *SZ* §69’s ‘laconic’ approach to the problem of transcendence it does not make transcendence intelligible as a real problem in and of itself. But if transcendence becomes an explicit and real problem with the 1929 release of *Vom Wesen des Grundes*, and a more perplexing problem with the concurrent release of *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, it has become impossible to ignore with the later release of every text in which transcendence is a central and explicit problem (with the exception of the complete notes for the formulation of *SZ* 1.3 and the possible exception of *Kants Lehre von Schematismus*). While we still await the release of Heidegger’s retrospective analysis *Anmerkung zu “Vom Wesen des Grundes”*, retrospective analyses of transcendence occur in texts such as *the Contributions* and *the Principle of Reason*. Thus, in sum, almost every relevant text for the question of what Heidegger means by the word ‘transcendence’ in the late 20s has been released in German, and indeed, for some time now the most important have even been translated into English for the convenience of English language scholarship on Heidegger.

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2 VWG (ER/D) 96-97 *infra* / 162 *infra* (here and throughout where the same passage is referred to in VWG (ER) and in VWG (D) this is because most parenthetical remarks in VWG (ER) are explanatory insertions by Malick; in these cases then, reference to VWG (D) attests that the parenthetical remark is Heidegger’s).

3 The latter, delivered in 1927, will most likely be released in GA84. The former belongs to the Nachlass and may never be released in full. These notes were appended to the manuscript for LQT and are some 200 pages long (Kisiel (2005[2001]) 211). Approximately 15% of these notes were published as AT. All texts which attempt to explicate transcendence as a fundamental ontological problem belong to Heidegger’s work in the late 1920s (thus HCT’s concept is not the one discussed in SZ, BP, VWG, MFL etc.).

4 However, the self-critique offered in PR is not particularly important for this thesis. The preface to the third edition of VWG (VWG (EG) 97 *et infra*) refers us to pp 82ff. of the original (viz. pre-Gesamtausgabe) edition of *Der Satz vom Grund* for this ‘self-critique.’ However, a comparison of that passage (PR 44-49) with VWG (ER) 28-31, 120-125 etc. and indeed with MFL §14 shows that Heidegger’s self-critique only states that, while his conclusions about the principle of sufficient reasons were correct in the early 20s (because at bottom they’re the same as those of PR 44ff.) in the earlier work he didn’t tarry with the principle of sufficient reasons (but approached it through a phenomenological detour), and that, according to the later Heidegger, it is methodologically/hermeneutically better to tarry with the principle.
What becomes more and more clear throughout this mountain of work is simply that transcendence was a real question. And if, as Heidegger tells us, he could not make his concept of transcendence intelligible to Scheler and Husserl, then we cannot assume that its meaning is obvious. Instead, we must assume the opposite and in this way it is already clear that the question of transcendence requires methodical and sustained work. But if transcendence has not really been understood and the published part of *Being and Time* is “nothing more than a concrete revealing project of transcendence” this means that, to some extent *Being and Time* has not been understood either. Conversely, it means that to determine the meaning of transcendence we must place it within the hermeneutical circle of *Being and Time*.

In reading these texts we find that transcendence is connected with world. Having read *Being and Time* it is all too easy to think that we understand world in a final sense. SZ I.1.iii tells us that the worldliness of the world is significance and this is then repeated throughout. Yet the *Metaphysical Foundations of Logic* tell us that we have not understood world primordially when it chides that:

Had one the least sensitivity to method, one could conclude that this basic constitution [viz. world, being-in-the-world] is obviously central for a metaphysics of Dasein, that it returns continually and does so even more primordially in the course of the interpretation [viz., *Being

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5 Cf. MFL 131, 167f. *et infra*, thus, cf. Scheler (1973[1927-1928]) 321-326 / Scheler (1976[1927-1928]) 211-215 vs. SZ (S/S) 209-212 (viz. because Heidegger’s reference to the above passage from Scheler in MFL 168 *infra* has the potential to modify the meaning of MFL 167f.); Neither the above passage in Scheler nor the area of SZ which Scheler refers to explicitly mention ‘transcendence’ (Scheler refers to SZ “210ff.”; cf. Scheler (1976[1927-1928]) 215). A reading of these passages show that the point Heidegger is making in his reference to Scheler in MFL 168 *infra* is that Scheler misunderstands the character of the difference between world and innerworldliness (and thus, that he misunderstands, the admittedly relatively ambiguous, use of *Realität* in the relevant passage of SZ). Exposition of the sense in which this is identical to the problem of transcendence would need the resources of the Founding Analysis. But since showing Scheler’s mistake is identical to showing what the transcendence of the world means, the Founding Analysis will show how Scheler went wrong simply by working through its allotted task (but not by dwelling on what Scheler said and discussing it thematically).
7 VWG (ER) 96-97*infra*
8 SZ *passim.*
and Time]; this means the phenomenon comes more and more to light as central.9

In the same area, Heidegger also links the above with the problem of transcendence, both in and beyond SZ §69.10 Thus, not only is SZ §69c intended to be a more primordial formulation of world, but SZ I.3 was itself to include an entire chapter entitled “Temporality and Worldliness.”11 Having had access to the notes for first formulation of SZ I.3, Kisiel tells us that the latter “would have taken its themes primarily from §69c of Being and Time.”12 Kisiel also reports that these notes repeatedly refer to “69” (thus, to SZ §69).13 The primordial question of world is somehow a question of transcendence – this much is already clear in Being and Time. Thus, to the extent that transcendence remains covered over so too does world, and thus being-in-the-world – that is, even the preliminary question of Being and Time remains covered over.14

As was mentioned above, transcendence is not wholly absent from the literature on or responding to Heidegger. Transcendence arises as a problem in Sartre’s original existentialist-Husserlian-Heideggerian philosophy.15 Indeed, as in Vom Wesen des Grundes it is also connected with freedom.16 But, of course, with the Letter on Humanism, along with other texts, this particular approach to the problem in Heidegger has been definitively put to rest (though it may still be useful for Sartre research).17 Transcendence sometimes becomes an issue in the literature on Heidegger as part of a conceptual ‘rapprochement’ with Husserl, who after all also uses the expression “the transcendence of the world” and the “transcendent world” just as Heidegger does in SZ §69c.18 Transcendence also comes up with respect to the

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9 MFL 167
10 Ibid. f.
11 Kisiel (2005[2001]) 211; Zeitlichkeit und Weltlichkeit
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 Cf. SZ (S) 53ff., 180
16 Cf. Ibid. & Ruin (2008) 277f., 283
17 Cf. Ibid., LH passim & VWG (EG) 135 et infra.
problems of Heidegger’s *Kantdeutung* since Heidegger tells us there that Kant’s transcendental philosophy is *a fortiori* philosophy of transcendence.¹⁹

The last guideline is perhaps the most prominent in the literature. Its biggest names are scholars such as Dahlstrom, Malpas, Crowell and Blattner.²⁰ There are significant differences between them, so that, for instance Dahlstrom’s work is infinitely more subtle and sensitive to the matter than Blattner’s. But this approach does not generally arise directly from a concern for transcendence. Instead, the task is to make Heidegger intelligible – both historically and ‘in himself’ – by reflecting his project off of those historical philosophies which are called ‘transcendental.’²¹ Accordingly, in its most genuine form, this approach to Heidegger is simply a matter of understanding the historical meaning of Heidegger’s thought.²²

In these approaches, transcendence tends to be mostly subordinated to elucidating Heidegger on the basis of historical concepts of the transcendental. Accordingly, transcendence becomes a supernumerary problem.²³ This approach to Heidegger may gain its warrant from the sense in which human existence enters the centre of the picture for Heidegger, the sense in which he speaks of ‘the possibility of’ and the ‘conditions of possibility for’ and perhaps from the systematic character of his endeavour in these respects.²⁴ Then of course there are the historiographical facts; Heidegger develops under Rickert and Husserl, and similarly, in the late 20s Kant enters the centre of his work.²⁵ Kant, Husserl and Heidegger (at least in the late 20s) are all in their own words – and of course, *in their own way of saying this* – ‘transcendental philosophers.’²⁶

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¹⁹ KPM (T) 71, 74/., 93, 132, 138 etc.
²¹ Cf. *Ibid*.
²² Which is, for example a primary goal of Dahlstrom (2005b)
²³ If the ‘the transcendental’ says the central thing, and transcendence is to be yoked to the former, then the latter is *eo ipso* a supernumerary problem.
²⁴ Esp. *SZ* *passim*.
²⁵ For an in depth analysis of Rickert’s place within Heidegger’s development cf. Farin (2009)
Formulated in Kantian terminology, this transcendental interpretation of Heidegger is all well and good as ‘analytic’ (after all, everything in the previous paragraph is true), but it nonetheless falls down as ‘dialectic.’ That is, when it wants to make something of its discovery it comes into trouble.27 This ‘trouble’ becomes especially pressing whenever an exegetical appropriation of the ‘a fortiori’ between transcendental philosophy and transcendence is attempted.28 Speaking in fundamental ontological terms (thus in no way yoked to an alternative ‘architectonic’) Heidegger says that the ‘transcendental’ is that which “owes its inner possibility to transcendence.”29 But the specifically ‘transcendental’ reading of Heidegger wants it precisely the other way around! It wants to say that transcendence owes its inner possibility to the transcendental, because it wants the ‘transcendental’ to be that to which, and in accordance with which everything is to be traced back (thus, inner possibility as such). It wants to win the transcendental so that it can win it as the ‘condition of possibility.’30 For this reason, the transcendental reading of Heidegger, insofar as it comes up against transcendence, has to struggle with the sense in which its whole orientation amounts to an inversion of what Heidegger had to say.31

Thus, as this approach gains more ground, its central difficulty starts to chafe. And so, in response to this difficulty Chad Engelland has recently published an article called Disentangling Heidegger’s Transcendental Questions.32 There he works through a large proportion of the problems which occupy this thesis. There, transcendence and transcendental

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27 The Kantian transcendental is given operative priority in the (immediately) following argument. For an example of the difficulty in formulating a relation between Heidegger and Husserl’s transcendental cf. Crowell (1990). Part of the difficulty here is that, in important respects, the Cartesian element is so ‘supercharged’ in Husserl (above all in the Cartesian Meditations) and yet that element is so anathema to Heidegger. In this way, the phenomenon of Husserl’s transcendental becomes foreign to Heidegger even if at a certain structural level one may connect the two, and in this formality the connection tends, not to be wrong, and yet, all too easily becomes vacuous.

28 Which will be shown in the First Stage of the Founding Analysis.

29 VWG (ER) 41


31 Cf. moreover, BP 323f.

32 Engelland (2012). Here, recognising that these questions are entangled and thus, in need of disentanglement is the crucial first step to posing the question of transcendence.
come together; they become a unified question. Yet another difficulty persists here. First and foremost this difficulty is the sense in which transcendence resists thought, in which it is continually a more difficult question than can be anticipated. This resistance shows itself when Engelland defines the transcendence of Dasein as Dasein’s understanding of otherness. This in turn is supposed to be an alternative to the epistemological subject-object problem. But the question remains: doesn’t such an approach merely re-formulate the exact same problem (albeit without appropriating an ontological commitment to substance metaphysics)? And if this commitment to substance metaphysics is, or appears to be broken where does the necessity and import of the problem of otherness come from? And what, in any case does ‘otherness’ mean? And how could it possibly form the basis of a fundamental ontological analysis of Dasein? After all, we are here talking about the being for whom knowledge is a founded mode, and whose being-in is a Sein-bei qua familiar being-in-the-world.

The closest we get to an answer to these questions is Engelland’s consistent identification of transcendence with the problem of beings which I myself am not. In terms of what Heidegger said about transcendence this is not entirely without merit, since, it is true that for Heidegger transcendence is connected with the discovery of innerworldly beings and of the others. But transcendence is not only connected with the openness of other beings. Heidegger is so far from understanding transcendence specifically as a question of other beings that he also speaks of it as the condition of possibility for the possibility of being a self at all and this means that transcendence is equally the possibility of non-otherness, of

34 Which first occurs at Engelland (2012) 84, and has become the thematic definition by Ibid. 85f. and continues to be so thereafter.
35 Ibid.
36 SZ §§12-13 et passim
37 Engelland (2012) passim
38 Cf. Engelland’s quotations of Heidegger in Engelland (2012) passim
But this would seem to indicate that transcendence precedes the distinction between ‘self’ and ‘other.’

Aside from transcendence formulated by Heidegger as a Kantian problem (which is a murky business in principle) the clearest textual warrant for Engelland’s formulation of transcendence as otherness comes from Being and Time where Heidegger says that something like otherness must be traced back to transcendence; that transcendence makes otherness possible. As an attestation this remains unsatisfactory so far as the origin does not need to ‘exist’ in the same way as its ‘result’; that something makes something else possible does not immediately yoke the former to the latter’s horizon nor does it imply an equivalence between the two. Above all – and here the very real difficulty of understanding what Heidegger means by transcendence comes to the fore – it remains unclear what transcendence means when Engelland places Heidegger’s primary formal indication for transcendence from Vom Wesen des Grundes (transcendence means surpassing beings as a totality) side by side with his understanding of transcendence as a question of the understanding of otherness. They stand together in the one sentence, but the possibility of any intrinsic connection between the two remains shrouded in mystery (especially, given that Dasein is a being and thus belongs to ‘beings as a whole’). Thus whilst Engelland’s article discusses by far the greater proportion of issues which arise in this thesis (many more than those just discussed), his grounding orientation nonetheless differs quite essentially from that of this thesis.

Transcendence primarily comes up in the literature because it is connected with something else. Thus, some literature on Heidegger still wants to understand transcendence as a question of the transcendence of intentionality to its ‘transcendent’ object. To be sure, one protests, this is not to be understood in a Cartesian way because, for instance, this transcendence is not

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39 E.g. MFL 182, VWG (ER) 38ff.
40 Moreover, ‘self and other’ is itself not a phenomenologically fundamental distinction as per SZ I.1.iv, I.2.v & §64
41 Engelland (2012) 84-86
42 E.g. Engelland (2012) 85, 88 & VWG (ER) 36ff. etc.
43 Cf. Ibid.
intermittent, it is instead, constant. This focus on intentionality is continued with greater subtlety by other readings which attempt a kind of *rapprochement* between Heidegger and Husserl or a Husserlian/quasi-Husserlian reading of Heidegger. These can gain some warrant from *History of the Concept of Time* and from certain passages in *Being and Time* and *the Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. Yet really, as will be shown, *History of the Concept of Time* does not yet orient itself towards the understanding of transcendence which occupied Heidegger during those heady years after *Being and Time*. It uses the same word but not the same meaning. The warrant for the intentional reading of transcendence to be gained from *Being and Time* speaks only of tracing intentionality back to transcendence: of grounding the former in the latter. Whilst, the warrant provided by *the Basic Problems of Phenomenology* is far more ambiguous than it at first appears when its context is considered. What is far less ambiguous however is Heidegger’s *repeated and categorical denial* that transcendence is to be understood as a matter of intentionality.

Similarly, Heidegger repeatedly connects transcendence with the problem of the understanding of being. In *the Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, transcendence leads forthwith to Temporalität. In *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, transcendence is synonymous with ‘ontological knowledge.’ Thus, one solves the problem of transcendence by identifying it with the ‘specific difference,’ so to speak, between temporality and

45 E.g. Kelly (1994) 1f.
47 HCT §5 et seq., SZ (S/S) 363 *infra*, BP §9b
48 *Ibid.*, on the reading this as binding the two cf. VWG (D) 133 *et infra*.
49 Cf. Second Stage of the Founding Analysis
51 BP 300, 302, 323, also e.g. MFL 16, 88, 135f., 141, 148, 153, VWG (ER) §§1 & 3, PIK 226 etc.
52 BP §§20b-21. Throughout, rather than, using capitalisation to distinguish Temporalität and temporality, or calling *Zeitlichkeit* ‘timeliness’ and Temporalität ‘temporality’ I will use Temporalität for the abstract noun and ‘temporale’ (the root ‘with-determining-article’ form of the German adjective associated with Temporalität) for the adjectival form of this term. This approach is justified to the extent that it is clearly visible (whereas, for instance, one all too easily ‘misses’ the difference between ‘temporality’ and ‘Temporality’) and because the German and English are in each case relatively homophonous (viz. temporality and Temporalität, temporal and temporale). This seems to me the simplest solution to the problem of how one ought to render these terms in English language Heidegger scholarship. Moreover, these two words are herein treated as ‘loan words’. Accordingly, whereas other foreign language terms (except for Greek) will be italicised, Temporalität and temporale, like Dasein, will not be automatically italicised.
53 KPM *passim*
Temporalität, or else, by understanding transcendence from the problematic of the Kantdeutung.

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger says that ‘being is the *transcendens* pure and simple’\(^{54}\) and later writes in *the Letter on 'Humanism'*:

> But whether the definition of being as the *transcendens* pure and simple really does name the simple essence of the truth of being – this and this alone is the primary question for a thinking that attempts to think the truth of being.\(^{55}\)

If one understands by this that the ontic-ontological distinction needs to be thought in its unity, then we do not have to look that far afield for the thinking which finds this identification problematic. Already in 1928, *in the heart of the question of transcendence*, Heidegger says that being and beings belong together in the sense that the “ontological difference is one!”\(^{56}\) And more properly, especially in *Vom Wesen des Grundes*, we find that transcendence is ‘the ground of the ontological difference’\(^{57}\) in such a way that transcendence concerns not only original ontological truth, but also ontic truth.\(^{58}\)

The determination of being as the *transcendens* ‘just’ says that being is not a being; that being ‘transcends’ the ontic. The formulation ‘being is the *transcendens*’ simply states being’s difference from beings; it states the ontological difference. It does so in the *Introduction* to *Being and Time*. There, Heidegger must use what limited resources he has available to him to open his question. And so, when the marginal note appended to the above passage from *Being and Time* warns “of course not *transcendens* – despite every metaphysical resonance – scholastic and Greek-Platonic κοινόν…”\(^{59}\) this is not a free floating warning. Rather, it refers

\(^{54}\) SZ (S/S) 38
\(^{55}\) LH 257
\(^{56}\) MFL 157 cf. also VWG (ER) 26f. & BP 327
\(^{57}\) VWG (ER) 28f., cf. also MFL 152f., etc. – but what is ground? This is precisely the question of VWG and will be discussed in the Founded Analysis.
\(^{58}\) *Ibid.*, VWG (ER) 18ff. (and not merely, because Heidegger also speaks of ‘ontic transcendence’ which is another problem entirely)
\(^{59}\) SZ (S/S) 38 *infra*
to the fact that this ‘transcendens’ has been determined in the preceding analysis along the
guideline of the ‘transcendentals’ of scholastic philosophy, namely, those determinations of
the beingness of beings which surpass (transcend) even the categories in universality and
power (they are that which is ‘common’ to all beings as beings).\(^{60}\) This guideline gives us
being as the transcendens, the marginal note warns us not to over-interpret the significance of
that origin. For the same reason, Heidegger immediately also speaks of “the transcendence of
the being of Dasein.”\(^{61}\) That is, Heidegger does this because such a formulation is not
possible within the horizon of the scholastic transcendentia (the transcendentals) since the
latter experiences this ‘transcendens’ solely as a possibility of metaphysica generalis.\(^{62}\)

The determination of being as the transcendens makes being preliminarily visible as a
question and phenomenon. The statement “being is the transcendens pure and simple”
borrows the terminology of scholasticism. It is not immediately certain that this transcendens
thereby becomes terminology of Being and Time. With respect to the question of the
transcendence of Dasein – which is of course connected with the question of being – one
should not immediately seize on this connection in order to build from there; in the 20s at
least, one does not simply leap in to the question of being. Instead, one must develop the
phenomenon itself in order to first win the grounded capacity to pass judgement on the
matter.

Nonetheless, these connections, broadly put, lead to a common interpretation of
transcendence which says that ‘transcendence transcends towards being’ or something

\(^{60}\) Cf. SZ (S/S) 3, 14, Gracia (1992), BP189f., a brief look at Ibid. indicates quite clearly that there are many
interesting and important questions attached to the problem of these transcendentals and their place in the history
of philosophy. However, they are not immediately relevant to the present thesis and so must be passed over here.

\(^{61}\) SZ (S/S) 38 (italics added) Thus, this phrase does not simply speak of the ‘transcendence of Dasein,’ and not
only because Heidegger here inserts ‘the being of,’ but also because of the context which, as discussed above, is
yoked to the scholastic problem. Thus, this phrase (‘the being of’) has the dual function of disrupting the
scholastic horizon of metaphysica generalis and of emphasising the ontological difference with respect to the
problem Dasein itself (and thereby the articulatedness of being). More generally, Dahlstrom (2005b) 34f., 52 is
right that the grammar of this phrase is troublesome. In the above it is hoped that elucidating the context of the
expression shows that the context is powerful enough to determine the phrase’s meaning.

\(^{62}\) Cf. Gracia (1992) read with respect to the above problems. This yoke is, in effect, the condition of possibility
for the fact that the transcendentals are transcendentals rather than categories etc.
similar. If, as indicated above, transcendence and transcendentality essentially belong together, then the title of SZ I – with its talk of a ‘transcendental horizon’ – might be taken as proof of such a simple relation between transcendence and being. This occurs in Engelland’s interpretation of the connection between the *transcendens schlechthin* and the ‘transcendental horizon.’ One then identifies SZ I with the basic *answer* to the question of the meaning of being. That Heidegger calls *the Basic Problems of Phenomenology* a ‘new elaboration of Time and Being’ and that it discusses Temporalität (which we easily understand to provide such an ‘answer’) would seem to further secure this inference.

Yet such quick and unmediated identifications of transcendence with being must take note that, when discussing the title to SZ I, Heidegger italicises the word ‘question’; it is the ‘transcendental horizon’ for the *question* about being. Similarly, we find that SZ II.1 was to discuss Kant’s schematism as a ‘preliminary stage of a problem of Temporalität.’ Taken together this already indicates that the historical problem is really nothing more than the first irruption of the ‘γιγαντομαχία περὶ τῆς οὐσίας,’ the ‘battle of giants concerning being.’ The transcendental horizon – which must be understood to ‘owe its inner possibility to transcendence’ – is nothing more than the secured form for the *question* of being. Its function is to let the confrontation concerning being come to pass. And so, there is a reason why Heidegger says in the introduction to *Being and Time* that the “question of being attains true concreteness only when we carry out the destruction of the ontological tradition.”

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64 Engelland (2012) 89-95, cf. also SZ (D) 38
65 Engelland (2012) 80f., 89-95
66 BP 1 *infra* & §§21-22
67 Cf. VWG (ER) 97 *infra*
68 SZ (S/S) 40
69 SZ (S/S) 2
70 SZ (S/S) 26
Introduction

problem with transcendental philosophy is that it is inextricably ahistorical – whereas, according to the above, it is more properly the intrinsic possibility for a truly historical question of being.\(^{71}\)

This is already indicated on the final page of *Being and Time* when Heidegger says:

> The conflict with respect to the interpretation of being cannot be settled because it has not yet even been kindled. In the end, one cannot just “rush into” this conflict; rather, igniting this conflict already requires a preparation. It cannot be “jumped into,” but the beginning of the strife already needs preparation. This investigation is solely underway to that.\(^{72}\)

It is solely underway towards kindling the *Auseinandersetzung* with respect to being, and this in terms of its history – it precisely does not stand at the precipice of the answer, of the simple, straightforward answer to the question. At best – and this is all that \(\text{SZ I.2}\) hopes for – it stands at the precipice for the formulation of the (intrinsically historical) question. Heidegger does not jump into the fire (he can’t, there is, as yet no fire), he gathers the firewood (and perhaps a few matches), he does not claim to have solved everything, he claims only that he has hopefully made the question about the question possible. Accordingly, the next step is to concretely and above all patiently make the question itself possible. And so, even if one accepts something like the formula ‘Dasein’s transcendence towards the world and the transcendens of being are the same,’ it would be phenomenologically more grounded and appropriate to follow the problem of the phenomenon of world as far as it goes, so as to avoid posing a phenomenologically rootless question of being in connection with an opaque understanding of the *phenomenon* of transcendence.\(^{73}\) After all, if a rootless question of being were acceptable then the published portion of *Being and Time* would be unnecessary.

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\(^{71}\) Engelland (2012) 92, 94-96

\(^{72}\) \(\text{SZ (S/S) 437}\)

\(^{73}\) Engelland (2012) is able to gain guidance from the later philosophy in order to ameliorate this difficulty. However, so far as his analysis still has to strike up roots in the 20s, and indeed, has to refer itself to how Heidegger attempted to win the question in the 20s (i.e. to win such roots) the project of questioning outlined above remains unavoidable.
The difficulty throughout is that one wants to take a \textit{shortcut} to the problem of transcendence. We know what intentionality is, transcendence is connected with intentionality, let us move through there. We understand Kant, Kant is connected with transcendence and the transcendental, let us pose the question by that means. Transcendence is connected through Temporalität to being, let us put transcendence in circulation alongside Temporalität – here one even takes a shortcut to transcendence through a question which is (or should be) even more difficult! Alternatively, one takes a ‘reproductive shortcut’ to transcendence, for instance, one reproduces the main steps of \textit{the Metaphysical Foundations of Logic} (transcendence as \textit{transcendere}, transcendence is neither \textit{idéa} nor getting outside subjectivity, transcendence is not intentionality, transcendence and world, transcendence and freedom etc.).\footnote{Cf. MFL \textit{passim}} But \textit{the Metaphysical Foundations} is still heady, incomplete and not fit to be abused in this way.

Fundamental ontological transcendence is the transcendence of Dasein. Over and over again it is connected with \textit{world}. In \textit{Vom Wesen des Grundes}, which eschews the \textit{temporale} question, the central meaning of transcendence is world and thereby being-in-the-world.\footnote{VWG (ER) \textit{passim} esp. 108f. infra} This connection is essential and occurs over and over when transcendence is posed as a fundamental ontological question. But if we understand transcendence as intentionality or comportment, the essential connection between transcendence and world remains in the dark. At best we get a circuitous connection, for instance ‘world is that which ‘surrounds’ comportment.’ But this is no better than defining world as the totality of innerworldly beings – it commits basically the same fallacy. Equally, as this thesis will show, Heidegger is quite forceful and explicit in saying that this is not what he means by transcendence. Similarly if we understand transcendence as the understanding-of-being \textit{simpliciter} – for instance, as categorial intuition – the connection with world is again in the dark (it could not be

\footnote{Cf. MFL \textit{passim}}\footnote{VWG (ER) \textit{passim} esp. 108f. infra}
Introduction

otherwise), and especially so when one starts to formulate this as the ‘objectness of the object.’

Shortcuts then number amongst the greatest obstacles to the question of transcendence. One quickly takes a shortcut, but then one inevitably has to fix the mess one has gotten oneself into by some circuitous route. Everything now falls into shambles, and one has little hope but to merely state what one cannot state, e.g., transcendence is intentionality, and also… transcendence is world. One places side by side two incompatible statements and either passes the incompatibility over completely, or attempts to repair the damage as best one can (which is to say, incompletely).

This thesis then wants to take no shortcuts. But only in this way can it be direct. Indeed, we may already formulate the following apparent paradox; the fewer shortcuts one takes in the question of transcendence, the more direct that questioning becomes. Taking shortcuts in the question of transcendence leads only to getting lost.

 Transcendence is a question of world. There are no two ways about it – indeed it will even be shown that transcendence is world. But transcendence is also a question of fundamental ontology in general. Indeed, the whole of SZ I.1-2 is nothing more than a ‘concrete revealing project of transcendence.’ Thus, if we want to know about transcendence, we must get a

76 The latter of which occurs in Malpas (2006) 166-167 & Malpas (2007) 127 precisely because Malpas’ account lacks a thematic distinction between transcendence in the Kantdeutung (which whilst ‘violent’ is nonetheless subject to the rules of the interpreted texts as per, BP 127f. for example) and transcendence elsewhere. Accordingly, Malpas’ reference to PR 78 is not sufficient grounds for the above (which is also visible from PR 76ff.)
78 Final Stage of the Founding Analysis
79 VWG (ER) 96-97infra
grip on the proper realm of the problem; on fundamental ontology in general and world in particular. This is the task of Part I.

Part I prepares for the question of transcendence. To the extent that transcendence is revealed in the whole of Being and Time and SZ I.1-2 is there in order to make transcendence visible this thesis cannot bypass fundamental ontology, instead, it must pass through it. Yet, this thesis must preserve an appropriate amount of space for directly posing the question of transcendence, and so, it cannot exhaustively analyse Being and Time. Thus, Part I instead gives an outline for the problem of fundamental ontology – presenting its basic ‘movement’ and structure (§1). This outline is there so that, when particular problems of Being and Time are analysed in the subsequent analysis, their place within the whole is already determined in a preliminary fashion. But since transcendence is a problem of world, the question about transcendence needs a preliminary understanding of world. Thus, the last half of Part I is concerned with world; firstly, with the problem of the surrounding world (§2) and secondly with the problem of the history of the concept of world (§3).

The second part of this thesis is called The Founding Analysis of Transcendence. This title signifies that transcendence is to be grounded through this analysis and that it concerns the problem of this grounding. Firstly, this means disentangling the question; entering the circle in the ‘right way’ (chapters 1-2). Secondly it means, making transcendence thoroughly intelligible and transparent, i.e., setting forth the basic meaning and unity of transcendence (chapter 1-4). Here, Chapter 3 makes the transition into the fundamental question and Chapter 4 exhibits the basic, grounding meaning of transcendence. Finally it also means securing the necessity of a question of transcendence (chapter 4, §4). The latter comes last specifically because the essence of transcendence itself requires considerable labours to preserve and develop appropriately. Once the basic constitution of transcendence has been set forth, its ‘origin’ as a problem may be elucidated without this question becoming an extraneous and ambiguous tangent constantly liable to grievous error.
The third part is called the *Founded Analysis of Transcendence*. This title signifies that it deals with the problems of transcendence on the basis of the Founding Analysis, i.e. on the basis of a secured understanding of the basic meaning of transcendence. It does not mean that it is somehow abounding in grounds in general, but only, that it relies on a grounded concept of transcendence and that its understanding of transcendence remains wholly bound to that ground.

Thus if transcendence is essentially a question of world, but equally belongs to the formulation of the question being and innerworldliness, this is where these questions are to be discussed in earnest. The first step here is to show how and why transcendence, properly understood, means freedom (Part III chapters 1-2). From this, Part III then unfolds into the questions which Heidegger repeatedly says must be thought from, or, with respect to transcendence. In sum these are; historicity (chapters 2-3), selfhood (chapter 2), innerworldliness and being (chapter 3). The meaning of these indicated connections remains fundamentally opaque so long as transcendence is not first cleared and only on the basis of a concrete understanding of transcendence can any interpretation of these indications gain its proper warrant. Since transcendence belongs to a more fundamental stage of the problematic of *Being and Time* than SZ I.1-2, the formulation of these problems with respect to transcendence has no choice but to push them into a more primordial stage of their development than was made explicit in SZ I.1-2.

Nonetheless, this thesis has no pretence of re-writing the destroyed *Time and Being*, nor of saying everything there is to say about these problems. The Founded Analysis pushes into

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80 In the foregoing, no mention was made of those interpretations that render the problem of transcendence as ‘the problem of self-transcendence.’ This is because the expression is both true and false, both elucidatory and obfuscating. Moreover, in those cases where it is used (e.g. Sheehan (1992[1984]) *passim*) it is difficult to discern whether elucidation or obfuscation predominates. The existence of a chapter on selfhood in this text does not indicate that transcendence is to be worked out herein as ‘self-transcendence’ in the sense which the ‘common understanding’ would interpret such an expression. The problem with the expression ‘self-transcendence’ is that it tends to give selfhood a kind of ‘priority’ over transcendence; selfhood is all too easily thought of as ‘reserve’ and transcendence as breaking free of this reserve (and so on). Against such an interpretation cf. ZS 227f. etc.
these problems only so far as transcendence itself provides them with additional intelligibility and grounds them more radically. Since Heidegger connects the above problems with transcendence and transcendence is a fundamental problem of Being and Time, investigations into these problems which ask about them from the perspective of the late 20s must reflect their meaning off of transcendence – but of course, not just any concept, thus the necessity of this thesis. Conversely, transcendence is not the only important question. To this extent the Founded Analysis, as the conclusion to a long and focussed analysis of transcendence, can and must have something important and fundamental to say about them without needing to be completely exhaustive in its analysis. For instance it is not possible to say everything there is to say about temporality here, thus, it is not possible to say everything there is to say about historicity. But it is possible to say something important, genuine and original about historicity – because it will be shown that historicity is also a question of transcendence and vice versa. Similarly, something important can be said about the transcendental question of being, but for the same reason, this cannot be formulated as an exhaustive elaboration of its Temporalität. Accordingly, this thesis discusses transcendence because it is an important question in and of itself. But it also discusses transcendence because the fundamental interrogation of the aforementioned problems and their place within the questioning of the late 20s stands in need of a concrete understanding of transcendence.
PART I

PREPARATORY PRESENTATION OF THE HORIZON FOR THE QUESTION ABOUT TRANSCENDENCE
The introduction outlined the basic problems which one faces in finding the right starting point for the problem of transcendence. It showed that securing the correct starting point is a matter of pivotal concern. As we saw there, Heidegger indicates that *Being and Time* is “nothing more than a concrete, revealing project of transcendence.”\(^1\) Chad Engelland takes this to indicate that SZ I.1-2 is simply an analysis of the ‘transcendence of Dasein’ (with this name mostly held in abeyance), and that this analysis of transcendence was to be followed in SZ I.3 by a transcendental answer to the question of being.\(^2\) On the other hand, take this quote to mean that SZ I.1-2 prepares for the exhibition of the phenomenon of transcendence, where this phenomenon was to underpin the proper formulation of the *question* of being in SZ I.3.\(^3\) But this much is perfectly clear, and on this we both agree; transcendence is a fundamental ontological problem indeed, it is even a very important fundamental ontological question.

If transcendence is indeed an important fundamental ontological problem, then transcendence and the problem of *Being and Time* belong together. Accordingly, if we want to question transcendence *in its ground*, we must grasp it *on the basis* of *Being and Time*. And of course, if, transcendence was something held in abeyance, something sheltered and prepared for by *Being and Time*, this means that the lecture courses – which must be able to mostly stand on their own – present only a pale shadow of the complete phenomenon and question of transcendence. That is, if, as will be shown, transcendence was to be *concretely named* on the basis of SZ I.1-2 then the *possibility* of transcendence, in its connection with *Being and Time*, is greater than the ‘actuality’ it took in the lecture courses etc.

So now this indicates that the meaning of transcendence must be formulated in relation to *Being and Time*. Conversely, keeping an eye to *Being and Time* will even be useful in

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1. VWG (ER) 96-97 infra (modified)
2. Engelland (2012) 80, 89f.
3. Cf. MFL 135, 167-168 & Kisiel (2005[2001]) 211, VWG (ER) 96f. *infra* (Engelland refers to all three of the just cited passages, but does not note the way in which the first refers to the *unfolding* of transcendence as a question *throughout* SZ; the way in which the second refers to the *difficulty* of the topic of §69 and that this remains central in SZ 1.3; and that the third italicises the word question, cf. Engelland (2012) *passim*
clearing away the possible false paths for the question of transcendence. Through this, the analysis is kept on the straight and narrow road and freed to be dedicated wholly to its task. In sum: by keeping an eye to the fundamental ontological problematic the question of transcendence is deepened and guided.

Given the importance which this thesis places on grounding the problem of transcendence in the fundamental ontological project, one might think it preferable to present a complete and exhaustive preliminary analysis of *Being and Time*. However this would be impractical, indeed, it would even forestall the analysis of transcendence itself. Thus §1 will instead provide a *sketch* of *Being and Time* as a whole. This sketch will be primarily oriented towards the *movement* of *Being and Time*. As a sketch, §1 cannot act as a ‘secure foundation’ for the question of transcendence, indeed, there cannot even be any hope of this sketch fully securing itself at all – to accomplish the latter, this thesis would need to double in size. But the sketch provided by §1 may nonetheless serve as a reference point connecting *particular* problems of *Being and Time* discussed throughout this thesis to the *whole* problematic of *Being and Time*. In turn, §1 presents this thesis’ guiding interpretation of *Being and Time*. By doing so, it provides the reader with some orientation concerning the particular presuppositions of the present work.

On the other hand, Heidegger also says:

A study of the ontological structure of the beings discovered in the surrounding world⁴ – insofar as they are discovered as tools – has one singular advantage for a *preliminary characterization* of the phenomenon of world: it leads over to an analysis of this phenomenon and prepares the way for the transcendental phenomenon of world. As is indicated clearly enough in the outline and arrangement of §§14-25 of *Sein und Zeit*, this is the *sole* intention of the analysis of the surrounding world, which itself, considered in terms of the *guiding aim* of the book, remains subordinate.⁵

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⁴ “…die ontologische Struktur des »umweltlich« Seienden” VWG (ER) 80
⁵ VWG (ER) 80-81 *infra* (modified)
This says various things, for instance, in context it implies an intrinsic connection between the problematic of *Being and Time* and the question of transcendence Heidegger worked on after *Being and Time*. It also clearly indicates that the world is not to be reduced to things, the relevance-contexture etc. Importantly it also says that the problem of transcendence’s world-character cannot treat the analysis of SZ I.1.iii and the phenomenon it develops as the fundamental *measure* of world: we must be able to enact a fundamental modification of our understanding of world *through* the problem of transcendence. *Transcendence is a radicalisation of world*. It *cannot rest* with the surrounding world but this is so only because it *begins* with it. And so, in order to make good on this connection, §2 will present an analysis of the problem of the surrounding world.

Finally, when Heidegger develops the problem of transcendence after *Being and Time* he tends to eschew a radical grounding of transcendence. Instead, he presents a history of the concept of world *in lieu* of such an analysis. If it is possible to *substitute* the history of world for the radical exposition of transcendence then this indicates again all the more strongly that the problem of world stands *at the centre of the problem of transcendence*. It also indicates that this history can serve a preliminary function. Accordingly, §3 presents an analysis of this history.

In sum then the preparatory problem of transcendence includes; the problem of fundamental ontology in general (§1), the surrounding world in particular (§2) and the history of the concept of world (§3).

§1 – Sketch for the Problem of Fundamental Ontology

a) Being, Dasein and the Primacy of Temporality

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6 On this, cf. also other quotes herein & VWG (D) 133 et infra.
7 VWG (ER) §2, MFL §11b, EP §§33-34 (but one may also refer to Heidegger’s forays into Leibniz and Plato at key moments of the problem, as per BP 282ff., 299ff. etc.)
Being and Time dedicates itself wholly to something called ‘fundamental ontology.’ This means that it is an analysis of Dasein, of the openness of the ‘human being,’ which aims to unfold the ‘formal structure of the question of the meaning of being’ and to enter into the γιγαντομαχία concerning being thereby. This was not to proceed by attempting to treat the being of Dasein as one species of the genus ‘being.’ Instead, the task was precisely to analyse Dasein’s understanding of being. Dasein, we are told, is the being whose being it is to be concerned about its own being; this is the central meaning of existence, i.e., the name given to the being of Dasein. If Dasein understands its own being, it must also have an understanding of being ‘in general’ or ‘as such.’ Thus, the task is precisely to work out how one can question this understanding of being in a grounded way.

In the first place this is connected in an essential way to the title of SZ I: ‘The Interpretation of Dasein on the Basis of Temporality and the Explication of Time as the Transcendental Horizon for the Question about the Meaning of Being.’ The first two thirds of this part were published whilst the remainder of Being and Time was either written and destroyed, or, never written at all per se. And so, with respect to the architectonic of Being and Time and the problem of being it is noteworthy that, as Sheehan reports:

On February 13, 1952, exactly 25 years after SZ appeared, Heidegger told the students in his Aristotle seminar at Freiburg that immediately after the printing of SZ he was startled… to realize that while, as regards the issue, being was indeed alluded to and present in In-der-Welt-sein, nonetheless, as regards the formulation, being, as it were, only ‘limped along behind.’

8 L:H&L 301
9 SZ (S/S) 2, 5ff., 436-437
10 Cf. SZ (S/S) 3-4, 6
11 SZ (S/S) 7-8, 12-13 etc.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid. & 436-437
14 SZ (S/S) 39; “Die Interpretation des Daseins auf die Zeitlichkeit und die Explikation der Zeit als des transcendentalen Horizontes der Frage nach dem Sein.” SZ (D) 39
15 Sheehan (1992[1984]) 37
On the other hand it was not long after the publication of SZ I.1-2 that Heidegger, upon being
told by Jaspers that the third division was unintelligible, destroyed his draft to the concluding
division of this ‘transcendental’ horizon of the question of being. It was there, of course, in
SZ I.3, that fundamental ontology would have had to come into its own – though the above
indicates that in Heidegger’s estimation more should have been achieved in SZ I.1-2.

The first part of Being and Time concerns the formulation of the question of being. The
second part concerns the “Destruktion of the history of ontology along the guideline of the
problem of Temporalität.” And so, this means that the question is first formulated in the
first part, and, once formulated it was to be posed in a dialogue with the history of philosophy
(the γιγαντομαχία).

The first division is divided according to:

1. A preparatory analysis of Dasein,
2. The exposition of ‘Dasein and Temporality’
3. Time and Being; the reversal of the previous analysis; the radical interpretation of
temporality as the ground of the above and the “turning around into the source.”

In itself this already indicates that the whole of fundamental ontology is to be brought under
the power of time; its constitutive moments are to be given a temporal interpretation. Thus, it
is a fundamental precept of fundamental ontology that being is understood according to
time. This was to be formulated in the temporale interpretation of being. Similarly, all of
the key phenomena of fundamental ontology gain a temporal interpretation. For instance, in

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17 Cf. Ibid.
18 Cf. here, VWG (ER) 96-97
19 SZ (S/S) 39: “Grundzüge einer phänomenologischen Destruktion der Geschichte der Ontologie am Leitfaden
der Problematik der Temporalität.” SZ (D) 39
20 Cf. SZ (S/S) 26, on the γιγαντομαχία and its importance cf. SZ (S/S) 2, 5ff., 436-437 & KPM §44
21 SZ (S/S) 39 et infra. That one may understand ‘Dasein and Temporality’ to mean ‘Dasein as temporality’ cf.
KPM (T/D) 167f. / 239
22 SZ (S/S) 17-18, 147 BP 1 infra, §20 et seq., MFL 141ff., LQT 164f., KPM (T) xvii, §§44-45 etc.
23 Ibid.
§69c, world is given a temporal interpretation (something which is *not insignificant* given the title of SZ I). The phenomena of ‘being-in’ are given a temporal interpretation. Care is given a temporal interpretation and, indeed, the development of *authentic care* itself is that which first breaks open the proper meaning of temporality. Finally, dealings and intuition are given a temporal interpretation. Understood correctly, this only says what Heidegger says throughout the SZ I.2; *Dasein is to be understood as temporality in the ground of its being.* And thus it says that:

The meaning of being [Sein] of that being [Seienden] we call Dasein will prove to be *temporality*. In order to demonstrate this we must repeat our interpretation of those structures of Dasein that shall [in SZ I.1] have been indicated in a preliminary way – this time as modes of temporality [namely, in SZ I.2]. While it is true that with this interpretation of Dasein as temporality the answer to the guiding question about the meaning of being in general is not already given, the soil from which we may reap it will nevertheless be prepared.

Here, a temporal interpretation does not mean an interpretation of the sequentiality of… nor does it properly mean the élan of… Rather, it means an interpretation which shows how that which is questioned stands with respect to the threefold structure of Dasein’s temporality; what we commonly (and in a ‘vulgar’ way according to the Heideggerian understanding) know as the past, present and future. Here, the ‘elements’ of this threefold structure are named ‘ecstasies’ where “temporality ‘is’ not a being at all. It is not, but rather temporalizes itself.” The latter is particularly significant precisely because the usual and persistently dominant concept of time understands time as a being. This happens when we understand

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24 SZ (S/S) §69  
25 SZ (S/S) §68  
26 SZ (S) §65 (esp. pp 326ff.)  
27 SZ (S/S) 363 *et infra*, §§69a, 79-80  
28 SZ I.2 *passim*  
29 SZ (S/S) 17, on the rightness of the above glosses cf. SZ (S/S) 16ff.  
30 SZ (S/S) *passim*, MFL 207  
31 SZ (S/S) 326ff.  
32 SZ (S) 328 & ff.  
33 BP 271f.
time as being rooted in the ‘now’ which, after all, is something like pure presence, and thus, a being.\textsuperscript{34}

In order to be brief in this preliminary exposition, rather than dwelling on this problem, this thesis will instead work through the \textit{movement} of \textit{Being and Time}. If temporality truly has the importance it has just been said to have, then the analysis of this movement is at the same time the development of the problem of temporality and exhibition of its proper meaning (which was only alluded to above).\textsuperscript{35}

\textbf{b) The Movement of \textit{Being and Time}}

\textbf{a – The first division}

The point at which \textit{Being and Time} ceases to, as it were, concern itself as a whole and instead becomes the becoming of this whole is SZ I.1.ii.\textsuperscript{36} Here we concretely meet with the determination of Dasein as being-in-the-world.\textsuperscript{37} This structure is a \textit{unitary} structure and cannot be broken apart into ‘atoms.’\textsuperscript{38} But taken by itself, that ‘being-in-the-world is a unitary structure’ is only an assertion. It is only made concrete – it is only given justification and above all a meaning – when being-in-the-world is \textit{articulated} according to its structure \textit{and} its unity... that is, when its unity is \textit{exhibited}. Thus, Heidegger begins by articulating the structure of being-in-the-world. In its articulated character this means that there is ‘something’ called ‘world’ to which a ‘being’ corresponds in the mode of ‘being-in.’\textsuperscript{39} With this, the whole text has gotten underway, and in accordance with this directive, SZ I.1.iii

\textsuperscript{34} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{35} Cf. the similar procedure taken by Heidegger in CTD Ch. 2-4, cf. esp. pp 47f.
\textsuperscript{36} That the preceding part of SZ (during which Heidegger’s analysis concerns the problem of SZ as a whole) still has its own inner drive or tendency towards movement and that this may be profitably worked through cf. Vassilacopoulos (2008)
\textsuperscript{37} First hinted at SZ (S/S) 13, now concretely encountered as a problem at SZ (S/S) 53ff.
\textsuperscript{38} SZ (S/S) 53
\textsuperscript{39} SZ (S/S) 53ff.
Preparatory Analysis

concerns world, SZ I.1.iv concerns the ‘being’ which is as being-in-the-world and SZ I.1.v concerns the latter’s mode of being-in.\footnote{On the connection cf. \textit{Ibid.}}

So the next step is the analysis of world. The central core of SZ I.1.iii is the analysis of the surrounding world (\textit{Umwelt}), but it also includes a critical analysis of the Cartesian doctrine of world (\textit{res extensa}) and a subsequent existential analysis of spatiality.\footnote{SZ I.1.iii} The analysis of the surrounding world attempts to show the way in which dealings are constituted in a worldly way.\footnote{SZ (S/S) 66ff., 85} This will be discussed in §2. In the meantime the fundamental concepts of the world-problem should be preliminary defined and differentiated. With respect to the problem of transcendence the proper grasp of their difference is of the highest importance.

Firstly, there are three main concepts of world.\footnote{There is also a fourth which however serves little to no function cf. SZ (S/S) 64f. \textit{et passim.}} The first is the existentiell concept of world. This is “\textit{in which}” factual Dasein “lives.”\footnote{SZ (S/S) 65} Existentiell concepts are ontic determinations of Dasein.\footnote{SZ (S/S) 12f.} Categorial concepts concern beings unlike Dasein.\footnote{SZ (S/S) 44} As an existentiell concept, the above concept of world is precisely not categorial, and thus, the factual in-which of Dasein is nothing like the totality of things. Such a concept of world as the latter is called the “world,” that is, world is placed in quotation marks to signify this sense of world.\footnote{SZ (S/S) 64-65} “World” means the “totality of beings” insofar as they “can be objectively present within the world.”\footnote{SZ (S/S) 64} Thus, it is not simply the totality of whatsoever \textit{is} discovered as objectively present, but the totality of what \textit{can} be so discovered. That which is ‘handy’ \textit{can} also be discovered as objectively present.\footnote{Cf. SZ (S) 73ff.} “World” is another name for the totality of beings which, as we will see, transcendence transcends as a whole. Finally, the third use of world
Part I

refers to the *existential* concept of world. This, Heidegger calls *worldliness*. Worldliness is the *ontological* concept corresponding to the *existentiell* concept (and none other).

Secondly, Dasein is being-in-the-world and this is opposed to the innerworldly. In *both* cases these terms indicates that the named beings are discovered or disclosed *from* the world. Yet, whereas beings other than Dasein are discovered only as *innerworldly*, as ‘within the world’, Dasein’s mode of being ‘in’ world is of another type, and so there accrues to it a *more radical* problem of the ‘in.’ In outline, that Dasein is being-in-the-world means that Dasein is not contained in the world but *dwell* in a worldly way. Through the elaboration of transcendence we will be able to ever more radically encounter and formulate this phenomenon.

The next step in this threefold analysis is to work out in a preliminary way, the *being* (*das Seiende*) which is in the world *as such*. In SZ I.1.iv the analysis is limited to the everyday selfhood of Dasein; to the proximal phenomenon of the Who (i.e. *das Seiende* of being-in-the-world). Yet, it is worthy of note that this analysis does not proceed by ruminating on one’s individuality. Rather, its phenomenological basis is precisely *being-with*. This will be taken up by the second chapter of the Founded Analysis. On the basis of the phenomenon of being-with, in connection with that of *distantiality* (*Abständigkeit*), the analysis comes to the conclusion that Dasein is ‘the they’ (*das Man*). All the more that Dasein ontically distinguishes itself from the others, compares itself with the others etc., ontologically it is the they-self; in a certain sense it *is* the others. Proximal selfhood measures itself against the others in one way or another, and so, in a certain sense *is* precisely this measuring.

50 SZ (S/S) 65
51 Ibid.
52 SZ (S/S) 65, 72, 76, 85 et passim.
53 Ibid. & passim
54 SZ (S/S) 54f.
55 Cf. SZ I.1.iv (esp. §27) vs. §64 & I.2.v
56 SZ (S/S) §26
57 SZ (S/S) §27
58 Ibid.
59 Cf. Ibid.
Next Heidegger considers the problem of being-in, which he also names the structure of disclosedness. Disclosure (Erschliessen) means the revealing of Dasein as opposed to the opening up of beings unlike Dasein which is called discovery (Entdeckung). Here, the temporal problem begins to flourish – which, of course, does not mean that it has become explicit or even that it can be explicitly posed at this point of Being and Time. Proximally – which is the only horizon so far properly under consideration – Dasein is being-in as understanding, attuned, discursive falling. Structurally speaking, “attunement always has its understanding… Understanding is always attuned” and so on for all of the other existentials of being-in. That each mode of being-in is always characterised by each of the others points to the central unity upon which each are grounded; the unity of temporality. Similarly, each particular existential is rooted in a special way in the ecstatic structure of temporality.

Thus, ‘understanding’ is futurity held in abeyance. Understanding does not first mean ‘grasping’, ‘comprehending.’ Proximally it means ‘know how’ but more primordially, understanding refers to the primal making-it-for-the-sake-of which Dasein gives to itself insofar as it is. Confusion and comprehension are equally modes of understanding; of making disclosure an issue, of bringing disclosedness into its being an issue.

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60 SZ (S) 132f. §68
61 SZ (S) 85, In accordance with this however (despite SZ (S, D) 69, 73 which, in any case, occurs before the terminological fixation of the distinction) discoveredness is almost always ontical, precisely because the “ontic distinction of Dasein lies in the fact that it is ontological.” SZ (S/S) 12 That is, because “being not (not beings) is dependent on the understanding of being.” SZ (S) 212, and so, the opening up of being, ontological truth, is primarily associated with disclosure (SZ (S) 147; ‘the disclosedness of being in general’ is possible as a terminologically consistent statement only given the above).
62 Whereas, technically, it is true that authenticity has already become an issue at this point, cf. SZ §45 & I.2.i-iii that it hasn’t yet properly become an issue.
63 SZ (S) 142
64 Cf. SZ I.1.v
65 Cf. SZ (S/S) 346, 349f.
66 SZ §68
67 Cf. SZ §§38, 68a
68 Cf. SZ (S) 143
69 Ibid. & cf. Dahlstrom (2001) 303f., 338 (of course, cf. also Ibid. 430f.)
70 Cf. SZ (S) 143f. cf. also Third Stage of the Founding Analysis
But Dasein’s disclosure has already been ‘decided’ for it in some way. Understanding includes a prior ‘decision’; prior, that is, to anything like ontical volition. This is what Heidegger discusses under the topic of attunement (*Befindlichkeit*) or ‘mood’ (*Stimmung*).\(^{71}\) In fear, for instance, possibilities have already made themselves known in a definite way, namely, as threatening.\(^{72}\) This, already-character of ‘mood’ is made visible by the origin for the word *ennui*. Etymologically, ennui is a contraction of the Latin phrase ‘mihi in odio est’, which, basically means; for me, all is in hate; I’m just sick of everything. Usually by ‘mood’ we only mean ‘how one feels.’ Accordingly, moods “are taken as fleeting experiences that “color” one’s whole “psychical condition.””\(^{73}\) But mood in the original sense, in the sense which pervades being-in as such – and only this sense does so – is a way in which the possibilities and the character of disclosure has already been determined.\(^{74}\) Ennui does not mean ‘that which I feel qua the colour of my I-ness’, rather it means; all things are in hatred for me, and that disclosure (and with this, in a limited way, discovery) has been ‘destined’\(^{75}\) – ‘sent’ beforehand – in accordance with the ennui. The only way in which this ‘destining’ is overcome is in a change of mood, i.e., in a ‘counter-destining.’\(^{76}\)

Another ‘mood’ in which this is eminently clear is the phenomenon of *panic*. Panic is not so much a ‘quality’ which ‘consciousness’ has for itself, as it is something which guides and determines my being-in-the-world.\(^{77}\) My comportment and my disclosure of the world is determined by panic. At the simplest level, one who is ‘in a panic’ comports themselves differently and reacts to events differently to one who is not; but Dasein is always attuned, in one way or another, and so this attunement is always constitutive of disclosure and comportment in one way or another.\(^{78}\)

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\(^{71}\) *SZ (S, D)* 134-137  
\(^{72}\) *SZ (S)* 141  
\(^{73}\) *SZ (S)* 340  
\(^{74}\) Cf. above & *SZ §68b*  
\(^{75}\) No reference to the phenomenon of the historicity of being-with is intended here, only the connection, in the relevant German word with ‘sending’ and the sense in which this connotation is partially preserved in the English. Subsequently however, ‘destiny’ will indeed be used to refer to the *Geschick* of Dasein.  
\(^{76}\) Cf. *SZ (S)* 36  
\(^{77}\) On this Cf. *SZ (S)* 341-342  
\(^{78}\) *SZ (S)* §29, e.g. p 134
Attunement is the ‘having-been’ of being-in.79 ‘Having-been,’ which here translates the German past participle of sein, is Heidegger’s primary formal indication for the ‘past tense’ of Dasein.80 This ‘tense’ is usually marked by Heidegger with words such as ‘already’ rather than ‘was.’81

In the final part of SZ I.1.v, Heidegger is concerned with discourse and fallenness.82 Under discourse Heidegger means two connected things. Firstly, he means the discursivity of being-in. One may understand by this, the very discursivity of the existential (i.e. being-in is always attunement and understanding etc.) as much as the manifoldness which this structure gives to itself (the discursivity of existentiellity).83 Secondly, he means something like the ‘expressiveness’ of being-in; its addressing itself to beings, its giving voice to itself its letting itself be addressed (hearing) and so on.84 These are marked by the German words Gegliedern and Artikulieren respectively.85 Thus, that being-in is constituted by discourse does not so much mean that Dasein is being-in by ‘talking about’ the world (but includes this as a possibility); it means that being-in is always articulated and brought near… and towards…86

As Heidegger shows later in Being and Time, whereas, for instance, understanding is primarily futural, discourse is temporalised without giving complete priority to any one ‘ecstasy’ of temporality.87 However, enpresenting (Gegenwärtigen) does have a certain primacy in discourse so far as discourse ‘addresses’ itself to…, that is, so far as it is characterised by bringing near in general.88 In the order of SZ I.1.v discourse precedes the

79 SZ §68b  
81 On this, cf. SZ (S) 327-328  
82 SZ §§32-38 (but also with the development of the problems presented by attuned understanding)  
83 SZ (M&R) 161, cf. also Dreyfus (1995[1990]) 215 (on this, cf. SZ (M&R) 153 infra)  
84 SZ (S/S) 161ff. On this, also cf. SZ §§64, 68d  
85 SZ (M&R, S/S, D) 161  
86 Cf. SZ (S) 161, 163f. Also, thus, the ‘hermeneutic as’ SZ §32, 157f. the problem of conscience, SZ (S/S) 272ff. On the problem concerning the relation of discourse to speaking and its priority over speaking cf. SZ (S/S) 32-34, 165 & §33, or SZ (S/S, D) 349  
87 SZ (S/S) 349  
88 SZ (S/S) 349
presenting proper of being-in, namely fallenness, because it allows Heidegger to segue into the problem of inauthentic discourse, of ‘idle talk’ and therefrom into the complete phenomenon of fallenness and indeed, to articulate it temporally (which will be passed over here).\textsuperscript{89} Fallenness means that Dasein is ‘caught up in…’\textsuperscript{90} Bringing near leads to Dasein becoming rapt by…\textsuperscript{91}

Here, the problem of authenticity and inauthenticity becomes more acute. Dasein is either inauthentic, authentic or in an undifferentiated mode.\textsuperscript{92} Dasein is inauthentic when it interprets itself according to what it is not and evades itself.\textsuperscript{93} Dasein is authentic when it more properly interprets itself in terms of its being and holds itself steady against falling back to the rapt self-interpretation of fallenness into the “world” of things and the “tranquilising” of the they.\textsuperscript{94} Dasein is in an undifferentiated mode where the above does not apply, where Dasein is not ‘up to either’, for instance in blank staring into the distance or ‘just getting on with it.’\textsuperscript{95} It is important to note that this problem is in fact one of the most difficult in \textit{Being and Time}. Neither this passage nor this chapter, nor indeed, this thesis pretends to have said everything there is to say on the matter. If this thesis were to attempt such a thing it would never get around to discussing its topic; \textit{transcendence}

Now, on the basis of SZ I.1.v we gain the threefold structure; existence, facticity, falling.\textsuperscript{96} Existence of course, primarily means Dasein itself in its being, but it also refers to the futurity of Dasein (since, as Heidegger emphasises Dasein is primarily futural).\textsuperscript{97} Facticity formally indicates how this Dasein is, and its ‘that it is’; the kind of ‘fact’ which it is in each case.\textsuperscript{98} But on the other hand, it also refers primarily to the ‘thrownness’ or ‘having-been-ness’ of

\begin{footnotes}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{89} Viz. SZ §35-38
\item \textsuperscript{90} Cf. SZ (S/S, D) 178-179
\item \textsuperscript{91} SZ (S/S) 178-180, 189, 346-348 (lostness, averageness and fleeing are also important for the complete formulation of this topic cf. \textit{Ibid.} & 184-186. These topics are passed over for the sake of brevity)
\item \textsuperscript{92} SZ (S/S) 42-43, 53, 232
\item \textsuperscript{93} \textit{Ibid.} & 175ff. 184-186
\item \textsuperscript{94} \textit{Ibid.} & 308ff. etc.
\item \textsuperscript{95} Cf. LQT 342 & SZ (S/S) 43, 232
\item \textsuperscript{96} Cf. SZ (S/S) 181, 191, 316-317 \textit{et infra}, 350
\item \textsuperscript{97} SZ (S/S) 316-317 \textit{et infra}.
\item \textsuperscript{98} Cf. SZ (S/S) 55f.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotes}
Dasein.\textsuperscript{99} Similarly, fallenness can name Dasein’s factical existence as such, yet it can also name precisely its enpresenting, and this, primarily as inauthentic.\textsuperscript{100}

This gives the basic structure of Dasein’s being-in. Thus, with the completion of SZ I.1.v the guiding aim of determining being-in-the-world with respect to its complete structure (world, selfhood, being-in) has been achieved – but only \textit{preliminarily}.\textsuperscript{101} Proximally and for the most part, Dasein is the being (SZ I.1.iv) which exists averagely in the surrounding world (SZ I.1.iii) by discursively understanding, and being attuned in the mode of falling (SZ I.1.v). Formally put, this is the result of the whole analysis up to this point.

But now this being must be grasped in its \textit{structural totality}.\textsuperscript{102} In order to formulate this problem Heidegger turns to the phenomenon of anxiety.\textsuperscript{103} Anxiety serves the function of stripping Dasein away from its illusions, and thus, brings us before \textit{naked being-in-the-world}. It brings us to the sense in which our being is the nothingness of everything which we are proximally caught up in (e.g. I identify myself with ‘my stuff,’ but I am not ‘my stuff’).\textsuperscript{104} This nakedness of Dasein does not bring us back to a pure essence.\textsuperscript{105} But by stripping Dasein of its ‘adornments’ (the innerworldly as horizon for self-interpretation), we first gain the possibility of grasping the basic structure of Dasein aside from the \textit{distraction} and \textit{dispersal} which Dasein proximally and usually gives to itself.\textsuperscript{106} Anxiety does not negate these adornments but only holds Dasein back from interpreting itself in terms of them (i.e. it holds Dasein back from interpreting itself according to ‘what’ it is not).\textsuperscript{107} Through this – and

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{99} SZ (S/S) 179, 192
\item \textsuperscript{100} Cf. SZ (S) 328 (factical existence; futurity which has been)
\item \textsuperscript{101} Cf. SZ (S/S) 180
\item \textsuperscript{102} \textit{Ibid.} & 181
\item \textsuperscript{103} SZ §40
\item \textsuperscript{104} SZ (S/S) §40 (esp. 186-187), 343
\item \textsuperscript{105} Cf. SZ (S/S) 187
\item \textsuperscript{106} SZ (S/S) 186-191
\item \textsuperscript{107} \textit{Ibid.} (esp. 189)
\end{itemize}
on the basis of SZ I.1.iii-v – Heidegger arrives at the phenomenon of care.\textsuperscript{108} Care is the being of Dasein.\textsuperscript{109}

Now, care itself has a threefold structure and this is important because truly, it is only through this threefold structure that Heidegger is able to ascend to the temporal problem. Heidegger says, care means; “being-ahead-of-oneself-already-in (the world) as being-together-with (innerworldly beings encountered).”\textsuperscript{110} In outline, this means that the being-an-issue of Dasein perdures in excess (being-ahead), that this excess includes being factically determined (being already-in) and that it also refers itself to a ‘being amidst’ (being-together-with).\textsuperscript{111} These structures concern Dasein’s futurity, having-been and enpresenting respectively.\textsuperscript{112}

As the structural totality of being-in-the-world the care structure must necessarily give us the structural totality which disclosed itself \textit{in} SZ I.1.iii-v. Thus, for instance, we can easily see a certain homology between the care structure and the structure of being-in. For instance, ‘being-ahead’ is derived from the for-the-sake-of, from Dasein’s being-an-issue for itself, and thus, it belongs together with understanding.\textsuperscript{113} Yet, with respect to the having-been of care, it becomes clearer how the care structure differs from a mere reproduction of being-in. Here, ‘attunement’ has become ‘already being-in.’ This does not mean that already being-in is not attuned, rather, it means that already-being-in includes attunement but that, through the care structure’s higher formality, the having-been of care also includes the ‘already’ pertaining to world itself (more properly put, it indicates the unity of being-in and world). Similarly, ‘falling’ becomes ‘being-together-with (innerworldly beings).’ The latter signifies something which includes the possibility for the ‘movement’ of fallenness yet, on the basis of the

\textsuperscript{108} SZ (S/S) 191 etc.  
\textsuperscript{109} SZ \textit{passim}.  
\textsuperscript{110} SZ (S/S) 192; “Sich-vorweg-schon-sein-in-(der-Welt-) als Sein-bei (innerweltlich begegnendem Seienden)” 
SZ (D) 192  
\textsuperscript{111} SZ (S/S) 191ff.  
\textsuperscript{112} SZ (S/S) 327f. cf. also LQT (E/D) 195-196, 201-202, 338 / 235  
\textsuperscript{113} SZ (S/S, D) 191f.
analysis of anxiety, being-together-with must now include the possibility of a \textit{countermovement} to falling.\textsuperscript{114}

With respect to the broader question of care there are a few additional and important observations. The first is marked in a conversation which Dreyfus records with Heidegger. Dreyfus tells us:

\begin{quote}
In a conversation with Heidegger I pointed out that “care” in English has connotations of love and caring. He responded that was fortunate since with the term “care” he wanted to name the very general fact that “\textit{Sein geht mich an},” roughly, that being gets to me.\textsuperscript{115}
\end{quote}

This indicates – more explicitly and directly than \textit{Being and Time} does – that the meaning of care as whole comes primarily from \textit{being-ahead-of-itself}, that is, from the futurity of care. It also means that here, in care, the guiding determination of Dasein as ‘the being whose being is an issue for itself’ has been formulated more distinctly.\textsuperscript{116} Moreover, this identification of care as a whole with ‘being an issue for oneself,’ makes more explicit the sense in which being-ahead-of-itself is intended to imply the \textit{complete} structure of care. To this extent, it also gives us a preliminary formulation of the priority of futurity in the temporal structure of Dasein.

Through this determination, the two types of comportment which Heidegger has been using throughout the preceding analysis are also more concretely determined. That is, taking care of things (\textit{Besorgen}) and caring for the others (\textit{Fürsorge}) are now to be understood from the sense in which ‘being gets to me.’ That the analysis of selfhood (SZ I.1.iv) has already dissolved the priority of I-hood indicates that the ‘self-concern’ constitutive for the care structure must not be straight away interpreted in an egotistical fashion. The sense in which care factically ‘becomes’ \textit{Besorgen} and \textit{Fürsorge} also indicates this. Similarly, if the care structure does not explicitly speak of \textit{the being} whose being it is to exist as care (namely, the

\textsuperscript{114} Cf. the priority of possibility in SZ §40
\textsuperscript{115} Dreyfus (1995[1990]) 239
\textsuperscript{116} SZ (S, D) 12 etc.
topic of SZ I.1.iv), this is only because the care structure concerns the being of Dasein and not its ontic factuality.

\[\beta \text{ – The second division}\]

It is sometimes wondered why the second division was even needed.\(^{117}\) If the being of Dasein has been won why do we need authentic care? And why do we need a temporal interpretation? Thought from the destination of the second division these questions are almost meaningless, thought from the task of arriving at this destination, the basic answers are;

- We need authentic care because care has not been fully secured in its proper meaning. We must deepen our grasp of it and secure it more essentially and that means, in an important respect, we must secure its wholeness.\(^{118}\)
- We need temporality because this wholeness still has to be elucidated in its unity.\(^{119}\) If the being of Dasein is care, and we do not understand the unity of this being, then (our understanding of) this being is still liable to be dissolved because, until such a ground is given, Dasein lacks its own, inner grounding.\(^{120}\)

So now, authentic care becomes an issue. Being-ahead-of-itself becomes anticipation (Vorlaufen).\(^{121}\) In anticipation, Dasein experiences itself in terms of its ‘ownmost’ possibility of death.\(^{122}\) The fundamental ontological problem of death is not a biological problem.\(^{123}\) It concerns the finitude of possibility and the sense in which being from possibilities includes the

\(^{117}\) Cf. Dahlstrom on Fleischer in Dahlstrom (1995) 99. In my estimation this is a difficulty which arises from the way in which the SZ is formulated, and is thus a difficulty which all interpretations of that text face at one point or another. On the connected development of the problem of care and temporality cf. Kisiel (1997-1993) passim esp. pp 9, 105, 114f., 201, 510-511 etc.

\(^{118}\) SZ (S/S) 232ff.

\(^{119}\) Which, however was already a task at the beginning of the movement of SZ (i.e. the initial task of understanding being-in-the-world in its unitary character). Cf. §1bα this chapter

\(^{120}\) SZ (S) 131, 196, 317, 333 etc.

\(^{121}\) SZ I.2.i, esp. SZ (S) 259, 262ff.

\(^{122}\) Ibid.

\(^{123}\) SZ §49
necessity of a possibility which cannot be bypassed.\footnote{124} This possibility is terminologically named ‘death.’\footnote{125} In anticipation, Dasein understands this possibility authentically, i.e., from death’s possibility-character.\footnote{126}

Finitude forces Dasein back upon itself. This in turn gives us the phenomenon of guilt as the already-being of authentic care.\footnote{127} Guilt does not mean moral corruption, but – following the way in which Schuld implies something like ‘lack’\footnote{128} – it refers to the essential ‘negativity’ which pervades Dasein’s facticity.\footnote{129} Thus, Dasein is thrown in such a way that its thrownness bespeaks the nullity of its ‘background.’\footnote{130} Accordingly, in the structure of ‘project’ – which names the way in which Dasein exists toward possibilities – we find that guilt also refers to the sense in which possibilities must be given up on, and indeed, that various possibilities have always already been passed over.\footnote{131} Thus, guilt means that Dasein is the ‘null ground of a nullity.’\footnote{132} Dasein’s ‘going back to itself’ exposes the nullity which pervades all being toward possibilities, that it is my being to exist in such nullity (to be the ‘ground’ of it) and that my roots have always, in a certain way, fallen inextricably into darkness.

In turn, the discursivity of authentic care is given in the ‘call of conscience.’\footnote{133} At the fundamental ontological level this means; the silent call which calls Dasein forth from its fallenness.\footnote{134} Conscience implies no ‘subject’ which calls, but rather, refers to ‘something’

\footnote{124} SZ (S) 250f. 261f. etc.
\footnote{125} Cf. SZ (S) 245ff.
\footnote{126} SZ (S) 262-266 etc.
\footnote{127} Cf. SZ (S) 284f., cf. also CTD 49f.
\footnote{128} But, to hastily interpret guilt as ‘lack’ is misguided since that would interpret Dasein according to its having an objectively present absence. Instead, this ‘not’ character of Dasein, is interpreted according to care, and in turn, according to the authentic possibility of care, and thus, according to the being of Dasein in an eminent sense. Cf. SZ (S, D) 281f.
\footnote{129} Cf. SZ (S) 283
\footnote{130} Ibid. et ff.
\footnote{131} Ibid.
\footnote{132} Ibid.
\footnote{133} SZ (S) 269
\footnote{134} Ibid. & 273f., 296
which compels Dasein to come back from the they. This compulsion is a ‘call’ because it is the enpresenting of the discursively articulated potentiality-for-being which is existentially foreign (i.e. authenticity). That is, conscience grips my Dasein as something foreign (because authentic selfhood is foreign to the they-self) and this grip concerns my being, and in gripping me it calls (it says; it commands). In this sense, conscience is a ‘counter-raptness’ to the ‘raptness’ of falling. Accordingly, both conscience and falling depend on the same structure which enables Dasein’s ‘being-rapt’ (the formal concept of enpresenting; but enpresenting of the discursively articulated, thus, enpresenting qua discourse).

As this whole develops we gain the phenomenon of anticipatory resoluteness (vorlaufende Entschlossenheit). It is this which, properly speaking brings us before the phenomenon of authentic care. Anticipatory resoluteness means to hold oneself in one’s situation, and to do so in the finitude which anticipation discloses, the uncertain yet determinate rootedness which guilt commends us to and the steadiness which conscience calls us to. And it does this for the being which has already been inauthentic and established its selfhood therein. Authenticity does not negate this latter kind or fact of selfhood, but brings Dasein’s self-understanding into its finitude. Accordingly, authenticity is not ‘thinner’ and ‘paler’ than inauthenticity but precisely the opposite.

Now, a more complete analysis could show that it is from this phenomenon that we first break open the true problem of temporality – not just because the exposition of anticipatory resoluteness precedes the exhibition of temporality but because only here is the real problem

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135 The reference in SZ (SZ (S) 164 to a ‘friend’ which Dasein always already has (as conscience) which Christopher Fynsk makes use of to discuss the being-with of Dasein (Fynsk (1993[1986]) 41), is purely figurative, as per its repudiation at SZ (S) 274ff. A more fundamental phenomenological formulation of being-with than SZ I.1.iv can be gained only by other means.
136 Cf. SZ (S) 268-271 etc.
137 Ibid. & SZ (S/S, D) 338. On the relation between Gegenwärtigen and Rede cf. Third Stage of the Founding Analysis §3c & the Founded Analysis, Ch. 1.
138 SZ (S) 303ff.
139 SZ (S/S) 323, 325ff.
140 SZ (S/S) 297ff., 305ff.
141 Cf. Ibid. (esp. 298)
Preparatory Analysis

cleared, that is, the problem of how Dasein in a certain important sense is temporality.\textsuperscript{142} And so, the connection between authentic care and temporality is the best way (qua the most phenomenological way) to counter Blattner’s argument that primordial and authentic temporality are different.\textsuperscript{143}

Thus – because of the intrinsic connection between authentic care and temporality – anticipation is the futural ecstasy of authentic and primordial temporality. Anticipation preserves the for-the-sake-of given by understanding and brings it into its authentic, finite meaning.\textsuperscript{144} As ecstatic and futural, anticipation concerns the opening of possibilities in the ‘shadow’ (i.e. the luminosity) of finitude.

In first breaking temporality open Heidegger speaks of the ‘having-been’ of temporality.\textsuperscript{145} But having-been is merely a formal determination of temporality; it lacks the ‘ecstatic momentum’\textsuperscript{146} of temporality. Thus, he also formally indicates it as a ‘coming back to.’\textsuperscript{147} The having-been of authentic temporality is characterised by guilty, already being-in.\textsuperscript{148} But temporality is ecstatically towards itself.\textsuperscript{149} And so, in connection with this, the authentic ecstasy of guilty having-been is re-petition, i.e., re-petition is the name for authentic going back to.\textsuperscript{150}

\textsuperscript{142} SZ (S/S) 304 etc., cf. also CTD 48 et infra.
\textsuperscript{143} Which is not achieved here, i.e., I here only suggest how one might respond to that problem. Cf. Dahlstrom (1995) vs. Blattner’s response in Blattner (1999) 100ff. et infra (cf. also Dahlstrom (2001) 341ff.). Note, for instance, how the argument on both sides (and in part necessarily) rests on philology and leads thereby to a specifically philological ‘species’ of futility (which is not to say that the above alternative way of countering Blattner might not inexorably lead to a different species of futility). One might equally note, that the clearest evidence against Blattner’s position is Heidegger’s a potiori fit denominatio (SZ (S/S) 329), which is also, surprisingly enough, one of Blattner’s favourite quotations from SZ (cf. Blattner (1999) 102 & passim). That, in any case, a proper rebuttal of such positions would require a ‘monograph-length treatment’ cf. Dahlstrom (2001) 342 infra, similarly, cf. Dahlstrom (2001) 341 et infra that major analyses of the problem of temporality are exceptionally rare.
\textsuperscript{144} SZ (S/S) 326f.
\textsuperscript{145} SZ (S/S) 326ff.
\textsuperscript{146} MFL 207
\textsuperscript{147} SZ (S/S) 325f.
\textsuperscript{148} SZ (S/S) 325-327
\textsuperscript{149} SZ (S/S) 326-329 (the towards itself is a characteristic primarily given to futurity, but, which for that reason also constitutes the temporal structure of ecstatic existence as a whole)
\textsuperscript{150} SZ (S/S) 339 etc., recognising this is important for setting the problem of the historicity of Dasein on the right footing (but by no means immediately solves that problem). Throughout, the phenomenon of Wiederholung is
Similarly, Heidegger first refers to the ecstasy of the ‘present’ as Gegenwärtigen. In this thesis, in order to avoid the idealistic connotations of the common translation ‘making present’ – which are especially dangerous in an exhibition of transcendence – this thesis renders Gegenwärtigen with the word enpresenting. Later in Being and Time we find that enpresenting is the inauthentic ecstasy of the ‘present,’ but that ‘formally’ ‘every present enpresents.’ This to and fro is a “symptom” of the inner and special ‘ambi-valence’ which intrinsically belongs to Dasein’s ‘present’ in accordance with the existentiell priority of inauthenticity.

While the temporal problem of Dasein must be able to account for the sense in which ‘authenticity authentically appropriates inauthenticity,’ it is not as though primordial temporality simply ‘has’ an inauthentic ‘present.’ Rather, it is just that the word Gegenwärtigen is initially used to formally indicate the bringing-near which pertains to temporality in general (thus, preserving the ambivalence). It is only subsequently limited to naming the inauthentic present. In any case, the authentic present, properly named is the moment (Augenblick), which, might be idiomatically rendered as the ‘moment of clarity.’ To mark its ecstatic character we may alternatively refer to ‘resolution on the moment.’

rendered as ‘re-petition’ or ‘to re-peat’ in order to evoke the grounds upon which Stambaugh has rendered it ‘retrieval’ without dissimulating the possible breadth etc. of Wiederholung.

151 SZ (S/S) 326
152 Which is Hofstadter’s neologism from his translation of BP (cf. BP passim). One might also speak of a ‘waiting on’ given Heidegger’s occasional use of the word’s structure (SZ (D) 337-338, BP (D) 416, 434, AT 15), or else, one could use a translation of Husserl’s neologism ‘Appräsentation’ though the latter is unwieldy and its word-structure too obscured; on this word and its place in Heidegger’s development cf. Kisiel (1985) 208-210
153 SZ (S/S, D) 338; “Formal verstanden ist jede Gegenwart gegewärtigend, aber nicht jede »augenblicklich«.”, compare this with SZ (S/ S) 326
154 This cannot be fully grounded here. Suffice it to say; authenticity, inauthenticity and the undifferentiated mode are primarily different modes of Dasein’s being towards itself. Thus, the undifferentiated mode, contra Blattner (1999) passim etc. is not higher, but basically lower. On this problem cf. SZ (S) 179, 184-185 etc. But, paraphrasing (not quoting) cf.: ‘Dasein flees before its authentic potentiality for being’ SZ (S, D) 184-185 etc.; i.e., authenticity is existentially prior to inauthenticity (also cf. SZ (S) 259). ‘Authenticity must win itself from inauthenticity’ cf. SZ (S) 268, 336f.; i.e., inauthenticity is existentially prior to authenticity.
155 Cf. SZ (S/S) 298f. (not a quote)
156 Cf. SZ (S/S) 338
157 Cf. Ibid.
The unitary character of temporality is rooted in the primacy which the future has for the structure of temporality.\textsuperscript{158} Thus, in each case when Heidegger discusses temporality he says something like the following; futurity ecstatically breaks open possibility, so that as the breaking open of possibility, Dasein already is as having-been and may come back to itself (or rather, already does so in one way or another; as giving itself having-been by coming towards itself, Dasein’s temporalisation already includes a coming-back-to), so that as futural having-been Dasein is brought into its ‘present’, i.e. it enpresents.\textsuperscript{159} It is precisely because the future unfolds itself into the complete structure of temporality and that futurity has this priority that temporality can give the articulated unity of Dasein.\textsuperscript{160}

With this basic sketch of the temporal structure of Dasein – achieved by Heidegger right in the centre of SZ I.2 – his task becomes to exhibit temporality as the unity of Dasein. This means to show how it grounds world-time, historicity, the vulgar concept of time and the problem of within-timeness in general.\textsuperscript{161} And so with the first outbreak of temporality (SZ §65) the published portion of Being and Time has already reached its peak such that §67 – the first section in SZ I.2.iv – begins by saying that “any “arising” in the field of ontology is degeneration.”\textsuperscript{162} The historicity of Dasein has to be won on the basis of the temporality of Dasein. Only by rooting temporality in authentic and primordial temporality can world-time – the temporality of dealings – be developed in such a way that Dasein’s capacity to be dispersed is rooted in Dasein’s capacity as such.\textsuperscript{163} Similarly, the vulgar concept of time – the before the after, the now, the sequence and so forth – is shown to be wholly derivative by exhibiting its ‘parentage’ in primordial and authentic temporality via world-time.\textsuperscript{164} And only

\textsuperscript{158} SZ (S/S) 329
\textsuperscript{159} Cf. SZ passim (esp. 325/)
\textsuperscript{160} As per SZ (S/S) 329
\textsuperscript{161} SZ I.2.iv-vi
\textsuperscript{162} SZ (S/S) 334
\textsuperscript{163} SZ I.2.iv & SZ I.2.vi
\textsuperscript{164} Ibid.
by exhibiting temporality in its transcendence of within-timeness (*Innerzeitigkeit*) can one show how the former exceeds within-timeness and yet makes the latter possible.\(^{165}\)

And so with this, there is the possibility of showing the derivative character of these modes of temporality (but the matter is more complicated with respect to historicity), and in turn, of undertaking a temporal interpretation of the mode of *being* which they each primarily disclose, and so, of the way in which the understanding of being is grounded in temporality. Thus, there is already in the second division, an implication that handiness is primarily understood on the basis of world-time and that objective presence is understood on the basis of the vulgar concept of time.\(^{166}\)

But with these questions the analysis is beginning to move towards division 3, *Time and Being* where the temporal *problem* of being was to have been *concretely formulated*.\(^{167}\) This is the problem of Temporalität: the temporality of being; the way in which being is understood according to time; the way in which time is itself the horizon in which and from which being is understood.\(^{168}\) But if SZ I.3 was to accomplish the presentation of temporality as the *transcendental* horizon for the question of being, and transcendence is indeed the inner possibility of whatsoever is called ‘transcendental’, then it has already become preliminarily visible that *it is no accident* that the analysis of Temporalität in *the Basic Problems of Phenomenology* is preceded by an analysis of transcendence.\(^{169}\) And if Heidegger does indeed transform transcendental philosophy, then we must *think into* this ‘transfiguration,’ and not merely throw ourselves against the ‘unreconstructed’ problem of the transcendental hoping to catch sight of its transformation. That is we must think through the fundamental ontological problem of transcendence.

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\(^{165}\) Primarily SZ I.2.vi. Within-timeness is to temporality as innerworldliness is to world, this is fairly clear from the phenomena themselves, for exegetical justification (which also shows that they are even the same) cf. MFL (E/D) 194f., 211f. / 251, 274

\(^{166}\) Which is also noted by Dahlstrom (2001) 380, the latter is already marked at SZ (S/S) 327, the former is a necessary consequence of the problem of the temporal interpretation of dealings.

\(^{167}\) SZ (S/S) 19, 437

\(^{168}\) SZ (S/S) 19, BP 228 & §§21-22

\(^{169}\) Cf. BP §20e vs. §§21-22
§2 – The Phenomenon of the Surrounding World as Preliminary Stage of the Question of Transcendence

Heidegger first discusses the phenomenon of world and being-in-the-world with regards to everyday thing-relatedness.\(^{170}\) It is important to remain aware that the apparent priority of things here is merely a (necessary) preparatory move as is the uncomplicated focus on everydayness.\(^{171}\) Things refer us to world (and the others).\(^{172}\) World is not a thing, nor is it bound solely to thingliness.\(^{173}\) Everydayness leads us over into inauthenticity and authenticity, and through this, into more existentially fundamental – and existentielly unfamiliar – problems.\(^{174}\)

The analysis of thing-relatedness is a part of the analysis of the surrounding world, the *Umwelt*.\(^{175}\) This already indicates that it concerns something like the *circum-stance* of everyday being-in-the-world. When we consider the prevalence and function of Um- words in *SZ* I.1.iii (*Umwelt, Umgang, Umsicht, Umzu, Umwillen*) this becomes more certain.\(^{176}\) With this, we can already see that *SZ* I.1.iii – which is primarily concerned with everyday familiar being-in-the-world – is concerned with Dasein’s *circum-stance* and that everyday Dasein is concerned with itself ‘under the circumstances…’\(^{177}\) The surrounding world is exhibited as the ‘upon which and in-which’ of Dasein’s ‘dealings’, of its ‘going about’ its business (Umgang).\(^{178}\) Supporting this dealing is a kind of ‘taking in’ the situation, namely ‘circumspection’ (Umsicht) which takes stock of what’s ‘going on.’\(^{179}\) In turn, Dasein deals

\[^{170}\text{SZ §§15 et seq.}\]
\[^{171}\text{Cf. SZ passim, VWG (ER) 80-81 infra etc.}\]
\[^{172}\text{SZ §§15-18 esp. pp 70f., 76, 86f.}\]
\[^{173}\text{SZ §18 esp. p 88 etc.}\]
\[^{174}\text{SZ passim.}\]
\[^{175}\text{SZ (S/S) 66}\]
\[^{176}\text{Cf. SZ (S/S, D) §§14-18, on the importance of this ‘Um’ cf. SZ (S/S) 66, BP (D) 416}\]
\[^{177}\text{Cf. SZ (S/S, D) 384 (here, the term translated as ‘circumstances’ is ‘Umstände’)}\]
\[^{178}\text{SZ (M&R, D) 66-68, 86}\]
\[^{179}\text{SZ (S, D) 69}\]
with its surroundings ‘in order to’ (Um-zu) do this and that, ‘for the sake of’ (Umwillen) itself, i.e., in connection with its being an issue for itself.\textsuperscript{180}

Whilst the analysis of the surrounding world puts considerable effort into categorial questions, it is nonetheless primarily existential because, after all, the world is an existential of being-in-the-world.\textsuperscript{181} The primary categories which emerge out of the analysis of everyday thing relatedness are ‘objective presence’ and ‘handiness.’\textsuperscript{182} In the German these two words are more closely aligned (respectively; \textit{Vorhandenheit} and \textit{Zuhandenheit}), with the latter being a neologism whereas the former is used in regular German to refer to the “existence” of… in the usual sense of the word ‘existence.’ Everyday Dasein mostly encounters things in their existential proximity to the ‘hand’ (both figuratively and literally) and so they are discovered as ‘handy’ or ‘zu-handen.’ Conversely, when beings are discovered as objectively present, they are discovered as being merely ‘before the hand.’\textsuperscript{183}

Ontologically speaking, objectively present beings are discovered as being ‘merely present’ rather than by being positively \textit{involved} in what the hand does (the hand handles).\textsuperscript{184} But ontically speaking being involved in handling is not the measure distinguishing handiness and objective presence. Thus, for instance, the cup which is circumspectly discovered but for which I have no positive use is not for this reason discovered as objectively present. It is still discovered in its relevance to handling precisely by \textit{not} breaking the dominance of this horizon; by keeping out of the way and being handy precisely by not affecting handling.\textsuperscript{185}

Mostly in dealing with things we get ‘caught up’ in the dealing and through this absorption things are handy in an eminent way. I do not need to think about the keyboard, the pen, the

\textsuperscript{180}SZ (S/S) 68f., 84, 86f.
\textsuperscript{181} Cf. SZ §§14-18, 69c etc.
\textsuperscript{182} Cf. SZ (S) \textit{passim}
\textsuperscript{183} Cf. SZ (S/S) 69f.
\textsuperscript{184} Cf. SZ (S) 70-71 etc.
\textsuperscript{185} Cf. SZ (S/S) 69ff. 75f.
Preparatory Analysis

desk, the coffee cup, chair, the floor. They’re handy for me in an immediate way.186 This is constitutive of their handiness properly understood.

When dealings break down, or, when Dasein ‘takes a step back’ for some other reason, objective presence is first positively broken open as an ontological horizon.187 Every being which may be understood as handy can also be understood as objectively present, but, this does not mean that objective presence is ontologically prior to handiness.188 Rather, that which is objectively present is only intelligible as what it is on the basis of its already having been understood. The understanding of things as handy provides this prior understanding.189 And this indicates that the fundamental in-which of dealing with handy things must be the same as that of perceiving and analysing objectively present beings. Moreover, since this presents the existential derivativeness of understanding beings in the mode of objective presence, it also shows more completely that Dasein’s ‘in-which’ is not the totality of objectively present beings.190

In dealing ‘one thing leads to another’ but this is only possible because beings in general have already been found as ‘referring’.191 Insofar as dealing is constituted by a prior understanding of reference, and dealing is always a matter of dealing with ‘this that and the other thing in order to…’ dealings must be constituted by a certain referential totality.192 This referential totality includes a certain ‘self-reference’ ‘on the part of’ Dasein. This primal self-reference is called the ‘for-the-sake-of’ (which is also the primary about which of care).193 But, the reference of things to things and the self-reference of Dasein are ontologically different in kind. Thus, the mode of reference belonging to things is termed relevance.194 We may

186 Ibid.
187 SZ (S/S) 69, 71, 73ff. & 357ff. etc.
188 Ibid.
189 Ibid.
190 That it is not the totality of handy things either cf. SZ (S/S, D) 75 etc., VWG (ER/EG) 80-81 infra / 370
191 SZ (S) 69
192 SZ (S) 75-76
193 SZ (S/S) 84-87, 123, 191f.
194 SZ (S/S) 83f., 123
understand the proper name for the reference of Dasein to itself (and the others) to be precisely this *for-the-sake-of*.

The fundamental wherein of Dasein is called world. This wherein is existentially constituted (and not categorially). If the world is “the wherein of self-referential understanding” and self-reference means the for-the-sake-of this already points to a pivotal definition of world which Heidegger gives in *Vom Wesen des Grundes*: world is the “the totality of the for-the-sake-of.” Nonetheless, if proximal existence is caught up in its dealings, this means that its self-reference is somehow ‘circum-stantial’ for which reason its world is the surrounding world.

Whilst handiness is referential and there is a certain connection between handiness and the surrounding world, world *exists* – its being is existence – and so world does not mean the totality of handy beings. But, nonetheless, in its dealings, Dasein understands itself *in reference to* this referential totality of handy beings, and thus, we may say; the wherein of Dasein is something like its primordial *self-understanding*. In everyday dealings, the self-understanding of Dasein exists *in terms of* the referential totality of handiness.

This outlines, in broad brush strokes, the existentiell problem of the surrounding world, but this in turn, only necessitates the *existential* problem thereof. Heidegger names this the *worldliness of the world*. In SZ I.1.iii Heidegger gives an answer to this existential problem of world – but, we do well to note that in its orientation towards the problem of the

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195 Cf. SZ (S/S, D) 123, SZ (S/S) 191f.
196 SZ (S) 86
197 SZ (S) 88
198 SZ (S/S) 86
199 VWG (ER) 100
200 Cf. SZ (S/S) 86f. etc.
201 SZ §18 etc.
surrounding world and given that it still belongs to a preliminary stage *Being and Time*, it is reasonable to say that SZ I.1.iii actually offers the *worldliness of the surrounding world*.²⁰²

Now, Heidegger says that the problem of worldliness is the problem of *structure* of world, and in turn, names this structure *significance*.²⁰³ The structure of significance is composed of *signifying* and here it is relevant to note that Heidegger defines the meaning of the latter term by hyphenating it.²⁰⁴ Thus, in a preliminary sense, signifying means *be-deuten*; to show, in the sense of making understandable, but here, as a referentiality which belongs to the ontological-structural level of the problem world.²⁰⁵ On this basis Heidegger quickly defines significance in the following way:

The for-the-sake-of-which signifies an in-order-to, the in-order-to signifies a what-for, the what-for signifies a what-in of letting something be relevant, and the latter signifies a what-with of relevance.²⁰⁶

That these significations are “interlocked among themselves as a primordial totality”²⁰⁷ is important but cannot be radically secured by Heidegger at this point of *Being and Time*. Nor, however, does Heidegger explain himself in an explicit fashion at this point. Instead he leaves the reader to compare the structure of significance with the various exemplifications of it in the analysis leading up to the definition.

So the for-the-sake-of signifies an in-order-to; but this more or less means that, in each case, self-concern gives itself a self-concern which goes about its business. The remaining elements of the structure of significance concern the letting-be-relevant which the for-the-

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²⁰² Cf. SZ (D) 66 vis-à-vis HCT (E/D) 185 / 251 (but cf. here SZ (S/S) 299 etc. on the preservation of inauthenticity in the phenomenon of authentic Dasein, i.e. the above ought not to be too overzealously applied)
²⁰³ SZ (S/S) 86f.
²⁰⁴ *Ibid*.
²⁰⁵ *Ibid*. Be-deuten = bei + Deuten; signifying as bringing into interpretedness.
²⁰⁶ SZ (S/S) 87 (minor modification); “Das Worumwillen bedeutet ein Um-zu, dieses ein Dazu, dieses ein Wobei des Bewendenlassens, dieses ein Womit der Bewandtnis.” SZ (D) 87
²⁰⁷ SZ (S/S) 87
sake-of and the in-order-to intrinsically accomplish. This must be a letting be relevant because Dasein itself is never relevant and because significance is an existential structure.

Instead of attempting a philological retrieval of this prepositional structure, it should be enough to point out that Heidegger’s brevity is possible only because the structure of significance refers itself upon structures already elaborated in the preceding part of SZ I.1.iii (which have just been outlined here). Thus, the for-the-sake-of and in-order-to refer to a letting-happen of Dasein’s relatedness to a referential totality of handiness, where, Dasein is towards the latter in connection with handling such that the in-order-to refers us to use and to the Dasein(s) for which the use happens in one way or another.

And so, if the for-the-sake-of unfolds into each mode of signification, the world is the totality of significance as the totality of the for-the-sake-of. The surrounding world – which provides us with significance as the worldliness of the world – is the totality in which it is primordially possible for relevance to perdure but this does not mean that significance is the totality of relevance. The totality which most primordially belongs to world is rooted in the for-the-sake-of and not in relevance. But this is only a problem – a problem which, as will be shown, refers us to the problem of transcendence.

§3 – THE HISTORY OF WORLD AS PRELIMINARY STAGE (AND FORMULATION) OF THE QUESTION OF TRANSCENDENCE

The analysis of the surrounding world presents the worldliness of the world as the structure of significance. There it is already decisively shown that the world-problem points back to

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208 That this is true of the Dazu cf. SZ (D) 74-75, 86, 359-360.
209 Cf. SZ (S/S) 65, 84, 88 (if significance included relevance per se then world would be ‘partly existential’ and ‘partly categorial’)
210 If one wanted to do so one would have to unlock the idiomatic sense of these German terms and discuss their use in such passages as SZ (D) 74-75, 84-86, 352-354, 359-360, along with BP 293 / 415f. and perhaps by referring back to HCT §23 etc. in order to secure the basic meaning of these wholly operative terms, taking care at all times to ward against the constant and almost insuperable danger of misdirection, and to do so with an inner grasp of German idiom.
211 Cf. here SZ (S) 110, 144-145, 210
something more primordial than the innerworldly and that, instead, the worldliness of the world is an *existential* structure.

But we also know that this whole analysis in SZ I.1.iii remains ‘subordinate’ and that it is only through the question of transcendence that the problem of world will really be disclosed.²¹² It is also, at least preliminarily clear that whilst §69c ‘begins’ the latter problem, it does not complete it. The latter will be shown in the Founding Analysis (i.e. Part II).

What is the primordial world-problem given in the problem of transcendence? In *Being and Time* it is expressed through the ‘horizonal schemata.’²¹³ In *the Basic Problems of Phenomenology* it is engaged with in much the same way, except that there it immediately segues into the problem of Temporalität. In *the Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, Vom Wesen des Grundes* and *Einleitung in die Philosophie* (1928-1929), without the full resources of *Being and Time*, the problem is instead primarily approached through *an analysis of the history of the concept of world*.²¹⁴

In *Vom Wesen des Grundes* this analysis of the history of world explicitly functions as an *alternative* to properly expressing “how being-in-the-world as the primordially unified constitution of Dasein should be expressed conceptually.”²¹⁵ Similarly, as canonical as *Vom Wesen des Grundes* is for the question of transcendence, it explicitly states that its exhibition of transcendence follows the problem only so far as is required for its primary task; the elucidation of the principle of sufficient reasons.²¹⁶ What Heidegger’s history of world achieves is a special connection between the problem of the transcendence of the world with the for-the-sake-of-which and an indication that his concept of world is not historically arbitrary.²¹⁷

²¹² Cf. VWG (ER/EG) 80-81 infra / 370
²¹³ SZ §69c
²¹⁴ VWG (ER) §2, MFL §11b, EP §§33-34
²¹⁵ VWG (ER) 47
²¹⁷ VWG (EG) 121, VWG (ER) 82ff.
But the problem of world is also connected with the problem of ‘world-view.’ This is a problem marked by *Vom Wesen des Grundes* and taken up in earnest by *Einleitung in die Philosophie.*218 Pursuant to the constraints placed on this thesis a complete analysis of that problem cannot be attempted here. However, §3b will give an outline of a small part of the problem understood from the historically original meaning of *Welt-Anschauung.*

Where Heidegger says that *Vom Wesen des Grundes* is not up to a completely radical exhibition of transcendence he also says that his preceding formal indications of transcendence only ‘negatively defined’ it.219 These formal indications will occupy the first two chapters of the next part (especially the first). They will be used in this way because they give the most concrete and secure horizon and entry point for posing the question of fundamental ontological transcendence. But, on the other hand, the fact that they only negatively define transcendence justifies this thesis’ goal of posing the problem of transcendence by returning it – from its post-*Being and Time* formulations – to the fundamental ontological problematic.220

The history of the world is the problem of the transcendence of the world by proxy (thus imperfectly, though this history might have contributed to a higher perfection if it had been repeated at a higher level). The task of this section is to briefly work through these problems in order to better grasp, in a preliminary fashion, how matters stand between the problem of the surrounding world and that of the transcendence of the world and to further formulate the domain of the latter problem. Firstly, the broad, historical problem will be worked out, and then, secondly and in a limited way, the problem of world-view.

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218 Cf. VWG (ER) 77-81 et infra, EP passim.
219 VWG (ER) 47
220 Similarly, the approach of this thesis coheres with FMC 176ff., especially since *ibid.*’s minor dissatisfaction with the reception of SZ §§14-18 has already been countered (viz. by foreclosing the interpretation which Heidegger was bothered by). That the history of world stands here, in the preparatory part coheres with the ‘external’ though nonetheless helpful character which FMC ascribes to such a history. The inner history of world (referred to by FMC 176ff.) will not be worked out in this thesis, however the groundwork upon which it could become a founded problem will be worked out in the entire subsequent investigations (especially Final Stage of the Founding Analysis et seq.)
a) Heidegger’s Standard History of the Concept of World

Heidegger’s basic outline for the history of the concept of world is relatively stable during the late 20s. The stages of this history are: the Greeks (especially the pre-Socratics), early Christianity through to Medieval scholasticism, rationalist scholasticism and finally Kant. Here, one could add various others, for instance, Descartes, whose concept of world was to be discussed in SZ I.3, where, through the *Destruktion* of this concept, “a positive understanding of the problematic of the world… [would have been] reached for the first time.”

In the interests of brevity, Descartes is passed over here, and below I merely list the primary characteristics of each moment in Heidegger’s ‘standard’ history of world from the late 20s lecture courses:

- In the ‘decisive origin’ of world (viz. the Greek origin), world meant ‘the how’ of the totality of beings. Thus it refers to the totality of beings but only by referring to the ‘way’ in which they appear. Accordingly, it also refers to Dasein as the being for whom this ‘how’ is. Heidegger shows this by referring to Herakleitus’ talk of a waking-world and a sleeping-world where ‘waking’ and ‘sleeping’ are, of course, Dasein-determinations. Aside from Heidegger’s commentary on this problem, this sense of world can be seen in the conventional understanding of κόσμος as ‘arrangement’; the ‘world of all that is’, is the ‘arrangement of all that is’;

221 Cf. VWG (ER) §2, MFL §11b, EP §§33-34
222 SZ §§19-21, SZ (S/S, D) 100 On the other hand, one might say that Descartes’ formulation of world as *res extensa* is ontologically, in the most important respects, no different to that of rationalist scholasticism, while bearing the possibility – not yet realised – of something approaching Kant’s theoretical concept (cf. world and the problem of the *ens infinitum* vs. the *ens finitum*).
223 VWG (ER) 49
224 VWG (ER) 49-51
‘arrangement’ refers to the ‘how’ (albeit, in an existentially inappropriate manner). For Heidegger "This how in its totality is in a certain way primary."\(^{225}\)

- In the early Christian and Medieval conception (Paul, Aquinas etc.), world is identified with the *saeculum* (thus, ‘the temporal’).\(^{226}\) World now names both the *totality* of the *ens creata* (thereby, the how of this totality; createdness, which also means ‘finitude’) and humanity *so far as* the latter are primarily *turned towards* the former totality (especially qua ‘the flesh’) and thus, turned *away* from the divine.\(^{227}\) In the first sense, world names that which is ontologically different to God (*ens finitum* vs. *ens infinitum* etc.), in the second sense, world means the worldly as the God-forsaken, the fallen, the unheavenly.\(^{228}\)

- In rationalist scholasticism (specifically Baumgarten and Crusius) the concept of the world is largely whittled down to the totality of beings, or the totality of finite beings as inextricably connected.\(^{229}\) In this inextricable connection, the *ens infinitum* (God) stands at the centre of worldhood as the being which gives the totality of finite beings their interconnection.\(^{230}\)

The Kantian problem of world has multiple versions. Kant’s basic ways of formulating world as a problem are organised as follows:

- In Kant’s 1770 dissertation, world is understood as the whole which has no parts, namely, as a synthetic *a priori* which cannot be analytically divided.\(^{231}\) This is connected with the concept of world presented in rationalist scholasticism yet here the world is grounded not in God – the *ens infinitum* – but in the human being as the synthesiser.\(^{232}\)

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\(^{225}\) VWG (ER) 51
\(^{226}\) VWG (ER) 51ff., cf. also Lewis & Short (1974[1879]) 1613f. (viz. that it is primarily a temporal term)
\(^{227}\) Ibid.
\(^{228}\) Ibid. cf. also BP §§10-12
\(^{229}\) VWG (ER) 57-59
\(^{230}\) Ibid.
\(^{231}\) VWG (ER) 61-63
\(^{232}\) Ibid. Indeed, on balance it would appear that God cannot even have world here because, as the *intuitius originarius*, God’s kind of knowledge would in each case be analysable; only finitude has the kind of essential powerlessness of being able to synthesise something which cannot be analysed.
• In the *Critique of Pure Reason* world is given as the unconditioned totality of conditions.\(^{233}\) Here, world – which in accordance with the principles of ‘critical philosophy’ cannot be exhibited in its complete ‘realitas’ or ‘whatness’ – is an idea of reason and forms the condition of possibility for appearances in general.\(^{234}\) That is, firstly, as a concept of reason it cannot be intuited, and secondly, as the unconditioned totality of conditions it is the condition of possibility of the conditioned.

• In Kant’s practical concept of world, world means ‘know how’, taste, being situated in and from ‘the world,’ which is now understood as the human realm.\(^{235}\) Now, ‘having world’ means knowing how to masterfully get by in the community while the world is primarily the human itself in opposition to nature.\(^{236}\) That is, world now means the world of a ‘man of the world’ or ‘woman of the world’.\(^{237}\)

Throughout, what is central is: a totality, the question of how this totality is and Dasein’s connection and occasional centrality to the above.\(^{238}\) The totality of beings is secondary to what makes world world (i.e. makes it world as opposed to something else). The totality of beings is connected with the world and yet is not the world. And Heidegger’s concept of world is to be understood within these basic characters.\(^{239}\) World is something like a primary ‘how’, which, as connected with the totality of what shows itself to Dasein, may be called something like the how *as such*. And yet, this determination, after all, is still very ambiguous – but this ambiguity is simply part of the reason why a dedicated analysis of transcendence is so necessary for those of us who study Heidegger in the late 20s.

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**b) Heidegger’s Supplements to the History of the Concept of World**

\(^{233}\) VWG (ER) 65-75

\(^{234}\) *Ibid.* On the problem of *realitas* (*Realität*) in Kant cf. BP §§7-13 esp. 28f. etc., PIK 203, 210 etc., KPM (T) 61 *et passim*

\(^{235}\) VWG (ER) 75-81 *et infra*

\(^{236}\) *Ibid.*

\(^{237}\) *Ibid.* (esp. 76-77 *infra*)

\(^{238}\) Cf. VWG (ER) 81ff.

\(^{239}\) Cf. *Ibid. et infra*
If we trace world-view back to its origin in Kant, then, world-view presents us with the same basic phenomenon as the above. The concept first arises in Kant’s *Critique of Judgement*.240 There, as Heidegger reports, *Weltanschauung* “means the immediate experience of what is given to the senses, of appearances”,241 i.e., the “sensible givenness of the world.”242 It means the totality of the given manifold as such; one’s pre-synthetic, sensible perspective on the whole. Here, *Anschauung* (the faculty of intuition) is simply the original ‘happening’243 of *Welt* in the sense delimited by §3a. That is, world-view immediately refers us to all of the key features of world uncovered by the history of the concept of world. Moreover, in its connection with intuition it already refers to the priority of time in the question of world.

But because the world is now grounded in this perspectival openedness there are as many world-views (and so, as many ‘worlds’) as there are ‘views.’244 Accordingly – in connection with the dissolution of the methodological primacy of the distinction between sensibility and understanding – the now common concept of world-view develops in German Idealism (and ultimately replaces the original concept).245

For instance, in his *Naturphilosophie* Schelling speaks of a ‘schematism of world-view.’246

This text stands after the original meaning of world-view but before that original meaning has been lost, and indeed, it still preserves the original meaning in a certain way (by holding itself...
to the prior as its ground).\textsuperscript{247} That Heidegger mentions this repeatedly – but holds back from a complete discussion of it – and that in \textit{Being and Time} transcendence arises as a problem of the \textit{schematism} of world indicates that an historical interpretation of the meaning of the horizontal schemata ought to include a reflection on the significance of Schelling’s world-view schematism.\textsuperscript{248} Such an analysis will be passed over in this thesis since it would be too lengthy and more succinct approaches are possible. It is nonetheless appropriate to outline the proper gravity of the question here.

Speaking of Schelling’s schematism of world-view, Heidegger tells us:

\begin{quote}
World-view is here a metaphysical determining element of every existing being itself in accordance with which it – in various stages of clarity and consciousness of the drive toward itself [des Dranges zu sich selbst] – relates to beings as a whole, and comports and acts in terms of this fundamental relation.\textsuperscript{249}
\end{quote}

That is, world-view arises from the being’s ‘drive toward itself’ its ‘for-the-sake-of’ qua situated in the midst of beings as a whole.\textsuperscript{250} This talk of ‘drive’ is not an adornment of Heidegger’s but something constitutive of Schelling’s discussion of the problem.\textsuperscript{251} Equally, insofar as the world-view – ‘the worldliness of drive’ – is the original ‘in terms of which’ for any possible comportment, world-view is in a certain sense, prior to all comportment and activity. Since this world-view arises from \textit{drive}, each world-view is already determined by

\textsuperscript{247} EP 230-231
\textsuperscript{248} Cf. \textit{Op. Cit.} \& SZ §69c. The very fact that Heidegger repeatedly mentions Schelling’s schematism of world-view as an essential stage in the history of world-view (even though he does not go into it in any detail) coupled with the fact that this concept is mentioned \textit{only once in Schelling’s work viz.} Schelling (2004[1799]) 132 / Schelling (1858[1799]) 182 indicates that what is sparsely mentioned may nevertheless be important. On the repeated mentions cf. BP 4-5, EP 231, SHF 17f. On the importance of Schelling for Heidegger and his early relationship with Schelling as a student and evidence of his knowledge of those texts cited herein cf. VWG (ER) 9, Vita 9-10, L:H&J 65, 80, 83, 86, HPS 103, 121. It is worthy of note here that what activated Heidegger’s interest in the late 20s was the \textit{Freiheitsschrift}, but that he had severe difficulty mastering it (for which reason he mostly kept quiet about it). Cf. L:H&J 64, 154 that Heidegger’s enrapture by the \textit{Freiheitsschrift} begins in early 1926 and comes to the point, in 1936, of desiring to do to Schelling what he had done to Aristotle in his early Freiburg years.

\textsuperscript{249} SHF (E/D) 18 / 31 (modified)
\textsuperscript{250} On this inference cf. SZ (S/S, D) 365
\textsuperscript{251} Albeit, that technically, Heidegger speaks above of \textit{Drang} and the word which is constitutive for Schelling’s analysis is \textit{Trieb} (especially, \textit{Kunstrrieb}, but not only this) cf. Schelling (2004[1799]) 128ff. \& infra / Schelling (1858[1799]) 177ff. \& infra. The quotation from the 1936 course is used here solely because it makes the exhibition simpler. EP 230f. speaks neither of \textit{Trieb} nor \textit{Drang} but it does speak repeatedly of the \textit{produktiv} and \textit{Handlung} character of \textit{Weltanschauung} in Schelling (which is nothing more than its ‘drive’).
the ownmost finite unity of the drive which gives the world-view. That is, drive determines beforehand how ‘the seeing of world’ happens, and so determines the *happening* of world itself.\footnote{Cf. Schelling (2004[1799]) 131f., 190, 193 / Schelling (1858[1799]) 181f., 265f., 271} This unity which determines beforehand and originally opens is what Schelling calls the ‘schematism of world-view.’\footnote{Ibid., BP 9f., EP 230f., for a more concrete elaboration of the problem of schematism in Schelling cf. Schelling (1981[1800]) 134-154 (Part 3, the Third Epoch)}

Initially, in Schelling’s discussion world-view, world-view names the being of every finite being, but Schelling immediately retracts this saying instead that only ‘the intelligence’ – i.e. Dasein – bears the possibility of such a schematism.\footnote{Schelling (2004[1799]) 131f. / Schelling (1858[1799]) 180-183} Thus, here, the special being of the intelligence is precisely to have always already grasped the world beforehand in a determinate way and to do so in such a way that all comporting is secondary.\footnote{Cf. Schelling (2004[1799]) 131f., 190, 193 / Schelling (1858[1799]) 181f., 265f., 271, SHF (E/D) 18 / 31}

World-intuition surpasses (transcends) in principle all intuition of beings (directedness towards beings) but in such a way that the latter is grounded in the former. In the primal and ‘unconscious’ character of this world-intuition, beings themselves are almost literally an ‘after thought.’\footnote{Cf. Ibid.} For the same reason, the conscious and thematic intuition of an ‘ideal world’ is also derivative.\footnote{Cf. Ibid. & BP 4f., EP 230f.} World-view is world insofar as it stands in an essential and inner relation to the world-viewing being. It does not name the totality of beings discovered in world-view so much as the ‘how’ of this discovery. Thought in terms of the *inextricable facticity* of the view itself and the constitutional determinateness of its schematism/drive, world-view simply makes the priority of the ‘how’ discussed in §3a more concrete.\footnote{Cf. Ibid.} That is, here, *world-view brings the basic contents of the world concept found in the historical analysis of world into systematic concretion.*
But if the unity which constitutes the happening of world-view may be called ‘drive’ (Drang)\textsuperscript{259} then this refers us to Heidegger’s formulation of drive as the central meaning of Leibniz’s monad, especially in the *Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*\textsuperscript{260}. This reference becomes all the stronger when we reflect that Schelling’s discussion of the schematism of world-view is precisely oriented towards the problem of monadology\textsuperscript{261}.

Heidegger’s formulation of the essence of the monad as drive is in some part just a translation of Leibniz’s *vis activa* (‘active force’) and his related concept of ‘appetition,’ but it is also something more and amounts to placing Leibniz’s problem on a completely new footing\textsuperscript{262}. If however, this means to understand the *mundus concentratus* – the monad qua ‘concentration of world’ – on the basis of drive (it does), then monadology is already basically identical to the problem of Schelling’s schematism of world-view. Drive is the basic unity of the ‘view’ established in the being whose being, as drive, is to be a ‘perspective’ on the whole\textsuperscript{263}. In this way, drive pertains essentially to world’s concentration in the monad, and for this reason, drive is the unity and meaning of the monad\textsuperscript{264}.

And so Schelling’s schematism of world-view and Heidegger’s reformulation of monadology in the *Metaphysical Foundations of Logic* point toward basically the same phenomenon. Namely that drive drives in itself, from its own particular constitution, into a totality of beings, which only ever show up in a particular way in accordance with the facticity of drive and the specificity of the constitution of drive\textsuperscript{265}. Both achieve a certain ‘perspective’ on the whole where the ‘perspective’ in turn has a certain priority\textsuperscript{266}. The result of the *mundus*

\textsuperscript{259} In connection with *Trieb* cf. MFL (E/D) 83f. / 102 also, Schelling (1858[1799]) 177ff.
\textsuperscript{260} Cf. MFL §5
\textsuperscript{261} Schelling (2004[1799]) 132 / Schelling (1858[1799]) 182 etc.
\textsuperscript{262} Cf. MFL 82f., 86, 102f., 209f. & §5c
\textsuperscript{263} Here it is worthy of note that what was referred to as drive’s placing ‘Leibniz’s problem on an entirely new footing’ is by no means fully elaborated in the above discussion. Drive, for instance, is exhibited as the origin of unity and multiplicity in Heidegger’s discussion of the monadology. It is also formulated as original temporality. Cf. MFL §5c
\textsuperscript{264} *Ibid.*
\textsuperscript{265} *Ibid.*
\textsuperscript{266} On the determination of the monad as a specific ‘perspective’ on the whole cf. MFL 95f., Leibniz (1968[1686]) §14, Leibniz (1968[1714]) §§47-62
sensibilis (world-view in its shift from Kant to Schelling) is the same as the mundus concentratus (Leibniz).

But as Heidegger intimates, the phenomenological basis for monadology is neither logic nor metaphysics. Rather, the phenomenon guiding Leibniz is Dasein – which however is immediately brought under the heel of objective presence. Similarly then, that Leibniz’s monad, the mundus concentratus, continually comes to the fore in the centre of Heidegger’s analyses of transcendence indicates that monadology latently, and with distortions, speaks of the transcendence of Dasein.

With regard to the problem of distortion in the Leibnizian formulation, it is relevant to note that Vom Wesen des Grundes is dedicated to the problem of ground through Leibniz, but also, immediately thinks this problem beyond Leibniz. Similarly, in Heidegger’s re-petition of the Leibnizian problem, the central Leibnizian problem of identity (truth, original ground etc.) is both radicalised and made factical. But if the problem of drive, as the drive towards itself, is the origin of world and this drive-towards-itself is nothing more than the for-the-sake-of, then the problem of world in Schelling and Leibniz indicates what Heidegger elsewhere achieves by formulating transcendence in relation to Plato’s ἀγαθόν and its οὗ ἐνεκα (which Heidegger translates with das Umwillen). That is, the drive to world uncovers the priority of the for-the-sake-of as the primordial situatedness of Dasein in the midst of a totality of beings.

In this regard, it is interesting – though this interesting fact should not be over-deployed – that the common etymological root of ‘world’ and ‘Welt’ is the variously rendered weruld,
werold, or weralt.\textsuperscript{272} I find no evidence that Heidegger discussed this etymology, nor is it really discussed in the secondary literature on Heidegger.\textsuperscript{273} Weralt is a composite word, meaning something like the ‘age of man’. Thus, wer, as in werewolf (man-wolf), or vir, as in virile (manly).\textsuperscript{274} And alt, as in ‘old’, which is etymologically connected with words for seniority and with growth, but also age in the sense of ‘epoch’ or ‘the time of…’

Etymologically then, the word means: man or humanity in and with the totality of our concerns. It means the totality of humanity with the totality of its communal and historical life, and thus, in a certain sense world means history itself in opposition to pre- or non-history.\textsuperscript{275} It means something like Kant’s practical concept of world, but now thought more fully from the belonging together of Dasein, time and world – a belonging-together which is already implied by the scholastic determination of the world as saeculum, and the origin of world-view in Kant (original intuition is a fortiori, original time). Weralt means; the ‘flourishing of man,’ the time itself in which we flourish, and thus, it also means the primordial, temporalised existence of the human in its facticity and its ground.

So now, in summary, κόσμος, mundus, Welt, Weltanschauung and weralt all point toward the same factors which animate Heidegger’s history of world. Moreover, we already have an as yet groundless, but nonetheless intuitive response to a problem posed to us by Theodore Kisiel, namely: why is it, in SZ §69c, that the horizon of temporality should be named world?\textsuperscript{276} That it is the case in Being and Time does not in itself explain why it is the case. The latter presents us with a difficult problem which, as Kisiel indicates, goes beyond the

\textsuperscript{272} Unless otherwise marked the reader should refer all subsequent etymological discussion in this chapter to: Seebold et al. (2008) 1128, Kluge & Lutz (1899) 230, Skeat (1884) 688, 718, Harper (2011a), Harper (2011b)
\textsuperscript{273} The following texts discuss Heidegger and mention this etymology: Spitzer (1942) 213-215 infra, Luft (2005) esp. 33 et infra. However, both mention it only in immediate connection with Husserl.
\textsuperscript{274} Accordingly, ‘wer’ is in this case gendered, for which reason in the subsequent elaboration ‘man’ is used where other, less gendered terms might otherwise have been used (i.e. if it were not a kind of ‘revisionism’ to use ungendered terms). Of course, as Kluge (1891) 391 indicates this ‘wer’ from the original Germanic word for world is indeed connected with the contemporary German pronominal wer (who). But, wer did not yet mean ‘who’ when the word for ‘world’ was weralt.
\textsuperscript{275} Cf. the concept of historicity in SZ I.2.v, CTD etc. (only Dasein is historical)
\textsuperscript{276} On this cf. Kisiel (1995[1993]) 448
scope of his exhaustive study on the problem of the origin of *Being and Time* (from whence the previous question comes to us).\(^{277}\)

Preliminarily put, the horizon of temporality is world because the factical ‘time-horizon’ is the world-horizon *as* the primordial historicity of Dasein. Rendered differently, as the ‘age of man’, world means: the totality of Dasein’s time, where the *existential* meaning of time is equiprimordially original situatedness. As the ‘age of man’ world means the situatedness of Dasein – in the ‘how’ of a totality – in primordial accord with and in the bounds of the original *providence* of time. Or, conversely, the original providence of time *is* world.

This intuitive formulation must be given a proper, philosophical foundation in what follows if it is indeed to be won *philosophically*. To show the connection between temporality and world is in a certain sense the basic task of the analysis of transcendence, but *precisely for that reason it is not the first task here*. And if the question of temporality and transcendence cannot be posed immediately then the situation is even more extreme with the question of historicity. Thus, the *Founding Analysis* will *conclude* with the former connection but only by first delimiting and determining the basic meaning of transcendence. On the other hand, it is methodologically necessary that the problem of the historicity of the world is broken open only on the basis of the Founding Analysis, and that means, it is only possible to question the historicity of world properly in the Founded Analysis.

\(^{277}\) On this cf. Kisiel (1995[1993]) 445
PART II

THE FOUNDING ANALYSIS OF TRANSCENDENCE:
FORMULATION OF THE GROUNDING MEANING OF TRANSCENDENCE
Part II – the Founding Analysis

First Stage of the Founding Analysis:

Formal and Doxographic Conditions for the Question about Transcendence

If Part I of this thesis was characterised by hermeneutic *anticipation* (etc.) then this part is characterised by *method*. While the previous analysis has given an overview of the problem and has thus formulated transcendence in a rudimentary way, this part has the task of winning transcendence philosophically. Since this is to occur methodically, we must first take a step back in order to properly ground and delimit what has so far been indicated.

This step back is nothing less than the *First Stage* of the Founding Analysis. Each subsequent step moves forward from this point. Accordingly, this chapter and the three immediately following it present a linear deepening of the problem of transcendence. Each stage of the Founding Analysis builds on the last and prepares for the problem to be blown wide open in the Final Stage. In this sense, within the economy of the Founding Analysis, the Final Stage is nothing less than the *causa finalis* of the first three stages; that to which they are constantly aimed; the consummation of all prior preparation.

Here, in the First Stage, transcendence is not yet made phenomenal, rather, for the most part, it is only formally secured *so that* it may be developed as a phenomenon in subsequent chapters. Accordingly, the task of this survey is not yet to say ‘what transcendence is’ so much as to secure the correct *form* for the question. But there are two distinct ways to ‘form’ the question and both are relevant to the present problem. On the one hand, there is the ‘architectonic-historiographical’ problem of transcendence, that is, the question about where transcendence stands with respect to the structure of *Being and Time*, the ultimate collapse of
its project etc. On the other hand, there is also the formal question about the ‘essence’ of transcendence. Under this topic, one places the question of the formal indications for transcendence along with the ‘grammar’ of the problem and so on.

The above provides the basic outline for the present chapter. Firstly, the importance of transcendence for *Being and Time* and the former’s relation to the ‘demise’ of *Being and Time* will be discussed (§1). This analysis by no means says all that there is to say on the matter.

Secondly, the basic formal indication for transcendence will be discussed and from this, certain guiding formal characters of transcendence will be deduced (§2). Next, the other ways in which transcendence may be named – rightly and wrongly – will be discussed (§3). In turn, §§2-3 provide the analysis with adequate resources to attest and develop the understanding of the word ‘transcendental’ guiding this thesis (§4).

Finally, the last major section (§5) secures the basic connection between transcendence and the fundamental ontological project, that is, it returns once more to the general horizon of problems discussed in §1. Through this – in connection with the indications from the preceding part – the entire formal, pre-phenomenological context of the problem of transcendence will have been outlined.

In these discussions some level of inadequacy cannot be avoided. The task is not to be adequate now, but to be as adequate as possible in the end. And in this regard it is worthy of note that the Founding Analysis does not aim at phenomenological completeness: the task of formulating the completeness of the phenomenon belongs to the third part, to *the Founded Analysis*. Instead, this part, the *Founding Analysis*, aims at *unity*, that is, it aims at determining the *central* meaning of transcendence.
This whole question is a hard one – something which Heidegger himself gave up on. For the most part Heidegger’s question of transcendence is either overlooked completely – perhaps even where one might expect it to become a central problem – or else, it is yoked to problems foreign to it.¹ This already indicates that something about Heidegger’s expression lacks the force which it needs to break through and be heard.

§1 – THE END OF BEING AND TIME AND THE END OF TRANSCENDENCE, OR: WHY BOTHER WITH TRANSCENDENCE?

As Theodore Kisiel puts it, the question about transcendence is also a question about “the demise” of Being and Time.² This implies that transcendence is a difficult problem and that it was to be decisive for the completion of Being and Time. There is clear textual evidence for these implications, for instance, in 1928 Heidegger says:

Insofar as the entire investigation tries to highlight temporality as the metaphysical essence of Dasein, transcendence becomes itself considered by way of temporality; but, as basic constitution, transcendence must always come into central focus along the whole path of the investigation. The analysis of Angst (§40), the problems of Dasein, worldliness, and reality [Realität], as well as the interpretation of conscience and the concept of death – all serve the progressive elaboration of transcendence, until the latter is finally taken up anew and expressly (§69) as a problem, “the Temporality of being-in-the-World and the Problem of the Transcendence of World.” Here again is transcendence, for the first time a problem. By making this reference I want to say that the problem must not be underestimated and that one must have a long wind, so as not to be exhausted just when the problem is first beginning.³

Clearly this says that transcendence concerns the whole of the Being and Time project, and that it concerns it in a fundamental way. Equally, it says that the problem of transcendence is

¹ For the former, e.g. Pöggeler (1997[1992]) 13f. 80-82, 86 etc. (which is not to say that Pöggeler is always silent on the matter, thus cf. Pöggeler (1990[1963]) 48f., 55, 64ff. 72f., though even here the matter itself remains very ambiguous).
³ MFL (E/D) 167-168 / 214 (modified)
an eminently difficult question. But it is not as though Heidegger says this here and nowhere else. For instance, elsewhere he says;

We might point out here that the portion of the investigation concerning “being and time” published so far has as its task nothing more than a concrete, revealing project of transcendence (cf. §§ 12-83, esp. §69). The project is there in order to make the single prominent goal of these investigations possible, a goal that is clearly indicated in the heading of the whole first part: namely, attaining the “transcendental horizon of the question about being.”

Or in the Basic Problems of Phenomenology Heidegger says that “rooted in this transcendence is Dasein’s basic constitution, being-in-the-world, or care...”

The whole question about the ‘demise’ of Being and Time is at once ‘merely captivating’ and completely necessary; on the one hand it’s just a ‘sexy’ question, on the other hand, there’s a sense in which we know nothing about Heidegger’s thought unless we know why he gave up on completing Being and Time. So then, if transcendence is connected with the ‘failure’ of Being and Time we immediately want to pose this question.

There are a thousand stories of this demise. Everybody has a perspective on the problem. The problem is always posed from a specific context and this context determines the story which is developed. More so than perhaps any other question concerning Heidegger there is no clear measure for this question, and thus, there is a lack of clarity on the question. Along with this, there is a danger, if not a tendency, to treat any fundamental aporias which one’s

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4 VWG (ER/D) 96f. infra / 162 infra (modified)
5 BP (E/D) 312 / 444 (modified) also cf. MFL 209, BP 298
own formulation of Heidegger’s late 20’s philosophy faces as the cause of the collapse of the

Being and Time project. This is a symptom of the difficult and troubling ‘measurelessness’
of the question. Thus, posing the question without fatal naïveté requires especial rigour.

Now, probably the most famous statement about the demise of Being and Time comes from
Heidegger’s 1946 Letter on Humanism. There Heidegger says;

The adequate execution and completion of this other thinking that
abandons subjectivity is surely made more difficult by the fact that in
the publication of Being and Time the third division of the first part,
“Time and Being,” was held back (cf. Being and Time, p. 39). Here
everything {in terms of the “what” and “how” of that which is
thought-worthy and of thinking} is reversed. The division in
question was held back because thinking failed in the adequate saying
{letting itself show} of this turning [Kehre] and did not succeed with
the help of the language of metaphysics.

So let us unpack this statement. ‘Time and Being’ – viz. SZ I.3 – was itself intended to be a
kind of Kehre i.e. a turning which preserves. In this case, at bottom, Kehre simply signifies a
reversal of the direction of the analysis. Now, ‘thinking’ failed in ‘saying’ this. Here, the
words Heidegger uses are simple, they are merely ‘Denken’, merely ‘Sagen’, but it is this
very simplicity which gives them their power.

Thinking was not able to ‘bring to language’ what had to be said. Thus, the language – and
with this, the approach – of Being and Time had to be overcome in favour of new directions.
Conversely, when the attempt was made to work out these problems in greater closeness to
the re-petition of the history philosophy the elaboration of these questions still failed.

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7 For instance this is a common reaction to Blattner’s story of the demise of SZ e.g. Malpas (2006) 157-158,
Capobianco (2000) 919 etc.
8 “Im Was und Wie des Denkwürdigen und des Denkens.” LH (E/D) 250 infra / 328 infra
9 “Sichzeigenlassen.” Ibid.
10 LH (D) 328
11 LH 249f. Above, {} brackets indicate marginal notes which have been interspersed into the main text
12 Cf. Kisiel (2005[2001]) 190 that BP (the second draft of SZ I.3) was an historicised reformulation of SZ I.3.
Cf. MFL 8f. etc. but cf. MFL 154f., KPM (T) 168: SZ is already re-petition whether explicitly or not (here we
who study Heidegger should not be too hubristic about the ‘obviousness’ of the horizon pertaining to the word
Wiederholung). On the other hand, cf. Kisiel (2005[2001]) 208f. that SZ I.3 and SZ II had been merged in the
last (re-formulated) plan for SZ from 1930. Of course, as per Mindfulness §116, SZ already enlists the help of
Transcendence belongs to both of these domains, namely, the ‘not-yet-explicitly-historical’ question (i.e. the ‘not yet historiographical question’) and the historically formulated question. In SZ §69, which is somehow almost hidden away in SZ I.2, the attempt is first made to directly grapple with the question of transcendence. As SZ §69c makes clear – but which is equally emphasised elsewhere – transcendence must provide a *fundamental re-interpretation of the concept of world*. So, if transcendence – especially, in its connection with *temporality* – offers a re-interpretation of the *beginning of Being and Time* (viz. being-in-the-world) it must present an essential condition for the *Umkehr* of SZ I.3. That is, in the overall movement of *Being and Time* such re-interpretation as the above signifies only that the groundwork comes into its ground or is coming into its ground. Conversely, with more or less emphasis and ubiquity, transcendence resides at the centre of Heidegger’s re-petition of history in the late 20s, most visibly in his discussions of Kant, Leibniz and Plato.

Now, in the late 20s it is common to find Heidegger lauding Kant for his method, philosophical spirit and hermeneutic strategy. Kant, he tells us, had an *inner peace*, he presupposed and was willing to wait for a ‘resolute reader’. He hewed to the matter, he held himself in detachment from ‘the many’ (viz. οἱ πολλοὶ – *das Man*) and their capacity to understand. He let them say what they will without letting it affect him. In sum, he was detached from every levelling force and free for genuineness. This is essential to his philosophical gravitas. By way of comparison, Heidegger derides Schopenhauer; he is not...
detached, he has no inner peace with respect to his reception and his place amongst his contemporaries, his work is therefore ‘astonishingly unfree’, it lacks ‘taste’ and finally, it is thereby ‘superficial.’

So, hearing these remarks on the inner bearing of genuine philosophising, its method and its hermeneutic strategy, we expect Heidegger to follow the above precepts, perhaps even, to be their greatest exemplar. We expect that the only plausible explanation for Heidegger’s giving up on transcendence is a failure with respect to its inner possibilities of saying. Yet here, we find a remarkable vacillation or equivocation within Heidegger’s disposition.

Thus, scattered throughout the works of this period we find Heidegger venting his frustration with respect to the reception of transcendence or of its related concepts; “had one the least sensitivity to method...”, “it is a simple imperative of even the most primitive methodology...” and so forth. And it is within that context that we should read in the Contributions:

Even when “transcendence” is grasped differently than up to now, namely as surpassing and not as the super-sensible as a being [viz. ens infinitum, ἰδέα etc.], even then this determination all too easily dissembles what is ownmost to Dasein. For, even in this way, transcendence still presupposes an under and this side and is in danger of still being misinterpreted after all as the action of an “I” and subject. And finally even this concept of transcendence continues to be stuck in Platonism (cf. Vom Wesen des Grundes).

Thus, in effect, Heidegger says; the language is not secure enough against the misinterpretation of the others. He says; it is not clear enough, there are ‘dangers’ which are ‘easily’ fallen into... Yet in its most methodologically pure form, difficulty is not in itself a

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19 MFL 112-113 etc.
20 MFL 167
21 MFL 187
22 Cf. the generally more circumspect remarks of VWG 80f. & 98f. infra, KPM (T) 164 infra, L:H&A 53 etc.
23 Contributions 226 (underlined italics added), for a much more positive appraisal of the words ‘metaphysics’, ‘ontology’ and ‘transcendence’ in Heidegger’s late 20s philosophy (in SZ, the Kantbuch and VWG) cf. Mindfulness §116
failure of radical philosophising, but on the contrary it is its sole and genuine reality.\textsuperscript{24} On the other hand, we are told that in the end – ‘finally’ – the whole question of transcendence is stuck in ‘Platonism’ i.e. an ontologically inappropriate horizon. But this, it seems, is similar in kind to Freud’s ‘kettle logic’;\textsuperscript{25}

- Transcendence is easily ‘misinterpreted’ it all too easily ‘dissembles’ there are ‘dangers’ – this says that transcendence speaks the matter correctly, but is, as it were, easily heard incorrectly, namely, in a way which says something not ownmost to Dasein.
- On the other hand, transcendence is stuck in Platonism and therefore it ‘misinterprets’ what is ownmost to Dasein.

This very same tension also plays itself out in other places where Heidegger expresses his frustration with his reception.\textsuperscript{26} Why was it dropped; because the others misinterpreted it, but in any case it was wrong… but this is contradictory: it’s my fault, but it’s their fault, but it’s my fault… In this way, the extent to which Heidegger drops transcendence out of unfree frustration and the extent to which he drops it because of the matter itself is by no means self-evident.

Thus, the \textit{Letter on Humanism} says that the thinking and saying of \textit{Being and Time} failed. But why and in what sense and to what extent? Even the task of formulating this question requires considerably more resources than are so far available here. And whilst this thesis can offer some reflections on this question, the complete engagement with it goes beyond the limits of the present work: we are primarily concerned with transcendence here – a question which is intimately connected with the collapse of \textit{Being and Time}, but not identical with this collapse per se.\textsuperscript{27}

\textsuperscript{24} But of course, in and of itself difficulty does not make philosophy genuine.
\textsuperscript{25} Though not identical to the complete form of the original example. On ‘kettle logic’ – viz. offering multiple explanations for something where the various reasons contradict each other – cf. Žižek (2007[2006]) 289
\textsuperscript{26} Cf. Malpas’ detailed account (albeit deployed differently) in Malpas (2006) Ch. 2, §4 esp. pp 155-157, 161
\textsuperscript{27} The above is not a critique of Kisiel (2005[2001]) which has its own limits and goals separate from that of this thesis. That is, yes, transcendence and the demise of SZ belong together, but there are other possible questions,
What must be taken from this problem is firstly that the sense in which transcendence is a failure – that because of which it was discarded – is *not* self-evident. Secondly, that transcendence belongs to the *demise* of *Being and Time* means *at the same time* that it belongs to the *possibility* of its completion, but what this means is also not self-evident.

What we now know most of all is that there are many dangers of misinterpretation. That the question of transcendence belongs to the whole problematic of fundamental ontology, but, that the whole field of the question is *not self-evident*.

Thus, the next section (§2) concerns the formal structure of transcendence. Following this we turn to the problematic of the language of transcendence (§3a) and then develop this with respect to its history (§3b) and from there the analysis shifts to the problematic of the ‘transcendental’ (§4). Much rests on how we understand this latter word and for this reason its meaning *cannot be left to chance*. In the final sections a few further observations are made on the interconnection of transcendence with the questions of *Being and Time* and through this the way forward for the analysis of transcendence is indicated.

### §2 – THE FORMAL STRUCTURE OF THE QUESTION OF TRANSCENDENCE

**a) The Formal Indication of the Root Meaning of Transcendence**

For Heidegger, formally speaking, and in the first instance, transcendence is transcending beings; a going beyond beings. This however, precisely does *not* mean getting ‘beyond myself’ to ‘something else’ or *exceeding* the everyday realm or even forgetting about

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28 VWG (ER) 38f., MFL 165f. etc.
First Stage: Formal Preconditions

Indeed, the priority of transcendence is connected with the priority of beings as a whole. But if transcendence is determined as Dasein’s primary opening of beings (and we will see that it is so determined) the discoveredness and disclosedness of this whole is always primordially factical.

Prior to every ‘getting stuck into’ or ‘ignoring’ beings Dasein has transcended these beings. What transcendence transcends towards is world, the (existentiell) factical totality of... in which I am. We can preliminarily secure this dual structure of transcendence if we look at Heidegger’s own way of establishing it in Vom Wesen des Grundes;

What is surpassed is simply beings themselves [Seiende selbst], i.e., every being which can be or become unconcealed to Dasein, even and precisely the very being as which Dasein “itself” exists... That onto-which [woraufhin] Dasein transcends, we call the world, and we can now define transcendence as Being-in-the-world.

For Heidegger, the first description of transcendence implies the second and vice versa so that, as Jeff Malpas has noted, transcendence is merely one of the ways of naming ecstatic openness. And since surpassing beings means the very same thing as establishing the factical world, surpassing beings is identical with originally being-in-the-world. Accordingly, Heidegger formulates transcendence as the most original breaking open of distance and nearness and transcendence provides the original formulation of Dasein’s existing inmitten des Seienden.

Because this is the sense of the ‘beyond’ which belongs to transcendence, transcending beings obviously does not mean anything like transcending this realm into another. This latter

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29 Cf. Ibid. & VWG (ER) 36f., 40f. etc.
30 Cf. Ibid. in the light and limits of Part I §3a herein; thus, ‘connected with’ is not the same as ‘identical to’ etc.
31 Cf. Ibid. etc.
32 Ibid. etc.
33 Ibid. etc.
34 VWG (ER) 38-41 (modified)
35 Malpas (2006) 164, 169
36 Thus, MFL 221, VWG (ER) 88f. 106f. 131 etc. (cf. also, VWG (ER) 106; the sich befinden which has a similar meaning and is rooted in the same ecstasy of temporality as the inmitten)
possibility is, for instance, that used by Medieval Christian theology according to which the world is the *saecularum* of God-forsakenness which Dasein transcends in drawing near to God and the heavenly. This is so far from being the case here in *Vom Wesen des Grundes* that transcendence precisely signifies an original concept of situatedness.\(^{37}\)

The formal structure of transcendence is going beyond beings *as* being-in-a-world and being-in-a-world *as* going beyond beings. This formal structure creates a collection of problems. These problems form the real problem of transcendence. Accordingly, the more pressing and difficult problem is unfolding the entire dimension of this formal structure; grounding it, exhibiting it.

### b) That which may be Derived from the Formal Structure of Transcendence in a Relatively Immediate Way

Merely stating the formal structure does not yet secure it against the gravest misinterpretation nor does it secure against extreme perplexities… nor can it! Moreover, in and of itself, merely stating a formal structure – merely asserting it to be the case – is philosophising in a groundless manner. Formal indication which lacks a thematised grasp of its fore-having is simply the poverty of the phenomenon. Methodologically, we enter this poverty only so that it may be overcome. In some ways it would be preferable to let the phenomenon of transcendence arise ‘organically’ from the problem of Dasein rather than, as it were, to bring it into the world with forceps – but that would be a somewhat longer and more complicated birth. Taken together, these reflections indicate that transcendence even now remains deeply veiled. Nonetheless, in a preliminary manner, some of the central structures of transcendence may be directly adduced from the formal definition of transcendence given above.

\[\alpha – \text{The concept of the ‘transcendent’}\]

\(^{37}\) Cf. *Ibid.* etc.
The transcendent is not really those being which are surpassed (i.e. not legitimately anyway, or, not when understood from the appropriate horizon).\textsuperscript{38} In usual philosophical discourse, for instance, in Kant, the transcendent is, in principle, an ‘object’ of some sort.\textsuperscript{39} This is not an arbitrary determination only so long as beings discovered are thought of as exceeding us, that is, of ‘transcending’ our existence in principle. But the most central tenets of \textit{Being and Time} rule out the perspective guiding the above concept of ‘the transcendent’.\textsuperscript{40} Beings discovered are not ‘out there’ in another realm from Dasein, rather, they proximally \textit{are} the realm of Dasein.\textsuperscript{41}

The ‘object’ is traditionally characterised as the transcendent to the extent that it is traditionally characterised as that which most properly \textit{transcends}.\textsuperscript{42} But if within this perspective, \textit{Dasein} is the being which primarily transcends, then discovered beings are so far from being properly named ‘the transcendent’ that it is Dasein itself which should instead take this name. Thus Heidegger says; “what is originally transcendent, what \textit{does the transcending}, is not things as over against Dasein; rather, it is Dasein itself which is transcendent in the strict sense.”\textsuperscript{43} It is noteworthy here that this modification of the ‘strict sense’ of the ‘transcendent’ can only be an issue for Heidegger because he is concerned about the grammar of the word ‘transcendence’ and because he wants to exhibit transcendence as the primary cognate.\textsuperscript{44}

\textbf{β – The connection between facticity and transcendence}

\textsuperscript{38} Cf. BP 162 (but note, Heidegger says similar things \textit{passim} the relevant texts, e.g. SZ (S) 366 implies the same; the only question there is whether this meaning is to become terminologically fixed. It is. Thus, for instance VWG (EG) 108 & of course BP 162 etc.)
\textsuperscript{39} E.g. VWG (EG) 119
\textsuperscript{40} E.g. SZ I.1.ii
\textsuperscript{41} Cf. SZ I.1
\textsuperscript{42} Cf. MFL 160ff. etc. God equally gains this type of characterisation because God, as the highest being, is determined as that being which most transcends as Heidegger mentions at various points, e.g. MFL 162.
\textsuperscript{43} BP (E/D) 162 / 230 ’im strengen Sinne’, cf. also BP 219, 298, VWG (ER/D) 36f. / 138
\textsuperscript{44} Cf. also BP 298f., VWG (EG) 108
The second important feature which we can read directly off of the formal structure of transcendence is that it is always factical. Transcending beings and thereby having a world is only possible qua factical. But this is to say that by definition transcendence is situated. Transcendence concerns the way – but not necessarily ‘everything’ about this ‘way’ – in which Dasein, as factual, arises from its situation or from its facticity.

To be sure, for instance, this is also true of care: “being-ahead-of-oneself-already-in (the world) as being-together-with (innerworldly beings encountered)”\(^{45}\) includes facticity and situatedness. Yet, the connection is more intimate in the structure of transcendence. And in this intimacy the above already presents a stark contrast with any application of the handed down, or unreconstructed use of ‘the transcendent’ for the problem of world.

\(\gamma\) – Transcendence and the problem of the ontological difference

One final thing which may be read directly off from the formal structure of transcendence; it is (formally) a kind of ‘relating to’ beings which is equally a relating to them ‘in general.’ Now, according to the formal definition of transcendence presented earlier, transcending beings is existentially ‘prior’ to relating to a specific being. As will be discussed in the next chapter this is connected with (but not identical to) Heidegger’s frequent assertion that intentionality (in the phenomenological sense) is founded on transcendence and not the other way around.\(^{46}\) But if intentionality is grounded in transcendence, and transcendence ontically discovers and discloses, then according to the law of the excluded middle it seems that transcendence must be the original openedness of beings: that transcendence is original ontic truth. And this is precisely what Heidegger says in the Vom Wesen des Grundes.\(^{47}\)

\(^{45}\) SZ (S) 192

\(^{46}\) Cf. Second Stage of the Founding Analysis.

\(^{47}\) VWR (ER) 18ff., 110ff.
But, for *precisely the same reason* this also means that transcendence must have a special relation to the disclosedness of being. That is, if transcendence is the most original form of ontic truth, it must also present the most original *happening* (or *concretion*) of ontological truth. Taken together, these say that transcendence is a formulation of – or the site for – the question about the *ontological difference*. It does not necessarily exhaust that question in and of itself but presents an original phenomenon thereof. And it is in connection with this that Heidegger can say of *Vom Wesen des Grundes* (a work dedicated to the articulation of transcendence and its associated problems) that its true aim is the elucidation of the ontological difference.\(^{48}\) For the same reason, he can also say there that transcendence is *both* ontic and ontological truth – and this in a primordial sense.\(^{49}\)

§3 – **NAMING TRANSCENDENCE; THE SYNONYMS OF TRANSCENDENCE AND THE GRAMMAR OF TRANSCENDENCE COMPARED TO HISTORY OF NAMING TRANSCENDENCE**

**a) The Ways of Naming Transcendence**

Transcendence and its cognates are words from the history of philosophy. Therein it has had very many differing technical formulations and has been situated within varying contexts: by situating transcendence in an opposition of world (qua *saecularum*) and heaven, or by situating transcendence in opposition to the immanence of subjectivity, it gains differing meanings. Heidegger notes this.\(^{50}\) Sometimes he goes so far as to say that some meanings which have accrued to the word make no sense.\(^{51}\) In accordance with the ambiguity in the word, Heidegger first wants to bring us back to the very formal and basic meaning of this word (indeed, the ‘verbal’ meaning of the word, i.e. its meaning as a verb).\(^{52}\) It means,

\(^{48}\) VWG (ER) 3
\(^{49}\) VWR (ER) 18ff., 110ff.
\(^{50}\) E.g. MFL 160ff. (cf. also §2bα of this chapter etc.), PIK 216-217
\(^{51}\) E.g. PIK 216, MFL 162 etc.
\(^{52}\) That this is a relatively common procedure cf. BP 298, MFL 159f. etc.
‘passing over’ or ‘going over.’ And from this root, it accrues very many synonyms. For instance, Heidegger says in the *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*:

> Transcendere signifies literally to step over, to pass over, go through, and occasionally also to surpass [übertreffen].

It is important to note here, that this word ‘surpass’ (which is only ‘occasionally’ relevant) is not the same word which becomes the primary indicator for the meaning of transcendence in *Vom Wesen des Grundes*. In the latter, transcendence is primarily understood as ‘surpassing’, but as *Überstiegen* rather than *Übertreffen*. This does not mean that what was marginal in 1927 has become central in 1929, rather, the terminological shift should be taken as harbouring only marginal significance.

In *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic* – which must be viewed as the first, extended draft of *Vom Wesen des Grundes* (though the former lacks an analysis of the three modes of grounding) – Heidegger says;

> We will proceed from the verbal definition and then try to set down the meanings found in usages of the expression “transcendence.” The verbal meaning comes from *transcendere*: to surpass, step over, to cross over to. Thus *transcendence* means the surpassing, the going beyond.

Transcendence accrues much the same signification in both places. Transcendence is the going beyond, and refers to the ‘beyond.’ And so, Heidegger employs various expressions for this beyond (which are mostly rooted in “Über”). What unifies all the rhetorical power of these various expressions (and does so most decisively in *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*) is precisely the Greek ‘ἐπέκεινα’, namely, one of Plato’s determinations of

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53 BP (E/D) 298 / 423
54 Ibid. & VWG (ER/D) passim
55 Cf. MFL passim vs. VWG passim
56 MFL 160
First Stage: Formal Preconditions

the meaning of ‘the good’.\textsuperscript{58} And this indicates a special connection of transcendence with the re-petition of history and of the Greek origins of this whole problematic. In some ways, this connection is indicated by the fact that Heidegger’s first public discussion of transcendence that is consonant with his problem from 1927-1929, occurs under the topic of the \textit{Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy}.\textsuperscript{59}

b) General Historical Reflections on the Problem of Naming Transcendence and its Grammar

The topic of transcendence in the history of philosophy makes us immediately think of such philosophers as Kant and Husserl. And of course, while Heidegger tends to keep his engagement with Husserl ‘incognito’, in the late 20s, Kant has a special and very visible role.\textsuperscript{60} There are the 1925-1926 \textit{Logic: the Question of Truth} and the 1926 lecture course \textit{History of Philosophy from Aquinas to Kant}. It is almost not an exaggeration to say that \textit{the Basic Problems of Phenomenology} is an analysis of Kant.\textsuperscript{61} After \textit{the Basic Problems} Heidegger works out the \textit{Phenomenological Interpretations of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason}, and then of course there is the \textit{Kantbuch}. Kant plays an important role within \textit{Vom Wesen des Grundes} and of course, Kant has a continuing significance for Heidegger, not least of all in \textit{The Essence of Human Freedom} and \textit{What is a Thing?}

\textsuperscript{58} BP §20
\textsuperscript{59} BCA 7-8, 86-87 (esp. vs. 30: τάξις), 165 183 – though not everything is unambiguous here. The origin of the problem as a fundamental problem remains fairly mysterious. Much of the passages referred to above could just as easily be discussed without transcendence having become a fundamental problem. Thus, one ought to be careful with the above assertion: nothing is wholly certain in this particular question. It is clear from a comparison of the archival material (relying on Kisiel (2005[2001]) and Kisiel (1995[1993])) with that of the published texts that the problem of transcendence is subject to a higher reticence, before, as Kisiel puts it, “it is suddenly there in its full glory in §69c.” Kisiel (1995[1993]) 448
\textsuperscript{60} Re; Husserl, cf. the SZ (S) 38, 98 160 \textit{infra}, very early texts such as \textit{Introduction to Phenomenological Research} along with LQT §§6-10, HCT, intentionality in BP & MFL \textit{passim} etc., cf. also Carr (2007) \textit{passim}
\textsuperscript{61} Cf. Kant as the ground for the \textit{movement} of BP §§7-18 as well as being Heidegger’s primary interlocutor for BP §§7-9, 21a and other areas of the text.
But this historical significance must be tempered. After the above quote from *the Basic Problems of Phenomenology* (“Transcendere signifies…”) Heidegger continues by prioritising the formal significance of the word transcendence;

> We define the philosophical concept of transcendence following the pattern of the original meaning of the word and not so much with regard to traditional philosophical usage, which besides is quite ambiguous and indefinite.

On this basis, the grammar and formal significance of the word is given priority *over* the handed-down sense, for which reason Heidegger continues (speaking not just of ‘transcendence’ but also its *cognate* ‘transcendental’);

> It is from the ontological concept of transcendence properly understood that an understanding can first of all be gained of what Kant was seeking, at bottom, when transcendence moved for him into the centre of philosophical inquiry and did so as transcendental philosophy.

Thus, as important as the history of transcendence is, it offers no clarity. As important as Kant is in this history, he does not offer the key to unlocking it, rather, he is *in want of this key*.

What is not as conspicuous, is the way that Plato and monadology, that is Leibniz, enter into the centre of the problem of transcendence at pivotal junctures. Leibniz enters the centre of the problem in both *the Basic Problems of Phenomenology* and in *Vom Wesen des Grundes*, but, most completely (and therefore most clearly) in *the Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*. Plato’s good, the ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας, that which is ‘even beyond being’, is repeatedly used as an historical substitute for the existential phenomenon.

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62 BP 298  
63 BP 298  
64 BP 300-301  
65 *passim*  
66 MFL §§1-7, 209f.  
67 VWG (ER) 92ff., MFL 184f., BP 283-286
First Stage: Formal Preconditions

In turn the history of Heidegger’s personal relation with the word transcendence contains its own set of problems which can only be touched on here. For instance, as Kisiel notes, in the very early, more theologically motivated lecture courses, Heidegger considers transcendence in opposition to decadence.\footnote{Kisiel (1995[1993]) 218, 408} This can be seen to follow a traditional Christian model:

- Because God is the highest being, he is the being which most truly transcends, yet,
- Since, the human being exists in the image (ἰδέα) of God, and since the being of the human is essentially a drawing-near-to-God, the essence of the human is equally characterised by transcendence.\footnote{Cf. SZ (S/S) 48-49 et infra} This ‘drawing near’ to God (transcendence) means that Dasein is, in a certain sense bound by its own essence to God and the divine just as for Plato, according to Goethe’s translation, the eye is sonnenhaft insofar as the eye’s essence is to come together with the sun in vision.\footnote{Cf. Ibid. & BP 283}
- However, the essence of the human includes both the possibility of appropriating this connection with God and the counter-possibility of shaking it off. Dasein can fall to the flesh, i.e., to the ‘world’ qua the unheavenly and the realm of the decadence of man. Thus, decadence, deflexus, is the kind of situation in which transcendence (human existence) turns away from itself and falls away from its own essence. Conversely, the mode of being of the righteous, and that which righteousness hopes for is precisely composure and peace; continentia.\footnote{Cf. Kisiel (1995[1993]) 202, 218} Continentia is the way in which our Dasein most fully draws near to God, thus, the true transcendence is inner peace.

Here, the greatest and most radical excess which belongs to the being of Dasein is precisely composure, and indeed, composure as becoming essential. Kisiel implies that this and its connected concepts return again in Heidegger’s work on transcendence in the late 20s.\footnote{Kisiel (1995[1993]) 408} And, aside from the clear similarity of deflexus and Being and Time’s concept of fallenness, perhaps we can understand this more completely if we reflect that transcendence as
continentia is precisely ‘com-posure’ which is nonetheless ‘excessive.’\textsuperscript{73} For, whilst so much of what common understanding signifies by ‘transcendence’ is self-destructive, and may be called ‘decadent’ either in a religious, or as it were, an ontological sense (i.e. qua dispersal: \textit{Zer-streuung}), transcendence as Dasein’s taking up a world is merely a primordial name for the how of Dasein’s situatedness. Nonetheless, the religious concept of transcendence has been all but completely dropped by the late 20s.\textsuperscript{74}

In \textit{History of the Concept of Time} (summer, 1925) – which is commonly called a draft of \textit{Being and Time} with good reason – transcendence is still employed primarily in opposition to immanence.\textsuperscript{75} In \textit{the Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy} (summer 1926) Heidegger alludes to kind of problem of transcendence we see in \textit{Being and Time} and thereafter.\textsuperscript{76} Between these two lecture courses stands the winter semester 1925-1926 course, \textit{Logic: the Question of Truth}. On this we find that:

In the dossier of his autograph of the lecture course of WS 1925-1926, Heidegger has left a thick accumulation of loose notes focussed repeatedly on “§69,” archivally suggesting what a sticking point this new development [viz. transcendence] was for the conceptual formation taking us beyond BT [i.e. beyond SZ I.1-2].\textsuperscript{77}

These notes are labelled “I.3”; that is \textit{Time and Being}.\textsuperscript{78} §69 is aimed at (and incompletely achieves) the \textit{temporal problem of the transcendence of Dasein}, that is, it aims at the true \textit{fundamental ontological problem of transcendence}.

\textsuperscript{73} Kisiel (1995[1993]) 202, 218, 408 Here however, one must read p 408 in constant awareness of the passage from SZ which Kisiel refers to therein (viz. SZ 49, though also cf. SZ (S) 48) cf. also VWG (ER) 128ff.
\textsuperscript{75} The former being is discussed in Kisiel (1985) 197 \textit{et passim}, Kisiel (1989) 3 etc. For the latter, see HCT \textit{passim}. As we will see there are secure grounds for supposing that the concept of transcendence discussed here is not yet a problem for Heidegger at this time (most fundamentally, in HCT’s concept of world).
\textsuperscript{76} BCA 7-8, 86-87 (esp. vs. 30), 165 183 etc. But not qua ‘releases an already fully formed idea.’ In this regard there are insufficient grounds in the public domain to really get a grip on where things stood with the problem at the time.
\textsuperscript{77} Kisiel (1995[1993]) 449
\textsuperscript{78} Kisiel (2005[2001]) 211
First Stage: Formal Preconditions

So, we know that, despite the terseness of SZ§69, it presented Heidegger with both inordinate difficulties and the central possibility of the completion of *Being and Time*. That hidden within its ‘matter of fact’ exhibition lay significant difficulties, the solutions to which are by no means obvious. We also see that the grammar of transcendence is important for Heidegger, and that he wants to reconfigure this grammar, to make it coherent as a grammar and only then to think it as a fundamental ontological problem. And within this context, the history of the philosophy of transcendence is both help and hindrance.

§4 – THE PROBLEM OF FUNDAMENTAL ONTOLOGICAL TRANSCENDENCE AND ‘THE TRANSCENDENTAL’

a) The Problem of Heidegger and Transcendental Philosophy (in sketch form)

No doubt the difficulty which Heidegger faced in making himself understood is connected with the history of the word ‘transcendence’ and its related terms ‘the transcendent’ and ‘the transcendental’ and the baggage they bear. Of these terms, ‘transcendental’ would seem to be the most difficult to pin down in Heidegger’s analyses. To this extent, this section must remain at once one of the most important and the hardest in this chapter (though, properly §2 should be treated as the most important).

In our time, aside from some debate about important subtleties and the occurrence of some parallel discourses, at bottom it has grown obvious what each of these words mean. Simply importing the traditional meaning of these terms then serves as a much sought-after shortcut in the analysis of Heidegger’s problem of transcendence. But, what is obvious is not questioned. And so, the so called ‘petrified tradition’ and the tradition’s tendency towards petrification becomes one of the greatest obstacles to an original question of transcendence.

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79 As discussed in Dahlstrom (2005b) 40-41 & BP 323-324 etc.
80 The existence of which is practically axiomatic (both the subtleties and the debate about them)
81 On petrification, cf. MFL 155ff.
That Heidegger espouses phenomenology or that he engages with Kant is now falsely taken as grounds *simpliciter* for merely importing handed down concepts into Heidegger. Through this we slip into the maxim according to which from “out of five authors you can make a sixth.”

As important as the history of ‘transcendental philosophy’ is for the question of fundamental ontological transcendence, the connection is not without certain points of fundamental divergence. And so, if the grounding gesture of the usual appropriation of Heidegger’s ‘transcendental question’ is one of ‘comparison’ (e.g. of comparing Kant to Heidegger and thereby entering the question in a way which is *ruled* by this comparison) and, as Heidegger puts it, “every comparison limps” then the predominant grounding gesture of this field of engagement with Heidegger is an attempt to limp in a primordial way. And if this thesis can establish that the problem does not require us to ‘limp’ this will already be a significant achievement. Thus, the task becomes to first encounter Heidegger’s understanding of transcendence and its related concepts *on the basis of* Heidegger’s philosophising rather than on the basis of analogy.

**b) Definition of the Relation between Transcendental and Transcendence**

The preliminary demarcation of the fundamental ontological significance of transcendence and the transcendent has already been worked out but the question about ‘the transcendental’ still needs additional clarification. This word stands at the head of SZ I. We find this word again in the introduction to *Being and Time*; “Phenomenological truth” (disclosedness of

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82 Rendered differently, the *Auseinandersetzung* of the *Kantdeutung* (KPM (T) 175) instead becomes a matter of *Einsetzung*.

83 MFL 141 (which Heidegger derides as “the simpleton’s notion of philosophy” *Ibid.*).

84 Cf. SHF 28
First Stage: Formal Preconditions

being) is *veritas transcendentalis.*”85 Clearly then its definition must determine how we understand the whole of *Being and Time.*86

At bottom, according to this thesis, for Heidegger, in fundamental ontological terms, *transzendental* is simply the adjectival form of *Transzendenz*; a ‘*Transzendentale*’ or ‘*ein transzendentaler Begriff*’ is merely a concept which corresponds intrinsically to *Transzendenz.*

This is also the approach taken explicitly and unambiguously by Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann.87 Similarly, it is in complete agreement with the implicit maxim guiding Kisiel when he says:

> In terms of transcendence, the destruction of the history of ontology naturally becomes that of transcendental philosophy, from Plato to Kant to Husserl. The categories of the being of *Dasein* can now be called not only temporal and existential but also transcendental.88

That is, properly speaking, the transcendental is not some special case of transcendence or mystical super-concept structuring the analytic of *Dasein* from the outside, rather, simply put, *tranzendentale,* is to *Tranzendenz as existenziale* is to *Existenz.*

c) The Ambiguity Pertaining to Heidegger’s Language

Heidegger is not his most forceful in enunciating this re-configuration, but nonetheless he is consistent so far as this was *possible.* For instance, in his analyses of Kant he does in fact

85 SZ (S) 38
86 Though, discussion of the above domain of problems (viz. the *veritas transcendentalis*) must await the *Founded Analysis.*
87 Von Herrmann (1993[1989]) 120f. While he immediately binds this to the *transcendens schlechthin,* he does so with an ordered level-headedness, self-awareness and clarity of thought which almost wholly makes up for his skipping essential steps of the problem (according to the maxims of this thesis). By this ‘skipping ahead’ is meant his completely bypassing the transcendental problem of world, thereby disrupting the sense in which the fundamental ontological problem of transcendence is fundamental ontological without for this reason being ‘purely ontological’ or ‘solely temporale.’ Conversely, for an interpretation which does not do this cf. von Hermann (2011).
88 Kisiel (1995[1993]) 408
Part II – the Founding Analysis

determine the ‘transcendental’ in its Kantian sense ‘as synthetic a priori knowledge.’ His doing so is a pre-condition of the re-petition which aims at the unsaid. Since this procedure is simply a necessary part of the re-petition it speaks neither for nor against Heidegger having fundamentally re-configured the meaning of the word ‘transcendental.’

One factor which blocks the way to hearing the word ‘transcendental’ in this other sense is simply that, for the most part, when Heidegger places these words together, the sentence remains ambiguous so that one could feasibly read it either way. Conversely, if one wants to speak about the Kantbuch – which is easily, but not necessarily correctly, thought of as the most canonical source for these questions – the primary way in which transcendence and transcendental are placed alongside each other follows the model:

Schematism forms transcendence \textit{a priori} and hence is called “Transcendental Schematism.”

This could be read either way. Yet, without mounting a major investigation of the Kantbuch (which would require a chapter of its own at the very least), elsewhere we find that:

Kant wants to replace the “proud name of an ontology” with that of a “Transcendental Philosophy,” i.e., with an essential unveiling of transcendence.

As long as we want to keep ‘transcendence’ and ‘transcendental’ separate this kind of talk remains merely figurative, wilfully violent or meaningless. If however, we grant these terms the interconnection which \textit{belongs} to their grammar then the above becomes possible. If we place this grammar into the Kantian architectonic, and ‘reverse engineer’ the transcendence

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89 PIK 39-40, KPM (T) 10f. \textit{et passim}. Heidegger also defines the transcendental in Kant according to ‘possibility’ and ‘conditions of possibility’ (though less frequently) as per CPR (A/B) 15-16 / 29-30, for instance, in VWG (ER) 40f., SZ (S/S) 144f. The latter passage could be profitably used contra Blattner (2007) 21 \textit{et passim}, or Malpas (2006) Ch. 4 etc. However, there is no space for such an exhibition here. \textit{In lieu} of such an analysis, one might note that in the above cited passage from SZ Heidegger precisely emphasises the transcendental’s connection with \textit{possibility} and de- emphasises its connection with \textit{conditions} (whereas the transcendental reading of Heidegger places especial emphasis on winning conditions). The priority of possibility over conditions \textit{points to a temporal problem, that is, to the priority of futurity}. Cf. also BP 127f.

90 Though KPM (T) 10f. already prioritises the grammar as a condition for the re-petition of Kant.

91 KPM (T) 74

92 KPM (T) 88
whose essence belongs together with Kant’s transcendental problem this does not immediately lead us to Heidegger’s problem of fundamental ontological transcendence. It leads us into the ‘wilderness’ of the Kantian problem, i.e., it leads us to ‘Heidegger’s Kant.’

d) The Clarity Pertaining to Heidegger’s Language

In order to attest the aforementioned relation between the terms ‘transcendence’ and ‘transcendental’ we may begin with the most prominent example: in Being and Time, when Heidegger is leading up to the line about ‘veritas transcendentalis’ he says; “Every disclosure of being as the transcendens is transcendental knowledge.” This says: what makes knowledge transcendental, is that it is a knowing of transcendence. ‘Transcendental’ doesn’t signify some special case of transcendence; the word merely indicates the ‘belonging to transcendence’ which pertains to whatever is named ‘transcendental’ (in this case, truth).

In Malpas’ Heidegger’s Topology – a work which, in other respects, is generally sensitive to the questions in play – Malpas quotes Heidegger in order to define the meaning which ‘transcendental’ bears for Heidegger:

Heidegger says of the “transcendental” that “this term names all that belongs to transcendence and bears its intrinsic possibility thanks to such transcendence.”

Its ‘intrinsic possibility’ that is, its innere Möglichkeit. The quote here is from Vom Wesen des Grundes. After the above, Heidegger continues: “it is for this reason alone that we can

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93 Cf. KPM (T) 10f. et passim. Note: in PIK the word ‘transcendence’ is used in a way mostly consonant with Heidegger’s more usual problem of transcendence elsewhere (e.g. SZ, MFL, VWG, EP). By way of contrast, KPM is an exception (its use of transcendence is related but irreducibly different) and thus requires its own dedicated analysis.
94 SZ (S) 38
95 Here, moreover, cf. Gracia (1992) 19 that the adjectival form was not even used during the Middle Ages to name the doctrine and problem which was subsequently named ‘the transcendentals.’
96 Malpas (2006) 166, Malpas drops the word ‘essentially’ viz. wesenhaft from this quote; “all that belongs essentially to transcendence” (Ibid. & 357, VWG (ER/EG) 40 / 109) Heidegger is using this word here only to differentiate the transcendental from what only ‘formally’ or ‘accidentally’ pertains to transcendence. This problem will be discussed the Final Stage of the Founding Analysis §4
also call the clarification and explanation of transcendence a “transcendental” discussion.”

The sentence in *Vom Wesen des Grundes* immediately preceding the one quoted by Malpas reads;

> World goes to make up the unified structure of transcendence; the concept of world is called *transcendental* because it belongs to this structure.100

*Because* world is *intimately* connected with transcendence, it is called transcendental. Thus, not the other way around, and instead, the naming occurs in simple accord with a grammar for which transcendence is the primary cognate. Yet later, in what is a central tenet of Malpas’ account Malpas also says:

> The transcendental names the proper structure of transcendence, that which belongs to it, and so to being-there, and can thus be said to name that which makes transcendence possible.101

But here Malpas’ interpretation becomes incompatible with his quotation of Heidegger even more so when we consider the sentence preceding the passage he quoted above. Heidegger says: transcendence is the inner possibility of whatsoever is named transcendental, Malpas says: the transcendental is the inner possibility of transcendence. Heidegger says: transcendence has an inner structural unity, whatsoever belongs to this structural unity may be called transcendental, Malpas says: the transcendental is that underlying structure which precedes and thereby structures transcendence.

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97 Cf. VWG (D) 139
98 Malpas (2006) 166, 357
99 VWG (ER) 40f.
100 VWG (ER) 40f. (modified). To aid the clarity of the ensuing exhibition, the entire quote reads: “World goes to make up the unified structure of transcendence; the concept of world is called *transcendental* because it belongs to [zugehörig] this structure. We use the term “transcendental” to designate everything that belongs by its essence to transcendence [was wesenhaft zur Transzedenz gehört], everything that owes its inner possibility to transcendence. It is for this reason alone that we can also call the clarification and explanation of transcendence a “transcendental” discussion.” VWG (ER) 40f.
101 Malpas (2006) 168-169. And even more problematically (re the word ground) he says “the transcendental is that which concerns the structure or ground for transcendence” (Malpas (2006) 171). Malpas’ concern here is to secure that the grounding of transcendence is hierarchical and thereby a non-topological concept of grounding, namely, so that it may be overcome (e.g. Malpas (2006) 170 etc.).
By saying that transcendence bears the *inner* possibility of the transcendental Heidegger makes *explicit* that he is *not* talking about ‘mere possibility’. Perhaps if he was, then Malpas would be in the clear. But that means, the only way in which the transcendental could be that which ‘makes transcendence possible’ (Malpas’ words) is if – *in direct opposition to what Heidegger said* – something called ‘the transcendental’ bore the inner possibility of transcendence.

Instead we must say ‘the transcendental’ (viz. *that* which is called transcendental, e.g. the world) ‘names that which belongs to transcendence’ *because and only because* transcendence is the former’s *inner possibility and not the other way around*.

Grammatically speaking, Malpas has reversed the proper grammar between transcendence and the transcendental concept (and he is by no means alone in this). He now interprets transcendence on the basis of something called ‘the transcendental’ and, the latter now structures his understanding of the former (but such a relation implies that the syntactical difference is understood as a semantic difference). And since a guiding principle of Malpas’ account is that Heidegger’s analysis of transcendence is sparse because “Heidegger seems to assume it to be already well understood, presumably on the basis of its existing usage within the philosophical tradition”\(^\text{102}\) here, in the question of transcendence posed with the aid of the history of metaphysics, the history of metaphysics helps just a little too much. This kind of ‘helpfulness’ of the history of metaphysics (namely, ‘helping too much’) is not something peculiar to Malpas but is instead one the most pervasive difficulties facing any attempt to grasp the problem of fundamental ontological transcendence.

Now it could be exhaustively shown that this relation between transcendence and transcendental holds in every single text from the relevant period. With this it would be completely demonstrated that the grammatical relation between ‘transcendental’ and

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\(^{102}\) Malpas (2006) 163
‘transcendence’ is a foundational precept for the meaning of the former in Heidegger’s late 20s work and not, for instance, an accident of language from the above discussed portion of *Vom Wesen des Grundes*. But that would also be rather prolix and so, instead, a more concise overview is given in what follows.\(^{103}\)

In *the Metaphysical Foundations of Logic* Heidegger is at his most forceful and elemental on this relation:

> Because it pertains to transcendence as such, world is a transcendental concept in the strictest sense of the term.\(^{104}\)

But that is to say; any concept which *pertains* to transcendence – which is *gehörtig* to transcendence – is simply in the *strictest sense* of the term a ‘transcendental concept’. *Anything else* (i.e. where the difference is interpreted semantically) is loose language.\(^{105}\)

As we saw earlier, in a footnote to *Vom Wesen des Grundes* Heidegger says;

> We might point out here that the portion of the investigation concerning “being and time” published so far has as its task nothing more than a concrete, revealing project of transcendence (cf. §§ 12-83, esp. §69). The project is there in order to make the *single* prominent goal of these investigations possible, a goal that is clearly indicated in the *heading* of the *whole* first part: namely, attaining the “transcendental horizon of the question about being”.\(^{106}\)

So this says clearly that transcendence is essentially connected with that which may be called transcendental. After all, we work out the structure of transcendence *in order to* arrive at the ‘transcendental horizon of the question about being.’ If working out the whole of transcendence leads to the ‘transcendental horizon of being’, the difference between these two

\(^{103}\) In outline cf. also BP 17, 323 vis-à-vis 281, PIK 216 vis-à-vis 213f.; 232, KPM (T) 10f.

\(^{104}\) MFL (E) 170, cf. MFL (D) 218 : “Welt ist, weil zur Transzendenz als solcher gehörtig, ein im strengen Sinne transzendentaler Begriff.”

\(^{105}\) Cf. §2bu, this chapter

\(^{106}\) VWG (ER) 97 *infra* (modified)
First Stage: Formal Preconditions

phrases amounts to… the word ‘horizon’, a suffix and the word ‘being.’ That this is not an idle inference is shown by how Heidegger continues:

... by illuminating transcendence, we are supposed to gain the horizon within which the concept of being – even the much discussed "natural" concept – can alone be philosophically grounded as a concept."\(^{107}\)

So now, ‘illuminating transcendence’ is the same as presenting “the horizon within which the concept of being [can be]… philosophically grounded as a concept”. Making the ‘horizon of transcendence’ visible is the same as making the ‘transcendental horizon’ visible. The suffix appended to the word ‘transcendental’ serves no appreciable semantic function. In sum, we are told that it is obvious that Being and Time’s central goal is the transcendental horizon of the question about being and this in turn is identical with the analysis of transcendence and its horizon.

The equivalence is even more striking in the following passage where transcendence and transcendental are constantly used interchangeably;

In … [the understanding of being] transcendence is founding. And since being and its constitution are disclosed in transcendence, transcendental founding is called ontological truth.\(^{108}\)

And if there remain any doubts, compare what the above says of ontological truth to what Heidegger says a few pages later:

Thus we see that the “birthplace” of the principle of sufficient reasons lies neither in the essence of the assertion nor in its truth but rather in ontological truth, i.e., in transcendence itself.\(^{109}\)

Simply put, the terms are used interchangeably.

\(^{107}\) VWR (ER) 99 \textit{infra}

\(^{108}\) VWR (ER) 116-117

\(^{109}\) VWR (ER) 123
• In the understanding of being, transcendence is founding.
• Disclosing being therein is transcendental founding.
• Transcendental founding is ontological truth.
• Ontological truth is transcendence itself.

So, whilst that which this section has tried to show is not always conspicuous, it should be conspicuous enough. That this connection holds is a basic precept throughout the following analysis. If the word ‘transcendental’ is used in what follows then it simply means that which pertains to transcendence – except, of course, so far as discussions of Kant etc. require otherwise.

With the above, the ‘transcendental’ shortcut to the problem of transcendence has been basically forestalled. In Kant the grammatical difference between ‘transcendence’ and ‘transcendental’ is a conceptual-semantic difference. In Heidegger and in this thesis the grammatical difference is not a conceptual/semantic difference, thus, for example, the ‘transcendental problem of world’ simply means ‘the problem of world in accordance with transcendence.’ We cannot solve the problem of transcendence by reflecting on ‘the transcendental’ – at best, we can understand why and how something may be called ‘transcendental’ in a fundamental ontological sense only by first concretely determining the meaning of transcendence.

§5 – THE QUESTION OF A FUNDAMENTAL ONTOLOGICAL CONCEPT OF TRANSCENDENCE: RETURNING THE PROBLEM OF TRANSCENDENCE TO THE PROBLEMS OF BEING AND TIME

In the Contributions Heidegger calls that concept of transcendence which animated his work in the late 20s the ‘fundamental ontological concept of transcendence.’\(^\text{110}\) Of course, this means that transcendence is important not just because it has an important place in Kant’s

\(^{110}\) Cf. Contributions 151,
First Stage: Formal Preconditions

terminology but (also) the reverse.\textsuperscript{111} Thus, in some way, it must be possible to experience the essence of transcendence on the basis of the analysis of Dasein. Thought with respect to the original formulation of \textit{Being and Time}, once this experience has been determined it becomes possible to historicise the question. In the historicisation of the question we finally break open the complete question.

Yet, for the most part, we instead have Heidegger trying to analyse transcendence ‘with the help of the history of metaphysics.’ This did not make the full problem of transcendence transparent; indeed, it often had the opposite effect.\textsuperscript{112} Heidegger’s fundamental confrontation with the tradition results in us falling back into traditional habits; we continually read the destructive re-petition as if it were a non-destructive appropriation. In this very precise sense, the historical interpretation of transcendence becomes the biggest obstacle to our understanding of transcendence.

But Heidegger does work out the essentials of an existential concept of transcendence. And if we hew to these essentials, perhaps then we can first break into the real question of transcendence which Heidegger was seeking in the late 20s.\textsuperscript{113} And it is not as though these traces are hidden, we just have to first resolve upon elucidating their significance.

Transcendence is a central problem. \textit{Being and Time} seeks the transcendental horizon of the question of the meaning of being, transcendence attests world and grounds it, the question of world-time is interconnected with the question of transcendence and the temporale question of time concerns transcendence: \textit{Being and Time} is “nothing more” than a concrete analysis of transcendence.\textsuperscript{114}

\textsuperscript{111} Already visible in foregoing citations & BP 17 vs. 323f. etc.
\textsuperscript{112} E.g. cf. the previous section vs. the reception of Heidegger’s \textit{Kantdeutung} etc.
\textsuperscript{113} Indeed, in this way it becomes possible to see why transcendence is \textit{intrinsically} historical and not merely something can be exhibited historically.
\textsuperscript{114} SZ (S) 419, VWG (ER) 96f. \textit{infra} etc.
We ourselves are the source of the idea of being [i.e., the understanding of being], but this source is to be understood as the primal transcendence of Dasein.¹¹⁵

But after all, we usually think of this source as temporality/Temporalität. On the other hand:

The transcendence of Dasein is the central problem, not for the purpose of explaining “knowledge,” but for clarifying Dasein and its existence as such, and the latter in turn with fundamental-ontological intent.¹¹⁶

‘The central problem’; is this merely hyperbole? Is transcendence supplanting temporality in this context? Is transcendence different from time – a new ‘level’ perhaps? But if the latter were so, and transcendence is the central question, why is it called Being and Time and not Being and Time and Transcendence? Or does transcendence’s centrality have nothing to do with a possible question of the supplantation of time by transcendence? For instance Catriona Hanley conceives transcendence as the ‘and’ of Being and Time.¹¹⁷ If, as we have seen, transcendence belongs essentially to the Being and Time project, then in the first instance, transcendence seems to occupy an awkward and ambiguous position in the analysis.

But perhaps, in what seems paradoxical at first, it is this very ‘awkwardness’, this non-locatedness, which secures transcendence as the central question of Dasein.¹¹⁸ Consider the quote from Heidegger rendered near the beginning of this chapter. It says that:

The analysis of Angst (§40), the problems of Dasein, worldliness, and reality [Realität], as well as the interpretation of conscience and the concept of death – all serve the progressive elaboration of transcendence, until the latter is finally taken up anew and expressly (§69) as a problem.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁵ MFL 88
¹¹⁶ MFL 135 (italics added)
¹¹⁷ Hanley (2000) 187, if so, then Cf. KPM (T) 170, that it is a reasonable supposition cf. MFL 141, 144, 148
¹¹⁸ This is already indicated by the sentences from MFL (E/D) 167-168 / 214 preceding the following long quote. Cf. the longer version of this quote heading §1 of this chapter.
¹¹⁹ MFL (E/D) 167-168 / 214
Of these parts of *Being and Time*, only §69 explicitly mentions transcendence. Conversely, there is the quote from *Vom Wesen des Grundes* given in the previous section which tells us that *Being and Time* SZ I.1-2 concerns “nothing more than a concrete, revealing project of transcendence”. All this for a book which barely even mentions the problem. Elsewhere Heidegger also indicates that the complete phenomenon of transcendence must be exhibited through the phenomenon of care. But if this is so, then transcendence ought to be something which springs from the totality of fundamental ontology as an *inner* character thereof. Accordingly, if the analysis of transcendence is carried out correctly, then by developing the concept of transcendence we will be developing a more complete understanding of existentiality in general.

This is wholly contrary, for instance, to François Jaran’s approach to the problem. According to him, transcendence is the basic concept of the ‘metaphysics of Dasein’ where this metaphysics overcomes, or at least appears to overcome, fundamental ontology and basically replaces the latter’s project. Jaran’s primary way of attesting this position is by referring to the chronology of the appearance of certain problems – especially, their thematic appearance. Through this, transcendence and fundamental ontology are cut off from each other; one project gives way to another, rather than one project expanding itself and thereby gaining new dimensions. But if transcendence were something that replaced and overcame fundamental ontology then it would have to gain power over time. Yet it does not. Temporality, as the most basic ground of fundamental ontology continues to bear existential

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120 Indeed, aside from SZ §69, transcendence is mentioned in the introduction, as is well known, along with one explicit mention in the analysis of historicity (SZ (S/S) 389) and another in the analysis of world-time (SZ (S/S) 419). Neither one of these instances is particularly elucidating in and of themselves: they clearly refer to the problem of §69 but do not show anything more than it does. Other instances of the word in the text are not relevant (e.g. the transcendence of consciousness to its object at SZ (S/S) 202).
121 VWG (ER) 96f. infra
122 Cf. above.
123 E.g. BP 298
125 Ibid. & 224
126 Accordingly, Jaran (2010) 206f., 209 seems to identify ‘fundamental ontology’ more with SZ I.1 than with SZ §65 et seq. However, his text is entirely unclear in this respect, i.e., fundamental ontology and the metaphysics of Dasein are constantly distinguished but what constitutes and grounds the difference remains ambiguous.
priority over transcendence throughout the late 20s amidst this period’s talk of a ‘metaphysics of Dasein’ and a projected ‘metontology’.127

Thus, for instance in Being and Time Heidegger says;

And if the being of Dasein is completely grounded in temporality, temporality must make possible being-in-the-world and thus the transcendence of Dasein.128

Which says the same thing about the relationship between transcendence and temporality as Vom Wesen des Grundes:

Yet just as the future precedes “in” time, yet temporalizes only insofar as having-been and present also – as intrinsic to time – temporalize in the specific unity of time, so too those ways of grounding that spring from transcendence display this connection. Such correspondence is to be found, however, because transcendence is rooted in the essence of time, i.e., in its ecstatic-horizonal constitution.129

Throughout this entire period Heidegger says the same thing. Transcendence does not replace temporality, nor is it just another name for ecstatic-horizonal temporality per se, rather, the former is ‘grounded’ in the latter.130 Formally put, Heidegger tells us that the central question of Dasein is transcendence and he also tells us that the central question of Dasein is temporality. Moreover, he tells us consistently that transcendence is grounded in temporality. But if transcendence is that because of which Dasein is being-in-the-world and Dasein is always being-in-the-world, then temporality must always ‘entail’ transcendence. Thus, the ‘grounding’ relationship between temporality and transcendence is so original that in a certain sense temporality ‘is’ transcendence, that is, more precisely, temporality is never without transcendence.131

127 MFL 154ff. (but cf. on this ‘arousal’ BCA 87, as noted by Jaran (2010) 223)
128 SZ (S) 364 (modified)
129 VWR (EG) 128
130 BP 302, PIK 251, MFL 195, KPM 171
131 This problem will be discussed in the Final Stage of the Founding Analysis.
§6 – CONCLUDING REMARKS

Kisiel tells us that transcendence was to replace existence as the formal indication of Dasein’s being in SZ II, i.e., in the historical part.\textsuperscript{132} If this is true, it is not to be taken lightly. This statement expands on what Kisiel was quoted as saying above, namely, that on the basis of transcendence, the \textit{Destruktion} of ontology naturally becomes a confrontation with transcendental philosophy. In turn, it is made more intelligible when we reflect that in \textit{The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic} Heidegger says that all genuine philosophy is philosophy of transcendence.\textsuperscript{133}

Yet, for a concept to serve the above function it must be developed as a problem and a phenomenon at some point. And in this respect it is significant that – as was alluded to earlier – Kisiel has also shown that transcendence was to form an important part of the problematic of SZ I.3.\textsuperscript{134} That is, transcendence belongs to both the historical part and the part which ‘mediates’ between SZ I.1-2 and SZ II.

Something can only truly belong to history, by pertaining to the historicity of Dasein.\textsuperscript{135} If this is so, and the above is also the case, then transcendence cannot be something ‘external to history.’ If, in a rough and ready fashion, the historicity of Dasein can be called the temporal problem of Dasein’s situatedness, and if, indeed, transcendence stands in an inner relation to temporality, and transcendence somehow concerns the primordial problem of world, then it is already shown (preliminarily!) that transcendence concerns the primordial situatedness of the temporal being (Dasein), that is transcendence concerns the \textit{happening of historicity}. And thus, in accordance with this Heidegger frequently refers to the specific \textit{happening

\textsuperscript{132} Kisiel (1995[1993]) 313-314
\textsuperscript{133} MFL 180, 182
\textsuperscript{134} Kisiel (2005[2001]) passim esp. 211, Kisiel (1995[1993]) 449 etc.
\textsuperscript{135} SZ (S/S) 375, 381f. 378ff.
(Geschehen) of transcendence and of transcendence’s relation to the primal historicity of Dasein.\(^{136}\)

This chapter presents the merely formal basis for the question of transcendence and does so in a grounding connection with the problematic of fundamental ontology. In the preceding part of this thesis, that connection was already foregrounded. And now, this analysis has arrived at the point where it may start to reach beyond the formal question and into the grounding question, that is, into the problem of the Founding Analysis as a whole.

Heidegger says many things about transcendence – only some of which have been outlined in the foregoing – but how they all fit together is not perfectly clear. For instance, Heidegger says of transcendence that:

- Its grammar has been subverted.
- It belongs to Dasein; and it is the constant hidden theme of Being and Time.\(^{137}\)
- It founds Kant’s transcendental.\(^{137}\)
- It is a question of the being, of horizontality, and world.
- It is a question of beings.
- The traditional exhibition of it has always wavered between determining it as the most subjective and as the most objective.\(^{138}\)
- There are two main historical determinations of it; transcendence as opposed to immanence and transcendence as opposed to contingency.\(^{139}\)
- Its main history concerns Plato, scholasticism and Kant, yet all philosophy thinks transcendence and this includes, for instance, Aristotle and Leibniz.\(^{140}\)

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\(^{136}\) E.g. VWG (ER) 34-39, 46\textit{f}.; 88-91, 102\textit{ff}.; 128\textit{ff}.; MFL (E/D) 194\textit{f}.; 209\textit{f}. / 250-252, 270-272

\(^{137}\) BP 298, PIK 213-216 etc.

\(^{138}\) VWG (ER) 94\textit{ff}.

\(^{139}\) MFL 160\textit{ff}.

\(^{140}\) Cf. previous citations & SZ (S/S) 3, 14 208, MFL 184\textit{f}.
First Stage: Formal Preconditions

But we can only say that we understand the problem of transcendence when we can also say that we know the unity which makes these many names and problems possible. In order to reach this domain, the next chapter will first grasp the problem negatively, by counterposing it to the question of intentionality. On this basis, the way will be cleared for the Third Stage of the Founding Analysis to enter into the problem of horizontal schematism in the right way. And then, with this groundwork achieved, it will be possible to finally and concretely formulate the basic meaning of transcendence in the Final Stage of the Founding Analysis. That is, through the whole unfolding of this part a founded concept of transcendence will be achieved in terms of which all other ‘transcendental’ questions may be posed.
Second Stage of the Founding Analysis:
The Difference between Transcendence and Intentionality

It is a relatively common feature of Heidegger’s analyses of transcendence that he begins by first counterposing transcendence and intentionality. Indeed, the connection of transcendence with the problem of intentionality is marked in Heidegger’s footnote to SZ §69b, where he indicates that SZ I.3 will work out the transcendental possibility of intentionality. Heidegger’s linkage of transcendence and intentionality is intended to secure the proper domain of each and their interrelation. The purpose of this chapter is to work through this problem.

By showing the difference between intentionality and transcendence, the proper bounds of the problem of transcendence are more completely secured. This difference then serves as one of the basic presuppositions of the whole subsequent analysis. As we will see Heidegger’s procedure here is by no means hermeneutically perfect, not least of all because he introduces unnecessary ambiguities (or does so too early). Accordingly, what is meant to secure the basic ground of the question instead endangers the very beginning.

This chapter aims to recover what was supposed to be elucidatory about conjoining these two problems. In order to do this we must first enter the problem of intentionality itself and then develop it as a problem for Heidegger. Once intentionality is preliminarily clarified (§1a) it

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1 Cf. MFL §9b, VWG (ER) 26-28, 38f., VWG (D) 135 et infra. Cf. also BP §§9b, 15c, 20e, esp. BP (E/D) 162 / 230 (the place of BP §9b within the overall problem will be formulated in this chapter; the last half of BP §9b should not be taken at face value).
2 SZ (S/S) 363-364 et infra, MFL 168
3 Some part of these ambiguities might be understood as necessary but could have been discussed more clearly.
Part II – the Founding Analysis

becomes possible to begin developing the distinction between intentionality and transcendence. This will be worked out by showing that it is a mistake to identify transcendence with any sort of comportment (§1b). Thereby the first possible fundamental mishap which could befall the analysis is overcome. This indicates a second possible mishap, namely, the identification of the world disclosed in transcendence with the totality of beings (§§1c-2). In connection with these problems it becomes possible for §2 to terminologically secure the meaning of ‘ontic transcendence’ as a separate and derivative phenomenon with respect to what will be provisionally called ‘world-transcendence,’ i.e., fundamental ontological transcendence: the transcendence whose essence is bound up with world (this is a short hand for ‘the transcendence of the world’).

In turn, the final section formulates, in outline, the proper problem of intentionality and transcendence by tying the problems discussed in this chapter into the problems of anxiety and care (§3), that is, into the fundamental ontological project.

As Heidegger says in early 1926;

[Time and again one slips into the mistaken notion that what gets said about a subject during a lecture course within the appropriate methodological limits is the only thing that could be said. One can, in fact, discuss exclusively the fundamental issues, but what is discussed does not have to include everything.”4

It is simply a fact that if one were to make an itinerary of Heidegger’s explicit statements connecting transcendence and any number of fundamental ontological concepts from Being and Time one would learn little. The lecture courses only present fragments of the problem, and yet, we know that transcendence belongs together with fundamental ontology in general.5 Through this chapter it will first become possible to begin to explore this connection. That is, by developing the phenomenon of transcendence with respect to its difference from intentionality this chapter can then pose the question of transcendence in terms of anxiety and

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4 LQT 197-198,
5 Cf. previous chapter
care. This in turn opens up the possibility of the Third Stage of the Founding Analysis where the ‘heavy lifting’ for the fundamental ontological problematic of §69c will be worked out and secured.

If this chapter is characterised by the ‘first light’ of the phenomenon of transcendence – the first breakthrough into the problem itself – the Third Stage of the Founding Analysis is something like its mid-morning – something a little less exciting but nonetheless structurally crucial. The Third Stage is there in order to press further into the phenomenon – to prepare the existential and temporal problem – so that it may come to fruition in a complete sense in the Final Stage of the Founding Analysis. To follow the metaphor, while the First Stage still grapples about in the phenomenological dark, and in this stage the sun first peers over the horizon, in the Third Stage the sun rises, albeit slowly, so that in the Final Stage we may experience the unity of the problem in its full brightness. Conversely, the first chapter of the Founded Analysis concerns the ‘afternoon’ of the problem – here the matter is still bright – whereas the second and third chapters of the Founded Analysis press into the darker places of the problem: here the problems are as important as they are obscure and thus need the greatest guidance.

The formal indications for transcendence discussed in the preceding chapter, along with other matters discussed throughout already indicate that transcendence is a primordial problem of world. As much as the exhibition of these formal indications lacks concrete phenomenological security, they must nonetheless be treated as the most foundational and important part of the First Stage of the Founding Analysis (viz. §2). Here, everything rests on them, arises from them.

If transcendence is a problem of world and transcendence is also a primordial question of being then transcendence must be understood in such a way that it can primordially support both of these problems. Yet, if this is our hermeneutic situation, and we want to avoid being
rightly subject to the Eleatic stranger’s rebuke (“For manifestly you have long been aware of what you mean when you use the expression ‘being’…”)
then we must first found the problem of transcendence in world and not in being. That is, the problem must take its directive from world, and only when this directive is exhausted may we even consider how this relates to the understanding of being in general.
For otherwise, we are mere ‘σοφιστάς’ – we ‘tell it how it is,’ and thereby pass over the task of Being and Time which is to awaken the question of being and “to work out the meaning of being and to do so concretely.”

Transcendence must first be bound wholly to the problem of world precisely to the extent that one wants to question being concretely and in a guided way. The problem of world is hermeneutically prior precisely to the extent that the question of being is more important. Thus, in this way the problem of world-transcendence is the problem of the Founding Analysis.

§1 – INTENTIONALITY

Frequently, when Heidegger discusses the concept of transcendence he will do so in contrast to ‘intentionality’. Intentionality is also central to Husserl’s work and the broader phenomenological movement. Indeed, in 1925 Heidegger said that phenomenology’s concept of intentionality was one of its greatest achievements.
Here, the goal is to clarify what guides this aspect of Heidegger’s discussion of transcendence. As we will see, while Heidegger tends to use the contrast for introductory purposes, its meaning and function remains obscure and all too many pitfalls are possible. Accordingly, the first task is to formulate the meaning and problem of intentionality (§1a) while the second is to secure intentionality’s proper meaning within the Heideggerian problematic (§§1b-c).

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6 SZ (S/S) 1 (that the speaker is indeed the Eleatic stranger cf. Sophist 216a, 244a)
7 A reading of WM which bears these problems in mind will be forced to note that, as directly as it goes to the heart of the problem, it nonetheless does so through world (and “world”).
8 SZ (S/S) 1 (emphasis added)
9 Cf. MFL §9b etc., VWG (ER) 26-28, 38f., 112f.
10 HCT 80
In what follows Husserl enters into the question. However, this occurs only insofar as it serves the thesis’ primary goal. Thus the analysis is self-consciously one-sided but this is simply a methodological and practical necessity. And so, for instance, in what follows, when I say ‘for Heidegger the object of intentionality is the thing itself and not some immanent percept’ this is not to discount that Husserl also claims that intentionality intends the ‘thing itself’.\(^\text{11}\) Rather, this statement is said purely from the Heideggerian perspective on the matter.\(^\text{12}\) This approach is necessary here, since to do Husserl justice would require much work and would only lead away from the fundamental ontological problem of transcendence.

\textbf{a) Heidegger and the General Problem of Intentionality}

In contemporary philosophical debate intentionality is often used to mean something like ‘the structure of willing that…’ and ‘what is willed in a willing that…’\(^\text{13}\) but in the phenomenological movement it had a different meaning which was in some ways more consonant with its older significance.\(^\text{14}\) This is because Husserl’s teacher Brentano – from whom the term properly originates – points back to the Aristotle and Medieval philosophy’s use of the term in establishing his own.\(^\text{15}\) For Heidegger as much as intentionality is already conceptually at issue in Greek and Medieval philosophy,\(^\text{16}\) and as much Husserl took the concept over from Brentano, it is only with Husserl that intentionality is first grasped radically and made a properly philosophical problem.\(^\text{17}\)

\(^{11}\) Cf. LI:II 98
\(^{12}\) The same would apply to Scheler. On Scheler’s relevance cf. Emad (1981) 6-8 (purity of the act-being of intentionality and Heidegger’s adherence to a terminological distinction between \textit{intentio} and \textit{intentum}), 11-12 (act being of personality and priority of possibility in contradistinction to any concept of \textit{personalitas psychologica}), 12-13 (comparison of Scheler’s understanding of death to the existential concept of death), 15-16 (spheres of being, compared to division of being in Heidegger), 21 (cf. vs. BP §9b) also cf. Heidegger’s eulogy for Scheler in MFL e.g. MFL 133, & SZ (S) 47f. etc.
\(^{13}\) Cf. Malle et al. (2001) 1-3
\(^{14}\) Cf. Harper (2011c). This however, is not to say that its use in scholasticism is properly consonant. On the Scholastic employment of \textit{intentio} see BP 58: the \textit{intentio} is only discussed in terms of \textit{the will} in Scholastic philosophy.
\(^{15}\) Brentano (2009[1874]) 68, Moran (2000), HCT 27-28
\(^{16}\) LQT 79, 85-87, 98-102
\(^{17}\) Albeit imperfectly. Cf. MFL 133, BP 58, HCT 28 etc.
Intentionality says that “all consciousness is consciousness of something and is directed toward [gerichtet auf] something.”\textsuperscript{18} Or, “very roughly, intentionality is self-directedness to something.”\textsuperscript{19} Or, again, as Husserl puts it in Ideas I (which is very similar to the definition laid down in the Logical Investigations II); “Under intentionality we understand what is ownmost to lived-experience; “to be a being-conscious-of-something”\textsuperscript{20} Intentionality is a reaching towards (in-tention); a relating to (Sichbeziehen-auf).\textsuperscript{21} For Brentano, intentionality is a name for ‘psychic phenomena in general’, for what characterizes the psychical as psychical whilst, for Husserl, intentionality does not apply to all experiences without qualification.\textsuperscript{22} This is because, for Husserl, intentionality is not merely consciousness of… in the broadest possible sense, but rather consciousness of an object and Husserl defines the latter more strictly than Brentano.\textsuperscript{23} Thus for Husserl the pure ‘matter’ of sense, that which is ‘merely sensible’ (in a sense similar to Kant’s pure manifold) is not an object in the first instance.\textsuperscript{24} All this means that intentionality is ‘object-relatedness’, so that, as David Carr rightly explains, Heidegger’s focus on ‘object relatedness’ in his Kantdeutung refers us to Heidegger’s relation to Husserl problem of intentionality.\textsuperscript{25}

When Heidegger discusses intentionality he typically analyses the problem of intentionality in terms of an intentio, or its plural intentiones (the intending itself, the act of intending), and the

\textsuperscript{18} Cf. ZS 147
\textsuperscript{19} LQT 78, cf. also MFL 204, BP 157f.
\textsuperscript{20} Ideas I (E/D) 200 / 188 (modified): “Wir verstanden unter Intentionalität die Eigenheit von Erlebnissen, „Bewußtsein von etwas zu sein”” also cf. LI:II 95-97
\textsuperscript{21} MFL (D) 168
\textsuperscript{22} LI:II (E/D) 97, 99 / 349, HCT 27
\textsuperscript{23} Formally intentionality is also object relatedness in Brentano. In principle, the difference is that Brentano is more liberal with the word ‘object’ than Husserl. For Husserl, Brentano falls into a trap created by his reference to both an external and inexistent object; in Brentano, every representation is either technically an object (because it represents a thing outside us) or properly an object (because it is an object inexistentively). On this basis, in Brentano the psychical is always directed towards an object. By instead talking only about the intentional object, Husserl presents a more rigorously determined and defined constitutional analysis of intentionality which results in the position that presentations in general are not objects per se (the presentation of the ‘real’ qua pure manifold is never an object, thus, only some presentations are objects) and thus, not everything is intentional per se. cf. Brentano (2009[1874]) 61-62, 68, LI:II 97ff.
\textsuperscript{24} Accordingly, LQT 81-82 defines Husserl’s concept of intentionality as the ‘relation of the real to the ideal’.
\textsuperscript{25} Carr (2007) 39f.
Second Stage: Transcendence and Intentionality

*intentum*, or its plural, *intenta* (that which is intended). Indeed, Heidegger goes so far as to say that Kant’s failure to thematise such a distinction is a significant flaw in the latter’s work.

For Brentano the *intentum* is always properly the ‘inexistent object’ that is, that which is given (which ‘exists’) purely within the subject; inexistence means much the same as the ‘immanence of the percept’ and was thus also called *Einwohnung* by his followers. Husserl explicitly reacts against this ‘immanence’ of the *intentum*, but insofar as he hews programmatically to the Cartesian model, he does not do so radically enough from a Heideggerian perspective. With Heidegger of course, this must again be modified; just as the *intentum* cannot simply be the ‘object’ of the subject-object dichotomy, properly speaking, the *intentio* cannot be understood as an act of the subject or a mental act etc. What is intended in the intention is the thing itself. What does the intending is Dasein as being-in-the-world.

Thus, the *intentum* is not the immanent percept; it is simply *that* which is discovered with the *intentio*. Similarly, the necessity of a problem of intentionality is now to be derived from Dasein itself (that is, the Husserlian neglect of the problem of the being of the intender is to be overcome), and this means, most clearly, but not exclusively, that intentionality is to be grounded in being-together-with. ‘Coming upon’, is thus no longer considered purely as a matter of having an object, presentation, or quality and so on. This is linked to one of Heidegger’s criticisms of Husserl’s philosophy; it is far too dependent on objective presence

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26 Cf. HCT passim, PIK passim, BP passim, (but, interestingly, not, LQT or MFL)
27 PIK 58
28 Brentano (2009[1874]) 68, Moran (2000) 43 (thus ‘in-,’ not in the sense of the privative but in the sense of prepositional ‘in’: ‘within’, ‘inside’)
29 Cf. Moran (2000) 42-44 & 63 infra. & SZ (S) 98 et infra
30 BP §9b
31 But this is merely a formulation of the problem: it is not an answer.
32 BP §9b
33 BP §15c, (also cf. BP (D) 229), MFL 134. On the neglect of the being of the intender cf. BP 161 & MFL 133, HCT 108
and the theoretical relation to beings.\textsuperscript{34} Thus, comportment – Verhalten – is now used as an alternative for intentionality; comportment includes the practical-proximal concept of intentionality.\textsuperscript{35} In everyday dealings, just as in theoretical concerns, we have ‘objects’ in the sense that we ‘happen upon’ beings.

In Heidegger, it is of course of great importance that intentionality is interpreted from the phenomena and not the other way around.\textsuperscript{36} But what constitutes the basic ‘phenomenon’ in Heidegger’s work is not the same as that which orients Husserl’s work. And so, this means that intentionality must become a ‘Heideggerian’ problem.

Thus, Heidegger tells us that in accord with Husserl’s theoretical and Cartesian orientation, whilst Husserl does grasp a central factor of Dasein with intentionality, he is not radical enough:

With his doctrine of the immanent intentionality of the cogitationes, he brings out the problem’s connection with the basic questions of modern philosophy since Descartes. But just as Brentano leaves the concept of the psyche itself untested, so too, in his idealistic epistemology, Husserl does not further ask the question about the being constituted as consciousness. The insight into intentionality does not go far enough to see that grasping this structure as the essential structure of Dasein must revolutionise the whole concept of the human being.\textsuperscript{37}

So now, intentionality points to the problem of fundamental ontology and even requires it. The problem of intentionality does this primarily by showing that the ‘subject’, that is, Dasein is never to be interpreted as first itself by itself and then out there with the ‘world’ but, rather, that its kind of being includes always being in a commerce with… But ‘before’ intending, Dasein is as being-together-with.\textsuperscript{38} This leads us to the point where grasping exactly how Heidegger understands intentionality becomes both possible and necessary.

\textsuperscript{34} LQT passim & persistent subtext (HCT 25 partly says the above), Dahlstrom (1994a) 237ff.; MFL 134
\textsuperscript{35} Cf. VWG (ER) 112-113, cf. also LQT 78 vs. 183, BP 61 and the following analysis
\textsuperscript{36} Cf. Heidegger’s way of introducing it as a question; LQT 83-84, BP §9b
\textsuperscript{37} MFL 133 (italics added)
\textsuperscript{38} MFL 134
b) The Specific Problem of Intentionality and Heidegger; securing the domain of intentionality in Heidegger

As much as Heidegger occasionally speaks positively of intentionality, as an explicit problem it remains relatively absent from the published portion of *Being and Time*. Similarly, elsewhere he indicates that it is a derivative phenomenon. Burt Hopkins has contended that, for Heidegger, intentionality is derivative because it is solely a way of discovering objectively present beings. This is by no means wholly without justification. On this view, Heidegger would then speak positively of intentionality only to the extent that objective presence constitutes a legitimate domain of phenomenological investigation. Hopkins’ primary evidence for this determination of intentionality is Heidegger’s critique of Husserl’s use of the term. Thus, in his examination, Hopkins vacillates between, on the one hand, trying to ground his interpretation on the basis of the frequency of Heidegger’s connection of intentionality with objective presence and, on the other, by reflecting on Husserl’s limitations.

This vacillation, however, points to the underlying difficulty with this view: is it that, for Heidegger, intentionality *is* restricted in principle to objectively present beings or is it that, intentionality *can be* restricted to objective presence – for instance, in Husserl, and other philosophers in terms of which the problem is re-peated? After all, if as Heidegger is fond of saying, ‘possibility is higher than actuality’, the pre-existing actuality of intentionality as intending of objective presence does not prejudice its potential to be something more.

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39 MFL 196, 217, VWG (EG) 108, BP 162
41 E.g. SZ (S) 363-364 *et infra*
43 E.g., intentionality is connected with objective presence at BP 314 – but this is *necessary* because the topic is Kant.
For Heidegger the question of objectification is connected with intentionality. This is discussed in SZ §69b.\textsuperscript{44} This passage may be taken as grounds for connecting intentionality with objective presence \textit{insofar as} it determines intentionality in connection with the ‘scientific projection of nature’ whose reality is the ‘thematization of the objectively present’.\textsuperscript{45} But this does not immediately limit intentionality to such objectification.\textsuperscript{46}

And when Heidegger strips down intentionality to the ‘relating-to’ and also identifies it with comportment, with \textit{Verhalten}, in the specific way that he does, and with the centrality which this determination gains, he thereby identifies it with a \textit{broader} ontological horizon than objective presence.\textsuperscript{47} Thus, \textit{Vom Wesen des Grundes} equates intentionality with “all comportment toward beings.”\textsuperscript{48} In turn, we are told that we comport towards beings unlike us, toward ourselves and others and that we occasionally comport towards nature in the scientific or romantic sense.\textsuperscript{49}

Thus, whereas the connection between intentionality and perception (\textit{Wahrnehmung}) is central for Hopkins, in the \textit{Basic Problems of Phenomenology} Heidegger speaks of “perception’s intentional structure” \textit{in contrast to} “that of every other mode of intentionality.”\textsuperscript{50} There he also speaks of the “intentional structure of respect” (in the Kantian-practical sense) – something which, \textit{as} respect cannot be concerned with the objectively present.\textsuperscript{51}

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\textsuperscript{44} §SZ 69b \textit{passim} esp. 363 \textit{infra}
\textsuperscript{45} Cf. SZ (S/S, D) 363
\textsuperscript{46} Thus, BP 157 is both possible and exists.
\textsuperscript{47} E.g. BP 318. On the identity of intentionality and comportment (viz. for attestation of the above interpretation) cf. BP 61, 313f., MFL 134f., 184, 196, VWR (ER) 28f. 112f. etc., on the meaning and function of \textit{Verhalten} in Heidegger more generally cf. Dahlstrom (1994b) 781
\textsuperscript{48} VWG (ER) 28 \textit{et infra et passim}
\textsuperscript{49} VWG (ER) 82-83 \textit{infra} (on the broader problem here, cf. 80-85 \textit{et infra}), 86-87, 112-113 / VWG (EG) 370
\textsuperscript{50} Cf. BP 314-315, Hopkins (1993) 115ff. \textit{et passim}
\textsuperscript{51} BP (E/D) 136 / 192
Similarly, §15c of the Basic Problems gives itself the task of contributing to the task of “interpreting more radically the phenomena of intentionality and transcendence.” It then proceeds to lampoon Fichte’s ‘think the wall’ and instead presents an account according to which the primary circumspection and comportment of Dasein is directed towards a totality of relevance. This leads to the problem of world, specifically insofar as it is not the totality of innerworldly beings, and insofar as it instead ‘exists’, that is insofar as “the world is something Daseinmäßiges” – insofar as it is ‘Dasein-like’ or, in Hofstadter’s rendering, ‘Dasein-ish’. The rest of §15c merely reinforces the above by critiquing the objectivising and subjectivising interpretations of world and reflecting the foregoing off of the problem of authenticity and inauthenticity. It is not until Heidegger is summing up the entire chapter (on the Thesis of Modern Ontology) that intentionality is mentioned again by name. But if it is clear from the preceding analysis, as much as from the procedure of BP §15c, that the problem of transcendence is attached to the existence of the world (in connection with its difference from innerworldliness), this means that the radicalisation of intentionality was achieved by the analysis of comportment towards the referential relations of the contexture of useful things in opposition to mere perception. And so, in explicit connection with transcendence and intentionality, Heidegger can say near the beginning of the final section of the Basic Problems that:

Temporality makes possible Dasein’s comportment as a comportment toward beings, whether toward itself, toward others, or toward the handy or the objectively present.

Accordingly, in his article, “Heidegger’s Critique of Husserl and Brentano’s Accounts of Intentionality,” Dermot Moran emphasises that intentionality is not primarily a matter of

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52 BP 162 (While the above passage does speak of transcendence in the traditional, epistemological sense, by the end of the introductory part of §15c, this has merged into the more fundamentally problem)
53 Ibid. (it is significant for our estimation of the proper place of BP §9b that, there, Heidegger did precisely this (i.e. he ‘thought the wall’), cf. BP 63. In §2 of this chapter the proper interpretation of BP §9b will become a pivotal issue.)
54 BP 163-164
55 BP (E/D) 165-166 / 237
56 BP 167ff.
57 BP 175 (BP §15d)
58 BP (E/D) 318 / 453 (here, ‘temporality’ = Zeitlichkeit)
intending the objectively present for Heidegger.\textsuperscript{59} According to Moran, Heidegger believes that Husserl’s grasp of intentionality is too enamoured to objective presence. Accordingly, for Moran, Heidegger wants to show that this is a derivative \textit{mode} of intentionality.\textsuperscript{60} The more original intentionality is the discovery of beings in everyday dealings.\textsuperscript{61}

As Moran explains, Husserl’s goal is to give a generic account of intentionality.\textsuperscript{62} He wants to grasp the structures which are common to all ways of relating to objects i.e.; he wants to grasp what is common to cognitive-theoretical \textit{as well as} practical comportments. Conversely, Heidegger wants to develop a genetic account, according to which practical comportments serve as the condition of possibility for cognitive-theoretical comportments.\textsuperscript{63}

In some part, Moran’s exhibition has the goal of showing the proper depth of Heidegger’s debt to Husserl. Thus Moran argues that Heidegger knew of Husserl’s forays into the intentionality of practical comportments, and thus that this problem was not Heidegger’s contribution.\textsuperscript{64} Accordingly, for Moran, Heidegger’s contribution is that he emphasises the importance of context (the referential contexture, the surrounding world, historicity).\textsuperscript{65}

Yet Moran also overplays this agreement.\textsuperscript{66} For instance, since Husserl criticises Brentano’s immanentist tendencies, when Heidegger criticises immanentist tendencies in the philosophy of intentionality Moran contends Heidegger is not directing this at Husserl.\textsuperscript{67} Yet here, with respect to Husserl’s work we must distinguish between announcing something to be the case,

\textsuperscript{59} Moran (2000) 42, 59-60 (though his definition of the distinction is rather levelled Cf. Moran (2000) 48, 58-59, 62 – effectively, objective presence = being found in cognition, handiness = being found in practical activity; this is ‘accurate’ in most cases, but not all)
\textsuperscript{60} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{61} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{62} Moran (2000) 61
\textsuperscript{63} Moran (2000) 48
\textsuperscript{64} Moran (2000) 61-62
\textsuperscript{65} Moran (2000) 60
\textsuperscript{66} Another example, which is just as relevant as the one which follows above is Moran’s contention that Heidegger follows Husserl in connecting intentionality with transcendence (Moran (2000) 39f. \textit{et passim}). Yet it ought to be noted here, that as much as this is formally correct, Heidegger indicates that Husserl is so far from agreeing with him on the meaning of transcendence, that Husserl precisely does not even grasp the phenomenon which interests Heidegger, and indeed that Husserl “vehemently opposed the problem from the start” MFL 167. Thus, here Heidegger follows Husserl’s “wording though not in its substantive intent” (cf. BP 21).
\textsuperscript{67} Moran (2000) 41-42, 63 (but contra this cf. MFL 204)
and being able to say it as such, between declaring that… and properly disclosing in speech. In the first case, if one does not grasp the proper domain of ‘practical behaviour’ yet includes it and asserts its centrality, then this domain is included only ‘by fiat.’ If however one can properly develop the phenomena of practical existence, then one can include them from out of matter itself and by showing the matter itself.

Thus, just because Husserl criticises Brentano’s tendency to understand the ego as an immanent whole does not mean that Husserl has truly erased this tendency from his own thinking tout court, at least not from a Heideggerian perspective. From the perspective of Heidegger in the late 20s this could not be achieved until the last vestiges of Cartesianism were erased and the phenomenon of world (thus, according to our guiding principles, the phenomenon of transcendence in Heidegger’s sense but not Husserl’s) grasped with adequate originality.\(^{68}\) Equally, Husserl’s goal of creating a theory of that which is common to all forms of intentionality is not proof that a special type does not surreptitiously gain dominance in his work. The maxim is; Husserl announced it to be the case, therefore he achieved it in a proper sense… That is about as necessary as the idea that George Washington by saying ‘I cannot tell a lie’\(^{69}\) eo ipso rigorously clarifies the essence of truth in each of his subsequent statements. Husserl announces a special place for the intentionality of practical activity which is in principle irreducible to the intentionality of theoretical comportment.\(^{70}\) But this does not yet mean that he grasped ‘the practical’ with adequate originality.

Heidegger’s contention is that the proper understanding of intentionality “must revolutionise the whole concept of the human being.”\(^{70}\) A revolution cuts deep. It is a question of depth, of penetration. Thus, that intentionality is supposed to exceed the theoretical-cognitive domain for Husserl does not mean that Heidegger cannot legitimately critique Husserl for failing to really get beyond the domain of objective presence.

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\(^{68}\) Cf. SZ (S) 98 et infra, 100f. vs. §64 etc.

\(^{69}\) Cf. Moran (2000) 61-62

\(^{70}\) MFL 133
In Husserl, the *intentum* is divided in each case according to its ‘real’ and ‘ideal’ contents.\(^{71}\) The real contents are simply a ‘Heracleitian flux’.\(^{72}\) But this ‘flux’ is the same as what Heidegger critiques as the ‘flow’ ofnows. As much as temporality in Husserl is distinct from now-time, insofar as the real is interpreted as flux the real is understood according to the vulgar concept of time; and that means the time of objective presence.\(^{73}\) Equally, the ideal is simply that which is ‘atemporal’, that which persists across time.\(^{74}\) Accordingly, it too is understood within the basic horizon of the vulgar concept of time. Thus the ideal is also understood as objective presence.\(^{75}\) If, with this as one’s basis, one now asserts that there is more than mere ‘theoretical cognition’ in life, this doesn’t mean that the horizon of objective presence is overcome, it means that the latter’s inadequacy is identified *without* being overcome.\(^{76}\)

In this sense, intentionality is factually stuck in objective presence, but not by design. To put it in a relatively pithy way: Hopkins grasps the fact of intentionality’s special connection with objective presence but not the design of its proper breadth. Moran grasps the design of its proper breadth but does not fully grasp the fact of its contraction (in Husserl). As a delimitation of the *possibility* of intentionality, the ‘design’ is of the greater import, but as can be seen above, matters of fact are also of some importance since when treated inappropriately they can lead to distortions.

c) Intentionality and the ‘World’

\(^{71}\) Moran (2000) 44-45  
\(^{72}\) Moran (2000) 47  
\(^{73}\) Cf. SZ (S) 422, MFL 203f.; for the broader problem cf. Dahlstrom (1994a) 239ff.  
\(^{74}\) Cf. Moran (2000) 44-46  
\(^{75}\) On this cf. Part I, §1bβ herein.  
\(^{76}\) Thus Heidegger’s mocking of Husserlian language tropes at BP 158, also see Heidegger’s critique of Kierkegaard on the Moment and temporality at SZ (S/S) 235 *infra* & 338 *infra*. Kierkegaard’s approach is very far from ‘disinterested’ or ‘ateleological’ (Cf. Moran’s rhetorical formulation of the difference between objective presence and handiness, Moran (2000) 58-59). Equally, see Moran’s equation of the ‘fused totality’ with Heidegger’s ‘equipmental contexture’ (Moran (2000) 59). The sense in which ‘fused’ is, rhetorically, so inextinguishably connected with objective presence is a fundamental problem between Husserl and Heidegger (thus the profusion of neologisms in SZ) and cannot be used to present a simple connection between Husserl and Heidegger.
So now, intentionality is a relating to beings whilst, transcendence, which grounds intentionality, is a primordial ‘relating’ to world. *And this means that intentionality is in the first instance a discovering directedness towards beings.* But having an object… does this now mean having one object, or only two, or does it rather mean comporting towards in general?

Intentionality does not simply intend this or that particular thing; when I see the cup, the *intentum* of my *intentio* is not the cup *tout court.* This is only a possible abstraction, and thus, it is solely a *derivative* mode of intentionality. More proximally the cup is discovered together with ‘cupness’ just as it is together with the table, and though I do not see them, the legs of the table are intended with the table, the table is in turn intended as this table in this place, for instance, in my office. The designation ‘in my office’ includes within it, the being-in-a-room of the cup and table, and the cup’s being there for a work-related purpose as much as it also indicates a certain distance from my home. These constitute what Husserl calls the “background-intuitions” or the “obscurely intended to horizon of indeterminate actuality” discovered in everyday lived-experience.

But already, this is to say that intentionality turns out to (factically) *intend* something like the *material, or ontic-constitutional concept of the ‘surrounding world’* (“*Umwelt*” – not *Umwelt*). Indeed Husserl discusses the ‘surrounding world’ in precisely this way in §27 of *Ideas I,* ‘The World of the Natural Attitude: the I and my Surrounding World [Ich und meine Umwelt].’ In Heidegger’s *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* the question of the surrounding world first arises under the topic of “conceiving intentionality itself more radically” in connection with the question of fundamental ontological transcendence. So now, the intentionality of dealings is the structure of discovering innerworldly beings. The

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77 Thus LQT 81-82
78 Ideas I (E) 52, 70 also cf. the analysis of ‘region’ at SZ (S/S) 103 etc.
79 Ideas I (E/D) 51 & ff. / 56 & ff. (my translation)
80 BP 162
81 Ibid. ff
analysis of the surrounding world radicalises intentionality by disclosing intentionality’s proximal and usual mode as the intending of an ‘equipmental contexture’, the totality of references and so on.\textsuperscript{82} But the equipmental contexture consistently points to a more primordial world problem in Heidegger’s work from the late 20s.\textsuperscript{83} This more primordial problem is different in type because world, properly speaking, is different in type. The world as such is not intended; \emph{within} intentionality world is nowhere to be found. Yet world makes intentionality possible.

This is what Heidegger indicates when he says that world is “inaccessible to circumspection insofar as only beings are an issue for circumspection, but it [viz. world] is always disclosed for that circumspection.”\textsuperscript{84} As it were, \emph{Umsicht}, as proximal intentionality, sees only \emph{Umdinge} but never the \emph{Umwelt} upon which the \emph{Umdinge} can be visible at all. Formulated from the Platonic concept of transcendence, circumspection sees the surrounding shadows and even, in a proximal way, their look (\textit{i̔dēa}) but does not see the Sun itself, nor does it see that which is ‘still more to be honoured’, namely; \textit{ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἕξις}, the mastery of the good.\textsuperscript{85}

Thus, as Heidegger emphasises in \textit{Vom Wesen des Grundes} transcendence transcends towards world, it specifically \emph{doesn’t} transcend towards beings; transcendence is not towards ‘that which is’.\textsuperscript{86} \emph{Only intentionality} is towards \emph{das Seiende}. Accordingly, intentionality is discussed in \textit{Being and Time} (albeit without the word being used), under the topic of Dasein’s dealings and so on. But even in the preliminary analysis of the surrounding world Heidegger is at pains to draw the analysis back to the \emph{proper} phenomenon of world.\textsuperscript{87} There, this latter phenomenon is named the existential structure of significance, later its name will become

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{82} Ibid. SZ I.1.iii etc.
  \item \textsuperscript{83} Cf. especially BP §15c, also cf. the structure of SZ (S) §§15-18, pp 210, 297 etc., conversely, for instance, this is not yet the case in CTD Ch. 2 \emph{et seq.}
  \item \textsuperscript{84} SZ (S, D) 75 (modified)
  \item \textsuperscript{85} Cf. VWG (ER) 96-97, which qua \textit{οὐ ἐνέκα} is more properly the \emph{self-mastery} of the good. ‘Mastery’ here translates ‘Mächtigkeit’ cf. \textit{Ibid.}
  \item \textsuperscript{86} VWG (ER) 40-41
  \item \textsuperscript{87} SZ (S) §18
\end{itemize}
transcendence. Accordingly, as was discussed in Part I, Heidegger says in *Vom Wesen des Grundes* that:

If we somehow equate the ontical system of useful things with the world and explain Being-in-the-world as traffic with useful things, we then abandon any understanding of transcendence as Being-in-the-world in the sense of a ‘basic constitutive feature of Dasein.’

On the other hand, a study of the ontological structure of the beings discovered in the surrounding world – insofar as they are discovered as tools – has one singular advantage for a preliminary characterization of the phenomenon of world: it leads over to an analysis of this phenomenon and prepares the way for the transcendental problem of world. As is indicated clearly enough in the outline and arrangement of §§14-24 of *Sein und Zeit*, this is the sole intention of the analysis of the surrounding world, which itself, considered in terms of the guiding aim of the book, remains subordinate.\(^{88}\)

And so in view of this it should now be clear that the contrast between intentionality and transcendence resides in something like being-towards-beings in opposition to being towards the world as world. This however, by no means indicates that transcendence is solely concerned with being, or that we must now understand transcendence as categorial intuition, especially since, in phenomenological terms, *intuition is merely a special case of intentionality*.\(^{89}\) Accordingly, to interpret transcendence as categorial intuition would clearly be absurd, it would be as if one were to say: ‘transcendence is not intentionality, therefore transcendence is a highly developed type of intentionality’ – and let there be no mistake, transcendence and intentionality are different in kind.\(^{90}\)

It should now be clear that if, in the transcendental problem of world, we identify world – the ‘toward which’ of transcendence – with anything like the referential relations of the “surrounding world” (i.e. relevance) this would constitute an unmitigated philosophical disaster and the complete foreclosure of our topic. In what follows we must build on the basis of this principle.

\(^{88}\) VWG (ER) 80-83 *infra* (modified)

\(^{89}\) Cf. LQT 84f.

\(^{90}\) On this, Cf. MFL 183 etc.
Catriona Hanley begins her direct discussion of transcendence with the following problem;

“Transcendence, being-in-the-world, is never to be equated and identified with intentionality” says Heidegger in the summer course of 1928 (GA26: 214/168). In the previous summer's course, on the other hand, he asserts (and discusses at length) that “it is precisely intentionality and nothing else in which transcendence consists” (GA24: 89/63). How to explain this apparent contradiction?91

Hanley’s solution is to distinguish two senses of the relation. The first sense says that the “transcendent comportment” of Dasein makes each and every intention possible.92 This offers a solution only so long as we don’t notice that it begs the question (petitio principii) since comportment is used by Heidegger as another name for intentionality.93 Hanley’s second sense of the relation says that; “'Intentionality is transcendence” means that for Dasein to be in an intentional relationship, interacting with entities in the world, it must already be in the world.”94 This is equally uninformative insofar as it is formulated as an identity statement within which transcendence serves no real function (at least not explicitly), viz.; intending beings in the world implies world.

Perhaps sensing the difficulty, Hanley continues, by quoting from the Basic Problems of Phenomenology §9b (which is where Heidegger identified transcendence and intentionality above). This provides her with following seemingly pithy and secure solution;

91 Hanley (2000) 169
92 Hanley (2000) 170
93 Moreover, the above may be profitably compared to MFL 134
94 Ibid.
In short, “intentionality is the ratio cognoscendi of transcendence. Transcendence is the ratio essendi of intentionality in its diverse modes.”

That is: on the one hand, because of intentionality, transcendence is known, or, manifest. On the other hand, because of transcendence, intentionality is.

But as much purchase as this may seem to have, we must instead say: No! This is not the solution, rather, the solution is to show that there is no problem at all with respect to the primordial transcendence of Dasein! This alternative view is forced upon us the moment that we carefully take note of what is under way in the Basic Problems of Phenomenology §9b. The problem of transcendence there does not arise from the fundamental ontological problematic it arises from the questions which are traditionally asked. Thus, the directive there is simply:

How can this ego with its intentional experiences get outside its sphere of experience and assume a relation to the objectively present world? How can this ego transcend its own sphere and the intentional experiences enclosed within it, and what does this transcendence consist in?

But this is a directive which is completely foreign to the proper formulation of the fundamental ontological problematic! And it is only by working through this concept of transcendence that Heidegger arrives at the formula that intentionality consists in transcendence just as it is only on this basis that Heidegger develops the ratio cognoscendi and ratio essendi dependencies between intentionality and transcendence. Accordingly, properly speaking, the latter relation applies only to this (deficient) formulation of the problem. Transcendence is an issue here only as a name for a concept which determines the intentum of the intentio as the thing itself rather than the ‘inexistent object’ and directs us to phenomenologically analyse the intentum on this basis.

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95 Ibid. (cf. BP 65)
96 BP (E/D) 61 / 86 (modified)
97 Cf. BP §9b & vs. etc.
98 Thus, BP 62 ff.
But this latter transcendence is an ‘ontic transcendence.’ It concerns the ‘act-ive’ relation between Dasein as a being and another being (i.e. it concerns the ‘from and towards’ or the ‘movement’ of ‘transcendence’ within a purely ontical horizon).\(^9\) This ontic transcendence is opposed to what Heidegger calls the ursprünglich or Ur-Transzendenz of Dasein.\(^10\) These latter terms, when used in contrast to ontic transcendence, are connected with the understanding of being yet they are also identified simpliciter with being-in-the-world.\(^11\) The world is the towards-which of transcendence. And so, since being-in-the-world is never the understanding of being unhinged from all ontic understanding (just as ontic understanding is never without an understanding being) this means that if one may call the Urtranszendenz of Dasein an ‘ontological transcendence,’\(^12\) this transcendence cannot be ‘ontological’ in the sense of being a ‘categorial intuition’ (a pure making being present): to be in a world is not identical to intuiting being.\(^13\) Instead, it must be the case that this transcendence is ‘ontological’ because it concerns transcendence as the being of Dasein (transcendence now means the being of being-in-the-world).\(^14\) Ontic transcendence concerns the relation between various beings, primal transcendence concerns transcendence as the being of Dasein. Thus, the former is ontic because it’s horizon of understanding is ontic, while the latter may be called ontological because it concerns the ontology of Dasein as being-in-the-world.

As an ontic transcendence, the concept of transcendence resulting from Basic Problems §9b is simply the name for the directedness of the intentio insofar as this directedness is always towards the thing itself. This intending is circumscribed by the relations of the ratio

\(^9\) MFL 134ff.
\(^10\) Ibid., also cf. MFL 166ff.
\(^11\) Ibid., also cf. MFL 166ff.
\(^12\) As Heidegger does only once in MFL (MFL (E/D) 159 / 203 vs. Ibid. et passim
\(^13\) This, here, says nothing about the ‘ontological transcendence’ of the Kantbook, a book which operates according to different rules since it must operate in harmony with Kant. As indicated by the title of this thesis, the problem a Kantian ontological transcendence cannot become a central theme here.
\(^14\) Cf. MFL 134ff., vs. 159, 166, cf. also BP (E/D) 300 / 435f., MFL 168, VWG (EG) 123 etc. MFL 135f. is one of the passages most problematic to my reading of the problem insofar as it says that Dasein’s “urprünglicher Transzendenz” and its “Seinsverständnis überhaupt” must ‘in the end’ be “ein und dasselbe”, that is, they must be one and the same (MFL (D) 170-171). In general, this thesis is able to integrate and understand this passage of MFL and is able to do so concretely but only after transcendence itself has been concretely worked out; only, if I may put it so, in the end.
Second Stage: Transcendence and Intentionality

cognoscendi and ratio essendi. This is the result of a phenomenological re-petition. As such it reaches further than its guiding question (viz. how can the ego get outside its inner sphere) to a provisional, phenomenological concept of ‘ontic transcendence.’ But this concept of transcendence does not transcend towards world thus, it is not primordial transcendence and insofar as it is fit to be named transcendence, it can only be called a derivative transcendence. ¹⁰⁵ Nonetheless, in accordance with the historical approach of the Basic Problems (i.e. its hermeneutic strategy), the primordial problem of transcendence does indeed start here in §9b (in the traditional problem), it is developed further in §15c and along with some other forays, comes to fruition in §20e right on the precipice of the problem of Temporalität. ¹⁰⁶

Thus, with respect to the guiding problem of the relation between intentionality and primordial transcendence, our watchword is precisely not the statement that transcendence ‘consists in’ intentionality – this is irrelevant to the fundamental question – but rather that “Transcendence, being-in-the-world, is never to be equated and identified with intentionality.” ¹⁰⁷ Connected with this is the principle that:

Intentionality is grounded in Dasein’s transcendence and is possible solely for this reason… [whilst] transcendence cannot conversely be explained in terms of intentionality. ¹⁰⁸

Intentionality is grounded in Dasein’s transcendence, that is, in fundamental ontological transcendence, in world-transcendence. This is the fundamental principle of the relation between intentionality and transcendence – a principle discussed by Heidegger throughout the late 20s and even foregrounded in Being and Time. ¹⁰⁹ That this last quote comes from the Basic Problems indicates that here, there is no conflict between this 1927 lecture course and

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¹⁰⁵ Accordingly, Hanley’s original division of the transcendence concept according one sense which is connected with comportment itself and the other with world is not so far off.
¹⁰⁶ Cf. BP *passim* & Kisiel (2005[2001]) 190
¹⁰⁷ MFL 168
¹⁰⁸ BP (E/D) 162 / 230 (modified)
¹⁰⁹ SZ (S/S) 363 *et infra*, 365f., BP 312, 318, MFL 135, 183, 196, VWG (ER) 112f.
the Metaphysical Foundations of Logic (1928). The confusion arises only when BP §9b is detached from the hermeneutic strategy of the whole course. This remains a constant danger because this hermeneutic strategy is not always immediately visible, especially with respect to the problem of transcendence. And so, from what has been said so far it is clear that the Basic Problems of Phenomenology §9b must be treated with kid gloves and that taken out of context it obscures the question. Perhaps it is for this reason that, in the Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, Heidegger instead says that:

Inasmuch as Dasein exists qua being-in-the-world, it is already out there with beings; and even this manner of speaking is still imprecise since ‘already out there’ presupposes Dasein is at some point on the inside. Even if I say, Dasein’s intentional activity is always already open towards beings and for beings, there is still at bottom the supposition that it was once closed. What we mean by transcendence cannot be made compatible with the previous formulations of it… Neither Bergson… nor Husserl see the problem and the phenomenon; two years ago Husserl vehemently opposed the problem from the start.110

Moran makes the same mistake as Hanley on transcendence by uncritically quoting the ratio cognoscendi/essendi line.111 Moran has two basic approaches to transcendence in Heidegger. The first is an analogy to Husserl’s concept of the transcendence of the object (as the ideality of the ideal; the permanent transcends the impermanent).112 If this analogy is concerned solely with the structure of the object (or the “world”) it is irrelevant, though, how it could be freed from such a yoke remains unclear.113 Moran’s second approach to transcendence is basically the ontic getting-beyond of the Basic Problems §9b, where immanence has been struck out and world added by fiat.114

The connection of transcendence with world thus remains merely artificial because the proper dimension of the problem is not grasped. Later, admittedly, Moran does seem to interpret

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110 MFL 167
111 Moran (2000) 42
113 Cf. the above quote on this moreover.
114 Moran (2000) 42 – In order for this immanence to be securely struck from the problem of Dasein, it would be necessary to ground the transcendence of BP §9b in fundamental ontological transcendence.
transcendence according to the constitutive structures of significance rather than the whole of innerworldliness. But, so long as we want to merely interpret transcendence as this going-out-towards of the *intentio*, world will remain a mere appendage to transcendence, something arbitrarily or empirically added; something which is added merely as a ‘fact’ or because Heidegger ‘said so’. Instead, *world must be understood as the sole and true reality of transcendence (and vice versa)*. The Founding Analysis is dedicated to formulating this understanding.

So in large part because of this ambiguous use of the word ‘transcendence’, because of its connection with intentionality and ambiguities surrounding the relation Heidegger more or less ‘lets’ himself be misinterpreted. On the one hand, Heidegger warns against prioritising the ontic-epistemological concept of transcendence, for instance in his criticism of Kant’s ‘scandal of philosophy’. On the other, wherever there is a habituation to the subject-object mode (which is by no means an easy thing to break) and especially whenever there is a *fear* for my immersion in the world with… and by… so too does this result in transcendence being understood as ontic transcendence and the latter becoming the same old problem of overcoming immanence.

Thus, for instance, Richard Holmes’ analysis of Heidegger in *The Transcendence of the World* (a book which is only partially concerned with Heidegger) interprets the worldliness of the world as that which ‘transcends’ each particular life-world and does so as the common in-terms-of-which of intersubjectivity (the super-system of all individual world-systems and only thereby the ground of intersubjectivity). Effectively, Holmes confuses worldliness with the “world” albeit in an ‘original way,’ namely, within the limits of the traditional *category* of possibility. Similarly, Thomas Kelly begins his analysis by focussing on a concept of

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115 Moran (2000) 59-60 (viz. significance as opposed to relevance etc.)
116 SZ (S) 202-208, also cf. MFL 167 etc.
117 Holmes (1995) 42-46, 52-54. The major themes of this book come from an analysis of Husserl, Sartre, Heidegger and quantum physics (the import of the latter is bound up with what might be called a quasi-naturalisation of the priority of possibility and the independent portion of Holmes’ analysis).
transcendence whose necessary opposite is immanence, or solipsism, and saying that this concept ‘has affinities with… the position taken by Heidegger in his essay *Vom Wesen des Grundes.*’ He continues by saying;

Transcendence, as Heidegger rightly affirms in VWG, belongs as such and uniquely to human existence, and certainly not as an occasional and fugitive property, but rather as that which is constitutive of that existence… Heidegger recognizes in VWG (Section 2 *passim*), that to be for us is to move beyond the reserve which is ourselves towards the world, that is, firstly to beings like ourselves, and secondly to entities, which are always within their constitutive limits i.e. which do not transcend.

But what is central to *Vom Wesen des Grundes* and to the concept of transcendence Heidegger is developing in the late 20s is *precisely not* this concept; it is not central to that work, but rather lies on the periphery, as a concept which is to be *subdued* and ordered well and truly under the transcendence of the world. That, in the context of a re-petition, one must countenance a deficient formulation now results in and gives the textual basis for the confusion of the deficient and the primordial concepts of transcendence. Accordingly, for instance, one now thinks that what distinguishes Heidegger’s concept of transcendence from traditional accounts is just that it is constant rather than occasional.

It is not the case that intentionality is identified with transcendence, rather, intentionality is both contrasted with transcendence and declared to be derivative of transcendence. But just as the vulgar concept of time has a right to the word ‘time’ insofar as it originates from primordial temporality, so too does ‘ontic transcendence’ have a right to the word insofar as it is founded on primordial transcendence. But this does not mean that we can understand primordial transcendence by extrapolating from ontic transcendence, rather, if it means anything at all it exclusively means the reverse. And this means that even the traditional

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119 Kelly (1994) 1
120 Kelly (1994) 2, cf. also Kelly (1994) 340-341
121 Cf. VWG (ER) 34-40 (esp. 39f.) & MFL (E/D) 188ff. / 244-253 vs. Ibid.
122 Cf. Ibid.
concept of transcendence must gain its meaning anew from out of the phenomenological discussion of the problem.

§3 – THE PRELIMINARY PROBLEM OF TRANSCENDENCE AND WORLD IN CONNECTION WITH ANXIETY AND CARE (ANALYSED ON THE BASIS OF THE FOREGOING)

That transcendence is to be distinguished from intentionality and that the latter is to be grounded in the former is an important principle of Basic Problems of Phenomenology, the Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, and Vom Wesen des Grundes.\textsuperscript{123}

Whereas intentionality concerns my being as a being which relates itself to beings, transcendence concerns my understanding of their upon-which, namely, world. Thus, intentionality and transcendence are not parallel modes of going-out-to rather;

- They differ essentially in their ‘directionality’;
- Transcendence is hierarchically more basic than intentionality and,
- As existentials of Dasein, they differ in kind.

Whereas intentiones are proximally directed towards beings, towards das Seiende in general, transcendence transcends towards the world.

Fundamental ontological transcendence does not transcend towards beings. Thus, the world disclosed in world-transcendence is not the same as ‘the whole of the comported towards.’

The occasional failure of the literature to grasp this is in each particular case disastrous for the formulation of the problem; precisely where the transcendental concept of world is at issue, one instead falls back onto the categorial part of the analysis of the surrounding world. Precisely where one aspires to a more advanced level of the fundamental ontological project, one instead proceeds forthwith to violate its introductory principles (viz. those of SZ §§12-24). Accordingly, one not only fails to grasp the problem of transcendence, one even destroys

\textsuperscript{123} MFL 134-135, 168, VWG (ER) 27-29, 41, 113
the achievements of the analysis of the surrounding world. Thus, to belabour, but also to expand the point for the last time, Heidegger is very clear that:

One cannot pack transcendence into intuition, in either the theoretical or the aesthetic sense, because it is not even an ontic activity. Even less can it be packed into a practical comportment, be it an instrumental-utilitarian sense or in any other. The central task in the ontology of Dasein is to go back behind those divisions into comportments to find their common root, a task that need not, of course, be easy. Transcendence, precedes every possible mode of activity in general, prior to νόησις, but also prior to ὄρεξις.125

With this the most basic determination of the difference is achieved. Transcendence differs from intentionality (intuition, comportment) because it is not an act.126 If transcendence is connected with the understanding of being this connection must be understood wholly beyond and before the act – transcendence is beyond activity, it is prior to νόησις and ὄρεξις as such.

But, in the connection of transcendence and world, and in connection with the proximal binding of intentionality to beings, this refers us to a renewed problem of the difference between world and innerworldliness – a problem which is central to SZ §69c. In distinguishing world and innerworldliness anew we must do so in a way that is nonetheless pregnant with innerworldliness, and so, with the possibility of intentionality.127 That is, the transcendence of the world must lead us back to the original possibility and grounds of intentionality. Here, the difference between intentionality and transcendence must also be preserved. And with this another difficulty lays waiting in the background; the being-in-the-world of my Dasein, being-with and the innerworldliness of things must be grasped anew. For it is a fatal error to say that transcendence is concerned solely with the others and with

124 Cf. §§1-2 of Part I herein & SZ (S) 72-76, 88
125 MFL 183 All italics added. ὄρεξις means appetite; compare vis activa (appetition, drive etc.) for the limits of the re-petition of Leibniz developed in MFL and discussed in Part §3b (which is nonetheless connected with the problem of transcendence as per MFL 209).
126 Here it would be profitable though too lengthy to compare the problem of intentionality developed here with Scheler’s formulation wherein the act-being of intentionality becomes especially decisive, cf. Emad (1981) 6ff. This indicates that the ‘act’ here ought to be understood in terms of the broader phenomenological movement and this movement’s use of the ‘act’ in connection with intentionality.
127 Cf. SZ (S/S) 366
Second Stage: Transcendence and Intentionality

things. This is so far from the case that transcendence transcends “even and precisely the very
being as which Dasein ‘itself’ exists.”

The task now is to more precisely formulate the distinction between intentionality and
transcendence in such a way that transcendence is preliminarily clarified. But we must not do
so merely at random. The distinction must instead be brought back into the fundamental
ontological problematic and integrated with this problematic. Only though this can its proper
significance be secured. Thus, in concluding this chapter, we turn to anxiety and care as sites
for the preliminary formulation of transcendence.

a) The Non-Directedness-Towards… of Transcendence in Light of the
Phenomenon of Anxiety

Transcendence is directed towards world but not towards beings. Intentionality is proximally
comportment towards beings. As surpassing beings towards world, beings are implicit in
transcendence but not in the mode of a coming toward them, grasping them and so on. Insofar as it is always and only being-in-the-world which intends, world is implicit in
intentionality, but world is not intentionality’s toward-which. Transcendence as
transcendence is not yet a mode of getting ‘caught up’ in beings thought it enables the latter.
Intentionality is primarily fallen. Transcendence frees beings (as surpassing them) but it does
so freely (i.e. without falling to them) and does so by transcending towards – that is, by
originally forming – world. Intentionality implies a prior freedness of world, but
intentionality itself does not free world.

Proximally and for the most part Dasein is caught up in its comportments. According to the
analysis of Being and Time this is simply Dasein’s proximal and usual mode. Accordingly,

128 VWG (ER) 39, and thus, “In surpassing, Dasein first attains to the being it is… but also surpassing touches on
a kind of being that Dasein ‘itself’ is not.” Ibid.
129 On this cf. VWG (ER) 88f. etc.
world, and thereby being-in-the-world remain covered over by the concerns of fallenness. Thus, the Analytic of Dasein, in seeking to first concretely determine the being of Dasein, set itself the task of ‘bringing Dasein itself before itself’ in such a way that Dasein might become “accessible to itself as simplified in a certain way” as being-in-the-world. The phenomenon deployed for that purpose was anxiety. Since Dasein as transcendence is simply the primordial phenomenon of being-in-the-world it follows that anxiety is simply a way – but not the only way – of disclosing transcendence as such; of bringing it into a exemplar phenomenon.

But it is worthy of note that anxiety was contrasted with another attunement, namely fear. Fear is characterised by fallenness. In fear I interpret myself from beings taken care of, and it is these beings before-which fear is fearful. Thus fear is rapt by beings and the whole of what ‘matters’ in fear is taken from the horizon of comportment. The more fearful I am, the more that this horizon overpowers. If anxiety is burdened by having to be being-in-the-world, fear is burdened by the horizon of comportment.

Anxiety disrupts absorption in comporting and the comported towards because it renders insignificant every possible comportment. Beings are of course still there for Dasein but the whole horizon of intentionality is stripped of its significance (and of course, that includes myself qua personality). The intentum is stripped of familiarity. The intentio is emptied of its power and stunted. All of my proximal grounds – those by which I usually interpret myself (things taken care of, the they) – are annihilated in anxiety in the specific sense that they are still there but can no longer serve as proximal grounds. Accordingly I am left ‘naked’ in my abyssal ‘groundlessness’.

130 SZ (S/S) 182  
131 Ibid.  
132 SZ §30  
133 Cf. SZ (S/S) 134f., 189  
134 SZ (S/S) 186  
135 Ibid. & f.  
136 Cf. Part I, §1b herein.
According to Being and Time, Dasein is anxious before and for-the-sake-of being-in-the-world torn from the power of its intentio and its intenta.\(^{137}\) According to What is Metaphysics? Dasein is anxious before the Nothing.\(^{138}\) That the first speaks implicitly of the problem of world-transcendence should be clear; anxiety is anxious before and about the structure of transcendence, i.e., before and about being-in-the-world, before and about the non-intended world as world.\(^{139}\) The second formulation, on the other hand, speaks of the same phenomenon but emphasises more decisively that it involves an essential nihilation of the intentum.\(^{140}\) This cannot now be surprising for us; for here in both cases Heidegger is simply speaking of a phenomenon which exemplifies transcendence in its distinction from intentionality. Here it must be borne in mind that the complete structure of intentionality is the intentio and the intentum; if the intentio is subdued and beings are still ‘there,’ they are, in a certain sense there without being the intentum.

Anxiety subdues the intentionality of Dasein and brings us before world itself.\(^{141}\) But, beings are nonetheless there in anxiety.\(^{142}\) In some deficient sense I can even comport myself toward them, for instance in grasping my forehead, in stumbling about, in grappling with their ‘slipping away.’\(^{143}\) Anxiety is not the annihilation of beings, but the annihilation of their ‘hold’ over Dasein.\(^{144}\) Since transcendence ‘comes from’ beings insofar as it surpasses them towards world it can never really be ‘without beings’. But in anxiety, beings no longer cover over being-in-the-world because their dominion (not their innerworldliness) is shattered.

\(^{137}\) Cf. the structure of mood, e.g., fear is ‘fearful about’ (it has a Worum), this is the self-reference of mood. Fear is fear before (it has a Wovor); this is the having-beenness of mood. Fear is fearful; this is its discursive enpresenting. Cf. SZ (M&R, D) §§30, 40

\(^{138}\) WM passim

\(^{139}\) Cf. §40

\(^{140}\) Here it is important to hearken to the fact that What is Metaphysics? precisely does not merely abstract a concept of nothingness, or let its preliminary formulation (science knows beings ‘and nothing besides’ WM 82-84) bear the weight for the analysis. Instead, the question of ‘the nothing’ is formulated in terms of beings as a whole (WM 85f.), and this in turn is formulated, not according to an intellectual construction but according to Dasein’s finding itself amidst the totality (“Sichbefinden inmitten des Seienden im Ganzen” WM (E/D) 87 / 110) and only then does Heidegger ask the question of the nothing and he does so from precisely this base, that is, from the world (i.e. in the presencing of world in which “world” is primordially visible). Only then, within the economy of the address, does it become possible to grasp anxiety’s disclosure of this ‘nothing’ and to let being shine through the cracks, so to speak (WM 88ff., VWG (EG) 97).

\(^{141}\) SZ (S/S) 87

\(^{142}\) This is equally true in WM 86-91

\(^{143}\) On ‘slipping away’ as a formulation of the relation to beings given in anxiety cf. WM 90

\(^{144}\) Ibid. & SZ (S/S) 186-187
Transcendence is not an act. It is before all ‘acts’ because it is not intentional. Moreover, properly speaking it is not directly concerned with beings, thought, like anxiety, beings are implicit for it. Anxiety as anxiety is non-intentional: Dasein can still be (deficiently) intentional within anxiety but the anxiety itself brings to primacy a non-intentional mode of Dasein. Thus, anxiety is a preliminary phenomenon of transcendence precisely because it brings us towards the phenomenon of a non-intentional (or pre-intentional) being-in-the-world.\footnote{Indeed, here we can see some sense in which Husserl misses the fundamental ontological concept of transcendence, since for Husserl, mood is always already connected with intentionality; it is merely a question about how ‘determinate’ the object is. (LI:II 106-111)} What is more, as the next chapter will discuss, the analysis of the structure of attunement contributes to the formulation of transcendence in §69c. It is for these reasons that Heidegger singles out anxiety as a phenomenon which “serve[s] the progressive elaboration of transcendence” in Being and Time.\footnote{Cf. MFL (E/D) 167-168 / 214 (quoted more completely in the §1 of the First Stage of the Founding Analysis)}

And this means that, to a certain extent, the difference between intentionality and transcendence is ‘simply’ the pure, general form of the distinction between fear and anxiety. In anxiety Dasein is brought before itself as being-in-the-world, that is, as transcendence. In fear, Dasein is concealed from itself as fallen to its intentional life. This intentionality, this falleness of Dasein is only possible insofar as Dasein is being-in-the-world, that is, insofar as Dasein is transcendence, yet, the two are nonetheless radically different. Only in ‘limit experiences’ like anxiety is Dasein released from falleness so that it can encounter its character of transcendence directly.

But according to what was said earlier, transcendence is essentially factual, thus the world disclosed in transcendence is equally factual. Thus, on this basis it is already preliminarily clear that the world disclosed by anxiety is not simply the ‘ideal world’. Anxiety gives neither the archetype of world, nor the archetype of being-in-the-world. This is not the power of anxiety nor should it be. Anxiety instead, gives a ‘jeweilig’ world but it gives the ‘world
Second Stage: Transcendence and Intentionality

as world.” On the other hand, as fearful, Dasein is fallen so that the world is given but is factically covered over by the ‘pull’ of intentionality towards and into beings.

Anxiety discloses transcendence. Anxiety in its contradistinction to fear gives a preliminary existential form of the distinction between transcendence and intentionality. Just as beings are always there for anxiety, beings are always there for transcendence. But this simply means; intentionality is not the sole possible way in which beings can appear in the strictest sense. Intentionality is a specific way in which beings appear, specifically, the one that arises from a directedness towards them and their ontic region. Just as anxiety suppresses this comportmental character of Dasein without absolutely destroying it, transcendence makes comportment possible (as we will see more completely later) without being comportmental. Moreover, just as anxiety points towards care, yet for that reason, only necessitates the analysis of care, so too does anxiety point towards transcendence without yet fully clarifying it in its essence.

b) Transcendence and Intentionality in the Problem of Care

The question of care and transcendence must follow the guideline set down by the comparison of intentionality and transcendence. The question of care and transcendence has two levels. Firstly, there is the problem of the modal modification of care and secondly there is the question of care itself brought back to its fundamental essence.

In the first place, care is modified according to its modes; Besorgen and Fürsorge. Care as such is neither primarily taking care nor caring for:

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147 SZ (S/S) 187 (italics modified from the two instances which occur at Ibid., viz. “world as world” and “world as world”)
148 So does fear, though, fear also covers transcendence over.
“Earlier” than any presupposition that Dasein makes, or any of its ways of comporting, there is the “a priori” of its constitution of being in the mode of being of care.\textsuperscript{149}

Nonetheless, care itself is always in a certain sense ‘taking care and caring for.’\textsuperscript{150} After all, if, things and the others are nonetheless ‘there’ in anxiety, the mode of care which encounters these beings must remain, no matter how deficiently.\textsuperscript{151}

Care, as the being of Dasein can ‘become’ a comportment; it can ‘become’ taking care of things, and caring for the others. For instance, this occurs when Dasein is rapt by… In being rapt by the work, the care structure is modified and is now ‘interpreted’ out of the work.\textsuperscript{152} The way in which care is marshalled for… affects the way in which it is. The care structure itself exists in such a way that it may place ‘all’ of its possibilities ‘in the service of…’\textsuperscript{153} But this intentional mode, is supported by the care structure itself which is nonetheless pre-intentional (but not therefore “ethereal”). This pre-intentional care structure forms the ‘common root’ of the intentional modes of care.\textsuperscript{154}

Since care names the structure of being-in-the-world and transcendence also names the structure of being-in-the-world, it is preliminarily clear that there must be a basic connection between care and transcendence. That is, transcendence pertains to the being of Dasein. But what was relatively clear cut in the analysis of fear and anxiety has become ambiguous and fluid; care names transcendence, but it also names intentionality. As a name for Dasein, care is modified with respect to its primary significance, so as to flow from one to the other. As the being of Dasein, care is (\textit{ipso facto}) the structure of transcendence. As the structure of taking care and caring for, care is the existentially determined typology of intentionality.

\textsuperscript{149}\textsuperscript{SZ (S/S, D) 206 (modified)}
\textsuperscript{150}\textsuperscript{SZ (S/S) 194 – “even if only privatively”}
\textsuperscript{151}\textsuperscript{Cf. Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{152}\textsuperscript{Cf. SZ (S/S) 195}
\textsuperscript{153}\textsuperscript{Cf. SZ (S/S) 196 (paraphrase)}
\textsuperscript{154}\textsuperscript{Cf. SZ (S) 193 etc.}
Nonetheless intentionality is an ‘act’ whilst, as we saw earlier, transcendence is not to be determined as an ‘activity’ in any sense. As that which has become a taking care and a caring for, care is primarily an act. But as the being of Dasein, care is not an act, just as transcendence is not an act. But this means, for instance, that the possibilities which intrinsically belong to being-ahead-of-itself are not to be first interpreted as intended possibilities. Similarly, it means that the primordial constitution my already being-in (viz. the having-been of the care-structure) is not simply the retained qua intenta. And it even means that the being-together-with which is constitutive of care is not originally a matter of intending beings. Indeed, this interpretation of being-together-with was already indicated in the previous chapter by the determination of transcendence as a surpassing of beings; surpassing as such is already pre-intentional being-together-with innerworldly beings.

Anxious care gives us a basic insight into these phenomena, for which reason the analysis of anxiety precedes that of care, and the problem of anxiety carries over into SZ §41 The Being of Dasein as Care. Thus, as much as SZ §41 primarily discusses being-together-with within the confines of care’s entangled mode, it is important to note this entangled mode is identified with fleeing before anxiety.

Right at the heart of the introduction of being-together-with as a structure of care Heidegger indicates the possibility of a being-together-with which is surrendered to anxiety. Indeed this possibility becomes the basic guideline for the whole of SZ I.2.i-iii. Being-towards-death

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155 Introductory portion of this section.
156 With the following proviso: if transcendence opens beings, and Besorgen is nothing more and nothing less than care which understands things and Fürsorge is nothing more and nothing less than care which understands the others, then transcendence is in a certain sense already, and pre-comportmentally taking care and caring for (that is, in a non-act).
157 There is a temporal problem here, vaguely indicated by LQT 201-202, namely that ‘act’ is a temporal designation which bespeaks within-timeness, whereas the being of Dasein must be temporal in a way which is never properly characterised by within-timenes.
158 This, I think is revolutionary and must be achieved if we are to ever make the care structure radical enough to bear the weight it is supposed to bear (and free it from ‘systems’ of possibility etc.).
159 On retaining (Behalten) Cf. SZ (S, D) 339. Of course, as constitutive for the ecstatic structure of world-time, forgetting is more primordial than retaining (but this is passed over for the moment).
160 Cf. SZ (S/S) 192
161 Ibid.
which is guilty and resolutely wanting-to-have-a-conscience refuses fallenness and that means, it refuses to interpret itself wholly (mark well) from its intentional life.\textsuperscript{162} The factual and situated objectlessness of guilt bespeaks transcendence as does the silence of the call of conscience.\textsuperscript{163} Similarly, the sense in which death is not authentically datable alludes to something like transcendence (the grounding of existence in the happening of non-intentional finite openness). Authentic understanding of death breaks with actuality (which is solely a possibility of innerworldliness) and concerns my whole existence (viz. the constancy of Dasein, where, as will be shown in the second chapter of the Founded Analysis, un-self-constancy belongs to self-interpretedness from intentional life).\textsuperscript{164}

Innerworldliness is that in terms of which temporality has always already become factically bound up with time-reckoning. And so, unless we are to align being-towards-death with time-reckoning (and we must not do so), existence must somehow and in some limited way break free of (transcend!) innerworldliness.

Anticipatory resoluteness is the way in which Dasein holds itself in authentic care, and discloses itself therefrom.\textsuperscript{165} In this disclosure Dasein is ready for and engaged in its intentional life without being consumed by it.\textsuperscript{166} Instead, anticipatory resoluteness knows anxiety in equanimity and it factically grasps its finite being-open as such.\textsuperscript{167} But insofar as original openness may be identified with world, the above simply says that anticipatory resoluteness hearkens to the finite transcendence of being-in-the-world in the concretion of its comportment, that is, it frees the former without obliterating the latter.\textsuperscript{168}

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\textsuperscript{162} Cf. SZ (S/S) 305ff.
\textsuperscript{163} Cf. SZ (S/S) 284-287, 295-296
\textsuperscript{164} Cf. SZ (S/S) 305ff. \textit{et passim}. To break with actuality, of course, also means to break with the category of possibility and thus to preserve only the existential of possibility. Here, a deepening of the meaning of existence requires a further deepening of the existential of possibility. On actuality cf. the related problem of \textit{Realität} in SZ §43
\textsuperscript{165} SZ (S/S) 306
\textsuperscript{166} Cf. SZ (S/S) 308
\textsuperscript{167} SZ (S/S) 305, 309, 345
\textsuperscript{168} Cf. e.g. VWR (EG) 130f. for a semi-distant exegetical justification of the above. This problem will come to a head in Ch. 2 of the Founded Analysis (viz. Part III)
Thus, in this chapter we have seen that the proper distinction between intentionality and transcendence is to be understood along the axis of directedness towards in general in contrast to a prior openness for… The openness of Dasein is either intentional (=comportment/intuition) or transcendental (=transcendence=the openness of world). For reasons which can be properly clarified only in the final chapter of this thesis, the former is grounded in the latter. But if intentionality is grounded in transcendence and all openness is either intentional or transcendental this means that transcendence is the most primordial openness of Dasein. And if openness is the being of the Da, then transcendence becomes a fundamental question about the being of Dasein.

This understanding was endangered by the concept of ‘ontic transcendence,’ especially, where Heidegger fairly carelessly employs the latter in *the Basic Problems of Phenomenology* §9b. On the other hand, just because transcendence is connected with the understanding of being and contrasted with ontic transcendence does not mean that transcendence proper is categorial intuition (intuitional intending of being). Fundamental ontological transcendence is not a parallel ontological comportment to that of ontic transcendence because the former is not a comportment at all. Of course, something like categorial intuition would have almost certainly formed the basis for the temporale science of being, yet this by no means indicates that the *phomenon* underpinning such a science has already been objectified in the being of Dasein.  

169 HCT 48
170 This connection of the science of Temporalität and categorial intuition is rooted in the determination of the temporale science of being as an objectification (*BP passim*). This objectification however, is rooted in the essence of *science*. Conversely, then, since this objectification is connected with the scientific character of philosophy, it would seem to no longer be at issue by the time of MFL and thereafter when philosophy is no longer thought of as a science (cf. MFL 179f., 221 vs. *BP passim* & PIK §1 *et seq.*, cf. also Kisiel (2005[2001])). That said, there is one minor indication of ambivalence here, since it is precisely that philosophy has a genuine horizon which makes its inquiry scientific (cf. *SZ* 1.1.i, *BP* §1 *et seq.*, PIK §1 *et seq.*). This horizon would have been the horizon of temporality/Temporalität, yet, whilst MFL has already started to move away from thinking of philosophy as a primordial science, it still understands the finitude of horizon in a way consonant with the scientific interpretation of philosophy (cf. MFL §12 esp. 208, for a chiaroscuro cf. *EHF* §1). In either case, on balance it would appear that ‘explicit transcending’ replaces this categorial intuition as the name for that in which fundamental ontology approaches the question of being. This expression occurs once in KPM, in the final *Abschnitt*, where fundamental ontological transcendence is finally a problem (KPM (T) 170), it is also pervasive in *EP* (*EP passim*). Whether it arose as a replacement for the temporale science or whether it had been held in abeyance (for instance, as mediating stage for the original draft of *SZ*) and then simply had to take a greater role in the breakdown of the scientific character of philosophy cannot be securely discerned.
Finally, the question of transcendence was shown to be implicitly operative throughout the analyses of anxiety, care and authentic care. It was possible to identify this only on the basis of the contrast between intentionality and transcendence. Thus, the contrast enabled us to gain existential insight into the question of transcendence.

Yet, naturally, one cannot fully formulate the contrast between intentionality and transcendence so long as transcendence itself has not been completely clarified. To the extent that this remains to be achieved the analysis in this chapter remains only preliminary. But that simply brings us to the necessity of the next task; the clarification of the horizontal schemata as guideline for central problem of the Founding Analysis of Transcendence.
Third Stage of the Founding Analysis:

Analysis of the Temporal Constitution of Transcendence

Based on what has so far been established it is possible to say something like the following: world-transcendence is the non-intentional transcendence of Dasein which surpasses beings as a whole in an original letting-world-happen. But this has not yet been fully developed in its meaning and necessity. The more that we identify the transcendence of Dasein with the original phenomenon of world, the more that the question of world becomes another face of the question about the being of Dasein itself, i.e., of being-in-the-world as care and temporality.

But this means that grasping the phenomenon of transcendence more essentially requires a temporal interpretation of transcendence, that is, an interpretation which presents the temporal – and thus, the existential – constitution of transcendence. Qua transcendence of Dasein, the problem of the temporal constitution of transcendence is a necessary part of the fundamental ontological problem of transcendence. This temporal question does not present another ‘aspect’ or ‘mode’ of transcendence: rather, it penetrates further into the same.

So how does one pose the question of the temporal constitution of transcendence? This is the question of SZ §69c The Temporal Problem of the Transcendence of the World.¹ Yet, as Kisiel notes:

The term “horizontal schema” does not even sneak up on us in BT... It is suddenly there in its full glory in §69c, and only there, in

¹ Cf. SZ §69c
conjunction with the “temporal problem of the transcendence of the world,” as if a world-horizon were more intuitive than a time-horizon (it is), as if a world-horizon should also be regarded as a temporal horizon.2

It is a very strange state of affairs. All of a sudden a whole host of problems arise and before we have even adapted to this new situation, it is over, and is explicitly mentioned only two or three times more in §§70-83.3

Thus, as Kisiel puts it, “§69 has always conceptually stood out, like a strange outgrowth, from the textual corpus of BT.”4 And if transcendence did not become a central issue for Heidegger in the years following the publication of Being and Time and we did not know from archival material, as Kisiel has reported, that Heidegger was severely struggling with §69 in the preparation of SZ I as a whole, and that it was central to SZ I.3 then it would be all too easy to dismiss this section as some kind of wild night terror which accidentally made its way into publication.5 But we cannot.

As perfunctory as §69 may appear to be, it is clear that it contains a whole host of fundamental problematics which lay at the centre of the possibility for the completion Being and Time but which were held back by Heidegger – a man who always played the game of hermeneutics with his cards close to his chest.

The problem which – in a terse and formal yet enigmatic way – lies at the centre of §69 is none other than the temporal constitution of the transcendence of the world. In the present chapter, the task is precisely to penetrate this ‘centre’, namely, SZ §69c. The further that we push into these problems the more what at first seems obvious becomes difficult. Thus, pushing into these problems is not yet breaking them wide open; that task belongs solely to

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2 Kisiel (1995[1993]) 448
3 Viz. SZ (S/S) 389, 419, more implicitly at SZ (S/S, D) 396
4 Kisiel (1995[1993]) 448
Third Stage: the Temporal Constitution of Transcendence

the Final Stage of the Founding Analysis. Here, as in the entire previous analysis, all things prepare for and stand in service of the Final Stage.

The basic terms of the ‘language game’ (as Kisiel calls it) of SZ §69c are transcendence, temporality, world, horizon, schema, for-the-sake-of, before-which, where-at and in-order-to, and by association, praezens and Temporalität (thus, by implication, also ‘futurum’ and ‘praeteritum’).\(^6\) Merely listing them achieves little. The goal for a presentation of the essence of transcendence must be to present them in their necessary interconnection and character. Of the terms above, the idea of an existential ‘schema’ is the most difficult to formulate as a problem. Accordingly, in this chapter the meaning of ‘schema’ is prepared for but it is only broken open in the Final Stage.

This chapter is primarily dedicated to unravelling the inner meaning of the horizonal schemata of temporality, i.e., of determining them as phenomena. Only by rooting the analysis in these three phenomena themselves – in connection with ecstatic temporality and transcendence – can the problem of their horizon-character and schema-character be laid bare with appropriate precision.\(^7\) Equally, only by first winning, and then rooting the analysis of transcendence in these phenomena can the transcendence of Dasein and its world be grounded as the transcendence of Dasein as such. That is, any founded concept of transcendence needs something like the horizonal schemata because any founded concept needs to root itself in temporality.

As much as a text like the Metaphysical Foundations of Logic also includes a temporal problem of transcendence, there, the temporal problem remains vague. In §§12-13 of that text, the problem of temporality and transcendence soars. We find ourselves transported into the highest stages of the question – but when it is all over it is hard to say what we have


\(^7\) I.e. only by developing the for-the-sake-of in connection with transcendence and temporality (insofar as they have been disclosed) can we ask why and how the for-the-sake-of, as a horizonal schema, is ‘horizontal’ and ‘schematic.’ This follows, mutatis mutandis, for the horizonal schemata of having-been and enpresenting.
learnt; the analysis is not concrete enough to really found a question of transcendence. It is enough to evoke it and to that extent guides this thesis, but is not enough to ground and secure the problem. On the other hand, in the Basic Problems of Phenomenology, the temporal problem of transcendence remains at once too nascent and too advanced (i.e. in its immediate transposition from a nascent stage into the temporale problem) and in each case too sparsely formulated.\(^8\)

In §69c the temporal problem is rudimentary, yet distinctly organised and rooted in the phenomena of Being and Time. Thus, if we want to pose the temporal question of transcendence through SZ §69c, all that we must do is phenomenologically develop its phenomena in terms of the already available resources for doing so. This is the task of §3.

But we cannot just jump into the horizontal schemata unprepared. Thus the first task is to prepare the phenomenological domain of the problem, firstly, through some brief reflections on the care structure (§1), and secondly, by laying bare the structure of the problem of SZ §69c (§2). Only then can we begin to unravel the horizontal schemata themselves (§3).

As a ‘transitional chapter’ of the Founding Analysis, this chapter lacks both the originality of a beginning and the finality of a conclusion. Here, we are guided above all by the formal indications set down by the First Stage and by the difference between intentionality and transcendence as worked out by the previous chapter, yet these are not yet consummated. As much as the problem quickly moves forward in §§1-2, the difficulty of the problem of the horizontal schemata requires us to tarry for a while.

This chapter is concerned with steering the correct course towards the conclusion rather than with achieving that conclusion. By unfolding this whole problematic in its proper interconnection the meaning and necessity of a horizontal schematism becomes preliminarily

\(^8\) Cf. BP §§20e et seq.
visible. By working this out concretely in the next chapter it will be possible to truly answer the question of this chapter and of the Founding Analysis as a whole, that is, it will be possible to answer the question about the meaning of transcendence.

§1 – PREPARATION FOR THE TRANSITION TO THE TEMPORAL PROBLEM

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger names the being of Dasein care, and yet, in the years that follow Heidegger will often call transcendence the being of Dasein.\(^9\) That this is a development of the problem of the being of Dasein (rather than a different approach) is indicated by the previous quotations linking transcendence and the problematic of *Being and Time*, along with the fact that Heidegger will often refer to the irreducible importance of care in his discussions of transcendence.\(^10\) And so, in preparation for, and transition to the temporal problem of transcendence, some additional reflections on the transcendental problem of the care-structure will be worked out here.

So again, the formal structure of transcendence is as follows:

> What is surpassed is simply beings themselves [Seiende selbst], i.e., every being which can be or become unconcealed to Dasein, even and precisely the very being as which Dasein “itself” exists… That onto-which [woraufhin] Dasein transcends, we call the world, and we can now define transcendence as being-in-the-world.\(^11\)

Transcendence transcends beings as a whole in opening world. In doing so it provides an upon-which of facticity in general. World itself is that onto-which transcending transcends whereas “beings are not that onto-which [woraufhin] surpassing occurs.”\(^12\) *Being and Time*’s formal indication for the meaning of world is that ‘in which Da-sein lives’ as that upon-which

\(^9\) Cf. MFL 134ff., vs. 159, 166, cf. also BP (E/D) 300 / 435f., MFL 168, VWG (EG) 123 etc., cf. also SZ (S) 364 vs. 231 et passim etc.

\(^10\) Cf. BP 298, MFL 209, VWG (ER / D) 120-122 / 132

\(^11\) VWG (ER) 38f., 40f. (modified)

\(^12\) VWG (ER) 40f. (modified)
Part II – the Founding Analysis

140

The task is to experience the unity and coherence of all of these formal indications. This task first comes to fruition in §2 of the Final Stage of the Founding Analysis. For now, we must simply keep this task in mind and preserve its possibility.

The first element of the care structure is ‘being-ahead-of-itself.’14 Dasein’s being-ahead-of-itself is its being-an-issue-for-itself qua being-possible.15 That the possibilities intrinsically pertaining to Dasein’s being-ahead-of-itself must not be understood as intentional possibilities was established by the previous chapter.16 The second element of the care structure is ‘already being-in (the world).’17 This seems to indicate that world belongs primarily to having-been.18 And yet, the first moment of the structure of significance (SZ §18) is the for-the-sake-of and, in SZ §69c, the for-the-sake-of names the futurity of world.19 Conversely, the for-the-sake-of is simply another name for the “es geht um” which intrinsically belongs to being-ahead, i.e., to the futurity of the care structure.20 And so, in complete agreement with this, Heidegger calls the world “the totality of the for-the-sake-of” in Vom Wesen des Grundes.21

World is an existential structure. World exists.22 But since existence means temporality and temporality is primarily futural, futurity must have ultimate priority in the existence of world. As a question of Dasein and its transcendence (both of which are primarily futural), world is primarily futural. Conversely, since temporality is a primordial unity, world is also intrinsically characterised by having-been and enpresenting. Accordingly, we must say that the phenomenon of world referred to in the care structure is world insofar as it is disclosed from having-been. That is, because world means something more (because its temporal

13 SZ (S/S, D) 65, 76, 86, 364-365 (of course, these are the same formal indications as pertain to meaning (Sinn)) cf. SZ (S/S, D) 151, 323ff., this cannot be elaborated here
14 SZ (S/S, D) 191f.
15 Ibid.
16 Second Stage of the Founding Analysis esp. §3b
17 Cf. SZ (S/S) 192
18 Cf. the temporal problem of care in Part I, §1b herein etc.
19 SZ §§12, 18, 69c
20 Cf. SZ (S/S, D) 191f. & MFL §11c, Part I §1b herein etc.
21 VWG (ER) 88, 100, cf. also SZ §69c
22 Part I §§1b-3 herein, SZ §§18, 69c etc.
Third Stage: the Temporal Constitution of Transcendence

structure is threefold) it can also mean something less (it can be identified with having-been, i.e., with a single ecstasy).

The third element of the care structure is “being-together-with (innerworldly beings encountered).” Now, as the previous chapter showed transcendence cannot be understood as an intentional being-together-with. However, innerworldly beings do belong to the complete structural possibility of transcendence precisely because it transcends them. And thus, transcendence can still be understood as an essential and primordial (though non-intentional) being-together-with innerworldly beings. Conversely however, world itself must also be enpresented. If transcendence gives the temporal problem of world as such, then the most essential enpresenting of transcendence must be something other than the enpresenting of innerworldly beings. Transcending must have its moment; this belongs to the temporal problem of transcendence.

But just as temporality is not a being, world is not a being. And so, again, if being-together-with innerworldly beings (i.e. enpresenting beings) belongs to the complete possibility of transcendence, this does not mean that such enpresenting consummates the fundamental meaning of the enpresenting of transcendence. And similarly, if world is an existential structure which must be enpresented, then this enpresenting is still ontologically different from the enpresenting of selfhood even when the latter is grasped with the utmost radicality; because to be a self is precisely to be a being.

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23 SZ (S/S) 192; “Sich-vorweg-schon-sein-in-(der-Welt-) als Sein-bei (innerweltlich begegnendem Seienden)”
SZ (D) 192
24 Thus, VWG (ER) 38f. & 40f; cohabit with VWG (ER) 84-86, 88ff., 104ff., 112f.
25 Cf. Ibid.
26 Cf. the authentic enpresenting of resoluteness and conscience as modes of care’s enpresenting that are bound to silence and reticence e.g. SZ (S) 323ff. etc. (thus by thinking through care to an enpresenting which is not wholly bound to beings this thesis is not being exegetically arbitrary).
27 SZ (S/S) 365 MFL (E/D) passim, esp. 195, 209f. / 252, VWG (ER/EG) 87 / 121f., BP 165, 299.
28 Cf. SZ (S/S) 297 et passim, cf. also formal indications above from VWG (ER) 38f., 40f. (modified)
That world is not a being *is a precept* of the transcendental problem of world: but this is *precisely* not yet the case in *History of the Concept of Time*. This fact is the basic proof that *History of the Concept of Time* occurs before fundamental ontological transcendence has arisen as a problem for Heidegger (i.e. because it calls world a being). The problem of transcendence is a radicalisation of Heidegger’s problem of world. Formulating the ontological problem of the meaning of the statement ‘world is not a being’ is one of its most essential tasks. But then, to let the phenomenon of transcendence demonstrate that world is not a being, is at the same time, by proxy, to demonstrate that the concept of transcendence discussed in *History of the Concept of Time* is not yet the fundamental ontological problem of transcendence.

This section has outlined how the question of transcendence stands in relation to the care structure. This relation has many contours. However, recognising a connection between care and transcendence must be tempered by an understanding that the already-world is not the only character of world; world is also ‘ahead.’ Similarly, under the topic of the transcendence of the world, the world must have a ‘present’ and an enpresenting which is not to be taken forthwith from beings. That is, we must bring transcendence and the *being* of Dasein (but not its selfhood) together in such a way that “Existing, Dasein *is* its world” and not only ‘in’ a world qua having been, or, amongst this and that qua enpresenting of beings. This is the task...

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29 HCT 168f. vs. SZ (S/S) 365 MFL (E/D) *passim*, esp. 195, 209f., / 252, VWG (ER) 87, VWG (EG) 121ff., BP 165, 299.

30 Ibid. Similarly, the analysis of CTD Ch. 2 cannot be made to cohere with the preceding analysis of transcendence and the latter’s connection with world. That the problem of world has developed can equally be seen if CTD Ch. 2 is compared to SZ §69c (cf. §2 this chapter). Thus, e.g., whereas CTD 13 gives something like the basic threefold division of being-in-the-world later presented in SZ (S) 53, Heidegger does not say in CTD (1924) that being-in-the-world “stands for a unified phenomenon” (SZ (S) 53) nor could he have done, because in the earlier text world primarily means the “surrounding world” in such a way that to be worldly means to be *innerworldly* cf. CTD Ch. 2 *et passim*. However, it would still be possible to show that CTD is pregnant with what will become the problem of transcendence, e.g., the problem of ‘the how’ of Dasein in its irreducibility to ‘the what’ CTD 45, 70, or the determination of Dasein as its time CTD 47, 50ff., 70ff., 73. However, the inference that these are pregnant with the problem of transcendence could be attested only on the basis of the properly clarified and elaborated meaning of transcendence.

31 SZ (S) 364
of SZ §69c. As the difference between world and beings indicates, the unity of Dasein and its world must not be straight away interpreted as the unity of selfhood and world simpliciter.\textsuperscript{32}

\section*{§2 – THE STRUCTURE OF THE PROBLEM OF SZ §69C}

In First Stage of the Founding Analysis we encountered the formal structure of transcendence. In the Second Stage we saw transcendence in its distinction from intentionality. But now, we want to develop the phenomenon of the transcendence of Dasein concretely as a matter of Dasein. Heidegger’s guideline for this topic is presented in its most canonical form in SZ §69c. There, in a discussion which is as unexpected as it is brief, the outline for the temporal (i.e. fundamental ontological) structure of transcendence is presented.\textsuperscript{33}

Here we will discuss §69c step by step. But the task is not just to be precise about its contents, though this is an important first step. Rather, the task is to enter into each of its constitutive moments as far as is possible on the basis of what has so far been established. The first step of achieving formal precision is worked out in this section. In the following section the analysis will push further into the phenomenon itself thereby achieving \textit{phenomenological} precision. What has so far been established goes beyond what became truly explicit in \textit{Being and Time}. Thus the task of this chapter – which has been prepared for – is to think §69c in order to think beyond it, i.e., towards what it says.

§69c begins by apparently re-affirming the primordiality of the analysis of surrounding world:

\begin{quote}
The understanding of a totality of relevance inherent in circumspect taking care is grounded in a previous understanding of the relations of the in-order-to, what-for, for-that, and the for-the-sake-of-which. We
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{32} As attested by VWG (ER) 39 also cf. MFL 186-189 VWG (ER) 105, & Postscript to the Founding Analysis.

On this problem cf. Ch.2 of the Founded Analysis

\textsuperscript{33} But, not completely unexpected. Cf. Part I §§1-2 herein, SZ (S) 202f. etc.
set forth the connection of these relations as significance. Their unity constitutes what we call world.\textsuperscript{34}

Thus all practical comportments are grounded in the structure of significance. Whilst world was always referred to as a ‘totality’ in SZ §18, here in §69 world is called the ‘unity’ of significance.\textsuperscript{35} The task here, in §69c however, is to push further than the achievements of SZ §18. Thus, Heidegger continues;

Now the question arises: how is something like world in its unity with Dasein ontologically possible? In what way must world be, such that Dasein can exist as being-in-the-world?\textsuperscript{36}

We not only want to make intelligible the concept of world but to make it intelligible in its possibility. This possibility is to be questioned ontologically and with respect to its existential character. That this means that the question is now the unity of world as opposed to its totality may be seen clearly if we note that the question now concerns world as a question of the transcendence of temporality (the horizontal schemata), and thus, it concerns world insofar as it is rooted in the primordial unity of Dasein (temporality). Thus, for instance, §69a had the task of presenting the broader phenomena of the surrounding world in their underlying temporal unity.\textsuperscript{37} In this respect, the surrounding world is to the transcendence of the world as care (totality of Dasein) is to temporality (unity of Dasein).\textsuperscript{38}

Dasein, Heidegger continues, is always for-the-sake-of itself, thrown and delivered over to beings with respect to a factical in-order-to.\textsuperscript{39} That this refers us to a temporally determined (and indeed temporally limited) concept of the structure of world is indicated by how Heidegger continues:

\begin{flushright} \textsuperscript{34} SZ (S/S) 364  
\textsuperscript{35} Cf. SZ (S, D) 87, 364  
\textsuperscript{36} SZ (S/S, D) 364 (modified)  
\textsuperscript{37} SZ (S) 351-355  
\textsuperscript{38} Cf. SZ (S) 231-232, 317, 327  
\textsuperscript{39} SZ (S) 364 \end{flushright}
That *in-which* existing Dasein understands *itself is* ‘there’ with factical existence. The *in-which* of primary self-understanding has the kind of being of Dasein. Existing, Dasein *is* its world.40

This says; world *exists*; world has the kind of being of Dasein i.e. *existence*. As the primary *in-which*, world is not partly handy and partly existential, rather, it is wholly existential. The existential threefold of the for-the-sake-of-which, thrownness and the in-order-to bring us towards this pure phenomenon of world. But fundamentally, ‘existence’ means *temporality*.41 In this way, the existential threefold above corresponds to the threefoldness of temporality.42

And it is from this point in SZ§69c that we are suddenly thrown into the deep end. Care, temporality and world all suddenly come together into a single question such that “the unity of significance, that is, the ontological constitution of the world, must then also be grounded in temporality.”43 And from this we straight away move to the horizonality of time; “the ecstasies are not simply raptures to…” rather, ‘ecstatically going out to’ *essentially* ‘aims at a where’; each ecstasy has its *Wohin*.44 With even less ceremony than the introduction of temporal horizon, we now find that the where-to of each temporal ecstasy is to be called a ‘horizontal *schema*’.45

Each ecstasy has its specific horizontal schema.46 Since primordial ecstatic temporality is unified, and these horizontal schemata are constituted by the ecstasies, these horizontal schemata form a unified whole, and thus, the most primordial (and of course, pre-intentional!) ‘where-to’ of Dasein.47 As the most primordial where-to of Dasein, this unity is equally the fundamental upon-which of disclosure.48 So that, here, in the transition through these passages:

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40 SZ (S/S, D) 364 (modified)
41 SZ *passim*
42 Cf. SZ (S/S) 364ff.
43 SZ (S/S) 365
44 SZ (S/S, D) 365
• A primordial and radical ‘in which’ which is at the same time an upon-which is presented. That is, a radical concept of world is presented; world is traced back to the transcendence of time as its most basic truth.

• This in-which/upon-which is grounded in the being of Dasein and limited to the structure of being of Dasein. Thus, as much as it is connected with factically discovered innerworldly beings etc. it is never equivalent to these beings.

Yet, it bears noting, Heidegger presents this in a formal way, and so, it remains decisively in need of phenomenological deepening and explanation. Since these horizontal schemata essentially belong to the ecstasies:

Insofar as Dasein temporalizes itself, a world is, too. Temporalizing itself with regard to its being as temporality, Dasein is essentially “in a world” on the basis of the ecstatic and horizonal constitution of that temporality.49

Accordingly, to the extent that this concept of world constitutes my very being:

The world is already presupposed in one’s factical being together with handy things in taking care of them, in one’s thematisation of objectively present beings, and in one’s objectifying discovery of the latter; that is, all these are possible only as modes of being-in-the-world.50

As a matter of essence, Dasein is being-in-the-world; its existence means to be in a world. Indeed, “Dasein is its world.”51 This is the case irrespective of any particular beings and of how one understands them etc. By extension then, Dasein is being-in-the-world more primordially than attains to any possible epistemological or ontic-comportmental questioning concerning whether Dasein is ‘really’ or appropriately in this or that situation. On the order of possibility, world outstrips comportment and its proximal conditions unconditionally. Thus, which is to say the same thing (but which also says more):

49 SZ (S/S) 365
50 SZ (S/S, D) 365-366 (modified)
51 SZ (S/S, D) 364
The world is transcendent, grounded in the horizontal unity of ecstatic temporality. It must already be ecstatically disclosed so that innerworldly beings can be encountered from it.\textsuperscript{52}

World is transcendent: it outstrips beings unconditionally, and does so because of its inner relation to temporality. Yet here, the priority of the world over the innerworldly is not merely a formal-logical reflection. Instead, since the transcendence of the world gives the primordial upon-which and in-which in general, the transcendence of the world is the original ‘from-which’ – and not a merely formal-logical ‘from which’ – for the discovery and disclosure of beings. That is, world is that from which beings ‘arrive’ in Dasein’s comportmental ‘cares.’ Here, by ‘from which’ no reference to any of Heidegger’s prepositional terms from \textit{Being and Time} is intended.

\textit{Insofar as} the transcendence of the world is, as Heidegger says above, nothing more than the happening of temporalisation, Dasein is its world and thus, on this basis, Dasein is never worldless. That is, Dasein is being-in-the-world, not because it can deal with hammers, but rather, the reverse. Dasein exists only insofar as it gives itself a world and Dasein gives itself a world insofar as it exists, i.e., insofar as it temporalizes. This pertains essentially to the radical, yet still nascent meaning of the problem of transcendence.

\textit{§3 – FORMULATION OF THE PHENOMENON OF SZ §69C; THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL SETTING FORTH OF EACH HORIZONTAL SCHEMA}

When Heidegger defines the horizontal schema of futurity he says:

\begin{quote}
The schema in which Dasein comes towards itself \textit{futurally}, whether authentically or inauthentically, is its for-the-sake-of.\textsuperscript{53}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{52} SZ (S/S) 366
\textsuperscript{53} SZ (S/S, D) 365 (modified)
Because of this “whether authentically or inauthentically” SZ §69c holds one of Blattner’s key exegetical proofs for the priority of an undifferentiated ‘primordial temporality’ over ‘authentic temporality.’

But, the matter is of course more complicated than this. Thus, for instance, as was indicated in the closing passage of the previous chapter, anticipatory resoluteness – and this of course means authenticity in general – both comports and transcends. The same holds for inauthenticity and the undifferentiated mode. But, in §69c, with the horizontal schemata, the task is solely a matter of the transcendence of the world. This phenomenon is hidden within both authenticity and inauthenticity but reducible to neither, because it is prior to comportment. That is, effectively, it is an ‘abstraction’ from both insofar as they are existentiel possibilities. This of course indicates a whole new and difficult problem which does indeed implicate the problem of authenticity and inauthenticity. But phenomenologically speaking, one might just as easily say that the priority of the for-the-sake-of here is proof of the primacy of authenticity. Everydayness and inauthenticity are equally constituted by the for-the-sake-of but in a way which covers this for-the-sake-of over, i.e. covers over the primary being of Dasein. Similarly however, it does indeed mean that the problem of the horizontal schema must, within the limits laid down by the previous analysis, be appropriate to both inauthenticity and authenticity.

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55 Thus, for instance, the attempt in connection with this, by Michel Haar to treat the ‘undifferentiated mode’ as if it were identical to the ‘metaphysical neutrality of Dasein’ (discussed in MFL) is in every respect doomed. The latter is “prior to every factical concretion” (MFL 136) and thus genderless. This is clearly not the case for factical undifferentiated Dasein. It is instead the case that “Neutral Dasein is never what exists; Dasein exists in each case only in its factical concretion.” (MFL 137) Cf. Haar (1993[1990]) 36ff. vs. MFL 136f. etc. The last quote, rendered in terms of the language of ET, means that essence happens only in its non-essence; authenticity, inauthenticity and the undifferentiated mode are modes of Dasein’s non-essence; but essence itself breeds non-essence and only happens in non-essence. This should be enough to point to the scope of the problem, its difficulty and its manner of connection with the problems of authenticity, inauthenticity etc. The Founded Analysis will further investigate these problems.
56 Cf. SZ §60
57 Of course, it is more hidden in inauthenticity and the undifferentiated mode, cf. SZ (S, D) 75, §§35-38 etc., VWG (ER) 130f.,
58 Cf. SZ passim, thus to use the above passage of SZ to say that the undifferentiated mode is primary is akin to saying: because Dasein is primarily for-the-sake-of itself, its most primordial mode of being is characterised by its most extreme degree of indifference to itself (or else to be a ‘structure’ which somehow precedes and then attains the for-the-sake-of). Cf. Blattner (1999) xv, 60f., 99, 112 et infra, etc. vs. LQT 342, Blattner (2006) 127ff.
Now, to the extent that these horizonal schemata are fundamentally, indeed *constitutively* connected with the transcendence of the world – that is, with that which world-transcendence most primordially transcends towards – the question concerning the horizonal schemata is paramount. As the temporal determinations of transcendence – when understood with appropriate methodological precision and penetration – the horizonal schemata, in their unity, *present the primary phenomenon of fundamental ontological transcendence*. This is so because the transcendence of *Dasein* brought under the sway of temporality is simply transcendence brought into its essence.

§2 – in accordance with the hermeneutical sparseness of SZ §69c – presented little more than an inventory of the phenomena and their structural interconnection. We cannot aspire to these phenomena unless we aspire to go beyond this mere inventory. Yet such aspirations come with a price, and that price is the hard and less exciting work which must now occupy the remainder of this chapter.

At one point Heidegger, says of Kant that;

> When he reaches his limits, he leaves the problem there – which is more helpful for later research than forcefully arranging some half-baked ideas into an imposing system.

As insightful as this may be, it might also be said that Heidegger reached his limits with the horizonal schemata far too early. After all, Heidegger left off his analysis of the horizonal schemata at the *very point* (§69) when transcendence was “for the first time a problem.”

*Being and Time* and the lecture courses give us very little *direct* insight into how to pose the question of these horizonal schemata and the secondary literature on Heidegger in its

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59 That they are so connected cf. SZ §69c, BP §20e
60 I.e. because the unity of Dasein is temporality.
61 LQT 170
62 MFL 168, cf. also LH 249f. vs. the connection of SZ I.3 and transcendence established throughout (e.g. §1, First Stage of the Founding Analysis)
occasional (and usually brief and overly formal) analyses of them reflects this. They are mentioned, yet they are very rarely penetrated into. For instance, they are mentioned because one wants to discuss horizon or schema by looking somewhere else. They are listed, but not analysed *in themselves*, aside, for instance, from some peripheral observations (or else, the relevant paragraph from *Being and Time* is quoted and then one immediately moves on to related matters).

To be clear, by ‘the horizontal schemata themselves’ I mean each individual schema as a phenomenon as opposed to the general problem of horizon and schema which they indicate. As much as the horizontal schemata belong to one of the most primordial problems of *Being and Time*, as much as studies of Heidegger continually find themselves forced to discuss them they remain almost wholly in want of *analysis*.

The most extreme result of this is that there is not even a clear consensus over what the individual horizontal schemata are. If the primary way these schemata *themselves* become an issue in the secondary literature is limited to listing them, this constitutes about as basic a problem as can be imagined.

63 Cf. also Final Stage of the Founding Analysis §1a

64 E.g. Schalow (1992) 182-183, quoted in order to compare a concept of horizonal as opposed to transcendental schematism. Carman (2002) 88-89, quoted to show the in-order-to as one formulation of the horizon of the present and that it makes the traditional priority of presence questionable. Van Gorkom (2009) 71-72 *et infra*, quoted because each horizontal schema is defined through the use of ‘as’ and “Heidegger transforms the question of being into a question of the ‘as (such)’” (72). Wood (2001[1989]) 233/., here, in his major work on the problem of time David Wood lists the horizontal schemata and shows, at least formally, that he understands the problem of the transcendence of the world, lauds it but does not penetrate any further into it (for Wood’s preparatory forays into the problem cf. *Ibid.* 222, 230f.). Blattner (2005) 319f. that the in-order-to is the horizon of dealings: quoted to attest the link between primordial temporality and dealings. Much the same at Blattner (1999) 161: the horizontal schema of the in-order-to gives the “embeddedness thesis,” namely, that primordial temporality is ‘embedded’ in pragmatic concerns. Cf. also Blattner (1999) 171f. The most explicit but also most ‘afflicted’ discussion of the problem occurs in the penultimate chapter of Blattner (1999), *viz. Ibid.* 271-276: there Blattner struggles with the idea that ‘Dasein is its world’ (cf. SZ §69c). The ground for Blattner’s difficulty is in fact his refusal to be shaken by what this statement says and his insistence on identifying world with the in-order-to vs. Dasein as an ‘individual’ with the for-the-sake-of (the horizontal schema of having-been isn’t discussed). Pöggeler (1997[1992]) 80ff. as a question of the modifiability of temporality (ectastically and with respect to historicity, within-timeness etc.), in connection with the first beginnings of the temporal formulation of the meaning of being. This and Blattner’s discussion above constitute some of the most penetrating analyses of the horizontal schemata themselves, but neither penetrates very far. etc. etc.
In principle everyone agrees that the horizontal schema of the future is to be understood as the for-the-sake-of but the other two schemata are more ambiguous. Inwood identifies the horizontal schema of having been as “the sheer fact that one is as thrown and has to make something of oneself”. Philip Tonner says much the same thing: “the schema of the past is rendered the ‘what has been’.” This amounts to saying that the horizontal schema of thrownness and having been is thrownness and having been. Either way, it isn’t properly what Heidegger says in §69. Others have provided readings more in line with the text. Thus, Daniel Dahlstrom, Michel Haar and Richard Sembera interpret the horizontal schema of having-been as the before-which (Wovor). In one place William Blattner interprets it as the at-which (Woran). Whilst Otto Pöggeler, Theodore Kisiel and Joseph Kockelmans all aver that there are two horizontal schemata of temporality; the before-which and the at-which.

On this basis, in his major work, *The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time*, Kisiel says that this schema is “oddly double” and asks “why are not the others doubly schematized, say one constraining and the other enabling?”

As we will see in §3b, the answer to this problem is to show that the horizontal schema of having-been is not doubled. This interpretation persists because of an ambiguity in the text and a lack of phenomenological penetration into the matter. None of the above alternative formulations are able to mount a real counter argument against the double-schema view because they all share in the same fault as the double-schema view namely, an ambiguous textual basis which lacks re-petition.

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66 Tonner (2010) 63
67 Cf. SZ (S/S, D) 365
71 Kisiel (1995[1993]) 449
72 This textual basis amounts to one single sentence. A philological approach needs more material if it is to get its bearings.
None have really experienced the naming of the *phenomenon* as a problem, or else, have shrunk back before it. This is not completely unreasonable; there are many other important problems and this one is particularly difficult. Here however, let there be no ambiguity: in this chapter, it has now become the problem. Only by making these horizontal schemata themselves a *philosophical issue* is a grounded conclusion to the Founding Analysis – or indeed to any analysis of transcendence – even possible at all.

Finally, a more perplexing difficulty lies with the horizonal schema of the ‘present’ (*Gegenwart*). In *Being and Time* Heidegger says that the “horizontal schema of the present becomes determined through [wird bestimmt durch] the in-order-to.”\(^73\) Conversely, in the *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* ‘praesens’ is given named horizonal schema of the present.\(^74\) Accordingly, in the literature, the horizonal schema is either identified with the in-order-to, with *praesens*, or it is noted the ‘horizontal schema of the present is either the in-order-to or *praesens*.’\(^75\) Sometimes no further explanation of this fact is given.\(^76\) Yet it bespeaks a basic difficulty.

In *Being and Time* the in-order-to is only said to be that *through which* the horizonal schema of the present *becomes determined*. This *doesn’t* necessarily indicate that it is not the schema, but it *does* indicate that it is careless to say that it is without further examination.\(^77\) On the other hand, if one were to interpret the ‘wird bestimmt durch Um-zu’ as meaning that

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73 SZ (D) 365
74 *Ibid.*, BP §21
76 E.g. Tonner (2010) 63 vs. *passim*
77 The only analysis which takes note of this ‘wird bestimmt durch’ in terms of whether it has a special significance is King (2001) 278f. However, I must confess, I find her impenetrable on this point.
Third Stage: the Temporal Constitution of Transcendence

‘praesens’ is that which SZ §69c says must be ‘determined through the in-order-to,’ this is just as overhasty.\(^78\)

Since the phenomena themselves have been prepared here, not just those of fundamental ontology in general but also of transcendence in particular, this thesis is in an eminent position to first truly question the horizontal schemata themselves. Through this it should be possible to formulate the horizontal schema of enpresenting. Similarly, it will be shown that the horizontal schema of *praesens* constitutes a different level of analysis to that of SZ §69c. This is possible only to the extent that *Being and Time* and transcendence have already been cleared. Only in the context of an analysis such as this can one go further than merely presenting a list of the horizonal schemata accompanied by some observations about their horizontal character, or of how Kant also spoke of the schema etc.

In Heidegger’s laying down of the horizonal schemata there is no ceremony. We are merely told the names for each horizonal schema. The way to get to the bottom of them is precisely to develop the phenomena involved with a constant eye to the problem of temporality and transcendence. If these three factors constitute the transcendence of the world, then a primordial development of them should unravel the proper sense in which they are horizontal and schematic, and along with this, the sense in which they constitute an ‘in-which’ and ‘upon-which’ in general (i.e. world).\(^79\) Thus we should be able to develop an existential concept of horizon, as against Orkrent’s view that the inclusion of horizonality is ‘inappropriate picture thinking.’\(^80\)

In the whole of the collection of essays entitled *Transcendental Heidegger* the temporal problem of world is barely mentioned at all. Karsten Harries notes that Cassirer would

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\(^78\) This has not been done, but would be a possible response to the exegetical difficulty, assuming that one associates a ‘horizon’ of temporality with being as sometimes occurs.

\(^79\) This unravelling, however, is completed only in the Final Stage.

\(^80\) Cf. Okrent quoted in Dahlstrom (1995) 96-97
disagree with a ‘horizontal’ and purely temporal horizon of transcendence.\textsuperscript{81} Malpas indicates that in \textit{Being and Time}

The ordering of self and thing within the larger horizon of the world is itself determined by the ordering of past, present and future… and captured in terms of the notions of care (\textit{Sorge}) and being-toward-death, both of which can be taken as tied essentially to facticity.\textsuperscript{82}

The latter amounts to nothing which could not be said on the basis of world-time. Apart from this the temporal problem of the transcendence of the world remains unspoken. This constitutes proof positive of the difficulty of this task, the sense in which it remains untilled, and above all, in want of thinking.

a) The Horizontal Schema of Futurity (the for-the-sake-of-which) and the Preliminary (guiding) Formulation of Horizontal Schematism

The horizontal schema of futurity is the for-the-sake-of.\textsuperscript{83} In \textit{Being and Time} this term is connected with the primary moment of significance, with Mitdasein, understanding, and Dasein’s being-ahead-of-itself.\textsuperscript{84} Throughout it is connected primarily with Dasein’s potentiality for being and being-possible, that is, with Dasein’s futurity.\textsuperscript{85} As a horizontal schema, the question of the for-the-sake-of must preserve this connection with futurity, yet it must also be renewed in light of transcendence. The same preservation and renewal applies, \textit{mutatis mutandis}, to the other two schemata.

Simply put, the for-the-sake-of names the sense in which Dasein is an issue for itself.\textsuperscript{86} The ‘for-the-sake-of’ is the structure through which, \textit{in whatever way}, ‘being gets to me.’\textsuperscript{87} In terms of \textit{intentionality}, this being-an-issue can be immersed in the work or it can be

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{81} Harries (2007) 82-83
  \item \textsuperscript{82} Malpas (2007) 123
  \item \textsuperscript{83} SZ (S/S, D) 365
  \item \textsuperscript{84} SZ (S) 84-88, 123, 143, 191-194
  \item \textsuperscript{85} SZ (S) 191, 193, 236, 297-298, 327, 336, 359, 364, 414 etc. (also see MFL 190)
  \item \textsuperscript{86} Cf. SZ (S/S) 143, 191, MFL §11c
  \item \textsuperscript{87} \textit{Ibid.}
\end{itemize}
otherwise, it can be egotistical, it can be altruistic or it can be neither. But the task here is precisely to think the for-the-sake-of transcendentally, and that means pre-intentionally.

The for-the-sake-of is the guiding indication for the phenomenon of being-ahead-of-itself and the condition of possibility for anything like the primacy of anticipation (anticipation is authentic, futural being-an-issue for myself). By extension, in the expression ‘for-the-sake-of-which’ the primary ‘which’ is none other than Dasein itself, but, in the first instance this must be understood in a formal and original sense. This sense, for instance ‘precedes’ any possible distinctions between egoism and altruism. Inappropriately identifying this ‘which’ with Dasein as ‘personality’ (in the usual sense or something like it) in a discussion of SZ §69c, as Blattner has done, leads to the immediate foreclosure of the whole topic. The horizonal schema of the for-the-sake-of cannot refer itself to ‘I myself alone’, quite the opposite, because ‘I myself alone’ is only possible as an intentional concern. This last fact belongs to the severe difficulty of expressing the phenomenon in question.

Now, as “that on-to-which [woraufzu] Dasein as transcending transcends” the for-the-sake-of has a “universal scope”, an “universale Spannweite.” This gives the formal breadth of the for-the-sake-of. But clearly this ‘universal scope’ is not the ‘counted up set’: it is not the totality of intenta, nor the totality of intentiones. The formal structure of being-an-issue-for-myself can have a character which inceptualises all possible issues, but it cannot be a mere repository because Dasein’s being an issue for itself is characterised by possibility as such.

In fact, we can already clearly see that the for-the-sake-of primordially differentiates the ‘in-which’ from a mere repository as follows. The world is that in terms of which Dasein is for itself. Transcendence is being-in-the-world. Since Dasein is not objectively present, the ‘in’

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88 Cf. SZ (S/S) 191ff. 265, 327ff. etc.
89 Cf. SZ (S/S) 143-146, 191, MFL §11c
90 Which, however, may be artificially kept open: cf. the procedure and fate of Blattner’s analysis at Blattner (1999) 271-276
91 MFL (E/D) 191 / 246 (modified)
92 SZ passim esp. SZ I.2.i, SZ §§31 & 61 etc.
of being-in-the-world cannot be being-contained, but is only possible as original being-an-
issue, i.e. the futurity of Dasein. But that is the same as to say: the ‘in’ is made possible by –
and ontologically characterised by – the for-the-sake-of.

The transcendent world is the “the in-which of primary self-understanding” – but that means,
world is transcendence which is an issue for itself. The for-the-sake-of is the primordial
possibility of the ‘in’ that accrues to the world qua ‘in-which.’ The for-the-sake-of is “the
schema in which Dasein comes towards itself [zukommt] futurally.” This means that the
‘zukommen’ – Heidegger’s original formal indication for futurity – is identical to the ‘being
an issue’ of the for-the-sake-of.

The ‘universal scope’ of the for-the-sake-of is connected with horizonality, but, only because
of the priority of transcendence over intentionality can the for-the-sake-of have such a
universal scope. The for-the-sake-of cannot be a horizon in the sense of the (material
concept of a) field of possible ‘existential/existentiell’ facts. Dasein’s non-totalisability in
this sense, is after all indicated throughout Heidegger’s work in the 20s according to which
Dasein is its ‘possibilities as possibilities’ by being-ahead-of-itself as anticipating etc.
Thus, if the for-the-sake-of is to be called a horizon it must be so named for another reason.

The for-the-sake-of names the futural horizontal schema of the transcendence of the world,
i.e., the futurity of world-transcendence. What this means has already been basically outlined.
This ‘for-the-sake-of’ is not intrinsically bound to intentionality or its horizon, but rather, is to
be understood wholly within the bounds of the problem of world. As will be demonstrated

93 Cf. SZ (S) I.1.ii, pp 325, 364
94 Cf. SZ (S/S, D) 364 (modified, italics added), §2, this chapter, & Part I herein.
95 Note: one can also temporally articulate the ‘in’ (as exemplified by the having-been of care and the connection
of the ‘in’ with enpresenting which ‘shimmers’ in the margins of SZ I.1.ii).
96 SZ (S/S, D) 365: “Das Schema, in dem das Dasein zukünftig, ob eigentlich oder uneigentlich, auf sich
zukommt, ist das Umwillen seiner.”
97 Cf. Ibid., SZ (D) 325, & VWG (ER) 88f.
98 Cf. MFL (E/D) 191 / 246. This is so whether one interprets the for-the-sake-of according to the formal
indications of transcendence (which is underway here) or else, interprets the for-the-sake-of essentially enough
that it bespeaks transcendence of itself (which is an alternative path not taken here).
99 Cf. SZ (S) 145, 236, 243f., 261, 264 etc.
more fully in the next chapter, world happens only in the unity of transcending and the for-the-sake-of.

The transcendental for-the-sake-of makes the open possible as such precisely because it makes the opening as such *an issue* and because it intrinsically belongs to this opening. That is, if transcendence means to transcend beings as a whole, this transcendence can only refer to ‘the open’ – i.e. to the world – because of its intrinsic relation to the for-the-sake-of. The for-the-sake-of lets transcending be the open.

And because of the intrinsic relation between transcendence and the for-the-sake-of, world can be called the ‘totality of the for-the-sake-of’ in a discussion of transcendence. This is the case for three reasons. Firstly, as the *futurity* of world the for-the-sake-of unfolds into the totality of the temporal structure of world. Secondly, in accordance with the ontology of Dasein, the relation between transcendence and the for-the-sake-of is so intrinsic that it doesn’t make sense to separate them. Thirdly, the for-the-sake-of is the light which lights up transcendence; it is that because of which transcendence can be a question of world in the first place. Conversely, because the for-the-sake-of *qua* letting-be-the-open, *qua* original letting-matter primally accrues to transcendence (rather than intentionality, to which it secondarily accrues), the most primordial open of Dasein is the phenomenon of world (rather than *intenta*).

Rendered differently, we saw in the first part of this thesis that the existential problem of understanding is basically none other than the problem of the for-the-sake-of. This was alluded to above. In this sense, the for-the-sake-of is simply the ‘primal being-understood’ of transcendence and *this primal understanding is nothing less than the existence of Da-sein; the*
happening of world; the unity of Dasein and its world.\textsuperscript{105} Only because transcending and primal understanding essentially belong together can transcendence light up and be ‘what’ it is, namely, world. This ‘lighting up’ is the same as the primal happening of being-in-the-world. In this sense, the transcendental for-the-sake-of is nothing less than the most surreptitious presupposition of any and all inquiry into Dasein and of ‘the human.’\textsuperscript{106}

Only because Dasein is an issue for itself in its being can it be ‘in’ the world. As we saw above, thought from Dasein’s futurity, ‘in’ means nothing less than being-an-issue-for-oneself-in-one’s-being but ‘one’s being’ now signifies \textit{transcendence itself}.\textsuperscript{107}

In this sense, if transcendence is \textit{itself} always already horizontal in some way precisely by surpassing, then the for-the-sake-of simply brings this horizontality under the power of temporality; under the \textit{unity} of existence. More precisely, it makes visible the \textit{necessary} constitution of transcendence on the basis of the fundamental constitution of Dasein, i.e. temporality. And since it brings the problem of transcendence into its existential dimension, this means; the for-the-sake-of brings this horizontality \textit{into} the happening of Dasein; it lets world happen; it lets transcendence form the happening of being-in-the-world. This last formulation is the most essential.

So now, if the for-the-sake-of is a horizontal schema, this means that the primary meaning of the complete existential phenomenon of horizon is \textit{that which stands at the root of possibility} and \textit{not} the totality of possibilities as facts.\textsuperscript{108} That is, insofar as horizon implies totality, we are to understand this totality \textit{from its unity (origin) and in no other way}. This is now the guiding definition of a ‘horizional schema.’ Only because Dasein’s opening is either intentional or transcendental and the former must be traced back to transcendence, and the

\textsuperscript{105} For this interpretation of understanding cf. SZ (S/S, D) 144, 364, Part I §1b herein etc.
\textsuperscript{106} Cf. \textit{Ibid}. (albeit, less directly), MFL §11c, SZ (S/S, D) 133 vs. SZ (S/S) 144ff.
\textsuperscript{107} On this formulation, prepared throughout, cf. BP (E/D) 300 / 435f., MFL 168, VWG (EG) 123 etc. This will be secured in the Final Stage.
\textsuperscript{108} Cf. SZ the difference between the categorial and existential concepts of possibility at (S/S) 143-144.
latter thereby implicitly forms the unity of Dasein’s ways of opening can the for-the-sake-of pertaining to transcendence have this function. This will be deepened in the Final Stage.

The concept of horizon is so far from submitting the analysis to an ‘inappropriate picture-thinking’ that horizon, properly understood, constitutes nothing at all like a ‘model’ of possibility. That the primary horizontal schema is the for-the-sake-of (in connection with transcendence) now attests that ‘horizon’ does not imply a ‘picture thinking’ precisely because the for-the-sake-of cannot be anything at all like a ‘picture.’ To the extent that futurity has primacy in the being of Dasein, what has been won here with respect to the horizontal and schematic character of the for-the-sake-of may now be applied to each of the subsequent horizonal schemata.

Here, the temporal problem is just beginning and, to this extent, the complete determination of the meaning of transcendence is just beginning. The for-the-sake-of attached to transcendence has been identified with the primordial ‘in’ of the ‘in-which.’ This means that Dasein’s being-an-issue-for-itself as transcendence is the primordial (temporal) origin of world. The for-the-sake-of lets transcendence form a world.

b) The Horizonal Schema of Having-Been as the Before-Which

The position of this thesis is that the horizonal schema of having-been is simply the before-which, or more precisely, that when understood with appropriate penetration, ‘the before-which of thrownness’ means the same as the ‘at-which of being-delivered-over.’ In order to show this and to develop the phenomenon itself we must first elucidate this ‘before-which.’

The Wovor is a term from the analysis of attunement.\textsuperscript{109} There, attunement was discussed as having a ‘Worum,’ a ‘Wovor’ and a specific character (e.g. fearfulness, joyfulfulness,

\textsuperscript{109} \textit{SZ} (S/S, M&R, D) §§30, 40, 68b
anxiousness). Heidegger called this the ‘structure’ of attunement. Each ‘moment’ of this structure corresponds to a temporal division of attunement (where attunement in general is primarily temporalized from having-been). The Worum names the for-the-sake-of-which, the Wovor names attunement’s having-been, while the such-and-such-ness of the attunement names its enpresenting.

As attunements, both fear and anxiety are characterised by a before-which. It is here, in the co-determination of fear and anxiety that we receive our clearest guideline for the question of the before-which appropriate to the transcendence of the world – a disclosure which was already prepared by the last chapter.

Fear is afraid for (um) its own fallen possibility and afraid before an innerworldly being or circumstance. Thus, fear is guided by fallenness. In fear I am thrown amongst innerworldly beings and I interpret my entire ‘in’ from them. As that ‘from-which’ I exist, the before-which of fear constitutes the proximal thrownness (and thus having-been) of afeard Dasein. But in anxiety, being-in-the-world is both that which I am anxious for and that which I am anxious before. Here I am anxious ‘before’ my being (Sein). Accordingly, I am not anxious ‘before’ a being (ein Seiendes). Yet it is not as though I am anxious in the sense that I primarily intuit my being (categorial intuition). That my being is the before-which, but

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100 SZ (M&R, D) 140ff., §§40, 68b
101 SZ (M&R, D) 140
102 To be clear, this is an inference based on the phenomena referred to. SZ §68b, for instance, does not say this in any explicit fashion. The closest one comes is (the not very close) SZ (M&R, D) 343.
103 Cf. Second Stage, §3
104 SZ (M&R, D) §§30, 68b
105 SZ (M&R, D) §§40, 68b
106 Ibid. e.g. SZ (M&R, D) 187, 343. Here, as a philological qualification to this and the interpretation which follows, it is mete to note that whereas English idiomatically says that one ‘flees from…’ or that one is ‘afraid of…’ it is idiomatic in German to use ‘vor’ to form such clauses (i.e. one ‘flees before…’ one is ‘afraid before…’). However, as a perusal of SZ (D) §§ 30, 40, 68b quickly shows, this preposition is precisely put to work. Thus, in the italicisation of ‘vor’, in Heidegger’s placing it in guillemets, and the way in which ‘vor’ and ‘Wovor’ occur in the one sentence, the Wovor and the vor are aligned by Heidegger in such a way that the vor is used to explain the meaning of Wovor. Thus, one could clarify the Wovor by showing how it is hermeneutically/phenomenologically grounded in the idiomatic German ‘vor.’ To do so would rightly give the Wovor a very proximal and ‘formal’ meaning and precisely not, at least in the first instance, a Sturm und Drang “being brought before…” or “brought face to face with…” (with its connotations: to stand against; to be an ‘object’ whether in an epistemological or a ‘vital’/’polemical’, i.e. πολέμιος, sense).
Third Stage: the Temporal Constitution of Transcendence

is not thereby ‘the intuited,’ indicates something which should need no further attestation: the before-which is primarily unthematic.

The previous chapter showed that anxiety preliminarily formulates the meaning of transcendence. That this was primarily rooted in the problem of transcendence’s difference from intentionality indicates that the before-which of anxiety cannot be reduced to an intentum. The most proper before-which of anxiety turns out to be neither the beings which occupy fallenness, nor the intuition of my being. Instead, this before-which turns out to be myself as being-in-the-world i.e. as transcendence. Insofar as anxiety discloses transcendence, the before-which of anxiety is taken from transcendence and, in a certain sense, is nothing less than the having-been of transcendence.

The thrownness of transcendence has a relation to beings. Thus, in Vom Wesen des Grundes, Heidegger says with respect to the having-been of freedom towards ground that:

\[
\text{Transcendence means project of world. As that which projects from the beings which it surpasses, it is itself already disposed and governed. By virtue of the preoccupation [Eingenommenheit] with beings that is part of transcendence, Dasein has taken up a footing in beings or has won ‘ground’}.^{118}
\]

Yet, the connection of the before-which with anxiety already indicates that the before-which of transcendence is not to be interpreted solely from the way in which beings surpassed govern transcendence.

At this point a preliminary proof that the before-which adequately delimits the horizontal schema of having-been may be offered. In naming the horizontal schema of having-been, Heidegger says;

\footnote{\textsuperscript{117} For further confirmation Cf. SZ (M&R, D) 187, 343 vs. MFL §12
\textsuperscript{118} VWG (ER/EG) 108f. / 128 (modified). “Transzendenz heißt Weltentwurf, so zwar, daß das Entwerfende vom Seienden, das es übersteigt, auch schon gestimmt durchwaltet ist. Mit solcher zur Transzendenz gehörigen Eingenommenheit vom Seienden hat das Dasein im Seienden Boden genommen, »Grund« gewonnen.”}
The schema in which Dasein is disclosed to itself in attunement as thrown we call the before-which, i.e., the at-which of being-delivered-over. It characterizes the horizontal structure of having-been.\footnote{SZ (D) 365 “Das Schema, in dem das Dasein ihm selbst als geworfenes in der Befindlichkeit erschlossen ist, fassen wir als das Wovor der Geworfenheit bzw. als Woran der Überlassenheit. Es kennzeichnet die horizontale Struktur der Gewesenheit.” – note the use of the singular; “das Schema”, “Es” etc.}

Now, the ‘bzw.’ (‘beziehungsweise’) translated above as ‘i.e.’ might be rendered differently; it could also be an ‘or’ or a ‘more precisely (not the preceding but the following) …’.\footnote{This \textit{bzw.} is mostly interpreted as an ‘or’ or an ‘and’, thus, SZ (M&R, S, S/S) 365, Pöggeler (1990[1963]) 169.} But, as a structure of anxiety (i.e. within that context), the before-which is that to-which we are delivered over: there is no difference. Equally however, as a structure of openness \textit{as such} – namely, transcendence – that \textit{to-which} we are delivered over in transcendence may just as rightly be called a before-which and vice versa. Understood from the correctly prepared horizon, they say the same and there are no genuine grounds for distinguishing them.\footnote{Exegetically-linguistically speaking, while \textit{bzw.} is ambiguous here, Heidegger says ‘schema’ not ‘schemata,’ and he only italicises ‘\textit{Wovor}’; he specifically \textit{doesn’t} italicise ‘\textit{Woran}’, cf. SZ (D) 365.}

This will be more completely elaborated below using a list form to alleviate the unavoidable density of a survey of the problem of having-been and its before-which. Here, \textit{in the first instance}, the task is not so much to elucidate what the before-which of transcendence is, as it is to elucidate what a primordial ‘before-which’ of Dasein means. In the first instance, withholding the transcendental before-which means protecting it so that it may subsequently be exhibited in a grounded way. This will be worked out in 5 theses.

1. \textbf{The ‘before’ does not imply an existentiell explicitness or ‘in-your-face-ness’}

Dasein is ‘before’ itself whether it is brought ‘face to face’ with itself, or whether it flees;

That before-which Dasein flees is precisely what it comes up behind. Only because Dasein is ontologically and essentially brought before [vor] itself by the disclosedness belonging to it, \textit{can} it flee \textit{from} [vor] that from which it flees.\footnote{SZ (M&R, S, D) 184 (modified): part of SZ §40}
Thus, the ‘before’ does not mean that which is made explicit: it does not mean an ‘intentum’, and in this sense, ‘in the face of which’ is an imperfect translation of Wovor.

2. The proximal before-which is beings taken care of in general

The problem of fear shows that the proximal before-which of fallenness is beings.\(^{123}\) Here, this primarily means the totality of the retained whether in a narrow or broader sense.\(^ {124}\) In the narrow sense I retain where I am in the process of the work. In the broader sense I have always already let myself be interpreted from the totality of my social-historical context.\(^ {125}\)

3. Forgetting is a mode in which Dasein’s being is a before-which for itself.

More primordial than retaining is the forgetting (Vergessen) which is connected with it (and indeed constitutes it).\(^ {126}\) Insofar as retaining is constituted by fallenness it is constituted by forgetting of my ownmost having-been. Forgetting is an enabling structure of fallenness.\(^ {127}\) That is, as an ecstasy of world-time, forgetting means the occlusion (‘forgetting’) of my own being as constitutive for my immersion in the “world” taken care of.\(^ {128}\) But:

This forgetting is not nothing, nor is it just a failure to remember; it is rather a “positive,” ecstatic mode of having-been, a mode with a character of its own. The ecstasy (rapture [Entrückung]) of forgetting has the character of backing away before [Ausrücken vor] one’s ownmost having-been in a way that is closed off from oneself. This

\(^{123}\) Cf. the problem of fear.
\(^{124}\) Retaining, Behalten, is a derivative form of the ecstatic having-been of world-time Cf. SZ (S/S, D) 339, 353ff., 391 etc.
\(^{125}\) Cf. Ibid.
\(^{126}\) SZ (S/S, D) 339
\(^{127}\) Ibid.
\(^{128}\) Ibid.
backing away before... ecstatically closes off its before-which [Wovor], and thus closes itself off, too.\textsuperscript{129}

That is to say; forgetting is not a leaving behind \textit{as such}, rather, it is a bringing \textit{before} which is closed off from itself; its before-which is closed off \textit{as} before-which; \textit{the fundamental occlusion of the before-which that pertains to forgetting does not change it into something other than a before-which nor does it make it a mere ‘quasi-before-which.’}

4. Guilt is constitutive for any existentially cleared notion of a before-which

If as the above indicates a before-which is constitutive for my having-been, then there can be no equivocation that this before-which must be understood in terms of guilt – and this is especially clear when we consider that guilt constitutes all projection \textit{as such}.\textsuperscript{130} Guilt means to be the null ground of a nullity.\textsuperscript{131} And so, if Dasein is a before-which for itself (see above) this means that Dasein’s before-which must be understood \textit{as} null, and as \textit{constituted in each case} by the nullification of possibility. That is, if a before-which is to be attached to Dasein in the way that it was above, any primordial interpretation of it must understand it \textit{in its essential nullity and deprivation}.

5. The before-which of re-petition has nothing to do with ‘getting behind thrownness’\textsuperscript{132}

Given the above, re-petition of Dasein’s before-which can only mean a \textit{bringing} Dasein itself \textit{before} its guilt \textit{as} guilt, for instance, in the happening of the call of conscience (which is not immediately a ‘cognising’ of guilt). And so, in sum, in being brought ‘explicitly’ before its nullity (through conscience), Dasein is brought before its closing off and its closed-off-

\textsuperscript{129} SZ (S/S, D) 339
\textsuperscript{130} SZ (S) 284f.
\textsuperscript{131} SZ §58
\textsuperscript{132} On this expression, cf. SZ (S/S) 284, 383
Third Stage: the Temporal Constitution of Transcendence

ness. In forgetting, the closing off is itself closed off: the before-which of forgetting remains in want of re-petition. In everyday fallenness, my guilt remains inaccessible and forgotten, yet, since guilt characterises the structure of projection itself it is must remain constitutive of the before-which of everydayness.\(^{134}\)

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So now, to sum up what has so far been said about the before-which. Just as the before-which does not mean that which is ‘in front of us’ as opposed to ‘behind us,’ it does not mean that which is accessible and accessed as opposed to the inaccessible. Indeed it cannot mean this because it concerns my having-been and is thus existentially structured by nullity and nullification. Nullity and nullification are so far from not belonging to the before-which that, as constitutive for the having-been of Dasein, they instead characterise the primordial constitution of the before-which. Dasein exists ‘before’ its nullity so far as it is. This determines the meaning of the ‘before’ in terms of guilt and not the other way around.

Transcendence is primordial giving-the-open.\(^{135}\) The horizontal schema of having-been concerns the having-been of the open as open. Regardless of whether we call this horizontal schema the ‘before-which’ or the ‘Woran der Überlassenheit’ the analysis of having-been indicates that the open is itself pervaded by closedness. Concealing is a mode of unconcealing and is not a peculiar and unconnected alternative. As the problem about the existence of the world, the question of transcendence is concerned solely with disclosedness. The disclosedness of that ‘to which we are delivered over’ is in each case, and with complete primordiality the before-which of disclosedness. This is basically demonstrated above. Only, if, for instance, the before-which meant the intentum as opposed to some hidden background

\(^{133}\) SZ (S/S) 286-287  
\(^{134}\) Cf. SZ (S/S) 287-288 (for premises)  
\(^{135}\) BP (E/D) 300 / 435f., MFL 168, VWG (EG) 123 etc.
truth could the Wovor and the Woran be differentiated. But this is precisely not the case. That is, every measure according to which they could be differentiated has been mooted by the development of the essential meaning of the Wovor.

With this, the Wovor of transcendence must now be concretely named. This Wovor names nothing more and nothing less than the having-been which accrues to transcendence. In the first instance, this Wovor may be understood as that which is surpassed in transcendence. Or else, it is simply the ‘already-world’ of care, i.e., ‘already-being-in (the world)’. Yet this is only a rough and ready explanation. Thus, in the last instance, we must understand the Wovor of transcendence as naming the thrownness of transcendence itself. Thus, every sense in which transcendence is factical, is pre-governed, as concealed and opened belongs to this Wovor.

This may be formulated as follows: if transcendence means transcending beings as a whole towards world, and this transcendence has its futurity in the for-the-sake-of, then, because of the unitary character of temporality, transcendence’s having-been means nothing more and nothing less than the peculiar facticity and thrownness which this for-the-sake-of breeds within itself.¹³⁶ The Wovor is nothing more than these roots which the for-the-sake-of pertaining to transcendence – and only this – gives to itself.¹³⁷ Whatsoever happens in the Zukommen of the for-the-sake-of is that towards which the Zurückkommen of the Wovor goes back.¹³⁸

We are precisely dealing with original concepts here. This constitutes both the difficulty and the necessary incompleteness of the present stage of the analysis. Similarly, it is precisely because of the originality of the problem we are dealing with that the Wovor is to be understood solely within the scope of its futural correlate and this, solely in accordance with

¹³⁶ Compare by ‘analogy’ the way in which guilt arises from project at SZ (S) 284f. etc.
¹³⁷ I.e. the way in which the future gives itself having-been; the way in which futurity has been in and of itself. Cf. Ibid., cf. also Part I, §1bβ herein, SZ §65 etc.
¹³⁸ Cf. against SZ §65
and within the bounds of the problem of transcendence as it has so far been established (in terms of what transcendence is, and in terms of what transcendence is not). The transcendental *Wovor* is the having-been of the transcendental for-the-sake-of and nothing more. All that is occurring here is that temporality, in its formal and original structure is being applied to transcendence. This is both the simplicity and the difficulty of the present investigation.

c) The Horizontal Schema of the ‘Present’

One horizontal schema remains. Before this analysis may be freed to follow its quarry (the phenomenon of the horizontal schema of the present) there are two possibilities which must first be dispensed with. Without a prior analysis of these which shows how they are relevant but do not consummate the meaning of the horizontal schema of enpresenting, the analysis of the latter would remain incomplete and its grounds would remain opaque. §§3cα-β are dedicated to this preparatory task. In §3cγ the basic meaning of the horizontal schema enpresenting is exhibited.

α – Concerning the possibility for development of the in-order-to as horizontal schema of the present

The horizontal schema of futurity is the for-the-sake-of. The horizontal schema of having-been has been delimited as the before-which. So far we only know that the horizontal schema of the ‘present’ (*das Gegenwart*) ‘becomes determined through the in-order-to’ (“wird bestimmt durch das *Um-zu*”). How important is this ‘becomes determined through’? Why should Heidegger use this expression?

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139 SZ (D) 365
The in-order-to concerns manipulating a contexture for getting to such and such. Thus in the Basic Problems of Phenomenology Heidegger says that the ‘Um’ of the Um-zu is the ground for the fact that dealings are called Um-gangen.\(^{140}\) There, he also glosses the in-order-to as the structure of relevance.\(^{141}\) If the latter is the case in a simple and unqualified sense then the in-order-to cannot form the horizontal schema of the present because the enpresenting of transcendence must also include, in some way, the enpresenting of Dasein (both myself and the others).

In Being and Time the in-order-to is primarily connected with the structure of references in general.\(^{142}\) As we saw in Part I of this thesis, the for-the-sake-of is also a kind of reference, and indeed, significance itself is referential, thus, references are ontologically appropriate to Dasein.\(^{143}\) Within the analysis of the surrounding world Heidegger also showed that the referential relation of things includes a for-Daseins, namely, that dealing with things includes dealing with things for myself and the others.\(^{144}\) Yet, firstly, this remains a deficient mode of caring for the others (because it involves taking care of things on behalf of the others as opposed to caring for their existence per se), and secondly, this in-order-to is still essentially bound up with comportment.\(^ {145}\)

Resoluteness is an authentic enpresenting.\(^ {146}\) Thus, the horizontal schema of enpresenting should be primordially connected to resoluteness, that is, to the authentic disclosedness of Dasein.\(^ {147}\) Under the problem of resoluteness we find that the authentic self is a modification of the they-self, such that:

Even resolutions are dependent upon the they and its world. Understanding this is one of the things that resolution discloses, in that

\(^{140}\) BP (D) 416  
\(^{141}\) BP 295  
\(^{142}\) E.g. SZ (S) 82  
\(^{143}\) SZ (S, D) 84ff.  
\(^{144}\) SZ (S, D) 84, 86  
\(^{145}\) Cf. SZ (S/S) 121ff.  
\(^{146}\) SZ (S) 326  
\(^{147}\) SZ (S) 296ff.
resoluteness first gives to Dasein its authentic transparency… Resolution does not escape from “reality,” but first discovers what is factically possible… 148

Thus, resolute Dasein is essentially concerned with the kind of in-order-to discussed under the heading of the surrounding world. In resoluteness Dasein keeps itself free for this in-order-to. But that this in-order-to remains constitutive of authentic Dasein’s ‘present’ does not yet say that it is the constitutive horizon of the authentic present. More decisively it does not say that it is constitutive for the transcendent world. 149

As we saw in the previous chapter, transcendence cannot be “packed into a practical comportment.” But no way of freeing the in-order-to from comportment shows itself. Perhaps it is here that we find the necessity that the horizonal schema of the present must be determined through the in-order-to rather than be it simpliciter. After all, it is a precept of Heidegger’s phenomenology that the fully appropriate formulation of any problem must pass through an exemplary and concrete mode – and for the most part this means through inauthenticity or everydayness. In the especial ambivalence of enpresenting, the need for greater care arises. In this way, I suspect that the ‘wird bestimmt durch’ is no accident, and that it is instead a statement about the proper means for phenomenologically clarifying the horizonal schema of enpresenting. But these observations lack any fundamental proof or rigorous grounding. For instance, just because the Um-zu refers to articulatedness does not exclude it from forming the horizonal schema of enpresenting because transcendence, as ‘something’ grounded in temporality, is necessarily articulated. 152

One should not pretend to powers which are beyond one. Though it cannot be exhaustively shown here (because it would cost much and achieve little) there is simply no way to answer

148 SZ (S) 299 (modified)
149 Cf. §2 this chapter: “The world is transcendent, grounded in the horizonal unity of ecstatic temporality. It must already be ecstatically disclosed so that innerworldly beings can be encountered from it” SZ (S/S) 366. The world is transcendent, it is not transcendent of existence (because it is grounded in temporality), rather, it is transcendent of innerworldly beings (thus, of intenta etc.)
150 MFL 183
151 Cf. SZ passim
152 Cf. VWG (ER) 104f. 108f. 125f., MFL 138, 214 etc.
the question about the horizontal schema of enpresenting by investigating what Heidegger said about the in-order-to during the 20s. Accordingly, this thesis wants to decide neither for nor against the determination of the in-order-to as horizontal schema of the present. It wants to decide only on the phenomenon of the horizontal schema of the present: in the end, its name is immaterial. But this itself had to be proven in a preliminary fashion, because otherwise, the analysis which follows would necessarily appear capricious.

\[\beta \quad \text{Concerning the possibility of developing praesens as the horizontal schema of the present (Pre-view of the transcendental problem of being)}\]

A clear guideline for deepening transcendence’s for-the-sake-of is offered in Heidegger’s lecture courses. The before-which could be developed on the basis of its function within Being and Time. But neither of these options are available to us with respect to the in-order-to. Accordingly, one looks to the concept of praesens discussed in the Basic Problems of Phenomenology. There, praesens is elaborated by Heidegger (but not completely) as the horizontal schema of the present. In turn, Heidegger connects praesens with transcendence. Temporalität is determined as horizontal, and, Heidegger arrives at Temporalität via an analysis which is deeply analogous to SZ §69c. Thus, for Dastur, Temporalität is firstly, temporality insofar as it enables the understanding of being and secondly, the horizon of

\[\text{153 The closest one comes to an answer to this problem is SZ (S, D) 261 but this is still primitive and ambiguous, and the connection with a categorial horizon all too obtrusive. Alternatively there is SZ (S/S, D) 364 (this is of course, in SZ §69c) here Heidegger says “Since Dasein exists factically, it understands itself in this connection of the for-the-sake-of-itself in each instance with an in-order-to.” /“Sofern Dasein faktisch existiert, versteht es sich in diesem Zusammenhang des Um-willen seiner selbst mit einem jeweiligen Um-zu.” Of course, I have no intention of demeaning the importance of the in-order-to; this thesis does not want to imply that factical existence lacks an in-order-to; the only question is whether the in-order-to can name the horizontal schema of enpresenting. In the sentence following the above, Heidegger continues: “That within-which Dasein understands itself is “there” together with its factical existence.”/“Worinnen das existierende Dasein sich versteht, das ist mit seiner faktischen Existenz »da«.” Ibid. This seems to indicate that here, world (the Worinnen) and “factual existence” (that which in each case ‘has’ an in-order-to) are not identical per se (viz. because the latter includes ‘more’ than world). More importantly however, the above does not give us sufficient guidance for interpreting the in-order-to in such a way that it may phenomenologically circumscribe the horizontal schema of enpresenting. \text{154 Cf. esp. MFL §11c} \text{155 BP §21} \text{156 BP 303ff.} \text{157 Viz. the analysis which precedes the problem of Temporalität. BP (E/D) 302, 306-307 / 428-429, SZ (S,D) 364-365} \]
temporality pure and simple.\textsuperscript{158} Here, Heidegger even determines \textit{praesens} through dealings and thus, through the in-order-to.\textsuperscript{159}

If one simply follows these facts then one must come to a conclusion such as Dastur’s. However, because of the nature of these facts, such conclusions can only be arrived at through \textit{guess work}.\textsuperscript{160} As methods go, ‘guess work’ is best avoided, yet one all too easily falls to such a method in analyses of the problem of the horizontal schemata.\textsuperscript{161} Conversely, another path is open and opening here; this other path is to pose the question \textit{from transcendence}.

As much as Dastur’s solution seems to have weight, Temporalität is solely the temporal problem of \textit{being}.\textsuperscript{162} In the foregoing it was shown that transcendence, and thus the horizontal schemata of temporality from §69c, have an \textit{ontic-ontological} scope. Transcendence cannot be both purely ontological, and at the same time, primordial ontical truth.\textsuperscript{163} Yet, if we may say that Dasein’s openness is either comportmental or transcendental, and the former is founded in the latter, then we may still understand the following statement near the end of \textit{the Basic Problems of Phenomenology} without immediately interpreting transcendence as a purely ontological phenomenon:

\begin{quote}
Transcendence as such, in the sense of our interpretation, is the first condition of possibility of the understanding of \textit{being}, the first and nearest upon which an ontology has to project \textit{being}. The objectification of \textit{being} can first be accomplished in regard to \textit{transcendence}.\textsuperscript{164}
\end{quote}

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{158}] She determines these respectively as the broad and narrow sense of Temporalität. Cf. Dastur (1999[1990]) 58
\item[\textsuperscript{159}] Cf. BP 303ff.
\item[\textsuperscript{160}] The same grounds are implied in Tonner (2010) 63f. & Sheehan (1992[1984]) 31, 41-43 (but with a curious distinction according to which SZ §69c only concerns Dasein’s \textit{being} whereas SZ I.3 would concern \textit{being} in general, this seems to also exist in von Herrmann (1993[1989]) 123. Conversely, we find almost precisely the opposite in Sembera (2007) 209, Blattner (1999) 271-276 etc.). On interpretations which take their lead from the presence of ‘schema’ in the term ‘horizontal schema’ cf. §1a of the Final Stage of the Founding Analysis.
\item[\textsuperscript{161}] Ibid.
\item[\textsuperscript{162}] SZ (S/S) 19, thought nonetheless as “\textit{die Temporalität des Daseins}” BP (D) 429
\item[\textsuperscript{163}] Cf. First Stage of the Founding Analysis §2b\textgamma{} herein.
\item[\textsuperscript{164}] BP 323
\end{itemize}
That is, we can understand transcendence as the “first condition of possibility of the understanding of being” because transcendence is the first condition of possibility of truth in general – both ontic and ontological – and because truth happens only in the equiprimordial openness of beings and being; because being is never without beings and beings are never without being. That is, transcendence is the original happening of the ontological difference, and phenomenologically, even in the late 20s, “the ontological difference is one.”165 To push further: the question of being in general needs an exemplary phenomenon: being must be asked about phenomenologically, that is, in terms of a possible concrete phenomenon, and that means, from an essential belonging together of beings and being!

The question of being as such becomes available through transcendence, but since transcendence means transcending beings, transcendence is only possible at all on the basis of the belonging together of the ontological difference.166 “Transcendence as such, in the sense of our interpretation, is the first condition of possibility of the understanding of being” – yes, because it is the first condition of possibility of the happening of the understanding of being! But that does not mean the happening of categorial intuition; it means the happening of understanding tout court (existentially understood).167 This of course is still very far from answering the question about being.

The complete phenomenon of transcendence has to refer back to beings in some sense. Praesens is a purely ontological question. In the end, praesens is the name for the upon-which, or meaning of being, insofar being is disclosed from the essence of enpresenting.168

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165 MFL 157, cf. also VWG (ER) 26-29: being and beings “belong together”, what is “distinctive about Dasein” is that it “comports towards beings by understanding being” and in turn “transcendence is the ground of the ontological difference”, i.e., it is the ground for this distinctive character of Dasein. But what is ground? As we find in VWG it is freedom itself – thus nothing like the ‘cause’ of the difference. The problem of ground is a thematic problem of Ch. 1 & 2 of the Founded Analysis. In Ch. 3 of the Founded Analysis inquiry into the transcendental question of being is attempted.

166 Despite our differences, Schalow comes to much the same conclusion at Schalow (1992) 157-158, similarly, Dastur (1999[1990]) 56-58 appears to do so too (however, in neither place does the difference between the temporal and temporale horizon as articulated here become necessary).

167 Cf. §3a this chapter.

168 BP 306
**Third Stage: the Temporal Constitution of Transcendence**

*Praesens* is therefore essentially ‘narrower’ than what pertains to transcendence *as such* as a phenomenon.

Thus, Kisiel understands the horizontal schemata of Temporalität as a sort of ‘grammar’ or ‘logic’ of being.\(^{169}\) The horizontal schemata of Temporalität correspond to the *Tempora*, that is, the tenses (thus *praesens*, *futurum* and *praeteritum*, i.e., the German names for present, future and past tense).\(^{170}\) This is in contrast to the *prepositional* formulation of the horizontal schemata in *Being and Time*.\(^{171}\) Accordingly, Kisiel now thinks of SZ I.3 as the phenomenological elaboration of this grammar. In support of this, Kisiel refers to a redacted footnote from SZ §68d linking SZ I.3 with the temporal re-petition of grammar, along with Heidegger’s notes for the first formulation of SZ I.3.\(^{172}\)

If we understand *praesens* in this way, then Heidegger’s formalistic definition and exhibition of it in *the Basic Problems* (“*Anwesenheit und Abwesenheit*”) is only ‘natural.’\(^{173}\) *Praesens* is more ‘blank’ than the prepositional horizontal schemata because its task is, as it were, to say ‘nothing’… but in a meaningful and temporally delimited way.

The horizontal schemata of Temporalität are connected with transcendence. But since the prepositional schemata concern world as such, the temporale problem can only be a purification of the complete phenomenon of transcendence. As a purification, the setting forth of *praesens* is a task, that is, *praesens, futurum praeteritum name* (rather than answer)

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\(^{169}\) Here he refers to the problem of a grammar of being at SZ (S) 39.

\(^{170}\) Kisiel (2005[2001]) 191f: more correctly, *Präsenz, Präteritum and Futur*: these are the words Heidegger used (or would have used) and they are also the names for the *Tempora*. It is of course customary to render Heidegger’s Latinate German word *Präsenz* with its cognate Latin word ‘*praesens*’, thus the above are rendered correspondingly.

\(^{171}\) Kisiel (2005[2001]) 196

\(^{172}\) The relevant footnote was redacted from the seventh edition of SZ and all subsequent editions. Cf. Kisiel (2005[2001]) 209-211, SZ (EH) 349 *infra*: the footnote simply reads “Cf. Division three, chapter 2, this treatise.” It is appended to the last sentence of SZ 349 which critiqued grammars that are grounded in the vulgar concept of time and concluded by speaking of the temporality of discourse (of ‘the temporality of Dasein in general’) in connection with “the ‘origination’ of [linguistic] ‘significance’” cf. SZ (S/S, D, EH) 349 et *infra* (note, the clause order is different in SZ (S/S) to SZ (D)). It is clear however, that Kisiel’s interpretation of this passage of SZ is supported by the unpublished archival material which he obliquely discusses (i.e. the real evidence remains hidden away in Marbach am Neckar). Cf. Kisiel (2005[2001]) 209-211 etc.

the basic question about being on the basis of transcendence.\textsuperscript{174} The horizontal schemata of Temporalität are not identical to those of §69c, for the former have already thought beyond the latter, that is they have already thought beyond transcendence because they have developed (or indeed, skipped ahead to) the question of what is primordially hidden within it (viz. the understanding of being).

Reflecting on the above one might say that it is because being and beings belong together that so much effort is required to concretely arrive at the question of being. Here we are interested in the primary phenomenon of the temporality of transcendence. That the horizontal schemata of Temporalität are purifications of the phenomenon of transcendence does not prejudice the fact that they are more original, indeed it is the presupposition for this fact. Yet such problems lead beyond the task of this thesis: we want to grasp the basic phenomenon of transcendence not to re-write SZ I.3.

\section*{\textbf{\textgreek{gamma} – The phenomenon of the horizontal schema of the present}}

The enpresenting of Dasein is the least ‘independent’ ecstasy insofar as it always arises from the future which has been, i.e., so far as it is the final ecstasy.\textsuperscript{175} Accordingly, ‘caught in the middle,’ it is also the most ‘chameleonic’ ecstasy. And so, in a certain limited sense one can see enpresenting as a ‘synthesis’ of futurity and having-been.\textsuperscript{176} But it is also the ecstasy of bringing-into and holding-in; into the moment, into fallenness.\textsuperscript{177} We can understand the unity and necessity of this duality if we understand enpresenting as the ecstasy of being held-in, where this ‘in’ is always already determined from the “world” taken care of and by futurity.

\textsuperscript{174} Which doesn’t mean that Heidegger couldn’t decide that this strategy is corrupt: cf. \textit{Contributions} (E/D) 317f. / 451 vs. VWG (ER) 96f. infra
\textsuperscript{175} Cf. SZ \textit{passim} etc.
\textsuperscript{176} E.g. this appears to happen at VWG (ER) 110ff.
\textsuperscript{177} Cf. SZ \textit{passim}
Third Stage: the Temporal Constitution of Transcendence

which has been. That is, because of its place within the structure of temporality, enpresenting
is a bringing-into which necessarily brings Dasein into discursivity.\(^\text{178}\)

This may be critically attested from the temporal analysis of discourse in SZ §68d:

\[
\text{The complete disclosedness of the there constituted by understanding,}
\text{attunement and falling prey is articulated by discourse. Thus discourse does not temporalize itself primarily in a definite ecstasy.}^{179}
\]

That is, the original temporal ground for the discursivity of discourse resides in its connection
back to the totality of the ecstasies of temporality.\(^\text{180}\) Insofar as the discursivity of discourse
primordially arises from the articulatedness of temporality, discourse is ‘indefinite’ with respect to its primary ecstasy. But that means; the discursivity which arises again and again
with respect to enpresenting is not the central determination of this ecstasy; it concerns enpresenting’s being determined by the other ecstasies, i.e., the former’s being the final ecstasy. Heidegger continues;

\[
\text{But since discourse is for the most part spoken in language and initially speaks by addressing the “surrounding world” in taking care of it and talking about it, enpresenting has, of course a privileged constitutive function.}^{181}
\]

Thus, discourse has a special connection with enpresenting. The ground of this special connection is discourse’s ‘addressing’, its ‘pointing to.’\(^\text{182}\) But this says that it is precisely this bringing-into which primarily characterises the ecstasy of the ‘present’. This is most clearly visible in the directionality of fallenness, yet this character belongs equally to resolution and the moment as it does to the bei character of ‘being-together-with (innerworldly beings)’.

\(^\text{178}\) SZ (S) 326, i.e. insofar as the present is dependent on the future which has-been.
\(^\text{179}\) SZ (S/S) 349 (italics added)
\(^\text{180}\) Thus, “the temporality of discourse, i.e. of Dasein in general” SZ (S/S) 349
\(^\text{181}\) SZ (S/S, D) 349 (modified, underlined italics added)
\(^\text{182}\) Thus Gegen-wart cf. SZ (D) 338; there are two instances at Ibid., one explaining absorbed enpresenting, the other explaining authentically being in the Moment. Cf. also AT 15 (thus Gegen-wärtigen as ‘waiting on’).
For these reasons, the discursivity of enpresenting is something which necessarily pertains to enpresenting not because enpresenting is the same as discourse, but, because enpresenting ‘is’ in such a way that discursivity must accrue to it. At the most primordial level, this is simply because of enpresenting’s place in the structure of temporality (i.e. because it is the third ecstasy). Thus, because of this connection with discursivity, in §69c Heidegger either identifies or connects this horizonal schema with the in-order-to. Here, the latter option remains unintelligible but is not for that reason disproven.

According to the guiding definition of horizonal schema (§3a), the horizonal schema of enpresenting means that, which in a special connection with enpresenting, stands at the root of possibility for the non-intentional happening of world. The horizonal schema of the present must be understood as that horizonal schema by which Dasein is brought into the unified and articulated happening of its futurity and having-been. But this means, if the for-the-sake-of (qua futural) is the horizonal schema which essentially gives unity, the horizonal schema of the present must be that in which this unity ultimately arrives (i.e. presences).  

In this sense, Heidegger’s constant connection of logic, intuition and truth is not just a reflection on the history of λόγος. In this history we find a constant connection of λόγος with discourse and synthesis. This connection then grounds the problem of truth (truth belongs to judgement). But on the other hand, truth gets grounded in νόησις, in intuition in direct and simple perceiving (truth belongs to intuition, i.e., enpresenting). For Heidegger, both are true in their own way and the temporal ground for this is that disclosedness, primordial truth, is an enpresenting but enpresenting is inextricable from discourse (indeed, enpresenting has always already ‘become’ discourse). That is, both existentially and historically, truth as λόγος

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183 Thus, VWG (ER) 110ff. & SZ (S) 397 are consistent with SZ (S) 329, 326, 354, 365 etc.
184 Thus, the critique of this concept of truth, so far as it is a ‘critique of the present day’ becomes a critique of the ‘logical prejudice’ as per Dahlstrom (2001) passim.
185 On λόγος as discourse cf. SZ (S/S) 165. On the broader problem discussed above Cf. LQT passim, BP 118, §§16-18, compare SZ (S) 297, 326 against §68d, cf. also SZ (S/S) 33, MFL passim, EHF §9 etc. Similarly, thus the connection of resoluteness, enpresenting and truth: SZ (S) 297, 326
(discourse: the temporalisation of temporality as a whole) and truth as νόησις (enpresenting) are different from each other yet belong together.

In *Vom Wesen des Grundes* the enpresenting of freedom is arrived at through the ‘why?’

Since, Heidegger says, the ‘why’ is to be asked after transcendentally, it is to be questioned from transcendence, and that means that it is not to be questioned ‘factically’ (where this means in terms of any comportmental ‘why’). The ‘why’ arises and is conditioned by the overflow of possibility which belongs to futurity and the deprivation and determinateness which belongs to having-been. Thus, the ‘why?’ turns out to be a ‘why this, rather than…?’ Since enpresenting is bound to the excess of the future and the deprivation of having-been, the enpresenting of ground turns out to be intrinsically discursive.

The ‘why?’ is not a contender for the horizontal schema of transcendence; it belongs to the transcendental question of ground. Being towards the ‘why?’ means questioningly being towards a discursivity which has already been disclosed from the future which has been. But, Heidegger avers in *Vom Wesen des Grundes*, because the ‘why?’ has this structure “it contains the ultimate and primordial answer to every question.” The horizontal schema of enpresenting must ‘account’ for this ‘answer’ and form the most primordial power of its being given – and it must do so on the basis of transcendence. This means it must include the bringing-to and discursivity *transcendently* pertinent to fallenness, conscience, resoluteness, the moment and the Sein-bei. That is, it must be the horizontal schema of holding us to that which gives itself as it gives itself – it must be the schema of letting the transcendent world happen in its discursive unity.

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186 VWG (ER) 113ff.
187 Ibid.
188 Ibid.
189 Ibid. cf. also the centrality of this ‘rather than’ in MFL 113f., 219
190 VWG (ER) 111ff.: indeed, Heidegger even gives this mode of grounding names which belong to the determination of truth as judgement.
191 Cf. VWG (ER) 110ff.
192 Cf. Ibid. & pp 108f.
193 Esp. vis-à-vis the question of being. VWG (ER) 115.
If enpresenting must refer to that which gives itself as it gives itself, this indicates, as Pöggeler has also noted, that the primordial enpresenting of Dasein refers us to the ‘as structure.’ Thus, Heidegger says in SZ§69b:

The deliberation that brings near must, in the schema of enpresenting, adapt itself to the kind of being of what is to be brought near…

The way the present is rooted in the future and in having-been is the existential and temporal condition of the possibility that what is projected in circumspect understanding can be brought nearer in an enpresenting in such a way that the present must adapt itself to what is encountered in the horizon of awaiting retention, that is, it must interpret itself in the schema of the as-structure.

And it is along the same lines that we may rightly understand the in-order-to to either be, or lead to the horizontal schema of the present. The in-order-to is a structure of bringing-into as a structure of bringing-near qua self-adaptation-to. In connection with this manifoldness, it includes a primordial ‘to’ (a nearing). The horizontal schema of enpresenting is to be understood from this ‘adapting-nearing-to’ and may be formally indicated in this way (but of course, not, as above, in terms of circumspection and deliberation, both of which are primarily unable to see beyond innerworldliness).

Brought back more explicitly into the question of transcendence thus far established this means the transcendence of the world is characterised by a holding-to. This holding-to has an ontic and an ontological dimension. In turn, that which is held-to is in each case articulated. In the ‘first’ instance this articulatedness is a consequence of the (articulated) structure of temporality. Yet, for the question of transcendence this now means; world which is thrown forth beforehand is itself articulated.

The necessary meaning of the phenomenon of the horizontal schema of the present is a ‘holding-to the given’ – and this, bound wholly to transcendence. What is held to is not only

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194 Cf. Pöggeler (1997[1992]) 80f
195 SZ (S/S, D) 360 (italics added, modified)
the transcendent before-which, but also the primordial giving of possibilities, i.e., the transcendent for-the-sake-of. And for this reason, the holding-to of transcendence must always already include a certain discursivity. Here we must grasp this discursivity solely as the essential discursivity of the complete structure of transcendence and this, first foremost, in terms of the temporal articulateness of existence.\textsuperscript{196}

Bringing world ‘near’ is letting world happen (\textit{Geschehen}): letting world world. Letting world happen includes the for-the-sake-of and the before-which in their unity – happening in this particular case is the same as nearness. The horizontal schema of enpresenting is something like this letting-happen, letting-world (letting world world).

With this, the way has been cleared for the Final Stage of the Founding Analysis wherein the grounding meaning of transcendence must be given. To present the grounding meaning of transcendence means to present the essential unity of the for-the-sake-of, before-which and discursive enpresenting, within the bounds of a non-intentional surpassing of beings towards world, which happens in such a way that Dasein is its world in a wholly primordial sense, and world is transcendent of all beings (Dasein’s selfhood \textit{included}). The task of the Final Stage is to make this statement meaningful.

\textsuperscript{196} The topic of MFL 137f. is a subsequent problem. Cf. §2, Ch. 3, Founded Analysis.
Final Stage of the Founding Analysis:

The Inner Unity of Fundamental Ontological Transcendence

“Time itself is a self-projection upon itself (its horizontal [aspect], its ecstatic [aspect])”

1 Cf. Heidegger in Kïsel (2005[2001]) 211. This quotation comes from notes for the first formulation of SZ I.3
The first task of the conclusion to the Founding Analysis is to determine the horizontal schemata more concretely by determining why they are called ‘schemata’ — that is, to determine what ‘schema’ means in SZ §69, and thus, by extension, in the Basic Problems of Phenomenology §§21-22. Heidegger’s texts suggest two basic guidelines for such a task. The first is expressed succinctly by Otto Pöggeler, when he says that Heidegger’s discussion of horizontal schemata expresses an “obvious indebtedness to Kant’s theory of schematization.”² This is obvious to everyone. When one thinks of the ‘philosophy of schematism’, Kant’s chapter on schematism in the Critique of Pure Reason is the first that comes to mind. In addition, SZ II.1 was to concern Kant’s schematism and in differing ways, Kant’s schematism was central to Heidegger’s Kantdeutung.³

However, the second guideline for the problem of schema in SZ §69 makes all this questionable. The second guideline is Heidegger’s statement of purpose in §69b, which says that we must “define the concept of schema existentially.”⁴ At first it is obvious that we must follow Kant’s schematism to arrive at the meaning of schema in §69c, but ultimately it is far from obvious what that would mean. But this means that it is far from obvious that any particular aid is to be gained from Kant (or ‘Heidegger’s Kant’) for the question concerning the meaning of schematism in SZ §69c. This may be demonstrated in outline from the following points:

- Kant does not offer an existential concept of schema (his affinities for certain central phenomena uncovered in Being and Time does not in itself transfer his thinking into the fundamental ontological domain proper).⁵

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² Pöggeler (1997[1992]) 80
³ Cf. SZ (S/S) 40, LQT §§22-37, PIK 247, 292 and thus passim. KPM (T) passim, cf. also SZ (S/S) 23f. Also, there are the unpublished seminars Kants Lehre von Schematismus und die Frage nach dem Sinn des Seins from early December 1927, cf. MFL 144 infra, Kisiel & Sheehan (2007) xlv, lv. WT passim replaces the analysis of schematism with an analysis of the principles of the pure understanding. However, the difference between schemata and principles is not extreme: the latter are merely a development on the former, cf. CPR (A/B) 132, 136 / 171, 175, LQT 224f. Conversely, BP passim is heavily concerned with Kant but mostly in other ways (at least explicitly).
⁴ SZ (S) 360
⁵ Cf. LQT passim, PIK passim, KPM passim, WT passim, BP passim.
The re-petition of Kant does not negate the fact that his thought is essentially different to the existential problematic; the *Auseinandersetzung* does not extinguish the difference between Kant and Heidegger, it *relies* on it. The difference is made partly ‘fluid,’ so to speak, but remains essential.6

Heidegger’s analysis of Kant does not present an existential concept of schema. Thus, *Logic: the Question of Truth* merely articulates the concept of schematism in Kant.7 *Phenomenological Interpretations of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason* mostly only notes that schematism oriented the entire interpretation of Kant without explaining how this was the case in detail.8 The *Kantbuch* nowhere discusses schema in an existential sense.9 In the *Kantbuch*, schematism is discussed in the context of a re-petition of Kant, which however, is in each case *burdened* with the Kantian architectonic. When, in the final part, Heidegger turns to his own problematic he no longer mentions the schema at all.10

The ‘actuality’ of schematism in Kant is inadequate to the Heideggerian problem.11 It is true that Heidegger’s re-petition of Kant aims at freeing the possibilities of the latter from this actuality, but this only goes so far.12 Accordingly, any interpretation aimed at determining Heidegger’s schema through Kant’s would have to be a matter of allowing Heidegger to be *freely determined* by Kant. Yet how should one do this? To productively dig for a broader history of schematism preceding Kant – and thereby to broaden the grounds of the problem – is almost impossible.13 The *Kantdeutung* brings us to the precipice of a connection between

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6 *Ibid.*, esp. KPM (T) 175
7 LQT §§33-36
8 PIK §26c
9 Cf. KPM *passim.*
10 KPM (T) §§36-45
11 I.e. Heidegger’s question is alien to Kant’s. Cf. e.g., PIK 291, 292, LQT 337
12 KPM (T) 138, for instance, does not yet extinguish the difference between Kant and Heidegger; it does not convert Kant into Heidegger or vice versa.
13 Should the reader, having exhausted the obvious texts (CPR, CPJ), consult the Cambridge editions of Kant’s *Correspondence, the Notes and Fragments, and the Opus Postumum* they will find no reflections on this question. Correspondingly, it is clear that in 1762 Kant did not know that the original ‘syllogistic figures’ were in fact Aristotle’s syllogistic *schemata* (*σχήματα* cf. *Pr. Anal. passim*, vs. FSF (E/D) *passim* esp. 2.56ff. / *passim*). Whether he later discerned this fact cannot be determined with certainty. A more interesting connection is given by the fact that Aristotle speaks of τὰ σχήματα τῆς κατηγορίας, that is, ‘the schemata of the
Kant’s schematism and primordial temporality yet, this precipice constitutes the high point of the analysis. On the other hand – as both the Sache of the Kantbuch and the latter’s connection with SZ II.1 shows – the Kantbuch stands in the temporale dimension, yet this thesis and SZ §69c is precisely pre-temporale. Everything then is entangled. With this as our situation, to enact a more radical Auseinandersetzung between Heidegger and Kant than Heidegger himself achieved would require an exceptional mastery of Kant and it would require us to know Heidegger better than he knew himself. Accordingly, the obvious approach quickly becomes a Herculean task.

If on the other hand one wants to pose the question of an existential schematism aside from any of the ‘hints’ one might adduce from Heidegger’s Kantdeutung this approach is limited by the fact that;

- Heidegger nowhere explicitly defines schema existentially.
- The existential concept of schema is an operative term but it barely operates and thus remains obscure.

The first task of this chapter is to overcome this problematic situation. This is achieved from the central phenomena involved; transcendence and temporality. Through the development of

\[\text{categories’ (more appropriately, the schemata of predication: ‘category’ here has the sense discussed in SZ (S) 44f. viz. ‘to address’ and to determine in an ‘act of addressing,’ moreover, τῆς κατηγορίας is in the singular not the plural). While the Greek meaning of ‘category’ is indeed preserved in Kant (cf. CPR (A/B) 81f. / 107f.) no answer to the question of the origin of Kant’s use of schematism is immediately provided by this fact. Indeed, Aristotle uses ἡ κατηγορία interchangeably with τὰ σχήματα τῆς κατηγορίας (cf. Met. 1017a, 1026a, Cat. 1b-2a, the grounds for the opposite interpretation occurring in Seung (1989) is that he misreads the account of categories in Aristotle given by Owens (1981[1960])). More generally, in Aristotle, schema means something like ‘shape’, whether only those derivable from triangles (Anim. 414b) or shapes more generally, i.e. including circles (Met. 1020a, 1042b). This definition also occurs in BCA (E, D) §56 where Heidegger discusses Aristotle’s categories. Σχήμα can also mean ‘guise’ in the sense of semblance (Met. 1004b, Phdr. 255a: “σχηματίζομενον” – which does not occur in Met. –; ‘literally’ this means ‘schematising’). It can mean ‘type’ and this sense can be applied to speech (to command, to explain) and to theatre (drama, comedy) Poet. 1448b, 1449a-b, 1456b. Accordingly, the determination of schematism as ‘figurative synthesis’ or ‘synthesis speciosa’ (LQT §31 et seq. e.g. p 306 etc.) can be understood from the Greek. Similarly then, the occasional reference in literature on Heidegger to the schemata as ‘figures’ has a historical ground (e.g., Dastur (1999[1990]) 60, Kisiel (1995[1993]) 447). Yet, it would take considerable work to precisely determine the meaning of this ground. After all, for instance, neither Kant’s pure schematism nor Heidegger’s horizontal schematism can be taken to mean the ‘square’ or the ‘circle’ of time.}

\[14\] LQT 337, KPM (T) 123, 131f., 135f., 138 etc., PIK §§24-25
\[15\] SZ (S, D) 23f., 39f., KPM passim – however, neither Temporalität nor its cognates occur in KPM.
these two phenomena in their inner unity something like existential schematism will announce itself. Thus, if analogy with Kant remains an uprooted way of deriving the existential concept of schema then only through this approach may one first aspire to the inner meaning existential schematism.

With the delimitation of existential schematism the ‘language game’ of SZ §69c is finally codified and the way is cleared to draw the entire edifice of the Founding Analysis to a conclusion. This conclusion must explain the way in which transcendence is necessarily world-formation. By analogy to Being and Time’s division of world according to an existentiell and an existential sense, §2 will pose the existentiell problem of the transcendence of the world, whilst §3 will pose the existential problem of the transcendence of the world (and formulate the connection between the existentiell and existential problems of world).\(^{16}\)

It is notable here that, as Kisiel has reported SZ I.3.iv was to be called “Zeitlichkeit und Weltlichkeit”\(^ {17}\) – in itself this clearly indicates that the question of world can go much further than Heidegger ever publicly took it, and indeed, presumably further than this thesis will take it.

Through the analyses of §§1-3, the phenomenon of fundamental ontological transcendence will finally have been set forth. However, before we can claim to have truly founded the phenomenon of transcendence, the complete problem of the way in which transcendence is grounded in temporality must also be lain out (§4). Though this, the primordial necessity of a fundamental ontological question of transcendence (namely, that which the whole Founding Analysis has concerned itself with) will finally be proven. This question has been held back precisely so that it could be posed directly and without equivocation: something which only becomes possible at the conclusion of the founding of transcendence.

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\(^{16}\) Cf. SZ (S) 64f.

\(^{17}\) Kisiel (2005[2001]) 211
§§2-4 are focussed on the development of the essential meaning of transcendence. They are no longer concerned with the groundwork and preliminary disclosure of the phenomenon (the preceding analysis). Conversely, they are not yet concerned with the broader consequences of transcendence for fundamental ontology (the Founded Analysis). The development of transcendence in §§2-4 is solely concerned with world, i.e., with that which Heidegger explicitly and repeatedly indicates to be the most central determination of transcendence.

Here we are interested in determining why and how transcendence pertains to world and world to transcendence (§§2-3) and from this very determinate and highly developed understanding, we are then interested in the nature of the connection between transcendence and temporality (§4). That is, as a whole, this chapter concerns the inner unity of fundamental ontological transcendence.

This chapter is concerned with thinking transcendence through to the end. This is a possible task only because the question of transcendence has been constantly purified and developed in the foregoing. But it turns out that here, in posing the question of transcendence simply, directly and without distraction we enter a completely original phase of this thesis. Accordingly, aside from the reflections of §1a, this chapter more than all of the preceding analysis is forced to ‘go it alone.’

§1 – Exposition of the Existential Meaning of Schema from the Phenomenon of Transcendence Understood on the Basis of Time

a) The Usual Problem of Schema in Heidegger and the Vacuum of Meaning

In its existential signification schema is only ever an operative word – but it barely operates. Insofar as the existential concept of schema barely operates it does not get entangled in a web of meanings. Instead, it has basically only one function; signifying what is signified in a
temporal interpretation of transcendence.\textsuperscript{18} In this sense, schema is there to make transcendence intelligible in its temporal foundation and is only there for that purpose. But instead, it makes nothing intelligible. Thus, in the literature on Heidegger, this ‘vacuum’ of meaning gives way to speculation about its meaning. One compares Kant and Heidegger and one then identifies a point of commonality, one then hypothesises that this common element bears an explanatory function for the interpretation of Heidegger. Since the existential concept of ‘schema’ is always a matter of transcendence, all interpretations of existential schematism must gain their warrant from a sufficiently clarified understanding of transcendence.\textsuperscript{19} Conversely, the combination of mere speculation about the meaning of ‘schema’ in connection with an inadequately clarified warrant leads to the existential concept of schema becoming an irresolvable and phenomenologically groundless problem in the literature.

For Frank Schalow the analogy between Heidegger’s horizonal schemata and Kant’s schematism is obvious.\textsuperscript{20} Nonetheless, his analysis of the meaning of schema in Kant and in the relation between Kant and Heidegger is surprisingly cumbersome for a work on the relationship between Kant and Heidegger. In the first instance we are told that the difference between Heidegger’s horizonal schemata and Kant’s schemata is that Heidegger’s “proceed from an explicit distinction between the “can be” and significance.”\textsuperscript{21} As evidence for this, Schalow quotes the list of horizonal schemata as formulated in SZ §69c.\textsuperscript{22} Schalow’s previous definition of significance is something like a mixture of falling and relevance, and so, it is unclear what Schalow means by this “explicit distinction.”\textsuperscript{23} Schalow could be referring to the distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity or the distinction between the for-the-sake-of and the in-order-to. Both of these distinctions occur in the passage he

\textsuperscript{18} SZ §69c, BP §§20c et seq. Even the ‘as schema’ of SZ (S/S) 360 (§69b), which was discussed in the previous chapter, concerns the problem of temporality and transcendence (cf. Ibid). By way of contrast, SZ §§32-33 only ever refers to the ‘as structure’ and never to the ‘as schema.’

\textsuperscript{19} Cf. Ibid.

\textsuperscript{20} E.g. Schalow (1992) 156f.

\textsuperscript{21} Schalow (1992) 183

\textsuperscript{22} Schalow (1992) 182-183

\textsuperscript{23} Schalow (1992) 149, accordingly the use of this distinction in Schalow (1992) 157f: does not solve the problem.
quotes as evidence.\textsuperscript{24} The import of this distinction between the ‘can-be and significance’ remains unclear.

Similarly, Schalow struggles with the difference between schematism in Kant as providing an instance, and as providing a “qualitative perceptual horizon of transcendence.”\textsuperscript{25} This duality shows that “there are more assumptions and unspoken distinctions running through his analysis [viz. Heidegger’s \textit{Kantdeutung}] than may be initially evident.”\textsuperscript{26} Yet, though Schalow does not make it explicit – and since it is \textit{wholly fundamental} this is a significant problem – the former is nothing more than the schematism of \textit{empirical} concepts while the latter is a distorted formulation of Kant’s schematism of \textit{pure} concepts.\textsuperscript{27} For the Kantian schematism, and Heidegger’s understanding of it, the difference is \textit{crucial}.\textsuperscript{28} Because Schalow does not resolve this problem he can now, following Sherover and certain points in Heidegger’s analysis, symphonically, but without mediation, weave together Kant’s schematism, the horizontal schematism of \textit{Being and Time} and the \textit{Basic Problems} (viz. of Temporalität), with Heidegger’s explanation of both the transcendental object and being as \textit{das Nichts}.\textsuperscript{29} Thus “the hidden point of convergence between Heidegger’s account of transcendentality schematism in the Kant-book and the complementary exposure of horizontal schema from the \textit{Basic Problems}”\textsuperscript{30} turns out to be the horizonality of the transcendental object in connection with this unresolved ambiguity in the meaning of schematism itself (or else pure schematism is interpreted from the transcendental object).\textsuperscript{31} Insofar as Kant’s pure schematism remains nascent here, the analysis moves more from its understanding of

\textsuperscript{24} Schalow (1992) 182-183, SZ §18
\textsuperscript{25} Schalow (1992) 181
\textsuperscript{26} Schalow (1992) 181
\textsuperscript{27} KPM (T) 69, 71, 73-74 137-138, LQT 296, 299, 308-311 302, CPJ 351. In fact it makes more sense as an interpretation of KPM §25, namely, Heidegger’s determination of Kant’s transcendental object. However, should one compare KPM §25 with what was said about the horizontal schema of the for-the-sake-of in the previous chapter one would be forced to note that the two are incompatible in principle (this, of course, is not to say that KPM §25 is ‘Kant in himself’ by any stretch of the imagination).
\textsuperscript{28} Cf. \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{30} Schalow (1992) 186
\textsuperscript{31} Schalow (1992) 182-187 vs. KPM §25
Final Stage: the Unity of Transcendence

Heidegger than from Kant. Yet even here it turns out that the goal was to find a “hidden point of convergence.”

For all Dastur’s achievements in other respects, Dastur’s account of horizontal schematism is formulaic (and to this extent phenomenologically unclear); Kant’s schematism is the ‘prefiguration’ of beings; it is the rule by which the pure imagination ‘imagines’ an image. Dastur now explains that Heidegger ‘takes this over’ (of course, if true this could only mean that Heidegger is inauthentically historical) so that the schema becomes “the prefiguration of what will be able to present itself as a being.” For Dastur, the schema provides a previously understood figure of any being whatsoever; it is that in accordance with which Dasein’s understanding of being (image of being) is understood (‘imagined’). This is basically reasonable and it says basically accurate things about the execution of the horizontal schematism but it does not yet speak with appropriate penetration.

John Sallis also wants to understand the inclusion of schematism on the basis of Kant. His analysis begins with the horizontal schemata of SZ §69c, but it is not until he reaches the Basic Problems of Phenomenology that schema gains a determinate significance. Both Heidegger’s horizontal schemata and Kant’s schemata share in the fact that they seek to think being on the basis of time. Thus, Sallis concludes that the reason why Heidegger uses the word ‘schema’ to name his horizontal schemata is because the latter give being on the basis of time.

33 Dastur (1999[1990]) 60. Of course, VWG (ER) 88f. provides some exegetical justification for this approach. But how the latter should be read is another question entirely (Founded Analysis Ch. 3, §2 gives this thesis’ interpretation thereof). On the inauthentic historicity of such appropriation cf. Destruktion and re-petition in CTD 87f.
34 Dastur (1992) 176
35 Sallis (1990) 109
36 Ibid. ff.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid. Sallis is more ambiguous concerning those of SZ §69c. Here he tells us that the primary purpose of the horizontal schemata is to bind the ‘centrifugal movement’ of the ecstasy (Sallis (1990) 109). Why they are horizontal is thereby vaguely indicated, but why they should be called schemata – given his definition of the schema as discussed above – remains unclarified.
Over and over the literature follows this pattern. One develops Kant and Heidegger side by side in such a way that something they share in common comes to the fore, this commonality then becomes the basis for an analogy. This analogy now explains the existential meaning of schema, and thus guides the direction and bounds of the interpretation of SZ §69c and/or the *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* §§20-21.

Kant’s schema is not an existential schema. Merely finding or inferring points of commonality between Heidegger’s horizontal schemata and Kant’s schematism is methodologically unsound. If we take this as our maxim, then it is possible to ‘accurately’ formulate many more points of comparison than those discussed above, and accordingly, choosing one over the other would remain essentially ungrounded and uprooted. There is no hope of properly deriving a central, unifying meaning for schema via any simple application of this approach; one would have to get behind Heidegger’s Kant re-petition and master it and its aims completely.

Even if, as seems quite likely, schema enters Heidegger’s thought because of Kant this does not mean that an analogy with Kant provides sufficient grounds to determine the existential meaning of schema. Thus analogies between Kant and Heidegger concerning the ‘schema’ are no more a concern of this analysis than the fact that Heidegger sometimes uses ‘schema’ to refer to things like ‘the matter-form schema.’

Here, we are interested only in the horizontal schemata, i.e., in *existential schematism*. This means that we are interested in schema only so far as it concerns the assimilation of fundamental ontological transcendence to fundamental ontological temporality, that is, the unity of transcendence and temporality. Properly speaking, the existential concept of schema only ever serves the function of naming this unity. But this means; if schema in the existential sense serves the function of naming the unity of transcendence and temporality,

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39 E.g. PIK 85 (matter-form)
40 SZ §69, BP §§20e-22
and, we can exhibit the phenomenon of this unity, then we will know what schema signifies more primordially than if we determined why it was used and not another word or how an interpretation of Kant suggested the word to Heidegger.

If we can exhibit the meaning of transcendence in its unity with temporality, we will have presented the phenomenon itself which schema names. The phenomenon thus exhibited will be named schema, though this identification is not as important as the phenomenon so named. Rendered in a more or less identical statement, if the unity of temporality and transcendence is a schema⁴¹ which is understood horizontally, then schema is that which must be understood to be horizontal in the unity of temporality and transcendence.

b) Existential-Phenomenological Development of the Problem: the inner unity of temporality and transcendence as existential concept of schematism

What is transcendence brought into the power of time? Formally indicated, it is a threefoldly temporalized non-intentional surpassing of beings as a totality. In the previous chapter, this threefold was shown to be the for-the-sake-of, the before-which and discursive bringing-into. Thus, ecstatic futurity is ecstatically towards the for-the-sake-of. This means; the ecstatic-horizontal futurity of transcendence is a kind of original self-concern. Similarly, ecstatic-horizontal having-been is characterised by a before-which. This means: in one way or another (thus in various ways) Dasein’s transcendence ‘has been’, i.e., it is always already ‘determinate.’ Finally, all this is possible only in connection with an enpresenting of the first two horizontal schemata in their unity. That is, there must be a discursive bringing-into which enpresents the transcending for-the-sake-of and before-which.

⁴¹ Where, in this particular case, ‘a schema’ (i.e. rather than ‘the schemata’) signifies the unity of the three schemata.
Because ecstatic temporality forms an essential unity, the horizontal schemata must also form an essential unity.\(^{42}\) Firstly, this is simply a consequence of the horizontal schemata’s relation back to the ecstatic unity of temporality.\(^{43}\) But, more importantly, because of their essential connection with primordial temporality (the unity of Dasein), the horizontal schemata may be exhibited as a unity in and of themselves.\(^{44}\) This unity was already alluded to in the previous chapter and may be exhibited as follows:

- The facticity which belongs to the existence of Dasein does so on the basis of the for-the-sake-of. But that means Dasein’s being-an-issue-for-itself is the existential ground of its being-determined. The for-the-sake-of lets Dasein be the being which is always already abandoned to thrownness, i.e., the for-the-sake-of lets Dasein be the being to which a before-which belongs. Dasein cannot be for-the-sake-of-itself without taking thrownness into its existence, but Dasein cannot exist without the for-the-sake-of. This presents the unitary character of the horizontal schemata of futurity and having-been: the for-the-sake-of is the ground of the before-which and the former necessarily gives itself a before-which.

- The for-the-sake-of gives itself a before-which but since this before-which is itself an issue, Dasein is rapt by it, and that means, Dasein enpresents. Futurity and having-been – for-the-sake-of and before-which – intrinsically form a *bringing-near*, that is, an enpresenting. To the extent that enpresenting arises only from the future which has-been, this enpresenting is necessarily discursive. This presents the unity of the threefold structure of horizontal schematism.

With the above, the horizontal schemata have now been shown to be a unity in themselves. Because the horizontal schemata are indeed unified in both of these ways Heidegger may then, as he often does, speak of the ‘unity of ecstatic-horizontal temporality.’\(^{45}\)

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\(^{42}\) SZ (S) 365  
\(^{43}\) SZ (S) 365  
\(^{44}\) Cf. SZ (S) 365, MFL 208  
\(^{45}\) E.g. SZ (S) 396, BP 274
The horizontal schemata can form a unity only because they essentially belong together with temporality. But the horizontality of temporality only ever becomes a philosophical issue for Heidegger in connection with the problem of transcendence. This needs to be explained (and will be explained in §4). If transcendence is the original formulation of the open as such, then ecstasy considered with respect to transcendence already bespeaks something like a ‘where.’ Accordingly, it would seem to be no accident that the Wohin of temporality becomes an issue in Being and Time at the precise moment when transcendence becomes an explicit question. This indicates – as does the entire preceding analysis – that if temporality is that which confers unity on the horizontal schemata, transcendence is that which confers the open. But this ‘conferring’ is only possible as an essential conferring to the extent that the horizontal schemata name the unity of temporality and transcendence.

Transcendence is the most primordial formulation of the open. But it is not a simple horizon in the sense of an inert blueprint or anything of that sort. Transcendence is the most primordial formulation of the open as the most primordial formulation of the way in which Dasein opens. Transcendence is the original structure of breaking open: transcendence is surpassing, this surpassing as opening is necessarily a breaking open in the sense of the original happening of Dasein. This surpassing does not occur ‘every now and then’ or just once but surpassing always pertains to the existence of Dasein and makes it the being which it is; surpassing belongs to the constancy of Dasein.

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46 Thus, cf. SZ (S) 364-366, BP 301-302, MFL 208-209. On the other hand, where neither of these problems are developed explicitly, and thus, where in general, another route of questioning is taken and worked out, the situation is more ambiguous but ultimately visible if only implicitly, e.g., PIK 251, 264ff. EP 218, KPM (T) 84,198 (where KPM (T) 198 is from the Heidegger-Cassirer disputation). Etc.

47 Cf. SZ (S, D) 364-366

48 Thus not ‘breaking open’ in the sense of exceeding a barrier. VWG (ER) 89-91, MFL 210, 217 & cf. SZ (S) 133 et infra., 351-352

49 VWG (ER) 38f. EP 218, MFL 180. As we will see in the second chapter of the Founded Analysis an intentional interpretation of the constancy of Dasein’s transcendence would be to interpret Dasein in terms of its un-self-constancy.
So now, in sum, the unity of temporality and transcendence means the unity of the Dasein’s unity (temporality) and its breaking open (transcendence). Since the horizontal schemata formulate Dasein’s transcendence on the basis of Dasein’s original unity, the horizontal schemata form the inner unity transcendence. Since the transcendence of Dasein thought explicitly from the essence of time must, by definition, give the most primordial formulation of breaking open, horizontal schematism is simply the most primordial problem of open in its being opened.

In the Basic Problems of Phenomenology Heidegger speaks of the horizontal schemata as giving a ‘schematic pre-designation’. At first this sounds like a merely inert horizon, but, this is only because the grammatical difference between ‘schematic’ and ‘schema’ is also, idiomatically, a semantic difference. Everything in the phenomenon speaks against the interpretation of the ‘schematic pre-designation’ as an inert horizon. After all, this ‘schematic pre-designation’ must be understood from the temporalizing of temporality (which is primarily futural) and from the breaking open of transcendence (thus, as the Vorzeichnung appropriate to world’s transcendence of all systems). Furthermore, the ‘pre-designation’ must be understood from the pregnant unity of temporality; the pre-designation cannot be an ‘original model’ because this would ignore the priority of futurity and inappropriately determine Dasein according to objective presence.

This schematic pre-designation must be understood in accordance with the unity of temporality. Temporality gives the unity of Dasein only to the extent that it unfolds into and constitutes Dasein’s existing as possibility. Thus, temporality does not:

...coincide with the simplicity and uniqueness of an ultimate structural element. The ontological origin of the being of Dasein is

50 BP (E/D) 306 / 435 : “schematische Vorzeichnung”
51 In both other instances where Heidegger uses schematisch in the BP (viz. BP (D) 435, 438) there is nothing in those contexts which vetos interpreting it as meaning ‘in outline’ rather than ‘in a pertinent relation to the schema’ (this thesis decides against the former on the basis of its own understanding of what is at work in these passages more generally). Cf. LQT (E/D) 324 / 392 that Heidegger has used schematisch in a way that is unambiguously semantically the same as schema and only syntactically different.
not “inferior” [thus not a highest abstraction qua common] to that which arises from it [i.e. Dasein’s possibilities and structures in general] but exceeds it in power from the beginning; any “arising” in the field of ontology is degeneration.\footnote{SZ (S/S) 334. Also, cf. BP 308 where the same principle is applied to the horizontal schematism of Temporalität and its schema, \textit{praesens}. Cf. also SZ (S) 351}

That is, temporality as unity means: original unfolding; the centre of temporalizing, and not some kind of inert ‘pure common’ or ‘highest abstraction.’ All genuine unity, and especially that of primordial temporality is, according to Heidegger, the heart of possibility, the heart of a making-possible.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, also cf. BP 308 (for historically oriented discussions of genuine unity cf. MFL 75, 77, 85 & §5c, & LQT 76-77)}

The horizontal schemata give the unity of transcendence and temporality. Because transcendence is the transcendence of Dasein, the unity of transcendence is necessarily given by temporality. In turn, transcendence in its unity with temporality is the pregnant unity of the open; the \textit{unity of breaking open}. We may formulate this result simply as follows;

- The horizontal schemata are the unity of openness as the original giving of openness,
- The horizontal schemata are the original giving of openness as the unity of openness.

It doesn’t matter which way we formulate it, because ultimately, only by bringing these two together is there an original interpretation. That is:

- Only if the unity of the open is determined as an ‘unfolding into…’ can we claim that a primordial interpretation of unity has been attained.
- Only if the open has been determined in its unity can we claim that a primordial interpretation of the open has been attained.
Both formulations belong together in an elemental way. Formulating and understanding this ‘belonging together’ is an essential task for the temporal interpretation of transcendence. But the temporal interpretation of transcendence is simply the horizional schematism of world!

Thus, schema, so far as it is relevant to the question here (i.e. so far as it is identical with the unity of transcendence and temporality) may be defined as follows: the unity of opening; the unity which unfolds the open; unity which lies at the centre of opening and does so as the inner power of its possibility. Thus: a horizonal schema is the horizonal unity of opening; the inner ‘power’ or making-possible pertaining to horizonal opening.

The phenomenon designated as the unity of temporality and transcendence must be horizonal because – qua first and foremost oriented towards a totality – transcendence is primarily horizonal.54 Taken together then, ‘horizonal schema’ means; an essential unity of original opening to which horizonalitity intrinsically belongs, i.e., the unity of transcendence and temporality!

This interpretation is an existential interpretation, it simply follows the basic structure of the existential question and elucidates it. It has no need for a ‘Kant ex machina’ to save the day because it simply dedicates itself to the structure in question and pushes deeper into it. Nonetheless, it may be reflected off of Heidegger’s exhibition of Kant’s schematism in order to show that the above account is not historically arbitrary. In Kant, schematism primarily means sensibilisation qua the primordial centre of possibility for ontological knowledge (the binding of pure sensibility and understanding).55 Thus, for instance, the schematism grounds the possibility of the categories, and Heidegger is at pains in the Kantbuch to interpret

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54 Cf. MFL §§10, 12; horizon as identical with ecstemata: ecstemata as another name for horizon (ecstema is to ecstasis as noema is to noesis): this conversion is horizonal because ecstasy is always already ‘strewn.’ With respect to the guiding definition of horizon from the Third Stage the following qualification must be made. In SZ (S/S) 365 Heidegger uses horizon, schema and horizonal schema interchangeably. This is the sense of horizon given primacy in the Third Stage §3a. Here however, the sense in which transcendence is horizonal qua the existentiell of world is given primacy. That the latter may be called horizon in the existentiell sense indicates that the former may be called horizon in the existential sense. This existential sense is first freed as possible only in connection with the existentiell sense (and must be preserved in the face of any intentional readings).
55 LQT 294, 296ff., 306 et passim, PIK 291, KPM (T) §19 et seq. et passim
schematism in connection with the ‘common root of the two stems.’ The two stems are after all sensibility and understanding. The common root is imagination; the faculty of schematism. Thus schematism as sensibilisation is the inner unity of the faculties qua the pure possibility of opening.

Of course, this brief reflection on Kant is not an adequate historical justification for the above interpretation of the schema-character of the horizontal schemata. But the fact is that no matter how hard one looks in Kant one will never find an existential concept of schema; it is like a search for a needle in a haystack where the haystack doesn’t have a needle in it. As much as Kant is a fruitful site for Heidegger’s re-petition, and as much as Heidegger rightly sees Kant as a kind of ‘philosophical friend’, Kant is not Heidegger and nor, for that matter, is Heidegger Kant.

The *Kantbuch* is a “questionable digression” and a “supplement” to SZ II.1. It is neither the continuation of *Being and Time* nor a replacement for that continuation. It is more philological than SZ II.1 would have been, but, is not a philological text; it is an *Auseinandersetzung.* Its task is to develop Kant as a fundamental ontology, but not to develop Kant’s work as fundamental ontology. Moreover, like the SZ II.1 the *Kantbuch* is

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56 KPM (T) *passim* esp. §35. For some clarification of these points, cf. EP 271-272
57 KPM *passim*, CPR *passim* esp. CPR (A/B) 15 / 29
58 EP 271f., KPM (T) 91ff., LQT 306ff
59 One might here also note that time is the central determiner in both Heidegger’s and Kant’s schematism (and especially, of course in ‘Heidegger’s Kant’). This is not mentioned above only because the productive employment of analogies is not the business of this analysis.
60 An attempted historical justification would need a more concrete and extended analysis of Kant. However, the reader might also refer to Part I, §3b herein: there it was shown that Schelling’s schematism of world-view means the ownmost finite unity of world-openedness and world-opening. The connection between schematism and unity is even stronger in Schelling’s *System of Transcendental Idealism*. There, schematism means the self-differentiating unity of the transcendental *Intelligenz*. Moreover, the connection established in Part I §3b between Schelling’s schematism of world-view and Heidegger’s interpretation of Leibniz in MFL is not insignificant. In themselves, these facts already indicate that limiting the historical problem about schematism in Heidegger to schematism in Kant is overhasty, and may well be a ‘rigour’ which leads astray. On the other hand, a complete appraisal of the problem would also need to consider Heidegger’s relation with Scheler and Neo-Kantianism as per Dahlstrom (1996).
61 KPM (T) xviii
62 KPM (T) xix
64 KPM (T) xix, 175
65 KPM (T/D) 1 / 1
bound decisively to the ontological level: properly speaking it is temporale rather than

temporal. Thus when the *Kantbuch* speaks of ‘transcendence’ this does indeed primarily

mean surpassing towards being, or the understanding of being formulated as this surpassing.

But just because the *Kantbuch* uses the word ‘transcendence’ repeatedly does not mean that it

is speaking about the kind of transcendence we are discussing here. In fact, it only means that

the kind of ‘transcendence’ which belongs together with Kant’s transcendental, is nothing

other than a breaking beyond (transcending) the empirical (the ontic) into the ontological (the

transcendental). Here, the sense in which Kant develops *transcendental* philosophy as a

fundamental ontology consists in the analysis of the phenomenon of this kind of transcending.

The sense in which the *Kantbuch* is ‘exceptional’ is visible in its use of the word

‘transcendence.’ By way of comparison, transcendence takes on a completely different

meaning and function in the *Kantbuch* to that which it had in the *Phenomenological

Interpretations of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason*. Just as we do not attempt to read SZ §31

‘Dasein as Understanding’ on the basis of ‘understanding’ in Kant (though, for instance both

bear a certain ‘spontaneity’) we should not attempt to define ‘transcendence’ in SZ §69 on the

basis of the place Heidegger gives this word in Kant. In this sense the key to the integration

of the *Kantbuch* into Heidegger’s project is not to be found by seeking words which are used

in common between it and other works from the same time (neither transcendence nor

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66 KPM *passim*. The above does not mean to imply that Temporalität is explicitly thematic in KPM (in fact it isn’t mentioned by name at all); since KPM discuss temporality bound wholly to the ontological problem, Temporalität is the form of its problem, cf. SZ (S/S) 39f.

67 More precisely the ground of pure knowledge (which, as pure, is ontological). KPM (T) 10f., 30, 54 etc.

68 Ibid. *et passim*.

69 KPM (T) *passim* esp. pp 1, 10f. Here it is worthy of note that ‘transcendental philosophy’ is yoked in Kant’s first critique to the ontology of nature, either as *cosmologia rationalis* or *metaphysica specialis* as a whole (LQT 224, SZ (S) 10f; PIK 224ff., GMM 4:387ff., 4:427, CPR (A/B) 840 / 868 etc.). This is not something even Kant wanted to rest with (*Ibid.*), thus the distinction between theoretical and practical philosophy. On the whole, with respect to Heidegger’s appropriation of CPR, CPR’s attachment to ‘nature’ constitutes in itself an unbreachable ‘gap’ between Kant and Heidegger which an interpretation thereof should respect and dwell on. Of course it is also true that in KPM 109f. Heidegger wants to do away with the theoretical-practical distinction but what this means cannot be formulated with a wave of the hand.

70 Cf. KPM *passim* e.g. 10f. vs. PIK 213f., 216, 226, 258f. And here, whereas PIK is consonant with SZ, BP, MFL, EP, VWG and WM, it is simply the case that KPM is not (with the exception of KPM §43 which however, already speaks from a place further into the problem than this thesis has pressed).
schematism etc.).\textsuperscript{71} This key lies elsewhere and it is to be found only with greater pain and above all with greater care.

\section*{§2 – FOUNDED OF THE EXISTENTIELL PROBLEM OF WORLD-TRANSCENDENCE}

Transcendence is a question of world: why this is so, and how it is so belongs to the founding meaning of transcendence. However, to explain why it is so without first preparing the essential meaning of transcendence can, of course, only lead to ungrounded interpretation of the connection. It is precisely because of the importance of this connection that the fundamental delimitation of the relation between transcendence and world had to be delayed until this point. Conversely, in a certain sense, it is indefinitely delayed in Heidegger so that, while it is constantly indicated and constantly pressed into, it never becomes entirely transparent. Thus, for instance, as we saw in Part I, a history of world is more or less inserted into the \textit{Vom Wesen des Grundes} as a substitute for the radical exhibition of the problem.\textsuperscript{72}

In this chapter everything is essential, and this section most of all. What allows it to be essential is the preparation given by the whole preceding analysis. Thus, in this first concrete formulation of the transcendental meaning of world, it is appropriate to begin by recapitulating the results of the previous analysis. Through this – and its further development – the central phenomenon of transcendence is concretely won.

On the one hand, transcendence means surpassing beings as a whole in such a way that it means surpassing towards world. On the other, in Heidegger’s history of the problem of world-transcendence – which attests the non-arbitrariness of his interpretation of world from transcendence – world (viz. $\kappa\delta\sigma\mu\omicron\varsigma$, \textit{mundus}, \textit{Welt}) means the ‘how’ of the totality of beings,

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\textsuperscript{71} Cf. also KPM (T) 175: \textit{geschichtlich} vs. \textit{historisch} interpretation.
\textsuperscript{72} VWG §2. This approach is mirrored in MFL §§11a-b & EP. On the other hand, BP §§9b, 15c, 20-21 and SZ remain at a somewhat nascent stage with respect to the transcendental problem of world (but whereas BP wanders, SZ is more direct and rigid).
\end{flushright}
especially so far as this ‘how’ refers back in some essential way to Dasein.\textsuperscript{73} Finally, in \textit{Being and Time} the \textit{existentiell} (thus not categorial) concept of world is “that “in which” a factual Da-sein “lives”.”\textsuperscript{74} Taken together, these form the basic presuppositions for the question about the existentiell problem of the world given by transcendence.

Working through these basic phenomena again we find: transcendence transcends beings one and all: it does this as the original openedness of beings and being: world is that in which Dasein lives: that onto which Dasein transcends is the world, to this extent, transcendence is the happening of world. Finally, as we have seen throughout, world, as the open of being-in \textit{exists}, i.e., it has the same kind of being as Dasein.\textsuperscript{75}

But if world is simply that in which Dasein lives, \textit{and} if this world is identical to existence qua surpassing beings (i.e. qua transcendence), then this means that \textit{that in which Dasein most primordially lives is transcendence itself (existence qua transcendence)}.\textsuperscript{76} Mark this well, it is of the greatest importance for the analysis, indeed, it is the basic statement of the phenomenon of transcendence. That the above inference is not a mere triviality will be demonstrated in what follows. This inference simply says that the upon-which of Dasein’s transcendence is the \textit{existence} of world and then means it.\textsuperscript{77} Rendered differently, it simply says that, as transcendence, “Existing, Dasein \textit{is} its world.”\textsuperscript{78} Or finally, the above position simply \textit{accepts} (i.e. lets itself be determined by) the consequences of the fact that the having-been of transcending \textit{belongs} to transcendence but \textit{cannot} be reduced to the beings surpassed in transcendence.\textsuperscript{79}

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{73} VWG (ER) 49, 81-83.
  \item \textsuperscript{74} SZ (S) 65
  \item \textsuperscript{75} Cf. SZ (S/S) 64-65, 364-365, BP 299 etc.
  \item \textsuperscript{76} That this identification of world with transcendence is not the same as identifying it with ‘the transcended’ is a central difficulty with the formulation of the problem. That it cannot be identified with ‘the transcended’ was already indicated by the formal indications discussed in the First Stage of the Founding Analysis §2 (if Dasein specifically \textit{doesn’t} surpass towards beings but \textit{instead} surpasses towards world then, properly speaking, the world disclosed by transcendence is \textit{a fortiori} not the beings surpassed in transcendence).
  \item \textsuperscript{77} Cf. VWG (D) 139f. etc.
  \item \textsuperscript{78} SZ (S) 364
  \item \textsuperscript{79} Cf. First Stage of the Founding Analysis §2, Third Stage of the Founding Analysis §3b etc.
\end{itemize}
Transcendence itself is world (though of course, transcendence understood in the significance which has been painstakingly adduced for this word throughout the Founding Analysis and none other than this). More precisely, transcendence qua phenomenon is world. Dasein is transcendence. Dasein is being-in-the-world. The primordial simplicity and closeness is sole difficulty here. Malpas, for instance, whilst grasping something of this simplicity is led astray precisely when he attempts to unpack it, since precisely put, in doing so he immediately destroys it.80 Thus, the task here is to unpack the above formal indications whilst preserving them in the inner unity.

If Dasein transcends – and here that is the same as if one were to say ‘if Dasein is’ – then it surpasses a totality of beings. This does not mean anything like ‘Dasein surpasses the universe.’81 Instead it simply indicates that Dasein surpasses into a kind of factical horizon.82 This factical horizon is not subsequent to the surpassing, but rather, surpassing is itself the happening of a factical horizon; the surpassing is horizon.83 The whole analysis of intentionality and transcendence shows that this is a pure horizon in the sense that it is wholly lacking in any intentional character (though, here, in contrast to the Kantian use of ‘pure’ it is nonetheless ‘empirical’, i.e. factical/historical).84 This pure horizon (world) is ontologically prior to any kind of intentionality, and accordingly, Dasein has this pure horizon regardless of how things stand with its intentionality and comportment.

Yet, nonetheless, as an existentiell world is factical.85 That is, the pure horizon is factical because the surpassing is factical. In the constancy of this surpassing, transcendence in each case surpasses this totality of beings (but not ‘consciously’, or even ‘quasi-consciously’, i.e.

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81 Thus, VWG (ER/EG) 82-83, 100 / 120-121
82 Cf. Ibid.
83 For surpassing as horizon cf. above etc. The above reading however is partly an innovation of this thesis (i.e. it, at least partially reads ‘beyond Heidegger’), but it is also something which is already broadly indicated in Heidegger’s explicit discussion of the topic, cf. MFL 208-210 vs. passim, SZ (S/S) 365, VWG (ER/EG) 36-37, 39-40 / 122-123. Finally, on the basis of §4 of this chapter, Heidegger in Kisiel (2005[2001]) 211
84 For the Kantian concept (viz., the pure as that which is wholly unmixed with anything empirical) cf. CPR (A/B) 11 / 3
85 But not for this reason the same as facticity in general, cf. SZ (S/S) 65, 364 etc.
the surpassing of this totality ‘proceeds’ non-intentionally). Surpassing beings as a whole is always finite. This finitude includes a certain ‘indefiniteness’ which we can mark by noting the radical difference between transcendence and intuition (where intuition is purified intentionality which achieves the ‘bodily presence’ of its intentum). This is also visible from the fact that guilt structures all projection – because that means; guilt structures world-projection even when world is understood with the utmost radicality (which we are here working towards).

Yet as finite, Dasein’s transcendence is never wholly indeterminate. In some way this totality is determinate. This ‘way’ is a central difficulty with transcendence. For instance, the primordial transcendence of Dasein can be characterised by ‘the everyday grind’ or else by ‘the wonder of nature and having a holiday’-ness. At first this simply means that transcendence is characterised by attunement; anxiety, fear, joy, boredom and so on. Secondly however, transcendence, in surpassing beings is equiprimordially “disposed and governed” by beings qua ‘in the midst’ (inmitten) of them.

Thus, in a certain sense transcendence is ‘mastered’ by its facticity. And it is in this sense that we can understand the appropriateness of Dastur’s statement that Dasein’s:

“projection of Being” is not caused by the spontaneity of a transcendental subject but, on the contrary, by the facticity of Dasein, which is not a subject precisely because it is not the author of its own transcendence, but rather always already finds itself thrown into it.

This being said, so far as transcendence never comes fully to light in that text it is unclear how Dastur can live up to full power of this pronouncement. In this thesis – through the

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86 Cf. First and Second Stages of the Founding Analysis
87 On phenomenological intuition and ‘bodily presence’ cf. LQT 84ff.
88 Cf. VWG (ER) 88f., 110ff., SZ (S) 284f., BP 300f., 307f.
89 VWG (ER) 81-83 et infra., SZ (S/S) 365
90 Ibid. & VWG (ER) 106-109: “das es übersteigt, auch schon gestimmt durchwaltet ist” Moreover, if transcendence does indeed mean world then the problem of the worldliness of the world-historical also points towards the same problem cf. SZ (S/S) 378ff., 389, and §§1-2 of Ch. 3 of the Founded Analysis etc.
91 Dastur (1999[1990]) 54 (modified, cf. Raffoul & Pettigrew in Ibid. 76)
analysis of this chapter and those following it – it should be possible to make the real truth of this statement concretely intelligible for the first time.

Transcendence is ‘mastered’ by its facticity. This presents in outline the necessity that transcendence is in each case ‘determinate’: that ‘in which Dasein lives’ is transcendence, this transcendence is primordially determined by that which it transcends. But then, it is attested that transcendence is by no means ‘super-heavenly,’ instead, it is precisely the opposite; it is (pre-intentional, entirely inexplicit) original facticity.\(^{92}\) Transcendence gives the pre-intentional world which is always already concrete and rooted in the facticity of the situation.\(^{93}\) Transcendence ‘gives’ this world in the sense that it is world’s original happening. Thus, as Kisiel puts it: “It’s worlding, it’s giving, it’s temporalizing itself: these are the impersonals of sheer facticity” which, in connection with temporality means “primal history pure and simple” – where transcendence is always temporal, and temporality always transcends.\(^{94}\)

But of course, transcendence cannot be mastered in this way without an original letting-itself-be-mastered. Without this original ‘allowance’, which is called the ‘self-mastery’ of transcendence, there would be no facticity because facticity is grounded in Dasein’s for-the-sake-of; its being-an-issue-for-itself; its futurity.\(^{95}\) The original possibility that what is

\(^{92}\) VWG (ER) 83-85, 93-95: The Platonic problem of transcendence wavers on this: understood from anamnesis the forms are ‘the most subjective’ but on the other hand, as the most fundamental and eternal forms of what is, they are the most objective and belong to a ‘super-heavenly place’ (ὑπερ-ουράνιος τόπος: hyphen added)

\(^{93}\) Cf. e.g. VWG (ER) 83-85, 107-109

\(^{94}\) Kisiel (2005[2001]) 199-201 (all quotations from p 200). Here a certain ambiguity is sustained within the word ‘facticity’. Kisiel overcomes this by describing this kind of facticity as ‘sheer.’ Heidegger uses facticity to refer to the ‘kind of fact which one can ascribe to the existence of Dasein’ and the having-been of Dasein SZ (S/S) 55f., 179, 192. But he also uses it in opposition to transcendence, namely, because factual Dasein always already comports, i.e., because, whilst comportment/intentionality is grounded in transcendence Dasein is never without comportment etc. cf. SZ (S/S) 364, MFL 136f., 180, BP 318f. etc. Yet, factual Dasein in this sense is always already constituted by the transcendence of the world and this transcendence is not super-heavenly. Thus, properly speaking, if we refer to ‘factual Dasein’ this signifies the conjunction of factual transcendence and factual comportment. Accordingly, because both are constitutive of facticity proper one can also make factual transcendence a topic and speak of the facticity of transcendence (thus, EP 367).

\(^{95}\) Technically, it would not even be facticity, cf. VWG (ER) 89, 92-97. Here, ‘self-mastery’ refers to ‘der Mächtigkeit seiner selbst’ (p 94) Heidegger uses this in connection with Plato’s ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἔξωτος to explain the for-the-sake-of pertaining to transcendence. It should also be noted at this point – without making too much of a fuss about it – the above has just worked through the having-been-ness of transcendence and now grounds this in
factually transcended ‘matters’ in any way whatsoever is precisely this ‘being an issue.’ To ‘surpass a totality’ would mean nothing of any consequence if it were not bound by the for-the-sake-of. That is, the transcendental for-the-sake-of constitutes the surpassing of transcendence as something which ‘concerns’ Dasein in its being.

As we saw in the last chapter, this ‘being an issue’ is not primarily (i.e. not in the most primordial way) projected onto intentional concerns. Rather, we must understand the for-the-sake-of to be concerned with transcendence itself. The self-concern of transcendence is a self-concern which is simple, non-intentional and completely inexplicit. This being-concerned-about lets transcendence happen as world, and, for this reason, in *Vom Wesen des Grundes* Heidegger calls world ‘the totality of the for-the-sake-of.’ If this being-an-issue did not belong to transcendence then transcendence would have nothing to do with world; because it would have nothing to do with anything! The being an issue constitutive of transcendence is precisely its original having-to-do-with. Accordingly, the ‘for-the-sake-of’ is precisely that which originally lets transcendence be determined (not only by what is transcended but in general). And thus, it is from the for-the-sake-of that transcendence is in each case inextricably swept up by the ‘already-world’ (cf. the care structure), namely, by what was just discussed under the topic of transcendence’s being mastered by its facticity. Similarly, the world is the first condition of possibility that Dasein can be forced – against its will or even without its knowledge – to submit to the kind of thrownness which determines comportmental existence. As Dasein’s original letting-itself-be-mastered, the

\[\text{its future. Above, the having-been of transcendence was worked through first because the problem of the facticity of transcendence is harder not because it is more essential to transcendence’s unified structure.}\]

\[\text{96 Third Stage of the Founding Analysis §3a}\]

\[\text{97 VWG (ER) 100 etc.}\]

\[\text{98 Cf. previous chapter, also see the next chapter & VWG (ER) 100ff. for clarification on the power of the for-the-sake-of. With respect to the problem of the difference between transcendence itself and the transcended: if transcendence is a phenomenon in itself and transcendence is not a being, whereas that which transcendence transcends is beings as a whole, then above distinction must be both possible and necessary. The difference is an essential difficulty. The distinction will be constantly operative (and thereby worked out more concretely) in the whole of the Founded Analysis.}\]

\[\text{99 Because of the priority of world over intentionality. Cf. Second Stage of the Founding Analysis, SZ (S/S) 365f. etc.}\]
Final Stage: the Unity of Transcendence

transcendental for-the-sake-of is the condition of possibility for the factual powerlessness of Dasein and by no means speaks against the latter (quite the opposite).\textsuperscript{100}

Transcendence is always an issue for itself. This transcendence as transcending of beings is already determined. World happens, this means that there can be a ‘subsequent’\textsuperscript{101} intentional concern; but world itself is the original heart of the happening.\textsuperscript{102} In transcendence which is determined beforehand and originally gives itself the possibility of being determined (from the for-the-sake-of), in all this, the world has its moment. That is, in the unity of transcendence for-the-sake-of itself which has been determined beforehand there lies the inner possibility and happening of something like an immersedness in the (transcendent) world itself.

Heidegger says; transcendence surpasses beings as a totality, that onto-which (\textit{woraufhin}) it surpasses is called the world and precisely not beings. These formal indications have to be understood as an inner unity; world happens in the transcendence itself, in the surpassing itself, and not ‘at the end of a process’. World is not the \textit{intentum} of transcending. Transcendence is not an ‘act’ – it is not the ‘production line’ of world (in go the materials, out goes the world). This latter formulation would violate the central indications for the meaning of transcendence. But taken as a whole the above now means; \textit{transcendence transcends onto itself}; world is not the object of transcending (after all world is not an object), rather, the upon-which of the transcending (viz. world) is self-identical to the transcending itself; the upon-which of transcendence is transcendence.\textsuperscript{103} Transcendence is itself the \textit{existence of}

\textsuperscript{100} For an elaboration on this point cf. Ch. 1 of the Founded Analysis.
\textsuperscript{101} Not really subsequent; MFL 195, but ontologically ‘subsequent’; SZ (S/S) 365-366. Cf. Ch. 2 & Ch. 3 of the Founded Analysis.
\textsuperscript{102} Heidegger never explicitly formulates the problem of the connection between historicity and transcendence (indeed he doesn’t explicitly formulate the problem of historicity at all in the late 20s after SZ I.2.v). But Heidegger does, and indeed, \textit{must} link historicity and transcendence cf. SZ (S) 388f., VWG (ER) 34-37, 46-47, 88-91, 102-105, 118-119, 128-129, MFL (E/D) 194-195 / 250-252, compare this to MFL 208-212. This problem becomes thematic in Ch. 2 & 3 of the Founded Analysis.
\textsuperscript{103} By analogy cf. Heidegger in Kisiel (2005[2001]) 211. Through §4 this will cease to be an analogy. For world as the upon-which of transcendence cf. VWG (ER) 40-41
world.\textsuperscript{104} It is not the ‘cause’ of the world, but the primordial phenomenon of world. This is simply necessary if transcendence is the primordial \textit{constancy and happening} of world as such – and it is \textit{precisely} this!\textsuperscript{105} Transcendence is the happening of world not subsequently and not beforehand, but simply and primordially.

The happening of transcendence in its \textit{complete} structure (surpassing beings as a totality in being for-the-sake-of, as being before and being immersed) is the happening of world. The transcendence of the world is not to be identified with the totality of the facts ‘on the ground’ nor with some super-heavenly structure.\textsuperscript{106} World is the happening of transcendence, and this, \textit{precisely put} is identical to the inner meaning of the happening of Dasein.\textsuperscript{107} Transcendence is the primordial unity of world, being-in and being-in-the-world. Only for this reason can the transcendence of the world give the unity of world and the unity of Dasein with its world.\textsuperscript{108}

\begin{quote}
\textit{As} transcendence, being-in-the-world \textit{is} world, that is, as transcendence “Dasein \textit{is} its world.”\textsuperscript{109} The only legitimate sense in which being-in-the-world may be distinguished from world is the sense in which the former is a being and latter is not (this is the sense guiding the division of SZ I.1.iii and SZ I.1.iv).\textsuperscript{110} But with this a very radical situation is upon us which will be decisive in the second chapter of the Founded Analysis. For the moment an outline for the formulation of the problem of selfhood must suffice: transcendence is the origin of selfhood (the sense in which Dasein is a being) but transcendence is not the same as selfhood. Transcendence belongs to the ‘being of the the there’, but ‘Dasein’ names both the ‘being of the there’ and the being which is its there.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{104} I.e. this is the primordial sense in which world ‘exists’ – in which world has ‘the same kind of being as Dasein’ and the sense in which, as transcendence, Dasein ‘exists in a unity with its world’ etc. cf. SZ §69c
\textsuperscript{105} Cf. e.g. VWG (ER) 39-40
\textsuperscript{106} Viz. the ambiguity in the Platonic \textit{ἐπέκεινα}, cf. VWG (ER) 95-97
\textsuperscript{107} Cf. MFL \textit{passim}, VWG \textit{passim}, cf. also SZ (S/S) 388, for justification of the latter cf. §1, Ch. 3, Founded Analysis
\textsuperscript{108} Cf. §2 the Third Stage of the Founding Analysis etc.
\textsuperscript{109} SZ (S) 364
\textsuperscript{110} Cf. the Postscript to the Founding Analysis and Ch. 2 of the Founded Analysis for further elaboration of this problem.
Here, in the identity which has now been developed between world and transcendence, this thesis has answered in the only way that is both adequate and essential (and the answer must be essential), how “world in its unity with Dasein is possible” in such a way that “Dasein is its world” and world exists, that is, in such a way that world has the same mode of being of Dasein. Similarly, only now can we begin to understand the meaning of these words which Heidegger places in the early stages of *Being and Time* (which are thus words which must be returned to).

The compound expression “being-in-the-world” indicates, in the way we have coined it, that it stands for a *unified* phenomenon. This primary datum must be seen as a whole. But while it may not be broken up into components that may be pieced together, this does not prevent it from having a multiplicity of constitutive structural factors.

Not every problem is solved. Nonetheless, only now does the following start to become visible: the inner necessity that being-in-the-world, articulated according to its threefold structure, is nonetheless a “unified phenomenon.” Along with this, the essential indications for world-transcendence have been concretely demonstrated and unfolded. However, the analysis is not complete. We must still grasp the connection of transcendence with the existential-ontological problem of world and thereby more essentially develop and determine what has just been set forth. Conversely, the problem of selfhood does not belong here; it belongs to the Founded Analysis.

§3 – **FOUNDED OF THE EXISTENTIAL PROBLEM OF WORLD-TRANSCENDENCE (AND ITS CONNECTION WITH THE EXISTENTIELL PROBLEM OF THE SAME)**

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111 SZ (S) 364
112 SZ (S) 364
114 Cf. MFL 167f.
115 SZ (S/S) 53, on this statement cf. Part I, §1bα
a) The Problem of Worldliness and the Transcendence of the World

For Heidegger worldliness is an “ontological and existential concept.” Thus, since the word ‘worldliness’ must designate something like ‘that which has the character of being worldly’, this means that the problem of the ‘worldliness of the world’ is the problem of the being of the world as world or the being of the worldly as worldly. Heidegger more completely defines this phenomenon as follows: “worldliness itself can be modified into the respective structural totality of particular ‘worlds,’ but contains in itself the a priori of worldliness.”

Heidegger’s above definition of worldliness contains two aspects. Firstly, worldliness is that which is “modifiable” with respect to ‘particular worlds’ and secondly, worldliness is the “a priori” of world. With respect to the first part I think that it is fairly clear that while Heidegger puts “worlds” in quotation marks this is not because it means ‘various ontical-thing-totalities.’ Here there are two instructive points to consider. Firstly, this sentence stands before Heidegger has terminologically fixed “world” (i.e. world in quotations marks). Secondly, this is the only instance of the plural of world in Being and Time and Heidegger does not use the plural elsewhere during the late 20s (but he does speak of the modifiability of world).

“World”, so far as it matters for fundamental ontology is grounded in world. World is not a being, yet, as an existentiel of Dasein, it is modifiable. The plural of world is hermeneutically problematic because it tends to imply that world is a being, and thereby tends

116 SZ (S/S) 65
117 And according to SZ (S/S) 65; “terminologically “worldly” means a kind of being of Dasein, never a kind of being of something objectively present “in” the world. We shall call the latter… innerworldly.” Ibid.
118 SZ (S/S) 65, SZ (D) 65: “Die Weltlichkeit selbst ist modifikabel zu dem jeweiligen Strukturganzen besonderer »Welten«, beschließt aber in sich das Apriori von Weltlichkeit überhaupt”
119 HCT passim, SZ passim, BP passim etc. offer no simple exegetical solution.
120 Cf. Ibid.
121 Except for manifestly irrelevant counter-examples such as MFL (E/D) 49 / 61 (viz. that Leibniz speaks of ‘this world’ as the ‘best of all possible worlds’)
122 Cf. Part I, §§1βα, 2, First Stage of the Founding Analysis §2, Third Stage of the Founding Analysis §§1-2 herein
to inappropriately indicate that there are many of these “world-beings” and that we may ‘line them up’ and worry about their mediation. That is, firstly, any use of the plural of world must be placed in quotation marks because of its problematic character, secondly, world is indeed modifiable, and thirdly, world is more primordial than “world.” From this it follows that the modifiability of world is joined to worldliness more primordially than “world” is.

Thus, it must instead be that the happening of worldliness is the happening of world and that worldliness is modifiable with respect to world. Worldliness however is also the ‘a priori’ of world. That is, worldliness is that which makes world worldly. Accordingly, Heidegger also calls worldliness the *structure* of world. This last designation (worldliness as structure of world) stands between the previous determinations in such a way that it says both, but says neither distinctly.

In sum, worldliness is the inner possibility of world. As the *inner* possibility of world, it both makes world possible and belongs to the inner meaning of world. In this sense, worldliness belongs to the worlding of the world (which already means nothing less than the happening of transcendence) and shows itself differently in the different ways that world worlds.

In *the Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, referring us to “*Being and Time*, p. 64f.” – where the terminology of world was laid out in *Being and Time* – Heidegger again presents four concepts of world. Firstly, we have “world” as a categorial-ontical concept, then as a categorial-ontological concept (e.g. the world of such and such a science, i.e., its ‘object-domain’). Then there is world in the existentiell sense. Here, having just taken his basis from the history of world described in Part I §3a of this thesis, Heidegger lets the existentiell

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123 SZ (S/S) 65
124 SZ (S) 86
125 MFL (E/D) 180 / 231f.
concept of world be determined according to Kant’s practical concept of world. But now, in place of the familiar problem of “worldliness” Heidegger says:

Anticipating, we can name the fourth [concept of world] the ontological concept of world that indicates, not human society in an ontical way, but indicates ontologically the metaphysical essence of Dasein as such with respect to its basic metaphysical constitution, i.e., transcendence.

With this, the problem about the basic constitution of transcendence – and indeed of Dasein itself – has become the question about worldliness. The preliminary question of the surrounding world and of its worldliness (Umweltlichkeit) has been superseded into its ground, that is, into the temporal-transcendental problem of worldliness. It is towards this problem of worldliness that this thesis has been working.

In SZ I.1.iii worldliness is understood from the surrounding world. We should not hold up the result of §18 (Relevance and Significance) as if it were the end of any possible questions about worldliness. Rather, it is just the beginning. Heidegger tells us it is just the beginning. As the pre-temporal problem it is just the beginning from principle. As something discussed early on in movement of Being and Time it is just the beginning.

The question of worldliness is a question about the world-character of the world, that is, of how the world is worldly. Alternatively, there is the question about innerworldliness; the question about the essential relation of discovered beings, as discovered, to world. The latter, Heidegger already indicates in Being and Time can only be understood on the basis of the former. But the task this thesis has now arrived at is the primordial question of worldliness, that is, the question about the ontological structure of the transcendence of the world: the worldliness of world-transcendence.

128 MFL §11b, esp. pp 178ff., cf. also Part I, §3a herein.
129 MFL 180
130 VWG (ER) 81 infra, MFL 167 etc.
131 Cf. SZ (S/S) 65 et infra.
132 SZ (S/S, D) 365f., 389
b) Worldliness Understood from the Transcendence of the World

Transcendence is the original situatedness of Dasein and the original situatedness of Dasein is transcendence. Transcendence is the central giving of the open. Transcendence without the open – without this open, i.e. the open as jemeinig and jeweilig – is basically a contradiction in terms.

Transcendence first means ‘surpassing beings as a totality’; we can divide this formal indication into two. Firstly, there is the formal indication of ‘surpassing beings’, secondly there is the formal indication for ‘beings as a totality.’ The ‘beings as a totality’ which pertain to transcendence can only ever be formally indicated because the openness of the totality is always factual. In the question of transcendence there is no ‘ideal’ concept of the totality which is surpassed. The general concept therefore, is the formal indication for the facticity and particularity of that which transcendence surpasses (as a totality). The totality first ‘happens’ for Dasein in the surpassing and the surpassing first happens in the totality. That is, the formal indication concerns transcendence in its essential Jeweiligkeit, in its particular happening. But this means that not only is there not an ideal totality but there is not even an ideal ‘container’ for the totality. There is only the factically existing surpassing itself in its various ways of happening. This merely repeats the result of the previous section in a new way – and to that extent, confirms it. In accordance with the present problem however, this

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133 Cf. VWG (ER) 110-111
134 This follows from the whole proceeding analysis. However, also cf. VWG (ER) 88-89, 103. On Jeweiligkeit cf. Kiesiel (1985) 193f., 208, 210ff.: it is one of the central formal indications for Dasein between 1924 and 1925, later giving way to Jemeinigkeit. Usually, jeweilig simply indicates particularity, but in this context, as Kiesiel notes, qua je-weil[en]-ig (each-while-ish) it specifically means ‘temporal particularity.’ Jemeinigkeit – the character of being in each case mine – replaces Jeweiligkeit as a central formal indication for Dasein after HCT. What Kiesiel does not mention here however, is that Jeweiligkeit is a formal indication for transcendence. Thus; “The world gives itself to Dasein as the jeweilige totality of its for-the-sake-of.” VWG (ER) 100. “Recovery and disposition [Bergung und Haltung] are two fundamental modes of world-view, that is, being-in-the-world, the jeweiligen facticity of transcendence.” EP 367 etc.
135 Thus not a mere ‘aggregate’ etc. cf. VWG (ER/EG) 38-39 / 109, 122f.
136 Cf. also Third Stage of the Founding Analysis §3
shows that the worldliness of the transcendence of the world includes a special connection with facticity; it is a structure of factual existence in the double genitive.

Now this might seem to stand in the way of the existential problem of the transcendence of the world. But this is only the case so long as, under the problem of worldliness, we want to know ‘what the world really always is.’ But the world never ‘really is’ at all because it is nothing like a realitas: it is not a being or a ‘what’. Confronting this misinterpretation has been a theme throughout the analysis (for instance, in confronting the identification of world with the totality of beings themselves, the totality of innerworldly references and so on). This misinterpretation of world is the problem of SZ §43, ‘Dasein, Worldliness and Reality,’ for which reason Heidegger refers to that section as one of the central stages in Being and Time’s elaboration of transcendence.137 Conversely, it is in reference to Scheler’s interpretation of this section that Heidegger determines that Scheler has not grasped the problem of fundamental ontological transcendence.138 The world is neither an implicit nor an explicit object, nor is it a substance, a persisting thing or thing-complex, nor is it an ideal.139 In fact, the world is none of these things precisely because it is an existential problem of transcendence.

Transcendence is the transcendence of Dasein. Dasein is temporality. Thus, the transcendence of Dasein always has an inner temporal unity. This unity is given in the horizontal schemata of temporality. The essential guideline and possibility for each of these is the unity of transcendence and temporality, accordingly, each horizontal schema is precisely an expression of this unity. These horizontal schemata, which were discussed at length in the previous chapter, are the for-the-sake-of, the before-which and the discursive bringing-into of enpresenting. Rendered in plainer language: being an issue for oneself as being determined is being immersed. It has been shown that the horizontal schemata belong to the innermost

137 MFL (E/D) 167-168 / 214
139 On the non-objectness of world cf. VWG (ER) 87-89
structure of the transcendence of the world and thus, *a fortiori*, to the worldliness of transcendence.

One thing that became decisively clear in §2 was that transcendence, as a structure of world, is only possible on the basis of the for-the-sake-of; world-transcendence is only world-transcendence in its connection with the for-the-sake-of; the for-the-sake-of belongs essentially and inextricably to the complete structure of the transcendence of the world.

Yet, it was also shown that the horizontal schema of the for-the-sake-of implies and unfolds into the *unity* of the horizontal schemata, and so, is never without the other two schemata (§1b). But if the for-the-sake-of is a *temporal* determination of transcendence this means that transcendence can only have a special connection with world *because* of its inner relation to temporality.\(^{140}\) Where Heidegger does not interpret transcendence according to the horizontal schemata, he nonetheless offers an alternative formulation. These alternative formulations are always dependent in an essential way on the for-the-sake-of (i.e. for-the-sake-of ceases to be named ‘horizontal schema’ but serves much the same function). Thus, in *the Metaphysical Foundations of Logic* we have an analysis of the for-the-sake-of and an alternatively formulated problem of the connection between temporality and transcendence.\(^{141}\) In *Vom Wesen des Grundes* we have the for-the-sake-of and then the three modes of grounding (which are implicitly temporally determined).\(^{142}\) In this thesis, the horizontal schemata are given priority because of their strictness and their explicitly temporal character. Because of this character, they bear the greatest promise for a complete determination of the phenomenon.

The phenomena of the for-the-sake-of, before-which and discursive enpresenting, as horizontal schemata, radically interpreted, must be understood as structures *of* transcendence; they are

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140 Here one may profitably compare the for-the-sake-of with the ‘coming towards itself’ of futurity, cf. [SZ (S/S, D)](https://www.umd.edu/~phil/Heidegger/Heidegger-SZ.html) 325 etc.

141 [MFL §§11b, 12-13](https://www.umd.edu/~phil/Heidegger/Heidegger-MFL.html)

142 [VWG (ER) 84ff. & §3](https://www.umd.edu/~phil/Heidegger/Heidegger-VWG.html)
not simply tacked on next to transcendence or anything of that sort. Because transcendence is the transcendence of Dasein, the temporal interpretation of transcendence is merely the interpretation of transcendence as transcendence. The happening of transcendence is the happening of horizonal schematism. Transcendence may be abstracted from the horizonal schemata, but the phenomenon itself does perdure in such abstraction.

The question about the worldliness of world-transcendence is the question about the structure of the transcendence of the world as the latter’s inner possibility and essence (§3a). It has been shown that this structure includes the horizonal schemata, both exegetically (previous chapter) and necessarily (this chapter §§1b-2). But the horizonal schemata give the unity of transcendence and temporality, and, by definition this unity must form the most primordial structure of transcendence qua world. And, taken as a whole, this means that we may present the worldliness of the transcendence of the world (in a manner reminiscent of SZ §18) as follows; the for-the-sake-of primordially refers to transcendence in such a way that it refers itself to the before-which of transcendence, in such a way that it refers to the discursive enpresenting of transcendence. The worldliness of world-transcendence is the phenomenon of the structural unity of the horizonal schemata but this is so only so long as each is understood in its proper element, i.e., in transcendence.

Since the above structure concerns transcendence, and transcendence is always factical, each ‘moment’ or ‘element’ of the structure essentially pertains to the Jeweiligkeit of Dasein (which, as rooted in the for-the-sake-of also means the essential Jemeinigkeit of Dasein). Thus, this structure is ‘modifiable into the respective structural totality of particular worlds’ because it is the a priori of the facticity of transcendence; the structure is an a priori in and of and from factical existence. The existentiell of the temporalisation of transcendence always gives worldliness to itself. Without dwelling on it, Parvis Emad hits on this whole
problematic when he identifies world with the facticity and temporalised particularity of the "how" of the way that Dasein concretely exists for itself in the ecstasies of world-time.\textsuperscript{143}

The basic attestation for this formulation of the worldliness of transcendence as the \textit{a priori} of facticity itself (double genitive) has already been given insofar as the elaboration of the existentiell problem of world-transcendence \textit{had to} refer back to the temporal articulatedness of transcendence, that is, insofar as the existentiell problem already necessarily betrayed the \textit{‘a priori’} structure of world-transcendence. Accordingly, §3b simply had the task of making explicit, and thus transparent, what was already known: transcendence is temporalized in the horizonal schemata as the worldliness of world-transcendence. §3b does not re-invent the wheel, it merely makes explicit that the entire ‘wheel’ has come into view.

c) \textit{Reflections on the Inner Unity of the Problem of the Transcendence of the World; existential and existentiell}

Whereas primordial temporality gives the primordial unity of Dasein – that which Dasein always already is – transcendence is always this particular transcendence. Thus the question of the unity of temporality and transcendence is equally a question of the unity of the existential and existentiell problem of Dasein, or indeed, the unity of the existentiell \textit{simpliciter}.\textsuperscript{144} If transcendence is \textit{already}, in a certain sense, the unity of factical existence, then the temporal problem simply pushes further into this unity.\textsuperscript{145} Transcendence is always factical, thus the horizonal schemata must be understood as the \textit{inner unity} of the \textit{facticity} of world.

\textsuperscript{143} Cf. Emad (1981) 37-40. Emad uses the ecstasies of world-time largely because his analysis of transcendence hews to MFL.
\textsuperscript{144} Compare the dissolution of the possibility for a distinction between timelessness vs. temporalness in the existential analytic. Conversely however, one must note that if comportment and innerworldliness can be shown to be grounded in transcendence, while \textit{intentio} and \textit{intentum} are nonetheless different in kind from transcendence, this means that while transcendence can give the \textit{unity} of the existentiell it \textit{cannot} give the \textit{complete} meaning of existentiellity.
\textsuperscript{145} Cf. above footnote.
Because the derivation of worldliness is dependent on facticity, worldliness equally implies facticity. For instance, if the for-the-sake-of means being an issue for oneself, and this is a fundamental and inextricable determination of world, this only makes sense as a formal indication for the happening of Dasein; there is not an ideal ‘for-the-sake-of’ lying behind the existing for-the-sake-of, the latter itself is this ‘behind’ if one wanted to use such an expression. This means that worldliness is nothing besides the worldliness of the worlding of the world. Worldliness includes the necessity of ‘multiple worlds’ because it is not prior to the factical existence of Dasein but rather is constitutive of the inner structure of this factical existence (but this, as ontologically prior to comportment).

Worldliness does not precede worlding or world ‘in time’. Worldliness only is in worlding, worlding only is in worldliness. If Dasein gives itself a world (i.e. exists) then it gives itself worldliness and Dasein gives itself worldliness then it gives itself a world. This is the case to such an extent that, ultimately, world, worlding, worldliness all refer quite simply to that which happens in the conjunction of temporality and transcendence.

The temporalisation of transcendence is the ‘origin’ of worldliness in the sense that the former (the temporalisation of transcendence) is always already the happening of world, as worlding, in its worldliness. Conversely, worldliness is the temporalisation of transcendence in its worlding as world. If transcendence is not, if temporalisation is not, then worldliness is not, world is not, worlding is not. And there is no transcendence without temporalisation, while, as we will soon see, there is no temporalisation without transcendence.

Worldliness is not some ‘pure’ concept hovering over Da-sein but the inner structure of factical worlding itself. It is only in this sense that we can experience the full importance and necessity of both of Being and Time’s primary formal indications for worldliness; that worldliness is modified by worlding and worldliness is the a priori of worlding.
The being of Dasein is being-in-the-world because its being is the temporalisation of transcendence.\footnote{Cf. SZ §69c etc.} Dasein, as the temporalisation of transcendence, forms worldliness insofar as it is; not as a subsequent result or development, but rather, as the inner meaning of this temporalisation. And if we can conclusively show in the next section of the analysis that transcendence is a necessary phenomenon of the temporalisation of temporality this in itself will show that worldliness, just as much as world, is in a certain sense, nothing more than this temporalisation: that temporality, radically understood, is world.

So now, the principle that ‘world exists only if Dasein exists’\footnote{Cf. SZ (S, D) 365 & BP 297 “The world is neither objectively present nor at hand, but temporalizes itself in temporality. It “is” “there” together with the outside-itself of the ecstasies. If no Da-sein exists, no world is “there” either.” SZ (S) 365} is not merely an empty logical formula analogous to something like ‘Dasein’s properties exist only if Dasein exists’ or a ‘world-idealism.’ Rather we have come to the point where we can see concretely how the existence of Dasein is world.\footnote{This becomes more transparent in §4.}

\section*{§4 – The Founded Question of the Unity and Duality of Temporality and Transcendence}

The connection between transcendence and world has now been basically founded. This means, the inner truth of the phenomenon of transcendence was set forth as the most original worlding of the world. It is to this phenomenon alone that all of the other determinations of fundamental ontological transcendence must be referred. Thus for instance, the statement ‘transcendence is the ground of the ontological difference’\footnote{Cf. VWG (ER) 27-29} now means the same as if one were to say; being-in-the-world is the ground of the ontological difference, or, the worlding of the world is ground for the ontological difference. Though of course, only now is this formal equivalence given even the possibility of phenomenological clarity.
This being said, the elaboration of the above problem partly awaits the conclusion of the whole thesis and partly goes beyond the scope of this project. In this chapter the task is solely to found the central phenomenon from which all other questions about transcendence may be asked in a founded way.

In the First Stage of the Founding Analysis it was shown that Heidegger always says that transcendence is grounded in temporality. But temporality, as the unity of Dasein, is the primordial ground for all existential questions and phenomena.\textsuperscript{150} And so, that the transcendence of Dasein is grounded in temporality is at first nothing more than a tautology. However, the \textit{proper} sense in which transcendence is grounded in temporality has not yet been made wholly transparent. Thus, the conclusion to the Founding Analysis, must now come full circle and clarify how transcendence is grounded in temporality (§4a-b). In clarifying the temporal grounding of transcendence – whose basic constitution has now been fully elaborated – our understanding of transcendence will be finally and fully founded.

The expression ‘grounded in’ can be misleading: its ‘simplicity’ is an illusion. Being ‘grounded by’ is always a mode of belonging together. However, broadly speaking, this belonging together may be primarily ‘disjunctive’ (grounded qua uprooted from) or ‘conjunctive’ (grounded qua essentially rooted in). We may illustrate the difference with respect to a quotation we have already seen;

\begin{quote}
World goes to make up the unified structure of transcendence; the concept of world is called \textit{transcendental} because it is a part of this structure. We use the term “transcendental” to designate everything that belongs by its essence to transcendence, everything that owes its inner possibility to transcendence.\textsuperscript{151}
\end{quote}

To ‘owe one’s inner possibility to’ is a mode of grounding. Where this grounding occurs with respect to transcendence, the word ‘transcendental’ is used. Conversely, if transcendence has been set forth correctly, then, for instance, the ‘mere’ logistics and ‘historiographical facts’ of

\textsuperscript{150} SZ (S) 304, 351, 437  
\textsuperscript{151} VWG (ER) 41
the Second Continental Congress – the associated ‘occurrences’ i.e. objectively present events
– owe some part of their possibility to transcendence, yet we are not about to call them
‘transcendental.’ The world is transcendental because it is intrinsically related to
transcendence, but to the extent that the Second Congress is only circuitously – and thus
derivatively – related to transcendence, the Second Congress is not called transcendental.
This being said, the matter is indeed more complicated if we wanted to discuss the Second
Congress as a world-historical event and there I would tend to call it ‘transcendental’ in this
sense, since, after all, it deeply determines the world and the destiny of American existence
even to this day. Finally, the logistics etc. as bound to such a world-historical event could
themselves have a world-historical significance and to this extent, could have a transcendental
significance (since, one might say, they show what it meant to be in the happening of the
world of that age etc.). Here one differentiates the ‘mere’ logistics from the ‘world-
historical character’ of the same logistics.

To be ‘grounded in’ and to be ‘derivative of’ refer to the problem of ground. Being grounded
by… signifies a certain belonging together. As we will see in more detail in the first and
second chapters of the Founded Analysis, ‘to ground’ does not first mean that what is
grounded falls away from the ground and ‘loses touch with it’ – as if, so to speak, the only
grounded things were branches but never roots.

What has so far been offered in the whole preceding analysis primarily concerns the temporal
constitution of transcendence. Being constituted by… is one way of being grounded by…
It is an important way, but not the sole way. It must also be shown why temporality
necessarily gives transcendence; why transcendence must become a fundamental ontological
problem in the first place. That is, simply put, how “the origo of transcendence is temporality

152 By the ‘Second Continental Congress’ I mean that gathering of delegates in which the Declaration of
Independence of the USA was decided upon and ratified and which constituted an early provisional government
for revolutionary America.
153 On world-history and that events may be world-historical cf. SZ (S) 380ff., 389 etc. On this problem cf. also
§§1-2 of Ch. 3 of the Founded Analysis
154 Cf. SZ (S) 388ff., 396
155 For an historical exemplar cf. the causa materialis.
itself,”156 must now become a question. Finally, a complete analysis of the groundedness of transcendence in temporality must also be able to show in what sense transcendence is, as it were, ‘in’ temporality; how things stand with the two of them understood with respect to their relation of grounding and being grounded. This third problem must in part consider whether the grounded and the ground belong together essentially (‘conjunctively’) or non-essentially (‘disjunctively’).

a) Establishing why Transcendence had to become an Issue

In itself the development of the temporal constitution of transcendence does not yet elucidate whether or why temporality (Dasein) must be essentially characterised by transcendence. Yet it does prepare the hermeneutical conditions and the proper horizon for the latter problem. Questioning why Dasein must be transcendence without understanding what transcendence means would have all too easily fallen into disarray and it is for that reason that it has been postponed as a question until now. 157 By contrast, on the basis of the self-assuredness given by the analysis of the temporal constitution of transcendence it becomes possible to provide an answer to this question with relative ease.

Transcendence has been developed as a structure of the facticity of Dasein, and thus, a fortiori, of the facticity of time. If we can in some simple and primordial sense identify the facticity of temporality with transcendence it will thereby be shown that transcendence happens insofar as temporality is temporalised. That is, it will be attested that transcendence is a necessary fundamental ontological problem.

a – Statement of the thesis concerning the relation of temporality and transcendence

156 MFL 210
157 The same kind of procedure is followed in EHF (with respect to freedom), cf. EHF 8
Final Stage: the Unity of Transcendence

Temporality is ecstatic. Ecstasy surpasses first of all; it is a movement of going beyond.\textsuperscript{158} As grounded in threefold ecstatic temporality, Dasein is the ekstatikon.\textsuperscript{159} If we may here rightly assume that intentionality is a derivative phenomenon, then the original phenomenon of the facticity of temporality is precisely the factical happening of this openness qua pre-intentional ekstatikon. As an ekstatikon, this opening is primordially horizontal. That this opening is primordially horizontal is further disclosed through its non-intentionality. If it were intentional it would only be derivatively, or ‘objectively’ horizontal.\textsuperscript{160} Thus, being the factical ekstatikon pure and simple means being from an already surpassed totality; being ecstatic leads to—and is in the end the same as—being horizonally ecstatic.

The result is this: the ecstatic character of temporality qua factical, or qua situated already indicates transcendence as a question. It does this because temporality, as the unity of Dasein, when questioned with respect to facticity, indicates that the most primary opening occurs in a pure horizontal surpassing.

It is precisely this horizon and the ecstatic-surpassing constitutive of it which is called transcendence. Here, the crudest concept of transcendence is given from the essence of temporality itself; and it is this crude concept which has been developed with respect to its proper constitution in the whole preceding analysis.\textsuperscript{161}

\textsuperscript{158} MFL 208
\textsuperscript{159} SZ (S) 328-329
\textsuperscript{160} Thus, throughout, transcendence qua world is more radical than world in Husserl as far as Carr explains the latter in Carr (1999) 91; “the world, as Husserl stresses in the Crisis (CR 143), is not itself an object but the universal horizon or background of all possible objects.”
\textsuperscript{161} This proof has based itself on the unarticulated phenomenon of temporality, yet it would be more essential (though essentially harder and more complex) if the threefold structure of temporality was included in the question. Ecstasy means “being-carried-away” (MFL 208), being-ahead-of-oneself means factical surpassing and so on. But if surpassing thereby gains a special connection with futurity, then one can temporally articulate transcendence qua surpassing as follows: transcendence is surpassing, which means having-surpassed (or ‘having-been as surpassing’) in such a way that one exists in the surpassing. This must now be paired in the following way with the horizonal schemata; surpassing—for-the-sake-of; having-surpassed—before-which and; being-in/as-surpassing—discursive enpresenting/etc. ‘Surpassing as having-surpassed as being-in the surpassing’ is constitutive of the whole phenomenon of transcendence. But, as futural, properly speaking the surpassing is toward itself, toward its having-been, and towards its enpresenting (indeed the temporal articulation of the surpassing is only possible on the basis of the towards-itself of futurity which is merely a formal name for the for-the-sake-of, cf. the importance of the for-the-sake-of in §§1b-2). Accordingly, surpassing as having-surpassed as being-in surpassing becomes the for-the-sake-of, before-which and discursive bringing-into. The first structure (surpassing as having-surpassed…etc.) merely formally articulates the
Supposing one wanted to consider a temporality which is not essentially factical. This sometimes occurs in the literature when temporality is determined as horizontal. Here, the ecstasy is thought as a ‘pure ecstasy’ or a ‘structural concept.’ The ecstema of the ecstasy (thought as noema is to noesis) is thought without respect to facticity. Thought without respect to facticity, in accordance with the Greek ὁρίζειν (i.e. horizon), the ecstema may in a certain sense simply signify the ‘de-definition’ of the ecstasy. That is, the pure destination of the pure ecstasy, its ‘where-at,’ would then simply be its own character; futurity has a horizon of ‘futuralness’, the ‘ideal of futurity’ etc.

However, ‘Temporality… is not but rather temporalizes itself.’ Firstly, this marks off temporality from any kind of mere ‘what’ but secondly it means that if an ‘is’ qua copula can be applied to temporality, properly speaking this ‘is’ only applies to its facticity. That is, the ‘is’ qua copula applies only to temporality’s ‘that it temporalises.’ This is so because – and to the extent that – the ‘that it temporalises’ is what is proper to temporality as temporal.
But if temporality is always factical – if this is the sole and inner possibility of its truth – and transcendence is necessary for temporality qua factical, then *transcendence is a necessary phenomenon of temporality without qualification*.\(^ {167}\) And so, it can now be seen why Heidegger only ever speaks of the horizontality of temporality *in connection with* the problem of transcendence. Precisely because there is no ‘pure temporality’ – that is, because temporality is not a ‘what’ or an ‘ideal’ which ‘accidentally’ temporalises – the central, most foundational horizontality of temporality is the horizontality of temporality qua transcendence, i.e., original standing in the open: the happening of the ekstatikon.

Transcendence belongs to the facticity of temporality. Since temporality is only ever factual transcendence always belongs to temporality. Rendered with greater simplicity; *temporalisation* essentially implies transcendence… but temporality is nothing more than and nothing less than temporalisation! Here, we cannot properly pose the question; ‘why is temporality factual?’ because its only meaningful formulation as a question is equivalent to the question; ‘why is there Dasein?’ That is, it is not a possible fundamental ontological question.\(^ {168}\) Thus, with the determination of transcendence as ‘something’ intrinsic to the facticity of time, the question about why Dasein must be transcendence ends – it can go no further.

Temporality temporalises – but as the original phenomenon of Dasein, i.e. in a way which is completely ontologically prior to intentionality. Thus it becomes possible to say; temporality temporalises therefore Dasein is transcendence. And we can now understand the following statement taken from *the Metaphysical Foundations of Logic* which says: that which the “self-temporalising of temporality… as ecstatic unity, temporalizes is the unity of its horizon, the

\(^{167}\) Heidegger basically says this at MFL 208, but it’s slightly ambiguous, and could be feasibly read otherwise if one had the inclination. Cf. Dasein and world in SZ §69c, e.g. ‘if Dasein is, a world is, too’ etc.

\(^{168}\) Thus, VWG (ER) 45
world.” It says transcendence even though it never uses the word, and only because temporality itself bespeaks transcendence can Heidegger say world solely on the basis of time.

b) The Unity of Transcendence and Temporality Expressed in the Grounding of the Former in the Latter; the mode of this grounding

We may now explicitly pose the question of how transcendence belongs together with temporality. Transcendence is grounded by temporality in such a way that transcendence essentially belongs to temporality. That is, the above has shown that temporality temporalises transcendence insofar as it temporalises itself. Transcendence is not a derivative phenomenon but another way of showing the same phenomenon; an extension of the problem of temporality.

With the special determinations which grow from it as a problem, transcendence gains its own question and its own special problems. However, the development of these problems must circle back to temporality in a constitutional analysis (cf. the previous). Thus, transcendence moves beyond the core question of temporality (its threefold structure) in order to be tethered back to it.

169 MFL 210 (Also cf. BP 302); MFL 202ff. develops the ecstasies of world time as primordial temporality (but does so in a way which tends to push beyond everyday dealings). Thus it might be objected that the above quote is only relevant for world-time (which, of course, Heidegger says in SZ “has the same transcendence as world” SZ (S) 419). In order for this objection to be at all relevant it would need to be formulated as follows; world-time qua significant has already subsumed transcendence into its power, whereas, so far as primordial and authentic temporality is not named ‘world’ this indicates that it is not always already worldly. In order to formulate this, one then either interprets authentic temporality as primordial or else thinks primordial temporality in contradistinction to authentic temporality. If one interprets authentic temporality as primordial then this objection would need to exclude the Situation from the existentiell of anticipatory resoluteness (cf. SZ§60) along with those indications for the centrality of world and transcendence discussed throughout this thesis. If on the other hand one contends that primordial temporality is different from authentic temporality this primarily means that one says; the primordial unity of the being of Dasein, whose being qua Dasein is self-concern, is not to be found in the most primordial formulation of this self-concern (authenticity). Thus, with respect to the broader topic then, there is much which remains uncertain about the complete question of temporality (especially when the question of transcendence is fully posed), but this uncertainty does not stand in the way of this thesis’ interpretation of the relevant quote from MFL. (Also cf. the fact that primordial temporality is the unity of Dasein’s being and VWG (ER) 21 et infra refers to SZ §60 as giving the truth of the being of Dasein in contrast to the being of non-Daseinai being).
Final Stage: the Unity of Transcendence

Transcendence is grounded in temporality now means: temporality grounds transcendence in that transcendence is a phenomenon *of* temporality. However, whilst transcendence is an intrinsic phenomenon of temporality it is also a special problem, and accordingly, it points towards further questions. The latter have occupied us throughout the Founding Analysis. Finally, ‘transcendence is grounded in temporality’ also means that temporality constitutes transcendence; thus transcendence had to be temporally interpreted.

Thus, we can say more abstractly, transcendence is grounded temporality in such a way that the two essentially belong together – indeed they do so because Dasein *always temporalises* *its facticity* and because this implies that it always temporalizes transcendence. We can also say that temporality opens itself to itself in transcendence (and vice versa), and we might even go so far as to say that temporality in a certain sense (or ‘in part’) *is* transcendence. Ultimately, it is *only* because of the essential connection between transcendence and temporality that transcendence can serve as the *original* (non-derivative) site of the understanding of the ontological difference or the openness of Dasein in general. Transcendence could not bear this originality if its groundedness in temporality was not an essential groundedness, i.e., if it were not, in the manner just described, an extension of the phenomenon of temporality itself. And it is only because of this intimacy that Heidegger can speak of temporality *as* the “*transcendental* horizon of the question of being,” as he does in the title to SZ I.
Addenda to the Founding Analysis

POSTSCRIPT TO THE FOUNDING ANALYSIS: A NOTE ON TRANSCENDENCE IN BEING AND TIME §69 AND ITS RELATION WITH THE GUIDING INDICATIONS OF TRANSCENDENCE USED IN THIS ANALYSIS

The whole problematic of the Founding Analysis was primarily guided by formal indications from Vom Wesen des Grundes, in connection with the textually ubiquitous problem of the difference between intentionality and transcendence and concluding via the development and integration of these problems in terms of the formal structures lain down by SZ §69c. The most powerful guiding formal indication – which was taken from Vom Wesen des Grundes – says that transcendence is the transcendence of Dasein, as Dasein’s surpassing of beings onto world (not beings). In §69b Heidegger uses the expression “the transcendence of Dasein” but in §69c transcendence is in each case the “transcendence of the world” and the problem of the “transcendent world.”¹ The development of this thesis has relied on the identity of the transcendence of Dasein onto world with the transcendence of the world. This must now be attested. Through this some remaining implications for the problem of transcendence are made more explicit.

In History of the Concept of Time (summer 1925) Heidegger calls world a being.² But by 1927 – in SZ §69c, in the Basic Problems of Phenomenology and later again in Vom Wesen des Grundes – world is explicitly not a being. Just as temporality is not a being but temporalises itself, world is not a being but worlds.³ This manner of talking about world

¹ SZ (S/S) 363-364, §69c
² HCT 168f.
³ SZ (S/S) 365, MFL (E/D) esp. 195, 209f.; / 252, VWG (ER/ EG) 87 / 121–122, BP 165, 299 (Thus, §4 of the Founding Analysis)
Addenda to the Founding Analysis

(world worlds, worlding etc.) was first used by Heidegger in 1919 and is only now revived.\(^4\) But this presents a new and difficult ontological problem. World is not a being, instead, we now have “The world is transcendent, grounded in the horizontal unity of ecstatic temporality.”\(^5\) In addition, transcendence now becomes the fundamental horizon for the formulation of questions concerning discoveredness and disclosedness in general.

Leaving further elaboration of this question aside for the moment, another question becomes pressing. This thesis has primarily interpreted the transcendence of the world from the phenomenon of Dasein’s transcendence guided by texts published after *Being and Time*. But what is §69c aside from this reference? That is, how does §69c show itself in itself simply on the basis of SZ §§1-69b? Aside from that portion of the question which was analysed in detail by §§2-3 of the Third Stage of the Founding Analysis one must still ask: what is said in the expression; ‘the transcendence of the world’? It says that world transcends. What does it transcend? Firstly, we simply find that world transcends the innerworldly.\(^6\) The world is not the sum total of the innerworldly, but is precisely beyond this totality and must be understood in these terms: world is never composed out of things in any way; world is beyond beings one and all. Secondly, however, we find that connected with the transcendence of the world is the question of the possibility of the innerworldly, namely, the question of how beings can be as innerworldly.\(^7\) World is both the origin of the innerworldly and at the same time transcends the latter as (existential) origin.

This says almost exactly the same thing as the guiding indication from *Vom Wesen des Grundes*; world transcends beings, Dasein transcends beings in having world. Whereas *Being and Time* limits itself to the problem of the ‘fact’ of the difference between world and beings

\(^4\) Kisiel (2005[2001]) 199, on the meaning of *es weltet* in 1919 cf. Farin (1998) 273-278: the primary thing in 1919 is to get the pre-objective (hence, non-reified), pre-theoretical historical reality of life in its being-lived etc. Cf. vs. §§1-2 of Ch. 3 of the Founded Analysis.
\(^5\) SZ (S) 366
\(^6\) SZ (S/S) 365-366, Thus not the same as the Husserlian meaning given to this phrase, as discussed in HCT 98ff. (“transcendence of the world” occurs in this form at HCT 101; in HCT 98ff., Heidegger also speaks of the ‘transcendent world’ which is synonymous with the former).
\(^7\) SZ (S/S) 366
and only alludes to the problem of ‘why’ and ‘how’ this transcendence is the case, in his
lecture courses and in Vom Wesen des Grundes Heidegger tends to be much more concerned
with the ‘reason why’ world is transcendent. That is, world is transcendent of beings (SZ)
because it is the happening which pertains to their being transcended (VWG). The
transcendence of the world (SZ) is an issue because Dasein’s existence means to transcend
beings onto world (VWG).

So technically, the transcendence of the world and the transcendence of Dasein onto world are
not perfectly identical but there is no real problem of their consonance. Under the topic of
Dasein’s surpassing beings towards world the sense in which world is transcendent with
respect to beings is operative (transcendence’s difference from intentionality is most
important in showing this). Whether explicitly or inexplicitly, the transcendent existence of
world includes the question of how existence transcends and vice versa.

But the rudimentary formulation of transcendence in Being and Time does indicate a problem
which is easily overlooked in an analysis which follows the formal indications of Vom Wesen
des Grundes and the lecture courses, namely, the ontological problem of world’s transcendent
character. We cannot call world a being and we cannot simply call it being, but we can ask
after world itself as an ontic-ontological existentiell-existential problem. This characteristic
of transcendence must be understood to belong to the worldliness of the transcendence of the
world.

The problem of the transcendence of the world asks after this difficult ontological problem of
world, which is to say, it asks after what was faulty about History of the Concept of Time’s
determination of world as a being. That world was said to be a surpassing of beings already
indicated that world could not be said to be a being.8 Instead we have seen that
transcendence, properly understood, is world. Thus, if it is possible to pose an ontic-

8 Thus, the sense in which the transcendence of the world is easily overlooked when one follows the formal
indications of VWG is not because the former is not implicit in the latter (it is only a problem of rhetoric).
existentiell question of transcendence without this meaning that transcendence is a being, it is just as possible to pose the question of world without saying that world is a being.

With the concrete development of the whole scope of the temporal problem of transcendence this becomes clearer. Because, in a certain sense, world is nothing more than time itself, world is no more a being than temporality is. World is the temporalisation of situatedness pure and simple. Only by tracing the world back to temporality in this way is the sense in which world is beyond beings properly visible.

But this means that this ‘beyondness’ of world must be kept in mind in the determination of the worldliness of the transcendence of the world. The world is worldly precisely by never being a being; by never being identified with or as an innerworldly being. The worldliness of the world includes the not-a-being-ness of the world. This is what it means for the world to be transcendent. This not-being-a-being is to be understood as the time-character of world; world is indeed the wer-alt and is thus, in a certain sense, nothing less than happening pure and simple.

This points in turn to a difference between Dasein and its world, which, however, must be precisely formulated. When, in Being and Time, Heidegger articulates the structure of being-in-the-world he divides it according to world, being and being-in. These three factors correspond to SZ I.1.iii, iv & v. Heidegger says that Dasein is its world but he also says that Dasein is a being whereas world is not. At the essential level this is the sole point upon which one may speak of a ‘difference between Dasein and its world.’ That which here differs from world is the Who.9 The Who is the selfhood of Dasein.10 But Heidegger repeatedly indicates that selfhood is to be understood on the basis of transcendence and not the other way around.11 This indicates that Heidegger has indeed recognised this question. Selfhood is intrinsically connected with mineness, mineness comes from the for-the-sake-of, which also

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9 SZ (S/S) 45, 53, 10 Ibid. & 113f.
11 BP 297ff., MFL 187ff., VWG (ER) 38ff., 84ff., 102ff., 128ff., VWG (EG) 121, EP 323ff. etc.
belongs to world. This implies that transcendence gives itself a self just as primordially as it gives itself a world. Selfhood does not existentially precede world, nor does world existentially precede selfhood. Only the terms for the formulation of the question are made transparent by this reflection. This problem will be discussed in the second chapter of the Founded Analysis. One of the reasons why it had to be postponed is because it enters the domain of freedom’s for-the-sake-of and to this extent, it belongs to the questions marked out for the Founded Analysis.

Thus when Malpas says that “the structure of transcendence as a “surpassing” by Dasein in the direction of world… already presents a bifurcation between Dasein as that which is the ground of transcendence and world as that toward which transcendence must move”12 ...And when he then continues to say that “transcendence thus arises as a problem out of the distinction between Dasein and its world”13 and identifies the problem of overcoming this with something called “the transcendental”14 which “is itself tied in one way or another to human subjectivity”15 this formulation is nonetheless roundly and unreservedly contradicted by this thesis.16 Selfhood is here understood by Malpas to precede and indeed ground transcendence when really it is the other way around (existentially speaking). Here Malpas, who elsewhere speaks of transcendence in an essential way, misunderstands transcendence and world completely.17

Malpas is here guided by Heidegger’s self-critique from the Contributions.18 It is true that Heidegger says there that he was misguided in his analysis of transcendence, and that the orientation of the late 20s is easily misinterpreted (indeed, as the “action of an “I” and

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13 Ibid.
14 Ibid. cf. here also Malpas (2007) 127 (where, of course, if the transcendental overcomes what is problematic about the inner meaning of transcendence, this means that transcendence and transcendental are thought qua semantically different to each other).
15 Malpas (2007) 133
16 Cf. also von Herrmann’s contrary elucidation of the meaning of the word ‘Dasein’ in von Herrmann (2011) 213-220, 223
subject”). But Malpas’ interpretation implies that after all the work Heidegger put into overcoming Cartesianism, in declaring being-in-the-world a unitary structure, Heidegger then set up the most original question of world along the lines of subject and object, so that he could then get to work on mediating it, following the exact same model and procedure he also roundly criticised throughout *Being and Time.* Malpas’ implication is of course that Heidegger awoke from this thoughtlessness and thus dispensed with transcendence. But to attribute such a kind of thoughtlessness to Heidegger in the 20s does not sit well. And this uneasiness only becomes more pressing for us when Malpas indicates that the mediation was to have a Kantian ‘flavour’ since, after all, Heidegger roundly criticises this approach in *Being and Time.*

What justifies Malpas’ interpretation is his unreconstructed (i.e. traditionalist) interpretation of the ‘transcendental’ in Heidegger and an understanding of ‘ground’ which bears no connection to Heidegger’s late 20s problem of ground, namely the problem of *freedom.* It cannot be decided here how appropriate and important Malpas’ formulation of ground is. But the severity of the mistake which Malpas implicitly attributes to Heidegger and the thoughtlessness he thereby attributes to Heidegger brings into relief the necessity of the converse interpretation of the ‘relation’ between Dasein and world. Thus, when Heidegger says that transcendence is “der Überstieg zur Welt”, namely surpassing towards or in the

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19 Cf. Malpas (2006) 172. On this passage cf. First Stage of the Founding Analysis §1
22 Cf. Malpas (2007) passim. Malpas (2006) has a more lengthy analysis of grounding than Malpas (2007) but passes over an analysis of the three modes of grounding whilst still relying on the thinking which roots itself in them, Cf. Malpas (2006) 167 et passim vs. VWG (EG) 109 et passim. Instead, Malpas’ analysis cuts across the thinking of the three modes of grounding in attempting to show that the problem of transcendence implies a concept of grounding as ‘hierarchical dependence’ as opposed to ‘mutual dependence’. Specifically, Malpas aims to show that transcendence ultimately implies that world must be grounded in Dasein. In order to formulate this in a non-vacuous way Malpas must (i.e. he does) hold transcendence back from the radical consequences developed herein and cannot allow transcendence to touch upon and shatter the guiding meaning of Dasein and of world (that is, as it were, he must forestall the unfolding of fundamental ontology etc.). Cf. Malpas (2006) 110ff., 144ff.,167ff., 356. A comparison of Malpas’ analysis of grounding with the three modes of grounding from VWG as they are formulated in Ch. 1 & 2 of the Founded Analysis does not immediately refute Malpas’ position but it does tend to take the wind out of its sails.
direction of world, we should not take this innocuous ‘to the’ (zur = zu der) as if it indicated some great divide, setting Dasein against world.\(^{23}\) Just as the possibility of understanding *Woraufhin* as ‘towards which’ when Heidegger says things such as “we name the *woraufhin* of Dasein’s transcendence as such, the world”\(^{24}\) should not be taken as justification for interpreting world as the ‘object’ of a ‘transcending’ ‘subject.’ Rather, ‘world is never an object’ – indeed, this is already shown by the *difference* between transcendence and intentionality.\(^{25}\)

In deference to Malpas and all others criticised throughout it is appropriate to note that this thesis suffers from the same Achilles’ heel as all other attempts to pose the question of transcendence. This is basically the problem of the hermeneutical circle and how one enters it ‘in the right way.’ If however, this thesis has one advantage over other attempts to question transcendence it is this: that only this approach allows transcendence to ‘make sense’ both literally, as it were, i.e. to *make* sense (i.e. allows it to form world; original disclosedness and discoveredness), and figuratively, i.e. to be understandable (i.e. it allows transcendence to be intelligible).

The greatest bulwark against these sorts of misinterpretation is calm investigation of the phenomenon. The results of questioning transcendence to the end have been given in the Final Stage of the Founding Analysis and in this Postscript. With this the founding concept of transcendence has been shown in such a way that it secures the concept against the above misunderstandings. This interpretation arises of necessity when one takes the problematic seriously, and simply sets to work on elaborating the phenomenon unperturbed by extraneous distraction offered up by the ‘obviousness’ of what transcendence means and so forth.

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\(^{23}\) Cf. VWG (ER/EG) 102-103 / 126  
\(^{24}\) VWG (EG) 139  
\(^{25}\) Cf. SZ (S/S) 179, MFL 166
SUMMARY TO THE FOUNDING ANALYSIS OF TRANSCENDENCE

The task of the Founding Analysis was to provide the basic concept of fundamental ontological transcendence. At first this phenomenon remained opaque and everything betrayed the difficulty but also the importance of the question. In an important respect, both the difficulty and the importance of the question were shown to be connected with the thoroughgoing connection of transcendence with the whole of the fundamental ontological problem. Thus it was clear that something like transcendence was already visible in the preparatory work of the thesis.

However the very breadth of the problem also made the correct formulation of the question especially difficult. The breadth of the question left it indeterminate, thus the first task was to foreclose any floundering in the question by rooting the analysis of transcendence in its basic formal indications. Thus the First Stage of the Founding Analysis formally delimited the boundaries and goals of the question of transcendence – surpassing the totality of being, the relation between transcendence, transcendent and transcendental etc. – and gave a preparatory analysis of the relation between transcendence and fundamental ontology especially, with respect to temporality.

As the analysis continued it became clear that the literature on this problem all too often proceeds on the basis of the obvious. This is the second important problem concerning the breadth of the problem of transcendence; because we lack guidance, we proceed on the basis of the obvious. This way of proceeding either causes the question of transcendence to flounder (by forcing the question into an inappropriate mould), or is a symptom of floundering (in grasping at straws one grasps for what is first on hand, namely, the obvious). But relying on the obvious is equally a form of obliviousness. Thus the basic securing of the question in the First Stage was particularly necessary for entering this uncertain domain and was especially necessary in order to protect the question from any overhasty reduction to the ‘obvious.’
The First Stage of the Founding Analysis, in connection with the preparatory analysis of Part I, oriented the question towards world. Thus it quickly became clear that the adequacy of any given concept of fundamental ontological transcendence may be measured by whether it bears an essential relation to world. That is, it became clear that any concept of transcendence which could only be circuitously connected with world was not an appropriately or adequately determined concept of transcendence. This then became the central measure and task of the Founding Analysis; to exhibit transcendence as an essential phenomenon of world.

But posing a question is not the same as being able to formulate it. Thus, it was necessary to begin developing the phenomenon in a secure way. One of the obvious ways of questioning transcendence is to attach it to something like intentionality. Such an interpretation is in some sense justified by the Basic Problems of Phenomenology §9b. Yet, it quickly became clear that transcendence must instead be determined as a non-intentional phenomenon. Thus, the horizon for the question of transcendence was first secured by determining how transcendence differs essentially from intentionality. Primarily this provided negative guidance in that it prohibited a whole host of approaches to the problem. But it also gave a positive directive and phenomenon. This positive phenomenon was primarily exhibited by referring what had been established back to anxiety and care in accordance with Heidegger’s indications that the phenomenon of transcendence was especially foregrounded in these problematics.

The task of the Third Stage of the Founding Analysis was to move further into this positive phenomenon. One basic difficulty with the question of transcendence had already been shown to be the overhasty use of historical analogy to pose the question of transcendence. Thus the task became, to found the question of transcendence with an ever more penetrating eye to the fundamental ontological problematic. Similarly, a major problem with the literature on transcendence in Heidegger is its tendency to simply summarise what Heidegger said. This replication merely presents what is questionable without formulating it as a
question. Most commonly this either occurs by echoing the basic steps of SZ §69 or various sections of *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, or *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*. SZ §69c is merely an outline presentation. *The Basic Problems* is unclear and this lack of clarity ends with people confusing transcendence with intentionality in general (because of §9b) or with something like categorial intuition (because of §21). *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic* is in a certain sense beautifully clear, yet it is also frustratingly indeterminate. Beneath the clarity of the presentation there lies a conceptual quicksand. In this sense, *the Metaphysical Foundations* is merely a fragment of the problem though this fragmentary character is not immediately visible nor is the guideline for its integration with the whole immediately visible. It is, in effect, the exoteric formulation of the esoteric problem; it may thus serve as an introduction and a guide but not a conclusion. The primary value of this text is the guidance which its broad brush strokes may provide for reading other texts.

If one of the standard approaches to the question is primarily a matter of summarising (whether at the level of a chapter, a section or a paragraph) one or more of Heidegger’s expositions of the problem then the standard approach merely repeats the basic incompleteness of its parent exposition (or else mixes various sources together without adequately cleared guidance for the problem). Thus, for instance, just as a conceptual quicksand underlies *the Metaphysical Foundations*, so too does this occur in a summary of it; and to the extent that one repeats the steps of this text in its broad brush strokes, these strokes betray a lack of fine detail and in many cases the inability to set this detail out. Over and again one merely finds the repetition (but not the re-petition) of that which is questionable. Through this the question is not even really posed at all. The question is so far from being posed that its questionability is precisely covered over in the obviousness of the relation;

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26 On such approaches cf. the Introduction herein.
Heidegger said ‘transcendence is x’, thus, transcendence is x; with this one then assumes the whole question to be dispensed with – whereas it is barely asked.27

Thus, it became necessary to achieve both the clarity of the *Metaphysical Foundations* and the determinateness of SZ §69c. The Third Stage of the Founding Analysis was dedicated to preparing the grounds upon which this requirement could be fulfilled. At the beginning of the Third Stage, the way had already been prepared for clarifying transcendence on the basis of the fundamental ontological problematic. Similarly, since SZ §69c belongs to the existential problematic more essentially than Heidegger’s other approaches, SZ §69c was chosen as primary guide for the problem. In turn, because SZ §69c is essentially rooted in the problems of *Being and Time* it was possible to use these to clarify the phenomena involved in §69c. With this, the task had become to bring *phenomenological* clarity to the formal determinateness of SZ §69c; to unfold the inner problematic of the horizontal schemata as opposed to their summary (and thus external) presentation in *Being and Time* and elsewhere.

The goal there was to present the horizontal schemata as essential determinations of transcendence, i.e., to fulfil their purpose in *Being and Time*. But, before they could fully serve this purpose, they had to be understood in their basic phenomenal breadth and character. It turned out that the proper formulation of the horizontal schemata was by no means obvious nor had it ever genuinely become a question elsewhere. Thus it became necessary that considerable labours were spent on developing how these horizontal schemata showed themselves as determinations of transcendence.

With the completion of the Third Stage, the groundwork for the Final Stage of the Founding Analysis of Transcendence was complete. The horizontal schemata had been elaborated as structures of transcendence. Accordingly, it became possible to concretely discuss them as

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27 Here, there is a remarkable similarity (but in what follows not an identity per se) to Plato’s critique of writing in *Phaedrus*; if one is confused or uncertain about what the writing has said (in Heidegger) one asks the text for explanation (by writing about it) but in such a way that it merely repeats the same over and over again (one gives a summary) unless the father of the λόγος can be compelled to protect and elaborate the λόγος (here, this ‘father’ is properly the phenomenon and the problem of the phenomenon). Cf. *Phdr.* 275d-e
structures of the *unity* of transcendence and temporality, namely, to discuss their proper essence. Through the elaboration of this essence, the connection of transcendence with world was first concretely grounded. This means at the same time, the central meaning of transcendence was first set forth because this ‘connection’ is none other than the central meaning of transcendence. Finally, through the completion of this basic constitutional analysis it became possible to complete the founding of the concept of transcendence by exhibiting its necessary origin as an existential problem, that is, by showing how transcendence is grounded in temporality. Through this, transcendence was completely returned to the existential problem and the basic concept of transcendence was fully founded.

This was achieved in a movement of unifying. Thus, §1 of the Final Stage interpreted horizontal schematism as the unity of temporality and transcendence. §2 formulated transcendence *as* world, and thus, brought the formal indications for transcendence into a unity. §3 formulated transcendence as the existential unity of transcendence and temporality. It also formulated the unity of the existentiell and existential problem of world. Finally, §4 worked out one last step by grounding transcendence even more essentially in temporality. It did this by showing how temporality itself is, in a certain sense, transcendence. In so doing §4 implicitly formulated the unity which was disclosed in §1 as a unity which does not simply occur ‘after the fact’ but is, as it were, *primal facticity itself*.

Whereas at the beginning there were many possibilities and many formal indications, by the end all of the constitutive factors of the question had been unified and brought into their primordial simplicity. The articulation of this simplicity constituted the essential difficulty of the Final Stage. But now, on the basis of what has so far been elaborated, we may say that transcendence is the non-intentional temporally founded and constituted surpassing of beings as a totality in which the ontological difference first happens and happens as the most original worlding of the world… and say so in a way which is basically transparent with respect to its inner unity and meaning.
Similarly, throughout the Founding Analysis certain connections were repeatedly made without them being made completely thematic. For instance, transcendence *happens, es geschieht*. Transcendence is connected with the understanding of being. And there are certain phenomena which have been pushed only so far as was necessary for the Founding Analysis. As we will see in the next chapter, one of the latter is the for-the-sake-of; the for-the-sake-of is that because of which transcendence is essentially a question of freedom. Through freedom, we can more fully formulate the transcendental question of selfhood. These questions were held back because they belong to the *founded* question of transcendence. In the late 20s, the primordial question of freedom is a *development* of fundamental ontological transcendence and as such, it can only be radically questioned on the basis of the properly clarified concept of transcendence.

Similarly, the complete question of the historicity of transcendence belongs together with the question of freedom. The guiding connection of historicity (primarily marked by the word ‘happening’ in the foregoing) and transcendence was both necessary and preparatory. In what follows we must come to grips with the reason why Heidegger calls transcendence an *Urgeschichte*.

Through the development of freedom, temporality and transcendence, the sense in which transcendence belongs to the inner meaning of historicity will be shown. Finally, the question of the ontological difference, so far as it can be discussed within the bounds of this thesis, will be exhibited.

This gives us the basic contents of the Founded Analysis. The first chapter of the Founded Analysis will concern the problem of freedom. The second chapter is set the task of formulating the transcendental problem of selfhood. As we will see, the transcendental

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28 VWG (ER) 90f., cf. also MFL 209
question of selfhood requires us to think freedom more essentially and to press into the problem of historicity. And through this the way is prepared for the third and final chapter of the Founded Analysis. Here the historical formulation of the essence of transcendence in connection with the key ontological questions of fundamental ontology will be discussed.
PART III

THE FOUNDED ANALYSIS OF TRANSCENDENCE: TOWARDS THE COMPLETENESS OF THE PROBLEM OF TRANSCENDENCE
Chapter 1

Transcendence as Freedom

The purpose of the Founded Analysis is to unfold the basic consequences of the Founding Analysis. Everything which prepares for the problem of transcendence goes in the first part. Everything which essentially leads to and then shows the basic meaning of transcendence goes in the second part. Everything that is unfolded from this and everything that can only be questioned once transcendence is properly understood goes in the third part.

The Founded Analysis is first a matter of freedom, and therefrom, it is also a question about the fundamental concepts which bear an essential ‘relation’ to transcendence; selfhood, historicity, the question of being, innerworldliness and so forth. In the exposition of these related concepts the task is not to treat transcendence as a pan-existential panacea, nor is it even to completely solve these problems (i.e. in connection with other existential factors). The first approach is not possible because it would be a misunderstanding and the second is not possible due to limitations of space etc. Nonetheless, through transcendence it will be possible to bring these associated problems into a new light and to do so in a way that is eminently concrete and displays their dependence on transcendence.

But these ‘related problems’ of transcendence are not philosophically ‘ornamental.’ Thus, for instance, a complete understanding of transcendence must understand why and how transcendence implies freedom. But, as we will see, the complete question of freedom is also

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1 What transcendence means (founding). What transcendence implies (founded – presupposes a prior founding of transcendence). It may be of interest to the reader that the slightly pretentious naming schema for Parts 2 and 3 of this thesis was chosen in reference to the phenomenon of founding (Begründen) discussed in this chapter, namely, the free enpresenting of ground which is nothing less than an original formulation of truth. Accordingly: Part II: founding; thinking into the truth of transcendence. Part III: founded; thinking from this truth.
dependent on the problem of historicity and selfhood. Similarly, the constant reliance on ‘happening’ (*Geschehen*) in the Founding Analysis must be attested and developed here. Conversely, the problems of innerworldliness and being also belong together with the problem of transcendence. Unless the connection between transcendence and being is set forth the whole analysis remains fatally incomplete. Thus, if the Founding Analysis aims at unity, the Founded Analysis aims at completeness. Only in the unity of the two is the complete problem of transcendence given. Completeness without unity is uprooted, unity without completeness is stunted.

The first task of the Founded Analysis is the delimitation of freedom. This question comes up in a decisive way in *Vom Wesen des Grundes* and in its kindred work, *the Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*. Heidegger indicated that the analysis of freedom in the former (qua freedom towards ground) belonged to the turning of *Time and Being*. Freedom again continues to be of the greatest importance in his 1930 lecture course, *The Essence of Human Freedom*, and his concurrent address *On the Essence of Truth*. The same is true in his 1936 lecture course *Schelling’s Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom*, along with the seminars on the same topic of 1927-28. Similarly, while freedom never becomes a thematic issue in *Being and Time*, it nonetheless serves important ‘functions’ therein. *On the Essence of Truth* is said to belong to the problem of the turning while, in *The Essence of Human Freedom* Heidegger presents freedom as a fundamental question of philosophy through which the totality of its problems may come to light. Thus the latter thinks freedom as one possible doorway which swings open into the whole of philosophy, and so, into the question of being. As will become clearer, when in his 1929 lecture course *Einleitung in die Philosophie* (the

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4 On the topic of freedom there are also other seminars and lectures from the thirties along with the 1942 lecture course *The Metaphysics of German Idealism*. However, these are beyond the scope of this thesis. On the continued importance of freedom after Heidegger no longer explicitly analyses it cf. Ruin (2008) §§4-7

5 Cf. SZ (S/S) 122, 193, 266, 307f., 385, 391 etc.

6 ET 148 *infra*, LH 250, EHF *passim*, esp., pp 10, 14. The rhetoric of philosophising as ‘going to the root’ in connection with freedom throughout EHF may be compared with MFL 18 (that this is not a mere accident of translation, cf. EHF (D) 18, and MFL (D) 22).
last in which transcendence remains explicit and pervasive) Heidegger says that philosophising is “explicit transcending”\(^7\) this is simply a nascent name for freedom. This outlines the gravity of the problem of freedom.

The Essence of Human Freedom and the concurrent lecture On the Essence of Truth along with the later Schelling’s Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom belong to the period after which Heidegger no longer explicitly speaks of transcendence. Indeed, as Sheehan has said, “Richardson’s majestic Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought... definitively proved that the breakthrough from the earlier to the later Heidegger took place in his lecture “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit.””\(^8\) Yet the concept of freedom discussed in these later analyses does not present an absolute gap from Heidegger’s earlier elaborations of freedom.

The problem of freedom in Heidegger’s work from the late 20s is neither identical nor different in kind to the problem of freedom in Heidegger’s later work. But in the late 20s Heidegger poses the question of freedom on the basis of transcendence, and indeed, as identical to transcendence. In the later texts Heidegger no longer speaks of transcendence yet the phenomenon remains mostly the same. This indicates that transcendence becomes freedom; freedom, which is initially simply a greater concretion of transcendence, ultimately replaces transcendence and gains favour as the name and site for the question of philosophy over and against transcendence. Thus here, one may see the first stirrings of ‘the turning’ which has its end point in ‘another thinking,’ and indeed, we may see transcendence itself as formulating its own being-overcome.

The two kindred texts from the 20s pose the question of freedom on the basis of the question of ground.\(^9\) Because there is a question about the essence of ground, there is also a question

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\(^7\) Cf. EP passim, esp., 395-396, cf. also KPM (T) §43 & p 170
\(^8\) Sheehan (2001) 4
\(^9\) Cf. MFL passim, VWG (ER) passim
of freedom (or indeed, more primordially, the other way around). Freedom and ground belong together. But in these texts, freedom is precisely identified with transcendence! – that is, explicitly, foundationally, unmistakably. Here, transcendence becomes freedom; transcendence, thought more essentially, is freedom, and specifically, freedom towards ground. This indicates that if freedom continues to be an issue after transcendence is no longer spoken of, then freedom, as the result of thinking transcendence out to the end, replaces its origin in such a way that it sustains and preserves this origin. The way in which and the degree to which this ‘sustaining’ occurs is not self-evident.

On the one hand, if transcendence is a question about freedom, this means that the complete problem of transcendence needs to make freedom transparent. On the other hand, if transcendence is freedom, and freedom belongs to the turning, this means that the problem of this turning, so far as it is understood from what is earlier, must be understood from transcendence as freedom, or from the turning of transcendence into freedom. Here I leave the broader problem of Heidegger’s later philosophy to others. That is, insofar as this thesis speaks about the later philosophy, it aspires only to outlining some portion of the first stirrings of the turning which gives the later thinking.

Freedom is a difficult problem to enter into. But, with respect to the problem of freedom in Heidegger’s philosophy from the 20s what makes it all the more difficult is the extent to which the foundational sense of transcendence remains covered over. Since transcendence has just been exhaustively founded this presents an opportunity to make freedom properly intelligible. Conversely, since freedom is simply a deepening of the truth of transcendence, it behoves an analysis of transcendence to properly grasp the existential meaning of freedom.

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10 E.g. VWG (ER) 126-127, MFL §§13-14 etc., Thus, EP 214: “Nur wo Freiheit ist, wird Bindung und Notwendigkeit möglich.”
11 E.g. MFL 185, VWG (ER) 100, (& 102-105, 131)
12 Cf. Ibid., MFL 205; transcendence thought more essentially is also freedom; transcendence thought more completely is freedom.
The task of this chapter is to present the transcendental problem of freedom. This means, to interpret the problem of freedom from the perspective given by the Founding Analysis. This is worked out in two main stages. Firstly, the history of the concept of freedom is outlined (§1). This gives us a preliminary grasp on the problem but also indicates that which must be overcome by the specifically transcendental exhibition of the problem of freedom.

By way of contrast, §2 presents the transcendental and fundamental ontological problem of freedom, first by differentiating the traditional and the transcendental problem (§2αα) and then by presenting the basic transcendental problem of freedom (§2αβ). This is then deepened and developed through the problem of grounds which belongs to fundamental ontological freedom (§2β). On this basis the phenomenon of the unity belonging to freedom towards grounds is exhibited in connection with the problem of the turning and the change within Heidegger’s thought which begins around the time of *On the Essence of Truth* (§2c).

Through the exhibition of freedom in this chapter the way is prepared for the problem of selfhood, of historicity and the question of being. The problem of selfhood and historicity will be the thematic problem of the second chapter of the Founded Analysis. There it first becomes possible to understand what it means when Heidegger says towards the end of *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* that:

> Only a being to whose ontological constitution transcendence belongs has the possibility of anything like a self. Transcendence is even the presupposition for Dasein’s having the character of a self. The selfhood of Dasein is grounded in its transcendence, and Dasein is not first an ego-self which then oversteps something or other. The “toward-itself” and the “out-from-itself” are implicit in the concept of selfhood. What exists as a self can do so only as transcendent. This selfhood, grounded in transcendence, the possible toward-itself and out-from-itself, is the presupposition for the way Dasein factically has various possibilities of being its own and of losing itself. But it is also the presupposition for Dasein’s being-with others in the sense of the I-self with the thou-self.¹³

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¹³ BP (E/D) 300 / 425f.
And the same goes for the following passage from *Vom Wesen des Grundes* which says that:

coming toward itself from out of the world Dasein gives rise to itself [zeitigt sich] as a self, i.e., as a being entrusted with having to be... Dasein is in such a way that it exists for the sake of itself. If, however, it is a surpassing in the direction of world that first gives rise to selfhood, then world shows itself to be that for the sake of which Dasein exists.14

Similarly, it will also become possible to begin to properly question the relation between transcendence and historicity which was operative throughout the preceding analysis. And through this the way will be cleared for the final chapter to offer some closing reflections on the historicity of the ‘transcendental’ question about being.

§1 – SURVEY OF THE TWO HISTORICAL TYPES OF FREEDOM

In order to pose the question of freedom as transcendence we first need to make the domain of the question transparent. Broadly speaking, the history of the problem of freedom falls into two types. Both of these are given in Kant. Kant calls the first type ‘transcendental or cosmological freedom’, while, on the other hand, he calls the second type ‘practical freedom.’ By ‘transcendental’ Kant here means that which is not an appearance but which pertains to the inner meaning and unity of appearances, by cosmological he means that which pertains to the totality of spatial beings.15 By ‘practical’ he means the kind of freedom which is proper to the human situation, namely, ethical action (praxis) and its proper laws (which are not the same as those of appearances).16

a) The First Concept of Freedom: freedom as spontaneity; freedom as the negation of the ‘regula’

14 VWG (EG) 121
15 CPR (A/B) 334-335, 532-536, 542 / 391-392, 560-564, 570
16 GMM 4:463
What Kant calls both transcendental and cosmological freedom is that concept of freedom which he discusses in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. This is the capacity to begin a series of causes ‘spontaneously’ or ‘from itself’; that is, the capacity to be an uncaused cause. Along with this concept I categorise the similar though not identical formulation of freedom as ‘freedom of choice,’ namely, uninhibited and unforced choice. This means liberty to do… in such a way that it primarily means liberty from… That is, here, one speaks of freedom as something like caprice whether one understands this ‘metaphysically’ (Kant) or non-metaphysically (everyday and political discourse concerning freedom).

Thus, we may call this concept ‘negative freedom,’ as Kant himself does, and which Heidegger repeats in *Vom Wesen des Grundes*. It wants to negate bonds; freedom is what positively exists in the negation of being bound. Thus, it is negative because it is concerned primarily with destruction, and because, as Heidegger puts it, it characterises freedom only in terms of what it is not (i.e. it is not bound) and not in terms of what it is. This is the concept which primarily guides Enlightenment British liberalism. British liberalism, oriented towards the political question, wanted to create a ‘space of freedom’ where this means a ‘place of unregulated activity.’ The more that Dasein’s activity is unregulated, the more there is freedom. Here, as in Kant’s concept of transcendental freedom, freedom means *that which lacks a rule* (regula). Politically speaking, one either makes this liberty the central measure of law or else bargains it against other concerns.

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17 Both Spontaneität and von selbst are used, cf. CPR (E, D: A/B) 445f., 533, 553f. / 473f., 561, 582f. Also cf. Heidegger’s reference to this problem at VWG (ER) 102-103; that both give a merely negative definition of freedom.

18 Though, in EHF Heidegger avers that neither transcendental nor practical freedom are negative (EHF 15f.). The key point in EHF is that the *posing* which pertains to Kant’s concept of transcendental freedom is itself positive by definition. The reason why it was said to be negative in the earlier text was in reference to the way that the concept was derived, known and delimited (by negation). Thus, both formulations have their correctness and mandate.

19 VWG (ER) 102-103


For this approach, freedom is what exists in the absence of a rule. Thus, existentially speaking, in its unmediated form, this concept of freedom is concerned with phasing out thrownness. To this extent, it aims at phasing out a fundamental constitution of Dasein, or better (because, more accurately), taken to the end, it aims at phasing out Dasein. Its negativity and existential opacity shows up decisively here; this concept of freedom wants to negate that to which Dasein is bound (thrownness), but can only experience this negation as a fundamental task insofar as it passes over the existential origin of Dasein’s being bound, i.e., this concept passes over the fact that Dasein binds itself.

The Founding Analysis has already shown (albeit unthematically) that the existential origin of binding is the for-the-sake-of; the for-the-sake-of binds Dasein to thrownness. Accordingly, it is already clear that this concept of freedom is inappropriate to the grounding formulation of the fundamental ontological problem of freedom. If the concept of freedom as caprice has any significance at all (it does) it can have this only as derivative. In the first instance freedom is and must be freedom towards ground and precisely not freedom from ground because Dasein itself is original self-binding, i.e., original giving-itself-ground.

That this concept of freedom passes over the origin of binding indicates that it belongs primarily (but not necessarily wholly) to self-interpretedness from the “world.” Thus, in consonance with Heidegger’s earlier discussions of freedom, Heidegger says in the Essence of Human Freedom that “The first way,” namely, cosmological freedom “asked after freedom by inquiring into the possibility of its unity with the causality of nature.” That is, it asked about freedom from within the horizon of the problem of nature (what is possible, what is in fact, what is necessary, as opposed to what ought to… in general). “So there it is a question merely of the possibility of freedom, not of actual freedom or of the freedom which actually

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23 And thus, in the examples of Kant’s transcendental concept, Locke’s, Hobbes’ and Mill’s, freedom is in each case mediated and (thus) limited.
24 EHF 181, what follows is a single long quote interspersed with commentary
25 Ibid.
26 Cf. CPR (A/B) 840f. / 868f.
exists in man.”27 This must be the case because cosmological freedom is freedom interpreted according to nature, and precisely not, properly speaking, according to Dasein (i.e. ‘personality’ in the Kantian-practical sense). Kant understands this; it is methodologically inherent to his work. Transcendental knowledge for Kant is knowledge of appearances, i.e. of the visibility of ‘nature.’28 Dasein does ‘appear’ but this appearance is not ownmost to it; with respect to nature, Dasein is properly only ‘intelligible.’29 “Accordingly, the problem of the second way [practical freedom] will be to discuss and demonstrate actually existing freedom as the freedom of the ethically acting human being. The first way treats the possible freedom of a present being in general [being according to nature], the second treats the actual freedom of a specific present being, i.e. of the human being as person [i.e. as Dasein].”30

Thus, even in Kant, cosmological freedom is freedom insofar as it is proper to a horizon other than Dasein and is thus not yet the freedom of Dasein. Kant himself makes no pretence otherwise. Properly understood, Kant’s insistence in the third antinomy that cosmological freedom may still possibly belong to an ‘intelligible subject’ is his way of protecting the phenomenon of Dasein in general – or ‘personality’ in Kantian terminology – from being subsumed under the forms of sense and the categories of understanding (i.e. as a ‘mere

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27 EHF 181
28 On the appropriateness of ‘nature’ as opposite of practical philosophy cf. GMM 4:387ff., 4:427 & CPR (A/B) 840f. / 868f. Nature is used in two senses here. In the narrower sense it refers to cosmology in opposition to psychology and theology, as Heidegger employs it above. But, this use is not completely dominant for Kant’s discussion of freedom in the CPR, cf. CPR (A/B) 381, 535, 845f. / 563, 873f. However, this is only because nature in the broader sense is also at issue, namely physiology per se. Physiology (the science of nature in its various forms) refers ultimately to metaphysica specialis, and ‘transcendental philosophy’ by comparison, refers to non-formal metaphysica generalis (which is nonetheless bound to the former). Thus, the problem of transcendental freedom ‘is not a physiological problem but a transcendental one’ (CPR (A/B) 535 / 563) because it is not to be solved by an analysis of rational cosmology or rational psychology, which would have given “the possibility of freedom” (but would rely on transcendental illusion to do so). And so, the goal of Kant’s analysis of freedom in CPR was only to show that “freedom is at least not incompatible with nature.” CPR (A/B) 558 / 586. This freedom is, however, cosmological to the extent that it reflects the appearance of Dasein off of nature in the narrower sense (totality of causes) cf. here EHF 166-168. These are very messy matters, as is indicated when Heidegger quotes Kant as saying “everything which is possible through freedom is practical” KPM (T) 109, and yet, rational psychology belongs to theoretical philosophy rather than practical philosophy (thus, KPM (T) 109f. attempts to do away with the distinction, but, on the other hand, cf. PIK 44f. that Heidegger earlier acknowledged it).
29 GMM 4:456ff., cf. also, EHF 139
30 EHF 181, for glosses, cf. GMM 4:456ff. (Also, because Heidegger is generally not terminologically consistent in EHF, cf. EHF (E/D) 133-134, 137, 139 for nature, cf. 179f. / 192, 197 vs. 256)
appearance’).\textsuperscript{31} It is a way of ensuring that the analysis of appearances and their \textit{a priori} conditions does not foreclose the subsequent, proper question of human freedom. Properly speaking, it shows that transcendental-theoretical philosophy has almost nothing positive to say about the freedom of Dasein.

\textbf{b) The Second Concept of Freedom; autonomy; freedom ‘in’ or ‘as’ the appropriation of the \textit{regula}}

The second concept of freedom is discussed by Kant under the heading of practical freedom. This type of freedom is freedom as auto-nomy, self-regulation, binding oneself to a law.\textsuperscript{32} Practical laws show themselves (first happen, and do so as laws) in the feeling of ‘respect’ for the law.\textsuperscript{33} Kant developed this concept of freedom in connection with his reading of Rousseau.\textsuperscript{34} According to this concept of freedom as Rousseau laid it down, freedom means acting in accordance with a law which one has willingly agreed to.\textsuperscript{35} The most obvious difference between this concept of freedom and that of the first is that here ‘law’ or ‘rule’ now becomes positive and essential to freedom. Indeed, for Rousseau, this concept which he calls ‘moral’ or ‘civil’ freedom, “alone makes man the master of himself; for to be governed by appetite alone [‘natural freedom’] is slavery, while obedience to a law one prescribes to oneself is freedom [viz. ‘civil freedom’].”\textsuperscript{36}

For Rousseau, civil freedom means that society (collectively and individually) wills its ‘general will’ and lays down this will in law (which may only be general), so that the rule of law (the rule of the general will) can flourish on this basis.\textsuperscript{37} If I will the general will, \textit{and I

\textsuperscript{31} Cf. GMM 4:455f., CPR (A/B) 533f./ 561f., EHF 166-168
\textsuperscript{32} EHF 18
\textsuperscript{33} KPM (T) 110f.
\textsuperscript{34} Cf. Engstrom (2002) xxiv
\textsuperscript{35} Rousseau (2004[1762]) 21, 125ff.
\textsuperscript{36} Rousseau (2004[1762]) 21
\textsuperscript{37} Rousseau (2004[1762]) 27f., 33-36, 40-42
am equally subject to it, I am nonetheless free. If the general will prevails but I instead will a private will (as private) in opposition to the general will then I exist in bondage and am no longer free because I am now externally dominated by the general will. Being bound is unified with freedom only so long as the private will wills the dominion of the general will and the general will prevails. If on the other hand (as is more common), an arithmetic of private wills, or the dominance of one private will dominates the body politic then civil freedom is dissolved because the general will no longer determines the law. The latter occurs when the executive suspends the law or when the legislative process has been corrupted.

Here one says something like the following: existence means being regulated (whether the regula is understood to be a priori or else contextually true and thus a posteriori). One says that the first concept of freedom is correct when it says that freedom arises where there is no contradiction between my will and that of the regula, the rule. But freedom is not something which skulks about in the shadows evading the rule; freedom can only exist with respect to the rule (existence means being regulated). Thus, properly speaking, this agreement should not be merely accidental, rather, it should be ‘actively’ achieved; only then can Dasein exist freely. This is made possible in autonomy as self-legislation. Here, this refers to the will’s production or appropriation of laws in such a way that the will brings itself under them ‘willingly.’ If I will that the law should be, and that it should be as a law this means that I will that I should abide by it, and thus that I abide by it freely and am free with respect to it. That is, the will becomes factically free by being in harmony with itself as will, specifically, by bringing itself into harmony with its necessary regulatedness.

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38 Rousseau (2004[1762]) 41-42, 127
40 Rousseau (2004[1762]) 26ff. 30ff. 112ff. 127
41 Cf. Ibid.
Kant’s concept is more difficult to formulate than Rousseau’s. Accordingly, it can only be presented in outline here. Kant’s concept is akin to Rousseau’s because it has its ownmost formulation in *autonomy*, that is, in the power of *self-legislation*; the power and possibility ‘to be a law to oneself.’ Yet this self-legislation no longer primarily belongs to the ‘political animal’ – it belongs to the domain of the *practical*, to what Kant calls the ‘person,’ which is neither ‘animal’ nor ‘political’ *per se*. Personality is *freedom itself*. Accordingly, Kant’s problem refers itself to the *ontological problem of freedom*; of the meaning of being of freedom and being-free. This is not yet properly formulated as a problem in Rousseau.

*As* practical, practical freedom ‘surpasses’ the dominion of theoretical philosophy. Personality, then, is ‘transcendent’ of theoretical philosophy. This ‘transcendence’ means that freedom surpasses any *theoretical* application of the categories of modality. It surpasses them so far as it does not belongs to the ‘is’ (which is *physio-logy* in general), but to ‘the ought,’ and thus, to *responsibility*. That is, the kind of law which belongs to freedom is the binding of ‘the ought,’ and not the ‘it is necessary that…’, ‘it is probable that…’, ‘it is impossible that…’ Freedom is lawful in the horizon of the ‘ought,’ that is, its lawfulness is characterised in terms of its being responsible to and for itself.

For Kant, practical freedom is *essentially* lawful. For Kant, this is a consequence of its connection with causality (causality implies regularity; lawfulness). But this ‘causality’ must be understood as a causality of the will (freedom). This lawfulness can be either pure

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43 Cf. GMM 4:440: “Autonomy of the will is the property of the will by which it is a law to itself (independently of any property of the objects of volition).” EHF 202-203, GMM 4:435, 437, 450
44 Cf. EHF 182-183,188-189, 202-203
45 Ibid.
46 Though it would be possible to show that the problem exists in the background of the *Social Contract*, it never breaks free and comes into its own. E.g. Rousseau (2004[1762]) 2, 4, 8, 21, 64,112,115 126f. *et infra.*
47 Cf. §1a herein, EHF 182ff., & GMM 4:446 etc.
48 Ibid.
49 Possibility–impossibility, existence–non-existence, necessity–contingency, cf. CPR (A/B) 80 / 106
50 EHF 190-193 198f. 202f.
51 GMM *passim*, e.g. 4:447
52 EHF 190, 192. That the above is the case in Kant is clear enough from GMM *passim*. However, *why* it is so is not fully formed and cannot become a thematic topic here. An attempted concrete discussion of the problem would lead far away from the thematic problem of this chapter and the result would have only incidental interest.
53 EHF 192ff.
or impure. It is impure if it wills with respect to nature. This is the ‘heteronomy’ of the will, i.e., the unfreedom of freedom.\textsuperscript{54} If on the other hand freedom wills \emph{itself}, that is, if it wills itself \emph{as} will, then it is pure; it is the phenomenon of pure will. \textsuperscript{55} The facticity of such a will would be the highest factical freedom, i.e., autonomy proper.\textsuperscript{56} As Heidegger explains, in some ways reading Kant against the grain, it is here in the finitude of the will’s power to will itself (to become a pure will) that the ‘ought’ arises.\textsuperscript{57} Because the will tends to interpret itself from the “world” taken care of (heteronomy), \emph{and} because of the finitude of the will’s ability to will itself wholly and purely, the will falls away from its pure willing, and thus, pure willing remains an ought.\textsuperscript{58}

Practical freedom is \emph{self-legislation} because it \emph{is} lawful (self-legislation), \emph{and} because \emph{as} freedom, properly speaking only freedom \emph{itself} may bind itself (self-legislation).\textsuperscript{59} The laws of practical freedom have an essential formulation which is nothing more than the pure will (freedom) itself.\textsuperscript{60} The pure will is given in freedom’s complete harmony with itself (autonomy); this harmony is, in effect, the pure law (kingdom of ends). Accordingly, the pure will exists only in that \emph{self-control} which is in complete harmony with itself. Freedom is only ever truly free when it exists in harmony with itself and that means, when it willingly binds itself to the pure law of its own existence. Taken together this means that pure freedom lets the binding of freedom (its necessary regulatedness) occur wholly \emph{from} freedom itself. Here freedom becomes autonomy \emph{as such}. Rendered incautiously, this says that, in a certain sense, freedom is simply the law whose \emph{essence} is to be for-the-sake-of-itself.\textsuperscript{61}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{54} Cf. GMM 4:433, 4:453f. Here ‘unfreedom’ cannot be equated with the \emph{negation} of freedom per se, rather, it must be understood as \emph{a modification} of freedom; the will wills even in heteronomy however deficient its freedom may thereby become.
\item \textsuperscript{55} EHF 192ff.
\item \textsuperscript{56} EHF 190ff.
\item \textsuperscript{57} EHF p193
\item \textsuperscript{58} \textit{Ibid.}, GMM 4: 454
\item \textsuperscript{59} Cf. Op. Cit. & EHF 195
\item \textsuperscript{60} Cf. EHF 192f., 196, 198f.
\item \textsuperscript{61} Cf. EHF 198f. 202f.
\end{itemize}
Here the second concept of freedom has been formulated primarily with respect to the law. But it could be formulated differently. For instance, Hans Ruin, whose analysis is in some part relied on in this chapter, formulates the same concept as demand; the demand placed upon one to be...; in Kantian language, the ‘ought.’ Demand belongs to the second concept of freedom, but so too does regulation; the two are interconnected. In this analysis, something like a ‘rule’ gains primacy. Conversely, demand gains primacy in Ruin, and must do so, because his analysis delves into a later problem of freedom in Heidegger.

The second concept of freedom, namely what Kant calls practical freedom, is essentially closer to what Heidegger means by freedom, properly understood, than the first concept. The second concept is concerned primarily with the regula. Existentially speaking, it means freedom as resolute self-binding which understands itself in terms of its thrownness and the necessity of its being thrown. It does not want to be free by escaping itself but rather, to be itself as a free self. Existence means being regulated. Existing freely means ‘self-government.’ Indeed, in Kant (as marked by the transcendence of the practical with respect to the theoretical), the whole point is to show that, properly understood, freedom alone can allow the binding of free beings (persons, Dasein) to occur.

§2 THE FUNDAMENTAL ONTOLOGICAL PROBLEM OF FREEDOM

a) Fundamental Ontological Freedom, the Two Traditional Problems of Freedom and the Problem of Ground

α – Summary exposition of the fundamentals of the problem

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62 Ruin (2008) 278-279
63 On the unity of the two names cf. KPM (T) 110-112 specifically, cf. the problem of respect vs. submission.
64 Cf. Ruin (2008) 298 viz. the sending of being; the overpowering.
One should not jump to the conclusion that Heidegger’s concept of freedom is simply Kant’s concept of practical freedom, adjusted by a bit of tinkering; nor should one jump to the conclusion that the existential formulations of the above historical concepts of freedom reach the heart of the matter. The historical analysis above is there in order to show that the analysis of freedom below does not present a historically arbitrary concept of freedom. What should be immediately evident above is that both concepts of freedom are concerned – not completely, but nonetheless decisively – with Dasein’s comportment. They concern Dasein’s action, and thus, they concern Dasein as an ‘actor,’ and primarily as an ethical-political actor. They develop alongside this problem and thus, in one way or another, take themselves from this domain of questions.

Heidegger’s late 1920s problem of freedom is not oriented towards the practical ethico-political domain of problems. This does not mean that it cannot have anything to say about these matters but only that it cannot speak too loudly about them. Heidegger’s concept is neither developed from nor oriented towards ethical action nor any other kind of action. Instead it concerns transcendence in the sense given to this term by the whole of the preceding analysis. This already means, that Heidegger’s concept cannot mean anything like the causality of the will.

If one wanted a simple, introductory historical precedent for Heidegger’s concept of freedom, the best approximation would be the concept of freedom in Schelling’s Identitätsphilosophie. There, at a certain point, freedom is understood in accordance with

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65 Cf. also EHF 204ff.
66 Cf. Ibid. etc.
67 Here, continuity between 1929 and 1930 is already visible. Cf. EHF 13, 203ff.
68 Schelling’s Freiheitsschrift would also be fruitful but not introductory. On this problem of freedom and its connection with ground and evil cf. Dahlstrom (2005a) 72ff. Similarly a comparison of this topic with S:WF and VWG (ER) 8ff., might be fruitful e.g. that ground in VWG leads to an Unwesen, cf. VWG (ER) 124ff. which might be profitably compared to the problem of evil in Schelling’s Freiheitsschrift, and indeed to S:WF 50. The problem of the Unwesen will be elaborated in the next chapter though not in a historical way: an analysis of whether and how Schelling fits into the ‘picture’ cannot be elaborated here. Conversely, Schelling’s ‘Identity Philosophy’ becomes less useful when we find that only the absolute I ‘really has’ practical freedom (self-
Kant’s practical concept, but this concept is now directed towards the totality of theoretical philosophy (the distinctions here are essentially Kantian, though Schelling’s analysis moves beyond Kant in essential ways). Now, one must be free with respect to nature. The primary command is now: unify the I with the not-I… But such unity is the absolute, specifically, the absolute I. And thus the command here, through which theoretical philosophy is grounded in practical philosophy, is: become the absolute! which is to say “become identical[!]” And this command means: be free with respect to the rigidity and un-changeability of the fundamental rules of objective presence! One must make the law, over which one is powerless, one’s own law.

Here, the empirical intelligence wants to be free with respect to that which it has no part in (qua empirical intelligence). Indeed, it wants to be free with respect to that which it can never fully understand. It wants to be the absolute powerlessness which it is, but nonetheless as free. And the only sense in which this is possible is if its own law is to surrender itself to the absolute law, the law of the absolute – but that means, to surrender itself absolutely. The first concept of freedom wants to exist without regulation. Thus, it either does what it wills, or else resigns itself to defeat. Here the second concept allows for the possibility of a freedom which neither controls nor resigns itself. It does this in a way that is non-intentional and which expresses no causality, but rather, concerns the mode of being of Dasein. It wants to freely bind itself unconditionally and to first become truly free by doing so.

The freedom of transcendence is not a matter of comportment. But what this means remains unclear. If both of the above concepts of freedom want to understand freedom as the freedom of comportment, this means that for them to have anything to say in this context they would
require *essential* modification. Only Schelling’s development of the Kantian concept of practical freedom points towards a problem of a freedom beyond comportment (something, however, which he did not keep to).\(^{74}\) It is only with respect to something like this kind of problem of freedom that one can get a grip on the problem of ‘choice’ in Heidegger’s analyses of death and resoluteness.\(^{75}\)

But something akin to the ‘first concept’ of freedom is also relevant to Heidegger’s concept of freedom. Heidegger’s concept is not a pure *amor fati* as is Nietzsche’s deployment of the second concept of freedom in his concept of the eternal recurrence (or at least, one interpretation thereof).\(^{76}\) The key thing here, as elsewhere in Heidegger, is to set forth the problem *in the correct order*. The primary concept of freedom in Heidegger, and that which stands first in the proper (non-polemical) exposition of freedom, is akin to the second concept.\(^{77}\) Anything like the first concept only shows up *subsequently*, and thus, *in a horizon determined by the second concept*.

The second concept of freedom generally refers to ‘acting in accordance with.’\(^{78}\) Acting is comportment. Freedom goes beyond comportment because it goes beneath it. Freedom ‘goes beneath’ comportment because it belongs to transcendence, indeed because – for Heidegger in the late 20s – it *is* transcendence. But Dasein *is* transcendence. Thus we may say: *freedom is a way to be of Dasein in such a way that Dasein is free insofar as it exists.*\(^{79}\)

This indicates the gravity of the problem anew. *Existence is freedom.* The being of Dasein is freedom. Thus, Ruin says of *Vom Wesen des Grundes*;

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\(^{74}\) Cf. *Ibid.*

\(^{75}\) E.g. SZ (S) 268

\(^{76}\) Viz. the interpretation which understands it to say: choose the totality of what is in the totality of its unfolding cf. Nietzsche (2003[1883-1885]) 159, 160ff., 216ff., 235ff., 326ff.

\(^{77}\) Cf. MFL 191-192, VWG (ER) 101ff. vs. EHF *passim*. This priority of the second concept, as we will see, is connected with the *temporal structure* of the problem of freedom.

\(^{78}\) EHF 136f., 204f. Here I differ with Ruin (2008) 286f. with respect to the interpretation of the conclusion to EHF on the basis of the concrete elaboration of transcendence. The complete and sustained interpretation of transcendence has necessitated this differing, and equally shows the inexplicit continuity between VWG and EHF.

\(^{79}\) VWG (ER) 102-105, MFL 185 etc.
It is in the continued elaboration of his theme that Heidegger reaches a point where freedom is suddenly introduced as yet another name for the phenomenon of transcendence. Taken together with the previous statement, that SZ was in fact a meditation on transcendence, it implies that at least at this point he was prepared to see SZ as one long elaboration of the problem of freedom.\(^8\)

François Jaran, for instance, is sceptical of such conclusions. Jaran sees freedom, along with transcendence, as belonging to a post fundamental ontological formulation of the question of being.\(^8\) Thus, only to the extent that the first term of this syllogism, namely transcendence, has been secured against this interpretation, and then, so far as freedom is shown to follow as a necessary problem from transcendence, can Ruin’s insight be fully secured against Jaran’s counter-formulation of the problem. According to the guiding understanding of this thesis, in posing the problem of freedom we are not entering a new and distinct stage in the problem of Dasein; we are penetrating deeper into problems of the Founding Analysis.

\[\beta - \text{Basic Exposition of the Problem (the centre of the exhibition)}\]

Freedom, for Heidegger is ‘essential’ in the sense that it belongs to the essential constitution of Dasein and not just its occasional comportments. And thus, Heidegger says;

> It is unimportant here to what extent something defined as free is, in fact, free or to what extent it is aware of its freedom. Nothing is said here regarding the extent to which it is free or only latently free, bound or enthralled by others or by beings not of Dasein's kind. Only a free being can be unfree.\(^2\)

This indicates quite clearly that Heidegger’s concept of freedom primarily refers to the being of a being, namely Dasein, \(\text{rather than}\) to the existentiell modifiability of Dasein. Freedom is

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\(^8\) Ruin (2008) 282. In turn it is a possible (but unfortunately unattestable) reading of S:WF that Heidegger was already investigating freedom as the domain for the problem of truth and untruth in the summer semester of 1927-1928, cf. S:WF 50f. This connection of course stands at the centre of ET, but is also broadly indicated by \(SZ (S) \S 44 \& pp 297, 307-308.\)

\(^8\) Jaran (2010) 206ff., 213, 216-219, 223 etc.

\(^2\) MFL 191
not first a way of comporting oneself, rather, it is the being of existence (which is, nonetheless in each case factual). Unfreedom is an ontical modification of essential freedom just as comportmental or factual freedom is an ontical modification of essential freedom.

As an essential determination of Dasein, freedom must be exhibited on the basis of Dasein’s essential constitution – and that means, transcendence. What makes this freedom essential is that it is the freedom of transcendence, or transcendence understood as freedom.\(^3\) Thus, Heidegger says: “Surpassing to the world is freedom itself... *Freedom alone can both let a world govern Dasein and world Dasein.*”\(^4\) But surpassing means *transcending* and the Founding Analysis already showed that the *for-the-sake-of* is that which lets ‘world govern.’ Moreover, the Founding Analysis fully articulated the for-the-sake-of according to its complete temporal structure as the worlding of the world and showed that this structure is constitutive for *existence* itself qua transcendence. And this means that if one properly understands transcendence, one already, albeit nascently understands freedom.

Thus, the for-the-sake-of is itself, already, original *self-binding*, that is, *it is freedom in something like the second sense*. And because the for-the-sake-of is the existential origin of all thrownness, of Dasein’s being determined, this means that Dasein thrownness comes from its freedom, that Dasein is essentially free. Accordingly, if the world is the “totality of the for-the-sake-of”\(^5\) then Dasein is bound to the world, but only qua ‘autonomy’, only as original *self-binding*. That is, the original binding of Dasein is the binding of *freedom*. *Original* binding does not come from things, does not come from thrownness, but from existing as the for-the-sake-of; as the futurity of transcendence, i.e., Dasein can only be bound *from* freedom.

\(^3\) Thus, for instance, this problem of freedom is more ‘essential’ than that concept formulated by Günter Figal in Figal (1998[1994]) which is not to say that the latter cannot also gain a legitimate warrant (Heideggerian and/or otherwise) for its basic problem of freedom.

\(^4\) VWG (ER) 102-103 (modified). Here it is appropriate to note that this thesis must take a different path to freedom than VWG and MFL since, following the power of hindsight and attempting a systematic exhibition of the problem, the Founding Analysis has made it impossible to ‘leap into’ the connection of freedom and selfhood as Heidegger did in VWG & MFL.

\(^5\) VWG (ER) 100
But for this very reason original binding must be originally indefinite and thus unconditional. Futurity unconditionally delivers itself over to thrownness. As ‘unconditional’ it is not yet a law, that is, it is more essential than any proposition or proposition-complex. Arising from the future of transcendence, Dasein binds itself ‘before’ any possible voluntarism. But this means that Dasein binds itself in the essence of its being whether it ‘wants to or not,’ i.e., whether it is factically free or unfree, and indeed, in a way that is existentially prior to any possible ‘wanting.’

Dasein is essentially free, only because it binds itself; because the binding comes from its being. Because Dasein exists as the for-the-sake-of, Dasein can never be ‘free’ in the sense of existing in the complete negation of bonds – indeed ‘existing in the complete negation of bonds’ is a contradiction in terms. But if the original binding of Dasein is constituted in transcendence this binding cannot be understood in the everyday sense. Moreover, since ‘by itself’ the for-the-sake-of is indefinite, any definiteness which attains to this original binding arises only from the for-the-sake-of’s intrinsic temporal articulation and situatedness. And if the temporal articulation of binding leaves Dasein in its definite factual situation, and this situation is nonetheless open and questionable this means that original unconditional self-binding must nonetheless also point to something like freedom in the first sense. This is already indicated when we consider that as transcendence, that to which essential freedom is bound cannot be anything like a ‘mere fact’ – such binding occurs only in comportments. But if comportments are grounded in transcendence, and this means that facts are primordially grounded in non-facts, this also indicates the necessity of something like freedom in the first sense.86

Freedom must be ‘freedom towards ground’ because Dasein – as the temporalisation of its transcendence – must exist from ground, that is, it must exist for-the-sake-of-itself. To the

86 Thus, cf. VWG (ER/EG) 128-129 / 134. (the proper understanding of the phrase “Nicht als sei die einzelne freie Verhaltung grundlos…” is disputed between Malick and McNeill. But both ways of understanding this passage support the above. The above will be further elaborated in the next two chapters).
extent that existence *itself* is the *origin* of its own ground and Dasein primarily exists in terms of this ground, Dasein may be said to exist *as* freedom (specifically in the second sense). Dasein is never grounded ‘before’ the for-the-sake-of, rather, existentially speaking the for-the-sake-of is *original ground as such*. To the extent that this original binding throws Dasein back upon the possibility and indeed the *necessity* of choice (which will be demonstrated in §2b), this concept also gives freedom in the first sense.

Freedom is a way of being related to grounds. Specifically, freedom is the *happening* of ground, that is, freedom is the relation to grounds which pre-intentionally, and thus transcendentally, belongs to the essence of Dasein. This indicates that the grounding which we are concerned with here cannot take its primary guidance from the everyday understanding of ground (which, for instance, wants to understand the origin of grounds categorically rather than existentially). Equally, it indicates that if we analyse the structure of grounding which pertains essentially to transcendence – and do so with special reference to how Dasein exists towards this ground – this is equally an analysis of freedom. The temporal-transcendental analysis of grounds is not separate or ancillary to the problem of freedom, rather, it is identical to the latter problem. It is to this topic that we now turn. The problem of grounding will also be further developed in the next chapter.

**b) Freedom as the Existential Problem of Ground**

Freedom is essentially transcendence and freedom is essentially freedom towards ground. Heidegger calls the relationship between freedom and its ground, ‘grounding.’ Thus, when Heidegger formulates the question of freedom towards ground he asks; “to what extent is the

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87 Cf. MFL 216 etc.
88 VWG (ER) 125, 127
89 VWG (ER) 102-105, 128-131
90 VWG (ER) 100, 105
transcending of Dasein a grounding in the ways we have mentioned?"⁹¹ Here, as throughout, we see that transcendence is nothing more than another name for freedom. *Which means that, at bottom, this analysis is simply an analysis of the being towards ground which belongs to the inner meaning of transcendence.*⁹² The modes of grounding pertain to transcendence in the sense that transcendence constitutes them, but not only this; the point is to show why transcendence itself is necessarily a grounding.

The for-the-sake-of is original letting govern; it is original ground.⁹³ In fact, this was already visible in the Founding Analysis where the for-the-sake-of was shown to be original letting-matter.⁹⁴ But the most primordial for-the-sake-of belongs to transcendence itself and thus, specifically *doesn’t* belong to the *intentum* or the *intentio*. The modes of grounding unfold according to the essence of temporality, thus there are three modes of grounding corresponding to threefold structure of temporality.⁹⁵ Under the topic of transcendence the unfolding of the for-the-sake-of into the having-been and enpresenting of transcendence has already been discussed at length and this unfolding has been exhibited as the inner unity of transcendence and temporality.⁹⁶ Here we are precisely oriented towards the freedom of the world – or being-in-the-world, or world as freedom – under the *guidance* of this prior elaboration of transcendence. That is, we are interested in the delimitation of how transcendence intrinsically implies grounding.

Because freedom is a question of transcendence here, it is a question of the happening of Dasein. Accordingly, the modes of grounding must also exhibit this orientation towards historicity and transcendence. And if Dasein’s historical character must refer itself upon precisely this kind of ground this already indicates that a new dimension to the problem of

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⁹¹ VWG (ER) 104-105  
⁹² Thus, Cf. VWG (ER) *passim*, esp. pp 29, 33, 109, 111-115  
⁹³ VWG (ER) 102-103, 107  
⁹⁴ See VWG (ER) 92ff. & 107  
⁹⁵ Cf. VWG (ER) 108-109  
⁹⁶ Cf. Third and Final Stages of the Founding Analysis.
historicity is prepared through the analysis of freedom. Within certain strictly set limits these problems will be discussed in the next two chapters.

Heidegger calls the first mode of grounding ‘establishing’ (Stiften). This is the name for the mode of grounding pertaining to the futurity of transcendence. That what we have been talking about throughout the whole analysis is nothing more than freedom, albeit nascently, is clear from the fact that Heidegger, having laid down this form of grounding immediately says that “we could not avoid discussing it [viz. establishing] in the foregoing elucidation of transcendence.” Yet this is the first time that he has used Stiften or any of its cognate words in that text. Accordingly, we are told that it has been mentioned before because it is “none other than the project of the for-the-sake-of.” So, by the same principle, this mode of grounding has also been discussed throughout this thesis, because the for-the-sake-of as original letting-transcendence-matter was central throughout. Being an issue for oneself is original grounding.

This being said, there is one aspect which the preceding analysis does not fully prepare for the problem of establishing. In its connection with futurity, the for-the-sake-of pertains to the excess of possibility. Establishing always outstrips the actual. Establishing is always ‘more.’ This was indicated throughout the Founding Analysis but usually without full thematic force. Here, thematic force must be restored to this dimension of futurity.

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97 VWG (ER) 106-107
98 Cf. VWG (ER) 106ff. Here and throughout Heidegger does not explicitly identify each mode of grounding with a specific ecstasy, but throughout, it is plainly visible – especially when compared to the temporal problem of transcendence developed by the Founding Analysis.
99 VWG (ER) 107
100 Cf. VWG (ER) passim
101 VWG (ER) 106-107
102 On the sense in which this is also original grounding simpliciter cf. the problem of the for-the-sake-of in the Third and Final Stages of the Founding Analysis (cf. also the ontological priority of disclosedness and so on).
103 VWG (ER) 111
104 Ibid.
105 Ibid.
106 On transcendentally appropriate outstripping cf. §3 of the Second Stage of the Founding Analysis. Cf. also the long footnote to §4 of the Final Stage of the Founding Analysis. Etc.
Heidegger identifies the second mode of grounding with being amidst (the *inmitten*) and ‘attunement’ (*sich befinden* and *Befindlichkeit*).\(^{107}\) This already indicates that the before-which is an issue. That the before-which is a mode of grounding is clear enough. An important, though difficult problem throughout the preceding analysis has been to show that this character must be understood from the for-the-sake-of and not otherwise. Thus, for instance, it was shown in the Final Stage of the Founding Analysis that the before-which forms a unity with the for-the-sake-of.

This second type of ground Heidegger calls ‘taking ground’ (*Boden-nehmen*) which he associates with Dasein’s being ‘taken in by’ beings (*Eingenommenheit*).\(^{108}\) The ground which taking ground takes is its before-which (thus not simply the beings which ‘occupy’ Dasein but more elementally the before-which of transcendence itself). Taking ground must be a *taking* ground because its roots come from the for-the-sake-of. Dasein never merely ‘has’ roots.\(^{109}\) *Existentially speaking* Dasein *gives* itself roots because its existence is primarily grounded in the future.\(^{110}\) Transcendence, which exists for-the-sake-of-itself must then, in its complete and unified structure be a taking up roots. To exist freely in transcendence means to take the for-the-sake-of into one’s being as the before-which of transcending qua ‘taking ground.’ Transcendence itself is the original rootedness of Dasein.\(^{111}\)

If the futurity of transcendence (self-binding) means that Dasein is essentially free, and Dasein is primarily futural, and temporality is always temporalised as a unity, this means that the free self-binding of the for-the-sake-of is essentially freedom for its being grounded by having-been and of being powerless before this having-been. *That is, the self-binding of the for-the-sake-of binds Dasein to the whole of its temporally articulated situation.* This is not,

\(^{107}\) VWG (ER) 106-109
\(^{108}\) VWG (ER) 104, 108-109 etc.
\(^{109}\) Cf. the Final stage of the Founding Analysis.
\(^{110}\) If one wanted to interpret it existentially, this is more complicated and only true sometimes and in some ways.
\(^{111}\) This was already shown, in a different way and for different reasons by the Second Stage of the Founding Analysis, thus; Dasein is either factically rooted in and by transcendence or in and by intentionality/comportment, the latter is derivative, therefore transcendence is original rootedness.
in any original way, a matter of ‘factual choice,’ but comes from the self-binding of temporal transcendence itself.

Here, with these two modes of grounding we return to the kind of problem which pertained especially to authentic care as anticipating and guilty. Establishing means the for-the-sake-of in its essential outstripping. In grounding qua establishing Dasein exists as grounded in and by possibility. On the other hand, taking ground means deprivation. Taking ground deprives Dasein of possibilities and makes some necessary. But if the unity of establishing and taking ground expresses the same essential tendency of Dasein as anticipation which anticipates as guilty, what then of the ‘grounding’ which corresponds to resoluteness?

As the grounding which arises from the future which has been, this mode of grounding must give voice to the unity of establishing and taking ground and must do so as an enpresenting. The mode of grounding which pertains primarily to enpresenting Heidegger calls founding (Begründen). McNeill first translates this as the ‘grounding of something’, and later, usually, as the ‘grounding of things’, why he did this is not perfectly clear. What is clear is that, while the function of the word ‘of’ in this translation is good and proper to Be-gründen, the latter’s prioritisation of thing-relatedness is disastrous and that, consequently, one has to fight the translation in order to hear what the text has to say (about transcendence, about freedom and about Begründen). In common German, Begründen means ‘justification.’ Thus Heidegger’s analysis of the problem moves through the ‘why’ and has to first mark off the comportmental ‘why’ from the transcendental ‘why.’ Connected with this is the fact that

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112 VWG (ER) 111 (transcendently: the world is always this world etc., cf. also the analysis of guilt in Part I, §1bβ & Third Stage of the Founding Analysis §3b etc.)

113 Ibid.

114 VWG (ER) 112-113

115 VWG (EG) 127, 130ff. One might speculate that this is because of the ‘be-’ prefix (which comes from ‘bei’) in connection with the usual interpretation of the ‘bei’ as the thing-relatedness of care (Sein-bei..., Behalten, Besorgen etc. – but not Befindlichkeit). Contra the universal application of such a principle cf. SZ I.1.ii which brings out the more general meaning of be- (in its discussion of bin and bei) by connecting bei with bringing X near, or bringing X into an inner connection with... (thus Begründen becomes ‘bringing into ground...’, ‘granting ground’, ‘bestowing ground’).

116 VWG (ER) 112ff. This is one of those cases where it is pivotal that one understand ‘transcendental’ in Heidegger according to the primary meaning given to this word by the First Stage of the Founding Analysis.
justification’ includes questionability, whilst questionability equally harbours original justification. Heidegger’s analysis of the why leads him to the problem of being on the basis of transcendence. The relation between being and transcendence will be discussed in the final chapter, for now we simply want to understand the meaning of transcendence as founding.

The enpresenting of the unity of establishing and taking ground – as the enpresenting of outstripping and deprivation – leads of necessity to the enpresenting of the ‘why?’ The original ‘why?’ is nothing more than the enpresenting of existence (Existenz not Vorhandenheit) in its essential questionability. But Dasein can be concerned with questionability only in a relation of grounding, that is, in a relation to grounds. In founding, Dasein exists in questionability. Enpresenting does not have the power to overcome what is questionable in the unity of possibility and deprivation, but only to enpresent it. That is, so long as founding genuinely refers to the enpresenting of the unity of establishing and taking ground, founding refers itself to the inner questionability of what is given in this unity. For precisely the same reason however, Heidegger’s analysis also shows that ‘asking why’ and ‘knowing why’ belong together and determine each other. That is, the ‘why?’ does not arise from a rootless floating about, but rather, in the giving and givenness of futurity and having-been. Concisely: the ‘why?’ is always grounded in disclosedness, and so, in this sense, the belonging together of question and answer is not only a guiding precept of Being and Time; it is also a fundamental result of the existential problem of grounds.

But this means that founding is also genuinely ‘justification.’ Since, it is only here, in founding that one ‘fixes’ grounds into a justification. This ‘fixing’ is nothing more than bringing to a stand in enpresenting (i.e. a specific ‘type’ of enpresenting). And for this

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117 Cf. VWG (ER) 113-119
118 VWG (ER) 115ff.
119 VWG (ER) 114-115 (which may be profitably compared to SZ (S/S) 385)
120 VWG (ER) 112ff.
121 Cf. Op Cit. This fact is most powerful with respect to the understanding of being because of the specific finitude of ontical knowledge, cf. VWG (ER) 115-117. This may also be profitably compared to Vassilacopoulos (2008).
reason, without explanation, Heidegger uses *Ausweis* and *ausweisen* – the latter of which Hans Ruin befittingly renders as *demonstrating* – as synonyms for founding, along with *Rechtfertigungen* namely, justification or ‘right-construction’ and *Rechtgebung* (literally, something like ‘correctness-granting’). Transcendentally speaking (i.e. with respect to transcendence) founding means enpresenting ground. For this reason founding pertains to both questionability and justification. But this enpresenting is not just a ‘having-an-object’ (founding does not merely ‘make something present’). Rather, founding, the enpresenting of ground, means bringing Dasein, as transcendence, into its ground, that is, into the grounding pertaining to resoluteness. Bringing into ground is an essential mode of grounding. The essential meaning of this bringing-into is *truth*: existing in truth.

With the connection between truth and enpresenting ground we see why Heidegger chose to call this mode of grounding *Begründen* and why he might also use *Ausweis* as a synonym of the latter. He does so for the same reason that he always enters the problem of truth through its deficient formulation (as copula, judgement, statement etc.), namely, in order to effect a revolution within the deficient phenomenon, and to transform it into the original phenomenon of truth. Founding means ‘justification’ yes, but as a way of being of Dasein! In this ‘way of being of Dasein’ lies the central matter such that founding means the original ‘justification’ which pertains to the happening of Dasein as transcendence; original truth. Founding is standing in the truth of establishing which has taken ground. That is, justification, ‘brought back to its ground’ (i.e. into the original phenomenon of truth) means founding (rather than the converse).

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122 Cf. VWG (ER/EG/D) 112f., 116ff., 120-122/ 130f. / 169f., Ruin (1994a) 228. The word *Rechtgebung* is particularly uncommon (but not a neologism first formed by Heidegger) and presumably formed on the basis of – and gaining its specific sense from – the ‘colourless’ German expression “jemandem Recht geben” which is used to cede (*geben*, above this is rendered as ‘granting’) that someone is correct or justified (*Recht*) in such and such a matter (for guidance on this problem I would like to thank Daniel P. O’Connell and Shawn Loht). Accordingly, Malick translates it as “justification” (VWG (ER) 120f.) and McNeill translates it as ‘legitimation’ (VWG (EG) 132). These are reasonable translations only so long as, in our interpretation of the relevant passage, we yoke them to the problem of primordial truth being worked out in VWG. Whether we read the text in the German or in the English there is a danger (linked to Heidegger’s hermeneutic strategy) that we might do the converse.

123 Thus, cf. VWG (ER) 133-117, SZ (S) 297, 307-308. This may be profitably compared to the temporal analysis of truth in the Third Stage of the Founding Analysis §3cγ.

124 Cf. BP §§16-18, MFL *passim*, LQT *passim*, ET *passim*, SZ §§7, 44 etc.
So far as the primal possibility of both question and answer is transcendence itself, transcendence in its complete structure is original truth\textsuperscript{125} – but this is nothing more than the guiding presupposition of \textit{Vom Wesen des Grundes!}\textsuperscript{126}

Finally, it is only here, in founding, that something like choice becomes an issue. That is, \textit{founding presents the existential basis for the first concept of freedom}. In founding, Dasein exists in the questionability of its happening in such a way that Dasein encounters and must encounter the ‘rather than.’ That is, Dasein encounters the ‘rather than’ because Dasein exists in situated questionability where questionability already includes ‘options.’\textsuperscript{127} And since the ‘why?’ arises primarily from transcendence this means that ‘choice’ must be more original than comportment – indeed, it means that ‘choice’ is ontological prior to selfhood, i.e., that selfhood always already blossoms in and through a concrete gatheredness of ground (but not, therefore in the annihilation of questionability). And thus, ‘having-chosen’ belongs to the concretion of the happening of the being which transcends. But this means, that the more determinate this having-chosen becomes in the facticity of Dasein – which mostly exists as ‘the they’ – the more that authentic founding must announce itself as a ‘hearing into the distance,’ i.e. a hearkening beyond the pseudo-concreteness of the they. It also means that as grounded in founding, any comportmental choosing is never merely arbitrary.\textsuperscript{128}

\textsuperscript{125} I.e. founding, i.e., grounding qua enpresenting; the meaning of founding is truth; truth is the meaning of grounding qua enpresenting. The question about the essence of grounds thus requires a response to the question about the essence of truth (but it is not possible for this thesis to now enter into an exhaustive elaboration of the problem of truth). For reasons that should become clear in the remaining chapters, founding is also bound up with the dissolution of primordial truth (namely, through entanglement in things and the they). This potentiality for dissolution is intrinsic to the meaning of primordial truth. On the other hand, if one wanted to find here an analysis of the devolution of primordial grounding into the common concept(s) of ground then one will inevitably be disappointed by the present exhibition. For architectonic and hermeneutical reasons, this thesis can only provide a (de facto) answer to these questions in the Ch. 3 of the Founded Analysis.

\textsuperscript{126} Cf. VWG (ER) 19-29, \textit{a potiori fit denominatio}, as it were.

\textsuperscript{127} VWG (ER) 115, 123-125, MFL 137/ 219 etc.

\textsuperscript{128} And so, one could start to reintegrate Figal (1998[1994]) here, that is, to mediate the two formulations of the problem of freedom (viz. that formulated in \textit{Ibid} and that formulated herein)
Part III – the Founded Analysis

Understood temporally, this means that the first concept of freedom is grounded in the second concept; caprice is grounded in self-binding because enpresenting is grounded in futurity.\textsuperscript{129} Because neither establishing nor taking ground ‘solve’ the ‘riddle of existence,’ enpresenting of ground means the enpresenting of questionability; bringing it near, holding it near and then existing from this nearness or the levelling thereof. Within this enpresenting lies the original possibility of founding this or that comportmental choice, and thus, of resoluteness which holds-for-certain whilst being ready to take it back, or else, Dasein, as released to questionability which is nonetheless grounded, has the possibility of existing in factual unfoundedness, for instance, in curiosity and so on.\textsuperscript{130}

c) Closing Reflections to the Foundational Exhibition of the Problem of Freedom

The horizontal schemata as horizontal schemata already refer to ground. Thus, the question of freedom was primarily a question of exposing and developing this ground character of Dasein’s schematism. Accordingly, all that differs between the for-the-sake-of and establishing; the before-which and taking-ground and; the discursive enpresenting of transcendence and founding is that the latter of each pair has been \textit{developed} in its grounding character. This was already preliminarily indicated when Heidegger was quoted as asking “to what extent is the transcending of Dasein a grounding in the ways we have mentioned?”\textsuperscript{131} That Dasein is its freedom is secured by the sense in which its original grounding is the self-binding of the for-the-sake-of (where Dasein \textit{is} its for-the-sake-of). The further unfolding of the temporal structure of ground is nothing more than the complete exposition of the original

\textsuperscript{129} And equally then, one might be able to show that the higher dominance of the first concept of freedom in British liberalism is indicative of the kind of dominance of the present already announced in the that country’s penchant (during the Enlightenment, but also more generally) for empiricism, and thus, for starting purely with what is present and basing everything on this foundation (which, in the economy of SZ means a philosophy of falleness).

\textsuperscript{130} VWG (ER) 117-119 & SZ (S) 307f., also cf. SZ (S) §36. The implication here, is of course, that the truth of founding is best understood with respect to the truth of resoluteness and as a development of that problem.

\textsuperscript{131} VWG (ER) 104-105 given, the Founding Analysis \textit{passim} (esp. the Final Stage)
phenomenon of the aforementioned binding. But that means that world itself, in its existence (i.e. transcendence) is the primal grounding of Dasein.

And so, Heidegger says that “freedom is… the origin of ground in general.”\(^{132}\) That is, “freedom is the ground of grounds.”\(^{133}\) This is an existential statement and not a statement about the ontic organisation of nature. Binding unfolds itself into the original threefold structure of grounding. As this original phenomenon, the threefold structure of grounding is the basis upon which the intelligibility of every other mode of grounding is existentially possible, for instance, as Heidegger implies, Aristotle’s four causes.\(^{134}\)

World is the most primordial opening upon which the happening of Dasein happens and thus belongs to original, historical ground. As we saw, the connection between transcendence and temporality is intrinsic. We may thus already say, in a preliminary fashion, that the ‘being between birth and death’\(^{135}\) is the temporalisation of transcendence for-the-sake-of-itself. Temporalising historicity means existing with a heritage, and to this extent, it refers to grounding. But if freedom is the origin of grounds this means that in an essential way historicity is a temporalisation of freedom.

Finally, as the problem of founding showed, freedom is freedom in and of and for the open. As freedom, Dasein is opened to itself, released to its possibility and abandoned to itself. But, this means that the existentiell meaning of ground becomes the regula which pertains to a ‘de-regula.’\(^{136}\) To put it paradoxically, only because freedom is wholly freedom towards the regula as such (establishing, for-the-sake-of) is freedom given the possibility of existing in an un-regulated way; the first concept of freedom is grounded in the second concept.

\(^{132}\) VWG (ER) 104-105; origin = Ursprung

\(^{133}\) VWG (ER) 127

\(^{134}\) VWG (ER) 5-11, 119-121. This does not imply that these existentially derivative grounds ‘mimic’ the three transcendentental modes of grounding. Nor does it mean that freedom is the primary ontical or ontological ground in any other sense, thus not the ‘ground of grounds’ on the ordo essendi or ordo cognoscendi in any classical sense: freedom is not a ‘prime mover’ etc. Cf. VWG (ER) 104ff.

\(^{135}\) I.e. historicity, cf. SZ (S/S) 373 etc.

\(^{136}\) Cf. VWG (ER) 116ff., 124ff.
Both traditional concepts of freedom, in their existentially purified sense, come to a simple and direct fruition when in Heidegger’s 1930 public lecture *On the Essence of Truth* he defines the hidden essence of freedom as ‘letting-be.’ Letting-be is essential self-binding which keeps itself open in its questionability. Letting-be is neither the first concept of freedom nor the second, neither establishing, taking ground nor founding; it is the original unity of all of the above thought with respect to the complete problem of facticity. Insofar as the temporal problem of freedom pointed us towards this unity, it pointed us towards the phenomenon of letting-be. It did so through the temporal articulation of grounds which, as temporal, must be understood as an essential unity. However, aside from this reference of grounds to temporality and analogy to the previously attested unity of the horizontal schemata, no attempt was made to concretely demonstrate and set forth the inner temporal unity of freedom towards ground.

Heidegger himself first properly grapples with the phenomenological problem of the unity of freedom under the determination of freedom as letting-be. With this however, he brings freedom into the domain of the simple. Because here, in the problem of freedom Heidegger thinks the simple, he can think freedom without passing through transcendence. That is, the power of genuine, simple unity already says everything which needs to be said. For instance, in the simplicity of letting-be, the dominance of intentionality is itself already

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137 ET 144ff.
138 Ibid. & pp 148, 152f.
139 Cf. ET 144-146 this complete problem harbours both transcendence and comportment, something for which the analysis here is not yet ready but will be discussed in the following chapters. To foreground this problem it is enough to note that while transcendence is existentially prior to intentionality etc., fallenness on the other hand is existentially prior. For this reason any analysis which confronts the authentic potentiality of being of factical Dasein must ultimately analyse the being which is already fallen with respect to its existential possibility.
140 That the position is exegetically founded, cf. VWG (ER) 119-121. The question has been mostly passed over in order to first experience it here, in §2c without undue complication. On the other hand, an additional though limited analysis of the problem is nonetheless made in §2 of the next chapter. The latter formulation remains within the systematic problem of transcendence. Accordingly, it can achieve the unity but not the simplicity of ET’s concept of freedom, whilst conversely, it bears the power of the aforementioned systematics whilst ET doesn’t.
141 VWG (ER) 119-121 et passim. That founding is the ‘unity’ of establishing and taking-ground does not count towards the proper phenomenon of the unity of grounding as Ibid. implies, and the analysis of discourse in the Third Stage of the Founding Analysis §3cγ, applied to the present problem, shows.
142 Cf. ET passim
143 Thus, not solely ‘what transcendence says’, cf. the next chapter for additional explanation on this point.
overcome, and thus we are already transposed into the domain of the truth of transcendence. Though, here of course, we must experience letting-be in its essential reticence for this to become powerful, otherwise, letting-be becomes another simple ‘relation to beings’ ‘relation to being’ etc.\textsuperscript{144} This reticence is achieved in \textit{On the Essence of Truth} through the \textit{Destruktion} of the common concept of truth preceding the analysis of letting-be.\textsuperscript{145} Accordingly, central achievements of the problem of transcendence are preserved in this achievement of simplicity.\textsuperscript{146}

Now, in \textit{On the Essence of Truth}, freedom secures itself and preserves transcendence within itself in such a way that Heidegger no longer ‘needs’ to say or think his fundamental question through transcendence. Thus, for instance, world is now simply thought as the open and this is thought from the essence of freedom.\textsuperscript{147} Truth is thought from freedom.\textsuperscript{148} The simple takes over the power of transcendence in such a way that transcendence, as a thematic concept, is silenced – but not thereby rebuked.\textsuperscript{149} Nonetheless, once this simplicity is in view, the beginning of the passage beyond transcendence is secured – the passage beyond horizon, and thus beyond philosophy as a science, the passage beyond \textit{Being and Time} and into the simple which it had sought.\textsuperscript{150} In freedom as letting-be the phenomenon of transcendence and the central goals of the analysis of transcendence are preserved – but, \textit{in service to the simplicity of freedom}, the ‘architectonic’ dimension of transcendence is dropped.

\textsuperscript{144} Cf. vs. VWG (ER) 112-13, Second Stage of the Founding Analysis etc.
\textsuperscript{145} Cf. ET 140ff.
\textsuperscript{146} Though, the achievement is no longer fully systematic which is either a boon, an Achilles’ heel, or, as it were, both.
\textsuperscript{147} Cf. ET 147
\textsuperscript{148} ET 143ff.
\textsuperscript{149} Cf. the concept of silence and reticence in SZ \textit{passim}
\textsuperscript{150} Technically, the passage beyond the philosophical science/horizon is more complicated than this (but cannot be exhaustively analysed here), cf. EHF 5-6, Kiesiel (2005[2001]) 202ff. but, cf. MFL 1ff. & 209f. which hedges its bets, indeed MFL 207ff. includes what would require the most radical commitment the science/horizon-character of philosophy but then, cf. vs. MFL 221. However, cf. the Editor’s afterword (MFL 223ff.), which states that MFL 221 was not delivered.
Once this change is begun, it changes itself. The task of the turning – which belongs to Being and Time – comes to necessitate a modification of the thinking guiding Heidegger.\footnote{Thus, whereas ET is frequently associated by Heidegger with the turning to Time and Being – and this means it belongs to the same, it also effects a change, an alteration wherein new necessities emerge in the task of thinking etc. On the relation between turning and alteration cf. Heidegger in Richardson (2003[1963]) xvi ff. and Sheehan (2001) 3ff.} That is, here we stand at the first stirrings of that turning which comes to fruition in the Contributions. This ‘fruition,’ as Ruin has shown, no longer speaks explicitly and thematically of freedom but ceases to do so only because it wants to think freedom more essentially (and to preserve thinking against the humanistic/idealistic problem of freedom).\footnote{Ruin (2008) §§4-7}

If transcendence is that in connection with which philosophy may aspire to be a science (it is), the experience of essential freedom is that in which philosophy finds that it must never aspire to be a science but must aspire to be something more.\footnote{Thus, EHF 14 etc.} The consequences of this shift are vast – the shift is not just ‘science’ vs. ‘non-science’. The central problem here revolves around the problem of Dasein’s happening and of the question of the inner meaning of finitude. In the one, truth gets entangled with the mere happening of an existential structure, in the other, the happening of truth is the simple ‘origin’ which is to be thought wholly from its own element.\footnote{Cf. the Founding Analysis herein vs. ET passim. Cf. also Ruin (1994a) 237. This equally points us to the problem of the ‘truth which prevails’ and its ascendant priority in the shift away from the approach of SZ cf. Dahlstrom (2007) esp. 68ff. For and against the discussion in Ibid. of the problem of Seiendheit in the late 20s cf. §4 of Ch. 3 of the Founded Analysis herein.} And thus, in the one, finitude means being-horizontal, in the other, horizon no longer speaks to the truth of finite existence.\footnote{Ibid. (the most powerful expression of the connection between horizon and finitude occurs at BP 308)} Thus, when On the Essence of Truth says that freedom is original truth, this is basically the same as what Vom Wesen des Grundes says when it identifies truth with transcendence and freedom but the sameness nonetheless gives way to a fundamental difference.\footnote{Cf. VWG (ER) 19-29, ET 146-147}

Just as the ‘leap over beings’ pertaining to transcendence preserves and originally discloses the central phenomenon of the ontic, so too must the later philosophy’s “leap over…
transcendence”\textsuperscript{157} which questions “inceptually into Seyn and truth”\textsuperscript{158} preserve – or begin by preserving – the power of transcendence even as the latter’s structural power (its forming of the question) slips away. In this sense, transcendence leads Heidegger to a ‘new beginning’ but, once there, the philosophical ‘baggage’ of transcendence is made to be ‘out of its element.’\textsuperscript{159} This does not contradict the previous analysis worked out in the First Stage of the Founding Analysis which said that Heidegger primarily gives up on transcendence because it is hermeneutically/rhetorically unwieldy or dysfunctional, it only supplements it.

Freedom, then, is at once a central phenomenon of transcendence – a central phenomenon of \textit{Being and Time} – and a central phenomenon of the turning beyond and away from \textit{Being and Time}. And thus, deep within the time of this decision about the direction of his thought, that is, deep within this critical point, Heidegger says of an apparent change in Kant’s thought that:

Kant’s philosophy is rich in ‘overturnings.’ These, however, cannot be comprehended by the disastrous method of the common understanding which wants to hold up different results against each other. By contrast, a genuine and substantively necessary overturning is always a sign of inner continuity and thus can be grasped only from the whole problematic. When confronted by opposing statements [esp. those which may be chronologically ordered] we must always exert ourselves to understand the underlying problem. It will then emerge that no change of standpoint in fact occurs.\textsuperscript{160}

\textsuperscript{157} Contributions 177
\textsuperscript{158} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{159} Thus, Contributions 167-167, SZ (S) xvii (preface to the seventh edition) etc.
\textsuperscript{160} EHF 185-186
Chapter 2

Selfhood in the Light of Transcendence (and not the other way around)

“If the “I” is an essential determination of Dasein, then it must be interpreted existentially.”¹

¹ SZ (S/S) 117
Throughout the late 20s Heidegger indicates that selfhood is rooted in transcendence.\(^2\) Similarly, throughout this time Heidegger refers to transcendence as a happening and sometimes as an ‘Ur-happening’ – and it could be no other way because transcendence pertains in an essential way to the factical temporalising of temporality, which can only properly be a ‘happening.’\(^3\) But both selfhood and historicity are ontologically determined as the constancy of existence and thus, at a fundamental level both of these questions belong together.\(^4\) More broadly speaking, Heidegger also consistently indicates that the problem of being-with (which is, of course, connected with both selfhood and community) must also be thought from transcendence.\(^5\)

In *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, in the midst of a transcendental formulation of selfhood, Heidegger is particularly scathing about the reception of SZ §64 “Care and Selfhood.”\(^6\) There, he says that he does not expect §64 to be readily understood and lashes out at people in general for their ‘crudeness’ and inability to think ‘abstractly.’ This clearly indicates that SZ §64 is important, difficult and speaks positively of something far removed from everyday understanding.\(^7\) But since SZ §64 remains preliminary, the importance which Heidegger ascribes to it indicates that the fundamental ontological exhibition of selfhood remains decisively incomplete at the end of SZ I.2. By unfolding the problem of SZ §64, this chapter will show that what is essentially difficult about SZ §64 is bound up with the problem of transcendence. But, in accordance with the above, by unfolding the problem of selfhood in connection with SZ §64 this thesis will be torn away from the certainties of the common understanding.

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\(^3\) E.g. VWG (ER) 88-89 128-129, EP 329 etc., cf. also Final Stage of the Founding Analysis.

\(^4\) Cf. SZ (S/S) 322f. 375, 390f.

\(^5\) Cf. BP 296-302 (esp. 300), PIK 213-214, MFL 139 vs. 167 &180, §11c., VWG (ER) 85ff., 100ff., 129-131

\(^6\) MFL 188f.

\(^7\) Cf. *Ibid.* – here he uncommonly speaks highly of Hegel, and, approvingly lets Hegel speak of abstraction on his behalf. This is significant given the way the analysis of this chapter must proceed and thus may be taken as partial exegetical justification for the way in which this analysis proceeds (also cf. MFL 140).
Similarly, in the conclusion to SZ §77 (which concerns Count Yorck’s correspondence with
Wilhelm Dilthey), Heidegger indicates that there is a genuine and necessary question
concerning the unity of the difference between ‘historicity’ (Dasein) and the ‘ontic’ (qua
Yorck’s term for non-Daseinal beings). The fundamental exposition of this problem would
only be possible from transcendence because transcendence is that upon which such a ‘unity’
– and the difference – first flourishes. This unity and difference will be touched on in the
next chapter. Equally important however, is that here in SZ §77 – and indeed throughout SZ
I.2.v – historicity is used as a name for the being of Dasein. This of course does not mean
that historicity is now something ‘ahistorical’ – it means that the primal meaning of history
must now be thought of as the being of Dasein.10 But to think Dasein as primal history means
to fundamentally radicalise and renew our understanding of Dasein. This chapter and the next
make some contributions towards this radicalisation.

It is simple enough to formally connect all of these questions with transcendence: selfhood is
the Who of being-in-the-world (transcendence).11 Historicity includes the primal situatedness
(transcendence) of Dasein (transcendence).12 Being-with (thus also destiny) is the being-with
of being-in-the-world (transcendence). Historicity is temporal, temporality ‘is’
transcendence. Similarly, if that which gets handed down in (world-historical) artefacts is
precisely the world of Dasein which has-been, then these artefacts are somehow ‘signs’ of the
transcendence (the Da) which has been.13 But, at best these merely indicate questions which
are as yet unmasked.

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8 Cf. SZ (S/S) 403-404, cf. also Farin (2012) §2. In general, the analysis presented in SZ §77 on Dilthey and
Count Yorck’s correspondence has a close (and in part identical cf. Farin in CTD 89) precedent in CTD Ch. 1.
On the reasons for its not being published at the time and analysis of its significance cf. Kisiel (1989). Since
CTD hails from a time before fundamental ontological transcendence became an issue for Heidegger, and this
thesis is focussed on historicity only so far as it pertains to the question of transcendence, this thesis must be
primarily guided by SZ rather than CTD. Of course, given SZ (S/S) 377, 403f., CTD necessarily remains an
important document for the wider problem of Heidegger’s question about historicity both in the 20s and beyond.
Indeed, one of its more valuable contributions is to make clearer how Heidegger’s project can ally itself to
Dilthey and Yorck’s thought (cf. CTD passim esp. p 2 infra)
9 Viz, vis-à-vis the question about being as such in §4, Ch. 3, of the Founded Analysis.
10 E.g. SZ (S/S) 372-377, 382-385, 392f., also cf. Farin (2012) §2 (on the problem of historicity in Yorck)
11 On this determination of the Who cf. SZ (S/S) 45, 113f.
12 Cf. Founding Analysis
§69c (cf. Founding Analysis esp. Third Stage §2) this is exactly what Heidegger says when he says that: “The
The fact that Heidegger links historicity with transcendence is simple enough to show and has been relied on throughout the preceding analysis. But why and how this is the case is much less clear and thus requires its own development. And so, if this thesis had to rely on ‘happening’ in order to properly formulate its topic, it now befalls the analysis to attest and work out this connection. The Founding Analysis exhibited the unity of Dasein and world but did so ‘at the expense’ of selfhood. Through the analysis of this chapter we will find that this expense was really a gain for the problem of selfhood and historicity.

Similarly, in connection with historicity and selfhood it becomes possible to determine the meaning of freedom towards ground more fundamentally. In summarising the problem of grounding Heidegger asks what unifies the three modes of grounding so that they are all a ‘grounding’ and responds:

At our present “level” of inquiry… we cannot elucidate the meaning of grounding in terms of which the three ways of grounding correspond to one another both in unity and in bestrewal [gestreut i.e. temporal articulation]. To hint at this meaning, it is enough to point out that establishing, taking-ground and justification [Rechtgebung: an alternative for founding], each after its own fashion, spring forth from care for constancy and that which is as constant [der Sorge der Beständigkeit und des Bestandes] which itself is possible only as temporality.

Malick translates “der Sorge der Beständigkeit und des Bestandes” as “the care of existence and permanence” and McNeill translates it as “a care for steadfastness and subsistence.”

happening of history is the happening of being-in-the-world. The historicity of Dasein is essentially the historicity of the world which, on the basis of its ecstatic and horizional temporality, belongs to the temporalizing of that temporality.” SZ (S/S) 388 (modified). On this, cf. §§1-2 of Ch. 3 of the Founded Analysis.

14 If, on the one hand, Zer-streuung, namely that which is commonly translated as ‘dispersal’ is the ‘bad’ (Zer-) kind of being-strewn, Streuung is being-strewn to which no ‘negative’ connotation accrues. In MFL 137f., 214f. Heidegger appears to associate Streuung solely with the priority of the whole belonging to transcendence whereas VWG (ER) 104-109 appears to solely associate it with the temporal articulatedness of freedom (and must be interpreted in that way above). In either case, something like ‘bestrewal’ belongs to Dasein’s existence. Only in fallenness does this bestrewal result in the ‘dis-soluteness’ of Dasein as discussed by SZ §§35-38.

15 Cf. VWG (ER / D) 120-122 / 132 (modified)

16 Of course, Bestand later becomes a central indication for the essence of technology (commonly translated as ‘the standing reserve’ Cf. The QCT passim esp. p 17 et infra). We can understand this etymologically so far as the German Bestand is etymologically identical to the English ‘standby.’ Accordingly, the German word Bestand does mean resource; that which is ‘standing by’ for subsequent deployment, but it can also indicate
Thus this phrase becomes completely innocuous – aside of course from the fact that it now says that freedom is freedom towards substance and arises therefrom which of course is a disaster of some magnitude! In accordance with the above tendency of interpretation, this statement, which concerns the fundamental essence of ground, is basically absent from English speaking literature on Heidegger. Yet it points to the most fundamental – and thus the most important – problems of freedom. Through this chapter it should be possible to come to grips with its basic meaning and show its inner connection with historicity (§2c).

Some difficulty in this analysis is unavoidable. Primarily this just means that we are far away from everydayness, and, have thus been cut off from all obvious grounds. In the problems of historicity and selfhood this thesis is forced to turn to new and difficult analyses and to experience selfhood primarily from the Founding Analysis, that is, to become increasingly independent. This is the case because only on the basis of something like the Founding Analysis can Heidegger’s hints – and they are only ever hints – at the transcendental problem of selfhood be understood at all.21

The goal of this chapter is to formulate the ‘essential selfhood’ which pertains to transcendence and to demonstrate the former’s connection with factual authentic and factual inauthentic selfhood. To that end, this chapter (which is no doubt controversial) attempts a constancy in a more general sense. Thus, in English we can also say “he stood by his earlier statement”, i.e., he was steadfastly constant. And so, in accordance with the latter possibility (but not the former), Heidegger uses Bestand positively in SZ to indicate the self-constancy of Dasein (along with kindred words such as Ständigkeit and Standfestigkeit, cf. SZ (D) 46, 303 (terminology), 313, & esp. 322, (that it is also sometimes also used for the permanence of things cf. p 153). Thus, yes, in QCT Bestand does mean ‘standing reserve’, however, in SZ and in texts from that era, so far as they deal with selfhood, Bestand refers to Dasein’s self-constancy (or else, constant presence when used vis-à-vis objective presence); the word is simply used in a different sense and in a different context in each case.

17 VWG (ER) 120-122
18 VWG (EG) 132
19 The problem is similarly rare elsewhere, but has slightly more purchase in German scholarship, thus Ebke (2005) 4f. quotes the passage and shows that it as an existential rather than categorial problem. Rosales (1970) 278ff. uses it in connection with reflections on the problem of the unity of analogy as a means of exhibiting how VWG presents the ontological difference. Melčić (1986) 105 uses it as a kind of link between fundamental ontology and the metaphysics of the subject which enables the former to de-struct the latter. Siewerth (1987) 443ff. uses it, as part of a collection of quotations, with the aim of evoking the problem of transcendence. He does this as guidance for the meaning of VWG’s footnote on the problem of being-in-the-world and theology (cf. VWG (ER) 90f. infra).
20 Thus, MFL 188-189
21 I.e. one cannot pose the question without having first secured an understanding of transcendence.
radicalisation of Heidegger’s problem of ‘metaphysical selfhood’ (here called ‘essential selfhood’) on the basis of the foregoing analysis in connection with the fundamental ontological problem of self-constancy. In the Metaphysical Foundations of Logic the ‘metaphysics of Dasein’ refers to the problem of a purely transcendental interpretation of Dasein. But since the transcendental problem is a ‘metaphysical’ problem this already indicates that the problem of the ‘metaphysical selfhood’ of Dasein must come into direct conflict with substance-metaphysics, i.e. traditional metaphysics. Accordingly, a central part of this chapter is to radically experience selfhood in its originary difference from substance.

In accordance with the difficulty of the subject matter this chapter does not build upwards, as if stone by stone, but centres on the one question and progressively brings it more and more into its ground. There are three stages to the problem. In the first stage the problem is preliminarily cleared, first, by some general reflections (§1a), then by an analysis of SZ §64 (§1b) and then by a reflection on the connection between selfhood and the self-binding of freedom (§1c). In the second stage (§2), the problem of historicity is introduced. Firstly this means an analysis of the problem of constancy and its foundational connection with historicity (§2a). Secondly, the ontological distinction between selfhood and transcendence is worked out (§2b). With this the basic answer to the question of essential selfhood is given. In §2c the phenomenon of selfhood is further deepened and an answer to the question about

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22 Cf. MFL passim. Esp. §§10 & 11c
23 For the purposes of exegetical pre-grounding of what follows: the metaphysical neutrality of Dasein “is not an empty abstraction from the ontic… it is rather the authentic concreteness of the origin,” i.e., the “primordial… potency of essence” (MFL 137) in such a way that “in its metaphysically neutral concept, Dasein’s essence already contains a primordial bestrewal” (MFL 138) which is grounded in thrownness and this thrownness can be understood in the dimension of the problem of Dasein’s metaphysical neutrality (Ibid). This metaphysical neutrality is to be understood as freedom (MFL 139). In turn, this metaphysically neutral concept can only break into view through Dasein’s most extreme existentiell authenticity (MFL 139-140); that is authenticity alone breaks open Dasein’s metaphysical essence so that “the more radical [i.e. authentic] the existentiell involvement (Einsatz) the more concrete the ontological project [i.e. the project of metaphysical neutrality],” MFL (E/D) 140 / 177. Finally, however, we find that “transcendence in the sense of being-in-the-world is the basic metaphysical constitution of Dasein” which means at the same time, temporality (MFL 167), or indeed, transcendence is the “basic metaphysical constitution” of “the metaphysical essence of Dasein as such.” MFL 180. Thus the analysis of Dasein as transcendence becomes the variously named; metaphysical analysis of Dasein, the analysis of Dasein in its neutrality, and the essential problem of Dasein. This chapter gives terminological priority to ‘essence’. On the use of the word ‘metaphysics’ in the late 20s cf. Mindfulness §116.
24 Cf. SZ (S/S) 117
the origin of grounding is formulated. Through this, the phenomena of freedom and grounding are *eo ipso* clarified in their basic meaning.

In the third stage the question of transcendental selfhood is posed from the problem of the destiny (*Geschick*) of Dasein (§3). Destiny is the temporal problem of being-with. Here, in §3, the problem of history starts to enter its own. However, the primary task of §3 is to formulate the concretion of essential selfhood as destinal (§3a) and then to unravel the foundation of the whole chapter (§3b). Through §3b the problem of selfhood is returned to the complete meaning of being of being-in-the-world (which in each case transcends *and* comports).

§1 – Formulation of the Problem of Selfhood in Terms of Free Transcendence

Here we are interested not so much in what there is to say about selfhood in general, but about what transcendence ‘has to say’ about selfhood. Heidegger repeatedly links transcendence and selfhood, but only in hints and hermeneutic anticipations and not in a fully concrete way. And so if these hints have any clout at all, and the connection between transcendence and selfhood remains obscure, then above all, so too does the fundamental phenomenon of selfhood remain obscure.

a) Preliminary Disambiguation of the Problem of Selfhood

We know that Dasein is not the subject and that Dasein is ‘I myself.’ Dasein is not the subject; instead, Dasein is being-in-the-world. ‘At first’, and especially (but not only) if one

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25 SZ (S/S) 384f.
26 See previous citation.
27 SZ (S/S) 114
has a pragmatist orientation, this simply means that the term ‘subject’ implies a ‘self-contained consciousness’ whereas Dasein is not a sphere of immanence or a ‘container’ etc.\textsuperscript{29} Thus here, we might say, the term ‘subject’ is identified with immanent consciousness, whilst, in the analysis of Dasein we negate this immanence and its structure.

But this only goes part of the way towards identifying what is ‘negated’ when Dasein is opposed to the subject. What is left out by it is the fact that the statement ‘Dasein is not the subject’ also says that Dasein is not substance.\textsuperscript{30} Recognising this is essential to the proper formulation of selfhood; the Who of Dasein; the being (i.e. das Seiende) which is in the world.\textsuperscript{31} We must not hubristically underestimate the difficulty of this problem. In outline, that Dasein is not substance has a manifold of consequences, chief amongst which are that Dasein is not the ‘I’ to which properties accrue (subject-predicate), and nor is Dasein a ‘constant presence,’ i.e., Dasein is not constantly objectively present etc.\textsuperscript{32} This means of course, that any project of Dasein’s essential selfhood cannot be founded on the “I” if one understands this “I” as substance.\textsuperscript{33} Finally, it also implies, via other important phenomena (e.g. intentionality is derivative), that selfhood in the existential sense is not identical with first-personhood, but rather, properly speaking it is ‘neutral’ with respect to the language of ‘first’, ‘second,’ and ‘third’ person.\textsuperscript{34} Grasping the full weight of this last consequence is the hardest of all.

\textsuperscript{28} SZ (S) 53
\textsuperscript{29} Thus, SZ (S/S) 56, 62, cf. also Raffoul (1998) 160f. Not only does this concept of ‘limit’ go against the phenomenon of Dasein, it also goes against the ‘in’ character of Dasein (thus, SZ (S) 53-56) which was discussed in the Third Stage of the Founding Analysis and shown to be grounded in the for-the-sake-of. No attempt was made there to temporally articulate this ‘in.’ Such an analysis would have been instructive, and indeed, the temporal articulation of this ‘in’ must be understood to be structurally constitutive, but a threefold articulation of a single preposition would have made for exceedingly dense reading and was thus left out.
\textsuperscript{30} Thus, SZ (S) 46, 114-115 etc. On the history of this term Cf. WT 105f.
\textsuperscript{31} SZ (S/S) 45
\textsuperscript{32} SZ (S/S) 114, 318, 321f.
\textsuperscript{33} And one all too easily does so, as Heidegger argues in SZ (S/S) 46, §64 et passim.
\textsuperscript{34} Cf. MFL 188, thus, SZ (S/S) 116 infra.
Ch. 2: Selfhood

It is a central precept of the fundamental ontological project that being is understood according to time.\(^{35}\) If our understanding of selfhood amounts to the constant presence of personality in accordance with the vulgar concept of time, then it is clear that this temporal determination points to objective presence and thereby, to an inappropriate formulation of Dasein.\(^{36}\) Submission of the problem of selfhood to the vulgar concept of time is submission of this central determination of Dasein to objective presence. If historicity is the time in which Dasein as Dasein ‘lives,’ this already indicates the connection of selfhood and historicity. Here, ‘self’ is obviously not body, soul, spirit, nor the dialectic or unity of the above. Selfhood is a phenomenon of Dasein and must be understood accordingly, i.e., existentially.

In Cartesian terms, selfhood is the most obvious, the most immediately and apodictically given and thus the ultimate foundation, yet in Heideggerian terms this is no longer the case. Indeed, Heidegger’s analysis of selfhood in SZ §64 includes the statement “care does not need a foundation in a self”\(^{37}\) alongside the statement “care already contains the phenomenon of self.”\(^{38}\) Thus, selfhood needs a foundation in care but not the other way around.\(^{39}\) But if this means that selfhood is ontologically subsequent to care, then the Founding Analysis already encountered the problem of selfhood in similar terms. There it became possible to see the sense in which “existing, Dasein is its world.”\(^{40}\) Since the world is not a being, the unity of Dasein with its world ‘suspended’ or ‘radically’ silenced selfhood and showed that transcendence does not need a foundation in a self. Accordingly, it now behoves us to think selfhood anew in a way which does not violate the necessity of this prior suspension, that is, to found selfhood on transcendence and not the other way around.

\(^{35}\) Cf. Part I, herein esp. §1a. Cf. also BP§20 et seq., MFL141ff., LQT 164ff., KPM (T) xvii, §§44-45 etc.

\(^{36}\) On the connection between the vulgar concept of time and objective presence cf. SZ (S) 373-374, 422-423 (but the connection is nowhere thematically analysed with complete and single minded dedication; the connection is operative and not thematic: it is more something which a careful and ontologically oriented reading such as Dahlstrom (2001) 380 etc. picks up on)

\(^{37}\) SZ (S/S) 323

\(^{38}\) SZ (S/S) 318

\(^{39}\) Cf. Ibid. & SZ (S/S) 375 (the latter as clarification of the former)

\(^{40}\) SZ (S) 364
The Who of Dasein is its particular being a being. Thus, the problem of how Dasein can be a Who and at the same time its world now refers itself to the fundamental problem of selfhood in connection with transcendence, where *transcendence has priority over selfhood.* Dasein is a being, but it is a being *by* being for-the-sake-of itself and existing freely as transcendence. This insight must be made concrete.

### b) Selfhood as the Self-Constancy of Being-in-the-World

Selfhood is disclosed in anxiety. The proximal self is the they. Authentic selfhood is won from the they but not by setting itself against the they, that is, not by attempting to become everything that the they is not, or nothing which the they is. But for our purposes, the most important domain for the problem of selfhood is the problem of transcendence in connection with the problems of SZ §64 “Care and Selfhood”, anticipatory resoluteness and historicity. This includes the problem of ‘mineness’ (*Jemeinigkeit*) but cannot rest with it. Mineness is constitutive for the phenomenon of selfhood but not the solution to the problem of selfhood in and of itself.

The results of SZ §64 are primarily negative but nonetheless instructive. In connection with this, its primary purpose within the unfolding of *Being and Time* is to ensure that the problem of the unity of Dasein (viz. temporality, as per SZ §§65 *et seq.*) is not inappropriately yoked to the “I.” In outline, SZ §64 tells us that Dasein ‘expresses’ its selfhood in ‘saying I’

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41 Cf. SZ (S/S) 53, 322 etc.
42 Incidentally, the same problem is already indicated if we say that Dasein is its time, whereas ‘temporality is not a being but temporalizes’ as per SZ (S) 17, 328 & *ff.* etc.
43 For an explicit formulation of selfhood along these lines cf. MFL 189, VWG (ER) 84-85, SZ (S/S, D) 251 (the latter is here understood vis-à-vis the for-the-sake-of as exhibited in the Third and Final Stages of the Founding Analysis).
44 SZ (M&R) 188
45 SZ (S/S) 126-129
46 Cf. SZ (S/S) 130, 299, 383, VWG (ER) 131
47 Cf. SZ (S/S) 317 & *ff.*
Ch. 2: Selfhood

(which one ought to understand in terms of discourse) but this by no means indicates that particular Dasein expresses itself ‘truthfully’ in doing so. 

In SZ §64 we find that Kant says, saying-I means saying-I-think. Heidegger tells us that Kant’s inclusion of an essential relatedness of the “I” is superior to an inert formulation of the “I.” Because, in turn, Kant’s ‘I think’ (cogito) necessarily refers to an “I think something”, Kant’s formulation of saying-I says that the “I” is its intentionality and thus, that the “I” intends insofar as it is. But, says Heidegger, if this means ‘I intend innerworldly beings’ (it does), then saying-I primordially includes saying I-am-in-a-world. That is, saying-I primordially refers selfhood to being-in-the-world and thus refers selfhood to transcendence. This remains covered over in Kant.

In Kant the “I” is understood from the acting and intending of Dasein. According to Heidegger, the “I” must be understood in explicit connection with world, that is, transcendence. Heidegger tells us that, because Kant fails to understand the worldliness of saying-I, his Paralogisms must at once say that the “I” is not substance and that it is substance. But this says: the non-substantiality of Dasein’s selfhood becomes visible only in world, that is, in transcendence.

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48 Cf. SZ (S/S) 318ff.
49 SZ (S/S) 318-319 Kant does not literally ‘say this’ but according to SZ §64 it is how selfhood ‘expresses’ itself in Kant’s work; cf. the orienting gesture of SZ (S/S) 318
50 SZ (S/S) 320-321
51 Cf. SZ (S/S) 318-321. Here, Heidegger’s later Kantdeutung is already operative, namely, the priority of sensibility and its unity with understanding. That the priority of understanding was already a problem for Heidegger in 1919, albeit within a different register, cf. Farin (1998) 276f. Thus, while Heidegger here begins by acknowledging the canonical formulation Kant’s ‘I think’ as an ‘I combine’ (pure understanding) he soon brings it under the power of sensibility. Accordingly, the I-combine “in its full essential content” means “I think something” cf. SZ (S/S) 321. Similarly, heading his analysis of Kant’s ‘I think’ (and thereby qualifying it and apologising for its incompleteness) Heidegger refers the reader to the third Abschnitt (‘part’ in Taft’s translation and ‘section’ in Churchill’s) of KPM (cf. SZ (S/S, D) 319 infra & KPM (D) viii). On the other hand, the pre-Gesamtausgabe edition of SZ instead refers us to SZ II.1 (which of course was to concern Kant’s schematism) for the “concrete phenomenological-critical analysis of transcendental apperception and its ontological significance”, cf. SZ (EH) 319 infra (my translation). In this context, given the Second Stage of the Founding Analysis, it is not only possible but necessary to interpret Heidegger’s reference to the ‘I think something’ as intentionality.
52 SZ (S/S) 321
53 Cf. Ibid. (Heidegger does not explicitly name transcendence here)
54 SZ (S/S) 319-321
55 Ibid.
It is not as though only philosophers make Kant’s mistake, indeed, everydayness first makes intelligible the necessity and origin of Kant’s mistake and the quandary he ends up in. Everydayness also tends to understand the “I” in something like Kant’s way. It does this because it interprets itself out of the “world” taken care of. Here Dasein experiences its self as a specific kind of constancy which persists throughout the tumult of dealings. Saying-I becomes the ‘saying’ of something constant in the “world” of things, but that means, saying-I now understands the “I” from and within a categorial horizon. Since, in this mode of saying-I Dasein remains hidden from itself and empties itself out as the ‘common’ corresponding to the tumult of things, everyday Dasein arrives at the formal-logical “I.” In sum, everyday Dasein arrives at the proximal concept of the “I” as substance.

The main issue here is that selfhood gets understood categorially. Fallenness interprets itself from the “world” taken care of. In the throes of this falling, Dasein itself (existence; the non-categorial) is dispersed so that Dasein itself, in its existence, is inconstant. But being a ‘Who’ needs some kind of constancy, that is, the orientation towards constancy in the vulgar problem is not entirely groundless. Thus, for Heidegger the fundamental concept and happening of selfhood must instead be understood as the constancy which pertains to anticipatory resoluteness. But with this, in Heidegger’s exhibition, selfhood proper now means the self-constancy of Dasein – it is this, and only this, which is essentially in-each-

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56 SZ (S/S) 321-322
57 Ibid., or, what is more powerful: from the self-identification pertaining to, or reflected off of Dasein’s Erlebnismannigfältigkeit (cf. SZ (D) 130) viz. the manifold of experiences, (which, presumably refers, or could profitably refer to Husserl’s affinity for ‘flux,’). This is ‘more powerful’ to the extent that it must refer to a near absolute un-self-constancy of Dasein.
58 Ibid.
59 Cf. Ibid.
60 Cf. SZ (S/S) 317-323
61 Cf. SZ (S/S) 321-323. Here with inauthentic selfhood, and its self-interpretedness one could locate the problem of property ownership itself and its political and ontological-metaphysical priority in certain factual situations. Indeed, here the parallelism is particularly strong between Vassilacopoulos (2008) 143, Nicolacopoulos & Vassilacopoulos (2010[1999]) 20ff. and this thesis’ presentation of SZ §64. Similarly then, with this reading of SZ §64 one could here begin to formulate an alternate groundwork for Nicolacopoulos & Vassilacopoulos (2004). This last article is in some ways especially close to the broader problems of this chapter and in others wholly different. Disentangling this similarity and difference cannot become a task here.
62 SZ (S/S) 323, 375, 382ff.
That this existentially appropriate being-constant is grounded in anticipatory resoluteness means that selfhood is grounded in authentic existence. Indeed, Heidegger goes so far as to say that “Existentially, selfhood is only to be found in the authentic potentiality-of-being-a-self, that is, in the authenticity of the being of Dasein as care.”

Anticipatory resoluteness, which stands in the open (exists), is the possibility of standing in the open as constant. But in accordance with the existential priority of ‘saying I-am-in-the-world’ this priority of anticipatory resoluteness includes a fundamental self-projection onto transcendence. Here, moreover, it is essential to see that constancy is itself a temporal determination. This temporal determination does not mean ‘persisting through time’ – which after all would hew to the vulgar concept of time. Inauthentic Dasein is un-self-constant qua irresolute, and thus, ‘dissolute’; its temporality is entangled. Anticipatory resoluteness is steady and steadying; its temporality is primordial and authentic. And thus, the problem of selfhood now refers itself to transcendence, authentic temporality and anticipatory resoluteness.

c) The Pre-Temporal Problem of Selfhood and Free Transcendence. Breaking open the radical phenomenon of selfhood. The necessity of an exposition in terms of historicity.

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63 SZ (S/S) 375 & the preceding analysis. Thus, self-constancy which is in each case ‘mine’ rather than mineness which is constant. It is with respect to the problem of self-constancy that transcendence is most relevant to the problem of selfhood (contra Raffoul (1998) 164 vs. 158ff.: which thinks transcendence differently – but also, it would seem variously as per Raffoul (1998) 145-165 – and thereby thinks constancy in SZ as a kind of construction). Conversely, an exhibition of mineness doesn’t intrinsically need transcendence. Accordingly, in general, the analysis here is something like the converse of Raffoul (1998) so far as the latter primarily approaches the problem through mineness without attempting to get rid of self-constancy while this approach wants to think the problem through self-constancy without getting rid of mineness. Accordingly, moreover, there is not really enough material for a confrontation between this analysis and passages such as Raffoul (1998) 24, 29, 103ff. 153, 164, 253 etc. Similarly, as much as Raffoul (1998) 151ff. notes and grasps the central problem guiding this chapter (that selfhood is founded on transcendence) he does not penetrate into the question in the same direction as this analysis.

64 SZ (S/S) 323
65 SZ (S/S) 322-323
66 Cf. SZ (S/S) 322-323
67 Cf. Ibid. & SZ (D) 322-323
In SZ I.2, anticipatory resoluteness – which itself is already self-constancy, i.e. existentially appropriate constancy – is the primary signifier for self-constancy, and thus for selfhood. After *Being and Time* Heidegger links the problem of selfhood to transcendence and freedom, but also hints that the complete transcendental problem requires that its connection with care is also developed. This should indicate, albeit provisionally, that the complete problem of transcentendally understood selfhood must develop the problem in accordance with authentic care (anticipatory resoluteness) rather than replace the earlier analysis.

Anticipatory resoluteness is the counter possibility to falling. SZ §64 tells us that Dasein can only be as constant by not falling, that is, by not being its intentionality (which is not the same as not intending at all). Transcendence is different in kind from intentionality but as the ‘origin’ of intentionality it is also the hidden ground for the usual priority of intentionality in Dasein’s self-interpretation. Conversely, as original openedness, transcendence must also form some part of the possibility of a free resolution against fallenness, i.e., of resolution which holds itself open in not falling.

Freedom pertains primarily to transcendence and not to the self-interpretation of fallenness. Conversely, as we will see in §3, authenticity is connected with hearkening to transcendence. But this indicates that *freedom* has its most proper existentiell expression in authentic care; that authenticity is the existentiell possibility of Dasein in which freedom comes into its own. Accordingly, concrete, factical grounding (i.e. freedom) which is factically free must be understood as the anticipatory establishing of resolute founding (which thus includes guilty taking-ground). Here the reader should refer to the problem of essential freedom (and its existentiell modifiability) discussed in §2αβ of the previous chapter. There it was shown that Dasein’s essential freedom is the condition of possibility for existentiell freedom and unfreedom. Freedom yoked to fallenness is the freedom and unfreedom of inauthentic care.
which awaits, retains, forgets and enpresents by ‘waiting on’ the “world.” Conversely, freedom and transcendence belong together with authentic care, but, since authentic care always already comports it is not – and cannot be – identical to essential freedom. Finally however, the above means that if we can found selfhood in essential freedom then this selfhood may be rightly called essential selfhood.73

What then does self-constancy mean when thought directly from the essence of freedom? The self-constancy belonging to anticipatory resoluteness pertains to the being which is its transcendence. Transcendence, like care, is more original than selfhood. As indicated by the preceding analysis (§§1a-b), only as transcendence can Dasein exist as a self in the existentially appropriate sense.74

The for-the-sake-of always belongs to transcendence.75 But the for-the-sake-of pertaining to transcendence is also the original binding of freedom – and binding is itself constancy and steadfastness. That is, freedom itself is already original constancy. Since Dasein is essentially free, Dasein is in a certain sense overpowered by its ground; it is bound to be constant; constancy belongs to its essence. And so, if the being of Dasein is freedom in such a way that “only a free being can be unfree”,76 then, for precisely the same reason, only a being to which constancy essentially belongs can be factically-existentially constant or inconstant.

Freedom now means essential constancy qua original self-binding. As freedom, Dasein is essentially constant so that it can be factically constant or factically inconstant. Thus, if selfhood is the self-constancy of temporality and care, then according to what has just been worked out, freedom and selfhood are essential linked.77 Indeed, if selfhood is self-

73 Cf. also Wesen/neutrality and Unwesen in VWG e.g. VWG (ER) 42 ff. & 85 ff. vs 124 ff. etc.
74 Cf. §1b this chapter.
75 Cf. Third Stage of the Founding Analysis
76 MFL 191
77 This, ‘strong’ formulation is justified given VWG (ER) 100-103, MFL 185
constancy, then selfhood is only possible as freedom insofar as freedom is the essence of self-binding and self-binding means self-constancy.

Of course, neither transcendence nor temporality is a being, and similarly, as the being of Dasein, care is not a being either. Thus, the above has only established that freedom belongs to the inner constitution of selfhood. This must form an essential qualification to the above analysis.

Freedom establishes and founds selfhood. But if, in its most original form, this establishing and founding is wholly pre-intentional, this means that selfhood does not ‘first’ pertain to the “I” which comports, so much as it does to the “I” which transcends. In connection with the whole foregoing analysis, this implies that in selfhood which is understood purely from freedom the world, and only this, becomes a Who, i.e., the selfhood of being-in-the-world as such happens. If freedom gives selfhood, and freedom is ultimately transcendence, then the essential problem of selfhood implies that the world as world gives itself a self. There is no justification for immediately supplementing this Who with all of our usual concepts of selfhood because, at the level of freedom as such, these concepts are not yet possible. And thus, this Who is not yet anything like ‘personality’ or an “I” in the everyday sense.

This grounding of selfhood in the self-binding for-the-sake-of or in anticipatory resoluteness is the necessary consequence of the insight that Dasein is not objectively present. The

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78 Establishes/founds are used as terminology here (cf. §2b, Ch. 1, Founded Analysis). The above already indicates that selfhood is a ground which freedom gives to itself, cf. §2c of this chapter.
79 Cf. the above, especially, §1b, for secondary exegetical attestation of this formulation cf. also MFL 193, 215-216, VWG (ER) 84ff.
80 Cf. also SZ §40, & the problem of anxiety in Second Stage of the Founding Analysis §3a
81 For attestation cf. MFL 182 & §11c, cf. previous citation concerning transcendence and selfhood, SZ (S/S) 273ff. etc.
constancy of Dasein does not just ‘occur’ – that would determine constancy according to objective presence. Instead, self-constancy is a mode of holding oneself and the only mode in which such holding is appropriate and essential is the self-holding of transcending freedom (or else the kindred phenomenon of anticipatory resolve as discussed in SZ I.2).

The constancy of this Who-ness of Dasein is the constancy of freedom. But freedom is a modification of transcendence, i.e., the original phenomenon of world. Accordingly, if Dasein exists as a being by being in the world this is not so much because a world necessarily accrues to the self but rather that a self necessarily accrues to the world (but not in such a way that the world needs a self). In principle, this was already contained in §1a of this chapter. Unfolding and grounding this principle has now become a fundamental task which has only been partly and preliminarily exhibited. Similarly, §1b showed that self-interpretation from the world belongs to the inner meaning of selfhood and only with respect to such interpretation is the (non-substantial) self-constancy of Dasein possible.82

But this still only presents an outline for the problem of selfhood. Selfhood is referred to constancy, but constancy is a temporal determination. Thus, just as Heidegger connects the problem of selfhood with anticipatory resoluteness, world and freedom he also connects it with temporality, saying in the notes for SZ I.3 preserved in the Nachlass:

‘Time’ doesn’t need an “I”\(^83\) (compare, I and time)(I and self), but the reverse: time makes the “I” first possible (not in the Kantian manner). Time is ‘more’ as I – primordially I-like [selbstlich], even when not factical. And so more primordially, because [weil] primordially self-like, factical proximally in the they.\(^84\)

Time does not rely on selfhood, selfhood relies on and arises because of temporality, and this ‘arising’ is ‘essential’. Time itself forms primordial selfhood, but ‘time’ is usually fallen,

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82 Cf. also VWG (ER) 85
83 More literally, “To ‘time’ pertains not an “I””; “Zu ,Zeit’ gehört[?] nicht ein Ich,” AT 12
usually caught up in the “world” and thus selfhood is usually the they, where the latter implies the kind of existentially faulty self-interpretedness discussed in §1b. Time gives primordial selfhood. This primordial selfhood is opposed to the derivative selfhood which factically arises and dominates the existence of Dasein (the they). However, to the extent that factical authenticity is always a modification of the they we must add a third type of selfhood to the typology expressed in the above archival reference, namely, factical authentic selfhood. Factical authentic selfhood is identical to neither the ‘selbstlich’ character of time, nor to the fallenness of the they-self.

The problem of the constancy of Dasein refers itself to temporal problem of constancy. But, the temporal problem of constancy is precisely historicity. Thus, historicity shows itself to provide the temporal problem of selfhood in general. Only in historicity is it possible to concretely determine selfhood – that is, only in historicity understood with respect to authentic care and transcendence. Thus what remains indeterminate about selfhood is indeterminate to the extent that the analysis lacks a concrete understanding of historicity. Through the analysis of historicity, the problem of selfhood will be progressively and more completely grounded and exposed.

§2 – The Problem of Self-Constancy in Connection with Historicity Posed on the Horizon of Transcendence and Freedom

The question of selfhood leads to historicity. Yet, just like selfhood, historicity is a very difficult question and cannot “be solved by a sleight of hand.” In accordance with the difficulty of the question, we find Heidegger again and again speaking of the ‘enigmatic’ character of the questions pertaining to historicity. Indeed, Heidegger even says that

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85 Cf. SZ (S/S) 267
86 Cf. SZ (S/S) I.2.v esp. 375, 390ff.
87 Cf. Ibid. SZ (S/S) 375 vs. §64
88 SZ (S/S) 377
89 Cf. SZ I.2.v passim
preserving and developing this enigma is a central goal of SZ I.2.v. Moreover, near the beginning of *Being and Time’s* analysis of historicity in earnest, Heidegger says that “In the following reflections, we shall content ourselves with indicating the ontological place of the problem of historicity.” And so SZ I.2.v only provides an outline for the problem of historicity, it attempts to preserve historicity as a problem and awaits the possibility of a more complete exposition which, however, would not necessarily have wanted to overcome the enigma. Similarly, this thesis must be content with following the problem so far as it belongs to transcendence and so far as transcendence opens up the problem of historicity. Thus, what follows does not aspire to be a completely exhaustive elaboration of the problem of historicity, which as sparse as the material for such a topic is would nonetheless require extensive analyses.

**a) Basic Project of Historicity and the Constancy of ‘Being Stretched Along’**

In the first instance, historicity is a question of the stretched-along-ness of Dasein, what Heidegger also calls the ‘being between birth and death.’ The question of the being-stretched-along of Dasein gives us the temporal question of Dasein’s self-constancy; its selfhood. And so, the question of historicity is first posed in *Being and Time* with respect to the task of exhibiting Dasein as a whole. If it is established that Dasein has to die, if death belongs to its being, then the constancy which faces death nonetheless remains a question. After all, it would be a mistake to interpret the ‘eminent imminence of death’ as a sign that Dasein is some kind of pure present.

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90 SZ (S/S) 389  
91 SZ (S/S) 377  
92 SZ (S/S) 373-374 which in itself already indicates the constancy which exists as finite, and since the German reads “das Seiende »zwischen« Geburt und Tod.” SZ (D) 373, this statement in fact refers to self-constancy which exists between birth and death: not the ‘seiend’ or ‘Sein’ between birth and death; here this ‘being’ is simply identified with its self-constancy. (though cf. also SZ (D) 374)  
93 SZ (S/S) 373-375  
94 SZ (S/S) 372ff.  
95 SZ (S/S) 383  
96 On the imminence pertaining to death cf. SZ (S/S) 250-251, 264, on the ‘function’ of death in factical existence cf. SZ (S/S) 383
Un-self-constancy pertains to interpreting oneself in terms of the tumult of everydayness and the restlessness of the they.\textsuperscript{97} Thus, un-self-constancy is fallen self-interpretation. But self-constancy must also have a positive self-interpretation. Self-constancy, it was indicated, pertains to anticipatory resoluteness, and thus to authentic care. In self-constancy, by refusing fallenness and dispersal, Dasein is its Who more essentially. Indeed, Heidegger even says that Dasein is a self at all only with respect to this constancy.\textsuperscript{98}

Heidegger tells us: “the existential project for the historicity of Dasein only reveals what already lies enveloped in the temporalizing of temporality.”\textsuperscript{99} It is not different from temporality, merely a development of temporality; merely a matter of seeing the phenomenon with greater clarity and completeness. Of course, when we think of history we think of ‘the past,’ and when we think of the ‘being between birth and death’\textsuperscript{100} we all too easily think of the interconnection, and narrative of ‘events.’ But this amounts to interpreting Dasein’s self-constancy in terms of these objectively present occurrences (as discussed in SZ §64). That is, such self-interpretation is rooted in the phenomenon of Dasein’s fallen un-self-constancy. Thus, such an interpretation of these phenomena attempts to think the self-constancy of Dasein, its steadiness, in terms of what we can now recognise to be its un-self-constancy.

The attempt to ground the stretched-along-ness of Dasein in the interconnection of events cannot answer the question of this ‘being between birth and death’ because it misunderstands it from the ground up.\textsuperscript{101} But selfhood is existentially more primordial than these events. In turn, more primordial than the self-constancy of Dasein is the constancy of temporality itself.

\textsuperscript{97} I.e. §1b this chapter & SZ §64
\textsuperscript{98} Previously cited.
\textsuperscript{99} SZ (S/S) 376
\textsuperscript{100} “…das Seiende »zwischen« Geburt und Tod.” SZ (D) 373
\textsuperscript{101} LQT 76-77 is particularly forceful on this point with respect to the problem of the real and the ideal, but with an eye to the general problem of unity and distinction. In sum it says: there’s a reason why they never put Humpty Dumpty back together again.
Heidegger’s answer to the difficulty about the constancy of Dasein’s time is as ingenious as it is simple: as authentically care, \textit{Dasein is not in need of some additional power to hold itself together, but is itself self-constancy through and through}.\textsuperscript{102}

With respect to the constancy of temporality, we might say that it is without interruption, because, so long as it temporalizes – and here one should note that ‘so long as’ is itself a temporal determination – it is irruption as such. Dasein is its time, and it is its time constantly and constancy characterises this time in its essence.\textsuperscript{103} Accordingly, we must reflect the essence of temporality off of the phenomenon of constancy; only through such reflection do we understand the complete meaning of temporality.

Conversely, the very question of Dasein’s not-holding-together arises from the \textit{phenomenon of Dasein’s dispersal}; it arises from un-self-constancy and thus, it arises from the non-authenticity of world-time and the time-interpretation of now-time.\textsuperscript{104} The problem of putting Dasein ‘back together again’ is only possible on the basis of Dasein’s faulty, ontologically deficient self-interpretation in terms of things. But this self-interpretation is in fact doubly faulty since it not only interprets selfhood within this horizon, it also wants to understand temporality itself from the horizon of fallenness. Anticipatory resoluteness shows this fallen interpretation to be derivative and its obviousness to be illusory. This is how the problem of constancy is solved: the counter-possibility is dissolved because it is shown to be derivative and deficient. The dissolution of the counter-possibility brings us before the phenomenon of constancy itself which is always already ‘there’ in the existence of Dasein. Accordingly, this constancy is a \textit{phenomenon} of Dasein which must then be analysed in its inner constitution.

\textsuperscript{102} SZ (S/S) 390-391
\textsuperscript{103} On Dasein being its time, cf. CTL 212-213, CTD 47, 50ff., 73, 80 but cf. 70ff., LQT 338, in SZ this is given more cautious formulation, e.g., “the meaning of Dasein is temporality” SZ (S/S) 331, but for instance, cf. AT 13, 17, BP 271. Conversely, one can reverse the inference above (\textit{mutatis mutandis}); Dasein \textit{is} self-constancy, constancy is a temporal determination, thus, Dasein is its time in a special sense (delimiting this ‘special sense’ is the business this thesis is now committed to).
\textsuperscript{104} Cf. SZ (S/S) 390, 409-411
And yet, anticipatory resoluteness can only form the solution to the problem of self-constancy, and thus, the fundamental problem of the Who, if Dasein is always already ‘latently’ authentic. Fallenness is existentielly prior to authenticity, but if this priority were all powerful then fallenness would be enough to repel Heidegger’s solution to the problem – because, after all, Dasein is a Who when it is fallen too.\(^{105}\) However, whilst fallenness is indeed existentielly prior, it is not for that reason all powerful. That is, even fallenness must be \textit{latently authentic}.\(^{106}\)

This latent authenticity must include self-interpretedness from the world proper, even as the world is more and more ‘forgotten’ before the power of fallenness. This latently authentic self-interpretedness must refer back to the constancy of temporality itself, even as Dasein divides and allocates time according to the ‘now,’ and to the ‘time for’ and ‘of’ this or that thing.\(^{107}\) Dasein must be latently anxious, latently anticipatory and latently resolved. It must be latently \textit{free}, even as it ‘forgets’ itself in things ‘every day’ of its existence.\(^{108}\)

The existentiell priority of fallenness must conceal within it an existentielly ‘battered and bruised’ existential priority of authenticity.\(^{109}\) Simply put, only because Dasein is toward itself \textit{as such} can it be toward itself in a deficient way. Only in this way is Heidegger’s basic argument intelligible and only in this way can it be grounded.\(^{110}\)

\(^{105}\) Thus, whilst inauthenticity is primarily interpreted as ‘un-self-constancy’ cf. SZ (S/S) 128

\(^{106}\) In this regard, it is relevant to note that, as SZ (S/S) 382 says, anticipatory resoluteness is ‘an’ ‘exemplar’ for \textit{the Essential Constitution of Historicity} (i.e. SZ §74). This formulation of the importance of anticipatory resoluteness for the problem of historicity may also be taken as implicit justification for the more unconventional parts of this thesis’ analysis of the problem of historicity.

\(^{107}\) As occurs in the now-time and world-time respectively (the two are differentiable without being wholly different per se, as Heidegger’s analysis of the vulgar concept of time and world-time’s publicness shows, cf. SZ (S/S) §§79-80, esp. pp 417f.)

\(^{108}\) All of this is indicated by Heidegger’s talk of ‘fleeing before’ (cf. Third Stage of the Founding Analysis §3b) and latent anxiety cf. SZ (S) 190, cf. also SZ (S) 277f. (anxiety calls in conscience) & 189 (anxiety latently determines being-in-the-world in all of its modes)

\(^{109}\) On this twofold, cf. e.g., SZ (S/S) 267 (§54) vs. SZ (S/S) 317 (§64), cf. also SZ (S, D) 184-185

\(^{110}\) Here one might compare Heidegger’s statement that selfhood is located solely in authenticity SZ (S/S) 323 against SZ I.1.iv.
The latent authenticity of selfhood (self-constancy) refers itself to the constancy of Dasein’s time. The constancy of temporality must refer to something like the original ‘facticity of time’ because constancy is not a quality hovering over time but a characteristic of temporalisation itself. This means that the temporalisation of temporality ‘aside from selfhood’ must nonetheless include some kind of ‘situatedness’; it must include something like the open. So, supposing that we want to understand that which is primordially temporalised as beings, events etc. This means we want to understand the constancy of temporality in accordance with ‘its objects’, and thus, we want to understand the constancy of temporality by analogy to intentionality, which, of course, is derivative. Similarly we might want to understand the constancy of temporality on the basis of how it remains the same between point X and point Y – or else we devolve primordially temporality into a substance un-affected by these points, beings, objects etc. (but to which they accrue as properties of its ‘actuality’). In each case, we surreptitiously impose upon temporality something analogous to intentionality and end up at the vulgar concept of time.

But as the Founding Analysis showed, transcendence is the temporality of the open as such. There it was found that the temporalisation of temporality implies the worlding of the world. And so, if the constancy of temporality refers itself onto an original openness then that original open must be the world. The constancy of temporality is the constancy of world; it is precisely not the constancy of innerworldliness, which, as we have seen is constitutive for the origin of inconstancy in general. Indeed, not only does the constancy of temporality refer to transcendence, but as original constancy, temporality is transcendence, i.e. it is transcendent. That is, the original possibility for the constancy of temporality is that it opens… and temporalizes itself in the (factual) transcendence of beings as a totality.

We must understand the constancy of temporality in terms of its openness without entangling this time, in any way, in that which is opened. Only in this way is this primordial

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111 Cf. Final Stage of the Founding Analysis
112 Cf. Founding Analysis herein, esp. Final Stage of the Founding Analysis §4 & Postscript to the Founding Analysis.
phenomenon of temporality wholly secured from ‘now time.’113 And thus, we find, ever more originally that so far as historicity concerns the constancy of temporality, transcendence necessarily forms the essential horizon for the question of historicity. Only as transcendence is historicity (constancy) possible, and thus, only from transcendence is selfhood (self-constancy) existentially possible.

b) The Constitution of the Constancy and Self-Constancy of Historicity and Freedom: formulation of the ontological unity and distinction between essential selfhood and world

The constancy of temporality must be thought with respect to the for-the-sake-of, since, as the Founding Analysis showed, the for-the-sake-of originally gives unity to the happening of time in its transcendence.114 It is a basic and necessary precept of the preceding analysis that the for-the-sake-of pertaining first and foremost to temporality and transcendence (horizontal schematism) does not yet in itself imply (i.e. contain) selfhood; it is formally a for-the-sake-of which does not yet have a ‘self’ standing behind it. It may necessitate selfhood but does not in itself need selfhood. Much the same thing is said by Heidegger when he says that care (being-ahead-of-itself qua being for-the-sake-of-itself) does not need a foundation in a self.115

This ‘self-less’ for-the-sake-of was a central but difficult problem of the Third and Final Stages of the Founding Analysis. Conversely, insofar as freedom makes selfhood positively possible, and freedom is grounded in the for-the-sake-of, this means the for-the-sake-of pertaining to freedom is a modification of that which pertains to transcendence. This problem must now be formulated more concretely.

As the non-intentional happening of Dasein transcendence is a positive condition for the possibility of free, finite, factual care to exist as self-constant. And only in connection with

113 Cf. §§1-2 Ch. 3, Founded Analysis for the exhibition of transcendence as the non-entangled possibility for this entanglement.
114 Third & Final Stages of the Founding Analysis
115 Cf. SZ (S, D) 191-192, & previous citations.
Dasein’s always already existing as transcendence can Dasein always already be a self, and indeed, be a self even in the throes of its un-self-constant entanglement in the “world.” If Dasein were not transcendence, and yet an intending being, and self-constancy were the negation of fallenness, then, supposing that Dasein could still be a self, Dasein could only be a self by not being in the world. Selfhood, however, is the selfhood of being-in-the-world.116

The basis for selfhood proper is historicity as worlding and temporalisation; the constancy of the world, or, which signifies the same, the constancy of temporality. That authenticity nonetheless “brings the self right into its being-together-with things, actually taking care of them and pushes it toward concerned being-with with the others”117 does not speak against the above position. It merely indicates that the complete phenomenon of factual, authentic existence must include comportment and intention. As we will see, while transcendence is important for authentic existence, this does not mean that transcendence ‘replaces’ intentionality when Dasein exists authentically (any more than inauthenticity lacks transcendence). Rather it means that authenticity brings comportment back into its ground, namely ‘into’ transcendence. And that means: the being which always already comports and exists as the they now does so in a more essential way.118

Of course, if authenticity were in fact the negation of fallenness, where this negation brought Dasein back to a mere ‘structure’ which is ‘de-worlded,’ this would be a matter of a ‘what’ and not a ‘Who,’ and indeed, would lead the problem back to substance, and thus, away from Dasein.119 Dasein has the possibility of selfhood because it is in-the-world (§1b), and the concrete realisation of this possibility because it is free self-binding – the complete phenomenon of which includes facing death and thus ‘mineness’. Because Dasein is a

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116 Thus anticipatory resoluteness, i.e. self-constancy, ‘brings Dasein into its Situation.’ SZ (S/S, D) 307 (modified)
117 SZ (S) 298: “Die Entschlossenheit bringt das Selbst gerade in das jeweilige besorgende Sein bei Zuhandenem und stößt es in das fürsorgende Mitsein mit den Anderen.” SZ (D) 298
118 Cf. VWG (ER) 115-116, 128-131. For the same reason, “Even resolutions are dependent upon the they and its world. Understanding this is one of the things that resolution discloses.” SZ (S) 299 but, a fortiori, this says that untempered ontic ‘individualism’ is irresolute; any connection between (ontic) individualism and fundamental ontology is either an illusion or a mistake on Heidegger’s part.
119 Cf. §1b this chapter. Also cf. to SZ (S/S) 273ff. (esp. 274-275)
worldly being it is a Who. Dasein can only be a self from its concrete situation, from its world, and that means that transcendence forms the possibility that Dasein can be the self that it is in each case, i.e. be a self at all.

Selfhood is the selfhood of being-in-the-world, that is, of the being which exists in a unity with its world. Thus, more elementally, selfhood is the selfhood of world. Selfhood and historicity belong together in connection with the problem of constancy. If Dasein is always already self-constant this means that it always already binds itself, as a self, in the constancy of its time. But the original, and existentially appropriate concept of ‘binding’ is nothing less than freedom itself. That is, self-constancy is the inner work of freedom. Temporality is constant (because it temporalizes), but not by binding itself. As a self, Dasein is constant by binding itself in free anticipatory resolve; Dasein is its freedom.

Temporality gives selfhood – i.e. a temporal being – so far as transcendence binds itself in freedom and so far as anticipatory resoluteness happens in ecstatic-horizonal temporality (i.e. so far as anticipatory resoluteness happens in constancy pure and simple). Because selfhood originally binds itself to its temporalisation it binds itself as a being (as selfhood) to non-being (temporality, world). Accordingly, Dasein exists as a self in this binding. This gives the original location for the question of selfhood. But the difference between selfhood and the constancy of temporality must not only be relied upon, it must be explicitly formulated.

How is it that temporalisation/transcendence/freedom gives itself a being? Binding makes responsible. But that means that the binding must differentiate a that-which-is-bound (selfhood) and a that-to-which the binding binds (world). That is, Dasein is its responsibility. The binding creates the difference between selfhood and world. It is only in this

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120 Cf. the problem of substance in SZ §64
121 World (especially the transcendence of the world) and die Situation are not identical, but the latter implies the former, see SZ (S/S) 299-300
122 Thus, SZ (S/S) 396-397 & I.2.v passim
differentiation that we may speak of ‘original’ or ‘essential’ selfhood, i.e., selfhood which is wholly grounded in temporality and transcendence.

Selfhood holds itself to world and exists as constant because its most essential existence is simply to be its world, or, as Heidegger puts it in the *Metaphysical Foundations of Logic* and *Vom Wesen des Grundes*, to be the *Willen* of the *Umwillen*. More completely, Heidegger says there that the world is the ‘totality of the *Umwillen*’, and that the being which is worldly (the Who) is the *Willen* which pertains to this *Umwillen*. With this linguistic flourish, Heidegger indicates precisely what we have been aiming at; original selfhood is not world – which is ontologically impossible – but a kind of ontological ricochet off of world.

Heidegger says that Dasein is not something innerworldly, but is instead being-in-the-world; the full consequence of this is only now coming to the surface. That is, this analysis merely makes good on the significance of the difference between innerworldliness and being-in-the-world with respect to selfhood. Dasein is being-in-the-world and not innerworldly because, its selfhood means is to exist ‘counter’ to the world as such. This ‘counter to’ is repeatedly used by Heidegger as a way of saying selfhood on the basis of transcendence. It does not mean that world is the object of selfhood, or that selfhood is the object of world – such an interpretation is after all impossible since transcendence is not an act, not consciousness, neither the subject nor object of an intention. Accordingly, the ‘counter…’ must be taken in a

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123 VWG (ER) 100-103, MFL 185, 191
124 The sense in which this seems to linguistically imply that selfhood is a simplification of world, or a ‘part’ thereof (i.e. so far as world = *Umwillen*, selfhood = *Willen*) should not mislead us into reading it as saying that selfhood is more primordial than world.
125 Heidegger uses this sort of language in his analysis of the connection between selfhood, transcendence and freedom (VWG (ER) 102-103 (but compare to 100), MFL 192-193, 196-197). But, in Heidegger’ brief and cursory exhibition this language remains largely unintelligible and all too easy runs counter to the phenomenon which Heidegger is discussing. Thus, rather than dwelling on this language without the proper guidance for clarifying its meaning and significance, this thesis has attempted to work out the whole, on the basis of other indications and reflections, in order to first win the meaning of such expressions.
126 That is, while understand the difference in a way that is adequate if still rudimentary when we understand the different kinds of ‘in’ pertaining to each being (cf. SZ (S/S) 53ff., 65 etc.). However, with the phenomenon of transcendence, and especially, with the problem of its priority over intentionality (Second Stage of the Founding Analysis, already alluded to at SZ (S/S) 363 *infra*, 365f.) there arises the necessity of experiencing Dasein’s being-in-the-world – in its difference from innerworldliness – more radically (at the root level). Here, in this chapter, the consequences of this radicalisation are applied to the problem of selfhood. Cf. also the necessary innerworldliness of the everyday substantial self-interpretation of Dasein as discussed in SZ §64.
127 MFL 192-197, VWG (ER) 102f.
structural-‘genetic’-ontological sense (thus not an ontic opposition), one which must preserve the unitary character of grounding, the unity of freedom and transcendence and, above all, the original existential unity of Dasein and its world.

Of course, the above does not constitute anything like selfhood in the everyday sense. It gives selfhood solely in the primordial and essential sense, which however, must be understood in such a way that it can ‘become’ selfhood in the everyday sense. The above elucidation of selfhood is simply the complete significance of the statement that Dasein’s selfhood is its self-constancy, a ‘complete significance’ which does not immediately supplement this constancy with the usual concept of selfhood – which is at turns, inconstant, innerworldly and substantial. By the same token, it is merely the complete significance of the statement that being-in-the-world is a unitary phenomenon (which includes world and selfhood).128

Essential selfhood is ‘responsible’ to its world. Selfhood is freedom, but freedom founded in transcendence, that is, selfhood is founded on world as such. Selfhood here does not give in to our desire to understand ourselves psychologically or comportmentally – this Heidegger tells us, is merely the ‘what’ which accrues to the Who.129 This analysis grounds these possibilities in something which, for these desires, must remain unrecognisable. The point is not to shrink back from this discovery but to preserve it.

Thus as unsettling as this concept may be for our everyday self-understanding, it is exegetically attested by the quotation from the Nachlass above; by the connection of selfhood, transcendence and freedom; and by the definition of selfhood as self-constancy. Similarly, it is also attested by what Heidegger says to his wife, Elfride on April 30 of 1930:

All this unbearable chatter about ‘human beings’ & this person & that ‘as a human being’. I think that from time to time I have to

128 Cf. Part I, §1b
129 Cf. SZ (S/S) 273ff. (esp. 274-275)
experience such things in order to get a clearer idea of how much we’re growing towards something quite different.\(^\text{130}\)

That exegetical grounds for this topic must be sought in places such as these is a consequence of the sense in which this analysis has been forced into untrodden places. Through what Heidegger did say, to its meaning, which was never concretely thematised in writing (at least not in publicly available writings).\(^\text{131}\)

c) Grounding, Essential Selfhood and the Care for Constancy and the Constant

In the conclusion to *Vom Wesen des Grundes* Heidegger tells us that it ‘does not stand within the power of freedom that it temporalises itself in an Ur-happening\(^\text{132}\) and primarily discusses the problem of selfhood, in connection with the *Abgründigkeit* – the ‘abyssalness’ or ‘ab-groundness’ – of Dasein.\(^\text{133}\) In connection with this Heidegger now also speaks repeatedly, but unclearly, of the way in which ground is thereby determined as an *Unwesen*.\(^\text{134}\) The latter term, of course, was used in important ways in Heidegger’s 1930 address *On the Essence of Truth*.\(^\text{135}\)

In *On the Essence of Truth* the *Unwesen* of truth becomes an issue. There it primarily refers to the ‘errancy’ or ‘untruth’ of truth, namely, something like fallenness.\(^\text{136}\) In the same place *Unwesen* is also connected with the ground of the *mystery*, indeed this is so much the case.

\(^{130}\) L&M&E 123

\(^{131}\) Though, for instance, cf. *Contributions* §198, where much the same is said, and it is connected with transcendence given §199 (cf. also *Ibid.* §198’s consonance with AT 12), however, the connection with transcendence, and thus, the thinking of the late 20s remains tenuous as long as one can still ultimately ascribe this to a ‘change of perspective’. Thus, *Contributions* §198 is mentioned here only as an ‘afterthought’ now that the transcendental problem of selfhood has been secured from principle.

\(^{132}\) VWG (ER) 128

\(^{133}\) Cf. VWG (ER/EG) 126-131 / 133-135

\(^{134}\) Ibid.

\(^{135}\) ET *passim*

\(^{136}\) ET 146, 150-151, and one might note here, that Heidegger marks that the turning happens here in the transition from truth to untruth (ET 147-150 *et infra* but qua turning to SZ I.3 cf. LH 249-250).
that we find that the “authentic non-essence of truth is the mystery.”137 This connection is more concretely shown to be relevant to the present task when we reflect that, in SZ §44 Heidegger has already identified untruth with fallenness.138 Later in Being and Time we find that this formulation of untruth also has a positive counter-possibility when we find that “resoluteness appropriates untruth authentically.”139 That is, the Unwesen of truth in On the Essence of Truth is basically the same as the problem of untruth in Being and Time. Similarly, in a passage from the Metaphysical Foundations of Logic which ‘echoes’140 the conclusion to Vom Wesen des Grundes Heidegger briefly indicates that the inessentiality (Unwesentlichkeit) of the self is its simply its existentiellity.141

Here, given the existentiell priority of the they, this concurrent attachment of Unwesen to existentiellity and inauthenticity indicates that existentiellity is itself a kind of falling away from essence. This falling admits of a counter-movement in the phenomenon of existentiell authenticity. But this counter-movement is not a negation of non-essence, rather, it is a modification of the non-essence of Dasein just as authenticity is an existentiell modification of inauthenticity. In sum then, untruth is constitutive for Dasein’s existentiell possibility as such; factically existing Dasein is delivered over to untruth; to the non-essence of disclosedness.

And so, we can equally understand the work which the Unwesen treiben idiom does in Vom Wesen des Grundes. This idiom says that such and such is ‘up to tricks.’142 In its application

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137 ET (D) 194 “Das eigentliche Un-wesen der Wahrheit ist das Geheimnis.”
138 SZ (S/S) 221-223
139 SZ (S/S) 299
140 Quotation marks are used here because MFL chronologically precedes VWG
141 Cf. MFL (E/D) 139-141 / 176
142 Cf. Malick in VWG (ER) 143. Malick avoids the idioms I have used above because they are too informal but in any case… Following each instance of Unwesen from VWG’s conclusion: 1. VWG (ER) 124-127; the essence of reasons points to a fundamental phenomenon of truth and does so in a way which always points to its existentiell foundation, however, it is continually understood in a superficial way, and so even the principle of ground devolves into superficiality in connection with its being ‘driven’ to ‘non-essence’ (“Und so triebt… Unwesen”). 2. VWG (ER) 126-127; This non-essence (here Heidegger hyphenates Unwesen thus forming “Unwesen”) is a function of freedom and so bends back upon freedom (freedom is both the origin of fallenness and the possibility of authenticity; essential freedom destines non-essence so that the essence of freedom happens only in its non-essence), and 3. VWG (ER) 128-131; given this, freedom must learn to live with itself, that is,
to grounding, this then says that the essence of freedom/ground is characterised by an ontological ‘mischief’ – by making itself inessential in fallenness: covering itself over, hiding itself. It belongs to Dasein’s essence to be factical and thus essence has always already become inessential; it has already become non-essence. More completely, we may say that ground brings itself near and recedes in accordance with the inner ‘turbulence’ of existentiellity, namely, the inessentiality which accrues to the essence of grounding. Accordingly, factical selfhood is never solely essential selfhood, while, authentic selfhood (which draws nearest to essence) is necessarily ‘inessential’ in the above sense. Dasein is always and only ever its essence in an inessential way (i.e., existentielly, and thus, on the basis of the they).

Similarly then, with respect to the problem of the Abgrund, we may understand this term twofoldly. Ground belongs to the happening of transcendence as freedom, indeed, because Dasein is essentially free ground can only belong to Dasein on the basis of freedom. But this means that essential ground can never ‘measure up’ to the requirements of intuition or the needs of comportment, i.e., transcendence cannot be the measure for these. However, this is only the determination of abyss which is oriented by the self-understanding of fallenness, i.e., inessentaility. Properly understood, the abyssal character of grounding makes this self-understanding possible but is not the same as it. Thus, and more decisively, ground is abyssal not in the sense of being groundless (‘grundlos’) or deficient in ground, rather, it is abyssal because it is the grounding of Dasein, and is thus, the grounding which pertains to and arises from finitude. The grounding of freedom is abyssal because it is the grounding appropriate to Dasein and the grounding which is thought from the essence of Dasein.

Dasein exists as finite; as the temporalisation of anticipating, guilty transcendence. Its grounding must reflect this when genuinely understood. Essential selfhood as ‘something’

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with its ineradicable happening as non-essence, that is, the problem of essential existence must be posed on the basis of how it is won in and from the Unwesentlichkeit of existence.

143 For all this, cf. the preceding footnote and the analysis which follows.
144 Cf. MFL 140 etc.
145 Thus, cf. VWG (ER/EG) 126-131 / 133-135, Cf. also WM 96
grounded, is grounded in the finitude of time – which equiprimordially means the finitude of care, transcendence and freedom – and *is only grounded in this*. That is, essential selfhood is already abyssal because finitude belongs to the essence of Dasein and the original phenomenon of grounding belongs to the inner meaning of the essence of freedom.\(^{146}\)

With this reflection, the groundwork for the problem marked at the beginning this chapter concerning the ‘care for constancy and that which is constant’ has been achieved. Heidegger tells us that ‘the care for constancy’ is that which each mode of grounding has in common as a grounding.\(^{147}\) But according to the whole of the preceding analysis this now means care *qua anticipatory resoluteness*, i.e. authentic care, and thus the care for constancy now refers us to the *problems of selfhood and historicity just described*. Accordingly, this care is “possible only as temporality”\(^ {148}\) not only because Dasein in general is possible only on the basis of temporality, not only because anticipatory resoluteness is grounded in temporality, but also because *constancy* is a central determination of the essence of temporality and because the constancy referred to here is an *existential phenomenon* (and *not* a categorial phenomenon).

Because freedom is primarily transcendental self-binding, i.e. self-grounding, selfhood is *a fortiori* that which is first grounded in establishing, taking-ground and founding. This means that the reason why grounds have an essential and constitutive relation to the ‘care for constancy’ is because selfhood is that which is ‘first’ grounded in grounding (but given the preceding analysis it is clear that this has nothing whatsoever to do with idealism).\(^ {149}\) This was already implicit in the development of the existential-transcendental problem of freedom in this chapter and in the one preceding it but has now become explicit.

\(^{146}\) Cf. *Ibid.* & MFL (E/D) 182 / 223-224
\(^{147}\) Previously cited.
\(^{148}\) VWG (ER) 121-122
\(^{149}\) I.e. to ‘idealism’ as a doctrine – though it’s possible that it has something to do with German Idealism (e.g. Schelling’s *Freiheitsschrift*). This possibility is indicated when the above is compared to Dahlstrom (2005a) 65f., 68f. etc.
Grounding is *abyssal* in the positive sense because it pertains to selfhood, i.e. *because it really is the grounding of Dasein – the ab-[b]yss as such!* As the grounding of selfhood, the abyssal character of grounding is not a mark of inadequacy but the innermost meaning of what it means to ground self. Thus Heidegger says:

> The beings surpassed in transcendence are not, however, only those which are not Dasein itself. In transcendence Dasein surpasses itself as a being; more exactly, this surpassing makes it possible that Dasein can be something like self. In first surpassing itself, the abyss [Abgrund] is opened which Dasein, in each case, is for its self. This abyss can be covered over and obscured only because the abyss of being-a-self is opened up by and in transcendence.\(^{151}\)

Freedom which is grounded in transcendence surpasses Dasein itself as a being. But we understand this in a vulgar sense if we think that there is first a self which is subsequently transcended.\(^{152}\) Rather the self is formed *from* transcendence, thus Heidegger says “more exactly, this surpassing makes it possible that Dasein can be something like a self”\(^{153}\) – and he then continues by identifying selfhood with the “abyss” thereby opened, which is equiprimordially “the abyss of being-a-self.”\(^{154}\) Nonetheless, the self thus formed and ‘especially’ (if one can use such a word here) the self-construction of the they, is transcended. This ‘nonetheless’ pertains to the ontological priority of transcendence over selfhood.

Properly speaking Dasein’s ‘Who’ *is* the abyssal ground which freedom gives itself. ‘Essential ground’ means the essential grounding *of* freedom, i.e., the *Ab-grund*. But this Ab-*grund* is nothing less than essential selfhood itself! Essential freedom towards ground is freedom towards selfhood, or in fact, freedom pure and simple.

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\(^{150}\) Cf. VWG (ER) 124-131. ‘Abyss’ has basically the same etymological structure as Abgrund (‘away from the bottom’ vs. ‘away from ground’).

\(^{151}\) MFL (E/D) 182 / 223-224 (modified): “Das Seiende, das in der Transzendenz übersprungen wird, ist aber nicht nur dasjenige, was das Dasein selbst nicht ist, sondern in der Transzendenz überspringt das Dasein gerade sich selbst als Seiendes – genauer: dieser Übersprung ermöglicht es, daß das Dasein so etwas wie es selbst sein kann. Erst im Übersprung seiner selbst eröffnet sich der Abgrund, der das Dasein je für es selbst ist, und nur weil dieser Abgrund des Selbstseins durch die und in der Transzendenz offen ist, kann er überdeckt und unsichtbar gemacht werden.”

\(^{152}\) Cf. citations concerning transcendence and selfhood & preceding analysis.

\(^{153}\) MFL (E/D) 182 / 223-224

\(^{154}\) MFL (E/D) 182 / 223-224
Similarly, in *Vom Wesen des Grundes* Heidegger says:

> While surpassing beings in projecting its world, Dasein must surpass itself in order, from this height, to be able to understand itself [sich] as abyss… The breaking-open [Aufbrechen] of the abyssal in grounding transcendence is… the primordial move which freedom accomplishes within us, whereby it ‘gives us to understand,’ that is, that the more primordially the world’s ‘content’\(^{155}\) is grounded the more simply the heart of Dasein can meet its selfhood in its action. The non-essence [Unwesen] of grounds then, are only ‘overcome’ in factical existing, but are never eliminated.\(^{156}\)

Here Heidegger works with essential selfhood, and factical authentic selfhood in its counter movement to factical inauthentic selfhood.

In accordance with the preceding analysis, when Heidegger speaks of ‘surpassing in order to understand oneself as abyssal,’ this really means surpassing so that Dasein *can* understand itself *at all*, because properly speaking Dasein is a self *only* as the *happening of abyssal ground* (*i.e. freedom*). Authentically experiencing selfhood in ‘action’ makes possible the suspension of the non-essence of grounds; but this now means, the suspension of the non-essence of selfhood.\(^{157}\)

This non-essence cannot be eliminated we are told… but this means that it *can* be *existentielly suspended* only because it is constitutive for the existentiell possibility of selfhood! It belongs to the essence of selfhood to have become inessential, and thus, since we *do* factically comport ourselves, selfhood only ever becomes factically simple, becomes factically essential when we experience our comportments *in* their abyssal ‘background’ – then we exist *from* the world (we hearken to it) and then we too become essential. This occurs in factical authentic selfhood.\(^{158}\) The essence of selfhood resides in transcendence, but ‘the they’ and

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\(^{155}\) *Weltgehalt* (thus, not *Inhalt* but something similar in its connotation and meaning VWG (ER) 128).

\(^{156}\) VWG (ER/EG) 128-129 / 134

\(^{157}\) Cf. above & VWG (ER) 130-131

\(^{158}\) Cf. VWG (ER) 128-131
circumspection know nothing of worldliness. Here, the ‘world’s content,’ the Weltgehalt (namely, the beings belonging to the world) are ‘grounded’ but not primordially, and only in world-forgottenness (which nonetheless depends on world).\textsuperscript{159} Thus, when ‘saying-I’, which always already comports itself in the “world” with the others equiprimordially understands and recovers its being-in-the-world – when it recovers its essential selfhood from the they-self – then, it brings its existence as free transcendence near; it authentically becomes itself. \textit{This} is the meaning of the ‘suspension’ of the non-essence of ground.

The unity and bestrewal of grounding, in accordance with which each mode of grounding is ‘identical in one respect,’ is thus, that each is projected primarily onto the constancy of temporality in its threefold structure and unity. That is, the problem of the unity of grounds is the problem of the constancy which belongs to historicity and selfhood.

Originally speaking, I am the world, i.e., the abyss of freedom. Here our understanding of the basic and inner meaning of world, as developed in the Founding Analysis, must remain stable. This includes the ontological distinction between world and selfhood. What must instead shatter against this definition is our everyday understanding of the “I.”

Each mode of grounding pertains to the original phenomenon selfhood, and this means that each mode of grounding arises from care for time in its constancy. Thus, the primary establishing of establishing is selfhood, the primary taking ground of taking ground is selfhood and the primary founding of founding is selfhood. Again, this determines selfhood much more than it determines the modes of grounding.

Selfhood is the happening of abyssal ground in its temporal constancy and its temporal articulation. The Who is an abyssal ground. Because freedom is transcendence and because

\textsuperscript{159} The before-which of transcendence (one alternative interpretation) \textit{does not belong to action}. Conversely, VWG (ER) 130f. seems to associate the same phenomenon as the above with both things and the others; thus beings belonging to the world = beings in general. The above interpretation is intended to echo the primordial disclosedness etc. which pertains to anticipatory resoluteness which is engaged in dealings etc. as per SZ §60 (cf. VWG 20f. et infra’s endorsement of SZ §60 as giving the proper disclosedness of Dasein).
transcendence *exists* (because it is an existential and not a category), world is the kind of openness which is an appropriate upon-which for the facticity of the Who as such.\(^{160}\) And because selfhood is ontologically subsequent to transcendence, freedom grounds selfhood and selfhood exists in the grounding which freedom achieves, and indeed, does so as freedom.

And so we can now understand more completely the sense in which freedom comes together with historicity in the problem of self-constancy when we read Heidegger say in *Vom Wesen des Grundes*:

> The being-a-ground of freedom [Das Grund-sein der Freiheit] is not a ground in any one of the ways of grounding, as we are always inclined to think, but determines itself as the grounding unity of the transcendental bestrewal of grounding. \(^{161}\)

Freedom itself is the unity of grounds, but that simply means, in accordance with what was just established, that *freedom itself* is selfhood; that freedom, thought more completely, is the care for constancy and the constant. Original self-constancy is being-free *as such*.

### §3 – THE TRANSCENDENTAL DESTINY OF SELFHOOD

Being-with is a primordial determination of Dasein. Thus, the analysis of transcendence, which, after all, is supposed to be primordial, must be able to present a primordial and radical project of being-with.\(^{162}\) If transcendence cannot achieve this – especially if it completely falters on the problem of being-with – then the whole approach based on transcendence has failed. The phenomenon of being-with pertaining to transcendence must be more original than that pertaining to intentionality or comportment. Moreover, transcendence must bring

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\(^{160}\) This result should be compared to the problem of categorial self-interpretedness in §1b herein etc.

\(^{161}\) VWG (ER) 126-127

\(^{162}\) The following analysis is guided by SZ (S, D) 121ff. (esp. the temporal meaning of *vorausspringen* and *Rücksicht*, i.e., so far as these determine genuine and authentic being-with as something like ‘being another’s futurity’) & WM 87
being-with to light in a positive sense. This becomes possible in the connection of transcendence and historicity.

Transcendence is the original ‘breaking into the open’ of beings and their being. Selfhood means the free grounding of transcendence as a self in connection with historicity (the temporality of constancy). But historicity is also connected with the original (temporal) possibility of community.163 All of this means that the question of transcendence, freedom and historicity must come up against the question about the original possibility and constitution of being-with. Here, the point cannot be to ‘reduce’ everything to the original being-with which pertains to transcendence, but only to ‘give voice’ to that being-with.

To ‘over-extend’ the power of transcendence, is equally, to degrade the phenomenon. Thus, we must here distinguish between two wholly original forms of being-with. The first we may call ‘transcendental’ or ‘original’ being-with and the other is the they. From these the whole fundamental ontological problem of being-with could be unfolded – though of course, this thesis cannot now become an analysis of being-with in general because it is already dedicated to transcendence and transcendence alone.

Heidegger says very little on the problem of the connection between being-with and transcendence… aside that is, from saying that the problem is central!164 This is in some part necessary, since after Being and Time he sets to work primarily on the history of philosophy, a history which is primarily oriented not towards the ontology of Dasein, but towards objective presence.165 Thus, for methodological reasons, Heidegger’s late 20s lecture courses tend to be primarily – but not wholly – bound to the horizon of objective presence. These lecture courses and Heidegger concurrent publications are, of course, the primary source material for analysing his concept of fundamental ontological transcendence. Even in Being

163 Cf. SZ (S/S) 379, 384-386, 394
164 Cf. citations at the beginning this chapter, cf. for instance MFL 139 vs. 167 &180
165 Cf. e.g., BP passim e.g. 154 even when this history gives pride of place to ‘the subject’ it tends to treat Dasein as objective presence.
and Time Heidegger says little on the being-with of historicity.\(^{166}\) Though, of course, that there is a temporal formulation of the problem of being-with in SZ I.2.v attests the necessity of a renewed and more primordial analysis of being-with. Of course, this is equally indicated by the radicalisation of selfhood presented above.

In accordance with the difficulty this situation poses, this analysis first offers a sketch for the transcendental problem of being-with and then ‘negatively’ attests this sketch by deepening it through a reflection off of some of Heidegger’s hints about the problem from after Being and Time.

**a) Sketch for the Phenomenon of Destiny within the Bounds of Transcendence: transcendence as original being-with**

Securing the problem of community means first understanding the domain of the problem. Proximally and for the most part Dasein is the they.\(^{167}\) On the order of facticity, the they is first, and authentic selfhood is second.\(^{168}\) But, in Being and Time, Heidegger says that the converse is the case on the ‘ordo essendi.’\(^{169}\) And so, on the one hand, ‘being a self at all’ arises primarily from authentic existence in connection with transcendence, while on the other hand, the self which one factically is arises primarily from inauthenticity (which constitutively ‘forgets’ authenticity and transcendence). However, as indicated above, more properly put, authentic existence unifies inauthentic selfhood (they-selfhood) with essential selfhood (transcendental selfhood). In §3b we will see that this unification should be understood as a ‘hearkening’ which authenticity enacts in counter-motion to the they-self’s ‘forgetting.’ The following analyses are dedicated to unravelling the problem of being-with and selfhood in terms of the above foundation, and finally, in the §3b, with unravelling this foundation itself.

\(^{166}\) Cf. SZ (S/S) 379, 384-386, 394  
\(^{167}\) SZ §27  
\(^{168}\) SZ *passim*, AT 12  
\(^{169}\) Thus cf. SZ (S/S) 323 vs. SZ (S/S) 128
Under the topic of historicity, Heidegger speaks of fate (*Schicksal*). This is the historicity of the individual. However, we quickly find that existing as fate means existing as destiny (*Geschick*), namely, the historicity of community. Destiny, we are told, is not the ‘sum of all fates,’ instead it is a ‘happening-with’, ‘the happening of community,’ in such a way that destiny ‘guides’ fate in each case. Similarly, elsewhere Heidegger says that we need to understand selfhood in order to understand the others, but, he immediately warns, this does not mean that we need to understand selfhood qua I myself and then selfhood qua the others.

So what is the key to this difficult and at least marginally paradoxical situation? Firstly we must recognise and sustain the basic break developed between transcendence and intentionality. Secondly, we must not immediately surrender the selfhood derived from self-constancy to the egoistic “I.”

Selfhood is formed from world itself which exists for-the-sake-of itself in freedom. This means that anything which we might want to identify as ‘mine’ (for instance, my personality, my possessions) as opposed to thine (e.g. thy personality, thy possessions) remains ‘undifferentiated’ in the most primordial and essential constitution of selfhood. This may be more fully attested if we reflect that, whilst discussing conscience, Heidegger identifies such ‘possessions’ with the ‘what’ of Dasein in opposition to its ‘Who.’

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170 SZ (S/S) 384
171 Ibid.
172 Ibid.
173 SZ (S/S, D) 384
174 MFL 188, also cf. MFL 189-190, 192, VWG (ER) 86f.
175 Second Stage of the Founding Analysis
176 Cf. above and MFL 191-192
177 Here thou, thee, thine etc. are used in accordance with the standard translation practice for Heidegger’s discussion of these matters which uses ‘du’, namely, the German, singular familiar ‘you’ (presumably because Heidegger here reflects his problem off the popular problem of Martin Buber, as indicated by, MFL 187). ‘Thee’ is an archaic English near equivalent to this (especially in the modern interpretation of ‘thee’ etc.).
178 Cf. SZ (S/S) 273ff. (esp. 274-275)
But if selfhood is formed on the basis of the world *as such*, then Dasein is being-with, indeed, Dasein itself *is* originally primordial community because its selfhood is originally nothing more than an ontological modification of world (in which no distinction between I myself and they the others can prevail but which primordially includes *both*). 179 Dasein is the selfhood of world in such a way that only as this selfhood can it ‘subsequently’ become the understanding of an ‘I myself’ and a ‘thee thyself.’ 180 The latter possibility is established with the happening of the they. 181 And so, the following consonant ‘formula’ may also be given; if Dasein is a self on the basis of world, this means that the original being-with which belongs to transcendence is the possibility of selfhood, including here the transcendental possibility of the they. Indeed, for the same reason, and which says the same thing, original being-with *is* selfhood. Selfhood *is* the original groundedness – the original bringing into ground, and thus, bringing into truth (founding) – of being-with. 182 ‘We’ are the world and the world is that which gives essential selfhood.

But this says: fate and destiny are equiprimordial because at a certain level of the problem they are originally the same. For this reason, that the selfhood of world has to die is not yet grounds for distinguishing an “I” from a thou (i.e. ontic comparative). 183 This is an ontic distinction, which is disclosed necessarily when the they-self is confronted by death. 184 Selfhood, as arising from transcendence, makes a self of its world and that means that it makes a self of itself from the others as disclosed in transcendence (i.e., *not* here, as disclosed

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179 Thus, MFL 187/ff., similarly, compare Kant’s practical concept of world.
180 Cf. *Ibid*.
181 For analyses which nod in this direction cf. VWG (ER) 130-131, cf. SZ (S/S) 268
182 Cf. MFL 187. Note: ‘transcendental possibility’ should not be confused with complete possibility.
183 I.e. because the finitude of the world, in this original sense, is not yet attached to an ego-self. Thus, the above statement has nothing in common with the public ambiguous talk of the death of ‘no one in particular’ SZ (S/S) 253. Understood essentially, moreover, the above statement says nothing against the eminent certainty of death as per SZ (S/S) 256-257 etc. The above statement is instead analogous to what is said in MFL when Heidegger distinguishes between ontic individuality/egoism and the non-egoism of selfhood ‘in its metaphysical neutrality’ while he nonetheless attaches a *principium individuationis* to Dasein taken ‘in the metaphysical sense’ cf. MFL 186/ff., 209.
184 But, since the they-self has existentiell priority, this difference is disclosed so far as factual Dasein is confronted by death. Here, based on the above, the individuation of anticipatory being-towards-death includes the ontic individuation which is developed in the they in connection with the existential individuation which death discloses viz. the finitude of existence (thus releasing the they-self from its absorption in distancy as horizon for ‘individuality’). But, the finitude of existence is only the finitude of I-myself on the basis of the self-interpretedness of the they which resoluteness ‘appropriates authentically.’ Thus, SZ I.2.i. & SZ (S/S) 263-264 do not really speak against this, cf. also SZ (S/S) 266 & §62.
in comportment, which would be another problem entirely). Essential selfhood is original being-with.\textsuperscript{185} And indeed, if proximal being-with is characterised by the they, while transcendence is the most original open, this means that the they moves wholly upon the soil of its transcendental destiny, which is in fact nothing more than to say that the world is the upon-which of Dasein.\textsuperscript{186} This of course, should not be taken to reduce the they to transcendence.

But then, this communality requires clarification. Community in the sense we generally understand it – being a part of this nation or that nation, this family or that family, occident or orient – can only be an ontical modification of transcendental community. The grounds for this necessity are the same as the grounds for the derivative and non-essential character of I-hood (vs. thee-hood). Nothing in transcendence ‘itself’ necessitates this national character as opposed to that – that would be a misunderstanding of its essence – nor does transcendence in and of itself necessitate discrete boundaries for community. When thought wholly in its own element transcendence is never schismatic (yet as thrown etc. it is pregnant with the ground of such schisms).

If transcendence is original being-with, and transcendence is ontologically prior to selfhood, then in a certain sense Dasein is being-with ‘before’ it is a self. If original selfhood is formed wholly from transcendence, which is thrown upon its time, then this means that original selfhood arises from the totality of its destiny as such and without reserve – but only when understood solely at the transcendental level. This last qualification is essential.\textsuperscript{187} It should not be underestimated, but nor should it be cause to leave off in the analysis.

\textsuperscript{185} Thus even the ‘non-relational possibility’ is a mode of being-with; SZ (S/S) 263-264
\textsuperscript{186} As per the Founding Analysis, SZ (S/S, D) 86, 365 etc.
\textsuperscript{187} Here, the guilt indicated by the ‘birth’ of Dasein (as individuating correlate of death) should also be kept in mind. As born, Dasein isn’t just swept along by a destiny; it is ‘born into a destiny.’ This cannot become a thematic problem here, but ought to remembered in these analyses as an index of the finitude which must accrue to the being under discussion here. Cf. SZ (S) 373f., 390f. etc.
With respect to the problem of transcendence, the problem of how an “I” can be ‘connected’ to a thou, or a community, is so little a problem that the real difficulty becomes the question of how there is an I which opposes itself to a thou. Only once this opposition has emerged can Dasein worry about the ‘gap’ between itself and the others. That this difference is not native to transcendence only indicates that it is ‘native’ to fallenness, to non-essence.\footnote{Cf. SZ (S/S) 221-223, 299}

This becomes clearer when we consider what was said earlier (in §1b) about Dasein’s tendency to interpret itself from the “world” taken care of. In this tendency Dasein ontically opposes itself to the “world” and interprets itself from this ontical opposition (which of course requires world, that is, transcendence, as a prior condition). This is a consequence of fallenness in general. Fallenness – as interpreting myself from the “world” – presents the possibility for opposing myself to the “world” and the innerworldly in general, and so, in accordance with the ontic individuality this engenders it also presents the possibility of setting myself against the others. This ‘setting myself against the others’ occurs primarily in what Heidegger calls distantiality (Abständigkeit).\footnote{SZ (S/S) 126ff.} Distantiality is concern for ‘distance’ (of course, not spatially per se) in being-with; that it is too great and that it is not great enough, that it is just right and must be preserved.\footnote{Ibid.} It thus includes both Dasein’s setting itself against the others, and its interpreting itself from the others, both explicitly and surreptitiously.\footnote{Ibid.}

The complete formulation of this problem goes beyond the scope of this thesis. Nonetheless, we can see easily enough that these two existential determinations of everydayness\footnote{The one taken from SZ §64 and the other from SZ I.1.iv} indicate the possibility and necessity of an “I” which thinks of itself as ‘individual’ and opposes itself to a thou, and does so in a way which nonetheless gives priority to being-with.\footnote{The latter being Heidegger’s intention, cf. SZ (S/S) 126ff., the former being contained in VWG (ER) 128ff.} Similarly, distance, innerworldliness, intentionality, comportment – all these are grounded in

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188 Cf. SZ (S/S) 221-223, 299  
189 SZ (S/S) 126ff.  
190 Ibid.  
191 Ibid.  
192 The one taken from SZ §64 and the other from SZ I.1.iv  
193 The latter being Heidegger’s intention, cf. SZ (S/S) 126ff., the former being contained in VWG (ER) 128ff.
transcendence.\textsuperscript{194} To be grounded in, of course, does not mean to be the same as.\textsuperscript{195} A sketch for the problem of innerworldliness and comportment will be given in the final chapter, but this too cannot be wholly “solved” there.

Here we may merely say that freely holding itself in self-concerned freedom towards ground, Dasein holds itself in the breaking open of distance (something which belongs to the inner meaning of transcendence).\textsuperscript{196} Fallen self concern which is concerned about this distance interprets this distance according to beings. In this case, Dasein interprets distance comportmentally. Thus, Dasein now interprets itself according to the distance between itself and a thou, and thus, equiprimordially founds itself as an “I.” The problem of the “I” and the thou arises primarily from selfhood which is fallen. Transcendence is so far from being “the action of an “I” and subject”\textsuperscript{197} that it is not even the level upon which the fundamental ontological problem of the ego-self can be posed.

Since the existentiell possibility of the authentic self lies in the they-self, this means that even the authentic self has set itself against the others (i.e. arisen from distantiality). That is, while, properly speaking, there is neither an “I” nor a thou which pertains to essential selfhood, these determinations belong to inauthentic selfhood and factual authentic selfhood in accordance with the existentiell priority of fallenness. \textit{This existentiell priority is not to be dispensed with. Talk here of ‘essential selfhood’ has no intention of overcoming it.}

So now, it was said earlier that the original being-with belonging to transcendence is not yet schismatic, it is not yet the community which sets itself against… But, \textit{the facticity}, that is, \textit{the thrownness} of transcendence qua original being-with must nonetheless form the existential basis upon which ‘schisms’ within destinal being-with are first possible, and may

\textsuperscript{194} Cf. Second Stage of the Founding Analysis, on distance, cf. VWG (ER) 128ff.
\textsuperscript{195} Final Stage of the Founding Analysis
\textsuperscript{196} On the connection with transcendence cf. VWG (ER) 128ff.
\textsuperscript{197} As per the First Stage of the Founding Analysis cf. Contributions 226 (“transcendence… is in danger of still being misinterpreted after all as the action of an “I” and subject.” Similarly, cf. the Founding Analysis that transcendence is not an action esp. the Second Stage §3 thereof).
thus become “facts” of Dasein’s factical existence. And if transcendence pertains to the
essence of Dasein, while this schismatic character pertains to the non-essence of Dasein, then
it becomes preliminarily clear how essence is intrinsically pregnant with non-essence.¹⁹⁸

Transcendental community is nothing like an “ideal” community, rather, it is the original
happening of being-with, in which the before-which of world is always concrete and
historical in a broad but solely transcendental sense. The destiny of transcendence is not
‘first’ the destiny of the West or the East etc. First and foremost it is the destiny of existence
as such. In this way Dasein always takes its fate from destiny as a before-which, as a taking-
ground. This taking-ground, does not require classification, explicit understanding, study,
appropriation and so on.¹⁹⁹ Only because Dasein always already exists in the destiny of
existence, only because it forms itself by existing for-the-sake-of transcendence, in self-
binding and founding, can it exist in the destiny of the West as opposed to the Orient or vice
versa. Being thrown into such a destiny is the inner work of facticity, but recognising it,
securing its boundaries opposing it to the others is the work of a comportmental and distantial
existence. Because Dasein always factically comports itself and existentiellity is indeed
schismatic there can be ‘foreign worlds’ and the world includes the possibility of
foreignness.²⁰⁰

Insofar as transcendence is original being-with this means that transcendence is the existential
possibility for the they. In the they, this or that schism and making-discrete of being-with first
becomes possible: setting one community against the other (which is simply distantiality ‘at
work’), ontically ‘filling in’ the community and becoming an ‘individual’ with a destiny. But
if the they is existentielly prior, this still means that factical authentic selfhood, in taking over
the they, is not simply a negation of the schismatic character of fallenness. Conversely, if
authentic being-with aims at freeing the other for their freedom, this means that authentic care

¹⁹⁸ Cf. esp. §2 of Ch. 3 of the Founded Analysis.
¹⁹⁹ Thus, VWG (ER) 83-85 and, by analogy cf. SZ (S) 386
²⁰⁰ Here, everything is necessarily entangled. Essence and non-essence belong together. This problem is
sketched by §3b.
for the other understands the other in their worldliness.\textsuperscript{201} That is, authentic care for the other refers, in part, to our common destiny of transcendence – not as a ‘bridge’, not because the common somehow has generalised ontological priority in communication, but because this destiny is our being thrown upon our truth.\textsuperscript{202}

Accordingly, that which constitutes the transcendental destiny of Dasein can only be decided in the facticity of existence, i.e., of transcending. And this means that even essential selfhood belongs solely to the concrete historical facticity of its existence. To the essence of essential selfhood there pertains both a fate and a destiny. But, if historicity is indeed the concretion of temporality qua the inner meaning of history, all of this means that inner and essential ground of selfhood is history itself. Not only can one say “I am time”\textsuperscript{203} but one can say; I am my time, this is our time.

Leaving off from this problem, Hans Ruin explains that:

A number of critics have argued that this account [viz. SZ I.2.v] reduces history to individual Dasein, and that it therefore fails to capture the essentially collective nature of history.\textsuperscript{204}

In responding to these critics Ruin relies on an irreducible duality of Dasein: between Dasein’s gaining an origin from its heritage and its gaining an origin from the structure of authentic temporality – indeed, it is said that including the latter in the former is the cause of the difficulty in the first place. Along with this Ruin also rightly notes the they-self implies that the ego-self is existentially derivative.\textsuperscript{205}

Conversely however, precisely by following Dasein to its essential unity (temporality) and thinking this unity more essentially (horizental schematism) and then by unfolding this

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{201} Cf. SZ (S, D) 122, PIK 213-214
\item \textsuperscript{202} Cf. SZ (S) 122, WM 87
\item \textsuperscript{203} Cf. CTD 47, 50ff., 70f., 73 etc.
\item \textsuperscript{204} Ruin (1994a) 138 (for analysis also cf. 138-141 et infra therein)
\item \textsuperscript{205} Ruin (1994a) 140 also see 140-141 et infra.
\end{itemize}
phenomenon here, this thesis can come to a different conclusion. By following temporality further and deeper than the Founding Analysis we gained the transcendental problem of community according to which the appearance of a priority of the individual in *Being and Time* is shown to be just that; it is only an appearance. But not, one might add, in such a way that this non-priority of the individual merely displaces the supposed priority of the individual into community as a ‘mega-subjectum’ (a ὑπερ-ὑποκείμενον if you will). Rather, the priority of temporality is now shown to imply neither the priority of the individual nor of the factical community, but something else entirely.

And similarly, Ruin indicates that:

> Whereas the idea of authentic temporality suggests that there is a level on which Dasein can grasp its own projective capacities, as a transcendental field of meaning-constitution, the concept of historicity indicates that the hermeneutic situation rules over every level of ontological explication.²⁰⁶

This thesis has now brought us to a point where the radical possibility for dissolving this distinction first starts to show itself. The necessity of dissolving this distinction becomes visible here to the extent that this thesis has found that the true meaning of the ‘transcendental field of meaning-constitution’ is the temporalisation of transcendence. And the development of this discovery has indicated that, at the fundamental level, there is no difference between such a field and the historical world of Dasein. This ‘transcendental field’ has now become the essencing of history and the historical situation, i.e., the innermost happening of Da-sein. But this ‘visibility’ is not the same a complete answer to the above problem. Within certain narrowly defined boundaries this will be more concretely investigated in the final chapter.

### b) The Essence and Non-Essence of the Destiny of Selfhood

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²⁰⁶ Ruin (1994a) 175
The problem of ‘distantiality’ (Abständigkeit) discussed earlier already points to the more radical problem of ‘distance’ (Ferne) discussed in the evocative conclusion to Vom Wesen des Grundes. And thus, under the topic of this distance it becomes possible to further deepen and attest the ‘typology’ of being-with formulated above. Here, in the conclusion to Vom Wesen des Grundes, Dasein is experienced as primordially historical and abyssal selfhood. It is in this context that Heidegger evokes the problem of historicised, factual, authentic being a self when he says in the final paragraph:

And so man, as existing transcendence abounding in and surpassing toward possibilities [als existierende Transzendenz überschwingend in Möglichkeiten], is a creature of distance [ein Wesen der Ferne]. Only through the primordial distances he forms towards all beings in his transcendence does a true nearness to things flourish [Dingen ins Steigen] in him. And only the knack for hearing [Hörenkönnen] into the distance temporalizes Dasein as a self and awakens it to the answer of its Dasein with others. For only in its being-with with the others can Dasein surrender its individuality [Ichheit] in order to win itself as an authentic self.

It says: only transcendence provides nearness. We may understand this easily enough in a negative sense, since, as SZ I.1.ii already establishes, there is neither nearness nor distance without the open. But here it primarily speaks in a positive sense. True nearness comes from the open itself from a surpassing, from existing from the surpassing, and not from this or that directedness towards. Directedness towards, that is, intentionality in general is by comparison a deficient nearness: the true nearness then, is ‘explicit transcending,’ namely, philosophising in the proper sense.

Heidegger tells us that true nearness to things comes from letting transcendence be heard in our comportments. But he also tells us that something similar is true with respect to the others. Only this ‘ability to hear into the distance’ allows Dasein to authentically relate itself

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207 On the authentic problem of distance cf. SZ (S/S) 299-300. Distantiality is different from the former because it includes opposition, but this opposition must be first thought in terms of distance as such.
208 VWG (ER) 130-131 (modified)
209 SZ (S/S) 55
to the others and to become an authentic self thereby. Here, in this ‘becoming’ of authentic selfhood we are speaking of factual authentic selfhood which must always win itself on the basis of the they.

But ‘hearing into the distance’ then signifies that a comportmental existence – a being which already understands itself in terms of the “world” taken care of and the they – recovers its ownmost transcendence. That is: Dasein’s essential selfhood has to be awakened because it slumbers. Becoming authentic awakens the Wesen der Ferne to its Fernheit – to its transcendence. The awakening of essential selfhood then happens for the being which comports itself, for the being which already exists as the they. Hearing into the distance awakens Dasein to its truth; to the existential-transcendental foundedness of its comportments.

The implication is that Dasein’s essential selfhood has always already fallen: that the slumber of original selfhood is existentielly prior as such. Essential selfhood slumbers in Dasein such that Dasein can only become a factual authentic self on the basis of a modification of the they-self. In this awakening, the they-self first hears into the distance (into its own truth as Dasein). The arousal of authentic selfhood does not annihilate the they-self but releases it for essential selfhood, and thus, for its essential communality (for which reason, the awakening necessarily becomes responsible being-with). This release ‘surrenders individuality,’ I-ness, because it releases itself from fallenness and for essential selfhood. But this does not mean that it ‘becomes’ what this thesis has been calling ‘essential selfhood,’ rather, the self which it has already become becomes essential in authentic selfhood (it hearkens to essence). Authenticity as Heidegger’s analysis of resoluteness implies, resolves upon the complete meaning of what it means to factically be Dasein, and this must include comportment and the they-self along with transcendence, freedom and finitude.211

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211 SZ (S/S) 299, 307-308, 386 etc.
Dasein becomes a factual authentic self on the basis of the they and not simply as a negation of the they-self. Thus, here, to surrender ‘individuality’ does not mean to become ethereal. It means to first give the fallen self existential concretion, to unify one’s already having fallen with one’s existing as the world and this includes, to hearken, and to win the possibility for hearkening to transcendental being-with – to the happening-with of Dasein. It means to let the non-essence of Dasein become a becoming-essential.

Thus Heidegger says in Being and Time that “the fateful destiny of Dasein in and with its ‘generation’ constitutes the complete, authentic happening of Dasein.” Dasein can only be fateful destiny because its fate belongs to destiny, and not simply in a derivative way. And because Dasein’s fate comes from its destiny and its destiny bespeaks fate, so too is the authentic historicity of Dasein a matter of being ‘in and with’ in a complete sense. Because transcendence forms essential selfhood, Dasein is always already taken up by destiny. While, because fallenness constitutes the non-essence of selfhood, this destiny has always already expressed itself and grounded itself in the they. There is no measure according to which the ego is prior; neither existentially nor existentielly. Dasein’s selfhood happens in such a way that it can only ever be ‘in and with’ its ‘generation’ – this is both an existential and an existentiell fact. Through authentic historicity, through authentic selfhood Dasein exists from this constitution and does so as the being which it already is (the they).

The arousal of authentic selfhood means that Dasein awakens from the dream of its everyday life so that it may live one and the same life wakefully. This of course, does not mean, that it now asserts ‘itself’ with more determination against the others. Rather, it means that in saying-I it understands more essentially what it means to express itself as factual being-in-the-world; to freely exist here and now in a hearkening into the distance.

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212 SZ (S/S) 384f.
Chapter 3

Concluding Sketches for the Fundamental Problems of Ontology on the Basis of Transcendence

In the whole foregoing analysis the phenomenon of transcendence has been progressively developed. Through the first part a preliminary project of the phenomenon of transcendence was given in terms of fundamental ontology as a whole and world in particular. Through the Founding Analysis the basic meaning of transcendence was developed. This was first worked out in formal sketches (First Stage), then in the development of the difference between transcendence and intentionality (Second Stage). On this basis, the analysis moved through the problem of horizontal schematism (Third Stage) to the inner unity of transcendence (Final Stage). Through this analysis it was shown that transcendence is nothing less than the fully radicalised (thus temporal) phenomenon of world.

By developing the intrinsic connection between temporality, transcendence and freedom it was possible for the Founded Analysis to preliminarily develop the problem of historicity. This development implied that transcendence must be exhibited as an historical phenomenon. Thus, not only did the previous chapter bind transcendence to historicity in general; it also bound transcendence to destiny and thus let Dasein be essentially thrown from this destiny. Conversely, we can now see that this connection with history was already implied in Final Stage of the Founding Analysis. After all it was shown there that transcendence and temporality essentially belong together, but this now means that, radically understood, the before-which of the transcendence of time is history itself.¹ And if this equiprimordially

¹ Cf. the formulation of this in Ch. 2 of the Founded Analysis §2a
means freedom and freedom is ground itself, this means now means that historicity is the original and inner grounding of Dasein.²

The Founding Analysis concretely bound Dasein’s being to world.³ But this necessarily meant that it grounded the problem of transcendence aside from selfhood. This was necessary because of the ontological distinction between Dasein’s transcendence/temporality (neither of which is a being) and selfhood (which is a being). The temporal and transcendental radicalisation of world showed that world is not to be grounded in selfhood, but because Dasein is a being, this only indicated that the reverse must be the case; that selfhood must be grounded in the temporal transcendence of Dasein.⁴

The radicalisation of the problem of selfhood was the primary task of the second chapter of the Founded Analysis. In principle it was nothing more than a radicalisation of the thesis that there is a being (ein Seiendes) which pertains to being-in-the-world.⁵ In sum, it aimed to show that the inner meaning of selfhood is the grounding which free, transcending historicity essentially gives to itself.⁶ This task was prepared for by the first chapter of the Founded Analysis, which, by developing transcendence as freedom developed the phenomenon of transcendence more completely and afforded the analysis with key conditions for the transcendental problem of selfhood.

But it now behoves the analysis to return to the problem marked near the beginning of this thesis (Part I §3b) where world was already elucidated in connection with transcendence as an intrinsically historical phenomenon. This will be worked out §1. Similarly, the analysis must make good on all of the work which was put into each of its constitutive parts by presenting an analysis of two of the most central questions connected with transcendence. These two

² Cf. Ch. 2 of the Founded Analysis §§2-3
³ Cf. SZ §69c & MFL 180, 215f. that this thesis was right to do so.
⁴ This was already formulated in the Postscript to the Founding Analysis and prepared for in the §2 of the Final Stage of the Founding Analysis
⁵ Viz. the guiding problem of SZ I.1.iii-v as discussed in Part I, §1ba.
⁶ Cf. esp. §2 Ch. 2, Founded Analysis.
questions, which were held back in the foregoing, are the question of innerworldliness (§2) and the question of being (§4). These will be exhibited as essentially historical problems. Only now can the question concerning beings and being be presented as a transcendental-historical problem with any degree of simplicity. In turn, §3 offers an outline for the repetition and Destruktion of the history of the problem of transcendence.

With respect to the broader problems of this chapter, it bears repeating that the Founded Analysis does not aim to solve all of the problems intrinsically connected with transcendence but only to press into these problems insofar as they belong to transcendence. Thus, just as the previous chapter did not pretend to say everything that could be said about historicity nor does this chapter pretend to such things. But every question discussed in this chapter is a heady question. Even now, each question discussed in this concluding chapter could be expanded into a monograph length analysis – it is for this reason that the title of this chapter avows and must avow that it offers only ‘sketches.’

§1 – SKETCH FOR THE PHENOMENON OF HISTORY FROM TRANSCENDENCE

For Heidegger the discipline of history – i.e. historiography (Historie) – is an eminently ‘human’ science. If its proximal object of study is something called ‘history’ its fundamental object is the historicity of Dasein.7 Terminologically speaking, this intrinsic connection of historicity with the being of Dasein or ‘the human’ is not Heidegger’s invention. Rather, it already belongs to the problem of history in Rickert, in Dilthey and above all in Count Yorck.8 Thus, for instance, the domain of history in Yorck is not limited to ‘the past’ but includes the presence of history because historicity now means the being of life itself.9 Here, the problem of historicity becomes little more than a radicalisation of the problem about the
being of Dasein, and, in Yorck as in Heidegger this leads to the necessity that philosophising
become intrinsically historical.\textsuperscript{10}

The groundwork for the problem of history was already given in the previous chapter. There
it was found that if historicity is the temporal problem of the constancy of the open, then this
is only possible as transcendence.\textsuperscript{11} Thus, to the extent that the previous chapter shows
transcendence to be the condition of possibility for historicity as such it already shows
transcendence to be the fundamental condition of possibility for anything like the ‘passage of
history’ and ‘the fact of history.’

Insofar as historiography is authentic, it is concerned about its proper object, namely the
historicity of Dasein, i.e., authentic self-constancy.\textsuperscript{12} The latter phenomenon was also
developed in the previous chapter. In turn, Heidegger tells us that so far as authentic
historiography is concerned about ‘the past’ the object of its research is the Dasein which has-
been-there, that is, it is concerned with the having-been of the Da of Dasein.\textsuperscript{13}

How is this \textit{Da-gewesenheit} accessible? How can this ‘Da’ become an object of
investigation? The most fundamental answer to this question is simply that Dasein can be
historiographical because it is historical.\textsuperscript{14} And thus, the above questions are badly put: if
Dasein is its Da, then re-petition of the Da is \textit{already} re-petition of \textit{Da-gewesenheit}, i.e., there
is no genuine (i.e. fundamental) problem of ‘access.’\textsuperscript{15} The Da intrinsically belongs to history

\textsuperscript{10} Ibid. & SZ (S/S, D) 39, cf. also SZ (S) 377 vs. 397f, CTD 1ff. & 73 vs. 72, 81, 87f.
\textsuperscript{11} Ch. 2 of the Founded Analysis, §2a
\textsuperscript{12} Cf. SZ (S/S) 393ff. etc.
\textsuperscript{13} Ibid. & 380f.
\textsuperscript{14} SZ (S/S) 375, §76 etc.
\textsuperscript{15} Of course, as Ruin (1994a) 130f. notes, since Heidegger’s earlier use of \textit{Gewesenheit} in SZ was connected
primarily with particular Dasein, and \textit{Da-gewesenheit} is first and primarily connected with other Dasein, one
could formulate the distinction between the two forms of \textit{Gewesenheit} as I myself vs. they the others. However,
the development of selfhood has made it impossible for such a distinction to have a grounding significance here.
Accordingly, the ‘Da’ now indicates that \textit{Gewesenheit} is thought more completely (not just from the future; from
the Da). The approach taken here doesn’t entirely contradict the idea that SZ I.2.v has to face the problem of
’self and other’, but rather, this approach lets the difference be sublated, and faces the problem from the
perspective of this prior sublation (already announced by SZ I.1.iv and, less explicitly by SZ §64). Ultimately,
the problem of \textit{birth} (especially as it formulated in SZ (S/S) 390f) makes the rehabilitation of such a distinction
necessary for authentically historical Dasein. This should be understood along the guideline indicated for the
and the Da is itself historical. History intrinsically constitutes the thrownness of Dasein; of the being which is its there, of the being for whom the world gives its ‘transcendental constitution.’

But of course historiography also needs “remains, monuments and records.” These are the proximal ‘source material’ for historiographical research. Heidegger calls them the world-historical. For the most part Heidegger refers only to things and events as being world-historical. World-history then refers to that phenomenon whereby artefacts, heirlooms, events and so on, act as the occasion for the breaking open of the world of Dasein which has-been-there. World-history is then the world-‘signification’ of these things and events.

In the antique dresser, with its meticulous inlays, carvings and its many compartments, one experiences another world, one which has been: a world of artisans, of aristocrats, of knowledge handed down through apprenticeship, of working with one’s hands, of painstakingly taking one’s time, a world of stricter social protocols, of biting poverty and segregation, a world of inaccessibility – perhaps even a world imbued with the anguish of the revolutionary ‘third estate’ (viz. the French Revolution’s revolutionary class). And this means that the antique dresser stands as a ‘sign’ for a different way of proximally being-in-the-world: a different way of standing in beings as a whole.

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16 SZ (S/S) 394: consequently one may think of these things as bound up with the historiographically important but existentially derivative or secondary problem of access to Da-gewesenheit.
17 Cf. Ibid. etc. e.g. SZ (S/S) 380ff., §75.
18 SZ (S/S) 380f. & §75
19 But this different way of standing in beings as a whole doesn’t need the world to be ‘past.’ The way in which the above connects world-history with class divisions indicate this. Accordingly, cf. Ibid.
The dresser is a thing. Terminologically speaking, in itself, the thing never signifies because a thing is categorial and signifying (*Bedeuten*) is an existential. Things never signify, though, they can arouse the latter in Dasein.

Now, of course, SZ I.2.v is partly “a preparation for the clarification of the task of a historical destructuring of the history of philosophy.”\(^{20}\) The possibility for the *Destruktion* of the history of philosophy requires two things. It requires that which is ‘primarily historical’ namely, the historicity of the Dasein who questions, but it also requires that which is ‘secondarily historical’, i.e., it requires the texts which are to be worked through.\(^{21}\) To put it in a rudimentary fashion, SZ II relies on the fact that Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* (SZ II.1), Descartes’ *Meditations* (SZ II.2) and Aristotle’s *Physics* (SZ II.3) have been preserved.

Heidegger opposes world-history primarily to the historicity of Dasein itself, and implies that “works, for example books”\(^{22}\) are world-historical. This now implies that world-history pertains to whatever is bound up with history as a ‘fact’ of history.\(^{23}\) Books are world-historical, but not only in the way that the dresser is world-historical, i.e., as physical things. Books are also world-historical as works (as what is written). The fact that Heidegger does not concretely formulate this realm of problems is intelligible if we reflect that it implicates the problem of language. In SZ §34 Heidegger merely skirmishes with that problem and leaves the being of language undetermined. That Heidegger handles language with kid gloves in *Being and Time* indicates both the importance and the difficulty of the existential-ontological problem of language.\(^{24}\)

\(^{20}\) SZ (S) 392

\(^{21}\) Cf. SZ (S) 381

\(^{22}\) SZ 388 (‘by association’)

\(^{23}\) Consequently, cf. CTD 1-2, 4, 73f. *et infra*, 77 *et infra*, 81, cf. also 73 vs. 86ff. Note: it is much easier to determine the ‘world-historical’ as meaning (preserved) historical fact in CTD than it is in SZ because of the former’s less radical concept of world. The problems arising from the radicalisation of world for the meaning of world-history will be discussed in this section and in §2b of this chapter.

\(^{24}\) Cf. DL 6-8, cf. also, SZ §§7, 32-33, 68d, SZ (EH) 349 *et infra*. 
If the basic statement of SZ §43 is that ‘reality’ is another name for innerworldliness, then writing is language *qua* real (which does not yet decide whether language in itself ought to be determined as innerworldly, or how things stand with speech). Thinking *happens*. When this thinking is written down, it is made *real*. Accordingly, the book, as the constant presence of this reality, preserves the *reality* of thinking. In turn, reading arouses *signification* and thus the *happening* of thinking. This means that the *categorial* is what is proximally preserved: the categorial (paper, ink etc.) is a possible ‘medium’ of language, and this mediums preserves language. The book does not signify, but (categorially) preserves a specific way of arousing signification. In this way, Heidegger’s general determination of the world-historical as that which is ‘handy or objectively present’ still holds in the case of the world-historical character of the text – albeit in a way that brings us before an abyss of problems, namely, the broader ontological problem of language. The existential-ontological problem of language cannot even be formulated here. In itself, that language can be recorded on paper – that there is a possible innerworldliness of language – says *nothing essential* about the problem of language itself.

Just because the historicity of Dasein is opposed to *world*-history does not mean that the historicity of Dasein is worldless. The authentic ‘object’ of historiography is *Da-gewesenheit*. But, it has become more and more necessary throughout to interpret the Da of Dasein as world. Indeed, if to-be-open is either an intentional-compartmental opening or a world-opening, and the former is derivative whereas the latter belongs to transcendence which in turn belongs to temporalisation in general, then, it has even become *necessary* to interpret the Da as transcendence. And it has even become necessary to interpret this Da as the

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25 SZ (S/S) 209ff. (reality as innerworldliness), 161 (the possible “worldly” occurrence of language) vs. 166 (ontological questionability about whether language itself is innerworldly, worldly or neither)
26 Cf. *Ibid.*, & innerworldliness vs. the problem of the essential meaning of language at SZ (S/S) 161ff.
27 Cf. SZ (S/S) 388ff. Accordingly, if in Count Yorck “Life consists of life-experiences (*Erlebnisse*), which become objectified in expressions (*Ausdrücke*), which in turn can be transformed into empathic understanding (*Verstehen*)” (Ruin (1994b) 115). Then, world-history would correspond to these expressions in general (but because of the more radical formulation of discourse and understanding developed by Heidegger, *Verstehen* is no longer tied solely to objectified expressions).
28 Thus, SZ (S/S) 388
happening of historicity: the constancy of the open qua the transcendent openness of time in its temporalising.

And thus, even if authentic historiography could get by without world-history, it would still primarily study world. This is the case because authentic historiography studies Da-gewesenheit and because of the intrinsic unity of Da-sein and world already forcefully formulated by SZ §69c. Conversely, inauthentic historiography is entangled by inconstancy. When inauthentic historiography interprets its history solely as world-history this means that it lets the essence of historicity lie fallow and forgotten: it understands the reality of history but not the historicity of history. This forgottenness of historicity allows inauthentically historiographical Dasein to interpret history ‘solely’ in terms of the “world” taken care of. While such analysis has its own warrant and its own existential foundation it is nonetheless existentially derivative.

Authentic historiography is the study of the historicity of Dasein and this means, in an essential way, that it is the study of the facticity of the transcendence of the world. Authentic historiography cannot (and shouldn’t want to) erase the thing-relatedness and the they-selfhood of Dasein, but it can and must bring these phenomena to their worldliness. According to this, the transcendence of Dasein must gain a certain primacy in the authentic problem of history without itself becoming the sole domain of history. History is not reducible to the pure facticity of transcendence but the latter is primordially constitutive of historicity.

The existential origin of ‘history’ is historicity, i.e., the authentic self-constancy of Dasein. The possibility for the priority of having-been within this constancy comes from death which

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30 Heidegger doesn’t mention ‘inauthentic historiography’ by name, but cf. previous citations concerning authentic historicity vs. SZ (S) 390-391. The following is here assumed: inauthentic historiography is to authentic historiography as inauthenticity is to authenticity.

31 Cf. the analysis of authenticity in Ch. 2 of the Founded Analysis as foregrounded in Ch. 1 of the Founded Analysis.
Ch. 3: Concluding Sketches

throws Dasein back upon itself.\(^{32}\) Thrown back onto itself, Dasein experiences the needfulness that it re-peat its existence. But existence does not signify an isolated fate, it signifies a fateful destiny, and thus, ‘re-peating existence’ means re-peating the destiny upon which factual selfhood is in each case transcendentally possible.\(^{33}\) Because Dasein is transcendence, because selfhood is formed from transcendence this means that my having-been includes transcendental destiny.\(^{34}\) Because Dasein is transcendence, its selfhood is originally rooted in destiny so that the selfhood of Dasein – the bringing of transcendence into ground– is primordially historical.\(^{35}\) Because Dasein belongs to transcendence and not the myopia of comportment, Dasein’s primordial for-the-sake-of is Dasein’s primordial and unconditional letting-itself-be-abandoned to thrownness.

Dasein, re-peating itself in its transcendence then means a ‘going back to…’ (ecstatic having-been) which may with equal necessity concern ‘contemporary existence’ or ‘the ancients.’ In re-petition of the ancients Dasein as Dasein goes back to itself, not simply because the ancients ‘have interesting insights about the self’ but rather, because the ancients belong to the destiny of my own selfhood.\(^{36}\) Hearkening to the essence of selfhood doesn’t mean anything like hearkening to my ‘own person’ but means something altogether more akin to ‘hearkening to the existence of Dasein’, i.e. to the ‘Dasein in man’ which now also means the destiny in man. Accordingly, there is nothing at all egotistical about this going-back-to when

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\(^{32}\) SZ (S/S) 384, 386. This should be differentiated from the way in which curiosity throws Dasein back on ambiguity (SZ §§ 36-37). Heidegger only develops the possibility for the priority of having-been in historiography (in itself, this does not yet imply that the formulation of its necessity is a genuine existential task). This realm of problems cannot be discussed here as their derivation has no intrinsic connection with transcendence.

\(^{33}\) Cf. SZ (S) 385f., vs. §3, Ch. 2, the Founded Analysis etc. Conversely, if one wanted to understand the meaning of ‘re-petition’ in Heidegger from its obvious reference to Kierkegaard, then one ought to take note of the fact that, in the final letter of Repetition, we have risen to the point that it can now be said that the true repetition is eternity (cf. Kierkegaard (2009[1843]) 74f.). This true repetition belongs to the heavenly perspective, but it turns out that this only means that it repeats mortality as a whole (hence history etc.) and repeats this whole as its own.

\(^{34}\) Cf. Ibid.

\(^{35}\) Here, the connection between MFL 211f. & §§2c-3 in Ch. 2 of the Founded Analysis (i.e. the intrinsic connection of transcendence, philosophising, history and selfhood) indicates further questions which move much deeper into the whole problem than can be achieved in a work such as this.

\(^{36}\) Accordingly, cf. SZ (S/S) 22f., 390-395
it happens authentically. This re-petition means only that “existence” accepts “the thrownness of its own Da freer from illusion.”37

And here, guilt becomes truly powerful in the existence of Dasein, that is, we encounter the true depth of its power. Because I am temporal transcendence, wanting-to-have-a-conscience belongs to historical Dasein which is guilty as fateful destiny. Dasein can be guilty, historical, fateful destiny only because its time is constituted by transcendence. Conversely, the they-self as the selfhood of distantiality, is already unrecoverable-handing-itself-down through and through. That is, both the essence and the non-essence of Dasein’s guilt include history.

And so, in accordance with all of the above, Dasein is the wer-alt discussed in the Part I. I am world and world is history itself, i.e., I am the ‘age of existence’ (albeit finitely). Indeed, only because Dasein is its world and its world is indeed the wer-alt can there be Weltalter. Rendered non-etymologically, only because Dasein is its world and the world is its time can there be ‘ages’ or ‘epochs’ of Dasein or ages of the world. Being-in-the-world means being-in-the-age-of-man; history is the in-which of being-in-the-world.38

But now, since freedom belongs to the essence of Dasein, history is the history of freedom (grounding).39 But this is even truer of the history of philosophy to the extent that philosophy, as explicit transcending, is a matter of becoming factically free in an essential way. For this reason, the history of philosophy becomes the history which most of all springs from freedom and this history thus becomes an especially primordial history. It is the history of the way in which freedom comes into its element and tarries there. It is the history of Dasein’s hearkening to itself (i.e. to freedom).

37 SZ (S/S, D) 391 (modified)
38 Cf. Part I, §3b herein. Cf. also SZ (S) 401 / CTD 9
39 Cf. Ch. 1& 2, Founded Analysis
As the they, Dasein’s factual selfhood is an \textit{inexplicit} handing itself down.\textsuperscript{40} Indeed, this is the meaning of distantiality understood from the problematic of history. As transcendence, Dasein is \textit{essential} handing-itself-down. This is the meaning of the phenomenon of fateful transcendental destiny. As authentic, Dasein has the possibility of an \textit{explicit} handing itself down.\textsuperscript{41} But authentically historical Dasein does not have to “\textit{explicitly} know the provenance of the possibilities upon which it projects itself.”\textsuperscript{42} Taken together this means that authentic historicity primarily makes its \textit{thrownness} explicit to itself and not necessarily the historiographical and world-historical facts of history. That is, it becomes explicit about the historicity of its guilt, tarries with it and hearkens to it.\textsuperscript{43} And because handing-down is constitutive for the possibility of Dasein and because selfhood belongs primarily to \textit{distance} – whether as the \textit{Fernheit} of transcendence or the \textit{Abständigkeit} of the they – there is no fundamental ontological level upon which we could even speak of the priority of a ‘self’ which has to ‘enter’ a history. On the contrary, history belongs to the ‘Da’ itself, and selfhood is only possible on the basis of this Da. Selfhood, then, is always grounded in historicity. But ground is freedom and freedom is historicity, that is, in a certain sense, selfhood is history. This is the innermost meaning of the statement concerning “\textit{der Sorge der Beständigkeit und des Bestandes}.”\textsuperscript{44}

To formulate this as a thesis of temporality it is enough to reflect that (as the previous chapter indicated) the before-which of transcendence is always already historical.\textsuperscript{45} But if the before-which is only possible in an \textit{essential unity} with the for-the-sake-of – if the towards itself (future) and the coming-back-to (having-been) of Dasein form an essential unity – this means

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{40} Cf. SZ (S/S) 383-387 (which is not explicitly formulated in these terms there – but nor is the problem of inauthentic heritage precisely formulated at all)
  \item \textsuperscript{41} SZ (S/S) 385f.
  \item \textsuperscript{42} SZ (S/S) 385, technically the proximal grammatical ‘subject’ of this phrase is resoluteness. However, in context it is clear that this means resoluteness as authentic historicity. On this cf. also CTD 73ff. \textit{et infra}, 80f.
  \item \textsuperscript{43} Cf. SZ (S/S) 385, 391
  \item \textsuperscript{44} VWG (D) 132, cf. §2c in Ch. 2 of the Founded Analysis
  \item \textsuperscript{45} Cf. Founding Analysis (formulation of transcendence therein), Ch. 2 of the Founded Analysis esp. §3, cf. also SZ (S/S) 383f.
\end{itemize}
that the for-the-sake-of, is itself, primordially historical.\textsuperscript{46} And if the for-the-sake-of is the towards-itsel (future) of factical-historical thrownness (having-been), then the primordial enrepresenting of transcendence is only primordially possible as historical truth (i.e. historical founding).\textsuperscript{47}

So now, if transcendence means original standing in ontic and ontological truth – if it means original ground – it now means this only as historical.\textsuperscript{48} The they stands in need of this history yet this history remains foreign to it. So now, if truth is destined, we must say that this destiny remains closed off from everyday circumspection – but we must also say that this destiny destines everyday circumspection. This history of the essencing of truth determines the they, yet cannot enter the idle talk of the they (the they cannot bring itself before its own ground). Accordingly this historicity of truth must instead belong to the history of the most ‘covert judgements of common reason’\textsuperscript{49} since what pertains to transcendence – e.g. the world – is that which the they least ‘understands’ and yet this transcendence destines and determines the they.\textsuperscript{50}

The handing-down of transcendence is that which is most preserved. But this does not mean that it is preserved in remembering and safe-keeping. It means the reverse; it means that the destiny of transcendence is the primordial historical thrownness of Dasein which perdures in forgottenness. And because this handing-down is preserved in forgottenness, the Greeks can still determine everyday existence in its ground. Anything else would be a voluntarism, but all voluntarisms must shatter against transcendence – and thus, against essential freedom – just as thrownness must become ever more powerful in their absence.

\textsuperscript{46} On unity cf. Final Stage of the Founding Analysis & Summary to the Founding Analysis. That the above is implied does not make it phenomenologically cleared.
\textsuperscript{47} Cf. Ch. 1 of the Founded Analysis.
\textsuperscript{48} Cf. Founded Analysis passim
\textsuperscript{49} As Heidegger calls the history of being using Kant’s expression in SZ (S/S) 23 (cf. also SZ §6 in general)
\textsuperscript{50} SZ (S/S) 75, 129f. & §§36-38, §40 (thus, also Second Stage of the Founding Analysis §3). And so here there is already marked out the possibility of treating the history of philosophy as the most ‘essential’ history of Dasein (of course, above, the problem of the history of the understanding of being is held back).
But all of this is simply to say, as Heidegger says in *Being and Time* and which was mentioned *en passant* in the previous chapter:

*The happening of history is the happening of being-in-the-world.* The historicity of Dasein is essentially the historicity of the world which, on the basis of its ecstatic and horizontal temporality, belongs to the temporalizing of that temporality.51

The connection to §69c above is palpable.52 And this points us to something else which Heidegger says in *Being and Time*. Having just defined ‘world-history’ Heidegger says:

Here we must note that the expression “world history” that we have chosen, and that is here understood ontologically, has a double meaning. On the one hand it signifies the happening of world in its essential existent [existenten] unity with Dasein…53

But, as became more and more decisively clear throughout, the problem of the unity of Dasein and its world is the *problem of world understood according to transcendence*. Continuing, Heidegger says:

But at the same time it means the innerworldly ‘happening’ of what is handy and objectively present, since innerworldly beings are always discovered with the factically existent [existenten] world.54

This ‘double meaning’ must necessarily pertain to a certain ‘instability’ in the world-historical. Heidegger marks this by placing ‘happening’ in quotation marks above: the innerworldliness of the world-historical both belongs and doesn’t belong to historicity. But similarly, if the existence of the world includes this ‘happening’ of the innerworldly then a certain instability is now ascribed to the world itself.

That the first sense of world-history is indeed the transcendence of the world is attested when, in the same place, Heidegger says:

51 SZ (S/S) 388 (modified)
52 Cf. §2 Third Stage of the Founding Analysis
53 SZ (S/S, D) 389 (modified)
54 Ibid.
On the basis of the temporally founded transcendence of the world, what is world-historical is always already “objectively” there in the happening of existing being-in-the-world, without being grasped historiographically. And since factical Dasein is absorbed and entangled in what it takes care of, it proximally understands its history world-historically.55

So this last statement confirms again that what is at work here is precisely the problem of transcendence. World-historical things are innerworldly beings which act as ‘signs’ for the signification of a way of transcending.56 Conversely, the world-historical gets associated with deficient historicity because of the ‘second sense’ of the world-historical. That is, world-history binds transcendence and an innerworldly being together. Inauthentic historicity and historiography yoke history to innerworldliness on the basis of this connection.57

But now, Heidegger says something both expected and astounding: “the historical world is factual only as the world of innerworldly beings.”58 This brings us to the question about innerworldliness on the basis of transcendence, indeed it forces the question upon us, and it necessitates a wholly original answer. Anything less would be to degrade the primal phenomenon of transcendence. Instead, the problem of transcendence must be raised into its completeness.

§2 – SKETCHES CONCERNING TRANSCENDENCE AND THE PROBLEM OF INNERWORLDLINESS

a) Answer to the Question about Innerworldliness within the Bounds of the Problem of Transcendence

55 Ibid. (modified)
56 It seems relatively clear, given SZ (S/S) 77f. (esp. vs. §17 in general) that not every world-historical thing can be properly called a sign in the sense terminologically fixed for this word (Zeichen) by SZ §17. Accordingly, the word ‘sign’ is place in quotation marks above. An ontology of indication etc. cannot be achieved here.
57 Cf. SZ (S/S) 389-392
58 SZ (S/S, D) 389 (modified, italics added): “Geschichtliche Welt ist faktisch nur als Welt des innerweltlichen Seienden”, i.e., that it means the same as the above is unmistakable.
If the question about being is the most important question concerning fundamental ontological transcendence, the question about innerworldliness is amongst the most dangerous. It is the problem most likely to dissolve the phenomenon of transcendence. This is not because it is a complicated question, rather, like the derivation of the constancy of Dasein from anticipatory resoluteness, what makes it difficult is its simplicity. Accordingly, its solution only requires a special attentiveness to the matter.

As we saw most decisively in the Postscript to the Founding Analysis, the problem of transcendence brings us to the problem of the transcendent world. This means that transcendence transcends the innerworldly; that world is ‘beyond’ beings. But, as we saw repeatedly, with disclosedness of the world – with the disclosedness of this ‘beyond’ – innerworldly beings have already been discovered. Conversely, it is nothing less than a fundamental ontological precept that the inner-worldly bears an essential connection with the world.\(^59\) Thus, §2 of the Third Stage of the Founding Analysis interpreted world as the radical ‘from which’ of innerworldliness.

In the Postscript to the Founding Analysis we saw that Being and Time’s analysis of transcendence focuses on the ‘result’ of transcendence whereas subsequent texts tend to focus on the ‘movement’ which gives the transcendent. Thus, Being and Time speaks primarily of the ‘transcendence of the world’ or the ‘transcendent world’ whilst, a text such as Vom Wesen des Grundes speaks primarily of surpassing onto or towards world.\(^60\) In the Final Stage of the Founding Analysis and in the Postscript it was shown that the ‘movement’ and the ‘result’ are the same.

Much the same thing occurs in Heidegger’s elaboration of the problem of innerworldliness. Thus, in the Metaphysical Foundations of Logic and Vom Wesen des Grundes Heidegger

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\(^{59}\) SZ (S) passim esp. 61, 72f., 76 etc., cf. MFL 194 etc.

\(^{60}\) Postscript to the Founding Analysis. SZ §69c (vs. 364 in §69b), vs. BP §20e, VWG passim, MFL passim.
begins to speak of world-entry (Welteingang). Innerworldliness is to world-entry as the ‘transcendent world’ is to ‘surpassing towards world.’ World-entry is the ‘reason why’ there is innerworldliness in such a way that it is basically the same as innerworldliness. The difference is ‘only’ ‘rhetorical.’

World-entry is amongst the simplest questions and phenomena, but, for precisely the same reason, it is also especially liable to grievous misunderstanding. And if Heidegger himself, in an analysis of transcendence, can call world-entry an ‘Ur-happening,’ which is constitutive for the ‘primal history’ (Urgeschichte) of Dasein it is clear enough that the problem of world-entry – of the original givenness of innerworldliness – belongs together with the questions discussed in the previous section and the previous chapter.

Transcendence transcends beings as a totality. Precisely for this reason it is always ‘governed by beings’ and it has the potentiality for being ‘taken in by beings’, this, in turn, is one and the same with the ‘metaphysical powerlessness of Dasein.’ Transcending beings gives us original ontical truth. The task is only to see that with this the primordial question of innerworldliness has already been answered and that we must not, for instance, try to ground the exemplary discoveredness of innerworldliness in intuition etc.

Transcendence is never without world-entry and world-entry happens only in transcendence. Transcendence surpasses beings as a whole; the original phenomenon of innerworldliness is nothing more than this ‘being surpassed.’ That a being is surpassed is this being’s original belonging to world in the mode of innerworldliness. Being surpassed is the ‘entry’ of beings into the happening of world. That is, because, as was shown by the Final Stage of the Founding Analysis, world is identical with the transcending which belongs to

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61 Cf. MFL 194f.
62 MFL (E/D) 194, 209 / 250f., 270, VWG (ER) 90f.
63 VWG §3, MFL 215f.
64 MFL 210ff. 215f., etc.
65 Ibid. & MFL 194f.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
transcendence, world refers itself to beings \textit{without} being composed of them and yet this reference to beings is irreducible. Accordingly, innerworldliness is irreducibly discovered with the world and this discovery is wholly pre-intentional.

Understood correctly, this is simply what Heidegger says when he introduces the problem of world-entry in \textit{the Metaphysical Foundations of Logic}. There he begins by asking “when and how” is world-entry realised and says:

\begin{quote}
Entry into world is not a process of extant things, in the sense that beings undergo a change thereby and through this change break into the world. The extant’s entry into world is “something” that happens to it.\textsuperscript{68}
\end{quote}

That is, world-entry is not an ontical modification of the thing, it does not affect or cause anything to occur to the thing which enters a world. Instead it is ‘something’ which ‘happens’ to the thing. Here Heidegger only places \textit{etwas} in guillemets, on the other hand, in \textit{Vom Wesen des Grundes} this last sentence is replicated almost entirely, though in the latter text \textit{geschieht} is placed in guillemets.\textsuperscript{69} The latter only indicates that world-entry is nothing more than the original pertaining of beings to historicity, where, \textit{properly speaking} things are never historical (i.e. they don’t have the being of historicity).\textsuperscript{70} Accordingly, Heidegger continues:

\begin{quote}
World-entry has the characteristic of happening, of history. \textit{World-entry happens when transcendence happens, i.e., when historical Dasein exists}. Only then is the being-in-the-world of Dasein existent [existent]. And only when the latter is existent [existent], have things too already entered the world, i.e., become innerworldly. And only Dasein, qua existing, provides the opportunity for world-entry.\textsuperscript{71}
\end{quote}

Thus, the happening of world is the happening of world-entry which means, at the same time, of innerworldliness. World-entry is constitutive for transcendence, not because transcendence

\textsuperscript{68} MFL 194

\textsuperscript{69} MFL (E/D) 194 / 250f., VWG (ER) 90f., correspondingly, cf. the use of guillemets for ‘happening’ when applied to things in the previously quoted passage from SZ (S/S, D) 389.

\textsuperscript{70} That is, it refers us to the ‘instability’ which was given by the problem of world-history. Thus cf. MFL 194f., 209-212 & SZ §75 etc. It also refers us to the fact that only Dasein is historical.

\textsuperscript{71} MFL (E/D) 194 / 251 (modified, italics added)
makes a subsequent world-entry possible but because it is equiprimordially both the happening of world and the happening of world-entry. If transcendence is not an act then world-entry is not something pertaining to an act, which is to say: world-entry happens at a pre-intentional/comportmental (i.e. transcendental) level. And thus, Heidegger explains:

As being-in-the-world, transcending Dasein, in each case, factically provides beings with the opportunity for world-entry and this provision on the part of Dasein consist in nothing other than in transcending.

Transcendence is the happening of world-entry. World-entry is not subsequent to transcendence. World-entry is not, for instance, intuition or knowledge about beings. It is not practical know-how with beings but is simply the primordial pertaining of beings to world which always already constitutively belongs to transcendence as surpassing beings as a totality, i.e., as transcendent.

Conversely, in *Vom Wesen des Grundes* Heidegger says that:

Only if, within the totality of beings, a being “is” to some greater extent because it gets involved in Dasein’s temporality can we speak of its “entering a world” having an hour and day. And beings can manifest themselves only if this primal history, which we call transcendence, happens, i.e., if beings of the character of being-in-the-world break into beings.

Properly understood, this last quote repeats what was said in the previous quotes and analysis. Transcendence, world, is equiprimordially breaking into the totality of beings, and this breaking-in gives original world-entry. Accordingly, the above says that world-entry is the condition of possibility for datability (*Datierbarkeit*) but this does not mean that world-entry is the datedness of time. It means that world-entry is ‘time-entry’ as the first condition of

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72 VWG (ER) 112f. is particularly forceful and direct in this regard.
73 MFL 195
74 Within the economy of the present analysis, the problems of SZ §13 belongs to the ‘non-essence’ of Dasein.
76 VWG (ER) 90f. (modified)
possibility for the datability of time, i.e., as the first condition of possibility for Dasein to exist in the mode of ‘reckoning with time.’

In this way, world-entry is simply the primordial phenomenon of ontic truth itself. World-entry is the original truth of beings because it is simply their original being in the ‘there.’ But this does not yet mean to comport towards beings, to intend beings, to intuit beings. Instead it means the simple discoveredness that belongs to transcending as such. And by the same token, world-entry means nothing less than the entrance of beings into time, i.e. into the happening of the there.

b) Formulation of the Problems connected therewith: comportment, intuition, fallenness

In §69b Heidegger says:

This thesis that all cognition aims at “intuition” has the temporal meaning that all cognition is an enpresenting… That and how the intentionality of “consciousness” is grounded in the ecstatic temporality of Dasein will be shown in the following division.

According to Heidegger in the Metaphysical Foundations of Logic this states “that intentionality is based upon transcendence.” And we can now understand how this is so. Insofar as intuition means to enpresent beings, the transcendental problem of intuition is a question concerning the modifiability of the way in which Dasein’s enpresenting enpresents in the equiprimordiality of world and world-entry.

77 On datability cf. SZ (S/S) 406-409 et infra: proximally and for the most part ‘datability’ concerns the way in which time is ‘indexed’ according to the concerns of circumspection. Accordingly, datability needs world and world-entry so that the indexation can strike up roots. cf. also MFL 193f.
78 Cf. MFL 216f.
79 Ibid. & VWG (ER) 112f.
80 SZ (S/S, D) 363 infra (modified). Heidegger explicitly connects this with Husserl and his problem of intentionality.
81 MFL 168
And this, in turn, gives the formal structure of the answer to the question about how transcendence forms the origin of intentionality and comportment in general. It is a temporal condition of the worlding of world that the world is enpresented. Conversely, in comportment etc. Dasein turns more and more towards beings. The latter is only possible on the basis of the former. Only because there is world can there be world-entry (innerworldliness). If the most rudimentary existential-ontological possibility of dealings is the happening of world-entry (which already pertains to transcendence), then the rudimentary ontic-existentiell possibility of dealings is that Dasein turns towards (enpresents and becomes rapt by) the innerworldliness which is given with the happening of world. The latter ‘turning towards’ is simply innerworldliness gaining power in the happening of Dasein, that is, it is simply the original phenomenon of fallenness understood from transcendence.

And now, this thesis is finally in a position to explain something which was not mentioned throughout but not for that reason forgotten. In Heidegger’s exhibition of fallenness in *Being and Time*, fallenness is first a matter of ‘falling to the “world.”’ However, it is then immediately transposed so that Dasein falls to the world itself (Welt rather than »Welt«). Similarly, the world exists (it is an existential), yet Heidegger occasionally speaks in *Being and Time* of ‘taking care of’ (viz. besorgen) the world. Within the economy of the problem of transcendence these problems are not identical yet belong together. These problems have been held back because they would have merely introduced ambiguity into the problem of transcendence and selfhood without contributing any additional rigour.

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82 The inclusion of the discussion of this problem herein is guided by Heidegger’s statement that “… the transcendental possibility of intentional comportment must become a problem. And if intentionality is somehow a distinctive feature of the existence of Dasein, it cannot be ignored in elucidating transcendence.” VWG (ER) 112f. (modified)
83 SZ §69c, MFL 193f.
84 SZ (M&R, D) 175
85 SZ (M&R, D) 176
86 SZ (S) 297, SZ (M&R, S, D) 120, 122, 172 etc.
87 Though, if for instance one now wants to discard the previous analysis and interpret belonging to the world as inauthenticity then VWG (ER) 128ff. and SZ (S/S) 129 become inexplicable.
In *Being and Time* it is important that fallenness concerns Dasein’s falling to itself as being-in-the-world. This is because fallenness must be interpreted as an existential of Dasein.\(^88\) Accordingly, ‘Dasein falls to the world’ means ‘Dasein falls to itself’ and yet, since world does indeed form an essential *unity* with Dasein, interpreting oneself from the world cannot in and of itself be identical with inappropriate self-interpretation.\(^89\) However, this formal non-equivalence does not foreclose the possibility that Dasein might inauthentically (inappropriately) interpret itself and its world. In this way it becomes clear that fallenness is nothing less than *inauthentic being-in-the-world* whose counter-possibility is *authentic being-in-the-world* (thus, *not* reservation before the world or shunning the world).\(^90\) Fallenness to the world does not arise because world gains power in the existence of factical Dasein: fallenness to the *world* arises because, in accordance with the tendency of facticity, the *fallen mode* of being towards the world gains power in the existence of Dasein.\(^91\)

Fallenness can be a ‘fallenness to the world’ only because *inaauthenticity* gains power in being-in-the-world, and does so, on the basis of the self-interpretedness of *the they*. This means, the world is interpreted according to levelling and averageness. But since world and world-entry primordially belong together, it *also* (thus, not solely) means that world is confused with innerworldliness (even qua objective presence).\(^92\) But this implies that the world exists in such a way that it can become *entangled* and it even implies that world is proximally understood *from* this entanglement. Because the transcendent world (which Dasein exists as) and innerworldliness (which Dasein itself never is) essentially belong together, world and “world” can (and do) become entangled.\(^93\)

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\(^{88}\) *SZ (S/S, D) §38 (esp. 175f., 178f.)*

\(^{89}\) Cf. *SZ §38 vs. §69c*

\(^{90}\) *SZ (S/S, D) §38 (esp. 176f., 180) vs. §60 (esp. 297f.)*

\(^{91}\) *SZ (S/S) 178f. etc.*

\(^{92}\) *SZ (S/S, D) 129-130, §38*

\(^{93}\) Cf. *SZ (S/S) 178f. 297f. (though here note the terminological *faux pas* at *SZ (S/S) 297: “the discoveredness of the world” translates “der Erschlossenheit der Welt” *SZ (D) 297* and, accordingly, should have been translated as the *disclosedness* of the world.)*
And so, in this way we can understand how it could be the case that, while world \textit{exists} Heidegger can also speak of “the world taken care of” without this necessarily being either a mistake or a contradiction.\footnote{SZ \textit{passim}.} Because of the way that innerworldliness is grounded in world, the innerworldly whispers transcendence, and so, world can show itself from its entanglement in innerworldliness. Conversely, because the happening of world primordially includes world-entry, it is transcendentally possible for Dasein’s primordial for-the-sake-of to be taken from innerworldly beings.\footnote{I.e. awaiting as per SZ (S/S) 337, 343, 353 etc.}

Because world always already makes innerworldliness possible, world makes it possible for innerworldly beings to come into the foreground and eclipse the disclosedness of world. But in this eclipse, the world is still ‘alluded’ to in itself – even \textit{by} the innerworldly itself. Indeed, in a certain sense, the inner-worldly is already – one might even say by definition – the ‘entanglement’ of world and beings, and this entanglement is constitutive for the facticity of transcendence. Because transcendence is that which is primordially not entangled, yet an enpresenting of beings does belong to it, transcendence entangles itself. Transcendence belongs together with fallenness just as much as, qua transcendent – qua the existence of being-in-the-world pure and simple – it is primordially non-fallen.

And so here, within the economy of the problem of transcendence, we can now even distinctly make out the primordial priority of authentic temporality for the first time.\footnote{I.e. the ‘economy of the problem of transcendence’ is not the only ‘economy’. Here it is worthy of note, that when Part I §1\alpha\alpha indicated that this thesis cannot give a complete account of the problem of authenticity that statement still applies here, as it does to the previous chapter. On the priority of authentic temporality cf. Part I, §1.} Transcendence means the happening of world and this happening includes primal world-entry. Inauthentic temporality has seen through transcendence to innerworldliness and can no longer hear the world above the clamour of the innerworldly.\footnote{For allusions in this direction Cf. SZ (S/S) 129f., 343, VWG (ER) 128ff. This ‘seeing through transcendence to the innerworldly’ is a primordial possibility which is given by transcendence itself (but belongs to the non-essence of transcendence).}
existence no longer hears into the distance (i.e. into transcendence).\textsuperscript{98} Conversely, anticipatory resoluteness as the primordial disclosedness of Dasein does not dispense with innerworldliness – it cannot.\textsuperscript{99} Indeed, the ground for the indispensability of innerworldliness has now been given by transcendence itself.\textsuperscript{100} But authenticity can bring innerworldliness back to its ground.\textsuperscript{101} Authenticity, as primordial disclosedness, can temporalise the equiprimordiality of world and world-entry and bring this equiprimordiality into its truth.\textsuperscript{102}

And so, if world-entry as such belongs to the transcendence of Dasein and thus, to the inner possibility of any factical temporalising whatsoever, then authentic temporality is the temporality which temporalizes the complete meaning of being of Dasein. It does not do this because it de-worlds time, quite the opposite, that is, it temporalises world more essentially and completely than the temporality of inauthentic or undifferentiated Dasein.\textsuperscript{103} And thus, in this way, authentic temporality is primordial temporality. Indeed, this is even the case precisely because authentic temporality is not ‘essential’ in the sense given to this word by the previous two chapters, that is, because it temporalises the equiprimordiality of essence and non-essence.\textsuperscript{104}

On the one hand, inauthentic and undifferentiated temporality is the levelled down disclosure of being-in-the-world. It lets innerworldliness occlude world. On the other hand, authentic temporality brings Dasein into the complete meaning of being-in-the-world and lets the latter happen in its own element. In sum, world-entry has already happened with the transcendence

\textsuperscript{98} It even ‘hates’ the distance, cf. SZ §§ 35-38 & SZ (M&R) 188-191
\textsuperscript{99} SZ §60
\textsuperscript{100} I.e. §2a this chapter.
\textsuperscript{101} Previous chapter, e.g., §3b
\textsuperscript{102} Thus SZ §60 vs. VWG (ER) 18-21 et infra etc.
\textsuperscript{103} Cf. SZ §60, programmatically cf. MFL 139f., Ch. 2 of the Founded Analysis (there is a paucity of genuine attestation for this, but, this is not surprising since the topic belongs beyond SZ I.2 and because authenticity and inauthenticity are much less applied in Heidegger’s work after SZ). On the temporality of world cf. the Third and Final Stages of the Founding Analysis.
\textsuperscript{104} With the development of transcendence in the Founding Analysis and the problems which have occupied the Founded Analysis a renewed attestation for this position was needed. If temporality is not but temporalises itself, and this temporalisation intrinsically includes comportmental existence, primordial temporality must bring comportmental existence and transcendence to their truth. This is possible for authentic temporality but not for inauthentic and undifferentiated temporality.
of the world because world-entry is constitutive of the complete possibility of world. There is not one without the other. Yet, to put it pithily, *inauthentic temporality lets innerworldliness world, whereas, authentic temporality lets world world together with the innerworldly.*

Finally, the priority of handiness over objective presence can be understood in accordance with the primordial priority of the whole which belongs to transcendence. Handiness and relevance are *categorial* questions. Accordingly, so far as they are possible questions of transcendence they concern world-entry. In *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics* Heidegger says of SZ §18 that “it never occurred to me, however, to try and claim or prove with this interpretation that the essence of man consist in the fact that he knows how to handle knives and forks or use the tram.”

Similarly this thesis has no time to fully attend to such questions. Nonetheless, a formal sketch for the connection of transcendence with the possibility of the priority of handiness over objective presence can be given. In brief, the following may be taken as basic theses concerning handiness:

1. Handiness belongs to beings whose being is unlike Dasein.
2. Dealings are the existential possibility that beings may be discovered as handy. Accordingly, the discovery of handiness implies the *immersion* and *involvement* of Dasein.
3. Handiness is primordially whole.
4. Context is categorially-proximally prior to particularity. That is, “strictly speaking there ‘is’ never *a* single handy thing.”

But all of this may now be seen from transcendence:

1. Beings unlike Dasein are discovered with the transcendence of Dasein. This primordial discovery is called ‘world-entry.’

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105 FMC 177
106 Here, I do not mean *Bewandtnis* (which SZ (M&R) *passim* translates as ‘involvement.’)
107 SZ (S, D) 68 (modified): “Ein Zeug *ist« strenggenommen nie.”
2. The entanglement of world and world-entry means that Dasein’s primordial for-the-sake-of can be taken from beings. Through this, Dasein’s concern for the possible — for its ‘can-be’ — gets entangled with innerworldliness. But if Dasein understands its concern for the possible from innerworldliness then that means that coping with its own existence is now interpreted by factical Dasein as coping with things. If the most primordial meaning of understanding is the for-the-sake-of, then something like this way of understanding things of gains priority in the existence of Dasein.

3. Making innerworldliness an issue (i.e. primordial understanding thereof) means making what is discovered in its discoveredness an issue. But the discoveredness belonging to transcendence is always primordially whole. Accordingly, if Dasein has to ‘cope’ with its proximal thrownness into beings, this means it has to cope with its proximal thrownness into beings as a totality. That is, totality has priority in the foregoing.

4. Innerworldliness is always primordially whole. But transcendence is fundamentally strewn both because of its temporal articulatedness and because of its governedness by beings (where beings are themselves already articulated). This bestrewal (Streuung) of self-understanding is the possibility of the dispersal (Zer-streuung) of self-understanding. Thus, Heidegger speaks of the multiplication which belongs to the being-amidst… of transcendence. If Dasein binds itself and its self-understanding to innerworldliness, then, it binds itself to the totality of innerworldliness, where, this innerworldliness-totality is always already differentiation and articulation. Accordingly, the whole discovered in transcendence (3), and from which Dasein now understands its possibilities (2), is understood as context (interconnection).

108 MFL 137ff. (here the thesis from SZ (S, D) 68 is even repeated in transcendental terms), 214 & VWG (ER) 104-107, 126ff.
109 Cf. Ibid.
110 MFL (E/D) 137ff. / 173 (this ‘multiplication’ is more than the above, but the above is limited to a specific problem)
111 Conversely, since this context-totality gives Dasein familiarity with beings, Dasein can now ‘single out’ this or that being in intuition etc.
This outlines the *formal* possibility for the priority of dealings and handiness on the basis of transcendence. The word ‘formal’ here indicates that the above has no pretence about having solved the complete problem of the priority of dealings over intuition etc. which cannot even be completely formulated whilst staying at the present level of analysis.\(^\text{112}\)

Before turning to §3, we must first return to the problem disclosed in the discussion of world-history. The whole problem of world-entry brings us to one of the simplest and the most difficult questions of fundamental ontology. But what it discloses is the primordial possibility – indeed the necessity – that beings and world belong together. Innerworldliness ‘carries’ world because its essence comes from the world. Conversely, the priority of innerworldly beings in world-history is a *modification* of the way in which transcendence is governed by beings. Because, and *to the extent that* world-entry belongs to the world, beings belong to world. And in accordance with the existentiell priority of fallenness, this means that world has always already shown itself in terms of the world-entry which belongs to it. *World itself entangles itself.* *Being-in-the-world falls to the entanglement of its world.*\(^\text{113}\) Thus the problems which emerged at the end of §2 are basically answered when we understand that it belongs to world to have become entangled with beings, and for this entanglement to have become the *proximal* governedness of world by beings.

As a name for the essence of Dasein, ‘being-in-the-world’ means Dasein transcends. As a statement about the proximal happening of Dasein, being-in-the-world means Dasein has always already entangled its world in “world.” Authentic historicity lets innerworldliness happen in constancy, and so, conversely, inauthentic historicity binds constancy to

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\(^\text{112}\) Thus there is the answer already given in SZ I.1.ii-iii §13, §15 esp. pp 69, 71, cf. also §§32 & 69b: categorically speaking, merely ‘looking at...’ can never discover anything about things. This means that discovering things as handy is hermeneutically (existentially) prior to discovering them as objectively present because the prior understanding of handiness originally gives theoretical comportment ‘something’ determinate to look at (and thereby to interpret and theorise about).

\(^\text{113}\) Cf. also the problem of inauthentic selfhood in the previous chapter.
innerworldliness and in so doing it binds constancy to inconstancy. This is the basic meaning of the ‘instability’ of world and the world-historical.

§3 – Sketch for a Re-petitive and ‘Destructive’ History of Transcendence

In the First Stage of the Founding Analysis, we saw Kisiel’s statement that the problem of transcendence naturally becomes a Destruktion of the history of transcendental philosophy. It was also indicated there, as well as in the introduction and in Part I, that the question of being – which is of course connected with transcendence – must be an intrinsically historical question. In turn, as Ruin has argued, Heidegger is not engaged in a ‘historicism’ so much as a critical engagement in and with history mounted from and for the present situation. So then, on the one hand, we must grasp the way in which history hands the understanding of being down to us (re-petition), but on the other hand, we must also be able to develop a critical relation to this history (Destruktion). Indeed, properly speaking, the latter must precede the former.

Transcendence is a word from this history. Accordingly, the complete problem of fundamental ontological transcendence includes a Destruktion and re-petition of the history of the concept of transcendence. In part, this means that it should be possible to treat fundamental ontological transcendence as disclosing the basis for all historically essential ways of philosophising under the heading of ‘transcendence.’ Transcendence can form the

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114 Of course, if time is itself transcendent and this belongs to the inner meaning of the constancy of primordial temporality, and thus to historicity, then this means that historicity (at least, as formulated here) does not in itself answer the question about the time of historiography. However, to sketch an answer by placing the problem into the Aristotelian formula; the transcendence of time is the inner possibility of that constancy, which, by granting world-entry grants dataability (it numbers, it count) to what occurs (i.e., to ‘motion in accordance with the before and after’).
115 First Stage of the Founding Analysis §4b, Kisiel (1995[1993]) 408
116 Introduction herein, Part I §§1, 3, First Stage of the Founding Analysis §§1, 4b, 5
118 CTD 87f.
Part III – the Founded Analysis

guiding thread for a confrontation over the history of ontology only if such a relation can be established (otherwise it could only be an extrinsic thread of this confrontation). Such a maxim guides Heidegger’s Destruktion of Aristotle’s concept of time, Descartes’ concept of world, Kant’s concept of the condition of possibility, and Kant’s concept of the “I” etc.\(^\text{119}\)

Only now, with the transcendental exhibition of the problem of innerworldliness, are we in a position to outline how fundamental ontological transcendence can be both a re-petition of the history of philosophy and the groundwork for its Destruktion. We may trace the history of transcendence as follows: first there is Plato’s ἐπέκεινα, the good as ‘the beyond’.\(^\text{120}\) Next we have the scholastic transcendens which means either the highest principles of metaphysica generalis, or in its practical-religious aspect, it refers us to Dasein’s nearness to God.\(^\text{121}\) We have the ‘transcendence’ which is implied by Kant’s problem of ontological knowledge.\(^\text{122}\) Here, (mutatis mutandis!) with respect to the problem of transcendence, we may place Husserl’s transcendence of the ideal together with the scholastic transcedentia and the Kantian problem of ontological knowledge.\(^\text{123}\) Finally there is ‘transcendence’ as the basic problem of modern philosophy, namely, the problem of how the ‘subject’ goes out to meet its intentum and the latter’s connection with the thing in itself.\(^\text{124}\)

Heidegger already offers a typology of the historical problem of transcendence in the Metaphysical Foundations of Logic.\(^\text{125}\) On the one hand, there is the problem of transcendence as surpassing a boundary, and on the other, there is the problem of

\(^{119}\) Cf. SZ §§ 19-21, 64, 81 & pp 100, 144f. (note here how possibility gains priority over conditions), 432 infra, BP §19, for transcendence cf. also PIK §23
\(^{120}\) MFL 116f., 181-185, 219, BP 282ff., VWG (ER) 92ff.
\(^{122}\) KPM (T) passim e.g. 10f., BP 298 etc., PIK §23
\(^{123}\) LQT (E/D) 40ff. / 46ff., Moran (2000). Of course, as HCT §§6c-d shows, the ideal has been reformulated by Husserl and renewed in its basic meaning and orientation. The ideal no longer means ens qua ens and this alone (the scholastic transcendents). Nor is it limited to absolute concepts (Kant’s ideal) or even solely to predicates per se (the categories in their difference from sensibility, i.e., αἱ κατηγορίας as per CPR (A/B) 81f. / 107f.). Husserl’s ideal has now become a matter of meaning itself in the latter’s difference from flux (cf. also LI.I §§28-29 etc.)
\(^{124}\) BP 62f., PIK 216, SZ (S) 60f. 202ff. etc.
\(^{125}\) MFL 159-165
transcendence as the relation of the unconditioned to the contingent.\textsuperscript{126} So now, broadly speaking, we can place Plato’s ἐπέκεινα, the scholastic transcendentals, Kant’s transcendental problem and Husserl’s problem of the ideal (which transcends the real) primarily within the latter category.\textsuperscript{127} Modern philosophy’s problem of the subject’s self-transcendence belongs in the former category.\textsuperscript{128} Finally, the practical-religious transcendence of Medieval-Christian philosophy presents us with an ‘entanglement’ of both concepts.\textsuperscript{129}

It is clear that, for Heidegger, the history of the problem of transcendence begins with Plato’s good even before the Romantic word ‘transcendence’ has entered philosophy.\textsuperscript{130} The good is ἔτι ἐπέκεινα τῆς ὁμοίας – it is ‘even beyond being.’ Since however, in this case ‘being’ means ὁμοία, and, in the Metaphysical Foundations Heidegger glosses ὁμοία as both Seiendheit and ἰδέα, this would seem to mean that τὸ ἀγαθὸν is even beyond the ἰδέα, even beyond the being of beings. In this way, it would seem to become the Platonic question about Sein überhaupt.\textsuperscript{131} However, because the good surpasses both the ideas and beings, and does so for-the-sake-of-itself, the good carries its surpassing with it – i.e. that which it surpasses is an issue for it. Accordingly, the good now forms the primordial and original question about the

\textsuperscript{126} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{127} Cf. MFL 161ff. Of course, as Heidegger shows here Kant’s concept is more of an ‘entanglement’ of both concepts of transcendence. This entanglement is connected with the fact that “ontology is grounded in the ontic” etc. (MFL 164). Still, the purity of pure knowledge points us more towards the second concept of transcendence. A more penetrating analysis of the whole problem would be far too lengthy and thus cannot be worked out here.

\textsuperscript{128} Thus MFL 160f.

\textsuperscript{129} Thus, cf. MFL 162

\textsuperscript{130} Cf. BP 282ff. 299, 307, MFL 116f., 181ff., 219, VWG (ER) 92ff., First Stage of the Founding Analysis §3b etc.

\textsuperscript{131} Cf. MFL (E/D) 144f., 184 / 182f., 237. Thus, Müller (1964) 66. In this respect the way that Heidegger’s quotation and ‘translation’ of the Republic 509b 6-10 in MFL (E/D) 219 / 284 both stays with Plato and constantly moves beyond him presents us with rather difficult questions. The last sentence especially becomes a perplexing and rich difficulty: “the for-the-sake-of, however, (transcendence) [τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ] is not being itself [οὐκ ὁμοίας ὄντος], but surpasses being [ἄλλ’ ἐτι ἐπέκεινα τῆς ὁμοίας], and does so inasmuch as it outstrips beings [ὑπερέχοντος] in dignity and power [πρεσβεία καὶ δυνάμει].” (Ibid.) Thus more literally, following Heidegger’s glosses on ὁμοία in MFL: “the good is not the being-ness of beings, but is even beyond being-ness, surpassing the latter in dignity and power.” Cf. also BP 283f.: the good is the illumining of ὁμοία and beings. One could call world this illumining: though the understanding of being simpliciter is yet more primordial than world and is to that extent more illumining than world. Correspondingly, the different approach to the problem taken by Dastur (1999[1990]) 56-58 remains entirely reasonable.
Part III – the Founded Analysis

totality of that which it surpasses.\textsuperscript{132} In turn, it forms the inner possibility of the merely real, and of the ideas.\textsuperscript{133}

It is only from the οὗ ἕνεκα (the for-the-sake-of) that the good gains this power.\textsuperscript{134} That is, it is only from the primordial *phenomenon* of the future. But it is only because Da-sein itself somehow already exists in the futural disclosedness of the whole that it can ask about something called τὸ ἀγαθόν.\textsuperscript{135} Moreover, something like this ‘good’ – this ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας – must belong to the understanding which understands the whole.\textsuperscript{136} But since truth and understanding intrinsically belong together (qua disclosedness) and the understanding of being belongs to the inner possibility of granting the disclosedness of this whole (where this ‘granting’ is interpreted by Plato as the good itself), this now means that the good must become the location for the question about being, truth, and understanding.\textsuperscript{137} And so, it becomes clear that the historically original problem of transcendence is nothing less than this trinity of problems – but not in such a way that Plato himself properly grasped this, nor in such a way that this elemental content of the problem was explicitly handed down as the problem of transcendence.

Plato’s good also shows that, properly understood, standing beyond beings means standing before beings as a whole. The ‘beyond’ does not annihilate concern for the whole, rather, it binds us to the whole. And in this sense, it also shows that even if fundamental ontological transcendence were to be formulated as a kind of movement beyond beings to being, properly understood – i.e., radically understood – and understood with respect to the for-the-sake-of

\textsuperscript{132} E.g. MFL 116f.
\textsuperscript{133} Cf. esp. MFL 116f., 184f., 219
\textsuperscript{134} VWG 92ff., MFL 184f., 219 indeed, in the latter, τὸ ἀγαθὸν is even translated as *Umwillen* (cf. MFL (D) 284) and *Umwillen* is glossed as transcendence.
\textsuperscript{135} Parallel to this cf. BP (E/D) 283 / 401: “all unveiling requires an antecedent illumining. The eye must be ἡλιοειδές. Goethe translates this by “sonnenhaft”… As sensible cognition is ἡλιοειδές, so correspondingly all γιγνώσκειν, all cognition, is ἀγαθοειδές…”: the eye belongs to the sun, and thus, it can see, just as thinking belongs to the good, and so can think.
\textsuperscript{136} This is precisely the presupposition for the use of the problem in MFL 181-185
\textsuperscript{137} Cf. VWG (ER) 92ff. In MFL the thematic is more the question of being and truth as per (cf. MFL 116f.), however, the οὗ ἐνεκα necessarily also directs us to the problem of understanding (but cf. the indirect connection at MFL 148)
this would still mean that transcendence implies world. To go beyond beings for-the-sake-of oneself is to understand being and beings by breaking open the ‘how’ of beings as a whole: it means to understand world, it means original standing in ontic-ontological truth.\(^{138}\)

The scholastic *transcendens* pertains to that which wholly surpasses the conditioned.\(^{139}\) Through this, it gives the transcendentals; the determinations of any being whatsoever.\(^{140}\) In this sense, the transcendentals become the scholastic name for the being of beings. Dasein can arrive at the doctrine of the transcendentals only from a pre-view of beings as a totality. Only because this ‘pre-viewing’ and ‘looking towards the whole’ belongs to the being of Dasein can Dasein announce to itself that ‘to be’ means to be *unum, bonum et verum* (i.e. the most common transcendentals).\(^{141}\) Thus, the existential possibility of the problem of the transcendentals implies the problem of the world, world-entry and the understanding of being, that is, it implies transcendence in the existential sense. Moreover, existentially speaking, as the most primordial disclosedness of this whole, transcendence is even *the* soil and measure from whence the transcendentals may be questioned in their ground.

Here, in the problem of the *Destruktion* of the history of transcendence (on the basis of the fundamental ontological project of transcendence), Husserl’s ideal and Kant’s transcendentals belong together. Again, only because surpassing towards the whole and understanding oneself out of the whole belongs to Dasein can it arrive at the problem of the permanent and of the structure of the whole, and the being of that which is so surpassed.\(^{142}\)

Next, there is the problem of the transcendence of the subject to its object. This problem is constitutive for the horizon and project of modern philosophy. Primarily this transcendence of the subject is understood as an *intentional* relation. Thus it asks: how is it that I, as a being,

\(^{138}\) On the ‘how’ as world cf. Part I, §3a herein.

\(^{139}\) Gracia (1992), SZ (S/S) 14, MFL 162 etc.


\(^{141}\) *Ibid.*

\(^{142}\) MFL 163ff. does not wholly point in this direction. The above might be profitably compared to the phenomenon, if not the exegesis, discussed in Malpas (1997). Above, the brevity of the discussion is proportionate to the necessary length of a more detailed discussion.
go out to meet another being? The previous chapter offered a fundamental ontological Destruktion of the concept of the subject (i.e. of selfhood). Since that analysis grounded selfhood in transcendence it presented no horizon upon which one could speak of a problem of a self-contained subject which subsequently goes out to meet an object. To that extent it is already a destructuring ‘answer’ to the problem of ‘transcendence’ in modern philosophy. Conversely, so far as §2 of this chapter gave the formal conditions for the possibility of intentionality (and the problem of modern philosophy is concerned with ‘relating-to’ i.e. intentionality), and §2 did so on the basis of transcendence, this means that §2 also gave a destructuring ‘answer’ to the problem.143 That is, developing fundamental ontological transcendence eo ipso shows how the problem of modern ontology is based “misconstruing the problem of transcendence.”

The final problem is that of the practical-religious transcendence of Medieval-Christian philosophy. However, since no preparations for this problem have been made, it cannot be pushed further than it was already pushed in the First Stage of the Founding Analysis.145 This being said, it is entirely clear from the evidence scattered throughout Heidegger’s texts that during the late 20s Heidegger was silently planning to work out a Destruktion and re-petition of the experience of the nearness of divinity. This destructive re-petition was to be guided by the way in which the determination of Dasein’s nearness to the divine has been historically given the name ‘transcendence.’ The existential roots for this analysis were to be none other than fundamental ontological transcendence.146

143 Cf. also ‘ontic transcendence’ as discussed in §2 of the Second Stage of the Founding Analysis
144 Cf. PIK 213. Correspondingly, “the thing-in-itself cannot be set aside epistemologically, but this concept (as correlate of an absolute understanding) can only be removed if one can show that the presupposition of an absolute understanding is not philosophically necessary.” MFL 164. For a more precise formulation of the problem cf. ET §1, for a response to the problem cf. ET §2 et seq.
145 First Stage of the Founding Analysis §3b
§4 – Sketch for the Problem of the Transcendental Question about the Meaning of Being and its Connection with SZ II

SZ I was to give the transcendental horizon for the question of being. But this ‘transcendental horizon’ only necessitates that the pursuit of the meaning of being continues in a Destruktion of the history of philosophy (SZ II). Accordingly, as justification for the division of Being and Time into SZ I and SZ II Heidegger says:

The universality of the concept of being does not speak against the ‘special character’ of the investigation. That is, we advance to being by way of a special interpretation of a particular being, Dasein, in which the horizon for an understanding and a possible interpretation of being is to be won. But this being [Seiende] is in itself “historical” [»geschichtlich«], so that the authentic ontological illumination of this being necessarily becomes a “historical” [»historischen«] interpretation.147

Of course, this also means that the division of the first and second part of Being and Time cannot be simply packaged up as an ‘analysis of Dasein’ on the one hand and an ‘analysis of being in itself’ on the other. SZ II does not ascend beyond Dasein; it pushes deeper into Dasein and does so in accordance with the inner necessities facing an analysis of this being.

But since SZ I.3 was to consummate the transcendental horizon, the above also indicates that no matter how ‘systematic’ one’s determination of the meaning of transcendence – even when formulated in its temporale dimension – it is impossible in principle to simply use transcendence as an answer to the question of being.148 However, it is still possible on the basis of the foregoing analysis of transcendence, to present some relatively concrete reflections about the way that transcendence figures in the fundamental ontological question of being.

147 SZ (S/S, D) 39, on this formulation of philosophy cf. also CTD 8-10
148 I.e. because SZ I.3 was to consummate the ‘transcendental question about being’ but this only requires a deeper investigation of Dasein, cf. SZ (S/S) 26f., 39f.
Heidegger does connect the understanding of being with transcendence. For instance, in one of his strongest formulations of the connection, Heidegger says that “primordial transcendence and the understanding of being… must in the end be one and the same.”

This easily seems to contradict all of the above. And so, as a guiding attestation for the rightness of the path taken towards transcendence here, we should first note how Heidegger describes fundamental ontological transcendence in the Contributions:

Here [in the fundamental ontological concept of transcendence] the word’s primordial meaning is returned to it: surpassing as such, and it is grasped as the distinctive mark of Da-sein, in order thus to indicate that this being always already stands within the openness of beings. This is joined with, and determines more precisely “ontological” “transcendence”, so far as the latter is grasped from the essence of Dasein as the understanding of being. But understanding is now formulated as thrown projection, transcendence means: standing in the truth of Seyn, of course, without proximally knowing or questioning this.

Thus, transcendence first means to ‘stand within the openness of beings.’ This has been given proper weight throughout: transcendence is surpassing beings as a totality as the first and most primordial openness of Dasein. Since this open includes the understanding of being, it includes, in a renewed form, something called “ontologische Transzendenz.” In this area of the Contributions Heidegger is engaged in presenting an historical typology of

\[149\] BP 300, 302, 323, also e.g. MFL 16, 88, 135f., 141, 148, 153, VWG (ER) §§1 & 3, PIK 226 etc.

\[150\] MFL 136

\[151\] Contributions (E/D) 151f. / 217 (modified). Conversely, Dahlstrom (2005b) 39f. treats this passage as ‘revisionist’. This thesis (which is of course rooted in 1927-1929) is not able to agree because to do so would contradict the foregoing as a whole. Similarly, I side with Emad and Maly on the interpretation of “freilich ohne dies...” in the above contra Ibid. Of course, (for which reason Dahlstrom calls it a ‘qualified revisionism’) Heidegger continues “But now since Da-sein as Da-sein primordially sustains the openness of concealment, taken strictly one cannot speak of a transcendence of Da-sein: in the context of this approach the representation of “transcendence” in every sense must disappear.” Ibid. To engage with this statement one would need a grounding in thinking of the Contributions (not prepared here), though, one ought not to forget that it says “in the context of this approach” (“im Umkreis dieses Ansatzes...”) i.e., within the approach of the other thinking. The position that the first part of this passage is not a revisionism does not prejudice the possibility that Heidegger can later say that his earlier work and its focus on transcendence was inadequate (hermeneutically, with respect to the matter, with respect to its possibilities, with respect to its steadiness, with respect its penetration etc.). In this respect (vis-à-vis the problem of ‘Platonism’ in Contributions 226) the constant need to rely on ‘the whole’ (thus, leading to the kovôv) in this analysis seems significant, especially when compared with the analysis of §2c in Ch. 1 of the Founded Analysis.

\[152\] Ibid., correspondingly, cf. e.g. VWG (ER/D) 110 / 167: “Das Dasein gründet (stiftet) Welt nur als sich gründend inmitten von Seiendem.”

\[153\] Ibid.
transcendence.\textsuperscript{154} Within this typology ‘ontological transcendence’ refers to the ‘beingness of beings’ so that Dahlstrom quite reasonably – and I think accurately – infers that the transcendentals of scholasticism are the historical exemplar for this type of transcendence.\textsuperscript{155} Yet, in this case both of these words are placed in guillemets.\textsuperscript{156} This indicates that the sense in which this ontological transcendence is ‘ontological’ and ‘transcends’ is problematic. Accordingly, this ‘ontological transcendence’ must be thought more essentially, i.e. it “must be grasped from the essence of Dasein as the understanding of being.”\textsuperscript{157}

This renewal of ‘ontological transcendence’ becomes more concrete when we find that transcendence means \textit{standing in the truth} of being (indeed, in Seyn) \textit{because}, under the topic of fundamental ontological transcendence, “understanding is formulated as \textit{thrown projection}”.\textsuperscript{158}

Thus, in sum, transcendence means the happening of the truth of the ‘there.’ Transcendence is the original \textit{facticity} of ontic-ontological truth. The understanding of being never precedes Dasein’s standing in the truth of beings, but rather, the understanding of being is \textit{itself} formulated as ‘thrown projection’ and this must include both the ontic and the ontological meaning of situatedness.\textsuperscript{159}

Transcendence is \textit{essential} facticity as such. This was already indicated in the First Stage of the Founding Analysis and then shown by the development of the essential and inner unity of the horizontal schemata.\textsuperscript{160} Subsequently it was shown when transcendence was bound to the

\textsuperscript{154} Contributions (E/D) 151f. / 216f.
\textsuperscript{155} Dahlstrom (2007) 66
\textsuperscript{156} Conversely, in Contributions (E/D) 151f. / 217 when Heidegger first speaks of ontological transcendence he does place “ontological” in guillemets. In context however it is clear that this is primarily, if not entirely, procedural.
\textsuperscript{157} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{158} Contributions (E/D) 151f. / 217 (italics added). As justification for interpreting Seyn in the quoted passage as simply referring to the problem of being as it was thought in the late 20s cf. Emad & Maly in Contributions xxii & LH 245 vs. SZ passim, esp. p 7 \textit{et infra}.
\textsuperscript{159} Cf. Ibid., Part I, Third and Final Stages of the Founding Analysis etc.
\textsuperscript{160} Third and Final Stage of the Founding Analysis
Accordingly when Heidegger says “…but understanding is now formulated as thrown projection”\textsuperscript{162} this belongs to the inner meaning of the happening of Dasein, i.e. to the radical facticity and historicity of transcendence.\textsuperscript{163} That, moreover, transcendence means standing in the truth of being rather than merely ‘having it’ or ‘attaining it’ indicates that transcendence is the \textit{happening} of the understanding of being and that \textit{here as everywhere else understanding is always thrown and this thrownness is not to be dispensed with}.

As that which is most primordial, the understanding of being belongs to that which is most essential to Dasein. But as constitutively and ineradically thrown, and as bound to transcendence, the understanding of being is necessarily thrown from its history. And in this way, the understanding of being must somehow belong to the most primal and essential history of Dasein.

So what is a ‘transcendental horizon’ for the question of being, and what connection does it have with temporality? Heidegger concretely answers this in a passage of \textit{Einleitung in die Philosophie}, a text which stands right at the peak (precipice) of his explicit engagement with transcendence.\textsuperscript{164}

But something essential has come to light: philosophising means the formation of the understanding-of-being’s transcendence, i.e., philosophising lets that which makes existence possible in its ground happen.\textsuperscript{165} Philosohising is an existing from the essential ground of Dasein. Philosophising means: becoming essential in transcendence. Accordingly, only transcendence allows the projection of being and so on. But this essentially needs transcendence as the horizon of projection. The question about being thus needs the transcendental horizon.

\textsuperscript{161} Ch. 2 of the Founded Analysis, §1 this chapter.

\textsuperscript{162} Contributions (E/D) 151f. / 217

\textsuperscript{163} Cf. VWG 116f. for a statement from the 20s which is in all important respects identical to what is said in the \textit{Contributions} about fundamental ontological transcendence (i.e. the direct connection of transcendence, being, understanding and attunedness).

\textsuperscript{164} Cf. Kisiel (2005[2001]) 202ff. 206 etc.

\textsuperscript{165} EP 218: “Etwas Wesentliches aber ist ans Licht gekommen: Philosophieren ist als Ausbildung des Seinsverständnisses Transzendieren, d.h. Geschehen-lassen dessen, was Existenz im Grunde ermöglicht.”

362
(But this demands that transcendence is unveiled in its essence. Transcendence is the essential ground of Dasein’s self, of the being that we ourselves are. For this reason an unveiling of the constitution of being of Dasein and the essence of existence is required. It now becomes apparent that the original constitution of the being of Dasein, which means, at the same time, the ground of the inner possibility of transcendence, is temporality. And so it is necessary that time determines the transcendental horizon for the fundamental question of philosophising: the question about being. The fundamental question of philosophy is the question concerning being and time. Therefore, the first part of the thus-entitled investigation is: “The interpretation of Dasein on the basis of temporality and the explication of time as the transcendental horizon of the question about being”).

Here, in Einleitung in die Philosophie fundamental ontology is no longer scientific philosophy. This, in turn, has been replaced by the determination of philosophising as ‘explicit transcending.’ The extent to which, in itself, this does not constitute a complete repudiation of the problem of a ‘transcendental horizon for the question about being’ is shown by the fact that Heidegger continues by showing how it does in fact imply the transcendental horizon.

Here Heidegger says that when we philosophise genuinely we ‘let the understanding of being happen’, i.e., philosophising lets this understanding come into the open and grip our Dasein. But this happens only in transcendence and on the basis of transcendence. That is, unveiling the understanding of being means “becoming essential in transcendence.” In turn, this is only because transcendence is the essential foundation for projection in general. That is, the question about being needs the transcendental horizon because it needs to grasp the innermost meaning of projection. Rendered differently, the question about being needs the

\[166\] EP 218 translated in consultation with Toshiro Osawa and Shawn Loht. Cf. Otto Saame and Ina Samme-Speidel in EP 218 infra that the bracketed portion of this quote was not delivered. That the part explaining the problem of a transcendental horizon is the part which was dropped but not the assertion of the necessity of a transcendental horizon indicates that Heidegger hesitated about the communicability of the problem rather than its formulation per se. This realm of problems is discussed in the First Stage of the Founding Analysis & §2c of Ch. 1 of the Founded Analysis.

\[167\] Cf. Kisiel (2005[2001]) passim. Cf. also EP passim e.g. 354f, 395f. On the other hand, cf. MFL 221, cf. also SZ §§44 & 60 which could already be read in this regard. Also, cf. the problem of an authentically historical SZ II which would necessarily be a matter of explicit handing-one’self-down which, according to the whole of the foregoing must bespeak (if not be) an explicit transcending. Cf. also SZ §2 in light of Vassilacopoulos (2008) 143f.

\[168\] EP 218

\[169\] Ibid.
transcendental horizon because transcendence is the fundamental (i.e. essential) horizon for questioning and being-questioned in general.

And so, this means that “transcendence must be revealed in its essence” which, we find, simply means that transcendence must be given a temporal interpretation, i.e., that transcendence must be determined in its inner possibility by temporality. ¹⁷⁰ This is nothing more than the guiding presupposition and task of the Third and Final Stages of the Founding Analysis. But now we find that it is for this and no other reason that the title for the SZ I becomes “…Time as the Transcendental Horizon for the Question about Being.” ¹⁷¹ But if that is the long and the short of it then it should be no surprise that this temporal-transcendental horizon gives a question about being, nor should it be a surprise that Heidegger italicises the word Frage when he quotes the title of SZ I in Vom Wesen des Grundes. ¹⁷²

Temporality is the transcendental horizon for the question about being, i.e., temporality understood with respect to transcendence and vice versa. But temporality and transcendence are always historicity. ¹⁷³ But questioning is always a mode of understanding and understanding is always thrown. ¹⁷⁴ And that means, because transcendence is itself history, because time is itself history, the transcendental horizon is equiprimordially the historical horizon. ¹⁷⁵ Transcendence is the inner possibility for the question about being because it that which most primordially lets Dasein exist as thrown into the truth of beings and their being.

Because understanding is intrinsically historical – i.e. because historicity pertains to the inner thrownness of understanding – it becomes both possible and necessary to present, firstly, an

¹⁷⁰ EP 218
¹⁷¹ EP 218
¹⁷² VWG (ER) 96 infra (and in his subsequent analysis: “Alle konkreten Interpretationen, vor allem die der Zeit, sind allein in der Richtung auf die Ermöglichung der Seinsfrage auszuwerten.”). Cf. Introduction herein. The relevant passage is also quoted from in First Stage of the Founding Analysis §§1, 4d, on the problem of the question cf. also SZ (S) 26f.
¹⁷³ Ch. 2 of the Founded Analysis, §2 this chapter.
¹⁷⁴ Cf. the ‘why’ in Ch. 1 of the Founded Analysis §2b
¹⁷⁵ Ch. 2 of the Founded Analysis, §2 this chapter, and the identity of time and transcendence belonging to the Founding Analysis.
investigation of the distortion of the understanding of being (destruction) and secondly, an investigation into the philosophising which has positively determined how being presences for us (re-petition of the nurturing roots of understanding). And so, if SZ I.3 was indeed to concern a temporale ‘gramma-onto-logy’ as Kisiel has called it, then this onto-grammar can only be a propaedeutic or a prolegomenon to the historically posed question about being.

Thus: “…above all we lack the “grammar” – yes, this is true, but this does not say that attaining this grammar is the same as answering the question about being and should not be read as if it did. The grammar is still only the law for a λέγειν about being – it is still ‘only’ a matter of gaining a footing in the question. “… the understanding of being is a fact” – yes, but understanding is never simply a ‘fact.’ It is always thrown and always enpresented and thus brought into its truth from this thrownness, i.e., its truth is freedom and not fact.

And thus as Heidegger told Max Müller:

In the first elaboration of SZ I.3, where the turning to ‘Time and Being’ itself was carried through, I called that which was meant the ‘transzendenzhafte difference’, and did so in relation to the transcendental (ontological in the narrower sense) and the transcendent (theological) difference.

In connection with this, Max Müller later speaks of a Mitteilung on this threefold form of the question. He explains that the question of ‘transcendental difference’ concerns the ontological difference at the level of beings and their beingness. Secondly the transzendenzhafte Differenz is said to be the difference of being from beings and their
beings.

Accordingly, the *transzendenzhafte Differenz* is simply the level wherein the question of being ‘as such’ can be posed. That the *transcendental* question should be formed at the level of beings and their being is wholly in line with all of the foregoing so far as transcendence is never without a constitutive relation to beings. And whilst it is difficult to discern whether the *Mitteilung* which Müller speaks of is limited to the above correspondence, and if not, how accurate his recollection is, his determination of the difference between the transcendental and the *transzendenzhafte Differenz* remains a relatively plausible formulation of the lofty height which must implicitly belong to the latter and the comparatively ‘narrower’ bounds of the transcendental difference.

Thus, a marginal note to *Being and Time* refers to SZ I.3 as the problem of the *transzendenzhafte Differenz* and continues: “the overcoming of the horizon as such. The turn [Umkehr] into the source. The presencing [Anwesen] out of this source.”

Applying the basic results of this thesis (and above all, its determination of the root meaning of ‘transcendental’) that can only mean: thinking transcendence (the horizon) more essentially by thinking beyond it (i.e. thinking into the source).

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184 Sheehan (1992[1984]) 37. Müller says that the ‘*transzendentente Differenz*’ was to concern the “difference of God from beings, beingness, and being” (*Ibid.*). This is left out above. It appears to me that this Differenz was the third solely because of its difficulty and the dangers associated with it. For Heidegger’s hints concerning such a problem, cf. MFL 165 *infra*, VWG (EG) 371.

185 In itself, L:H&M 14f. doesn’t fully support Müller (1964) 67f. though it does indicate that a prior discussion serves as background for Heidegger and Müller’s 1947 correspondence (cf. also L:H&M 9f.). Conversely, Heidegger’s “what you say about the ontological difference hits the mark” at L:H&M 15, reflected off of Müller’s discussion of that topic (L:H&M 10) and his formulation of being as the ἐπέκεινα (L:H&M 11f. cf. also vs. Müller (1964) 66 “Das Sein ist eine Realität, aber...”) gives some weight to Müller’s formulation in his book. Similarly, Heidegger’s implicit acceptance of Müller’s statements concerning God at L:H&M 11ff. give weight to the latter’s interpretation of the theological difference (e.g. his talk of the ‘the strict sense’ in Müller (1964) 67: though Müller (1964) 67f. is too free and easy with the language of reality and actuality). Kalary (2011) esp. 113-121 offers an alternative reading of the difference: the transcendental difference concerns the ontological difference qua thematised, the *transzendenzhafte* difference concerns the pre-ontological understanding of the ontological difference. As the fate of Kalary’s formulation shows, his formulation leads to the third Differenz (*die transzendente Differenz*) being out of place (Cf. Kalary (2011) 113ff. vs. 117ff.); something which is not so much the case in Müller’s formulation and where the latter could be fruitfully formulated in relation to MFL 165 *infra*. Ultimately however, a confrontation between Müller’s and Kalary’s formulation here would only introduce ambiguity (SZ §37) into the present formulation of the problem, especially since the formulation being worked out here must be kept as brief as possible. Conversely, Sheehan’s interpretation of this passage does not allow the ‘transcendental difference’ to bear an inner relation to the problem of ‘time as the transcendental horizon for the question of being’ cf. Sheehan (1992[1984]) 37. It is one of the most foundational assumptions of the present approach that such a relation must perdure. Above, that the Gemeinte of SZ I.3 was *die transzendenzhafte Differenz*, in connection with SZ 39 *infra* enables this thesis to bypass these important but secondary questions.

186 *SZ* (S, D) 39 *infra*
The *transzendenzhaft* question is no longer the transcendental question per se but it is not for that reason *transzendenzfrei*. Accordingly, this ‘transcendence-bound’ or ‘transcendence-akin’ problem can only mean ‘getting on top’ of transcendence by posing the question of being from the truth of transcendence in the following way: \(^{187}\)

- One must let the horizon come to presence – i.e. let the transcendental difference come into its own,
- So that this letting-presence of the inner truth of the horizon can allow a turn into the source, thereby overcoming the horizon (i.e. what is *most* primordial ‘overcomes’ that which is less primordial) and
- One must now let the source (viz. the understanding of being per se) itself presence more elementally.

The most fundamental question is not transcendental per se, but it is bound (*haft*), or, to be determined in relation to (*in auf Bezug*) the transcendental question, i.e., in relation to transcendence. At the highest height of thinking, the task of thinking is to think more deeply into the essence of transcendence.\(^{188}\)

Transcendence, understood in its possibility, means ontic-ontological truth as the facticity of truth in general.\(^{189}\) Accordingly, the question about ‘being itself’ must somehow surmount the *possibility* of the ontological truth i.e. it must surmount the latter’s entanglement in the ontic.\(^{190}\) And so, in a limited and at first paradoxical way, the question about the understanding of being does indeed become the *question* of the *transcendens schlechthin*.

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\(^{187}\) The first translation comes from SZ (S) 39 *infra* the second from Kalary (2011) 133 *et infra*  
\(^{188}\) Thus -haft qua adjectival suffix.  
\(^{189}\) But this means *founding*, and thus, the “ground of the ontological difference [is] the *transcendence* of *Dasein.*” VWG (ER) 28/  
\(^{190}\) Thus, in BP 327, at the height of the project for a temporale science of being, Heidegger indicates that one must ground the question of being in the belonging together of beings and being; that this is *the* phenomenon upon which the ‘objectification of being’ would have taken place. Indeed, he even indicates that failing to preserve this twofold at the ground is both pervasive in the history of philosophy and is in each case disastrous. (In the interpretation of this passage one must understand that “the ecstatic-horizontal constitution of temporality” means transcendence, cf. Third and Final Stages of the Founding Analysis. Similarly, this passage’s prioritisation of comportment must be understood within the irreducible existentiell priority of the *Unwesen* of *Dasein*).
Transcending means understanding being – but not just this! Yet nonetheless, what is simplest, that is, what is most elemental about transcendence is the understanding of being, and this understanding always already perdures in the happening of transcendence. Where transcendence happens the understanding of being happens and vice versa. Thus, if we may call the *transcendens schlechthin* that which is *the most simple and elemental within transcendence*, then *insofar as* being belongs to the happening of Dasein, being is indeed this *transcendens*.

The question about being becomes the question about what is most simple and elemental to the happening of transcendence, but this simple and elemental happening is equally that which is most hidden and obscure within transcendence, i.e., the understanding of being. This simplicity points to the solution of an important hermeneutic difficulty in formulating the question about being. Only transcendence can provide the proper horizon for questioning being in general, that is, aside from its various modes. The meaning of being is to be grounded in the concretion of Dasein’s understanding of being. But if this concretion solely means comportment then there is no sure means for transposing the question from the meaning of this and that being (objective presence, handiness, existence) and into the question about being aside from this sort of dispersal of meaning. Staying with the comportment and intentionality of Dasein in formulating the question about being means staying with the ‘fragmentation’ of the meaning of being. By transposing the question into transcendence, the grounds for the question of being as such are first freed from this dispersal and for the *inner* possibility of this dispersal.

Transcendence primordially concerns the *unity* of the understanding of beings and their being in such a way that it somehow concerns the unity of the happening of the meaning of being. And so, if we can say that transcendence is the being of Dasein, then, the statement that ‘Dasein is the being whose being is to be concerned about its being’ now means that Dasein is the being whose being it is to understand being in general, i.e., in the latter’s unity and...
dispersal. And finally, since the understanding of being is thereby brought back to the essence of Dasein even this simple unity of the understanding of being is simple only as temporally articulated.\textsuperscript{191} That is, because the meaning of being is now thought from the most elemental determination of Dasein, this meaning includes an elemental temporal articulation.

Being and beings belong together. Transcendence gives the primordial concretion of the understanding of being, but transcendence is always the understanding of beings, world and being. And this means: it belongs to the possibility of the understanding of being that it has already become entangled in beings and in a history. The understanding of being has already been thrown, and Dasein, the being who questions being, “never gets behind its thrownness”\textsuperscript{192} and this thrownness is constitutively historical. Accordingly, the question of being on the basis of transcendence must still unfold as a question.

When Heidegger says: “the way what is questioned essentially engages our questioning belongs to the innermost meaning of the question of being”\textsuperscript{193} this is not something to be overcome and dispensed with – it is something which must be made meaningful.\textsuperscript{194} Accordingly, the question about being implies the constant need for skirmishes with the impossibility of fully subduing and grasping the transcendens schlechthin: the question of being needs an incursion into the grounds of facticity mounted from the most essential determination of the meaning of facticity. And if this is constitutive for the highest fate of SZ I.3 then this means that Temporalität can be nothing more than that which fundamental ontology discovers to be the proper ‘battlefield’ for the \textgreek{γιγαντομαχία περὶ τῆς οὐσίας}.

Transcendence is that in which being and beings happen, i.e. transcendence is that in which understanding is first ‘there.’ But this means that the understanding of being and the

\textsuperscript{191} Which is already alluded to at SZ (S/S) 196
\textsuperscript{192} SZ (S/S) 383
\textsuperscript{193} SZ (S/S) 8
\textsuperscript{194} Thus, Vassilacopoulos (2008) \textit{passim} e.g. 143 ff.
historicity of world belong together. Without attempting to press further than is here possible, that means that world destines the understanding which understands being.

Why must the phenomenological problem of being be historical? Because it is bound to the phenomenon and that means, it is bound to the historicity of transcendence, the historicity of freedom, the historicity of founding. Founding is truth – but founding is freedom and freedom is essentially historicity. Veritas transcendentalis happens in the historicity of Dasein.

That which is existentially concrete is historical, and so, because the question of being is concrete, it is a historical question even before we know what that means, and indeed, it is historical so that we can pose the question, develop it in its meaning and thereby know what it means for the question to be historical.
Epilogue: Concluding Reflection on the Worlding of the World and the Truth of Being

If transcendence – which is primordially historical – is simply concrete understanding as such, then understanding is primordially historical. But if, in its ground, understanding is only possible as historical then this means that the understanding of being is in some way historical. Does this mean that being itself is historical or only that understanding is historical? Such questions cannot be answered here because engaging with them relies on a greater penetration into the (transcendental-historical) question of being. Transcendence merely secures the most primordial horizon for the question. It shows that the ‘es gibt’ of being belongs to historicity. Because transcendence surpassing of beings as a whole it secures the possibility of the question about being itself (rather than the being of this or that being) and it secures the phenomenon from whence thinking can question being in a phenomenologically grounded way.

For a brief moment this questioning is explicit transcending: merely bringing transcendence near. But since this means letting transcendence become explicitly binding, it also means factual freedom itself and since transcendence is essentially historical it also means letting essential historicity happen.¹ On the other hand, it means letting world world and nothing more than this. Accordingly, earlier, in the Metaphysical Foundations Heidegger says:

World-projection in freedom is nothing other than the temporalisation of the understanding of being… as it is understood in the understanding of being.”²

² MFL 218
World is that within which being is primordially understood. All ways of understanding being come back to transcendence: to world. In this way, world is the primordial structure of Dasein within which the phenomenological question about being must take root. World worlds means Dasein understands being. But since the world worlds in historicity, world worlds the historicity of the understanding of being, i.e., it temporalises the understanding of being. Accordingly, the question about the understanding of being must remain ever ripe for Destruktion and re-petition. The task is not to simply ‘read off’ being from the structure of transcendence but to hearken into transcendence, into world, and through this, to hearken to being. The task is to let world be the safe-keeping and bringing-near of the meaning of being as such, i.e., to let world belong to its essence.

And so, in closing, and in reflection on the connection of being and world we may fruitfully turn to the conclusion of Heidegger’s 1949 address, the Turning. There, he says:

Will we see the lightning flash of being in the essence of technology? The flash that comes out of stillness, as stillness itself. Stillness stills. What does it still? It stills being into the essence of world.

May world in its worlding be the nearest of all nearing that nears, as it brings the truth of being near to man’s essence, and so lets man belong to the happening of Ereignis.3

But aside from the reference to technology and Ereignis is this not precisely the problem of being on the basis of transcendence? The answer is yes and no. It is formally the same, and yet this formal identity gives way to fundamental differences.4 Each approach takes its own path and each path has its own way of ‘going to the root.’ Each path has its own tumult and its own stillness. But both seek the same. World worlds means being happens for Dasein. Precisely put, one must learn to hear into this ‘happening.’ That is the task of thinking.

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4 Though MFL 221 (read in the light of VWG (ER) 130f.) comes quite close to saying the same as Heidegger later said in the Turning.
List of Works Cited

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In this list (viz. of works cited by Martin Heidegger) dates in square brackets either refer to:
1. The original publication date in the case of texts which were published at the time of their completion (thus, all editions of *Being and Time* have the square bracketed date “1927”), or,
2. Square bracketed dates refer to the period within which a text was written or worked out. Thus, whereas *the Basic Problems of Phenomenology* was first published in 1975 as Volume 24 of Heidegger’s Gesamtausgabe, as the lectures from the summer semester of 1927 it takes the latter date in square brackets. In this way, the square bracketed date refers in both cases to the time from whence it comes rather than the time which this thinking was first made public.


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In this list square bracketed dates always refer to the earliest publication date of the text without regard for edition or language (accordingly, square bracketed dates have a solely historiographical function). This does not apply to revised texts, where earlier versions of this type exist they are either ignored or mentioned in a footnote. An asterisk after the date indicates that the square bracketed date refers to the time of the work’s composition, rather than the original publication date (where the text was, for instance, published posthumously).


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