EDUCATION, LITERACY AND ITS COGNITIVE EFFECTS:
PROBLEM-SOLVING AND DECISION-MAKING
IN HOMER AND
ARCHAIC AND FIFTH CENTURY BC ATHENS
A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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ABSTRACT

This work draws research from the cognitive sciences, neurosciences and linguistics into dialogue with the history of Athens in the fifth century BC. This was the first recorded incidence of a society teaching reading and writing to its citizens. The aim of the work is to understand how problem-solving is significantly influenced by literacy or the lack of it.

This research posits both culturally sensitive factors altering cognition (in this case through the overlay of literacy), and universal cognitive characteristics in the processing of domain or multi-domain specific language. Literacy education, whilst making no genetic change, developmentally recycles brain architecture in the left hemisphere. This is the hemisphere dominant in processing/producing writing. Metred language (prosody), on the other hand, is a function dominant in the right hemisphere and is a general characteristic of an oral society's concrete, implicit procedural knowledge. In the modern world poets and song writers have highly developed cognition in poetic language. However, among the general population, children and adult non-literates are also shown to possess preponderant abilities to process this form of language. This suggests two things: that the ability to generate poetic language is innate, and, that prose literacy education in some way inhibits this inborn ability to 'think' in poetry - at least in modern western education. In Athens, beyond alphabetic consciousness, the majority became functionally literate by reading poetry but were unable to devise extended continuous written prose.

Within several generations a majority of citizens achieved functional literacy within the context of Athenian society. The extant texts of the period provide the first descriptions of a cognitive interface between 'orality' and 'literacy' in a population experiencing literacy en masse. Thucydides, Aristophanes, the logographers and some of their sophist teachers all provide first hand accounts of the impact on individual and collective decision-making.

In the second half of the century sophistic education came to Athens introducing, to a minority, tuition in new constructs of extended abstract probabilistic argument accomplished by the use of written prose. Literacy education of this type creates a 'bootstrapping' effect in that writing skills allow more complex abstract argument which, because of the complexity beyond normal oral 'cognitive capacity', in itself, becomes a form of 'serial reasoning'.

The work researches the Sophists and their curriculum; in particular the refinements Gorgias devised, which, to some extent, reconciled the psychological disconnect created by speech-makers trained in the extended written prose construction of forensic and abstract deliberation and audiences who could not initially formulate their ideas in such a medium.
DECLARATION

This is to certify that:

(a) except where due acknowledgement has been made, the work is mine alone;

(b) the work has not been submitted previously, in whole or in part, to qualify for any other academic award;

(c) the content of the thesis is the result of work which has been carried out since the official commencement date of the approved research program;

(d) any editorial work, paid or unpaid, carried out by a third party is acknowledged;

(e) ethics procedures and guidelines have been followed.
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The past four years have been a challenge and a pleasure and I acknowledge the help of those who have accompanied me on my journey.

I thank my two supervisors. To my primary supervisor, Dr. Ian Plant, Department of Ancient History, thank you for being there on call for the past four years for all things Greek, for challenging my thoughts and offering encouragement and insight. To Professor John Sutton, Macquarie Centre for Cognitive Science, thank you for investing your time in my work and for your invaluable and constructive criticism along the way. Your indefatigable patience is greatly appreciated.

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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

χρή γάρ εἰς μάλα πολλῶν ἱστορῶν φιλοσόφους ἄνδρας εἶναι
Those who are lovers of wisdom must be inquirers into many things.
(Heraclitus DK22.B.35)

Educational innovations effected in Athens during the fifth century BC provide a sustained historical example of how increased literacy within a population influences decision-making. Athens is also an example of how the dynamics of a democratic political system and a non-institutionalised, grassroots then market driven, educational system of literacy tuition can affect collective problem-solving. This work suggests that, by the second half of the century, there was in Athens widespread elementary literacy education. But this general literacy education did not involve written prose composition. Also, because the mode of tuition in elementary reading relied mainly on metred works - what the modern world calls poetry [ποίησις – ποιεῖν] - the resultant cognitive changes that occurred in the literate individual were different from those who received further literacy education and were taught to construct sentences in extended continuous (scripto continua) written prose. As the research will explain, the difference relates, firstly, to the differences between 'poetic thinking' and 'prose writing'. For the purposes of this work the oral 'prose' conversation and deliberative dialogue that occurs between individuals is seen as a flow of language and 'thinking' within the construct of Wallace Chafe's 'intonation units'. These 'intonation units' of speech consciously occur in roughly three-second spurts and are remembered in 'chunks'. There is a finite 'cognitive capacity' to the processing of oral deliberative thought. Writing is what makes

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1 That is prose sentences beyond a few words or lists.
2 There remains disagreement about the fundamental medium (or media) of 'thinking'. Different theorists favour different representational media: images and other sensory contents, natural language representations of one kind or another, or some amodal 'language of thought' or 'mentalese'. Others suggest that there can be many such media of 'thinking' changing across individuals and contexts. This work uses the term 'poetic thinking' to describe the feature of language that is prosody.
5 George Miller, 'The magical number seven, plus or minus two: some limits on our capacity for processing information', Psychological Review, Vol. 63, (1956), pp. 81-97; N. Cowan 'The magical
the difference to extended sequential abstract thought. Aside from the different cognitive functions between reading and comprehending phonetic symbols and/or words and writing, it is stressed here that writing should be regarded as far more than a mere substitute or facsimile of spoken language. Extended abstract speculative thought and deliberative argument cannot be sustained with consistent coherence without prose writing. It is a type of 'serial reasoning' that is constructed explicitly. It is different to 'poetic thinking' which results in poetry - whether written down or not. This type of thinking in poetry conveys implicit knowledge rich in imagery and concrete constructs. Chapter II references a wide variety of skilled literate poets who tell us in their writings that the act of writing poetry is not the same as the explicit construction of prose, but feels more like taking dictation. In other words, to quote two poets cited in Chapter II.2, the sensation 'is not subject to the control of the active powers of the mind, and that its birth and recurrence has no necessary connection with consciousness or will.' Again, from a modern poet and Nobel Prize for Literature winner: 'all my life I have been in the power of a daimonion, and how the poems dictated by him came into being I do not quite understand.' It appears that seasoned or skilled poets are used to this sensation.

Thus, in Athens, the acquisition of literacy produced varying levels of competence. Literacy education produced a limited comprehension of writing, quite unlike modern experience. The majority of (male) citizens attained this ability to read phonetically. It was a functional literacy adequate for their participation in civic administration and their (evolving) system of justice which required them to remember the rules and explanations which governed social behaviour. Rosalind Thomas divides this 'functional' literacy further into levels of capability: 'name literacy', 'list literacy' 'banking literacy' and 'officials' number 4 in short-term memory: a reconsideration of mental storage capacity', Behavioral and Brain Sciences, Vol. 24, (2001), pp. 87-114].


In this sense visual imagery conveyed through language.


literacy'. None of these categories, except the last, involved the use of 'continuous' prose writing. As the fifth century BC progressed, there was an increasing use of text in all categories. Writing was also a mnemonic tool to remind them of the 'sayings of sages'. Only a minority in Athens received a higher education and were taught how to compose extended written prose. The work argues that the formalised mode of deliberative argument that was taught by their sophistic teachers necessitated the use of prose writing. The result was the cultural overlay of extended forensic and abstract probabilistic pro and contra argument constructed by written prose onto democratic systems that required collective participation in decision-making. Even though the majority of citizens could not write extended sophistic prose arguments themselves, they listened to them in the courts and parliament. As such, it is the first incidence we have of a population to experience en masse the extended constructions of abstract written argument.

It is argued that the utopian educational philosophies of Plato have distorted the historical perspective on Athenian education in the fifth century BC. Difficult as it is to divorce the philosophy from the traumatic personal life of Plato the Athenian student, soldier and man, he is important as a source. Throughout this work, the method of interpreting the ancient texts is to look for the concrete embedded in the philosophy of Plato, or in the arguments of Alcidamas and Antiphon, or in the jokes of Aristophanes. For example, if Plato refers to a man walking down the street carrying an umbrella, three, and only three things may be accepted as fact: that in Athens in the fifth and fourth centuries BC there were such things as men, streets and umbrellas. It is not evidence of rain. As a young man at the close of the fifth century BC, Plato was a first-hand witness to how increased levels of literacy (among other social and political influences) changed the population. His views on poetry and music were deeply thought-through opinions on certain behavioural tendencies that he had observed in the citizenry. To reject Plato’s depiction of life in Athens, or the contemporary personality types he described, or the ways of thinking they displayed, as irrelevant, or untrue, or manufactured merely to convey his ethical and political metaphysics

is to overlook other contemporary evidence (Gorgias, Thucydides, or the others mentioned above, for example) which attests that some methods of sophistic teaching were contributing to the growing discord in ways of decision-making. Plato’s criticisms were of poetry and not of written prose because, aside from sport, poetry was the chief curriculum content for general education. Only a small minority learned to construct written prose sentences with any complexity above the odd adage (γνώμαι = γνώσματα = loci communes). Chapter II.6 examines Plato’s criticisms on this subject, including those on prose writing in the Phaedrus and Letter VII. It suggests these comments, when regarded in context, were relative to his personal opinions and experiences of plagiarism at the time because later, in the Laws, he advocated the writing of dialogues in prose (καταλογάδην συγγράφειν = συγγράμματα κατὰ λόγον) as a preferable form of problem-solving. On poetry his opinions remained steadfast. Regarding the Sophists, Plato’s criticisms of sophistic teaching are examined with the same methodology.

The work attempts to uphold the ideal of E.R. Dodds, who, in 1949, provided what Charles Beye called ‘an antidote to the conventional wisdom that the Greeks were first and foremost rationalist in everything.’ The method is multidisciplinary and the approach follows that of Dodds who, in a post-Hiroshima/Nagasaki atomic bomb world, felt a serious need for an interdisciplinary understanding of human behaviour and history. He thought Greek scholarship should avoid its characteristic ‘self-imposed isolation’ and its often ‘obsolete anthropological concepts’. Dodds’ The Greeks and the Irrational and Bruno Snell’s The Discovery of Mind stood as universal references across the disciplines whenever ancient Greek psychology was addressed until the works of scholars such as Eric Havelock, Albert Lord, G.E.R. Lloyd, Charles Segal, Rosalind Thomas, Elizabeth Minchin, Barry Powell and Jocelyn Small subsequently took further inter- or multidisciplinary approaches to address a broad range of questions relating to the mindset (Mentalität) of the ancient

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11 Pl. Protag. 325e.  
12 Pl. Laws 810b-812a; cf. Symp. 177b, Lysias 204d, Chapter III.3.  
Greeks. As well as reference to such scholarship and a reliance on the words written by contemporaries who lived in the fifth century BC, the aim of this work is to gather together evidence from the cognitive sciences, neuroscience and linguistics, disciplines which have made considerable progress since Professor Dodds completed his work.

Different disciplines define 'thinking' differently and form obstacles in approach in this type of research. Unlike experimental science, which begins with a theory and searches for phenomena to explain, 'historical thinking' should look at phenomena and then seek explanations. This gives the work a complex flow as it follows historical events chronologically throughout, but at certain points interrupts the account to investigate the psychology of the period. The aim is to adhere, as far as possible, to historical context and not mass together data from disparate time frames and geographical locations across Greece as evidence. A central perspective, stated now, and carried throughout the work is this: that individuals are born with equal cognitive potential (barring pathological conditions) and 'think' in different ways because of internal biochemical, biological and architectural cognitive variations, and also because of external cultural and environmental influences that differ between societies and collectively shape 'ways of thinking'. For examples of various 'ways of thinking', Jerome Bruner's lifetime of scholarship on the implicit-explicit dichotomy and


internal aspects of 'implicit thinking', and Geoffrey Lloyd's work dealing with cultural perspectives influencing cognition, over the past decade are enough to explain why a rethink of the historiography of education is in order. This work makes no claim that one form of 'thinking' is superior to another; they are merely different and cognitive science is progressively making inroads into their complexities and applications.

Much is made of Greek 'rationalism' no matter which definition of the term is taken. However, when the different methods of education then operational in Athens are considered against the background of the cognitive impact of literacy on a population, it becomes apparent that the nature of Athenian literacy requires a fresh conceptualisation. It needs an examination of the type of literacy Athenians acquired in that century and a consideration of the possibility that the 'intellectual revolution of the enlightenment' or the 'great age of rationalism' was more a period of confusing variations in modes of thinking due to different methods and levels of literacy education which was creating multidimensional cognitive processing within the population. This is because 'literacy' is not an inherent, inborn cognitive capacity. Individuals who were not taught to read were without letter and/or word identification. All who learned to read developed a 'VWFA' (visual word form area) in the left hemisphere of the brain, but only those who learned to construct extended written prose were capable of developing their deliberative abilities in new ways.

Chapter II argues that language used in the modern Western world to describe cognitive states has been greatly influenced by Plato and the early Greek philosophers and poets. Many cognitive terms in European languages have Greek stems and create difficulties in separating the historical context; the 'then' and 'now' which can determine what it meant when fifth-century BC Athenians

20 Dodds, op. cit., p.254.
21 By multidimensional it is meant, internal and external; cultural and biological.
said, 'I think'. Terms such as ψυχή (mind, understanding), δαίμων (internal voice), διανοητικός (intellectual acumen) or σύνεσις (intuitive intelligence) are often translated with anachronistic interpretations that take little account of fifth century BC usage. There were no fifth century BC Greek words for 'rational' or 'rationalism'. For the ancient Athenian, as for individuals generally, problem-solving and deliberative reasoning involved primarily conscious, 'serial' thought and 'working memory', but this is not as central to human mental life as Cartesians believe. The extended sophistic abstraction of pro and contra problem-solving of the type taught in fifth-century BC Athens was merely one variety of problem-solving and decision-making that functioned within the society. Implicit knowledge systems and non-conscious problem-solving were also functioning mechanisms. At one level, cognition or 'intelligence' is an internal biological process. It occurs across domains of the brain at the conscious, self-conscious and sub-conscious levels. This includes the ability to 'reason', not only explicitly, but at the non-conscious, 'implicit' level using procedural memory. This description acknowledges the 'distributed' character of cognitive phenomena across external as well as internal stimuli and multiple memory systems. This position carries through subsequent chapters.

In addition, the parameters of literacy, semi or partial-literacy and 'pre-literacy' are discussed as to how cognitive function, consciousness and problem-solving are influenced by literacy or the lack of it. Writing as a cognitive phenomenon can function in different ways. Not only are there cognitive differences between reading and writing, but there are differences between prose writing and the writing of poetry. There are two initial steps involved in the argument. Firstly, that there are distinguishable psychological capacities which drive oral poets; secondly, that these distinguishable psychological capacities also have distinguishable neural bases The argument revolves around the following hypotheses (referenced in footnotes or outlined in Appendix 1.1) drawn from laboratory research and diagnostic hypotheses:

- There is a degree of lateralisation in language processing in the brain.\textsuperscript{23} It is generally accepted that the right hemisphere is dominant in processing prosody,

\textsuperscript{23} This is not to take a position on the degree of laterality, localisation or modularity in the acquisition and processing of language, reading and writing, which have yet to be clarified. The position taken is merely to acknowledge that there are lateralised processes involved: Cf. Britta M. Glatzeder, Vinod Goel, Albrecht von Müller (eds.), Towards a Theory of Thinking, Berlin, Springer, 2010, 'Cognitive Neuroscience of Deductive Reasoning', in Holyoak & Morrison (eds.),
rhythm and metaphor, but cannot produce spoken language on its own. The left hemisphere contains the 'interpreter mechanism',\(^{24}\) which uses language as it seeks to explain experience. The 'interpreter mechanism' contributes to the narrativisation of personal identity in the social and phenomenal context. In pre-literate Athens the social narrative was in the Homeric hexameter and the lyric of the *symposia* and religious hymn ritual, a process of right dominated language passing via the corpus callosum to the 'interpreter mechanism' in the left hemisphere.

- Learning and thinking does not require the self-consciousness of 'serial reasoning' and, within the context of 'implicit knowledge', reasoning can take place without self-consciousness.\(^{25}\) Consciousness entailing 'serial reasoning' is a process and is intermittent.

- Implicit 'non-conscious' knowledge is a substratum to narrativisation by the 'interpreter mechanism'. In pre-literate societies, oral traditional stories provide background procedural knowledge for experiential constructs. In Greece, these stories were in poetry. This prosodic narrativisation used metrical metaphor that is right hemisphere dominant.

- For the average Greek citizen, the recitation of formulaic hexametric Homeric stories can be explained as the conscious recall of 'implicit knowledge' learned through prosody. The skilled story-teller (*rhapsode*) processed 'implicit knowledge' and poetic language in a different way. Rather than recitation, oral poets 'reinstantiated' their poems anew each performance.\(^{26}\) This reconstruction of a traditional oral story can create the sensation the Greeks referred to as *poiein* (*ποιεῖν*).\(^{27}\) It is proposed that this psychological sensation is the conscious realisation of implicit right hemisphere knowledge and poetic language as it

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\(^{26}\) Although the poets followed a 'story line' or plot, they were not necessarily aware that they were not using the same words each time they told the story. This is discussed in Chapter V.2.

\(^{27}\) *Poiein* has a cognitive dimension that implies ‘innovate’, or ‘think up’.
passes through the left hemisphere’s ‘interpreter mechanism’. Just as ‘serial reasoning’ is, as defined by Dennett, an intermittent cognitive state (meaning it is not a steady state in consciousness) poiein is also an intermittent cognitive state. The Homeric texts and lyric poets speak about the process.

- Cognition can be altered by cultural and environmental factors. In this context when an Athenian citizen learned to read and write at the beginning of the fifth century BC he developed a ‘VWFA’ (visual word form area) specific to writing in the left hemisphere of the brain, otherwise non-existent in pre-literate individuals. Prior to learning to read it is thought that this locus in the brain functioned in a similar way to its right hemispheric counterpart which processes spatial and facial recognition information; indeed with literacy activation to faces in the right hemispheric fusiform gyrus is increased.\(^{28}\) This is the cognitive difference between ‘orality’ (pre-literacy) and ‘literacy’. In consequence, at the collective level, Athenian society rapidly underwent this environmentally driven change.

- Writing should not be thought of as the same cognitive process as reading. Beyond the stage of alphabetic literacy and the ability to write words and simple sentences phonetically, writing can manifest in two ways. One way is writing poetry, which is not the same as writing in prose. As the poets quoted above state, the process of writing poetry feels more like taking dictation than by actively thinking up constructs. In relation to prose writing, literacy education creates a ‘bootstrapping’ effect in that writing skills allow more complex deliberative, ‘serially reasoned’ argument - also a narrativisation in the ‘interpreter mechanism’ - which, because of their complexity beyond normal oral ‘cognitive capacity’ require extended prose writing. Written prose arguments therefore further develop the ‘interpreter mechanism’. In this context the writings of the sophist teachers and their students are examined for indications of this process.

This work brings neuroscientific evidence into dialogue with an account of cultural and cognitive transformations in order to understand the differences between ‘orality’ (pre-literacy) and ‘literacy’. At this point it is necessary to make clear that the writer supports many of the criticisms of Roy Harris relating to fallacies about the superiority of the Greek alphabet over other forms of writing.\(^{29}\) It is also necessary to state that the writer does not subscribe to any strict binary, or ‘great divide’ theory between orality and literacy.\(^{30}\) However, from a non-culture-bound neuroscience point of view, there is a fundamental

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29 Roy Harris, Rethinking Writing, London, Continuum, 2000, pp. 121-137.
cognitive difference between a literate individual and one who does not know 'letters': as Chapter II.3 will investigate, it is the presence, or absence, of a 'VWFA' (visual word form area) in the left hemisphere of the brain. Furthermore, it is stressed here that, as a fully literate individual, the present writer cannot know if it is cognitively, or culturally, preferable to be literate or not. She can only know the different sensations of writing lists and descriptions of material things, or constructing abstract argument in written prose, and 'writing' in prosody, metre and rhyme. Therefore, no judgement is made as to whether being fully literate is 'superior' to any other kind of cognitive state on the 'orality/literacy continuum'. What cognitive abilities are lost by the acquisition of literacy (and Chapter II.3 shows that there must be) has yet to be determined by the sciences. John Miles Foley notes that most researchers on Oral Theory 'should be grateful for [Ruth] Finnegan's pluralistic model of orality literature'. 31 Her approach focuses on performative contexts regardless of how the 'script' is generated; the term 'oral' applies to the cognitive construct of all human oral discourse, regardless of the presence of literacy or not. Finnegan refocussed the discussion on 'orality' as a 'continuum' rather than a 'great divide'. 32 As such, there is no getting away from the fact that her important work, in Egbert Bakker's view, 'blurred the distinct senses of oral'. 33 In his linguistic work on how Hellenic oral epic poets made their hexameters, Bakker defined 'orality' as a process that has no need of writing. It is true that all songwriters, poetry makers, Stanislavski/ Strasberg actors and the like, are operating in the sphere of the oral world. However, on the 'orality/literacy continuum' it should be recognised that there are neurophysiological differences and defining psychologies in the 'oral-versus-written dichotomy'. Bakker observes that Finnegan's insights 'cause confusion' of what he takes to be the real issue of whether the poems were composed orally or not. 34 As stated, from a neuroanatomical point of view, 'orality' and 'literacy' may be precisely identified as cognitively different because

32 Ruth Finnegan [Oral Poetry: Its Nature, Significance and Social Context, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1977, pp. 168-169] rejects the 'cluster of romantic theories' that regard 'oral-transmission' as something different to ... the overlap of written and oral face-to-face media [and] the contribution of new media like radio and television, gramophone and tape-recorder ... it would be wrong to imply that transmission by word of mouth ... has lost its importance in the modern world.
34 Bakker, op. cit. p. 19. (The real issue being the type of language used.)
each state uses varying modular subprocesses of the right and left hemispheres of the brain to process language. A person who has not been taught the alphabet, or whatever system their language uses, does not possess a 'VWFA' in the left hemisphere of the brain.

Furthermore, the differences, mentioned above, between conversational speech and poetry, and the writing of poetry and the writing of 'prose' need to be clearly identified for the 'orality/literacy continuum' to be properly understood. Finnegan recognised that literary analysis adjudicating on 'poetry' and 'prose' created confusion as to what could be counted as 'oral' and what could not. To remove the argument from literary criticism Bakker identified rhyming, rhythmic, or prosodic, language as 'special speech' and this helps to bypass some of the problems Finnegan recognised. A literate individual can write down right hemisphere dominated prosody, but this is a different cognitive process to that of writing sentences in prose. The experimental science that indicates that prose writing develops a further deliberative ability allowing complex abstract decision-making and problem-solving is therefore detailed in Chapter II, setting the foundation for the further study of the Homeric canon and Presocratic writings as well as the textual works of individuals born in the fifth century BC in the following chapters. Most of this work is concentrated on these authors, only citing later authors from the ancient canon when necessary. Authors who were not Greek or who wrote post-Christianity are rarely cited, even if their subject matter deals with the period or people under discussion. It is conceded that they may have had access to sources now lost, but they possessed a different, predominantly prose literate, mindset.

Appendix 1.1 provides abstracts of diverse current cognitive research as it relates to brain function and language processing. This additional evidence is the basis for the hypotheses in Chapter II. Appendix 1.2 addresses Julian Jaynes’ now cult hypothesis of the 'bicameral brain' and the evolution of self-consciousness. It predicted much current cognitive research but posits a considerably variant

35 Finnegan [p. 27] notes: The distinction between 'poetry' and 'prose' is relative, and the whole delimitation of what is to count as 'poetry' necessarily depends not on one strictly verbal definition but on a series of factors to do with style, form, setting and local classification, not all of which are likely to coincide.

version of the nature of poetic language to that suggested in this thesis. Jaynes’ misuse of the Greek cognitive lexicon make his interpretation of the Iliad and the Odyssey devoid of historical chronology. His method of dealing with the cultural evolutionary hypothesis of self-consciousness is built on historical inconsistencies. It is inappropriate to equate this work in any way with Jaynes’ left brain/right brain hypothesis as background to split brain research.

For the first recorded time in history most, if not all, male Athenian citizens began learning letters. Grammar education, introduced in the closing years of the sixth century BC or early in the fifth, resulted in a century of gradual changes in methods of communication, deliberation and problem-solving (sumbolia) that involved the whole citizen population. Chapter III deals with elementary literacy education. It examines how the alphabet and reading were taught with the literary content heavily dependent on the hexameter. As spelling contests and games were popular, it would seem to follow that a significant proportion of the population could spell and decipher text. Some laboratory linguistic research is examined to identify how language functions; how spelling, reading and writing are processed in independent architectures of the brain (or ‘co-operating’ modular subprocesses), despite the fact that ongoing investigations have yet to precisely map and identify the separate functions and incorporate the external factors relating to memory retrieval. Both neurobiologically and linguistically the mere knowledge of letters changes decision-making processes, first by defining or conceptualising words as ‘discrete’ and separate units in a symbolic and linear fashion, and secondly, by creating a potential capacity to construct argument using writing. There is, however, one challenging phenomenon relating to the ‘VWFA’ that arises in the examination of Athenian literacy education. It is that, while word identification is a significant facet of modern literacy and literacy

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education across languages and nationalities, the general functional literacy achieved in the fifth century BC suggests an absence of whole word identification. This is covered in Chapter III.5-6.

Some of the appendices provide the evidence and scholarship for certain working assumptions on Greek socio-cultural dynamics taken throughout this thesis. Appendix 2 examines the structural social elements and political functioning of Athenian society that make conventional class divisions less discernable. This has relevance to education in the fifth century BC which was far more skills-based at all levels of society than Plato or Aristotle imply. Their criticism of certain trades was a class phenomenon that had less impact on education and political outcomes than later writers would maintain. The evidence for this is collected in Appendix 3 which covers the general curriculum and methods of elementary schooling aside from literacy education. The finish to a young Athenian citizen’s education was two years military training in the *ephebia*. Here *ephebes* were trained to a conditioned identification with the collective by the further use of metre and music in training programmes and ongoing military activities. This is outlined in Appendix 3.5.

Appendix 4 assists in deciphering religious aspects and dissociative states inherent in the psychology of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. It relates to the discussion in Chapters IV and V. Likewise Appendix 5 provides an assessment of archaic and classical Greek paedophilia and attendant scholarship. Primarily it provides the evidence that the seventh century BC 'Thera inscriptions' are insufficient proof of literacy competence in youth in that period. It also argues that, while paedophilia hovered in the background of Athenian education, it is not generally relevant to literacy education. If sexuality does not interfere with quality cake-making lessons, neither should it interfere with literacy training. And, as it involved sexually active adolescents in fifth-century BC Athens, it had as much impact on student learning as does any sexuality among high school and university students in the present day. However, Chapter IV(3.2(b)) develops the hypothesis that *pro* and *contra* probability argument originated in the love poetry of *symposia*, and in this regard paedophilia had relevance to the development of

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38 Cf. discussion in V.4.1.
Protagorian-style argument and to the style of Sophistic teaching (Chapter VIII.3-4).

Chapter IV traces the historical circumstances that account for how, as fifth and fourth century BC literary sources claim, the Homeric canon in particular became the mainstay of the Athenian educational curriculum. It argues that it was not just because it was good poetry but because the Peisistratidae made it popular. For propaganda purposes the Panathenaic festival performances needed to follow a fixed plot and for this reason a written template of Homer was necessary for rehearsal scripts. This, however, did not mean word-perfect performances because that is not the outcome of any extended poetic performance. The oral poets themselves had no need of text to recreate Homeric poetry. It is argued in this chapter and the next that writing in Athens at this time was more related to ritualistic practices rather than used as a tool for recording sequences of language. In Athens, due to the highly 'non-literate' quality of the culture there was no need to write beyond lists and simple sentences. This is reflected by the inscriptive use on clayware. This is why a practical rather than a psychological explanation more completely explains the Athenian textualisation of the Iliad and the Odyssey in the sixth century BC. It is further argued that, the random accumulation of diverse rehearsal scripts by local phyle, phratry or trittys groups became the textual resources that saw the majority of students being taught to read and write via poetry. Additional to Chapter IV, Appendix 6 provides lists devised from the Beazley Archive of the types of inscriptions and proportions of inscribed to uninscribed work in extant full pieces of several Attic black- and Red-figure ceramicists. It is of no real statistical value, but it provides at a glance an indication of knowledge of the alphabet and phonetic decipherment. It shows the extent of 'name literacy' and the capacity for simple sentences.

Chapter V looks at the psychology of the sixth century BC and the nature of deliberation in Homer compared to other archaic literature. It traces the rhetorical elements inherent in Homer to establish the benchmark psychology and modes of problem-solving for Athenians prior to sophistic influence. It is argued that many sophistic elements of problem-solving are embryonic in Homer, but they operate under an over-arching recognition of authority and
ritualised language and behaviour. This leads to a consideration of the role played by ritual and poetry in the society generally and at the symposion specifically. Following the view of Ezio Pellizer, it concludes that sophistic argument had origins in the symposion and, in particular, sympotic poetry.\(^{39}\)

Sophistic education introduced a formalised system of probabilistic or abstract argument. The practice of composing opposed arguments, one speech for one side of the argument and another perspective for the other, resulted in a student **consciously** mentally flexible and adept at looking at any proposition from more than one point-of-view. This propositional way of thinking challenged the concrete, authoritative constructs of archaic thought. The research of Paivio, Bakker, Rubin, Minchin, and others\(^{40}\) has identified the high imagery and emotional content in Homeric epic. This imagery and the poetic language that are features of Homeric epic have a cognitive right hemisphere dominance. This is because it is contextualised ‘narrative thinking’ as outlined by Bruner and Greenfield and Lawrence Parsons et. al.\(^{41}\) In the larger educational context of Athenians learning to recite and read Homer, the process is not quite the same as that of the skilled *rhapsode*. This is discussed in relation to literacy acquisition.

It is argued that the Peisistratidae text would have reflected the psychology of the period and the forms of argument practised at the time. This is because a long history of amanuensis from existing texts is unlikely due to the type of scribal literacy which would have constricted the ability of scribes to copy long tracts from manuscript. The textualisation would more likely have required a *rhapsode* to sing his poem to a scribe, or if the *rhapsode* himself was literate, to sing it to himself in order to write it down. Either way, both methods of rhapsodic recitation would not have produced identical unchanging versions of the poems.


The chapter considers the structure of archaic *samboulia* (debate) and rhetorical elements inherent Homer and other comparative works. The canon shows that persuasion in hexameters could be as structured and manipulative as the written prose of the Sophists. Examined in V.3.1(b) is the discussion between Nestor and Patroclus [*Il.11.656-803*] which is especially similar to the type of sophistic construction in Gorgias' *Encomium to Helen*. The examples of different types of argument in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* most probably reflect the evolutionary nature of oral poetry. The diverse methods and refinements in the argument construction point to organic changes as a result of the changing mentality of each *rhapsode* reflecting the period in which he lived.

Chapter VI pursues the following hypotheses. First, that the Sophists developed formalised public debate in a significant new way; second, that they initiated conscious forensic argument and *pro* and *contra* persuasion; third, that the Sophists were serious teachers with a bona fide curriculum developed by Sophists such as Protagoras and Gorgias and adopted by other Athenian teachers; fourth, that prose writing is necessary for extended forensic argument beyond the confines of spoken 'cognitive capacity'; and fifth, that written prose extended the cognitive capacity of individuals, not in a better, but in a different way to ordinary oral discussion.

The significant educational innovation of sophistic teaching was the use of extended prose writing. This is because prose writing greatly extends integrated argument into sustained long-term strategies of complex problem-solving. As Chapters IV and V argued, before the introduction of sophistic education, forensic analysis and abstract probability arguments (*eikotologia*) were not the norm in Athens. Following the Peisistratidae tyranny, the institution of the democracy initiated collective civic decision-making which in turn required the individual citizen to make abstract political assessments of risk vs. benefit. This necessitated a method of persuasion other than the traditional exercise of authoritative or coercive power. Under the pressure of periods of war with Sparta and the final stress of blockade and starvation, Thucydides observed that Athenian citizens increasingly faced complex and perilous decisions. The political advice and discussion increasingly used sophistic methods of deliberation and persuasion.
It is argued that this new political climate created a market for sophist education because it taught techniques for abstract thinking and persuasion. The work of Roy Harris, David Rubin, Simon Goldhill, Rosalind Thomas and Thomas Cole, when considered together, establish the paradigm that such formal abstract arguments could not be accomplished without extended prose writing to sustain the type of 'serial reasoning' (as defined by Dennett in Chapter II) and inherent in such argument construction. The ancient evidence for the hypothesis that the sophistic teachers were presenting revolutionary new ways of thinking is provided by Aristotle's Poetics, Rhetoric, and On Sophistical Refutations and Topics which contain his theoretical observations on language and its use in the fifth and fourth centuries BC. Also Athenian sophistic students such as Antiphon, Alcidamas and Isocrates prove, by their very existence, as well as by their candid, prose written, observations on the human behaviour within their society that the Sophists were competent educators of extended written prose argument.

These contemporary texts provide undoubted evidence that some students learned to compose extended written prose with consummate skill, but the observations therein also indicate that the new theories and methods of teaching literacy and semi-teaching of argument construction psychologically upset the status quo. Many sophistic eristic techniques involved training the individual to memorise set combinations of propositional alternatives and to work from them in constructing written prose argument rather than innovate their own abstract deliberative constructs. It is argued that some students merely learned to 'cut-and-paste' arguments already memorised by rote, while audiences, composed of many individuals who had only learned 'name literacy', and 'list literacy', with tracts of poetry, developed, through listening, the ability to discriminate abstract pro and contra argument which they could not have constructed themselves because they had not been taught to write extended prose sentences. Thucydides is most vocal regarding a disjunction in decision-making especially in the ekklesia (legislature) in the second half of the fifth century BC. A close reading of Gorgias'

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Encomium to Helen illuminates that he too recognised the psychological gulf between those who could consciously develop a extended, explicit argument and those who could only listen and react to it. Appendix 7 contains a full translation of the Encomium to Helen by Gorgias as background to the discussion in Chapter VII. The validity of the argument in the Encomium is not examined per se, but the alternative explanations for Helen’s behaviour are examined from a psychological point of view. As Gorgias explores the psychology of his audience, Chapter VII also examines the psychology of Gorgias himself and his use of elaborate metred prose. A discussion follows on the concept of kairos, a technique attributed to Gorgias, and, when exposed to the Encomium, suggests that Gorgias was highly conscious of why he used such prosodic linguistic devices.

In Athens during the fifth century BC traditional concepts were refined by developments in the political system which was structured on argument and competition. Educational methods, curriculum and educators such as Gorgias, and those following his teaching techniques, responded to the environment. After ephebic service, most citizens assumed their private vocations and civic duties; only a minority sought further education, specialising in private and public management and in the new methods of argumentation increasingly used in the legislature and the courts. The educators, the culture, the students, the market and political forces provide the context for Chapter VIII which examines the historiography of sophistic education; a profiling of students and teachers, and an assessment of the psychological consequences of the search for right thinking (εὐδοξία) and effective argument (εὖβουλία).

Because of the interdisciplinary nature of this work all ancient references have been quoted in both Greek and English rather than merely cited and paraphrased. They appear in full in Appendix 8 and the writer urges the reader to take the time to hear the words of the contemporaries, the people who lived in

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45 For example, Gorgias’ Funeral Oration [DK.6]: τί γὰρ ἀπὸ τοῖς ἀνδράσις τούτοις ὄν δὲι ἀνδράσι προσέναι; τί δὲ καὶ προσὴν ὄν ὢν δὲι προσέναι; εἰπεὶν δυναῖς ἀ βουλομαι, βουλοίμην δ’ ἀ δεί, λαθῶν μὲν τὴν θείαν νειμοίν, φυγῶν δὲ τὸν ἀνθρώπινον θῆλον. οὕτω γαρ ἐκείς εἰναι ἀνθρώπινον θῆλον. ... [For what was wanting in these men which should be there in men? And what was there which must not be there in men? If I may be able to say what I wish, and may I wish to say what I should, avoiding divine judgment and escaping human jealousy. For these men achieved an excellence that was divine and only the mortal part was human. (trans. Leiper)].
or close to the period. The relevance for this type of study of fifth century BC education in Athens is that it may open up further discussion in future educational theory. Present Western approaches⁴⁴ fail to recognise the important function of prosodic language on general cognition and on poetry writing exercises as a method of maintaining an innate cognitive ability that is diminished with current literacy training.

CHAPTER II
KEY WORDS AND CONCEPTS
OF LEFT AND RIGHT HEMISPHERIC LANGUAGE

Many learned books on poetry have been written, and they find, at least in the countries of the West, more readers than does poetry itself. This is not a good sign, even if it may be explained both by the brilliance of their authors and by their zeal in assimilating scientific disciplines which today enjoy universal respect. A poet who would like to compete with those mountains of erudition would have to pretend he possesses more self-knowledge than poets are allowed to have.


II.1 ABSTRACT

Cognitive function and problem-solving have been shown to be influenced by literacy or the lack of it. This chapter outlines various scientific work to lay the ground for the hypotheses that there are distinct cognitive differentiations between oral and literate, and more importantly, between prosody and written prose, and again, between written prosody and written prose.

Prior to the adoption of literacy education, Athenians relied on prosody to maintain cultural knowledge which functionally governed thought as 'practical intelligence' in a society that was largely oral. 1 It was in the fifth century BC that the male citizens of Athens experienced a radical shift from non-literacy to reading and writing. It is suggested that, in the individual, this shift constituted a rapid change in the individual's cognitive architecture, which in turn, gradually changed the collective cultural psychology over several generations.

A feature of Athenian elementary education was that its curriculum was largely comprised of poetry, an aspect of language primarily processed in the right hemisphere of the brain. Writing, on the other hand, is a function of the left hemisphere. Using Thomas' categorisations of Athenian literacy, 2 it is suggested that elementary education taught to the level of 'list' and 'name' literacy. While there is no indication that children were taught to write poetry themselves, the methods of reading tuition, beyond initial alphabet learning and simple word recognition, were likely to have involved the metre of the Homeric canon. 3 Literacy of this type therefore would be different to literacy that also includes the construction of continuous sentences in prose. The reason for this is that prose composition further develops what Gazzaniga calls 'co-operating modular subprocesses' that involve the deliberative left hemisphere 'interpreter mechanism'. 4 In Athens only a minority received further education and were introduced to continuous or extended prose reading and writing. Later chapters track the curriculum development of prose teaching, noting that teachers such as Gorgias adopted an elaborate written prose style that generated its own metre with extravagant devices such as chiasmus, balanced antithesis and anaphora. 5 It is suggested that this was in response to a transitional need of those with the new learning to communicate more effectively with those educated in metre. When faced with decision-making, the differing styles of education contributed to a disjunction in Athens' courts

3 Pl. Protag. 325e.
5 Cf. Chapter I, Note 42; Chapter VII.2-3; VIII.3; Appendix 7.
(dikasteria) and democratic legislature (ekklesia). The growing ability of the demos to understand the nuances of sophistic abstract argument were put under pressure in the face of war time panic and fear. Contemporaries such as Gorgias, Thucydides, Antiphon, Aristophanes, Xenophon and Plato, observed the dichotomy and their words are examined in section II.6 of this chapter. This section also examines some of the tragedians of the period - Aeschylus, Sophocles, and for comparison Euripides, for glimpses of earlier archaic styles of problem-solving acted out with ritual by the characters in the plays.

The chapter begins by tracking the equivocal nature of classical scholarship’s traditional ideas on rationality, irrationality and poetic inspiration. This has led to ambiguity and misrepresents information processing in the brain. The issues and models defining consciousness and how the brain functions, of laterality versus anti-localizationism; of plasticity; of extended mind theory; of universalism versus relativism are still being tackled by neuroscientists, anthropologists, psychologists and philosophers. There is also increasing research into cognitive integration and integrated linguistics that extends cognition to embody external phenomenological factors as well as internal neural function. This includes an ability to ‘reason’ and solve problems at the sub-conscious level. No one person can digest all the research that is being done, but there is reasonably widespread agreement that cognitive function and ‘intelligence’ is, at least in part, a multifaceted biochemical process that occurs in various regions of the brain in various modular combinations at the conscious, self-conscious and sub-conscious levels.

II.2 HISTORICAL CONSTRUCTS OF RATIONALITY, THE ILLUSION OF IRRATIONALITY AND POETIC INSPIRATION

In the Phaedrus and the Republic Plato constructed human thinking in terms of three highly conflicting faculties in which controlling reason [λογιστικός] contends with uncontrolled animal instincts, both good and bad [θυμοειδής and ἐπιθυμητικός]. Lloyd notes, that this tripartite idea of the psyche is the genesis of a Western concept of mind which is inconceivable to non-European cultures; for example, to Chinese philosophy, among others. So how much of Plato can we accept as historical truth? In his worldview reason strives for control by violently meeting force with force; ‘many Greeks seem to have felt threatened by the wild animals they imagined inside their souls’. Plato’s anxiety over his compatriots’ actions has resulted in definitional ambiguity in more than one discipline and fostered the myth of an unreasoning dark side to the human personality. Historians and philosophers often address Plato’s works metaphysically, without firmly placing him in his historical space; one of Ryle’s chief complaints was that Plato has often been denied the very human foible of changing his mind. Plato was reporting on, and developing an explanation for, behaviour that he had actually witnessed. From the beginning of the fifth century BC, this involved each progressive generation being taught how to read and write. This, as happens to all who are taught to read and write, altered their neurological

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6 Pl. Phaedrus 254c; Rep. 588c-e.
structures leading to functional specialisation, particularly in the left hemisphere of the brain.\textsuperscript{9} The extent, however, was varied and unlike literacy education today. This is because the curriculum during the fifth century BC consisted of a high degree of prosody, shown by Elliott Ross, et. al. to be 'a dominant and lateralised function of the right hemisphere'.\textsuperscript{10} Writing is dominant in the left hemisphere and is a cultural overlay and not an inborn part of inherited spoken language. Therefore the degree and/or type of literacy taught is relevant to how these processes interact. Elementary literacy taught students to read and write names, single words or a phrase; whilst mathematic tuition involved what Thomas calls, 'accounting literacy'.\textsuperscript{11} The introduction of continuous written prose composition by the Sophists mid-century extended left brain language function over that of the right. However, it was a minority who progressed from just learning to write their letters and construct simple sentences\textsuperscript{12} to learning to write prose in the form of abstract pro and contra arguments (δισοσκι λόγοι). The result was an historical example of a society where different forms of literacy education was a cause of societal and political disjunction as observed by Plato and others.

Because the foundation of Western philosophy and epistemology was laid by the Greeks, the argument must follow scholarship's romanticisation of the notions of poetic inspiration and the divorcement of logic or reason to any type of cognition that was not conscious in the narrower sense of Dennett's term, 'serial reasoning'. However, within his definition of the term, 'serial reasoning', Dennett also recognises that we possess the ability to reason within the implicit/explicit dichotomy, through implicit memory and knowledge\textsuperscript{13} and to make decisions at the sub-conscious as well as self-conscious level:

\begin{quote}
Although we are occasionally conscious of performing elaborate practical reasoning, leading to a conclusion about what, all things considered, we ought to
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{11} loc. cit.

\textsuperscript{12} Lists and simple sentences of a few words: e.g. Jack is handsome and jumps well.

do, followed by a conscious decision to do that very thing, and culminating finally in actually doing it, these are relatively rare experiences. Most of our intentional actions are performed without any such preamble. ... The standard trap is to suppose that the relatively rare cases of conscious practical reasoning are a good model for the rest, the cases in which our intentional actions emerge from processes into which we have no access. Our actions generally satisfy us; we recognise that they are in the main coherent, and that they make appropriate, well-timed contributions to our projects as we understand them. So we safely assume them to be the product of processes that are reliably sensitive to ends and means. That is they are rational, in one sense of that word. But that does not mean they are rational in a narrower sense; the product of serial reasoning.14

Aristotle also observed essentially the same thing:

εἰ δὲ ἄεὶ βουλεύεται, εἰς ἀπειρον ήξει. βουλευτὸν δὲ καὶ προαιρετὸν τὸ αὐτό, πλῆν ἀφορισμένον ἡδη τὸ προαιρετὸν· τὸ γὰρ ἐκ τῆς βουλῆς κριθεὶ προαιρετὸν ἐστιν, παύεται γὰρ ἐκαστὸς ζητῶν πῶς πράξῃ, ὅταν εἰς αὐτὸν αναγάγῃ τὴν ἀρχήν, καὶ αὐτὸν εἰς τὸ ένοχομένον· τοῦτο γὰρ τὸ προαιροέμενον.

[Aristotle Nic. Ethics 3.3.17-18 (1113a)]

Now the thing we deliberate about and the thing we choose are one and the same. The only difference is that, when a thing is chosen, it is already set apart, inasmuch as it has been already selected as a result of deliberation. We all stop asking how we are going to act when we have traced the origin of action back to ourselves, that is to the ruling or rational part of ourselves, for that it is which makes deliberate choice. [trans. Thomson]

Defining models of cognitive function is a 'thorny puzzle'; 'a terrible muddle' often leaving 'even the most sophisticated thinkers tongue-tied and confused'.15 Traditional concepts of 'basic human cognitive capacities' especially regarding rationality and logicality create definitional havoc in classical scholarship.16 The historical and prevailing common distinction made between 'reasoned argument' and 'emotional reasoning', implies one is 'rational' and the other 'irrational'; the inference being that one is logical, the other, illogical.17 This

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15 Litman, Reber, 'Implicit Cognition and Thought', loc. cit.; Dennett, Consciousness Explained, p. 22.
17 Some examples from The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) and The Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy (PDP): 1) 'irrational' (OED) - not endowed with reason; not in accordance with reason; absurd; illogical ['logical': Of persons: capable of reasoning correctly; also, reasoning correctly (in a particular sense) 1664]; nonce-use -Rational [p. 1652].
2) 'rational' (OED) - endowed with reason; having the faculty of reasoning; reasonable, sensible; not foolish, absurd, or extravagant: 'rational' (PDP) - pertaining to the faculty of reason; frequently implies a contrast with experience [religious revelation, ordinary sensory experience, emotion, etc.]; rationality is the adaptation of means to ends [in practical contexts].
3) 'reason' (OED) - that intellectual power or faculty (usu. regarded as characteristic of mankind, but sometimes also attributed in a certain degree to the lower animals) which is ordinarily employed in adapting thought or action to some end; the guiding principle of the human mind in the process of thinking; ...; to think in a connected, sensible, or logical manner; to employ the faculty of reason in forming conclusions [p. 1593]; to think out, to arrange the thought of in a logical manner.
4) 'reasonable' (OED) - endowed with reason; having sound judgement, sensible, sane; agreeable to reason; not irrational, absurd or ridiculous.
appears to have originated with Socrates (via Xenophon), Thucydides, and, as noted above, Plato. All criticised the mentality of the general Athenian population as being particularly unreasoned (ἀλογος). Plato then went further and identified the linguistic and cognitive differences between conversational, non-poetic language and metred speech (prosody). He claimed that all of the poets composed (poiein) their lyric and epic poetry when they were out of their senses and not in control of their minds:

{oι μελοποιοί ὁκ ἐμφρόνες ὄντες τα καλά μέλη ταύτα ποιούσιν, ὁλ` ἐπείδαν ἐμβάσιν εἰς τὴν ἀρμονιαν καὶ εἰς τὸν ρυθμὸν, βακχεύουσι καὶ κατεχόμενοι [Plato, Ion 534a]

The lyric poets do not indite those fine songs in their senses, but when they have started on the melody and rhythm they begin to be frantic, and it is under possession—as the baccants are possessed, and not in their senses. [trans. Saunders] 19

This fostered the tradition of the poetic mystique, a concept that has been varnished with increasing layers of meaning ever since:

By the very nature of poetry it is impossible for anyone to be at the same time a sublime poet and a sublime metaphysician, for metaphysics abstracts the mind from the senses, and the poetic faculty must submerge the whole mind in the senses; metaphysics soars up to universals, and the poetic faculty must plunge deep into particulars. 20

A recent work by Louisiana Poet Laureate and literary academic, Julie Kane, investigates poetry as 'right-hemispheric language'. 21 She structures her argument through an analysis of some two dozen poetic elements which are determined to have right hemisphere dominance. 22 She also discusses and

5) 'reasonless' (OED) - not endowed with, acting without the aid of, reason; irrational.
6) 'emotion' - (Psychology) a mental feeling or affection (e.g. of pain, desire, hope, etc.), as distinct from cognitions or volitions.
7) 'feeling' - (Psychology) a face or state of consciousness (J.S. Mill and others); as a generic term comprising sensation, desire, and emotion only; the element of pleasure or pain in any state (after Kant's Gefühl); an intuitive cognition or belief [p. 1739].
18 E.g., Thuc. 3.36-49; 6.8-26; Xen. Mem. 3.7.7; Pl. Rep. 4.431c-d, 6.494a, 8.564d-e; Laws 3.689a-b, 700c-701b, 8.861e.
19 Plato [Phaedrus 244a] refers to oracular pronouncements in the same vein: ὡν δὲ τὸ μέγιστα τῶν ἀγάθων ἡμῖν γίγνεται διὰ μανίας, θείας μέντοι δόσει διδομένης [Now, the most good comes to us in madness, when madness is sent by the gods]. Lloyd [In the Grip of Disease: Studies in the Greek Imagination, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004, pp. 150-151] remarks that this complex passage on the different forms of 'madness' contains some of the 'most convoluted language in Plato'. The complexity of the sensation is outlined in the work of Previc [Appendix 1, note 1] who notes that many dissociative states are quite naturally attributed to religious feelings.
22 E.g.: simile and metaphor, allusion, personification, synecdoche and metonymy, paradox, oxymoron, irony, understatement, litotes, and hyperbole, emotion, connotation, the symbol,
references the statements of some modern poets concerning their sensations of *poiein* to which the following is added. Goethe, and countless other poets, also attest to experiencing Plato’s description of the sensation of poetic creation:

> Aber ich lüge, dass sie eine Kunst sei; auch ist sie nicht eine Wissenschaft. Künste und Wissenschaften erreicht man durch Denken, Poesie nicht, denn diese ist Eingebung; sie war in der Seele empfangen als sie sich zuerst regte. Man sollte sie weder Kunst noch Wissenschaft nennen, sondern Genius.\(^{23}\)

I do not think poetry to be an art, nor is it a science. The arts and sciences are accomplished through thinking. Not poetry, because this is inspiration; received into the soul when it first stirred. They should call poetry neither art nor science, but genius. [trans. Leiper]

Shelley said *poiein* had ‘no connection with consciousness; Les Murray calls it ‘a painless headache’.\(^{24}\) This idea is rooted in the statements of the pre-literate ‘oral’ poets and *rhapsodes* who acknowledged the feeling that someone else was using them to deliver the poem. Often dismissed as a literary conceit, it nevertheless reflects one of the cognitive processes of orality which involves storytelling in formulaic language. It subdus active ‘serial reasoning’ in Dennett’s sense of the term.\(^{25}\) The immediate argument below considers how Dennett’s ‘serial reasoning’ differs from other forms of cognition, some of which resemble the


\(^{24}\) Les Murray is quoted in full at the head of Chapter V. Shelley [Defence of Poetry], as usual, has the last word: ‘We are aware of evanescent visitations of thought and feeling … always arising unforeseen and departing unbidden [p. 294]; Poetry, as has been said, differs in this respect from logic that it is not subject to the control of the active powers of the mind, and that its birth and recurrence has no necessary connection with consciousness or will’ [p. 319]; ‘Poets are the hierophants of an unapprehended inspiration … the words which express what they understand not …’ [p. 341].

Other poets, e.g. [http://www.poetsgraves.co.uk/poets_on_poetry]: Emily Dickinson - ‘If I feel physically as if the top of my head were taken off, I know that is poetry’. A. E. Housman - ‘I could no more define poetry than a terrier can define a rat’. William Blake in similar conceit to his ‘mind-forged manacles’ - ‘Poetry fettered fetters the human race’. T.S.Eliot - ‘Poetry is not a turning loose of emotion, but an escape from emotion; it is not the expression of personality, but an escape from personality’.

Also, e.g. [http://rpo.library.utoronto.ca/poem/1108.html]: Ben Jonson in *A Fit of Rhyme against Rhyme* - ‘Rhyme, the rack of finest wits / That expresseth but by fits’. Robert Frost [US Poet Laureate 1958-1959] - ‘I have never started a poem yet whose end I knew. Writing a poem is discovering’ and ‘Like a piece of ice on a hot stove the poem must ride on its own melting’. Dylan Thomas - ‘In my craft or sullen art / Exercised in the still night / When only the moon rages’. Czeslaw Milosz [Charles Eliot Norton Lectures, Harvard 1981-82, cited by Jerome Bruner, *Actual Minds, Possible Worlds*, p. 3] stated: ‘Frankly, all my life I have been in the power of a daimonion, and how the poems dictated by him came into being I do not quite understand.’

\(^{25}\) This is discussed in Chapter V.2.1.
sensations described by the poets. This leads to a consideration of how prosody is processed in the brain and how it relates to mental states which utilise poetry in aspects of implicit social memory. For the present, the traditional misinterpretation of the Greek concepts of ποιεῖν (to make, to poetise), and δαιμονᾶν (to be possessed, to hear or feel the presence of another internal identity) in ever-evolving though perennial observations of the ‘poetic mind’ deserves consideration. From Dryden, Shelley, Keats to and past T.S. Eliot, Bob Dylan, and Ice Cube, poiein somehow remained on ‘the dark irrational side’. Kipling claimed ‘When your Daemon is in charge, do not think consciously. Drift, wait, and obey’. It is interesting that Philip Johnson-Laird, when discussing poets, believes that ‘most artistic creation depends on abduction, induction, and deduction, as most of the problems that we solve in life do … there are only a handful of exceptions’. This view rather flies in the face of the cognitive process experienced by the many poets cited above and in Kane’s work who state that it is quite different to other types of language generation. Kane laments the probably insurmountable impediments to neural imaging and analysis of poiein because of the wired-and-waiting on-demand requirements of fMRI and that ‘transient and unpredictable phenomenon [of poiein] not subject to human will’. Perhaps it is methodological problems that prompt contemporary science often to neglect poetics and which obliges Lloyd, for example, to add the throwaway comment, ‘poetry is just poetry, for sure,’ when he observes ‘its influence on ordinary people’s perceptions can be far-reaching’. It is as if poiein is an alien phenomenon. Even Ruth Finnegan mistrusts the poets’ remarks about the non-conscious dissociative sensation of poiein and considers, ‘it can be a mistake to treat such claims literally as a complete account of poetic creation’. True, it is not a complete account of poetry making, but it is unfortunate that she quotes Nora Chadwick’s views on the ‘mentally abnormal or diseased’ states of ‘ecstasy and other forms of manticism’. Perhaps in the sense the poets used, it is

26 Cf. Appendix 4 for discussions on the evolution of δαιμονᾶν and other cognitive terms such as ψυχῆς, νοος and φῶς.
29 Kane, ‘Poetry as Right-Hemispheric Language’, p. 53.
30 Lloyd [Cognitive Variations, p. 90] is discussing ‘notions of health and well-being’ in ancient Greece and uses the poetry of Hesiod’s Works and Days and Homer’s Iliad as evidence.
a language-based cognitive process that needs to be experienced to be understood.\textsuperscript{32} It may be refined with a pen, but it is not created by one. The sensation of writing poetry is like that of taking dictation.

Plato’s adverse reaction to poetry is discussed below. What is stressed here is that he also favourably described ‘serial reasoning’ as ἐντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς σύνθεν διάλογος ἀνευ φωνῆς (a silent inner conversation of the psyche with itself).\textsuperscript{33} This was the seed of the concept that would develop into various forms of dualism, as for example, Descartes.\textsuperscript{34}

Scholarship’s traditional ambivalence to the duel between Dualism and Materialism extends to newer and widely differing theories seeking to explain introspection in terms of an internal ‘biological phenomenon’\textsuperscript{35} or alternatively as ‘distributed cognition’\textsuperscript{36} or as an extended ‘coupled system’ in which the ‘human organism is linked with an external entity in a two-way interaction’.\textsuperscript{37} For example Roy Harris, adopting the term for internal dialogue as ‘vulgar mind-speak’ does not accept ‘mind’ and ‘brain’ as a single operating system,

\textsuperscript{32} As this is not a work on Literature per se, it makes no judgements on quality, nor makes no distinction between ‘Poetry’ with a capital ‘P’ and what is often identified as doggerel. Any work of prosody using metre, rhythm or rhyme is the product of ποιεῖν.\textsuperscript{33} P\. The Sophist 263e, cf. 264a; Theaetetus 189e. Gilbert Ryle [Plato’s Progress, p.207; cf. pp. 118-119] highlights an anomaly which suggests this capacity was not necessarily a universal given: a generation or two later, Aristotle [Topics 1116b3] was obliged to instruct his students of dialectic that, if they could not find someone with whom to argue, they should argue with themselves. [O]ur very surprise that Aristotle should trouble to recommend this, to us, familiar solitary exercise shows how much we have been enabled to take for granted by Plato and Aristotle, who had to find out this secret’. Ryle also notes ‘a curious feature’ at the end of Theaetetus [21-c-d] where Socrates admits that he cannot personally think in any fashion other than maieutic (Socratic aporia or what Aristotle [Topics 169b26; Metaphysics 1004b26] called peirastic cross questioning); what Plato [Sophist 230-231] calls cathartic elenchus: [W]e must assert that cross-questioning is the greatest and most efficacious of all purifications [τῶν ἐλεγχῶν λεκτίων ὡς ὀρα μεγίστη καὶ κυριωτάτη τῶν καθόρσεων ἐστὶ].


suggesting, 'there is no translation available which will convert the neurophysiological predicates of English (or any other language) into corresponding mental predicates'. 38 This seeming pragmatism is typical of a 'traditional ambivalence', even though his insights into the dynamics and subtle differences between scriptism, writing, alphabet knowledge and reading provides substantial support in defining the arguments developed in Chapters III.3 and V.2.1-2 on Athenian functional literacy. His emphasis on 'vulgar mind-speak' ignores the sensation of implicit knowledge, or what Lloyd calls 'practical intelligence', as it reaches consciousness. 39 This dichotomy between the internal dialogue of 'serial reasoning' and poiein spans concepts of rationality and irrationality. It can also be observed that consciousness comes in a unified form, embodying those ἐντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς conversations as well as sensory perceptions and emotion/mood reacting to outside stimuli of environment and culture. 40 The extended mind theory of cognition suggests an integrated system; a 'hybrid' where 'neural and external processes co-ordinate with one another in the completion of cognitive tasks'. 41 Other research into implicit cognition uncovers various nonconscion mechanisms that significantly influence implicit learning and behaviour. 42 The quixotic sensation that someone else is doing the thinking is a product of the interface between these non-conscious mechanisms, the subconscious processing that arrives at a solution to the problem with an 'aha' experience of insight in which Litman and Reber state, 'the implicit processes become conscious'. 43 It involves the 'co-operating modular subprocesses' of

39 Lloyd, loc. cit.
40 Searle [op. cit., p. 77] observes that 'we are always in some mood, even if it does not have a name like elation or depression'.
41 Menary, 'Writing as Thinking', pp. 621-632 at 622.
43 Litman, Reber, p. 445 [‘implicity’ meaning implicit knowledge and its processing]. Cf. J. Dorfman, V.A. Shames, J.F. Kihlstrom, 'Intuition, incubation, and insight: Implicit Cognition in Problem-solving’ in G. Underwood (ed.), Implicit Cognition, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996, pp. 267-296. Cf. Bertrand Russell [Autobiography, London, Unwin, 1978, pp. 148-49] who explains: 'Every evening the discussion ended with some difficulty, and every morning I found that the difficulty of the previous evening had solved itself while I slept. The time was one of intellectual intoxication. ... For years I had been endeavouring to analyse the fundamental notions of mathematics, such as order and cardinal numbers. Suddenly, in the space of a few weeks, I discovered what appeared to be definitive answers to the problems which had baffled me for years. And in the course of discovering these answers, I was introducing a new mathematical technique, by which regions formerly abandoned to the vaguenesses of philosophers were conquered for the precision of exact formulae’. When a single thought, or idea or solution for an argument comes to the individual, the classic cliché about these ideas is that they come to you in the shower; Chapter VII.3.2 suggests Gorgias' famous term 'kairos' is this
Gazzaniga's 'interpreter mechanism' mentioned in II.1 and discussed below, with references in Appendix 1.1 notes 2, 11, 12, 13 and 14. In Greek oral society, it is possible that the extremes of delusional alien control and the ordinary influences of non-conscious mechanisms on learning and behaviour, along with the sensations of the implicit process, were closer than the two experiences today. These are explored below in II.6 and subsequent chapters. It was the prevalence of this sensation in Athens which prompted Gorgias to devise elaborate written prose metaphors and other prosodic devices that border on poetry (examined in Chapters V.2 and VII.2) when constructing pro and contra probability arguments.

For the present, the discussion below on cognitive modularity suggests one facet of this interface between 'implicit knowledge' bubbling to the surface of consciousness and 'serial reasoning' relates to the cognitive differences in processing prosody and writing continuous prose. Another facet is the relationship between the 'implicit knowledge' and prosody that characterises pre-literate society where the social memory is recounted in formulaic verse, both dominated by the right hemisphere. 'Serial reasoning' conversely appears to be dominant in the left hemisphere and is altered by the learned capacity to write in continuous prose. When Athenians began literacy education the transition from non-literacy to literacy did indeed involve alterations in brain function; a point of debate in the scholarship on 'orality' as a mental state. There are, however, several subtleties to consider: first is the cognitive differences between prosody and writing, and between writing prosody and writing prose, and the differing effects on the psychology of those who learned to read and write in Athens in the fifth century BC. For evidence in the Athenian context, the words of contemporary fifth-century BC Athenians are examined at the end of this chapter (II.6) for their opinions on what they saw around them and what can be inferred from the way in which they told it.

realisation that you have the solution to the argument, an 'ah-ha' moment, which is momentary. The process of poiein merely lasts longer.
II.3 CONSTRUCTS OF MODULARITY IN NEUROANATOMY THAT IMPLY SEPARATE, THOUGH INTERACTIVE COMPONENTS PRODUCING PROSODY AND WRITTEN PROSE

Notwithstanding the complex modular interface that occurs within and between hemispheres in the production of language, the cultural multidimensionality\textsuperscript{44} or the fact that no two brains are neuroanatomically identical\textsuperscript{45} - there is evidence that motor (in this case, writing) and language function is, to a greater or lesser degree, lateralised between the two hemispheres. Table 1 therefore outlines some language-related and separate literacy capacities currently being investigated across the disciplines. The demarcations between the acquisition of reading and writing, and the creating of prosody and writing function, especially as it relates to the development of argument in written prose, are significant to the consideration below of how Athenian education in the fifth century BC transformed its citizenry from 'pre-literacy' to varying degrees of 'literacy' within a generation or two. Later chapters relate how continuous prose writing (a relatively new invention from Hellenic Ionia) was not introduced into Athenian education in the main. Instead, elementary education used the Homeric canon to focus on practical and ethical training and taught reading using random texts or partial rehearsal texts of the \textit{Iliad} and the \textit{Odyssey} as teaching resources.\textsuperscript{46} Those who received training in the written construction of prose were a small (though ever widening) minority.\textsuperscript{47} In preparation for the arguments in the following chapters, Table 1 attempts to highlight i) how the very few who learned to write extended sentences in prose constituted a markedly different literacy to those who were taught the alphabet and lexical formation from Homeric hexameter, and, ii) how highly developed right hemispheric language would have been in Athenian 'practical intelligence' throughout the fifth century BC. Much of the contents of Table 1 are structured around the famous experiments of Gazzaniga, et. al. on split-brain patients who had callosa sections which made them unable to 'synthesise information between hemispheres' or had lesions in the left or right hemispheres.\textsuperscript{48} Since the 1970s much work has been done across the disciplines of mind science that corroborate and refine these findings. Therefore

\textsuperscript{44} Cf. Lloyd, \textit{Cognitive Variations}, p. 6, fn.2; passim.
\textsuperscript{46} Cf. Chapter IV, Appendix 1.2.
\textsuperscript{47} Cf. Chapter VIII.4-5.
the note numbers in Table 1 refer to work from others which have relevance to various aspects of Gazzaniga’s findings and which are to be found in Appendix 1.

TABLE 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEFT HEMISPHERE</th>
<th>RIGHT HEMISPHERE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LH can process language in the frontal and inferior temporal regions which are dominant for language and speech processing. (2) (3)</td>
<td>The capacity for syntax is not complex but lexical knowledge is present in the RH. (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LH can speak about what it sees and experiences. (2) (3)</td>
<td>RH cannot speak even simple words and cannot articulate what it sees or what it touches. (3) (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singing and music performance requires minimal LH activation. (5)</td>
<td>Aphasia patients with LH lesions and intact RH can sing and rhyme even though they cannot speak. (3) (6) This capacity (in LH damaged patients) was thought possibly to be restricted to songs already memorised; perhaps because they were not tested for new songs. However ‘melodic intonation therapy’ conducted by Martin Albert, et. al.; Gottfried Schlaug, et. al., and groups such as Stroke-a-Chord, have been successful teaching patients to construct new sentences. (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LH is dominant in complex problem-solving. (10)</td>
<td>LH is severely deficient in difficult problem-solving but can ‘think’. (In identification tests LH damaged patients with severed corpus callosum can get the left hand to point to the correct object). (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lateralisation of language may develop disproportionately. (9)</td>
<td>Lateralisation of language may develop disproportionately. (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LH effects capable search strategies (11)</td>
<td>RH conscious experience is different to that in the LH. (12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The LH tries to problem solve. It seeks the meaning of events and experiences, placing them in a larger context. By persistently seeking order and reason even where there is</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>qxLH recalls with more truth and accuracy but cannot put its experience into a larger context and simply attends to the perceptual</td>
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</table>
none, the LH continually makes mistakes through over generalising. The 'Interpreter Mechanism' is creative with narrative ability and a capacity for innovation. The LH consistently wants to be logical, looking for rational meaning even if it has no informational input and 'cannot' know. It can construct a potential past as opposed to a true one. LH asks 'Why?' (13) (17)

Personal narratives originate in the LH. (14)

Writing is a stand-alone LH system which is not part of the inherited spoken language systems. (16)

LH handles syntax. (16)

The right ear, processed in the LH, is more accurate with linguistic signals. (18)

LH cannot do illusory contours to assist in letter/symbol construction. (19)

RH can spell and rhyme, create metaphor, categorise objects and match words to pictures, but it cannot write. (3) (15) (17)

The left ear, processed in the RH, is dominant for non-verbal signals, such as music and rhythm. (18)

RH has visual spatial capacity to judge shapes involved in letter/symbol construction. RH can do illusory contours (i.e., modal completion). (19)

The above is not to imply any disunity in the brain as a consequence of lateralisation and modular specialisation, either in the fifth century BC or now. In this regard Gazzaniga's identification of what he terms 'the interpreter mechanism' in the left brain is of particular note:

The left-brain 'interpreter' constructs theories about ... actions and feelings and tries to bring order and unity to our conscious lives. It is a special system that works independently from language processes and appears to be unique to the human brain and related to the singular capacity of the brain to make causal inferences. ... Hundreds of such observations have now been documented in these [split-brain] cases over the years. When these results are compared to the poor performance in the right hemisphere displays (as compared to the left hemisphere) involving simple problems requiring making inferences and seeing causal relationships, it is concluded that the left brain interpreter evolved in association with the left hemisphere's specialised capacity in the human brain for such cognitive activities.50

Even with hexametric prosody having right hemisphere dominance, the left hemisphere's 'interpreter mechanism' is evident throughout the heroic action of Homer's characters.51 As to the many rhapsodes' explanations of what it felt like to sing Homer - akin to the spontaneous sensations of implicit memory / knowledge, including poetics - the dissociative feelings associated with

51 Cf. Chapter V; Appendix 1.2.
formulaic hexametric and ritualistic prosody indicate right brain language involved in narrativising in the left brain 'interpreter mechanism'. In regard to the 'wish' for the 'interpreter mechanism' to problem-solve and reason, it is possible to see an evolution, or at least an alteration, in Athenian students who were taught to write in extended prose. As is detailed in Chapter VI.2.4 some learned to utilise a prose style of the type devised by the sophist, Gorgias, which was embellished with prosodic elements to construct forensic and abstract pro and contra arguments devised by their individual 'interpreter mechanisms'. As the extant texts show, over time the more complex the arguments became, the less poetical became the prose. In fact Egbert Bakker creates a separate 'Gorgianic' category of writing claiming it is neither poetry nor prose. He names poetry and this type of prose 'special speech'. The following chapters, however, identify some distinct cognitive differences between what Gorgias was writing and what happens when poetry is made.

Literacy is not inherent; it is part of the social environment. Because of individual brain plasticity and epigenesis, literacy constitutes a sudden evolutionary trend in the individual's brain and, by a slower, bootstrapping effect, in the psychology of the collective at large. The mind is a result of two processes of selection: natural selection and somatic selection; where somatic selection consists, in part, of 'genes and inheritance', and synaptic connectivity during the life of the individual and 'experiential selection'. Therefore changes in the environment can alter brain function at implicit (collective) and explicit (individual) levels: collectively, in the natural selection of the species, and in the 'experiential selection' of the individual reacting to changes in the environment. In the individual the change with literacy is sudden with the adaptation of a section of the fusiform gyrus of the left temporal lobe into a 'VWFA' [visual

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word form area]. This specialisation of literacy is unique to humans (so far). Consider the physical evidence of human brain lateralisation and evolution and those of other species:

The human brain, like any brain, is a collection of neurological adaptations established through natural selection.... They can be lateralised to specific regions or networks in the brain.... It has always appeared that the lateralization seen in the human brain was an evolutionary add-on-mechanisms or abilities that were laid down in one hemisphere only. We recently stumbled across an amazing hemispheric dissociation that challenges this view. It forced us to speculate that some lateralised phenomena may arise from a hemisphere's losing an ability, not gaining it. ... Mutational tinkering with a homologous cortical region could give rise to a new function - yet not cost the animal, because the other side would remain unaffected.56

The left and right fusiform gyri function connectively; what literate humans have lost by the acquisition of literacy is yet to be determined. Cohen and Dehaene present further psychological, neuropsychological and neuroimaging data that identifies the 'VWFA' as a lateralised and 'well delimited region that activates to visual words'. This research shows evolutionary functional specialisation:

The lateralization may also imply preferential connections to left hemispheric language area. The conjunction of these factors may collectively conspire to define a cortical region optimally apt at hosting the functional processes of visual word recognition.

[It should be remembered that it takes years for children to develop expert word recognition, and that the emergence of this expertise correlates with the amount of activation of the VWFA by letter strings in normal and dyslexic children. There is thus no ready-made 'module' for visual word recognition, but a progressive specialisation process that capitalises on the plasticity of the human ventral inferotemporal cortex to build the VWFA.57

All of the above points to the diversity and changeability of the brain at a species and individual level. Menary also stresses that the hybrid skills of reading and writing, which utilise the brain circuits that evolved from other processes, change brain architecture within the individual who becomes literate regardless of age.58 Examined in the following chapters are the hypotheses that Athenian literates who pushed further than the general alphabetic literacy (constituting the recognition of letters, the ability to read phonetically and to write simple two or three word sentences) increased left hemispheric language capacity in two ways. Firstly, by acquiring the capacity to write extended prose sentences. The result of this ability has a second, bootstrapping effect which can increase the


capacity for left hemisphere dominance in 'serial thinking' by which extended abstract forensic argument may be developed with the use of writing. There is by now enough reproducible evidence that literacy does change brain architecture and its coordinate functioning to back up Plato's observations. It is a further hypothesis that this education in argument development reduced, or altered, the use of right hemisphere dominated prosody which was the language of reference for the society at large. Though of course not the only influences, these hypotheses make sense of the history and nature of Athenian education for the individual as well as the rapidity of the cultural and civic changes.

This is not to assume the 'cultural idées fixes' of the scholarship cited above that, as Roy Harris puts it, assumes literacy to be a 'Good Thing' and anything that devalues it to be a 'Bad Thing'; something Lloyd calls 'cognitive imperialism'. It is not just cognitive science, it comes through in terms such as Havelock's 'craft-literacy' and in Ong's phrases such as the 'tenaciousness of orality' and 'lingering, retardant orality'. In the same vein, theories of reasoning, come from literate minds; Searle, Dennett, Plato and Aristotle, as well as the others, are reasoning out their theories with the aid of computer keyboard or pen on parchment. And, part of the reason for the persistence of the traditional concept of 'the irrational' permeating theories of 'orality' in twentieth century classical scholarship, is that the discoveries of language locus in the left brain by Broca and Wernicke coincided with a resurggrence of interest in ancient Greece. This was due to the discoveries of Schliemann at Troy and Mycene, Fouqué on the geology of Thera and Evans at Knossos in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. From that time on, Homer's Iliad and Odyssey have gained a thousand new psychological nuances. As literates, with a developed 'VWFA', we cannot know how the non-literate brain functioned, but evidence outlined in Table 1 above suggests that 'orality' entails functional specialisation in metre, melody and rhythm in the right hemisphere of the brain in conjunction with a narrative function,


61 Cf. Chapter V.
Gazzaniga’s ‘interpreter mechanism’, in the left hemisphere which also plays a significant part in the recitation and/or creation of prosody.

II.4 SOME DIFFERENT MODELS OF LATERALISATION WITHIN THE LITERATE ATHENIAN POPULATION

From a neuropsychological point of view, a fundamental difference between 'pre-literacy' and 'literacy' is that 'pre-literacy' as a cognitive state lacks a left hemisphere (adapted) 'VWFA'. It also lacks the other modular functions adapted from yet other functions for the processing of writing and identifying script.62 Any ability to recognise letters indicates a 'VWFA' has been developed; the first step on the road to 'literacy'. In Athens, this interface between 'pre-literacy' and literacy was under way in the last quarter of the sixth century BC, but was not widespread until the increase in general literacy education in the first half of the fifth century BC.63 Another feature of 'pre-literacy' is the use of prosody and formulaic language, Bakker's 'special speech', a capacity of the right hemisphere to maintain functional implicit memory subprocesses, the 'social memory' for 'practical intelligence'.64 That this remained a viable transaction throughout the fifth century BC is evident in the use of the Homeric canon in education, the Homeric hymns used in ritualistic chant, the sympotic poets and in the work of the tragedians (examples of which are cited in II.6). At the same time the evidence that other Athenians possessed fully literate minds lies in the linguistic complexity and sophistication of the prose constructs of Herodotus, Gorgias, Thucydides, Antiphon, Xenophon and the generation of fourth century BC orators taught by those educated in the previous century. By the content and style of their texts, these ancient Greek writers show the result of, and evidence for 'fully interiorised literacy'.65 Cognitively, it is evidence of Cohen and

62 Cf. Table 1.
63 Cf. Chapters III.2; IV.2.
65 This is not to discount the external processes involved in reading and writing - Ong [Orality and Literacy, pp. 12, 14] defines fully interiorised literacy: A literate person, asked to think of the word 'nevertheless', will normally (and I strongly suspect always) have some image, at least
Dehaene's 'VWFA' coupled with Gazzangia's inborn 'interpreter mechanism' with its predilection to generate narrative and its learned capacity to convert narrative to prose script in the left hemisphere of the brain.

The chapters that follow examine the education of these men's fathers and grandfathers during the course of the fifth century BC. In this period the collective population of Athens was a mixture of individuals with a 'VWFA' and some 'phonemic awareness' (see II.5 below), which enabled them to decipher letters and words and to write single words or learned hexameters and a minority who were able to translate these lexical and phonemic capacities into innovative script. It was a period when social enculturation was still largely transmitted orally by students listening to and reciting Homeric verse. Learning an alphabet to spell words and to write them down developed an interior spatial construct for a method of 'serial reasoning' that sought explanations beyond learned hexametric axioms; that utilised the 'interpreter mechanism' and the predilection to narrativise first in learned concrete poetic gnōmai and eventually in abstract argument constructed in extended continuous written prose.

The ability to write is relative: copying text is as different a cognitive process to poiein as poiein is to inscribing (γραφεῖν) coherent original sentences in prose. Nevertheless, regardless of the degree of interiorised literacy acquired by the individual, the rapid change that any degree of literacy had within the population as a collective is reflected as much in the social and political change over the century as in individual brain plasticity. Ong thought that Plato was not conscious that his opposition to poets was against 'the old oral noetic', but that is precisely what his reactions were. His literacy was 'sufficiently interiorised' to know the difference between the concrete, implicit nature of 'oral noetic', which is limited by what George Miller defined as 'cognitive capacity', and the 'patiently analytic, lengthily sequential thought processes [that] were first coming into existence because of the ways in which literacy enabled the mind to

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vague, of the spelled-out word and be quite unable ever to think of the word 'nevertheless' for, let us say, 60 seconds without adverting to any lettering but only to the sound. This is to say, a literate person cannot fully recover a sense of what the word is to purely oral people. Harris [Rationality and the Literate Mind, p. 142] also states that once 'the Fall' from orality to literacy has occurred 'it is irrevocable'.

66 The extent and methods of literacy education is covered in depth in Chapter III.3.
process data'. Along with Ong, Searle, Dennett, Harris, Goldhill and Menary represent a general consensus that language and writing has had a profound influence on the cognitive functions that produce consciousness and 'reasoning' powers. Harris, however, suggests Ong conflates his use of the term, 'writing', and objects to his concept of 'the Greek mind'. This draws attention away from the historical evidence. Firstly, that literacy education related to scriptism can produce a rapid cultural 'bootstrapping' shift in the collective psychology. Those with alphabetic literacy were more able to conceptualise the potential of language to hypothesise alternatives, rather than pronounce verdicts. Secondly, the population's aural exposure to and growing familiarity with the new forms of abstract pro and contra and forensic arguments that were being taught to sophistic students in the second half of the fifth century BC; they introduced less traditional methods of problem-solving to individuals not generally exposed to this type of decompositional reasoning using modal logic. The demos became familiar with the reasoning process, but were themselves unable to construct the extended written arguments themselves. Later chapters follow the progress of the arguments audiences listened to in the agora, the ekklesia and the dikasterion and, as some of the quotations in II.6 below suggest, collective political and military decision-making suffered in the interface between the two methods of thinking.

The structuralist view that the rise of philosophy (φιλοσοφία) and abstract thought in Greece was a 'mental mutation' is questioned by Geoffrey Kirk, insisting that the construct had no meaning until Plato coined the term. He

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69 Harris, Rationality and the Literate Mind, pp. 7, 64-69. Harris ['How Does Writing Restructure Thought?', Language and Communication, Vol. 9, No. 2/3, (1989), pp. 99-106 at 99-103] has also been critical of such terms as 'literate mentality', claiming that the tradition has 'romanticised' the function of writing with a Western ethnic bias; with concepts such as 'the Greek mind', 'the female mind' and 'the [very British] criminal mind', 'keeping bad company' with the abstract 'literate mind'. He especially singles out Gelb, Parry, Havelock and Ong. Cf. Rationality and the Literate Brain, p. 7.


acknowledges that some type of cognitive shift occurred, but emphasises the slowness of the change which ‘was not the result of a sudden ‘discovery of mind’ but an ‘Odyssey lasting for many hundreds of years, in which storytelling, social preoccupation, migration, literacy, conservatism and religion all played their part’. In the light of research into intelligence testing, Kirk’s time frame comes into question. It is a mistake to think that psychological traits (including IQ) and cognitive structures are not susceptible to rapid shift and ‘can change tomorrow’. Increased intellectual trends do not need many generations:

[O]ur more deliberatively planned acts show the benefits of information gathered and transmitted by our conspecifics in every culture, including, moreover, items of information that no single individual has embodied or understood in any sense. And while some of this information may be of rather ancient acquisition, much of it is brand new. When comparing the time scales of genetic and cultural evolution, it is useful to bear in mind that we here today—every one of us—can easily understand many ideas that were simply unthinkable by the geniuses in our grandparents’ generation.

Neither is cognitive efficiency relative over time and space:

[Wechsler thought] a person’s intelligence must always be understood in the context of a particular culture; therefore, people classified as ‘intelligent’ in one society might not be so in another. This wise caveat was ignored because of a widespread conviction that each person - infant to octogenarian - has a relatively fixed amount of a complex mental quality that is - like Galen’s mysterious black bile - a material, indestructible part of their personhood. Because no other psychological quality possesses that feature, this premise is likely to be incorrect.

Lloyd has recently elaborated on the significance of cultural influence in the context of cognitive performance, highlighting the many variations between

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71 Kirk, op. cit., pp. 302. It should be kept in mind that there is no such thing as ‘philosophy’ until Plato comes along and invents the term. Up until then everyone, including Plato when he was a young student, is discussing the loving (philos) of wisdom (sophos) as in ‘getting cleverer’. Any date earlier than 399 BC and Kirk is really speaking about the development of ‘thinking’.


73 Dennett, ‘The Role of Language in Intelligence’ in What is Intelligence?, The Darwin College Lectures, ed. Jean Khalfa, Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press. 1994, pp. 1-10, at p. 5. With widespread use of computer technology and the internet, this is even more relevant in the second decade of the twentyfirst century.

74 Kagan, [op. cit., p. 70; cf. pp.58-59] relates the reflections of David Wechsler, the inventor of today’s most widely used intelligence test: A study of children in Boston and India revealed, surprisingly, that most reading-retarded first grade children read rows of colors and pictures of familiar objects as quickly as children who were excellent readers. … These children did not have a general intellectual deficit; rather their lack of familiarity with print prevented them from reading the letters quickly. [A. Sankaranarayan, unpub. ms]. The most popular intelligence test, the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children, assesses a smaller number of mental skills, including the size of the child’s vocabulary, short-term memory for numbers, ability to make inferences from pictures and a talent for solving puzzles. If intelligence were a unitary competence, the correlations among the scores on these four tests should be very high, but they are not. The test that measures short-term memory on the standard intelligence tests has a low correlation with the total IQ score. … If one administers tests of very different intellectual abilities to 1,000 children, each test tapping a different cognitive skill, the correlations among the scores are modest, usually less than 0.4. That fact is inconsistent with the notion that intelligence is a unitary characteristic. … These sharp differences between verbal and nonverbal skills challenge the concept of general intelligence.
diverse groups. Remarkably, even with such regional differences, there has been a global universality in nineteenth and twentieth century jumps in IQ (the proof now called the Flynn Effect). The Flynn Effect, therefore, can occur over short periods of time due to historical factors. There is no guarantee that such trends will continue, but this firmly grounds intelligence and its development in history’s time and place; it adds weight to the research cited earlier on long term evolutionary aspects of brain function as well as short term changes due to plasticity and environmental influences. In fifth-century BC Athens the cognitive development taking place was rapid at the individual level, but somewhat slower in the collective psyche of the society itself. Granted that other external influences are relevant, the most revolutionary impact in the early part of the century was that all levels of the population in Athens embraced the idea of literacy as a utilitarian tool rather than as a system with magical aspect. Even a passing knowledge of letters in itself would have altered the individual’s language components in the left hemisphere, Considered below is how, after the introduction of general literacy education, any level of literacy would have given Table 1’s ‘interpreter mechanism’ a tool with which to visualise the constructs of language. Being taught to write words as well as read would have developed the left hemisphere further. Those without sophisticated education in extended written prose, whilst understanding the concept of using written text to develop, say, a political or judicial proposition, when they heard them grappled with new forms of prose argument that were outside the parameters of their (hexametric-based) implicit knowledge. It was not the implicit knowledge system, the myths themselves, but the poetic form of the myths that constituted a

76 James R. Flynn, What Is Intelligence?: Beyond the Flynn Effect, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp. 172-175. The Flynn Effect was global including America, Argentine, Belgium, Brazil, Britain, Canada, Denmark, Dominica, Estonia, France, India, Israel, Kenya, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Scandinavia, Spain, Sweden; pp. 2-3, 143-144, et. passim. Statistics were also ethnically differentiated in America to include Black Americans, Chinese Americans, etc.; pp. 115-117, 123-124.
77 Schooling was not institutionalised. Therefore, before the general prosperity following the Battle of Salamis and the growth of empire, there are likely to have been a proportion of the citizen population who could not afford to pay for extensive literacy tuition. Nevertheless they would have still begun to recognise alphabet letters displayed on public stele and to sound them out into words, thus the widespread knowledge of what a writing system was, and how it worked, rather than suspiciously recognising ‘dangerous symbols’ written on wood [ll. 6.169: γράφειν ἐν πίνακι θυμοθέωρα πολλά]. This aspect is discussed further in Chapters III; IV.3.
78 Kirk, The Nature of Greek Myths, p. 108. Cf. Chapter VII.2.2 for discussion regarding Ionian phenomenologists of the period, many of whom wrote in prosody, most of whom used mythical constructs in their thinking.
disconnect in early forensic writers. 'Orality' in the form of hexameter and iambic pentameter had no need to be written down: when they were written down to convey new ideas they would have cut across from right hemisphere processing of metre to the modules processing writing and the problem-solving 'interpreter mechanism' in the left hemisphere. In Athens Plato and the other thinkers and educators of the period used myth in the same way Aeschylus and the other fifth century BC tragedians because it contained, for both composer and audience, sufficient internal logic to provide efficient problem-solving within the society at large. What was novel in Athens was that Plato and the earlier generation of educators did not write in hexameter or iambics, but used extended prose sentences.79

To summarise, in Athens during the fifth century BC human communication had rapidly undergone a process of cognitive evolution because the city had progressively begun to use writing in civic and legalistic applications, whilst still relying on prosodic implicit procedural knowledge in the decision-making processes. While the formulaic language of Athenian procedural knowledge involved the remembrance of archaic poetry (dominated by the language functions of the right brain), the arguments listened to in the ekklesia and dikasteria were increasingly prepared by written prose constructs of extended 'serial reasoning'. The process has a generative plasticity, with 'writing providing an autoglotthic space in which a new form of theoretical thinking becomes prevalent'.80 The emergence of sophistic education entailing the tuition of extended continuous prose writing in Athens sometime in the first half of the fifth century BC therefore reflects:
i) the evolution in extended 'serial reasoning' taking place in those who were taught to use extended written prose in argument construction;
ii) those who had been taught to read more than a word or two through the use of prosody represented a transitional state in Athenian thinking, because their participation in the civic forums remained 'procedural' in that they did not, could not, generate abstract pro and contra written prose arguments. They

80 Menary, 'Writing as Thinking', pp. 621-632 at 621.
listened and progressively learned to understand them in the problem-solving and decision-making debates.

II.5. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL TERRAIN OF ATHENIAN LITERACY:

Many assessments of Greek history assume that from one generation to another Athenians thought and taught in the same way, even though it seems to be understood that their education did in some way evolve. For example Jaeger saw education in evolutionary terms, stating that it 'keeps pace with life and the growth of the community', yet felt Greek education remained an unchanging, 'deliberate pursuit of an ideal'. In Athens the degree of literacy attained in the lifetime of each individual determined his capacity for 'serial reasoning', whilst the deliberative abilities of the collective were influenced, and educated, by the steadily increasing percentage of individuals able to acquire a higher degree of literacy with the capacity to construct extended argument beyond Miller's limits of 'cognitive capacity'. The influence of educational methods from a cognitive point of view is rarely considered when addressing Athenian education and the general assumption is that, by merely being taught to read and write Athenians were capable of deliberating and problem-solving in the same way as subsequent literate societies of the West. The indications are that, throughout the fifth century BC, except for the minority who were taught to write extended prose, the majority of literacy reading tuition in Athens was in metre and this remains an under-researched factor in the nature of Greek literacy education. The curriculum was not conducive to abstract 'serial reasoning'. Except for a little practical mathematics, nothing in fifth century BC general education could be termed 'analytical' (ἀναλογίζομαι and ἀνακρίνω = in the sense of problem-solving, to separate constituent elements, to examine closely, to question facts). Even when widespread literacy education is accepted, this does not mean that

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81 Werner Jaeger [Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture, Vol.1 (trans. G. Highnet) Oxford, Blackwell, 1967, p. xiv. Cf. p. xiii]: Education as practised by man is inspired by the same creative spirit and directive vital force which impels every natural species to maintain and preserve its own type. ... Education is not a practice which concerns the individual alone: it is essentially a function of the community. It does well to bear in mind that education in Athens was not institutionalised by the state but remained under the control of individual parents and clan based groups. Cf. Chapters III.2 and VIII.4.

82 Throughout this work diverse factors influencing literacy education such as increased wealth for education, more readily available publishing materials, and the tailoring of sophistry to fit the market are debated.

83 Cf. Appendix 3.
citizens were capable of reading prose texts of the calibre of Gorgias, Herodotus or Thucydides when they had not been taught to read continuous prose. This is not to say that the generation of any written work, poetry or prose, does not increase analytical capacities to some degree within the left hemisphere; writing appears to further develop the 'interpreter mechanism'; learning letters and being able to copy any text, thereby learning to spell and to read words out aloud, leaves an imprint (metaphorically) of words. Earlier, Table 1 noted research from the neurosciences. The discussion below follows linguistic arguments regarding the relationship between oral language and scriptism and the indications that prosodic language is indeed processed in a different way to the generation of written prose.

Linguistic and semiological questions relating to the cognitive relationships between language, script, notation, and literacy generally, have been controversial, ethnocentric and remain unresolved. The evidence nevertheless shows that a knowledge of notation and script, in itself, alters cognitive capacity by engaging and, as a consequence, changing neural architecture. Noted below is further evidence for a genetic component to literacy skills that are not reliant on benchmark levels of intelligence or any ability to problem-solve analytically. Neither is knowledge of letters and the ability to spell evidence for proficiency in reading and writing, which indicates that reading and writing are processed in independent architectures or in differing modular combinations. Applied to the

Athenian context, this raises questions relating to a type of literacy evident at the elementary level where the simple identification of letters, without any complex identification of a ‘word’ in script, was sufficient to understand the sense of the text.\(^7\) For example, the components of learning to read have been identified as i) 'logographic' in which alphabet letters can be identified via 'visual discrimination and visual memory abilities', ii) the alphabetic stage which identifies the relationship between the letter and its pronunciation, iii) the orthographic stage in which 'words can be identified as having familiar components'.\(^8\) One view is that these abilities are accomplished in stages, while another is that they develop concurrently and quantitatively.\(^9\) Another general hypothesis is that individuals need to be able to read before they become conscious of the separate sound components (phonemes) of words.\(^10\) Later, the discussion suggests that it might not be fully applicable in the Athenian context because Greek itself is highly intra-syllabic\(^11\) and the reading curriculum utilised intra-syllabic hexameters.

Some of the current controversies pertinent to the theory that reading and writing functions have a modular architecture and are biologically separate from speech are related to the relationship of language to script. The hypothesis here follows Harris’s line that script is not merely a substitute for speech, but a new layer of language with its own universally inborn and culturally overlayed aspects.\(^12\) As outlined above, one view is that literacy is a cultural evolution,

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\(^7\) This is explored further in Chapter III.3.


\(^9\) Uta Frith, op. cit.; Coltheart, 'Dual Route and Connectionist Models of Reading: An Overview', pp. 5-17 at 10.


dependent on educational methods and phonemic awareness. Other views, discussed below, suggest there are features of reading architecture that are inherent. 93 In the context of Athenian literacy this suggests that, while Athenian citizens collectively embraced the alphabetic technology and seemed to recognise that everyone had the capacity to learn, we should not assume that a competence in orthographic literacy equated to a capacity to read to any modern standard of literacy. Plato indicates the general elementary learning process for Athenians:

> ώσπερ ἄρα, ... γραμμάτων πέρι τότε Ἰκανός εἶχομεν, ὅτε τά στοιχεία μὴ λανθάνοι ἡμᾶς ὀλίγα ὀντα ἐν ἄπασιν ὅις ἔστιν περιφερόμενα, καὶ οὖτ’ ἐν αἰσχρῷ οὖτ’ ἐν μεγάλῳ ἡτιμάζομεν αὐτά, ὡς οὐ δεῖ αἰδιάδεσθαι, ἄλλα πανταχόν προνομοῦμεθα διαγινώσκειν, ὡς οὐ πρότερον ἐσώμενοι γραμματικοὶ πρὶν οὕτως ἔχοιμεν. [Plato Republic 3.402a-b]

When we were learning to read we were not satisfied until we could recognise the limited number of letters of the alphabet in all the various words in which they occurred; we did not think them beneath our notice in large words or small, but tried to recognise them everywhere on the grounds that we should not be literate till we could. [trans. Lee]

More than just phonemic awareness, knowledge of the alphabet permits the concept of speech to have a cognitive overlay that, once an individual has learned to read, allows the individual to hear their speech in terms of the graphic word model. Olson describes writing as a technology that ‘discovers words’ rather than merely transcribes them:

> There is now a great deal of evidence that people familiar with an alphabet come to hear words as composed of the sounds represented by the letters of the alphabet; those not familiar do not. 94

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Plato confirms that Athenian children were taught to assign phonetic values to their alphabet and that considerable pragmatic linguistic knowledge was applied to literacy education. Aristotle also observed that within his own society there was a difference between unconsciously knowing how to spell by rote and generating phonemic/graphic thoughts [Ar. Nic. Ethics 2.4.1-3; app. 8.II.1]. As Table 1 indicated, the brain has some preference for 'organising at least some kinds of perceptual work into parallel streams, one global and one analytic'. In relation to written word identification, evidence indicates two separate routes - phonemics (analytic) vs whole word (global) - identified below as Route 1 (mental orthographic, semantic and phonological lexicon) and Route 2 (grapheme-phoneme rules). The following discussion suggests that in Athens the development of these 'routes' was not necessarily concurrent and not developed to an equivalent degree because of the high rhythmic and rhyming components of spoken Greek itself and also of hexameters. Even though knowledge of notation develops a consciousness of a word as a separate entity and an activation of Cossu's 'transcoder' that 'sees' speech, or Cohen and Dehaene's 'VWFA', the ability to spell is not evidence of reading ability. Some can competently spell words and yet cannot read, while others can read well but are very poor at spelling. Such dissociations have been documented for English, German, Spanish and Italian readers. For Germans reading is easier than spelling, and while real words presented no problems, performance in deciphering pseudo words was low, indicating that German readers do not particularly rely on phonetics. Analogous testing carried out by Butterworth and Yin involving real words and pseudo-words (or new words) in Chinese Hanzi and Japanese Kanji scripts, as well as English, also confirms that the neural architecture for reading are located in 'two neurally separable sub-

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85 Pl. Philebus 17a-b, 18b-d; Cratylus 424a-425b.
87 Coltheart, 'Dual Route and Connectionist Models of Reading: An Overview', pp. 5-17.
components in the brain\textsuperscript{101} that process word/script/morpheme identification and phonemic analysis. Competent English, Chinese and Japanese readers employ the two 'routes,' one route using word components and another that processes learned patterns of letter (VFMs). Both routes therefore are present, or potentially present, at birth and utilised in varying degrees and combinations by readers of both alphabetic and ideographic scripts.\textsuperscript{102} While Harris is right in insisting that there is no brain 'centre' for reasoning, his denial that there is a brain 'centre' (co-operating sub-processes) for reading and writing does not fit the evidence.\textsuperscript{103}

In this regard, and as it relates to the ancient Greek languages, the question of 'phonemic awareness' and the innovative introduction of the vowel, Harris is also critical of classical scholarship's hypotheses regarding the superiority of the Hellenic alphabet and alphabets in general. Kerckhove, Ong, Havelock, Wade-Gery, and Powell, among others, suggest superior functionality in non-ideographic systems such as the phonetic Greek alphabet.\textsuperscript{104} It is ethnocentric and overly romantic in 'attributing the discovery of the phonemic principle ... to some unsung genius'.\textsuperscript{105} Such criticism of ethnocentricity over alphabet scriptism is supported by the evidence cited earlier that Hanzi and Kanji logograms have a phonemic component as well as a word/concept component that utilises both neurological routes. He argues against the hypothesis that the Greek introduction of vowels to the Phoenician alphabet confirms an awareness of 'the phonemic principle'.\textsuperscript{106} This perhaps overlooks research into the neural capacities for rhythm and metre and their relationship to inherent phonological knowledge


\textsuperscript{103} Harris, Rationality and the Literate Mind, p. 78.

\textsuperscript{104} This aspect of the introduction of vowels and early writing in Greece and Athens in particular and the work of Wade-Gery and later Powell is discussed in Chapter V.4.1.

\textsuperscript{105} Harris, 'How Does Writing Restructure Thought?', pp. 99-106.

\textsuperscript{106} Harris [op. cit., p. 101] suggests 'attributing the discovery of the phonemic principle to the Greeks on the evidence afforded by Greek alphabetic writing is like crediting the inventor of the kettle with discovering the principle of the internal combustion engine.
in pre-literates. Possibly, it also has relevance as to why Homer was favoured over non-metred prose texts. As with Olson above, Harris points out that, in non-literates, speech is not perceived to have phonemes; words are complete sound units that flow as language; he stresses that phonemic analysis does not precede reading development. This cannot negate the fact that there is an inborn intra-syllabic awareness that precedes phonemic awareness; it consists of 'onset and rime' and is readily identified in pre-literates.\textsuperscript{107} Extensive testing with Danish-speaking children has established that the acquisition of reading skills beyond the orthographic stage is more easily achieved with training in rhyme and metre. It was noted that phonological awareness was 'developed before reading ability and independently of it'. Furthermore this phonological awareness facilitated later reading acquisition. However 'segmentation ability', the ability to decipher whole words 'does not seem to develop spontaneously':

Phonological skill can be developed outside the context of formal reading instruction.\textsuperscript{108}

As the Greek language itself is 'rime riche' in its noun word endings delineating nominative and accusative, gender, etc. and corresponding article, plus verb endings, this intra-syllabic awareness may help to explain the phonetic basis of Greek script and its introduction. As far as Athenian literacy goes, with the reliance on the Homeric canon and sympotic poetry, it seems natural that literacy skills would probably be acquired in onsets (in reverse) and rhyme, and therefore entirely sensible that texts would be produced in metre. In this initial learning context it was possibly not absolutely necessary for them to orthographically differentiate between separate words in an hexameter: as with the combined conceptual/phonemic components in Chinese script.


Plato takes us through the next step in the Athenian literacy curriculum - learning to write:

οἱ γραμματισταὶ τοῖς μήπω δεινοῖς γράφειν τῶν παιδῶν ὑπογράφαντες γραμμάς τῇ γραφίδι οὕτω τὸ γραμματείον διδάσαι καὶ ἀναγκάζουσι γράφειν κατὰ τὴν ὕψησιν τῶν γραμμῶν. [Plato Protagoras 326d]

... the teachers who are teaching boys to write trace out lines with the stylus (nice and light) for the ones who've not yet got the knack, then hand the writing tablet back and make them write by following the guides. [trans. Beresford]

Even thought learning to write further develops the modular 'Route 2', the phonemic Route 1 ensured the degree of internalisation was not dependent on the attainment of a large vocabulary, so this was achievable in Athenian elementary schooling. Chapter III.2 discusses the extent of functional literacy within the citizenry of Athens; the point here is to state that, even with a limited literacy that was quite different to the literacy acquired in most societies today, the individual's brain architecture was radically and rapidly changed by the activation of the various letter recognition, reading and writing modules within the brain. This is covered in the following chapter. It remains here to survey contemporary fifth century BC observations on how the Athenians reacted to prosody and how they responded to literacy training in general.

II.6 ATHENIANS TALKING ABOUT THEMSELVES

1) Athenians respect traditional implicit knowledge

The textual residue from ancient Athens provides clear historical examples of the relationship between culture and thought. In Athens prosody was not a literary affectation but a primary oral, phonetic and then textual medium. And, because the socio-cultural tradition was crystallised in poetry, it also set permanent conceptual parameters to geographical, religious and utilitarian knowledge; an implicit or practical knowledge system. For example, Hesiod's compleat guide to an agrarian lifestyle reveals the utilitarian function of early poetry as a vehicle for social memory which operated as a 'song culture'. 109 Even in the last quarter of the fifth century BC, after four generations of male citizens had received

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literacy education, the medium and the message was still heavily reliant on the metre that permeated most aspects of everyday life.

I first requested my son to take his lyre and sing something by Simonides. ... And right away he said it was old-fashioned to play the lyre and sing whilst people are drinking - as if he was a woman grinding barley. [trans. Leiper]

So, the Athenians had singing and instrumental accompaniment, not only at dinner or religious and military festivals, but even when they worked at agrarian tasks. A significant function of metre was that it had a practical application in concrete cultural (formulaic) problem-solving. For example, the final scene of Frogs shows Athenians were conscious of two methods of problem-solving in their society; one through formulaic ritual and the other through question-and-answer abstractions (dialexis) [Aristoph. The Frogs 908-920; app. 8.II.2]. In the parabasis, the consensus is that metre could be preferable to dialexis [1482-1503; app. 8.II.3]. Granted, it could be just a comic absurdity, but in 405BC Aristophanes' choice of a poet to save Athens has a sentimental ring in its rejection of abstraction. The play is a biting criticism of the state of political debate in the ekklesia. Likewise, the professed scepticism of poetry in Pericles' 431BC funeral speech, à la Thucydides, in which he told Athenians they did not need the praises of Homer, 'or of anyone else whose songs may momentarily please us, but whose assessment of what really happened falls short of the truth'. This rejection of poetry could not have been as clear cut as it implies

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110 Of course, as Aristophanes suggests in the young man's heterodoxy, there were 'fashions' in sympotic entertainment. Chapter V.4.2(b) discusses Plato and Xenophon's implications that there was a growing tendency to engage in sophistic argument, whilst at the same time, a readiness to indulge in traditional singing with old and new musical instruments and tunes.


112 In answer to the question, 'To what extent was Aristophanes being funny?: it could be pointed out that this was 405BC. This was an audience who had just executed six generals for negligence at Arginusae. It is one thing to make fun of Cleophon, Theramenes and Archedemos but another to make fun of the city itself. There is a deadly serious undertone to Frogs: the title itself alludes to futility of war [Batrachomyomachia] and the stupidity of both the governing and the governed [Aesop's Frog King] while the parading of suicide by a hero is a statement, even a warning, on the social breakdown in Athens. Cf. II.6.(4) below for a discussion on some of the problems with decision-making by the demos.

113 Thuc. 2.41.4: καὶ οὐδὲν προσδέομεν οὐτε Ὄμηρος ἐπαινετον οὔτε ὅστις ἐπεσε το αὐτίκα τερψει, τῶν δὲ ἔργων τὴν ὑπόνοιαν ἡ ἀλήθεια βλάψει.
because the real Pericles used 'exquisite metaphors' in his own speeches.\(^\text{114}\) Thucydides too treated Homer's stories about the heroes of Troy as evidence.\(^\text{115}\) The events of divine and heroic lives had always been questioned, but neither Thucydides nor any other of the tragedians and Sophists of the period, question whether the mythic heroes ever actually had their place in the past. Aristotle said that they sometimes made up subordinate characters and invented new stories, which is how they retained their interactive social memory. Nevertheless, even in Aristotle's time, their historicity was not questioned.\(^\text{116}\) Such ambivalence regarding traditional myth was symptomatic of the Athenian mindset in the second half of the fifth century BC where the transactive social memory was often unlocked with mnemonic devices that activated set implicit problem-solving mechanisms:\(^\text{117}\)

\[\text{‘’Тηλίμαχος, ἀλλὰ μὴν αὐτὸς ἤνω ἔρωτος, τὴν νόοσειν, ἀλλὰ δὲ καὶ δαίμονων ὑποθετέα.’ Oddysey 3.26-27}\]

Telemachus, some things you will know in your mind and a daemon will suggest the rest. [trans. Leiper]

This permeated Athenian teaching methods such as the metrical rote learning of Homer. As a mnemonic system, like any repetition learning, it triggered memory processes whereby, once the action or subject matter had been memorised, its

\(^{114}\) Aristotle [Rhet. 1.7.34, 1365a] cites his funeral oration (which does not coincide with the words used in Thucydides 2.35) which lamented the loss to the polis of so many young citizens was like the year being robbed of spring. Cf. Rhet. 3.4.3. 1407a: where Pericles is also said to have devised the conceit of Samians as ungrateful children.

\(^{115}\) For example [1.10; 3.104] he questions the veracity of Homer's assessment of military numbers because he thought that, as a poet, he probably exaggerated, but elsewhere he accepts Homer as evidence for the longevity of the Delian festival. Likewise Thucydides' supposed criticism of Herodotus for believing 'all the old stories' is often cited as evidence for his scepticism, but it is not: [Thuc. 1.20.1-2] οἱ γὰρ ἄνθρωποι τὰς ἀκόας τῶν προγεγενημένων, καὶ ἦν ἡ ἡμιχώρια σφίζων ἣν, ὡμοίως ἀβασανίτως παρ' ἀλλήλων δέχονται. There is no real inference to be drawn by the two Herodotean examples of 'incorrect assumptions' made by 'most people'. It does not specifically imply that Herodotus himself was 'inclined to accept all stories of ancient times in an uncritical way', merely that he had recorded some 'general belief[s]' regarding 'contemporary history'. (Thucydides' other example of a general misconception (that Hipparchos was tyrant of Athens, is not to be found in Herodotus, who correctly reports he was the tyrant's brother [Hdt. 5.52]). Cf. S.T. Oost, 'Thucydides and the Irrational', Classical Philology, 70 (1975) pp. 186-196. On Thucydides' scepticism cf. J.B. Bury, The Ancient Greek Historians, New York, Dover Publications, 1958, pp.76; F.E. Adcock, Thucydid and His History, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1963, p.56; Paul Shorey, 'On the Implicit Ethics and Psychology of Thucydides', Transactions of the American Philological Association, 24, (1983), pp. 66-88.

\(^{116}\) 'In tragedy they adhere to the actual names. The reason is that the possible seems plausible: about the possibility of things which have not occurred we are not yet sure; but it is evident that actual events are possible - they could not otherwise have occurred. Yet even in some tragedies there are only one or two familiar names, while the rest are invented ... in certain plays ... events and names alike have been invented' [Ar. Poetics 9.18-25].

\(^{117}\) Cf. Chapter V.
recall did not need to involve any propositional or probability analytical process whereby stored knowledge is assessed, questioned or analysed.\textsuperscript{118}

2) Why Plato attacked poetry

Plato’s attack on poetry suggests that he had observed this spontaneous decision-making going on in Athens (as had Gorgias a generation earlier\textsuperscript{119}) and was not at all satisfied with the phenomenon \textit{[Republic 10.607a, 605c-d; app. 8.II.4]}.

This position has not always been accepted. For example, Roy Harris questions Havelock’s and Ong’s ’controversial’ conclusion that Plato was attacking poetry by citing Cornford’s suggestion that the attack in the \textit{Republic} was an afterthought. He also proffers Ryle’s hypothesis that it was a later amalgam.\textsuperscript{120} If that was the only time Plato raised the subject these points might qualify as an argument. But, as detailed below and in later chapters, Plato thought it was quite an issue and considered the question also in his other writings; and he was not alone. Echoing Aristophanes and Thucydides, Plato acknowledged that the Homeric canon was used both as a technical and cultural exemplar; a principal part of the written educational content studied in the elementary literacy curriculum.\textsuperscript{121} The psychological result of this type of indoctrination has already been noted; when a decision was required, a gnomical solution of the ’stitch-in-time’ variety was generally devised in the hexametric constructs of the Homeric canon. There are many examples in fifth century BC Greek texts that highlight this phenomenon. Homeric quotations abound in the literature and it was not unusual for myth to be used to formulate concepts of abstract reasoning, as did Plato in the fourth century BC when he made creative use of invented myth to illustrate new concepts.\textsuperscript{122} Tragedy and comedy, produced in poetry, also used

\textsuperscript{118} Cf. John Sutton [’Batting, Habit and Memory: The Embodied Mind and the Nature of Skill’, \textit{Sport in Society}, Vol. 10, No. 5 (2007), pp. 763-786 at 767, 778] quotes the words of cricketers, Ken Barrington, who explains the process in sportsmen of learned, repetitive habit, ’When you’re playing well you don’t think about \textit{anything} and run-making comes naturally’, and Ed Smith, who stated the process was ’a determination bordering on possession ... a kind of concentrated blankness’. This is also apparent in aphasia patients with left hemisphere damage who can sing pre-learned songs but cannot speak; cf. Appendix 1 Note 6.

\textsuperscript{119} Cf. Appendix 7 Translation: Gorgias’ \textit{Encomium to Helen}, and discussion Chapter VII.2.


\textsuperscript{121} Cf. Appendix 3.2.3 with references. Cf. Chapters IV.2 and V.2.3.

\textsuperscript{122} Kirk [\textit{The Nature of Greek Myths}, p. 108] who called it ’an emotive form of persuasion’ that ‘belonged to Socrates himself. He is shown in Plato’s \textit{Phaedo}, for example, as crowning some
myth in new ways to convey new concepts. This is reflected in Aeschylus where an explanation of innovations in the Athenian justice system was relayed to the audience via the Orestian myth and authorised by religion [Eumenides 682-798; app. 8.II.5].

The Eumenides is informative for this insight into the psychology of justice in the 450s. Four years before the play, in 462BC, eligibility for membership to the ancient areopagus, Athens’ homicide court, had been broadened. The psychological tension of the play indicates changing approaches to problem-solving that nevertheless still retained elements of formulaic knowledge. With archaic language, Aeschylus sets up the hypothesis that even the gods must accede to legal argument and that judgement, no longer arbitrary, must revolve around persuasion. At the same time he shows that persuasion is closely linked to metre and the sensation of enchantment (θελκτήριον / θέλγω):

\[ \text{άλλ' εί μεν ὁγνόν ἔστι σοι Πειθόος σέβοις; γλώσσης εἵης μείλιγμα καὶ θελκτήριον} \]

If you give your respectful honour to Persuasion, the soothing spell of my tongue

[trans. Leiper]

Thirty or forty years later, Gorgias would speak of persuasion in the same terms. This ‘integration’ of ‘implicit thinking’ and ‘serial reasoning’ is considered in relation to remarks made by Gorgias and his pupil Alcidamas on argument development and audience comprehension in Chapter VII.2.

Even though Plato conceded that Homer was the greatest Hellenic poet, in his ideal society the only permissible venue for poetry was religion; rhapsodes rhapsodising and the response to rhapsody was unacceptable. He certainly did not consider prosody to be a proper part of education, intelligent legislation or political decision-making [Laws 9.858c-d; app.8.II.6]. In all his works Plato’s epistemological search for answers reflects this position; an acute mistrust of formulaic thinking when it comes to cultural and political decision-making; while he saw that it was useful to control the non-decision-making portion of

rather inadequate proofs of the soul’s immortality by a lyrical myth about the jewel-studded landscapes of the after-life. ... eschatological visions in the Gorgias, the Phaedrus and the last book of the Republic.' Plato thus presents a challenge to Ong’s view [Orality and Literacy, p. 104] that ‘orally managed language and thought is not noted for analytic precision’.

123 Cf. Appendix 2.3 for the details of Ephialtes’ reforms.
any population (presuming the Republic’s big pseudo-muthos was to be in verse), formulaic thinking was not for those who needed to solve problems.

His opinion of choral training, which combined melody (\(\mu \varepsilon \lambda \varphi \delta \iota\), chanting) with metre, ran along the same lines of objection and was based on his own observations [Protagoras 326a-b; app. 8.II.7]. Plato documents how metre and melody were elemental to Athenian thinking processes and readily had a powerful effect on them. Songs were \(\epsilon \pi \rho \ rho \delta \iota \tau \alpha \iota \zeta \psi \chi \alpha \iota \zeta\) (spells / incantations / mantras for the psyche) earnestly devised to produce psychological harmony (\(\pi \rho \oslash \tau \imath \nu \tau \tau \iota \alpha \iota \tau \mu \iota \nu \varepsilon \mu \nu \varepsilon \alpha \iota \zeta \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \) \(\epsilon \sigma \rho \sigma \omega \delta \sigma \sigma \iota \zeta \epsilon \mu \iota \zeta \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \) confirming the status quo (\(\tau \alpha \iota \varsigma \varsigma \upsilon \rho \omicron \iota \omicron \upsilon \) \(\tau \alpha \iota \varsigma \nu \omicron \) \(\pi \varepsilon \pi \varepsilon \iota \varsigma \mu \varepsilon \nu \iota \varsigma \varsigma \)\). Plato therefore considered its discriminatory use in education was crucial and should be closely monitored [Republic 3.401d-411d; app. 8.II.8]. There is evidence that at times Athenians became so dissociated by metre and melody they ceased to differentiate between mimesis and reality. Plato disapproved of how the choruses at sacrifices got everyone into an excessively emotional state; he comments on how ritualistic the music was and on the effect the rigidity of the metre had to regulate the trance-like psychological response in both composers and audience [Laws 3.700b-e; app. 8.II.9]. Elsewhere Plato proposed the rejection of all ritualistic dancing which comprised of the same \(\mu \varepsilon \lambda \varphi \delta \iota\) and metre as their religious and canonical works. He even went so far as to propose the restriction of poetic composition to a select few and the banning of singing anything in metre to the public at large. He also observed that melody was powerful enough to both cause and cure psychotic episodes.

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125 It is interesting that Kane’s [‘Poetry as Right-Hemispheric Language’ pp.47-51] final diagnosis of poets engaging in poiein is that it is an phenomenon in which the individual is seeking to harmonise or re-balance their hemispheric equilibrium: ‘a self-prescribed remedy for the discomfort of an over-active right hemisphere’. She notes (with clinical references pp. 50-51) that patients with bi-polar, hypomanic and other dissociative states have been shown to change in their hemispheric asymmetry from LH language dominance to RH language dominance for the duration of the mental state.

126 Pl. Laws 2.659d-e.

127 Laws 815b-c.

128 Laws 829d.

Contrary to Harris’ claim that Plato ‘never praises writing as a technology or mental discipline’, in the Republic, as well as Phaedrus, he shows he was clearly conscious of the cognitive differences that distinguish poiein and writing in prose [Republic 10.607c-d, Phaedrus 258d; app.8.II.10]. Notwithstanding his famous derogatory comments on writing in the Seventh Letter (which tackled writing’s limitations as it related to plagiarism), he consistently criticised the way the population reacted to metre, not the particular forms of written composition. He indicates that there were teachers and ‘many thousands of voices’ that did not approve of extended prose writing. He, on the other hand, considered prose writing decidedly preferable to metre [Laws 7.810b-812a; app. 8.II.11]. Educated in the traditions of the hexameter, Plato was able to produce prosody as well as accomplished extended written prose, and such dexterity was not unusual among students of the Sophists. He was also close enough to his community to understand the powerful contribution hexameters made to implicit and explicit thought and social memory; a point sometimes missed in classical scholarship.  

3) Athenians recognise dissociative states and altered states of consciousness (ASC)  
These ASCs and dissociative ritualistic states identified by Plato were likewise described by the contemporary tragedians and apparently recognisable to the population at large. Aeschylus gives further indications that Athenians could recognise, and had a practical understanding of, the psychology of such mental states [Choephorî 1051-1057; app. 8.II.12]. That such dissociative states were nothing out of the ordinary is also evidenced by Aristophanes’ jokes about cures for mania in The Wasps and Plato’s mention of women who were specifically trained to cure dissociative states brought on by ritualisation [Laws 7.790d-791b; app. 8.II.13]. In the Poetics as well as the Politics Aristotle also attests that metre and melody communicated to Athenians with the same degree of dissociation [Poetics 1455a.32-33, 1460a.12-13, Politics 8.1342b.1-15; app. 8.II.14]. And, while Aristotle considered there to be merits in katharsis, he, like Plato, also noted that

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130 Harris, Rationality and the Literate Mind, p. 70.
131 For example, Kirk [The Nature of Greek Myths, p. 108]; Some may feel (as I do) that Plato might have done better to work a bit harder on the philosophical arguments before resorting to the traditional device of the persuasive myth; but that is what he tended to do, and he was thereby succumbing to an almost irresistible force in Greek culture - to what he himself called ‘poetry’ (including myth) as the natural enemy of philosophy.
audience reaction to the metre and melody in tragedy was negatively responsive enough that he would like to see stringent controls put on its performance [Politics 8.1342a; app. 8.II.15].

Another highly ritualised and poetic form of decision-making was the oracle, usually in metred verse or riddle [Thuc. 2.54.1-3; app. 8.II.16]. In *de Pythiae oraculis*, after three hundred years of prose writing, Plutarch dealt with oracular rituals, intimating the same attitude to poetry. While this later work manipulates an argument on the dynamics of Delphic prophecy in a rather un-Plutarchian way, it nevertheless traces a transition away from formulaic problem-solving in Athens over a period from Onomacritus, at the end of the sixth century BC, to Herodotus, Pindar, Sophocles and Euripides in the fifth century. Plutarch notes a trend in later centuries was the rejection of the 'metaphors, riddles, and ambiguities' of poetical oracles. He observed that, in the old days, 'people

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134 E.g. Hdt. 5.62.1: The Gephyraei (Harmodius' family) were among the Phoenicians who introduced writing to Greece. Herodotus is eyewitness to cauldrons with Cadmean characters on them in hexameter verse in the temple of Ismenian Apollo in Thebes. Hdt. 2.52: the foundation of oracle at Dodona. Aeschylus' Cassandra of course utters her prophesies in verse. By the first century AD Plutarch [De Pythiae oraculis: Why the Pythia does not now give oracles in verse, 9, cf. 7, 20, 22, 23] was of the opinion that many oracles by the Pythia were not delivered in metre in the fifth century. He mentions Spartan oracles regarding the war with Athens (cf. Thuc. 1.118) and the reinstatement of Pleistonax as well as the statues given Lycurgus. Athenian enquiries relating to the expedition to Sicily were also answered without verse, merely a riddling direction to bring the priestess of Erythrae to Athens (because her name was 'Quiet'). He notes fourth century BC Theopompus conducted an enquiry to contradict 'those who held that the Pythia did not prophesy in metre in those days' and found 'an exceedingly small number of such answers' which suggests that many oracles were 'even at that early time' rendered in prose. This seems the only concrete evidence because Plutarch, in order to build up his philosophical argument, makes consistent contradictions in the tract which, for example, state that 'oracle has ceased to use metre and poetry' [7], and '... her older predecessors ... for the most part, used to give the responses in prose' [23] while elsewhere says 'nothing is prophesied in our own day, otherwise than in metre' [20] and 'It is impossible for one who has no letters and knows no verse to talk like a poet ... yet we ... nevertheless ask that the Pythia should use a voice and style as though from the Thymele, not unembellished and plain, but with metre and elevation, and trills, and verbal metaphors, and a flute accompaniment!' [22]


136 Plutarch [De Pythiae oraculis: Why the Pythia does not now give oracles in verse,]: 'When men were mellow with wine and sentiment, some undercurrent of pity or joy would come, and they would glide into a song-like voice; drinking parties were filled with amorous strains and songs, books with poems in writing (he is here specifically referring to Euripides' time) [23] ... There was a day when metres, tunes, odes were the coins of language in us; all History and Philosophy, in a word, every feeling and action which called for a more solemn utterance, were drawn to poetry and music ... More than that, there was an aptitude for poetry, most men used the lyre and the ode to rebuke, to encourage, to frame myths and proverbs. ... Then there was a change in human life; affecting men both in fortune and in genius. Expediency banished what was superfluous, top-knots of gold were dropped, rich robes discarded; probably too clustering curls were shorn off, and the buskin discontinued. [24] ... Whereas of old that which was not familiar or common, but, in plain words, contorted and over-phrased, was ascribed by the many to an implied Divinity and received with awe and reverence. [25].
sometimes required a certain ambiguity’ and in his day 'some individuals' would always be 'best attracted by metre and a poetic cast of words' making prosody the preferred persuasion of oracular tricksters.\textsuperscript{137}

All of the contemporary fifth century BC writers observed that Greek prosody reduced self-conscious autonomy, that 'inner dialogue' of introspection.\textsuperscript{138} At the least, the cognitive state was 'a practised, embodied skill' that involved 'procedural memory' somewhat like professional sportspeople or repetitive religious dancers.\textsuperscript{139} It did not involve the kind of step-by-step 'serial reasoning' that abstract syllogistic or deliberative problem-solving involves. This is discussed further in Chapter V.2, but can be demonstrated immediately to the reader by a simple exercise which appears in the work of Julian Jaynes (however not quite for this purpose):

First, think of two topics, anything, personal or general, on which you would like to talk for a couple of paragraphs. Now, imagining you are with a friend, speak out loud on one of the topics. Next, imagining you are with a friend, sing out loud on the other topic. Do each for one full minute, demanding of yourself that you keep going. Compare introspectively. Why is the second so much more difficult? Why does the singing crumble into clichés? Or the melody erode into recitative? Why does the topic desert you in mid-melody? What is the nature of your efforts to get your song back on the topic? Or rather - and I think this is more the feeling - to get your topic back to the song?\textsuperscript{140}

Earlier it was noted that Plato's Socrates identified the composition of poetry as a


\textsuperscript{138} ἐντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς αὐτὴν διάλογος ἀνευ ϕωνῆς [Pl. \textit{The Sophist} 263e, referred to earlier in II.2].


\textsuperscript{140} Julian Jaynes, \textit{The Origins of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind}, London, Penguin, 1982, p. 366. This little test of course does not stack up to any controlled lab test and perhaps discussion of the experiences of patients involved in 'melodic intonation therapy' (refer Table 1) would add light to this experiment.

Jaynes goes on: 'If you practise it as an exercise twice a day for a month or a year or a lifetime, sincerely avoiding cliche and memorised material on the lyric side, and mere recitative on the melody side, I expect you will be more proficient at it. ... And if you should be unlucky enough to have some left hemisphere accident at some future time, your thought-singing might come in handy. What is learned here is very probably a new relationship between the hemispheres ...'

[pp. 366-367]. Jaynes' hypothesis, and its rejection for sixth and fifth centuries BC Greece, is discussed at length in relation to the Greeks in Appendix 1.2.
form of mania. He also described other dissociative states as widespread and recognised as legitimate forms of problem-solving [Phaedrus 244a-245a, 275b-c; app. 8.II.17]. Granted this and many of the other citations above represent Plato's own view, but they also resemble the observations of the Socrates profiled by Xenophon. The dissociation of personality mentioned by both of the lionised versions of Socrates is a recurring theme in the other literature of the sixth and fifth century BC and confirms that the Greeks were adepts at turning off individual self-conscious 'serial reasoning' and giving free rein to 'non-serial' reasoning [τό ἄλογος]. Plato's rejection of reactive thinking was in line with the restrictions Solon placed on mourning rituals, an indication that at that time, women's reactions were considered excessive. There is a later echo of this in Pericles' veiled direction in 431BC that Athen's newly grieving widows should quietly accept their situation. Likewise are the increasingly less sympathetic versions of Electra whose behaviour was successively interpreted as excessive.

Before we fix on what may be considered applicable norms, it should be recognised that there are cognitive gulfs between cultures and, as Lloyd suggests, research should take a closer look at what some scholars consider universals. In a similar vein, Pritchett warns against 'imposing on the ancients [our] own evaluation of what is credible'. This would certainly apply to the degree of ritual behaviour in individuals and groups in Athens. In the positivist interpretations of the occult and ritualism in fifth century BC writers such as Herodotus, modern historians rob ancient Greek culture of 'its sweating temples and bleeding rooftops'. 'To understand pre-Christian religious attitudes requires a great imaginative effort'. Therefore, when Dodds defines the type of behaviour described by Thucydides as a 'wartime mentality,' and interprets the

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11 Maurizio, Delphic Oracles as Oral Performances: Authenticity and Historical Evidence, p.332.
sudden growth of foreign orgiastic cults during the Peloponnesian War as a regression from 'Rationalism',148 he ignores the similar oscillations in religious prophecy and divine intervention during the Persian invasion fifty years earlier.149 The spread of foreign cults probably coincided with the increase in Delian League members resident in Athens (metics) and Athenian clerics (expatriates) resident in Ionia and the islands.150 Whatever the period, the ritualised behaviour was probably merely a heightened version of normal. Hellenic religion had always involved trance-like states arrived at by alcohol, mandrake, mushrooms, Eleusinian ergoline κυκέων (kykeon) and ritual repetitive movements to music and poetry.151 In Greek culture some individuals' 'non-serial' cognitive states could extend to a sustained sublimation of self-consciousness (ASCs); the opposite of what Searle calls 'ontological subjectivity' in which the 'boundary conditions' of situated cognition such as the awareness of what time of year it is, of what country and what city are removed.152 This is perhaps a reason why Athenians were suspicious of decisions made individually

148 An indication of how Dodds' 'wartime mentality' interpretation of the late fifth century Athenian history was arrived at is in his moving analogy (by experience) to post-WWII's 'own situation'. Cf. Greeks and the Irrational, pp. 193, 250, 254. Today it is more likely to be diagnosed as post-traumatic stress disorder.

149 Cf. Thuc. 2.53-54, 6.28.1-2, cf. 8.81.2; Andoc. De Mysteriis 1-33; Plut. Alcibiades 18.8, 19.1; Hdt. 7.138.1-143.3; 8.36.1-39.2.


and set great store in the wisdom of collective judgment [Ar. Politics 3.11 (1281a40-1282b3); app. 8.II.18].

This trust in collective judgement was an essential facet of Athenian democracy and can be seen to have applied in the military context early in the fifth century BC at Marathon.\textsuperscript{153} As Appendix 3.5 details, students of the \textit{ephebia} (military) were also trained to achieve the kinds of mental states that accompanied the many Hellenic religious observances detailed above. Cohesiveness was an important factor to a city state like Athens which, during the fifth century BC, relied on citizens for defence. First priority was the survival of the group. Confusion or indecision would arise if survival of the group did not coincide with the survival of the individual. Therefore, ephebic education involved training methods that engaged in the same type of ritualised behaviour that would have, to a considerable degree, reduced individual 'serial reasoning'.\textsuperscript{154} This ability to intermittently and/or partially suppress individuality and function as an intellectual collective resembles what has been observed in crowd behaviour generally where 'individuals are governed by unconscious forces' which appear 'spontaneously':

\begin{quote}
Once an individual joins a group, the field of his consciousness is reduced. ... Each individual in the crowd thinks he is acting freely and deliberately. He does not realise that he is only a mouthpiece for collective words, an instrument for decisions he has not made individually. ... Suggestion becomes the basic method of mass psychology ... what Weber calls 'mass conditioned action'.\textsuperscript{155}
\end{quote}

4) Administrative decision-making

Thucydides states and restates how political decision-making by the \textit{ekklesia} voters was wildly reactive.\textsuperscript{156} A few examples are sufficient: the deliberation on the alliance with Corcyra in 433BC that wavered over two days; on the first a decision rejected Corcyra in favour of Corinth, on the second day, a complete

\textsuperscript{153} Hdt. 6.103, 110: Ten generals (plus a polemarch) were appointed in the field to command on alternate days in turn. At Marathon Miltiades, possibly wary of usurping authority above what had been given to him by the collective \textit{demos}, waited for his legally rostered-day-on to begin the battle.

\textsuperscript{154} Robert Graves \textit{[Goodbye to All That],} London, The Folio Society, 1981, p. 165] discusses the necessity of such ritualisation 'when the company feels itself as a single being' in parade drill and how it had remarkable effects when his own troops saw action during WWI.


\textsuperscript{156} P.A. Brunt \textit{[Studies in Greek History and Thought],} Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1993, p. 143] describes them as 'dangerous oscillations'.
about-turn. Likewise the indecisive proceedings and directives concerning the revolt of Mytilene [Thuc. 3.3.1, 3.36.2-4, 3.37.1, 4.108.4; app. 8.II.19]. Like public officials, military officers also often faced reactive and unreasoning violence for stepping outside the conventional Homeric perceptions of what defined military behaviour (arete, aristeia and andreia). For example, in trying to decide how to resolve a siege on Pylos, the Athenians 'behaved in the way that crowds usually do' harassing Nicias and goading Cleon into a spontaneous and imprudent reaction. Cleophon was then condemned to death for being astrateia; Thucydides earned twenty years banishment for failure at Amphipolis, while Socrates could not moderate the unreasonable sentence of execution against the six generals of Arginusae. Military innovation on Pylos also resulted in the violent censure of Demosthenes (the strategos) and, later in Sicily, Nicias too despaired at the ekklesia's ability to make any considered, sensible, decisions [Thuc. 7.14.4; app.8.II.20]. Thucydides suggests Alcibiades' verdict on procedure in the ekklesia was that it was 'a system which is generally recognised as absurd' (ἀλλά περὶ ὀμολογομένης ἀνοίας οὐδὲν ἂν καίνων λέγοιτο) and unreasonably reactive. The views of Aristophanes have already been mentioned above. Thucydides also implies a general mistrust of any citizen with 'a reputation for cleverness and in saying what he knew' (κράτιστος ἐνθυμηθήμα γενόμενος καὶ ἀ γνοήν εἰπεῖν). All, of course, except Pericles, from whom they even tolerated vituperative criticism [Thuc. 2.65.1; app. 8.II.21]. This bears out Xenophon's statement that the ekklesia was packed with a citizenry who 'had never yet to think sensibly on politics' [τοῖς μηδεπώποτε φροντίσαι τῶν πολιτικῶν]. Thucydides and Xenophon therefore confirm Plato's assertions that most citizens were susceptible to enthralment and all consistently appealed for more disciplined decision-making [Republic 4.431c-d, Thuc. 2.64.6; app.

157 Thuc. 1.44.  
158 Thuc. 4.28.3.  
159 Thuc. 5.26.5, cf. 4.65.2; Lysias Against Agoratus 13.12.  
160 Xen. Hell. 1.7.1-34; Mem. 1.11.18; Pl. Apol. 32b; Gorg. 473e., Diod. 13.101-102.  
161 Cf. Thuc. 3.98.5; 7.15; cf. 3.114.  
162 Thuc. 6.89.6.  
163 Thuc. 8.1.4: πάντα τε πρὸς τὸ παραχρήμα περιδέες, ὅπερ φιλεῖ δήμος ποιεῖν, ἐτοίμοι ἦμαι εὐτακτεῖν, καὶ ὣς ἐδεότεν αὐτοῖς, καὶ ἐποίουν τούτα [As is the character of democracy, in the panic of the moment they were ready to be as prudent and expeditious as possible].  
164 Thuc. 8.68.1.  
165 Xen. Mem. 3.7.7; cf. 3.7.5.
8.II.22. This is not to say that the demos were not confident and vocal in their assessment of political issues; suspicious, as Thucydides says, of intricate propositions, varying majorities were nevertheless swayed by such arguments. Later chapters discuss the words of Antiphon and Gorgias to assess the problem-solving behaviour and varying approaches to decision-making in the civic forums.

Plato’s educational ideal was to produce a student with three balanced elements in his personality: self-awareness, self-confidence and self-discipline; the emphasis was so emphatically on the ‘self’. The reason he wanted to censor metre and the rhapsode’s oral poetry was that he had observed that this was how the majority had been enculturated and educated to make their rational decisions concerning all aspects of their society; the reason he intended the controlling ‘Big Lie’ in his ideal society to be presented in hexameters (ἐν ψευδομένους ... τὸ λοιπὸν τοῦ μύθου).

II.7 SUMMARY
The neuroscientific evidence cited above and compiled in Appendix 1.1 form the basis for the following hypotheses.

• Learning and thinking does not require the self-consciousness of Dennett’s ‘serial reasoning’. Within the context of ‘implicit knowledge’, reasoning can take place without self-consciousness.

• Implicit ‘non-conscious’ knowledge is a substratum to narrativisation by the ‘interpreter mechanism’. In pre-literate societies, oral traditional stories provide background implicit knowledge for experiential constructs.

166 Plato [Ap. 31c-33b, 40a-c; cf. Euthy. 2a, 2d-4a], on the other hand, saw nothing extraordinary in Socrates’ symptoms of disassociate states. Modern scholarship also overlooks certain characteristics. For example, Dodds [The Greeks and the Irrational, p. 64] calls Socrates ‘the father of Western rationalism and Lloyd [Cognitive Variations, p. 73] remarks that Socrates was ‘not just a bundle of disconnected capacities’, although both Plato and Xenophon [Mem. 1.1.1-3] indicate that sometimes he was.

167 For example Rep. 413e-414a; 435b-c.

• Conscious reasoning entailing implicit knowledge learned through prosody can create the sensation the Greeks referred to as *poiein* which is the conscious realisation of implicit right hemisphere knowledge narrativing in the left hemisphere 'interpreter mechanism', the experience of which is described by many modern poets. *Poiein* is therefore an intermittent mental state with similar parameters to 'serial reasoning'; the sensation of Gazzaniga's 'modular subprocesses' of right hemispheric language consisting of metaphor and metre (prosody).

• Prosodic narrativisation uses metred metaphor that originates in the right hemisphere of the brain.

• Consciousness entailing 'serial reasoning' is a process and is intermittent.

• Cognition can be altered by cultural and environmental factors. In this context, learning to read and write develops a 'VWFA' and other capacities in the left hemisphere of the brain, otherwise non-existent in pre-literate individuals.

• The 'interpreter mechanism' located in the left hemisphere of the brain uses language as it seeks to explain experience. Here narrativisation of personal identity and social and phenomenal context takes place. Literacy education creates a 'bootstrapping' effect in that writing skills further develop deliberative argument capabilities, which in turn require extended prose writing to sequentially structure.

The introduction of general literacy education and then higher education for a minority in Athens, plus the extant texts produced thereof, affords the earliest example of how the development of extended abstract deliberative argument necessitated the use of prose writing and, as such, is the first example we have of a population to experience en masse the cultural overlay of literacy to left hemisphere cognitive processing.

The cognitive distinction between an 'oral' Athenian and a literate one was the absence of a 'VWFA' in the left hemisphere of the brain of the pre-literate individual and an absence of a concept of letters, words and sentences as
separate entities. Psychologically there is really no intermediate stage between 'pre-literacy' and 'literacy'. Knowledge of the alphabet and the phonetic use of letters is the most radical change. Even in the late seventh and sixth centuries BC, it is not strictly true to say that an Athenian was wholly 'non-literate' because, as the inscriptionsal evidence shows, the public had knowledge of writing. The historical evidence compiled in this chapter showing how heavily Athenian society relied on prosody is a precursor to other contemporary fifth century BC evidence in the following chapters that shows how and why Athenians collectively experienced a rapid cognitive shift due to the introduction of literacy education. This transition between 'pre-literacy' and functional literacy did not replace traditional methods of problem-solving referencing prosody and hexametric metaphor and Plato’s *Phaedrus* suggests that, even in the closing quarter of the fifth century BC, deliberative problem-solving using written prose generated argument was not the sole method employed in every circumstance:

Φαιδρος — μάλιστα μὲν πως περὶ τὰς δίκας λέγεται τε καὶ γράφεται τέχνη, λέγεται δὲ καὶ περὶ δημηγορίας ἐπὶ πλέον δὲ σώκ ἀκίνης.

[Plato *Phaedrus* 261a-b]

PHAEDRUS: [T]he art of speaking and writing is exercised chiefly in lawsuits, and that of speaking also in public assemblies; and I never heard of any further uses.

[trans. Fowler]

The educational objectives were to inculcate an unchanging Homeric ethos and an aspiration for arete. The problem was the development of extended prose writing and its tuition to a minority who generated problem-solving abstract arguments in an innovative way. As some of the quotations in II.6 suggest, it led to a disjunction in decision-making at the collective level and as the charges against Socrates make clear, a generational disconnect in the home. These issues are examined further in Chapter VIII.5.

The most significant aspect of elementary literacy education in Athens was that Athenians did not use extended written prose. Literacy education in elementary school used written exemplars in prosody and taught by imitation and, as the following chapter (III.3) suggests, a reasonably widespread functional literacy

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169 ‘Orality’ in the neuro-psychological sense, not as Ruth Finnegan’s [op. cit.] pluralist model in which all oral discourse is regarded as ‘orality’ whether from literate individuals or non-literate ones.

170 Cf. Chapters III.2.2; IV.2.4.

171 Pl. *Apol.* 23c-d.
was attained by teaching children to read and copy hexametric verse. This, in itself would have rapidly changed brain architecture, developing 'VWFA's and letter recognition in the writing centre of the left hemisphere. Even though prosody is generated in the right hemisphere, its textualisation must involve the writing centres of the left hemisphere. There is no firm evidence that any significant proportion of the population during the whole of the fifth century BC were taught to write or copy in more than a few words in prose, but citizens taught to write in prosody still experienced a further cognitive shift. This was because, when in the legislature or law courts, they were asked to listen to and deliberate on the carefully constructed abstract *pro* and *contra* arguments developed first by extended 'serial-thinking' in written prose.

The level of competence attained in reading and writing continuous prose makes the process of problem-solving different to prosodic narrativisation. This is pursued in later chapters dealing with higher education which examine how sophistic teachers further developed abilities in 'serial reasoning' and *pro* and *contra* argument in their Athenian students. For the individuals who were taught to copy prose arguments, and for the minority who actually learned to compose them, there was a bootstrapping effect in that reading and writing down other peoples' ideas generated further ideas in the writer's brain. Literacy also provides a tool for the 'interpreter mechanism' to construct externalised argument structures that enable 'serial reasoning' to be accessed for sustained periods by the individual composer or by another reader; thus freeing them from the limits of oral 'cognitive capacity'.

The argumentation in the continuous written prose of forensic and deliberative probabilistic rhetoric, whilst not a medium through which many citizens formulated their ideas, was nevertheless filtering down into the collective psychology through public argument in the *agora*, *ekklesia* and *dikasteria*.

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CHAPTER III
ELEMENTARY LITERACY EDUCATION

Of all wild things, the child is the most unmanageable: an unusually powerful spring of reason, whose waters are not yet channelled in the right direction, makes him sharp and sly, the most unruly animal there is.

[Plato Laws 808d]

III.1 ABSTRACT

This chapter looks at the type of literacy achieved in Athens during the fifth century BC and finds that the Athenians do not appear to have been taught to construct continuous written prose during their elementary education. It proposes that they were taught to read phonetically and did not read as modern literates generally do, via a combination of whole word recognition accompanied by the identification of some phoememes.

First, in Section III.2, the extent and level of elementary literacy is covered by the following breakdown:

1) The nature of literacy education and how it was democratic and functional within the context of Athenian society. Evidence suggests that the state expected children to be taught letters, even though the quality and quantity of training differed according to financial constraints. It is proposed that a majority of Athenian male citizens rapidly evolved from alphabetic literacy to functional literacy within the societal context. (Citizen women are not considered in this study.)

2) The political and civic factors influencing the acquisition of literacy are considered. Archaeology in the form of ostraca and inscriptions as well as literary affirmation indicate that civic reliance on text increased as each generation was taught to read and participated in civic life.

3) The proportional spread of functional ‘officials’ literacy’ within the general male citizen population shows an interface between ‘pre-literacy’ and ‘literacy’ within government bodies which took approximately seven generations for all members of civic administration to achieve at least that level of literacy.

The theories of Roy Harris and Stanislas Dehaene are examined against the form and content of Athenian elementary education and are considered in section III.3 along with several cognitive and linguistic aspects of reading acquisition that may shed light on the nature of their functional literacy. They are broken down under the following headings:

1) Methods and curriculum - which considers the nature of alphabet acquisition at the elementary level.

2) Metalinguistic awareness - discusses alphabetic literacy and some dynamics of reading and the difference between reading and writing.

3) Clarification of the utility and dynamics of reading - this is considered as it relates to Athenian functional literacy and considers aspects of letter and word recognition in in that context.
III.2 THE EXTENT AND LEVEL OF ELEMENTARY LITERACY

1) Literacy education was democratic and functional within the context of Athenian society

Athenian law dictated that children be taught mousikē which included learning the alphabet, learning to read, writing (as in copying or dictation) and reciting poetry; to count and calculate (practical, domestic mathematics); to play an instrument; to sing and dance: μουσική, γράμματα, γυμναστική, the three branches of education.1 Aeschines credits Solon with introducing letters to schools; whether or not he was attempting to achieve mass literacy in Athens at the time is not known, but clearly there were individuals in the society then who could read and write.2 William Harris, Robb, Havelock and others noted in Chapter II.3 maintain that there is no evidence that there was more than 'craftman's literacy' practised in Athens, nor that there is conclusive evidence of any literate minority before the closing decade of the sixth century BC.3 Missiou, like Burns, believes that the participatory nature of Athens' democracy presupposes mass literacy levels and that the democracy could not have functioned without them.4 His emphasis should be on the minimal. Others question any general literacy amongst the population. For example, Havelock argues the interface between 'orality' and literacy extended into the fourth century BC.5 Kenneth Dover questions the degree of literacy within the population, however it could be inferred he means 'full literacy'.6 Likewise Harris' comprehensive survey adopts the UNESCO criterion of literacy as the ability to 'read and write a simple short statement on ... everyday life'; he

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1 Pl. Crito 50d: ἢ οὖν καλὸς προσέταττον ἡμῶν ὅ τι τοῦτο τεταχμένοι νόμοι, παραγιγέλλοντες τῷ πατρί τῷ σέ ἐν μουσική καὶ γυμναστική παιδείαν; [Did those of us who are assigned to these matters not give good directions when we told your father to educate you in music and gymnastics?]. Cf. Republic 403c; Xen., Constitution of the Lacedaimonians 2.1.
2 Aesch., Against Timarchus 1.9-12. Solon, like many other legendary lawgivers was often credited as the originator of the many laws and cultural practices that were outside the living memory of Athenians; as was Lycurgus in relation to the laws of Sparta; cf. Plut. Pericles 13.6, Solon passim, Lycurgus 4; Diog. Laert. 1.57. This is discussed further in Chapter III.2.2 below and IV.2.4.
maintains literacy remained between 5% and 10% and even went down in the last decades of the fifth century BC. The ability to sign one's name, in his opinion, does not constitute literacy, although he accepts 'a certain degree of literacy' from the zeugitai rank up. These ambiguous benchmarks for literacy do not account for the cognitive significance of alphabetic knowledge and the semiological effects of even being able to write one's name. J.A. Davison questions the degree of literacy due to limitations on the publication of books and sees irony rather than truth in Aristophanes, but does not address the evidence from the logographers and archaeology. Lowe also questions Aristophanes' references and meanings. Morgan's elegant argument offers the usual political chestnut that oligarchs, aristocracy and intellectuals felt threatened by newly literate nouveaux riche tradesmen and bankers:

As a group these nouveaux riches are the likeliest candidates to have acquired literate education, which would fit the fact that education has to be paid for, so is still unlikely to be available to the poor, and the fact that literacy overall remained very low in Classical Athens.

In this vein she maintains there is no explicit evidence of texts being used for teaching in the fifth century BC and this is addressed, and contested, in later chapters. Morgan also investigates the 'taxonomy' of education, pointing out that many works fail to categorise the components of Greek education. As an example, she observes that Jaeger's great work on education, Paideia, 'deals brilliantly with intellectual culture as a whole but only incidentally with education'. Morgan, like many other scholars, makes no distinction between elementary literacy education and the type of extended written prose composition taught by the Sophists. The problem is a need for a taxonomy of the term 'literacy' in the context of ancient Greece.

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7 William Harris, Ancient Literacy, pp.3-24; 61, 74-75, 86-87, 114-115.
Literacy is relative. Functional literacy even more so, and modern definitions are not helpful nor particularly applicable to Athens. Roberts explains:

'Literacy' is, contrary to popular opinion, not easily defined or understood ... [D]efining literacy (in the singular) is a red herring. ... [T]here is merit in attempting to specify - as lucidly as possible - the features which distinguish one mode of literate activity from another. Indeed, this is exactly the basis upon which a pluralist view of defining literacy is built: that is, a recognition that 'literacy A' is distinct in certain respects from 'literacy B', which differs in turn from 'literacy C', and so on. ... Delineating, as sharply as possible, the general characteristics of a specific form of literacy, for purpose X, under social circumstances Y, within historical period Z, remains an important objective for scholars and practitioners. ... [According to Guschinsky] the person is literate who, in a language he speaks, can read with understanding anything he would have understood if it had been spoken to him; and can write, so that it can be read, anything that he can say. ... [This] gives effective purchase on one aspect of literate activity - the linguistic dimension - without claiming to capture the essence or 'true nature' of literacy.\(^\text{15}\)

On Guschinsky's criteria Athenian literacy levels cannot be regarded as high. However, in the U.S.A. which is considered to be a fully literate country, functional literacy is 'the ability to read newspapers, to fill out employment applications, ... [and] to follow written instructions', yet 30% of navy recruit applicants are rejected on the grounds of 'functional illiteracy'.\(^\text{14}\) From a different perspective, this description of literacy seems more applicable to what was happening in Aristophanes' Athens:

> Literacy is an activity, a way of thinking, not a set of skills. ... Sometimes they read and write, sometimes they talk about what they read or wrote, and sometimes they talk about ideas using the ways of thinking and reasoning they might also have used when they engaged in directly text-based activities.\(^\text{15}\)

While the discussion and parameters regarding 'orality' are often 'woolly';\(^\text{16}\) the same applies to assessments of who could, or could not, read and write in Athens when the parameters of functional literacy are treated as static between the sixth and third centuries BC. Chapter IV.2.4 and V.4.1 track the gradual demystification of writing in Athens during the sixth century BC (not to suggest that, thereafter, writing ceased to be used on occasions with magical or religious intent), and later chapters highlight the radical cognitive shift that sophistic

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education had on deliberative processes. It developed the individual's ability to build up sustained thought, allowing extended propositions to be considered outside the limits of Miller's 'cognitive capacity'. It is not just the ability to express 'pure thought'. It is the actual generation of abstract thought, not just the expression of knowledge. It is a 'more literary kind of literacy' and it has very different features to the 'name literacy', 'list literacy', 'banking literacy' and 'officials' literacy' identified by Rosalind Thomas as evolving in Athens during the fifth century. Here, it is enough to emphasise that elementary literacy education in the fifth century BC should be judged for what it was: a utilitarian response to teach a practical skill; writing was a tool to mark or denote concrete things such as names of people, or places, or items of cargo. Thoughts and ideas beyond the concrete were not conveyed with this type of literacy.

2) Political and civic factors influencing literacy acquisition: a look at the archaeology and ancient sources

Evidence of the introduction of ostracism (and other civic reforms) by Cleisthenes around 508 BC, and with the first attested school as reported by Herodotus to be in 495 BC, the beginning decade of the fifth century BC is the period when the first generation of Athenian schoolchildren can be shown to have been taught letters. Chapters IV and V examine the reasons for accepting the publication of Homer as an impetus for curriculum content of literacy training. The following considers the other factors influencing the acquisition of literacy in Athens. The first trigger that should be examined is ostracism. In itself the introduction of ostracism does not prove widespread literacy even to the point of being able to write someone's name other than one's own. (For example, Plutarch's story of Aristides writing his own name on someone else's ostracoon: it is possible that his was the only name Aristides could write down.) The need for citizens to be taught to read and write was more probably a product of the

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19 Thomas, 'Writing, reading, public and private 'literacies': functional literacy and democratic literacy in Greece', in Ancient Literacies: the Culture of Reading in Greece and Rome, pp. 13-45.

20 Hdt. 6.27.2.

introduction of ostracism and other Cleisthenic reforms rather than the reverse, and post-480s, by the need for increased record keeping due to growth in mining, trade and commerce.\footnote{William Harris, Ancient Literacy, pp. 305-306; cf. Appendix 2.} The following examination of ostraca indicates that, by the 470s, there was an identifiable proportion of adults between twenty and forty in the ekklesia who knew their letters. (See Table 1, below for age groupings.) It is generally accepted that, on ostraca found from the 480s, many were written by a few hands.\footnote{Oscar Broneer, Hesperia, Vol. 7, (1938), pp. 228-243. Cf. Harris, loc. cit.; Josiah Ober, Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1989, pp. 73-74; Robb, Literacy and Paideia in Ancient Greece, pp. 135, 155 n. 23, 189-190; Andrew Ford, ‘From Letters to Literature’ in Harvey Yunis (ed.), Written Texts and the Rise of Literate Culture in Ancient Greece, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 21-22; James Sickinger, ‘Literacy, Documents, and Archives in the Ancient Athenian Democracy’, The American Archivist, Vol. 62, No. 2 (1999), pp. 229-246, at p. 242 for percentages of archived decrees and inscriptions.} At face value this scenario seems reasonable. Perhaps many citizens dictated their choice for ostracism to clerks as each citizen cast his vote (however, this would have taken an inordinate amount of time), or perhaps they obtained an ostracon from phratry or deme organisers who would have pre-labeled the ostraca with the choice of the more influential members; the less influential members, en bloc, merely took the ostraca with them into the ekklesia.\footnote{Intimidation of assemblies was not unknown: Peisistratus is said to have had armed supporters accompanying him [Hdt. 1.59; Plut. Solon 30]. Plutarch [Pericles 11.12] states that Thucydides, son of Mnesibas, grouped all of his supporters together in the ekklesia in a conscious effort of intimidation. Plutarch also states Cimon had the habit of retaining Laciadæ deme members en masse who would have been grateful and supportive in the ekklesia [Ar. Ath. Pol.27.3; Plut. Themistocles 5; Cimon 10]. Cf. the scenario in Wasps where Papa explains the considerable manipulation of the workings of the ekklesia and the boule [593-595] and where Cleon cajoled voters: ‘we lie safely in his arms and he keeps the flies off us.’ [596-597].} Vanderpool and Lang incline to a professional scribe, in business for himself selling ostraca,\footnote{Cf. Mabel L. Lang, ‘Writing and Spelling on Ostraka’, Hesperia Supplements, Vol. 19, Studies in Attic Epigraphy, History and Topography, (1982), pp. 75-87 at pp. 80-81. Cf. Lang, Ostraka, (1990), in The Athenian Agora, Vol. 25, Ostraka (1990), The American School of Classical Studies at Athens, Princeton, New Jersey, pp. iii-v, vii, ix-xi, xiii-xvi, 1-161, 163-188: re 480s Callixenos Aristonynomou (total 280) and a possible professional scribe, pp. 66, 161 and figure 30; Plates 4-11.} with Broneer identifying fourteen different types of ‘hands’ writing the ostraca that ostracised Themistocles.\footnote{Lang, Ostraka, (1990), p. 142: on which Lang comments: ‘Broneer distinguished 14 different hands on the basis of certain combinations of letter forms ... although some anomalies will be pointed out ... That is, for the most part Broneer used one chief criterion to identify each hand, and this has sometimes brought together strange bedfellows: pieces which by one criterion belong to one hand and by another criterion to a different hand. But whatever the details of the classification by hands may be, it is certain that the uniformity in general argues a comparatively small number of writers.’ Elsewhere Eugene Vanderpool [Ostracism at Athens, (Lectures in Memory of Louise Taft Semple, 2nd ser., no. 3, Cincinnati, University of Cincinnati, 1970, pp. 13-15] notes: ‘home-made’ ostraca occur in great quantities. Cf. Broneer, op. cit.} However the one hundred and ninety ostraca documented show random grammatical variations...
(nominative, genitive and dative\textsuperscript{27}), \textit{boustrophedon} and \textit{Schlangenschrift},\textsuperscript{28} and writers not sure of their letters, one of which had 'particular difficulties with the sound of lambda'.\textsuperscript{29} The ostraca for Themistocles also show 'sigmatic idiosyncrasy'\textsuperscript{30} along with the differences in letter use and grammar; such anomalies do not suggest 'professional' scribal knowledge. Other ostraka may provide evidence for the existence of a professional scribe:

One very suggestive group of Kallixenos sherds may serve to illustrate the possibility. All are written on the outside of sherds from the wall of large closed vessels with or without bands or poor glaze. All show considerable uniformity in arrangement, spacing, spelling, and letter shapes (alphas with slanting bars, tall and thin lambdas, X-shaped chis).\textsuperscript{31}

When the ostraca were checked with Themistocles' name against those of Kallixenos (his political opposite), the percentage of differences were correlated statistically.\textsuperscript{32} If a similar correlate was applied to the 4,662 ostraca with Megacles' name/s written on them there would be three hundred and forty two professional scribes running about on the day, or roughly, seven percent of the 4,662 voters, some of whom were asking to have 'rude comments' inscribed as well.\textsuperscript{33} One ostracon - indeed only one - has been found complete with elegiac couplet damning a Xanthippos as a user, which seems a lot of trouble for a busy scribe to go to.\textsuperscript{34} Further comparative research is needed, but there are difficulties:

The uniformity of this Kallixenos group ... leapt to the eye only because, coming from the same deposit and naming the same man, they ended up in the same museum drawer. ...[D]etecting the same hand at work in different names with but few common letters is a very subjective business, especially with such largely fragmentary material.\textsuperscript{35}


\textsuperscript{28} Lang, \textit{Ostraka}, (1990), p. 123, No. 932. \textit{Boustrophedon}: 'ox turning', lines written left to right, then right to left or retrograde in the manner of plowing of field. \textit{Schlangenschrift}: snake writing, curving to follow the shape of the physical surface.


\textsuperscript{32} Cf. Lang, 'Writing and Spelling on Ostraka', p.80.

\textsuperscript{33} Lang, \textit{Ostraka}, (1990), p.93-94. Megakles Hippokratous Alopeketen 4662 total, 480s - [Ar. \textit{Ath. Pol.}22.5] ostracised 487/6. 4647 of the total are found in the Kerameikos deposit suggest 487 ostracism ... the 'rude comments' on the sherds from the Kerameikos 'concentrate on his morals more than on his tyrannic tendencies'.

\textsuperscript{34} Xanthippos was ostracised in 484 [Ar. \textit{Ath. Pol.}22], Ostraka: 26 total (1053-1069); Lang, \textit{Ostraka}, (1990), p. 134, 1065; Fig. 27, Plate 3. Cf. Broneer, 'Notes on the Xanthippos Ostrakon', \textit{American Journal of Archaeology}, Vol. 52, No. 3 (1948), pp. 341-343: 'a remarkable metrical ostracon' [p. 341].

The sheer volume of ostraca\textsuperscript{36} written in the 480s suggests that, of the first generation of those who attended letter school, there was an identifiable number who could write more than their own name. Ostracon recovered from later ostracisms have not netted the volume of Megacles' ostracism, but as the century proceeded the identification of similar hands is no longer noted. Somewhat contradictory to his professional scribe hypothesis, Vanderpool, however, suggests that Themistocles 'deliberately cultivated the use of the demotic ... in order to increase his popularity among the common people'.\textsuperscript{37} This would imply that in the 470s a significant proportion of the common people had a knowledge of alphabet and grammar to inscribe and/or decipher ostraca. Some ostraca of the great Kerameikos deposit inscribed with Cimon's name make joins with, or come from, the same pot as other ostraca naming Megacles and Themistocles.\textsuperscript{38}

This has a non-fictional spontaneity about it - regardless of the fact that it has not been recorded whether the writing is from the same hand or not. For ostracisms mid-century, there is no mention of similar hands inscribing the 564 ostraca naming Cimon or the 749 ostraca naming Menon (Menecleidou) Gargettios; some even show 'unsure' writers which again argues against professional scribes.\textsuperscript{39} By 443B.C all sixty-four ostraca for the (possible) ostracism of Thucydides of Melesius are by different hands.\textsuperscript{40} If the production of ostraca occurred at the \textit{deme or phratry} level, the scenario of a 'teacher' with the name written up for 'students' to copy is not totally far-fetched. Thus literacy progresses slowly at the grassroots:

\begin{quote}
\textit{dokiai oun soi to aytou oinoia monon graphion o grammatisthei kai anagogonoskein i ymaz tous paixdas didaskaleis, i odin hepton ta taw exhroon egrafete i ta ymptera kai ta taw filon onomata; oiden hepton.} [Plato Charmides 161d]
\end{quote}

\textbf{SOCRATES TO YOUNG CHARMIDES:} And does the scribe, in your opinion, write and read his own name only, and teach you boys to do the same with yours? Or did you write your enemies' names just as much as your own and your friends?

\textsuperscript{36} In the fifth century each ostracism required a \textit{quorum} of 6,000 voters therefore the Megacles' ostraca could potentially represent 75\% of the vote. Cf. Rudi Thomsen, \textit{The Origin of Ostracism: A Synthesis}, Copenhagen, Gyldendal, 1972, p. 66 n.23; William Harris, \textit{Ancient Literacy}, pp. 54-55. Although, Mabel Lang [\textit{Ostraka}, (1990), p. 94] suggests the ostraca could be from two ostracisms. More than 11,000 ostraca have been found in the Agora and surrounds, the Kerameikos (outside the city walls), the North Slope of the Akropolis and one dozen or so from miscellaneous sites; cf. Lang, \textit{Ostraka}, (1990), pp. 7-8.


\textsuperscript{40} Lang, \textit{Ostraka}, (1990), pp. 132-133 Thoukydides Melesiou Alopece total 64:
CHARMIDES: Just as much. [trans. Lamb]

And is considered of no particular value beyond the utility:

Διατηρεῖται γνώσεως, συνεχομένης τας παιδεύματα και τα στοιχεῖα των παλαιού και προπολεμικούς. [Aristophanes Knights 188-189]

SAUSAGE-SELLER: But I have not had the least education (μουσικήν). I can only read, and that very badly. [trans. O'Neill]

The point to stress here is that literacy was not regarded with the same type of reverence that it is today. The creative dimension of writing was not necessarily apparent to the general population. Writing was a practical tool, the application of which wrote lists, named names, labelled ownership on articles.

Above the plain of Vari, in remote grazing country, the graffiti of more than fifty shepherds and goatherds attest to a knowledge of the alphabet and the ability to write simple names dated by Langdon as post-550BC.51 A (possibly meaningless) statistic is that there is no great increase in the ratio of extant inscribed clayware in the Beazley archives for the fifth century BC from those extant items dated 550-500BC.52 Nevertheless, finds of other clayware as well as extant inscriptions confirm that in the first half of the fifth century BC simple writing was used both by private individuals and increasingly by the state collective.53 Likewise, equally

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52 http://www.beazley.ox.ac.uk/xdb/ASP/dataSearch.asp. One observation, from personal experience, is that vase art dating varies from country to country, as with vases in the New York Metropolitan which are dated, on average, fifty years earlier than those in the new Ioannou Centre (from the Ashmolean) at Oxford.
53 Susan I. Rotroff and John H. Oakley, [Debris from a Public Dining Place in the Athenian Agora, Princeton, N.J., American School of Classical Studies at Athens, Hesperia supplements Vol. 25, (1992) pp. i-iii, v-xiii, xv, 1, 3-57, 59-129, 131, 155, 157-183, 185-248, esp. pp. 2, 27-28, 37 n.7 & n.8, Plates 1-60] report on a find of pre-426BC inscribed syssition dinnerware in the Athenian agora near the Royal Stoa, the location of an earlier find [by Lucy Talcott, 1936; marked H6:5, Plate 62] with matching inscriptions. The clayware occurs in numbers that indicate it was used by archons, hippocasts and phylarchs [p.41]. Many items bear the inscription δημοσίου [demosion] or a ligature representing the word [Plate 53. Cf. p. 37 n.7 & n.8 for locations of earlier finds with this inscription and references]. The published finds are fragmentary but there do not appear to be any further dipinto inscriptions on the clayware [cf. Plates 1-60]. However, several have names scratched on them, while six items have graffito with (humorous?, cf. Aristoph. Wasps 83-84) anatomical sexual connotations [pp. 27-28]. In reviewing the publication of this find Charles E. Mercier [‘Debris from a Public Dining Place in the Athenian Agora by Susan I. Rotroff; John H. Oakley, The Classical World, Vol. 88, No. 3 (1995), pp. 220-221, at p. 220] raises two important questions. One asks whether the heavy representation of pottery from 460 to 450BC might reflect post-Epialtian reforms that provided for a wider democratic participation in government. The other question is why are more than half the figured wares kraters? If the answer to this is in the affirmative, it raises another possibility: those aristocratic archons chafing at the privations of democratic symposia who donated these kraters owned and were donating uninscribed kraters. Therefore, they possibly replaced them for their own symposia with new, inscribed ones. Cf. E.B. French, ‘Archaeology in Greece, 1991-1992’, Archaeological Reports, No. 38 (1991-1992), pp. 3-70, at Fig. 2, p. 6.
simple are temple dedications emblazoned with letters etched by tradesmen who worked in stone or metal and the statues chiselled on stelae and publicly displayed. Some knowledge of the laws was expected of all citizens in order to participate in civic life; they were part of the ephebic curriculum, learned by heart and sung at military symposia.\(^4\) Andocides and others indicate that the intention was that the words of the law were σκοπεῖν τῷ βουλομένῳ (for all to see), but the reading in this sense was probably mostly used as a mnemonic.\(^4\) It still, however, brought before the population the concept of letters and how an alphabet system works. Whilst stonemasons and potters merely could have copied out the letters without knowing what they meant, some citizens were capable of simple but spontaneous written expression; just as in Wasps where Aristophanes suggests that writing on public surfaces was a habit practised by young and old.\(^4\) While Aristophanes’ graffiti is as simple as that on clayware, it suggests the type of exemplar phrases from the poets that Plato says were learned in school.\(^5\)

As noted, it was said that Solon instituted the teaching of letters in Athens, but there is no evidence that it was practised by more than a small minority until the ostracisms of the fifth century BC. Aristotle claims that he did, however, enforce and consequently nurture problem-solving by making it law that people take sides [Ar. Ath. Pol. 8.5; app. 8.III.2].

Contrary to William Harris’ view, state organised schools were not a necessary prerequisite for widespread literacy in Greece.\(^4\) Regional schooling in the demes or by phratry, perhaps organised in the same manner as training for religious performance, seems the most probable. Herodotos attests to the existence, by 495BC, of large schools in Chios teaching letters in addition to training in singing and music [6.27.2; app. 8.III.1]. This in itself does not prove the existence of

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\(^4\) Pl. Protagoras 326c: ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐκ διδασκαλίων ἀπαλλαγόν, ἢ πόλις οὖ τοὺς τε νόμους ἀναγκάζει μεθανάειν καὶ κατὰ τούτους ζῆν κατὰ παράδειγμα. [And when they are released from their schooling the city next compels them to learn the laws and to live according to them as after a pattern.] Cf. Appendix 3.5.

\(^5\) Aristoph. Wasps 97-99.

\(^6\) Pl. Protagoras 325ε; see section 4) below for the full quotation.

\(^7\) William Harris, op. cit., pp. 16, 74-75, 96-102. Cf. Anna Missiou, (op. cit., pp. 130-133) for the contra view that sees elementary literacy schooling done in the home.
letter-schools in Athens, but Herodotos' treatment of the subject implies that the learning of letters would have been considered commonplace. He was busy portraying the Chians as the 'brave and brilliant' heroes of the battle of Lade who were tied to an unlucky fate.\textsuperscript{49} If there had been anything extraordinary to Athenian ears about one hundred and twenty children learning letters \textit{in school} he would have made remark about it as one more attribute of the Chians. Instead, the story of the school's destruction by an earthquake is there merely to reflect the Chians' bad luck. Evidence for the teaching of letters from this time also comes from Attic clayware, with the earliest scenes depicting youth with writing materials appearing ca.510-500BC.\textsuperscript{50} Another unquantifiable indication of increasing literacy is the incidence of public archiving and its use.\textsuperscript{51} There is a mid-sixth century stone's dedicatory inscription that lists, \(\tau\alpha\delta\varepsilon\), items given, which implicitly suggests an invitation to read.\textsuperscript{52} Apart from the possibility that it was addressed to the eyes (or ears) of the God and not intended for passers-by to read, it is suggested that such lists are among the earliest uses of writing and have a high oral component in that their use is mnemonic.\textsuperscript{53} In themselves they are evidence of a public with a conceptual knowledge of the alphabet and writing (however not yet evidence of a wide reading public). There is a bureaucratic, \textit{polis} tone to such lists rather than something initiated by a private citizen. Official scribes are in evidence at the end of the sixth century BC when a statue of one, holding a wooden tablet in his lap, sat in honour on the Acropolis.\textsuperscript{54} By comparison, Themistocles' honorific plaque celebrating his own victory as \textit{choregos} shows an individualistic touch because it set out his name.

\textsuperscript{49} The luckless fate of the crew after the battle of Lade and the eventual defeat of the Chians at the hands of Histiaeos is related as tragic destiny [Hdt. 6.15-16].

\textsuperscript{50} Three are dated in the Beazley date categories -525BC to -475BC: Beazley 2881 [Brussels, Musees Royaux: A1013 - no original dating, but artwork less refined], Athenian Black-figure Phormiskos; Beazley 321 [Basel, Antikenmuseum und Sammlung Ludwig: BS465 - 500-490BC], Athenian Red-figure cup (C); Beazley 200906 [Munich, Antikensammlungen: J1168; Munich, Antiken-sammlungen: 2607 - 520BC], Red-figure Cup.


\textsuperscript{52} Sickinger, \textit{Public Records and Archives in Classical Athens}, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1999, pp. 33, 40; cf. IG i\textsuperscript{2} 510.

\textsuperscript{53} Cf. Chapter V.3.1.

with those of Phrynichos, the poet and Adeimantas, the archon of 477BC. The names of archons were not generally listed until much later in the century. Thucydides assessed Themistocles as a superlative thinker and arguer, while Plutarch had him practising extended sophistic pro and contra arguments whilst still an adolescent. So it is probable that Themistocles, and probably his contemporary and fellow student, Aristides, could spell more than their own names. Thomas suggests there grew a proportion of the citizen body capable of 'banking literary' and 'officials' literacy', enabling them to generate the accounts, decrees and administrative instructions necessary to keep the democracy operating. Further chapters deal with the sophistic education received by those with the wealth to obtain it, but for the majority functional 'name' and 'list' literacy is attested by the volumes of ostraca generated by each ostrakaphoriai. It would have been in the interests of democrat and oligarchic leaders alike to have as many supporters in the ekklesia able to read a name and copy it in a timely fashion; especially charismatic leaders such as Pericles, Cleon, Alcibiades and Nicias all of whom relied on zeugitai and thete naval support as well as their phratry and family affiliations.

Sickinger and Missiou see stelae decrees by this time as addenda to papyrus (βιβλίον, χάρτης) and wooden originals (πίνακας or γραμματεία λευκόμενα, σανίδες) kept in a central archive at the bouleuterion. Others suggest it is more probable that it was the other way around. For example, Thomas thinks the stone was the archive and Rhodes comments that the Acropolis probably looked like a cemetery. Whether or not there was then a central archive, growing numbers of literates were involved in the production and distribution of public documents. Multiple stone stelae set up in different locations would have needed a template which could have been kept, however, indications are that

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55 Plut. Themistocles 5.5.
56 Sickinger, Public Records and Archives in Classical Athens, pp. 42-43.
57 Plut. Themistocles 2; Aristides 2.
58 Thomas, 'Writing, reading, public and private 'literacies': functional literacy and democratic literacy in Greece', in Ancient Literacies: the Culture of Reading in Greece and Rome, pp. 37-41.
59 Cf. Appendix 2.
they were generally discarded.\textsuperscript{62} The reason for a lack of archaeological evidence goes further than physical non-survival; Sickinger and Rhodes both emphasize the transitory function of archives coupled with an 'ahistorical' attitude to recordkeeping; meaning that old laws were periodically altered over time, but were still identified as being 'ancient' law. Sickinger uses as evidence the 485\textperthinspace BC Hecatompedon Decrees which directed Athenian officials to 'write a report'. He does not, however, take account of a lacuna that occurs where the word 'write' would be: Alfred Köerte and Hans von Gaertringen placed κα[τά γεγραμμένα]; possible, but not incontrovertible evidence.\textsuperscript{63} The inscription itself at least attests to stonemasons highly skilled in inscription and grammar.\textsuperscript{64} Plato's Socrates presents a symbolic paradigm in that he was the son of a stonemason, learned to write at school, used books, but, when confronted with the difficult questions, chose not to use writing to sort them out. In choosing discussion (διάλεξις) he reflects the casual utilitarian attitude to writing prevalent in his generation as opposed to the next.

The use of wooden tablets and papyrus in the latter half of the fifth century BC is attested by Aristophanes and archaeology.\textsuperscript{65} By 450\textperthinspace BC court clerks (ὑπογραμματεύς) wrote up charges\textsuperscript{66} but records were still for the most part impermanent. For example, lists of tribute due to various gods in 434\textperthinspace BC were recorded 'for those who wished to see' (σκοπεῖν τοί βολομένοι), but when the debts were paid the records were to be destroyed (ἐξαλειφέναι).\textsuperscript{67} Later the oligarchic government removed statutes and honorifics from the areopagus.\textsuperscript{68} The 408\textperthinspace BC capitulation of Selymbria to Alcibiades decreed that hostages were to have their names erased by the grammateus of the boulê and witnessed by the

\textsuperscript{62} For example, the 421\textperthinspace BC the Peace of Nicias was set up in Athens, Sparta Olympia, Delphi and the Isthmus. Cf. Thuc. 5.18.10; 23.5; Rhodes, 'Public Documents in the Greek States: Archives and Inscriptions, Part I', pp. 36-37.


\textsuperscript{64} IG i\textsuperscript{3} 3; cf. Jordon, op. cit., pp. 19, 22.

\textsuperscript{65} Aristoph. Clouds 769-72 \textsuperscript{[wood]}, Birds 1024-5 \textsuperscript{[papyrus]; IG. i\textsuperscript{3} 34.14-18; IG. i\textsuperscript{4} 68. 18-21; IG. i\textsuperscript{7} 78. 26-30; IG. i\textsuperscript{7} 476. 291 \textsuperscript{[papyrus]; IG ii\textsuperscript{2}.1. 61-62 \textsuperscript{[papyrus]; cf. IG i\textsuperscript{7} 56, 156, 165.}

\textsuperscript{66} Antiphon On the Choraeus 6.35, 39. Lys. Ag. Nicomachus 30.26 suggests some clerks wrote up the laws at home.


\textsuperscript{68} Ar. Ath. Pol.35.2; IG ii\textsuperscript{4} 6 Tod 98; IG ii\textsuperscript{4} 9.
prytaneis\(^a\) and, in a peace settlement of 405\(^b\)C, the boulê and prytany noted in writing the erasure of earlier Samian naval commitments.\(^b\) Andocides confirms an archiving system existed by the time of the amnesty for those proscribed during the downfall of the oligarchic government (405\(^b\)C); it was still a system that allowed the erasure of public records no longer useful (ἐξεγράφη μέχρι τῆς ἐξελθούσης βουλῆς / πάντα ἔξελείψαι) [On the Mysteries 1.76; On the Return 2.23; app. 8.III.3]. Andocides implies individuals with private copies as well as the public ones.\(^c\) It seems that text in civic and judicial administration generally reflects growing numbers of general citizens with alphabetic literacy enough to decipher prose sentences of decrees and statutes.

There are indications of archived laws of some age. In the fourth century \(b\)C a permanent archive centre in the temple of Demeter, the Metroon, retained legislative and legal material and, as Aeschines' litigation affirms, individual citizens could go there to seek to remove a law or indictment.\(^d\) It is possible that there was already an archival system in the second half of the fifth century \(b\)C that kept Draco and Solon's ancient laws and civic oaths for members of the boulê and other offices. The physical evidence for this relies on two excavations of stelae dated to 408-9\(^b\)C. They both appear to be copies of archaic texts, either from older stone inscriptions or some other archive of wood or papyrus. One stele (IG i\(^3\).105) is the Bouleutic oath and decree about the boulê which Hignett judged to be 'to some extent' a reproduction of an earlier law because it contained 'archaisms'.\(^e\) The terminus post quern for this archive is 501/500\(^b\)C when Cleisthenes established the democracy.\(^f\) The other stele (IG i\(^3\).104) begins with a decree which orders the anagrapheis to 'obtain' (παραλαμβάνω) from the basileus Draco's homicide law and inscribe it on stone.\(^g\) Contemporaries Andocides [440-390\(^b\)C] and Antiphon [480-411\(^b\)C] refer to Draco's laws; although

\(^a\) IG i\(^3\).118.35-42 = M&L 87; cf. Rhodes, 'Public documents in the Greek States: Archives and Inscriptions, Part II', p. 138.

\(^b\) IG i\(^3\).127.24-30 = M&L 94.

\(^c\) Rhodes, 'Public documents in the Greek States: Archives and Inscriptions, Part II', p. 149 n.22; cf. Andoc. On the Mysteries 1.76,77-79.

\(^d\) Cf. Aesch. Against Cleophon 3.75, 187; Demosthenes On the False Embassy 19.129; Lycurgus Against Leocrates 66.


\(^g\) τὸν Δράκοντος νόμον τὸν τερί τὸ φόνο ἀναφρασάντον οἱ ἀναφραγὲς τὸν νόμον παραλαβόντες παρὰ βασιλέος [lines 4,5,6].
Thomas notes that Antiphon 'quotes no documents at all' in his orations. Later Demosthenes [384-322BC] and Aeschines [389-314BC] cite Draco's homicide laws, more likely from this stele than any older archive. Nevertheless, Gagarin considers the language on the stele strongly suggests that it is a transcription of an ancient prose text kept in archives. A litigation against an anagrapheis, however, implies a less organised system. Lysias states that the man was asked to make an inscription of the laws of Draco and Solon after the oligarchic coup of 411BC. He notes the job was estimated to take four months. The scribe however took six years, without any scrutiny, and Lysias accused the defendant of procrastinating because of bribes to alter or omit some of the laws in order to manipulate a death sentence at the trial of Cleophon in 404BC. The implications of IG i.104 and the accusations of Lysias are that the axones of the laws accepted as Draco and Solon's were destroyed during the coup. On the restoration of the democracy it was considered that four months was enough time to make the inscription from another source. If the basileus did not have access to a complete archive and the papyrus texts (βιβλίον, χάρτης) or wooden (πίνακα or γραμματεία λειευκώμενα, σανίδες) archives were dispersed piecemeal throughout the city, four months may not have been enough time. Moreover, the Athenians themselves would not have known if the old text used for the new inscription had been made in the sixth or early fifth century; 'it may be safer to

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76 Antiphon On the Choréutes 6.2; Thomas, Oral Tradition and Written Record in Classical Athens, p. 85.
77 Demosthenes [Ag. Aristocrates 23.51] quotes one of Draco's laws: φόνου δὲ δίκας μὴ εἶναι μὴδαμός κατὰ τῶν τοὺς φέυγοντας ἐνδεικνύοντων, ἐὰν τις κατὶ ὅποι μὴ ἔκαστιν [No man shall be liable to proceedings for murder because he lays information against exiles, if any such exile return to a prohibited place.]
78 Firstly, it designates itself as a thesamos rather than a nomos, the term for 'law' in the fifth century BC; secondly, it mentions frontier markets no longer in existence at the time of the reinscription. Thirdly, the preamble does not indicate aspirated h whereas the law itself does. Gagarin also considers the designation of adjudicators by rank to be less democratic than that which would have been introduced at the time of the reinscription. Possibly another indication is a provision for retroactivity, although the law's reintroduction post the coup of 411BC might have wanted this stipulation. As such he claims this inscription to be the earliest extant piece of Attic prose - unless of course 'Rememberers' attached to the office of the basileus dictated it to scribes sometime during the fifth century BC. Cf. Michael Gagarin, Drakon and Early Athenian Homicide Law, London, Yale University Press, 1981 pp. 93-94.
79 Lysias, Ag. Nichomachus 30.2; 11.
80 There is debate as to exactly what axones were: Gagarin [Writing Greek Law, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 99] suggests they were revolving wooden stands. Sickinger [Public Records and Archives in Classical Athens, pp. 17-18] suggests they could accommodate approximately 400 words (2,250 letters).
admit that they did not really know (and consequently we do not know either) whether it was an unaltered text of Draco's law or not.\textsuperscript{81}

On the question of general citizens reading archives in the fifth century BC, litigants were expected to explain the relevant laws to jurors and this surely implies gazetted laws. They may have copied the statutes from the archival source.\textsuperscript{85} They could as easily have inspected the stone inscriptions.\textsuperscript{83} Either way less-literate citizens could have learned the relevant law by rote and recited them under the coaching of a literate reader. This could explain the stock phrases in statutes.\textsuperscript{84} Draco's homicide laws were constructed with certain features resembling what Bakker identified as 'special speech' in the generally accepted nomoi of the Homeric canon.\textsuperscript{85} Judging from the 408/9BC stele, Draco's laws were constructed like the prose of the later Pherecydes, which was 'couched in continuous prose though it is essentially a list.\textsuperscript{86} Like the Ephebic oath, such lists with 'special speech' or 'archaisms' were easier to remember, and while Gagarin argues there is no such thing as 'oral law', he does concede that there were such things as nomoi songs.\textsuperscript{87} The differences between two inscriptions relating to the Heraclea, one dated mid-sixth century BC (IG i\textsuperscript{2}.508), the other post-Marathon (IG i\textsuperscript{2}.3), may point to a shift, not only in the form of language used, but in the purpose of public inscriptions, away from something to be remembered, to something to be planned. The earlier inscription 'reflects only on past deeds', is boustrophedon poetry with a prose list, the verbs indicative aorist; the later inscription looks to the future with stoichedon prose and infinitive verbs setting out the obligations of officials to recruit tribal representatives from within the epidemoi.\textsuperscript{88}


\textsuperscript{83} As Thomas [\textit{Literacy and Orality in Ancient Greece}, loc. cit.] suggests.

\textsuperscript{84} E.g. IG i\textsuperscript{2} 118.33-35.


\textsuperscript{87} Gagarin, \textit{Writing Greek Law}, pp. 33-35.

\textsuperscript{88} Missiou, op. cit., pp. 94-95.
Consider also the references by logographers to Solon’s laws. The nearest extant quotations of Solon from the period of Draco’s stele (ca.408/9 BC) are Andocides [On the Mysteries 1.95], Aristophanes [The Birds 1660-1666], and later, Demosthenes [Ag. Stephanus 2.14]. Confirmation that Solon wrote down his laws comes from the Athenaiton Politeia (330-320 BC) which cites one of Solon’s poems in which he states that he textualised his laws:

Θεσμοίς δ’ ὁμοίως τῷ κακῷ τε κάγαθῳ,
ειθείαν εἰς ἕκαστον ἀρετάς δικην, ἔγραψα.

And rules of law alike for base and noble,
Fitting straight justice unto each man’s case,
I wrote. [Ath. Pol. 12.4: Solon Frag. 34]

It is odd that Aristotle, or whichever of his students wrote the Athenaiton Politeia, composed an extended historical prose treatise that does not quote the prose of Solon’s laws, but only his poetry. Later still, Plutarch also quotes only Solon’s poetry.\(^9\) In fact, there is no surviving epigraphical evidence for the actual form Solon used in his laws and therefore the possibility cannot be discounted that his laws were not originally written in continuous prose. However, in his criticism of poetry, Plato clearly implies that the ‘lawgivers’ present their ideas and statutes in prose [Laws 858c,e; app. 8.III.4]. It is also significant that Solon resorted to ‘the old fashioned way’ to argue his case - the ‘special speech’ of poetry.

The first confirmation of a written copy in a law court is the one in On the Choreutes by Antiphon (cited above), so, by the third quarter of the fifth century BC, some individuals could read, copy or institute removal procedures of decrees and accounts. Some examples: Plutarch suggests Pericles defended moves to have his Megarian decree removed. The passage ‘envisages a displayed pinakion which could be turned to face the wall’.\(^9\) By 425 BC Lysias presents to the court a statute from a stele on the Areopagos.\(^9\) In 418 BC a stele was written to inform whoever wishes to know (ὁπος ἄν ἕι εἰδέναι τοι βολομένοι).\(^9\) Andocides

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9 Plut. Comparison of Solon & Publicola 1.4,5, 2.3.
91 Lys. On the Murder of Eratosthenes 1.30: ἀνάγνωθι δὲ μοι καὶ τούτων τὸν νόμον τὸν ἐκ τῆς στήλης τῆς ἑ̃ς Ἀρείου πάγου.
92 IG i 60.30-1, 133.6-11; 84.26-8.
ments a stele set up in front of the *bouleuterion* and asks a clerk of the court to read the text copied ἐκ τῆς στῆλης (from the stele).93

The foregoing evidence clearly shows that the courts and assemblies utilised writing in their operation. Aristotle suggests that the civic duties from the *basileus* and *areopagites* to clerks and officials chosen by lot entailed written documentation and reference reading [Athenaion Politea 47.4; 48.1; app. 8.III.5]. The earliest instance of private individuals actually writing (γράφειν) a decree is in 419 BC in Aristophanes' *Clouds* [1429; app. 8.III.6].94 In 411 BC, in *Lysistrata*, there is interest, possibly even from women, in what is to be written on stelae [511-512; app. 8.III.7]. Inscriptions usually identified the proposer of the decree as the one who 'spoke' (ἐἶπε), but by 411 BC, in *Thesmophoriazusae*, a council officer was taking notes [375; app. 8.III.8].95 Andocides and later Lysias refer to written registers and citizens who were under-clerks (ἀνθρώποι ὑπογραμματέως) who read out charges and relevant statutes to jurymen.96 Likewise, the banter between Philocleon and Bdelycleon in the *Wasps* indicates that written notes were routinely taken by jurymen during forensic arguments.97

3) The proportional spread of functional 'officials' literacy within the male citizen population

The links between learning letters and developing a capacity for abstract analytical thinking was outlined in the previous chapter and is reconsidered below in relation to the Athenian literacy curriculum going hand-in-hand with abstract analytical acumen. All citizens were used to making decisions, at least since Solon gave the go-ahead, but a growing proportion of literates (especially those capable of writing extended continuous prose argument) within the population increasingly influenced the way decisions were analysed; Aristophanes suggests that, by 405 BC, the average Athenian was capable of comparative sophistic analysis (μανθάνει τὰ δεξιά) [*The Frogs* 1109-1118; app. 8.III.9]. However, if this ability was a reality in 405 BC, Aristophanes' earlier

93 Andoc. *On the Mysteries* 96; cf. 51.
95 Rhodes, loc. cit.
96 Andoc. *On the Mysteries* 1.13, 1.15, 1.17 [to a jury of 6,000]; Lys. *Defence Against a Charge of Subverting the Democracy* 25.9: οἵτινες τῶν Ἐλευσίνἁδε ἀπογραφαμένων [those who had enlisted for Eleusis]; *Against Nicomachus* 30.28.
97 Aristoph. *Wasps* 538: καὶ μὴν ὁδὸν λέξεις ἀπλῶς μιμόσωμα γράψομαι γώ. [Now I'll observe his arguments, and take a note of each]; cf. 558, 576.
work, Wasps, implies this was not so in 422BC. Then he complained that the audience had not understood the new ideas he presented the year before and that he was still far too sharp for them.\(^{98}\) It might indicate a generational increase in literacy levels allied to literacy education at the elementary level and a wider learning in the general public. Incidentally, against the argument that Aristophanes was being ironical and fingerling the ignorance of his audience, it is worthwhile to consider that while 'under-challenged audiences' can become disinterested, over-challenged ones 'loathe' any period of challenge.

Aristophanes, to be sure, did not lose his audience during the long agon of Frogs: the play's success would seem to be sufficient evidence for an audience who could follow, as a collective and for at least most of the time.\(^{99}\)

One could add that audiences do not respond positively en masse to ridicule, which is why the demos was not to be criticised - by law. In this same vein is Euripides' knowledge of sophistics, when he made the stronger argument appear the weaker in his Electra.\(^{100}\) Euripides was not as popular as Aristophanes, but, of a potential seven thousand or so members of his audience it is reasonable to accept that a great many of them would have followed the gist.\(^{101}\)

**TABLE 1**

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\(^{98}\) Aristoph. Wasps 1044-49: [I] tried last year to sow a crop of new ideas, but you failed to see the point; ... never has there been a cleverer comedy though it will go over your head because you all lack the nous to understand it.


Other authors also confirm that there were considerable variations in types of literacy training. For example, Xenophon has Euthydemos and Socrates discuss literacy and agree that most tradesmen (metalsmiths, carpenters, and cibblers) were ἀνδραποδώδεις (slave-like, uneducated). A study on the Black-figure ceramicist, Sophilos, attests that he was alphabetically and grammatically literate. So, besides shepherds and goatherds, there was at least one sixth-century BC tradesman literate enough to write a sentence; and Xenophon perhaps did not know of Socrates’ collegiate friendship with the cobbler who had a library and took notes of what others discussed. As literacy in Athens was never an esoteric tool guarded by minorities, it was not like grandmother’s silver, kept under lock and key from domestics and tradespeople. Its functional qualities were apparent, even to those who continued to use writing for religious and/or magical purposes. It is generally argued, as in Chapter VIII.5, that old and new wealth vied for political influence and, as a consequence, scrambled to a more competent literacy by a sophistic education of varying quality. The rich of course got more; that is their lot; but the ideologies of the democracy filtered down through the property ranks (even if the actualities did not). In growing economies generally, the privileges and comforts of the elite become the general experience within a few generations and, to state the obvious, entrepreneurial personalities naturally look for ways to be entrepreneurial. Furthermore, as indigenous literacy programmes indicate, the attainment of functional literacy can be a less costly grassroots process by which students, becoming proficient

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102 Even though he is creating a ‘philosophy vs sophistic’ stance. Xen. Memorabilia 4.2.20-22; cf. Pl. Republic 430b.
103 Martin F. Kilmer & Robert Develin, ‘Sophilos’ Vase Inscriptions and Cultural Literacy in Archaic Athens’, Phoenix, Vol. 55, No. 1/2 (2001), pp. 9-43 at p. 36: On the matter of internal consistency, the few names written more than once in the extant oeuvre of Sophilos (for example, Demeter, Khariqlo) are spelt consistently where complete; ... Sophilos is also consistent in his spelling of the one verb he repeats: γραφεῖν.
104 For example, Aeschines’ assisted his mother by reading from religious book (τὰς βίβλους ὀνειγίσσας) in Orphic initiations [Demosthenes On the Crown 259]. Cf. Chapter IV.3.
parents, or mentors, pass on their knowledge.\textsuperscript{106} Missiou suggests Athenians learned rudimentary literacy at home, then served a type of in-house apprenticeship in the \textit{boulê} itself.\textsuperscript{107} This formula is more likely applied to local levels of administrative participation. A father or \textit{phratry} member with 'officials' literacy' would pass on that knowledge to the next generation. Practice would turn 'name literacy' into some level of 'officials' literacy'. Even with small numbers of children attending school in the 490s, the proportion of literates in the population multiplied to influence civic function as the foregoing evidence illustrates. 'Officials' literacy' was permeating all levels of government. What was 'adequate ability' in the 470s became 'outclassed' over the next fifty years.\textsuperscript{108} For example, Table 1 above illustrates how the \textit{areopagus} would have been the slowest to attain a majority of literates, which is perhaps why Ephialtes and Pericles were urging change.\textsuperscript{109} The proportion of literate citizens would have increased exponentially with each generation taught to read and write. Even if only 10\% of children were taught to read and write in the first generation,\textsuperscript{110} that proportion of literate twenty-year-olds would have been added to citizen ranks as the population increased\textsuperscript{111} and as each generation ascended through to age-regulated official positions, the use of writing would proportionally expand as the references above to increased documentation and archiving attests. Table 1 is


\textsuperscript{107} Missiou, op. cit., pp. 133-142.

\textsuperscript{108} Thomas, 'Writing, reading, public and private 'literacies', p. 41.

\textsuperscript{109} Cf. Appendix 2.2.5.

\textsuperscript{110} This is hypothetical; calculated on the ratio of 'hands' who wrote the 190 ostraca naming Themistocles, which amounts to around 7-8\% of citizens who could use the alphabet in ca. 471BC.

merely to illustrate the permutation of literates through the political and civic structures. Until 430BC (and probably after) each influx of ephebes would have been, with normal population growth, greater in number than the year before and, even if literacy education remained at ten percent, the numbers of literates active in the administration was increasing, while the passing of elders would have decreased the non-literate or 'name' and 'list' literate citizenry. An indication of differing levels of literacy in the boulê is that the boulê secretary was an elected office in the fifth century BC, whereas it was chosen by lot in Aristotle's time. Later chapters on sophistic show that political power filtered through and down because of literacy, but after seven generations all administrative posts would have been influenced by functionally 'officials' literate' office bearers.

III.3 ATHENIAN EDUCATIONAL METHODS AND CURRICULUM WITH SOME COGNITIVE & LINGUISTIC ASPECTS OF ATHENIAN LITERACY EDUCATION

1) Methods, curriculum and technical aspects relating to the degree of reading competence it produced

The use of poetry in literacy education is significant because it enhanced the already rhythmic and phonetic correspondence of Greek word endings, and because the sound to symbol in the Greek alphabet makes reading easier. Elementary education began around the age of six, was socially desirable but not institutionalised, and attendance varied according to financial constraints [Pl. Protag. 326e; app. 8.III.10]. General elementary education was within the reach of everyone. However, it lacked state control and was not compulsory. Nevertheless, it might be nearer the mark to recognise that the quality of teaching and type of literacy and musical training was subject to general administrative (at the phratry level) and cultural, as well as economic, constraints. The discussion below outlines how, even the most rudimentary level of literacy tuition in Athenian classrooms accomplished alphabet acquisition and reading through rote learning comprised primarily of metred language;

When the boys have learned their letters and are ready to understand the written word as formerly the spoken, they set the works of good poets before them on their desks to read and make them learn them by heart, poems containing much admonition and many stories, eulogies, and panegyrics of the good men of old, so that the child may be inspired to imitate them and long to be like them. [trans. Guthrie]

It is significant that elementary reading methods in Athens relied on prosodic metre rather than prose for reading tuition once past the stage of letter recognition. This is because, while it facilitated effective reading acquisition, it did not mean that students were competent at the composition of continuous prose. Reading is a different cognitive process to writing. Cognitively, continuous prose composition is a third process. Generating argument by composing extended written sentences is different to transcribing sentences, either in poetry or prose. Just because an individual can recognise and write the alphabet does not enable him to generate extended prose argument.

As outlined in Chapter II.5, the 'onset and rime' in Greek, plus its 'phonetic transparency', would have primed Athenian children to quickly pick up alphabetic competence and elementary reading. Likewise the 'systematic grapheme-phoneme correspondences' implicit in their teaching methods would have given them the freedom to read any alphabetic text. It would have had the effect of extending the student’s conceptual literacy (the mental identification of language in a linear form and recognition of words separated from spoken language streams) whilst not producing what we would assess today as a fully literate individual.

Some discussion of Ruth Finnegan’s continuity theory proposing 'a continuum' between 'the oral/written distinction' is helpful here. In the context in which she deals - the difference between 'oral' poetry and 'written' poetry - it is

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115 Literacy education in continuous prose writing creates a 'bootstrapping' effect in that writing skills beyond 'name literacy' and 'list literacy' allow for more complex 'serially reasoned' abstract deliberation beyond the capacity of 'oral' cognitive capacity.


perfectly intelligible. Learning to read and write does not prevent a literate individual poetising and a text of a poem can be turned into 'oral' poetry at any time. However denying any discontinuity between 'oral' or 'non-literate' and 'literate' individuals ignores the biology and neuroscience. The individual does not stop 'being oral' in the sense of using sound as a medium for language. The terms 'oral' and 'literate' when applied collectively to any population other than one without contact to any writing system is illusory. Any population with a collective knowledge of the basics of a writing system has begun on a continuum in which the non-literate, with 'residual oral traditions', will coexist with individuals who themselves are on a plane between alphabetic, some type of functional literacy, and 'full literacy'. Furthermore literacy levels can rise and fall over time due to cultural dynamics or historical events; 'full-literacy' too has a different meaning depending on context.

2) Metalinguistic awareness: alphabetic literacy initiates the separation of language into sounds and signs

As stated above, with the ability to read also comes a change in the individual's conceptual view of language. Alphabet acquisition, reading words and writing sentences, it is stressed, cannot be viewed simply as a substitute for spoken language. Literacy involves multiple interactions between oral/phonics and optic/graphics as well as relationships between the immediacy of reading aloud or dictation versus text over time and distance.

As it relates to the phonic and graphic mediums, the continuum interface with orality is apparent in Athenian teaching methods from the initial acquisition of letters to the skill of word construction in reading. Learning letters for the Hellenic child was practically the same as today. It began with an alphabet turned into poetry:

\[
\text{το άλφα, βήτα, γάμμα, δέλτα, θεό γάρ εί,}
\text{ζητ', ητα, θητ', ιώτα, β κάππα, λάβδα, μω},
\]

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118 'Orality' sometimes refers to 'oral culture', sometimes to 'phonic medium' or 'immediate' face-to-face or reader to listeners. These three distinctions between cultural and orality/literacy, phonic/graphic medium and immediacy/distance are difficult to apply to any population because individuals within the population perceive 'letters' differently.


This rote teaching technique is predominantly 'oral', even when accompanied by the graphic symbol for each alphabetic letter. Interestingly, Quintilian (35-100 AD) describes how later Roman children acquired the alphabet. With much of Roman education following a Greek model, it probably reflects the practice in Greece. If it does, it indicates that, significantly, rote learning of the alphabet did not at first match sound with symbol. Therefore subsequent learning would have had difficulties coupling phonemic awareness with grapheme awareness:

neque enim mihi illud saltem placet, quod fieri in plurimis video, ut litterarum nomina et contextum prius quam formas parvuli discant. obstat hoc agnitioi earum non intendentibus max animum ad ipsos ductum, dum antecedentem memoriam sequuntur. quae causa est praecipientibus, ut etiam, cum satis adfixisse eas pueris recto illo quo primum scribi solent contextu videntur, retro agant rursus et varia permutatione turbent, donec litteras qui instituuntur facie norint non ordine. quapropter optime sicut hominum pariter et habitus et nomina edocebuntur. sed quod in litteris obst, in syllabis non nocebit. non excludo autem, id quod est inventum irritandae ad discendum infantiae gratia eburneas etiam litterarum formas in lusum offerre; vel si quid aliud, quo magis illa aetas gaudeat, inveniri potest, quod tractare, intueri, nominare iucundum sit. [Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, I.1.24-26]

I do not approve the practice which is followed in many cases: teaching infants the names and the order of the letters before their shapes. This makes it difficult for them to recognize the letters, since the children do not pay attention to the form but rely on their memory. Thus, when the teacher thinks the child has mastered the letters in their customary order, they are written out in reverse sequence, and then in all kinds of permutations, in order to get the child to recognize them by their form (facie) rather than their place (ordine). The best way is, as with persons, to introduce them by their appearance (habitus) and by name (nomina) at the same time. But what is an awkward method where letters are concerned is not to be rejected when it comes to syllables. I do not disapprove the practice of giving children ivory letters to play with, or any such method that will encourage children's interest at that age, when they love to handle things, look at them and name them. [trans. Butler]

In the dissociation between phonic isolates, their oral identification and their graphic representation as letters of the alphabet, Roy Harris notes that Quintilian identified the distinctive entities of script and notation by recognising that 'notational structure as such is quite separate from the structure of the writing system and can be taught independently'. Not only are Quintilian's observations helpful in understanding reading and script and its independence to speech, as an educational impediment, Quintilian is spot on. However, from

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122 Roy Harris, Rethinking Writing, pp. 116-117. Cf. the survey of dyslexic Italian children by Cossu and Marshall in Chapter II.5, Appendix 1.1 Note 21.
that point of view, he might well be observing the practice of a later period and not fifth century BC Hellas. As Plato noted,\textsuperscript{124} the first century of literacy education was more phonically based.

Internalising the alphabet phonically is the beginning of 'bringing speech into consciousness'\textsuperscript{125} and of conceptualising and categorising language in several new ways. In this sense, an initial cognitive consequence of rote learning an alphabet that would have manifested itself in fifth-century BC Athens:

What this practice captures for the learner is the important semiological fact that the letters constitute a small closed inventory, the members of which stand in strict one-one correlation with their names.\textsuperscript{126}

The Ionic and, to a lesser degree, the Attic alphabets bear close phonic correlation and therefore held the potential for any alphabetically literate individual to write down anything that could be spoken. Nevertheless, Plato's observation that writing was far more than a substitute for the spoken word has a solid neuroscience foundation when applied to Athens. In the \textit{Phaedrus} and \textit{Letter VII} his criticisms of writing relate to the problems of being misconstrued.\textsuperscript{127} But his general observations relate to prose literacy's cognitive effects, and to the relationship between speech and writing [\textit{Phaedrus} 275a-e; \textit{Letter VII} 341b-e 342c; 344c-d, quoting \textit{Iliad} 7.460; app. 8.III.11]. Like Plato, Aristotle also recognised that speaking and writing Greek were separate components of language [\textit{On

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{124} Pl. \textit{Rep.} 3.402a-b, quoted in Chapter II.5.
\textsuperscript{125} David R. Olson, 'On the Relations Between Speech and Writing', in Pontecorvo (ed.), \textit{Writing Development: An Interdisciplinary View}, p. 5; cf. Lev Vygotsky, \textit{Thought and Language}, Cambridge, MIT Press, 1962, p.101. This is not to propose that having an alphabet is superior to other forms of script. As noted in Chapter II.5, Roy Harris [\textit{Rethinking Writing}, p. xiii] declares war on the 'backward-looking' concept of the alphabet as superior to non alphabetic forms such as Chinese script [cf. pp. 2-3]. He does however concede that any kind of writing 'cognitively relocates language in an 'autoglottic' space ... the text takes on a life of its own, which is ultimately independent of the life - or intentions - of its author. ... people come to regard meaning as residing in the words themselves' [p. 236]; A culture in which writing has become 'internalised' has already prised open a conceptual gap between the sentence, on the one hand, and its utterance or inscription on the other. The sentence, being what lies behind and 'guarantees' both utterance and inscription, is itself neither. But if it is - or may be - true that there is a huge gulf separating the mentality of the preliterate individual from the mentality of one who can read and write (and habitually does so), it is not difficult to see how writing falls into place as one of the most crucial developments in human evolution [p. 14]. ... until writing was invented, language lived in acoustic space [p. 235]. ... With writing, language invades the world of visual communication. ... with pictorial images of all kinds' [p. 236], Olson ['Why Literacy Matters, Then and Now', op. cit., pp. 385-398] says much the same.
\textsuperscript{126} Roy Harris, op. cit., p. 117-118.
\textsuperscript{127} As noted in Chapter II.2 and 6, Plato's distrust of writing as he expressed it was more probably related to his own esoteric doctrine and personal experiences as an oft misquoted educator rather than to the craft itself. To suggest that he condemned writing as a practice in itself makes no sense in view of his literary mastery of all the techniques employed in composition in his own time.
\end{footnotesize}
Interpretation 1.4-9:16a; app. 8.III.12]. As the above and Chapter II indicate, their views coincide with metalinguistic theory.

Modern assessments of the educational value of phonic vs whole word teaching methods hardly apply to the Athenians because it is probable that they had no highly internalised 'Route 2' whole word lexicon.128 Athenaeus describes several spelling puzzles used by the tragedians in the second half of the fifth century BC129 which suggests that a majority of Athenians must have known their letters for such spelling dramas to have been popular.130 These games were either iambic lines or songs with members of the twenty-four strong chorus representing the letters. The physical shapes of letters were also contrived in poses and guessing games played with the audience. However, Athenaeus, however, traces a growing complexity from a simple exhibition of the alphabet (as in Callias' play Letter Revue (γραμματική θεωρία / γραμματική τραγῳδία) to an exercise of mentally visualising alphabet symbols into a hidden word (as in Euripides' puzzle in Theseus). In The Poet and the Women Aristophanes hints at the spelling of Euripides' name, the send-up probably implying that such devices were part of his style.131 In the first instance the audience could be learning or merely recognising the alphabet; in the second they are using it in a far more graphically complex manner.

It is likely that, in school, a similar method of oral learning was also probably accompanied by music and dancing.132 No matter how it was learned, the very concept of writing and knowledge of letters would have transformed Athenian psychology both individually and collectively. How far this can be equated to a literate reading public depends on contextual functionality. The evidence above indicates that a considerable proportion of the Athenian citizenry knew the alphabet and could spell words which, according to the clinical evidence outlined in Chapter II.3, would have developed in the student a 'VWFA'

128 Cf. Chapter II.5.
130 Freeman, Schools of Hellas, pp. 88-90. A more recent discussion maintaining that Callias' bawdy ribbing of alphabet games derived from the practice of tragedians of including alphabet scenes in their plays 'right from the start'; Ralph M. Rosen, 'Comedy and Confusion in Callias' Letter Tragedy', Classical Philology, Vol. 94, No. 2 (1999), pp. 147-167 at 154-159.
131 Aristoph. Thesmophoriazusa 777-784; Eurip. Frags. 578-90K.
132 Freeman, op. cit., p. 90.
(Dehaene and Cohen’s visual word form area), a particular modular architecture in the brain which, depending on the type of literacy attained, then modified the way in which a citizen thought about problem-solving.

3) Clarification of the utility and dynamics of reading as it relates to Athenian functional literacy

The surviving physical artifacts of text cited and discussed above suggest that reading was not independent of a highly oral component. For example, Günther demonstrates that without graphic grammatical organisation in text the experience of an Athenian child learning to read was considerably different to that of a child today:

Günther's point about the degree of difficulty and impossibility of silent reading highlights an important difference in the teaching of letters between ancient and modern times. It is a reminder to consider the warnings of Roy Harris and the others and be cautious of conceptualising Athenian literacy through European conditioning. In fact, with a little practise English readers can comfortably read without gaps between the words. The results for modern readers, as they relate to competency, suggests the function and practical application of reading for the average ancient Athenian was highly phonic. With relatively even spaced letters Athenians could read texts and inscriptions adequately for meaning:

133 Abstract demonstration of layout development in Hartmut Günther, ‘History of Written Language Processing’, in Pontecorco (ed.), Writing Development: An Interdisciplinary View, p. 133, Figure I. Günther notes cursive writing was not used until the early Middle Ages [p. 134].

134 Dehaene, Reading in the Brain, p. 158.
Dehaene shows that there is a visual component in the ‘sequence of information processing stages’ (including the parallel or dual processing routes discussed in Chapter II.5) that indicates that irregular letter size, font change, letter strings, even orientation, does not affect reading competency. It is the spacing of letters and eye fixation (saccades) that is most relevant in this regard; and it is culturally adaptive:

We identify only ten or twelve letters per saccade: three or four to the left of fixation, and seven or eight to the right. Beyond this point, we are largely insensitive to letter identity and merely encode the presence of the spaces between words. By providing cues about word length, the spaces allow us to prepare our eye movements and ensure that our gaze lands close to the center of the next word. Experts continue to debate about the extent to which we extract information from an upcoming word - perhaps only the first few letters. ... In the West, visual span is much greater toward the right side, but in readers of Arabic or Hebrew, where gaze scans the page from right to left, this asymmetry is reversed. In other writing systems such as Chinese, where character density is greater, saccades are shorter and visual span is reduced accordingly.135

In this regard, Gagarin’s hypothesis that gridlines on stone inscriptions were to keep letters evenly spaced for ease of reading, is relevant.136 Nevertheless, in view of both Günther’s and Dehaene’s observations, for Athenians, the process of letter recognition functioned more easily than their word recognition. The practice of script being written left to right in one line and then right to left in the other (mirror writing) is sometimes viewed as a pathology in modern adults.137 Plato indicates that students may have been trained to cope with boustrephodon script [Republic 3.402b; app. 8.III.13]. This type of script, boustrephodon, ‘from the movement of the plough over a field’,138 appears on pottery and stone, but examples have not been found of the larger tracts of authors. The point is, without further training, even if the alphabet was known and could be sung or recited, and words could be deciphered phonetically from the lines of letters, the internalised spatial identity of words was probably weak, or nonexistent. In considering the degree and type of literacy competency of the majority, it is important to note that the general process of learning to read in fifth-century BC

135 Dehaene, op. cit., p. 16-17; cf. 79, 116-119, 264-269.
136 Gagarin, Writing Greek Law, p. 48.
Athens does not equate to them being taught to be able to sit in a corner with a book and move the eyes across the words on the page and silently comprehend the written context.\(^{139}\) At this level reading was not user-friendly and not aimed at exciting any abstract 'serial reasoning' in the sense of Dennett's term; Günther suggests it was more an aide mémoire for an already rote-learned text, rather than a tool for 'extracting information' from an unknown text of 'continuous' writing.\(^{140}\) This coincides with what Plato had to say about literacy education, although a contradiction to this could be a comic exchange between an oracle man (χρησμολόγος) and Mr. Average 414BC Athenian, Peisthetairos, in *The Birds*. There it is implied that the Athenian *could* read unfamiliar text and write as well; even though Peisthetairos does not actually do either. The laughs possibly lie in the absurdity of the suggestion (λαβῇ τὸ βιβλίον), but at least Peisthetairos appears to confidently handle the papyrus rolls.\(^{141}\)

### III.4 CONCLUSION

In Athens during the fifth century BC a majority of male citizens were functionally literate within the context of their culture. Their writing skills extended to an ability to phonetically compose words and construct simple two or three word sentences of ownership, dedication or admiration. They could also read phonetically, however, this did not generally entail lengthy tracts. Even with this simple literacy, left hemisphere brain architecture would have been restructured with a 'VWFA'. For the individual, the change in cognitive function and capacity began with the acquisition of letters. At the collective level, the move from a 'semi-oral' society, with a small minority able to read and write, to a functionally 'literate' society took approximately seven generations.

While the use of metred text in literacy tuition enhanced the ability to learn and remember laws, songs and prayers laid down in metre and used as a reference in problem-solving, it did not extend the ability to create extended argument strings in written form. Later chapters examine the higher education and prose literacy that developed the skills for extended forensic *pro* and *contra* argument.

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\(^{139}\) Günther [op. cit, p. 142] notes that silent reading was not practised until sometime after the fourth century.


\(^{141}\) Aristoph. *Birds* 974-990.
The following chapter considers how and why the Homeric canon became the foremost vehicle for literacy education in Athens in the first half of the fifth century BC.
CHAPTER IV
HOW HOMER BECAME THE MAINSTAY OF THE LITERACY CURRICULUM:
THE GRADUAL INTRODUCTION OF LETTERS TO ATHENS

Close examination reveals a bewildering range of ways of using the written word,
which seem very largely to reflect the society in question and its beliefs. Wider
theories about the significance or implications of literacy (in general) must also be
modified by such variation.

Rosalind Thomas,
(Literacy and Orality in Ancient Greece, p. 12.)

IV.1 ABSTRACT

This chapter, in conjunction with the following one, takes a broad approach to the question of
how, as fifth and fourth century BC literary sources claim, Athens adopted the Iliad and the
Odyssey as the basis of their primary education.1 It argues the following hypothesis:

1. By the closing decades of the sixth century BC everybody was familiar with Homer (identified
as the author of the two epics), not just because it was good 'literature' but because the
Peisistratidae made it popular for political reasons.

2. For political reasons, a written text of Homer was necessary to 'fix' the performances of the
poems at the Panathenaic festival. This did not mean a totally 'fixed' text because it is not in the
nature of extended poetic recitation. (This aspect is examined in Chapter V.2.)

3. Writing in Athens at this time was more related to ritualistic practices rather than as a tool of
communication, which is why a practical, rather than literary or psychological reason, more
completely explains the placement of the Athenian textualisation to the sixth century BC.

4. There were prose written texts in existence in Greece, but, in Athens, due to the highly 'non-
literate' quality of the culture, there was no need to write prose beyond lists and simple
sentences. Problem-solving was done with poetry, described by Egbert Bakker as 'special
speech'.2

5. If there was no need to write extended prose sentences, there was no need to teach them

The method for hypothesis 1 is to focus, not only on the literary sources, but on the extant
clayware of the period in order to ascertain the extent of knowledge of Homer prior to the
Peisistratidae. The research of Snodgrass, Shapiro and Boardman particularly indicates that
the argument, on the basis of ceramic art, for Athenians having written texts of the canon prior to the
mid-sixth century BC, is unsound. In a period before widespread literacy, the trends in
pictorial representation betray symbiotic Peisistratidae relationships in the evolution of attic
clayware and the Homeric works.

The historical and literary evidence is also examined to explain why Peisistratus favoured Homer
rather than other poets of the Epic Cycle. The section attempts to explain the chronology of
Athenian interest in the Homeric canon and why a preference for the Iliad and the Odyssey can be
attributed to the actions of the Peisistratidae who, it is argued, were responsible for providing
Athens with a written text that was then used to disseminate 'official' copies of tracts of the
poems.

The position taken here and in the next chapter is that thinking of the Iliad and the Odyssey as
reified texts is unhelpful when considering the historical chronology of when and why Athens

1 The type and extent of Homeric influence on practical education is covered in Appendix 3.2.
needed a written text. The most sensitive issue is whether the works were the product of a single unified composition or the fluid outcome of successive oral performances. Many theoretical models neglect the historical context as to whether the favoured period was physically able to produce lengthy text, or whether the psychology of the time was capable of reading such text. The discussion in the following chapter carries the debate further to consider why poets would actually need to write down their work.

There is no argument here that there were never any other textualisations of Homer in Greece before Peisistratus. The consideration is for Athens only, with a view to understanding how textualised sections of the poems might have been distributed to the cultural and civic groups participating in the Panathenaic festival, and then organically (in the sense that the text itself was not important, only its practical use in oral performance) treated as master script which became a resource for literacy education.

While the uses of writing were generally ritualistic until well into the sixth century BC, this was the first period in Athens in which a monumental work such as Homer could have been recorded. This historical approach concludes that Peisistratus had the motive, the knowledge, means and opportunity. The motive was political; the opportunity through wealth and connections to Ilion and a ritualised populace ready and willing to hear new songs.

IV.2 THE ARCHAEOLOGICAL AND HISTORICAL EVIDENCE FOR A PEISISTRATIDAE TEXTUALISATION OF HOMER

1) The artwork on clayware indicates more subjects featured other poems, so why the sudden preference for Homer?3

In Athens by the latter half of the fifth century BC Homer was considered the foremost poet and was frequently and ably quoted. It would seem that the Iliad and Odyssey had become significant educational tools. These works, however, were a small portion of the oral stories communicated in proto-literate Greece. It would seem reasonable that this ubiquitous predilection for Homer would be reflected in the subjects depicted on Attic ceramics, but this is not the case. Other poems are featured more frequently in the extant art than the Iliad or Odyssey.

So how can we explain the sudden preference for Homer? This section argues that the literature and archaeology suggest the Peisistratidae were responsible. For political reasons they needed Athenians to hear the same Homer at the Panathenaic festival and, competing Athenian phyles, phratries or genê would

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have accumulated, randomly over time, rehearsal texts of Homer, which then became a teaching tool for the literacy curriculum in individual phyles or phratries. Appreciation of Homer grew in tandem with a growth in knowledge of letters. What follows considers how Homer could have become the mainstay of the literacy curriculum by a random, organic accession initiated by the Peisistratidae. It suggests that the conventional argument that the growing Athenian democracy provided the initial impetus for a wider literacy within the population neglects the data indicating that the technology for literacy grew piecemeal from the Peisistratidae need for Athenians to sing and hear the same Homer at the Panathenaea. 

There were more artistic representations of other oral poems, yet there was a sudden preference for Homer. Factors other than literary quality alone need to be considered. As noted in footnote three, from at least the seventh century BC, the Iliad and Odyssey were only two of many oral stories communicated in proto-literate Greece. In Athens, however, succeeding fifth and fourth century BC generations universally recognised these epics as superior to all others. Authors imitated Homeric style and a quote from Homer often became the paradigm upon which to hang a new argument. Herodotus and Thucydides used him as a

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4 Anna Missiou [Literacy and Democracy in Fifth-Century Athens, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2011, pp. 7, 85-92] sees the same process in 'the pursuit of political equality' throughout the far-flung demes and tribes of Attica through the democracy. There is no doubt that it was a factor in the increase of written communication between, and within, the demes: military mobilisation lists, war casualty lists, property markers, organisational and religious 'accounting' lists, procedural laws and orders were all utilised in 'officials' literacy' and 'banking literacy'.

5 For example, they are frequently referenced by Pindar and Herodotus; Aristophanes [Frogs 1035] called him divine [ὁ θείος Ὀμήρος]. In the Laws [3.680] Plato portrays a Spartan as regarding Homer as 'the prince of poets' [δοκεῖν γε κρατεῖν τῷ ποιητῶν ποιητῶν]; an Athenian as being able to quote him and a Cretan recognising Homer's fine 'quality of mind' [ὁ ποιητὴς ὑμῶν οὔτος γεγονὼναι χαρίτες]. In Republic Plato names Homer 'master of tragedy' [598d-e] and confirms his primacy: [Y]ou meet encomiasts of Homer who tell us that this poet has been the educator of Hellas, and that for the conduct and refinement of human life he is worthy of our study and devotion, and that we should order our entire lives by the guidance of this poet [606e, trans. Paul Shorey]. Lycurgus [Against Leocrates 1.102] recognised the earlier generation's deep respect for Homer. Aeschines [Against Timarchus 1.142] ranked Homer 'the oldest and wisest of the poets.' Cf. Aristotle [Poetics 1459b] who adjudged Homer 'divinely inspired': ' Epic needs reversals and discoveries and calamities, and the thought and diction too must be good. All these were used by Homer for the first time, and used well. Of his poems he made the one, the Iliad, a 'simple' story turning on 'calamity,' and the Odyssey a 'complex' story—it is full of 'discoveries'—turning on character. Besides this they surpass all other poems in diction and thought.' Elsewhere he considered him 'the supreme epic poet' [Poetics 1448b]. It should be noted however that many of the 'Homerian Hymns' composed by others were also credited to Homer.

6 For example Simon Hornblower [Thucydides and Pindar: Historical Narrative and the World of Epinikian Poetry, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004, pp. 356-357] states: 'Pindar and Thucydides are rich in gnomic generalisation ... so is tragedy, especially in the ἀγώνες or
reference. Other poets were not ignored; the phrase is often 'Homer and the poets.' And, whilst Homer was credited with other works in different metres, it is clear that a thorough knowledge of the whole of the Iliad and Odyssey was particularly widespread in the fifth century BC:

Niceratus: My father, in his anxiety to make me a good man, made me learn the whole works of Homer; and I could now repeat by heart the entire Iliad and Odyssey.

Antisthenes: Has it escaped you that the professional reciters all know these poems?

Niceratus: How could it, when I listen to them almost every day?

[trans. Tredennick]

Two more such references are quoted in Appendix 8.4.1, one again from Xenophon [Memorabilia 4.2.10] and one from Plato [Alcibiades 1.112b]. Likewise, in Aristophanes' Banqueters (Δαιταλῆς) two youths are quizzed on rare words used by Homer.

debates ... [also] the rhetorical device by which a specific arithmetical statement is combined with a modest or pseudo-modest protestation of ignorance which has the effect of enhancing the believability of the precise statement. [Pin. O.13.45-6; Thuc. 3.87.3; cf. Hdt. 7.170.3] ... the ultimate model is Homeric (Iliad 2.488ff.). Likewise Herodotus; although Henry R. Immerwahr, [Form and Thought in Herodotus, Chapel Hill, N.C., Cleveland, Press of Western Reserve University for the American Philological Association, 1966, pp. 7, 11, 13-16, 19, 59 n.43, 263] stresses his innovation he also acknowledges the Homeric influence.

Examples for the use of Homer as paradigm: Isocrates [Paneg. 159], quoted below; while Lycurgus [Against Leocrates 1.104-108] used Homer and Tyrtæus to construct his argument. Likewise Aristotle, e.g. Nicomachean Ethics 1.10.1-5; 10.8.12. Plato repeatedly quotes directly from Homer, cf. for example, in Laws, the Iliad 3.681e, 4.706e, 10.906e; the Odyssey 6.777a, 7.804a, 10.904e, and 12.944a begins the argument with the Iliad.

7 For example, Herodotus who frequently referred his facts against Homer [2.23, 116-118; 3.18; 4.29, 32, 149, 190; 7.161; 9.103]. Thucydides referenced him as a primary source, 'the best evidence for this' [τεκμηριών δὲ μάλιστα Ὀμήρος]; quoted him [1.9.4, [Il. 2.108]; 3.104.4 [crediting the Hymn to Apollo as Homer's work]]; confirmed Athenians thought his words delightful [ὁστις ἔπεις μὲν τὸ αὐτικα τέρπει]

8 For example, Aristophanes [Frogs 1035]; Just look right from the start how useful the noble race of poets has been. For Orpheus taught us rites and to refrain from killing. And Musaeus taught the cures of illness and oracles, and Hesiod the working of the land, harvest seasons, plowing. Divine Homer, Where did he get honor and glory if not from teaching useful things. Aristotle notes an instance when Homer was taken as evidence in arbitration relating to the ownership of Salamis [Rheticus 1.15.13]. Likewise, in Laws Plato quotes Theognis, 1.630a; Hesiod 3.690e, 4.719a, 10.901a; Tyrtæus 1.639b-d and Pin. 3.690b.


It would seem reasonable that this preference for Homer would be a long standing one and reflected in the extant artwork on seventh and sixth century BC Attic clayware, ever since the oral creation and dissemination of the poems themselves. Significantly, this is not the case; Homer was not as well represented as is conventionally suggested. The work of Snodgrass and Shapiro both highlight the widespread misinterpretation of extant clayware that distorts the chronology for the popularity and textualisation of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. For example, a survey by Snodgrass, following the analysis of Fittschen, Kannicht, Cook and Ahlberg-Cornell shows that, between 600 and 530BC, scenes depicting the Trojan legend increased around 590%, but items that could be ascribed to Homeric characters remained steady at 29% (±1%); the same as for earlier periods in extant collections. In his opinion less than 10% demonstrate a knowledge of Homer and many identifications betray the 'wishful and sentimental thinking which … has too long prevailed in this field'.

Shapiro likewise takes exception to such use of the extant collections as evidence for knowledge of Homer, especially through any early written text. This is because the randomness of survival, and the particularly fragmentary state of clayware which happens to survive, make them unreliable as indications of which poems became known where and when. The question of when written texts of epics first appeared in Greece and Athens especially is addressed in a separate section below. The point at present is that the specific identification of iconography as belonging to Homer can lead to false assumptions. Another example comes from Steven Lowenstam, who attributes any discrepancies between the painted images and the textual *Iliad* or the *Odyssey* as 'artistic licence' and cites respected supporting scholarship that 'painters were well

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13 Shapiro, 'Old and New Heroes', p. 137.
grounded in some version of the Homeric poems.\textsuperscript{14} He spots the sixth century BC evolution of Achilles from ‘grizzled, bearded warrior’ to beautiful youth by citing the Camtar Painter (555BC). This painter portrayed Achilles bearded and unbearded in the same scene on different vases. Lowenstam sees him as one artist who fits the bill as being ‘valuable for the Homerist to pursue this evolution of portraiture because in essence the painters have become the first critics and interpreters of Homer.’\textsuperscript{15} In view of Aristotle’s statement that all the other Trojan legends pursued life-story plots whilst Homer alone focussed on episodes, it might be safer to consider such examples as possibly referring to one of the other Trojan stories.

Whilst Snodgrass does not himself subscribe to a late redaction of Homer,\textsuperscript{16} he demonstrates the lack of evidence for tying knowledge of Homer to art, or indeed to literacy, before the sixth century BC. To identify eighth or seventh century BC artwork with an extant Homeric text makes us ‘guilty of a completely false assumption’ that the Iliad known to the artist was a text or version resembling the extant one.


\textsuperscript{15} Lowenstam, ‘The Uses of Vase-Depictions in Homeric Studies’, p. 182. Cf. the Camtar Painter, Beazley 300782; Louvre CP10521, Athenian Black-figure Amphora, Neck, -575 to -525. and Boston 21.21; F] [Friis Johansen], figs. 25-26.


\textsuperscript{16} His sole reason is from an artistic rather than historical perspective: cf. \textit{Homer and the Artists}, p. 77.
This approach is compatible with M.L. West’s hypothesis of the somewhat anonymous nature of the epic tradition. He notes that elegiac and lyric poets speak of their creation in terms such as εὐρίσκειν, ποιεῖν, σοφίζεσθαι, μῶσθαι whereas ‘the epic ἀοιδός is not said to do any of these things, he just sings’. Thus, the concept of an actual author was not originally attached to epic poetry. In this regard, Burkett, West and Powell all track the emergence of an established ancient practice of professional rhapsode groups assuming a genos and fictitious ancestor. They note the first identification of Homeridae as evidence for the existence of Homer the person is around 630BC, with the Chian rhapsode, Cynaethus, the first to frame Homer as an individual. Cynaethus was a wandering rhapsode, performing his Hymn to Apollo in Delos and visiting Syracuse between 504 and 501BC. This coincides with the analysis of Friis Johansen that ‘points to a date around 520BC as the moment when the [clayware] artists suddenly began to show knowledge of the whole Iliad instead of just a few favoured episodes taken mainly from the last third of the poem.’

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17 Snodgrass, op. cit., pp. 76-77.
19 Barry B. Powell, ‘Text, Orality, Literacy, Tradition, Dictation, Education, and Other Paradigms of Explication in Greek Literary Studies’, *Oral Tradition*, Vol. 15, No. 1 (2000), pp. 96-125, at 107-108. M.L. West [‘The Invention of Homer’, p. 374] gives the following examples: ‘there was the medical guild of the Asklepiadai in Cos, who claimed descent from the god or hero Asklepios, and were able to enumerate nineteen generations of healers from Asklepios to Hippocrates [cf. Soranus, *Vita Hippocratis* 1; cf. Jacoby on Pherecydes 3 F 59; L. Edelstein, RE Supp. 6.1295]. In Crete there were singers called ὠμηροτρίτις or ὠμηροτρίτεις, who sang love songs to the lyre, and they were supposed to be descended from one Ametor, who invented this type of song [cf. Ath. 638b; Hsch. s.v. ὠμήροτριτίς; *Et. Magn.* 83.15; 0. Crusius, RE 1.1828-9]. In the Eleusinian Mysteries the cantor-hierophants had the hereditary title of Eumolpidai, which means no more than Master Cantors; but they claimed to be descended from a legendary ancestor Eumolpos, who appears in the Hymn to Demeter as one of the rulers of Eleusis to whom the goddess revealed the Mysteries. Similarly the heralds or marshals at Eleusis, the Kerykes or Kerykidae, whose office was a hereditary privilege, traced their descent to a legendary person called Marshal (Keryx). Cf. Walter Burkert, *The Orientalizing Revolution: Near Eastern Influences on Greek Culture in the Early Archaic Age*, (Trans. M. E. Pinder and Walter Burkert), Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1992.
2) Symbiotic Peisistratidae relationships in the evolution of Attic clayware and the Homeric works

a) Pictorial fashions on clayware reflect political propaganda

The driving force of the revolution in clayware can be traced to the actions and political will of the Peisistratidae tyranny. Their civic construction, active support of the arts, and their newly stabilised trade routes would have created the right environment for a boom in the industry. It is most noticeable with the potter, Lydos, who did not paint a single old scene.\(^2\) It was neither 'accidental', nor 'capricious', that the old scenes disappeared in favour of the new ones. Innovations in the pictorial art on Attic clayware parallels a Peisistratidae endorsement of the works of Homer and the Panathenaea. A self-conscious individualism featured in new narrative techniques and composition of specific makers. These innovations had their artistic origins in the monumental and plastic arts initiated by building in the town and on the Acropolis in the period. Likewise the revolutionary changes in choice of subject, narrative and composition coincide with the ascendancy of the Peisistratidae.

Clayware art displayed a similar evolution in civic self-consciousness as can be traced in the literary accounts of the Panathenaea. Shapiro outlines how artistic narrative and composition suddenly exploded around the decade 570-560 BC with 'fundamental changes in the Athenians' perception of themselves and the world around them.\(^3\) The chronology parallels the psychological dynamics of the Panathenaea, which celebrated Athena in Athens by Athenians, thus enhancing the cult of the hero by identifying the 'hero' to the city:

i) Anthropocentric subjects superceded animal and Mischwesen hybrids (rare after 560 BC).

ii) Genre scenes of Athenian life make a sudden appearance (about 560 BC) as well as an entirely new set of myth subjects, 'radical changes in the Attic repertoire,' and a focus on individual heroes and their actions rather than collective activities.\(^4\)

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\(^2\) Shapiro 'Old and New Heroes', p. 134; cf. Michales Tiverios, Ho Lydos kai to ergo tou, Athens, s.n., 1976, p. 85. Shapiro notes, 'One exception may be the plate at Harvard, 1959.127, Para 44,54, with two winged male figures identified by Beazley as the Sons of Boreas. But since there are no other figures present, it is uncertain whether an excerpt from the Argonautika is intended.' [p. 134 n.180].

\(^3\) Shapiro, 'Old and New Heroes', pp. 135-136.

iii) New scenes centre around Theseus, Herakles and the Trojan cycle where Panhellenic figures were given an Attic identification (occurring no earlier than 570BC, more often 560BC).

iv) After 550BC Herakles, with no significant myth set in the region of Attica becomes 'more prevalent' in Attic art that anywhere else in Greece.  

v) Around 565-560BC the Gigantomachy featuring Athena is first seen.

vi) By about 550BC older scenes start to disappear 'rapidly' and are 'almost totally absent' from the most prolific half-century of Black-figure (and early Red-figure).

b) Patronage of individual potters reflect political factions

The potter Lydos favoured images of Heracles which were almost exclusively produced for the home market and would not have had a profitable place in his export business. There is, therefore, no reason to reject the possibility that Peisistratus actively supported the industry as a whole, and specific businesses with a view to increasing his popularity by symbolic associations with Heracles and the other heroes.

Likewise, there are aspects of kalos vases that could be extended into a political dimension. Artisan potters were important catalysts of public opinion, and the potter's 'caprice and arbitrariness' must have had some input into the 'acclamation of persons widely-known at any given time for their beauty'. For example extant kalos-cups inscribed ATHENODOTOS KALOS, 'very approximately' 0.5% of total Athenian clayware produced survives; making around three thousand pieces acclaiming Athenodotus, quite possibly for a single athletics competition. Thus the influence of the Athenian ceramics industry was widespread, beyond Athens itself. The ceramics factory itself

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26 Shapiro, op. cit., p. 115. Cf. p. 122 for a table of ‘old scenes.’ Shapiro [p. 134] notes that the first three generations of identifiable artists (Nettos 650-575BC; the Gorgon Painters 625-550BC; Sophilos and the Komast Group) paint old scenes and overlapping scenes, but do not paint any of the new scenes; those active between 570-550BC (Kleitias, the C-Painter, Heidelberg Painter and early Tyrrhenian vases) depict old, overlapping and new scenes. However, Lydos is the first major potter to paint exclusively overlapping and new scenes, 'with a strong emphasis on the new'.
would also have been politically influential on the domestic market. This is because, even though most extant kalos vases do not designate a name (perhaps because they were reusable and intergenerational), the very nature of Greek sexuality within factional phratry groups, the use of a particular name would have meant that they sported their own kalos celebrities with cups from favoured potters.\(^{30}\) With the maker’s mark, EPOIESEN …, the branding, some Athenian drinking cups held the same status as do Moser or Waterford today. Because the quality and style of drinkware informed guests where a family stood politically, the work of ceramic artists, therefore played a similar part in propaganda to bolster the Peisistratidae tyranny as did the iconography of the Panathenaea and the gradual dissemination of Homer. The evident factional opposition to the Peisistratidae would have had the support of other potteries.

Boardman sees a definite propaganda agenda on the part of Peisistratus in relation to the Iliad and Odyssey.\(^{31}\) The choice of heroes bolstered their authority and a correlation appears between heroic subject matter and other political stunts carried out by Peisistratus. For example, he and his supporters carried Heraclean clubs when they seized power on the Acropolis in 561 BC, and the story reported by Herodotus of his returning to Athens with an Athena look-alike in his chariot.\(^{32}\) Even if Peisistratus did not initiate clayware fashion, he at least could read the trends. For example the amphora, which was chosen for Panathenaiic prizes, rapidly became the favoured shape in Black-figure.\(^{33}\) Whether the fashion came first or was the result of the Panathenaiic prize (for which artisans also produced miniature souvenir amphoras), it was good


business brought in by Peisistratus. Thus the industry is stamped with Peisistratidae influence.

3) The historical context for a Peisistratidae textualisation of the Iliad and the Odyssey

Aristotle attested that the tragedians found the other works inspirational, yet the general consensus in the fifth and fourth centuries BC appears to have been that the Iliad and the Odyssey were superior. Quality and fashion, however, does not fully explain this ascendancy over the other epics: 'the more basic question is not why, but how, the Iliad and Odyssey became preeminent.' The evidence suggests the Peisistratidae promotion of festival choral activity in the Panathenaea and the Greater Panathenaea which, in their own interests, would have necessitated an 'official' Iliad and Odyssey. In consequence, piecemeal rehearsal texts became a principle physical resource for literacy education in local schools. This argument details how the Peisistratidae had the motive, the means, and were the first in Athens to have the opportunity to disseminate written texts.

To begin with, in Hipparchus, Plato notes that a comprehensive (but non-institutionalised) educational system was encouraged by the Peisistratidae and that it involved an increased exposure to Homer as well as incentives for citizens to be able to read [Hipparchus 228b-e; app. 8.IV.2]. Along with the beginnings of literacy education, Plato's words emphasise a compulsion (ἀναγκασθείη) to sing Homer as well as certain set rituals for the performance of the poems. Isocrates also gives the same impression that children were taught to recite (ἐμανθάσθω) Homer [Panegyricus 159; app. 8.IV.3]. Note also that Plato claimed the rhapsodes were compelled to sing in relay, 'one following the other.' Any one of these three factors: compulsion, competition and ritual repetition, would each have favoured a fixed version of the epics. The compulsion to use Homer exclusively was probably politically motivated by the Peisistratidae, who claimed connection with Neleus, Nestor, Peisistratus and Antilochos, as well as with the

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35 Tragedians were inspired by Little Iliad and Kypria: Aristotle [Poetics 1459b] explains how the Kypria and the Little Iliad were consistently used as inspiration for tragedy; ‘several’ tragedies inspired by the Kypria and more than eight from the Little Iliad - e.g. The Award of Arms, Philoctetes, Neoptolemus, Eurypylus, The Begging, The Laconian Women, The Sack of Troy, and Sailing of the Fleet, and Sinon, too, and The Trojan Women.

burial site of Achilles, Patroclus and Antilochos at Sigeum.\textsuperscript{37} While these characters were prominent in the other epics of the Trojan legend (and figure amongst the 590\% increase of scenes painted on clayware), the \textit{Iliad} and \textit{Odyssey} especially associates the family with Athena, making them most suitable paradigms to legitimise Peisistratidai power in Athens. Peisistratidai control of Sigeum finally secured the grain routes to Athens and citizens grateful to see the end of famine would have happily competed in the newly instituted Greater Panathenaea of 565BC.\textsuperscript{38} They would also have enthusiastically embraced the new Homeric poems: there is evidence that citizen choruses and individual \textit{rhapsodes} trained for this and other festivals organised at the local level during the last quarter of the century\textsuperscript{39} where they were said to have enthusiastically embraced the learning of poetry that was new to them [\textit{Pl. Timaeus} 21b-c; app. 8. IV.4].

Inventive propaganda runs throughout the Peisistratidai tyranny. The stories of Heracles, and the linking of Athena with the leader of the polis, for example, have already been mentioned.\textsuperscript{40} That Peisistratus could place serious public relations value on Homeric recitations at the Panathenaea is attested to by the

\textsuperscript{37} The Peisistratidai traced their descent from Neleus of Pylos [\textit{Hdt.} 5.65.3-4]. Nestor's youngest son, Peisistratus, features in \textit{Odyssey} [3.36, 396-400] and Nestor's other son, Antilochos, the youngest prince in \textit{Iliad} [15. 569, 23.306]; whose shade and burial site is mentioned in the \textit{Odyssey} [4.188, 11.468, 24.16, 76-84; \textit{Pin. Pyth.} 6.28]. Tyrannos Peisistratus of Philaidae installed Hegesistratus his elder son as ruler of Sigeum [\textit{Hdt.} 5.94.1-2, cf. 5.65] while his granddaughter married the neighbouring ruler of Lampsacus [\textit{Thuc.} 6.59].

\textsuperscript{38} An alternative view, such as H. Aigner's ['Sigeon und die Peisistratidische Homerforderung', \textit{Rheinisches Museum fur Philologie}, Vol. 121 (1978), pp. 204-9], that Peisistratus used Homeric recitations during the Panathenaea to gain acceptance for his operations in the Troad perhaps neglects the gratitude historically engendered through famine relief.

\textsuperscript{39} Aristotle \textit{Ath. Pol.} 54.7, 56.3. The \textit{Iliad} and the \textit{Odyssey} were sung to audiences; cf. M.L. West, ['The Singing of Homer and the Modes of Early Greek Music', \textit{The Journal of Hellenic Studies}, Vol. 101 (1981), pp. 113-129, esp. 115, 121-124] who notes: 'I conclude that Homeric 'singing' was truly singing, in that it was based on definite notes and intervals, but that it was at the same time a stylised form of speech, the rise and fall of the voice being governed by the melodic accent of the words.' Peter Wilson [\textit{The Athenian Institution of the Khoregia: The Chorus, the City and the Stage}, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 75; cf. 339,n.111] argues for the mixing of all strata for the boys' choruses. Cf. contra view, David Pritchard, 'Kleisthenes, Participation, and the Dithyrambic Contests of Late Archaic and Classical Athens, \textit{Phoenix}, Vol. 58, No. 3/4 (2004), pp. 208-228, esp. 211-214. The dating for the innovation or alteration of the festival is indicated by the construction of the Panathenaic Way, the original ramp was found to have been constructed over a demolished house and well 'that were in use down to ca. 550' [Noel Robertson, 'The City Center of Archaic Athens', \textit{Hesperia}, Vol. 67, No. 3 (1998), pp. 283-302]. Cf. R.G.A. Weir, 'The Lost Archaic Wall around Athens', \textit{Phoenix} 49, (1995), pp. 247-258; E. Vanderpool, 'The Date of the Pre-Persian City Wall of Athens', in \textit{ФОРОΣ: Tribute to B.D. Meritt}, D.W. Bradeen & M.F. McGregor (eds.), Locust Valley, N.Y., J.J. Augustin, 1974, pp. 156-160.

\textsuperscript{40} Shapiro, 'Old and New Heroes', p. 121-126; John Boardman, 'Herakles, Peisistratus and Eleusis', pp. 1-12.
actions of Cleisthenes, who banned the performance of Homer in Sikyon.\(^{41}\) Political leaders routinely gave import to festival activities in Athens and considerable influence was exercised by festival judges presumably appointed under ‘the old law.’\(^{42}\) Plutarch states that Pericles instituted further musical contests at the Panathenaeae and he attributes similar acts to Sparta’s Lycurgus, while a later tradition suggested Solon also promoted round-robin recitations of Homer in Athens.\(^{43}\) In considering what begins to look like an archetypal story, it should be remembered that these things mattered, and that the Peisistratidae were lawgivers, even though it seems that in later centuries laws from this period were traditionally accredited to Solon who became the generic lawgiver.\(^{44}\) They were also festival overseers and, thus, it is probable that it was their actions that became the sterotypical in the minds of later writers. That such performances had an impact, and that poetic input was monitored is corroborated by Herodotus. He relates how Hipparchus exiled Onomacritus, a compiler (διαθέτην χρησιμων) of the works of Musaeus, because he attempted politically subversive interpolations. Plutarch also quotes Hereas of Megara, who maintained that Peisistratus removed a line from Hesiod to protect the image of Theseus and added a line to the Odyssey.\(^{45}\)

Also, as the compulsion to perform Homer related to competition, a ‘fixed’ or ‘official’ version would have been prudent from two points of view: first, because individual rhapsodes could not, like an Onomacritus, randomly alter the poems and omit Peisistratidae heroes; and second, because different phyles, phratries or genê could not haggle over ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ performances of their competing

\(^{41}\) Cleisthenes did not see Homer as a plus because the Iliad praised the Argives with whom he had been at war [Hdt. 5.67.1].

\(^{42}\) Pl. Laws 2.659; cf. 6.764d. -765a.

\(^{43}\) Plutarch Pericles 13.6. Plutarch [Lycurgus 4] has Lycurgus obtain the poems from the Kreophyleioi, epic performers from Kreophyllos of Samos. For Solon: Diogenes Laertius [1.57] citing Dieuchidas’ Megarian History: ‘He [Solon] has provided that the public recitations of Homer shall follow in fixed order: thus the second reciter must begin from the place where the first left off. Hence, as Dieuchidas says in the fifth book of his Megarian History, Solon did more than Peisistratus to throw light on Homer.’ Cf. J.A. Davison, ‘Notes on the Panathenaea’, The Journal of Hellenic Studies, Vo. 78 (1958), pp. 23-42; for Peisistratidae involvement especially pp. 26-33. In the fourth century Solon also became the archetypal lawgiver with later legislation randomly attributed to him.

\(^{44}\) For example, Aristoph., Birds 1660; Andoc. On the Mysteries 1.76, 81-83, 111; On the Peace 3.5; Aesch. Ag. Ctesiphon 3.2, 108, 175, 257; Against Timarchus 1.6, 18, 183, 9-12; Demosth. Ag. Timocrates 24.103, 106-7, 142, 211; On the Crown 18.6; Ag. Androtion 22.25, 30; Ag. Aristocrates 23.28; For Phormio 36.27; Lysias Ag. Theomnestus 10.15; Ag. Nichomachus 30.28; Pl. Symposium 209d; Ar. Rhetoric 1.15.13, 2.23.11. Cf. a discussion on archived laws, III.2.2.

\(^{45}\) Hdt. 7.6.3 cf. Pausanias 1.22.7; Plutarch, Theseus 20.1; Odyssey 11.631.
representative members. Episodes to be performed therefore needed to be fixed as far as storyline and themes and distributed among the phyles, phratries or genê as a reference.

A fixed text of the Iliad and Odyssey for the Panathenaic contests would have served as a template for the dissemination of Homer in episodic tracts for both the Panathenaic round robin competitions and the Panathenaic contests for competitions to rehearse festival performances. The Panathenaic round robin competitions would have increased a general familiarity with Homer, and for the Panathenaic contests, a rote knowledge of some tracts. The published pieces learned for each performance need not have been thrown away. It is probable they were kept and later utilised in the grammar schools set up by phyle, genê or phratry members. These organisations had far reaching input into the lives of individuals; it is reasonable to accept some input in literacy education because of their association with the Panathenaic contests, whose organisation was delegated amongst phyles, even though the festival's financial aspects were handled by the trittyes. In other words, the trittyes, and prominent members of phyles probably administered financial aspects of the Panathenaic contests. It is therefore probable that the Peisistratidae had a hand in the administration of the trittyes because the origins of the phratry was as a political institution of the polis and there is 'no reason, no evidence' to suggest the phratry was ever any type of 'pure' kinship

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46 This is not to say all competitors were reading the text. Only one chorus master or functionally literate attendant needed to read out the words for the performers to repeat and memorise.

47 Despite the discussion in Chapter III.2 regarding the non-retention of statutes and archiving, Homer was likely to have been kept whereas the ever-changing statutes were not, that Homer was as fixed and unchanging as it could be at that period; or rather that it was not expected to change from one to another.

48 Ar. Ath. Pol. 60.1, cf. 54.7. Thuc. 6.56-57.3. Trittyes were political divisions instituted by Peisistratus which combined town and country regions thus increasing Attic identification of the polis as a cohesive political entity.

49 Ar. Ath. Pol. 60.3. Furthermore, the saying, ἀπαίδευτος ἀχώρευτος [Pl. Laws 2.654a] highlights how important education in music and choral singing were. Officials were organised from phyle members to oversee the Panathenaic contests in the fourth century and it appears that the general system was as highly organised in the sixth century. Aristotle implies that education (though he is referring to the enculturation of older youths in his era) was not institutionalised by the state, yet at the same time he indicates that an improvement to education would be to administer it privately by the immediate family [Ar. Nikomachean Ethics 10.9.13-15]. It is possible to infer from this that other groups had influence on education. This also appears to have been the case in the sixth century. For example, Plutarch [Solon 1-2] describes Solon’s early life and education in a socially fluid, community-based context in which, 'with no lack of friends' [οἶκὸν ἐν ἀπορρήσει τοῖς βουλόμενοις ἐπαρκεῖν], he received assistance from his phratry or genê. Charles W. Hedrick Jr., ‘Phratry Shrines of Attica and Athens’, Hesperia, Vol. 60, No. 2 (1991), pp. 241-268, at 250] notes that the pre-Cleisthenic phratry organised and administered local affairs and was a mediator of citizenship. It did not however administer religious or financial affairs, which Nikolaos Papazarkadas [IG.IF 2490, The Epakreis and the Pre-cleisthenic Trittyes, Classical Quarterly, Vol. 57, No. 1 (2007), pp. 22-32, at 24, 27] points out was the responsibility of the pre-Cleisthenic trittys, a body though also tied to a locality.
group’.\textsuperscript{50} The point here is to relate the influence and connections of the Peisistratidae with the local bodies overseeing general education. This education was done at the phratry and genê level within the context of sunousia [συνούσια]. As noted in Chapter III.2.2, Herodotus confirms that literate choirs of Chians were well established by 495BC\textsuperscript{51} and were performing at Delos. Given that Peisistratus had earlier consolidated his power by sanctifying Delos, a Peisistratidae hand in Delian competitions is highly probable.\textsuperscript{52} Under the Peisistratidae competing Athenian choirs would have received similar tutoring as the Chians; if schools of one hundred and twenty boys in Chios were learning to read and write, so were Athenians. The seventy years between the first Greater Panathenaea and the Delian choirs of 495BC would have witnessed an increasing knowledge of Homer and a growing textual collection from a single template of Homeric tracts, originally intended as rehearsal notes, but subsequently available as teaching tools.

The only way to have ensured a politically useful version would have been to create a fixed official version, and the only way to do that was to write it down.\textsuperscript{53} The question of whether this could, or could not, actually guarantee word-perfect results is discussed in V.2.1 of the next chapter which deals with modes of composition and transmission. The point is that long tracts of memorised recitation can only occur from a fixed written source, and there is evidence from Xenophon, who would have been in school ca. 420-415BC, that by the 450s rhapsodes were 'word-perfect' (ἐπι ἀκριβούντως).\textsuperscript{54} Narrative consistency aside,


51 Chian association with Athens goes beyond Peisistratidae family connections. Being the last member to revolt from the Delian League, Chios had a close and long-term cultural and political association with Athens [Hdt. 6.27].

52 Hdt. 1.64; Thuc. 3.104.

53 Herodotus [7.6.3-4] relates how the Peisistratidae, reconciled with Onomacritus, manipulated his written oracles to persuade Xerxes to their cause.

the comment itself suggests an intimate running knowledge of a written text of Homer, both by the rhapsodes and by someone like Xenophon himself.

4) Physical barriers to the textualisation of Homer and the growing use of writing in everyday life

The archaeological and literary evidence indicates that it would have been both physically and psychologically challenging for Athenians to produce 28,000 lines of Homeric hexameters in written form before the second half of the sixth century BC. In the seventh and sixth centuries BC, there were of course some literates among the population capable of writing a reasonably spontaneous hexameter or two and potters inscribed everyday clayware vessels. Likewise, members of oikoi employed stonemasons to bury family members with farewell hexameters. But the sophistication was in the words, not the graphics. As noted in Appendix 6 and discussed below, the potters of the second half of the sixth century BC show varying competency in letters. Clearly this period exhibits features of the transition from ‘crypto-literacy’ to utilitarian literacy, ‘when writing is no longer regarded with mystical awe, but as a practical tool or technique for doing what would otherwise have to be done by means of


Stonemason inscriptions: grave stelae ca. 625-600 LSAG Pl.2.8, ca. 540 LSAG Pl.2.31; ca. 540 LSAG Pl.2.32; pillar/bases ca.625-600 LSAG Pl.2.7, 600-575 LSAG Pl.2.13, ca. 570-560 LSAG Pl2.17, ca.525 LSAG Pl2.36.

Dipinto by potters: e.g. ca. 625-600 - LSAG Pl.1.6a-b; ca. 570-550 LSAG Pl.2.14a; ca. 565 - BM Cat 1842.0728.834, http://www.britishmuseum.org/research, amphora inscribed τον 'Αθηνὴ βέην ἀθλιὸν ἐμί (retro.), [Old Cat. 569: Vases BM 130]; cf. Appendix 3.2. 3.

Inscribed by non-craftsmen: Dipylon oinochoe ca. 725 - LSAG Pl.1.1; on Skyphoi ca. 690-650 - LSAG Pl.1.3a-c, pp. 69 n.10, 70, cf. Powell, ‘Why was the Greek Alphabet Invented?’ p. 333; ca. 650 - LSAG Pl.1.4; amphorae ca. 650-590 LSAG Pl.2.10a, 10c, 10f; on eighth century stone - LSAG Pl.1.2; seventh century ostrakoi - Pl2.9c-e; ca. 550-525 - LSAG Pl.4.33. Cf. Robb, *Literacy and Paideia in Ancient Greece*, pp. 27-28.

For example, one mid-sixth century BC Siana cup may indicate a potter in training: on side A is: κολὼν ἐμί, τό ποτήριν καλ <ων> (I am a beautiful cup, the delicious drink is beautiful); competently written. Side B attests the letters καυ repeated at least three times, whilst the figure artist who painted the tondo (the inside of the bowl) surrounds his dancer with nonsense letters. CAVI description: Beazley 915, Paris, Louvre F.66; Black-figure cup, 575 to 525BC. Further examples of inscriptions on clayware are in Appendix 6.
speech.\textsuperscript{57} This does not exclude the continuing use of writing as a vehicle for magic. However, the jump from an elegant hexameter or two, clumsily inscribed on stone or clay, to 28,000 verses of closely lettered text presents hurdles that some maintain could not have been overcome, even late in the sixth century BC.\textsuperscript{58}

Another view comes from Gagarin (following Powell,\textsuperscript{59}) who sees the same collection of one and two line inscriptions as evidence of a generally literate seventh century BC reading-public capable of deciphering the 3,000 word \textit{thesmoi} of Draco inscribed on rotating \textit{axones}.\textsuperscript{60} Reading that many words inscribed on vertical wood or stone would be quite a feat to negotiate without a guiding finger or ruler. Nevertheless succeeding generations referred to the written texts of Draco and (later) Solon’s laws.\textsuperscript{61} There is, however, no evidence that law inscriptions of any length were accomplished in Athens before the second half of the sixth century BC. The earliest archaic archaeology is from Crete, a society renowned for legal inscriptions, but with very few literates.\textsuperscript{62} Several blocks of seventh century BC Cretan law codes were found at Dreros. One (now lost) was 75cm long and 26cm high, with less than one hundred letters in two scripts; the other exhibited approximately thirty-nine words in ninety-one letters; both were not tidily fashioned.\textsuperscript{63} Without evidence of more fragments nearby, the length of these laws may not be determined, but they are unlikely to resemble Crete’s Gortyn Code. This readable written prose law code found at Gortyn, one and a half metres high, nine metres long with 3,000 words, is as monumental as would have been the hypothesised law of Draco. It is dated to the first half of the fifth

\textsuperscript{57} William V. Harris, \textit{Ancient Literacy}, pp. x-xi.
\textsuperscript{58} Havelock \textit{[The Literate Revolution in Greece and Its Cultural Consequences,} Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1982, pp. 180-181] especially denies the possibility of a full redaction of Homer before the Peisistratidae tyranny claiming that ‘writing on this scale would presume a habit developed into an art. In \textit{Preface to Plato} [Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1963, pp vii-ix] he notes, ‘Because we are literate we are ‘prone to visualise this as a single event; to postulate that the technology of the alphabet once invented would be applied wholesale to the transcription ... the Greek ‘writer,’ whether visualised as \textit{rhapsode} or as scribe, is imagined to seat himself at a desk (tablets in his lap would not suffice) in order to transcribe on to rolls of papyrus.’
\textsuperscript{60} Draco is said to have written 3,000 words: \textit{γραφαίν ὑπήκοας εἰς ἑπταμέγιστα} [Suda \textit{Lexicon} 1495; ‘Draco’ (Adla No: delta, 1495), Suda On Line, 30/11/2012. http://www.stoa.org/sol-entries/delta/1495>. The word used for ‘words’ can mean either verses or ‘sayings’.
\textsuperscript{61} Andoc. \textit{On the Mysteries} 1.81, 84; Aesch. \textit{Against Timarchus} 1.8; Ar. \textit{Ath. Pol.} 7.1; Plut. Solon 25.
century BC, generations after Draco. And the question of whether this monument
was there to be read, or simply marvelled at in a religious context, is still up for
debate.\footnote{Cf. Whitley, op. cit., pp. 637-645.} The religious question also surrounds Dracon's laws because they were
called \textit{thesmoi} and not \textit{nomoi}. Such monuments therefore had symbolic, parabolic
reference and public display did not need to be comprehensive. The Gortyn
Code proves it can be done physically, but not in Athens before the
Peisistratidae. The reason that there is no bronze or stone evidence from Athens
until 520BC 'is not a trivial fact, nor merely a matter of the accident of survival'.\footnote{Whitley, op. cit., p. 645.} Psychological limits to literacy in Athens, even at the beginning of the fifth
century BC, suggest vast texts on walls were not meant to be read as reference. A
focus on the act of reading suggests that lengthy texts would more likely have
been written on scrolls. Powell, also an advocate of widespread literacy and an
eighth century BC textualisation of Homer, describes how script was likely to be
read and in so doing highlights the problems of tackling vast tracts of writing:

\begin{quote}
A script that went back and forth across the page without punctuation, word
division, capitalisation, or diacritical marks, column after column, roll after roll,
unintelligible to the eye or the mind until sounded out and heard aloud.\footnote{Powell, 'Text, Orality, Literacy, Tradition, Dictation, Education', Fig. 9, p. 115; p. 116.} [My italics]
\end{quote}

Even if some early Ionic letters indicate the availability of a cursive script,\footnote{L.H. Jeffrey, \textit{The Local Scripts of Archaic Greece, The Local Scripts of Archaic Greece}, [LSAG], Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1990, pp. 57, 327ff.} Powell's description pinpoints how physically slow and cognitively difficult the
process would be.\footnote{The way a sofer writes a 79,000 word Torah is instructive in that he writes without sentence
sense, speaking each single word before writing it down.} The utility of extended monumental text as tracts for general
reference in this period of 'crypto-literacy' needs to be rethought. Plato implies
both literate lawgivers and poets in the sixth century BC, but the material for
extended tracts was more likely to be papyrus or something flexible.\footnote{Pl., \textit{Laws} 858c-e; cf. Appendix 8.III.4; Chapter III.2.2.} And, while Herodotus records a period when papyrus supplies were unavailable, he
describes a technique successfully employing leather as a writing material.\footnote{Hdt. 5.58.3.}

The argument for how and why Homeric \textit{rhapsodes} would want to 'compose' or
'preserve' with writing is discussed at length in V.2.1-2 where the various poetic
techniques as proposed by Bakker, Rubin and Minchin are considered in the
light of script generation. The conclusion is that the poets themselves did not
need written script to preserve the Homeric canon. Because of this, it is argued here that a political motivation is enough to explain the event: providing sufficient supplies of papyrus, leather or even wooden tablets, physically it could be done. Objections are raised as to the expense of a hide copy of the Iliad, but such considerations would not faze Athenians as financially and politically dominant as the Peisistratidae. There is therefore no insurmountable physical reason that the Iliad and Odyssey could not have been written down, even if papyrus was unobtainable; painted boards from the period have been attested.\(^7\) Powell’s point, ‘unintelligible to the eye or the mind until sounded out’, highlights the dubious psychological dimension of the usefulness of such long tracts to rhapsodes.

Other texts, however, are attested to in the late sixth century and early fifth century BC, both in a public and private capacity. The prophecies of Musaeus were mentioned earlier and there are references to other such religious documents being used in this period.\(^7\) Xenophanes knew the cosmology of other Ionic and Eleatic phenomenologists; did he read them or hear them? As he grew up near Ephesus in Asia Minor and then lived in Elea, Italy, he probably listened. Even so, he appears to have exchanged his work with another, lesser poet in a competitive spirit, and, as he uses the word, πέμψας (πέμπω=send). This implies distance and possibly suggests an exchange of texts [Xenophanes

\(^7\) Cf. Boardman, ‘Painted Votive Plaques and an Early Inscription from Aegina’, The Annual of the British School at Athens, Vol. 49 (1954), pp. 183-201, esp. 187 regarding Attic painting. Nor would legibility have been an issue. The only papyrus find so far in Greece is a fourth century BC religious text. Tombs at Derveni Langada, Salonica investigated by Makaronas found a papyrus roll: [In] tomb A was found in the ashes of the pyre ... a papyrus roll, carbonised but not completely consumed. The writing is clearly visible on both sides of the roll as it now exists but whether it will be possible to open it out and recover more of the text remains to be seen. From the few words that can be read it is clear that it has to do with a religious text in prose. ... The papyrus is securely dated in the second half of the fourth century B.C. and is thus one of the earliest known Greek papyri. It is the only one ever found in Greece. Cf. Eugene Vanderpool, ‘News Letter from Greece’ American Journal of Archaeology, Vol. 66, No. 4 (1962), pp. 39-391; especially 390, cf. pl. 108, fig. 4. Cff. Hubert Hunger, ‘Papyrusfund in Griechenland’, Chronique d’Égypte Vol. 37, No. 74 (1962). Cff. Janko, ‘Review: Gábor Betegh, The Derveni Papyrus: Cosmology, Theology and Interpretation’, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004’, Bryn Mawr Classical Review, 2005.01.27, http://bmr.brynmawr.edu/2005/2005-01-27.html. This papyrus is neatly written compared to another extant high quality book from the fourth century AD which is particularly irregular with a ‘rough-and-ready appearance’; cf. Davison, ‘Literature and Literacy in Ancient Greece: II. Caging the Muses’, Phoenix, Vol. 16, No. 4 (1962), pp. 219-233; at 222.

\(^7\) In what appears to have been a traditional practice, Herodotus [7.142.1] mentions old texts of Delphic oracles being pawed over by nervous Athenians awaiting the Persians in 480BC. Much later in the fourth century Dinarchus [Against Demosthenes 1.9] also mentions secret deposits [τὰς ἀπορρήτους διαθήκας]. Plutarch Moralia de Pythiae oraculis, 7 implies that they were not written down by the Pythia herself; indeed in his time they were not delivered in any formal metre at all.
Frag. B.6; app. 8.IV.5]. Robb notes that around 200AD there was quite enough text of Xenophanes for Herodian to study and reference. If he had not composed or dictated a lengthy text, and had not had a few copies made, 'his words would not have survived for Herodian or us to read.' The same argument applies to Theagenes who, around 525BC, was the first to conceptualise Homer into allegory. Even if he did his analysing from an 'oral' memory his conclusions made it into text.

Likewise, Pindar’s epiptician to Diagoras of Rhodes was inscribed and dedicated in a Lindian temple of Athena and, by 470BC, he was sending written texts of his work overseas for his clients to ἵκων ἀθηρᾶν (look over and concentrate upon) [Pin. Pyth. 2.68; app. 8.IV.6]. The art on the Douris Cup is evidence that a fifteen thousand-line work of Stesichorus was textualised and used by pedagogoi at the beginning of the fifth century BC. Around this time too the Onesimos Painter also depicts a seated youth with a papyrus between two standing youths (draped and holding rhabdoi). Likewise a Black-figure phormiskos features a seated youth with a writing tablet. Another Red-figure cup dated ca.520BC figures one youth balancing writing tablets on his knees and holding a stylus. In another of the same period the tondo (the bottom of the inside of the cup) illustration features a teacher referring to text with a youth standing before him. As there is a pipes case suspended over the two, it is probable that the instructor was using a metred text. By the first half of the fifth century BC there are definitely texts in the school environment. By the second quarter of the fifth century BC old libraries had been accumulated. For example,

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73 Robb, Literacy and Paideia in Ancient Greece, p. 68; cf. Herodian, On Doubtful Syllables.
74 Diogenes Laertius 1.5.8; Suda, Lexicon 4102; Tatianus, Apol. Oratio ad Graecos 31.2.4-5; cf. Davison, 'Literature and Literacy in Ancient Greece: II Caging the Muses', p. 222.
76 Beazley considers the lines appearing on the papyrus roll featured on the Douris cup to be the first few words of a lost poem by Streisochorus [640-555BC]; cf., Beazley, 'Hymn to Hermes,' American Journal of Archaeology, Vol. 52 (1948), p. 338. Cf. Beazley 205092; Berlin, Antikensammlung F2285, Red-figure cup; the 'Douris Cup'.
77 Beazley 203389, Berlin, Antikensammlung F2322; Red-figure Kyathos; cf. Beazley, Attic Red-Figure Vase-Painters, pp. 329.134, 1645; Frederick Beck, Album of Greek Education, Sydney, Cheiron Press, 1975, P1.14.75A-B.
78 Beazley 2881, Brussels, Musees Royaux, A1013, Black-figure Phormiskos, ca. 525 to 475; cf. Frederick Beck, Album of Greek Education, P1.13.70
79 Beazley 200906, Munich, Antikensammlungen, J1168; Red-figure cup, ca. 520 [CAVI: Immerwahr, Corpus of Attic Vase Inscriptions, Munich 2607]; A: figures an education scene with one youth balancing writing tablets on his knees and holding a stylus.
80 Beazley 321; Basel, Antikenmuseum und Sammlung Ludwig: BS465, Red-figure Cup, ca. 525 to 475.
81 Beazley 203657, Ferrara, Museo Nazionale Di Spina 19.108, Red-figure Cup ca. 500 to 450; youths with scrolls, stylus and writing tablets.
Thrasyllus, who would have been born around 450 BC, inherited a library of papyrus scrolls acquired a generation earlier by Polemaenetus; Socrates learned to read from books during his school education some time in the first half of the fifth century BC and continued to consult the papyrus writings of earlier ὑπὸ δεξίον [Xenophon Memorabilia 1.6.14; app. 8.IV.7]. Opinions differ as to whether Sappho [612-570 BC] would have wanted her work textualised. But she, or someone in her circle remembered the more than five hundred poems which were eventually collated into nine books by the Alexandrine scholars; the first book containing 1,320 lines. In the wish for happier days did she, or fellow exiles in Sicily, dedicate some of her poems in a temple to Aphrodite? Aristotle attests to Sappho's celebrity, but she was famous generations before that when her portrait featured on herms. By mid-fifth-century BC Athenians conceptualised Sappho with papyrus in lap and pen-in-hand, which indicates that copies of her works were by then in existence in Athens. This artistic representation of a writer with pen-in-hand shows that the potter had knowledge of what 'writing' is; this signifies that he could at least have conceptualised an internalised alphabet and the linear construction of a logoi.

Such a construct is also evident in Βατραχομυμοχία, which opens with an attestation of actual composition with stylus in hand and is dated ca. 480 BC [Battle of the Frogs and Mice 1-3; app. 8.IV.8]. Presumably the work is the product of an adult at least twenty years old. Therefore his literacy education would have taken place around the same time as the Chian boys mentioned by Herodotus. The Chian classroom was a large, organised school and, like Socrates' classroom, probably had papyrus or leather texts. As Athens had no state schools any text resources for teaching letters would have resided in private homes or with phyle.

82 From Polemaenetus the mantic; Isocrates Aegineticus 19.5, cf. 19.45.
83 Against the suggestion that the intimate nature of Sappho's lyric meant that it was not for public recital Thomas [Literacy and Orality in Ancient Greece, p. 114] suggests that 'Sappho has confidence in the survival of her poetry not by being written down but by being remembered in song.' Cf. Fragments 193 and 55, E. Lobel and D. Page, Poetarum Lesbiorum Fragmenta, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1961.
86 Beazley 213777; Athens National Museum 1260; Red-figure Hydria 475 to 425; Polygnotos inscribed 'Sappho'; cf. F. Beck, Album of Greek Education, Pl.74 p. 366.
87 Hugh G. Evelyn-White [Hesiod, The Homeric Hymns and Homerica, London, Heinemann, 1959, p. 38] dates this work 'in the earlier part of the sixth century', but it is attributed to Pigres who was the brother of Artemisia ca. 480 [Suda, Lexicon 1551].
phratry or trittys officers. As noted earlier, these men were responsible for Panathenaeae productions, including the recitations of Homer, and would have access to rehearsal scripts. The craftsmen potters, 'without prestige among their contemporaries,'\(^8\) were unlikely to have been schooled in the private homes of the elite, but most belonged to phyles, phratries and all to trittys. The artist potter, Euthymides, is an early example of a literate individual who was not part of the elite. Most scholars suggest that, between 550 and 500BC, Euthymides, advertised his excellence over his competitor, Euphronios. Others couple the inscriptions differently and suggest Euthymides makes puns and jokes relating to ritualistic dancing and singing.\(^9\) It is not a lot of writing, but on either interpretation, it shows that Euthymides was a literate artisan, self-conscious with an internalised alphabet. Athens displayed more public notices relative to population than any other democracy since.\(^9\) Even if citizens did not much read them, those unable to read could still understand the symbolic meaning. There was, however, an increasing number able to decipher the potter’s words.

Alfred Burns suggests that there are 'no literary sources or other adequate evidence to determine the extent or degree of literacy among the general population during the sixth century BC.'\(^9\) What about the pots? They are a good indication of the literary predilections of the customer-base and the ability of the potter to provide what they wanted. The chronology of inscriptions found on Attic clayware track a customer-base literate enough to decipher words and, from 650BC, inscriptions increasingly appear on pottery. For example, the Heidelberg school, the Nettos painter, or the Gorgon painter show no inscriptions; the Tyrrenian potters, Sophilos, C-Painter and the Komast group


show a few inscriptions. Most of these are makers’ names attesting a growth in literate craftsmen with a proportion of their customer-base literate enough to decipher letters into words.\textsuperscript{92} As stated, Euthymides appears to be advertising later in the century, and such branding indicates that there was a prestige market; even administrative dining rooms valued their dinnerware sufficiently to support the major ceramic businesses and also kept sentimental pieces.\textsuperscript{93}

From 575\textsuperscript{BC} alphabetic literacy with the ability to decipher names phonetically must have been on the increase because there was a sharp increase in clayware inscriptions.\textsuperscript{94} The following potters provide examples. Literacy is clearly reflected in the François Vase with one hundred and twentyone inscriptions naming heroic characters and inscriptions ‘Kleitias made me’. Admittedly no other vase has as many labelling inscriptions, but it is clear that Kleitias could competently use the full alphabet to spell phonetically. Somewhat different is Chsenokles (the C-Painter) whose single inscription, HODIPOS, on the tondo of a cup, was not a label but a significant third of the design composition.\textsuperscript{95} This synoptic painter\textsuperscript{96} had rather non-linear ideas in the concept and use of writing. Exekias on the other hand is literate enough to label his subject matter, whereas his pupil, Andocides, did not go beyond inscribing his own name.

For the period 580\textsuperscript{BC} to the close of the century, there are more inscriptions on extant whole pieces than whole pieces without inscriptions, with a minimal number of nonsense inscriptions. The table below shows the trend over the century. It does not, cannot, reflect the volume of inscriptions overall because only whole pots can be counted.

\textsuperscript{92} Cf. Snodgrass, \textit{Homer and the Artists}, p. 76.
\textsuperscript{93} Susan L. Rotroff and John H. Oakley, \textit{[Debris from a Public Dining Place in the Athenian Agora, Princeton, N.J.,] American School of Classical Studies at Athens, 1992. Hesperia (Princeton, N.J.), Supplement 25} reports on a find in the Athenian agora near the Royal Stoa. The Athenian \textit{sysstition} was destroyed by the earthquake of 426\textsuperscript{BC} but mostly used thirty to forty-year-old dinnerware, representing every major workshop. More than half were kraters, suggesting some sort of commemorative ware. There was a Hydria ca.475 ’with wear around the rim’ and a Type A scyphus from the first quarter of the fifth century plus ‘a few scrappy, well-worn black-figures sherds that may be earlier.’\textsuperscript{9, 59; cf. catalogue pp. 61-129}. Cf. E.B. French, \textit{‘Archaeology in Greece, 1991-1992’, Archaeological Reports, No. 38 (1991-1992), pp. 3-70, at Fig. 2, p. 6.} Snodgrass, \textit{Homer and the Artists}, p. 104
\textsuperscript{95} Beazley 302435; cf. Appendix 6.
\textsuperscript{96} The synoptic painters brought together into a single picture sequences of episodes which happen in the plot at different times, but which are rendered together in the same frame. Furthermore, characters who are featured more than once in the several episodes within the plot are nevertheless only depicted once: ‘the actions and the attributes identify the sequence of events’. Cf. Snodgrass, op. cit. p. 57.
On extant pieces during the Peisistratidae tyranny increasingly more were inscribed than uninscribed. At the least it indicates an understanding of the general concept of the alphabet and its function in practical terms for the population as a whole. It is a long way from being able to read extended written tracts of Homer.

**IV.3 CONCLUSION**

Analysis of artwork on extant clayware suggests that, until the Peisistratidae tyranny, Athenians showed no special favour for the *Iliad* or the *Odyssey*. Yet by the closing decades of the sixth century BC Homer was widely known. This was the result of three factors, all due to directives of the Peisistratidae: i) the adoption of the poems for performance at the Greater Panathenaeae, ii) the appearance in Athens of a text of the poems, iii) the random distribution of rehearsal scripts. These factors co-incided with a gradual general acquaintance with writing throughout the population.

How the tyranny obtained their first text remains speculation. Perhaps they imported a copy from the Homeridae. They could equally have employed *rhapsodes* to dictate to Athenian scribes. This and other psychological aspects of how, and why, Homer's works were textualised is discussed in the following
chapter. The above is enough to demonstrate that there was no real physical, political or economic obstacle to prevent the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* being textualised and distributed during the ascendancy of the Peisistratidae and that there was every political and cultural reason why it should. In a newly post-oral Athenian society the Peisistratidae tyranny had the motive and the means. Their’s was the first government to have had the time to develop the administrative and economic clout necessary to institute some degree of uniformity in any poems’ performances. This uniformity had practical as well as propaganda use. The Peisistratidae tyranny consolidated Solon’s civic vision in that it developed a citizen’s identification with the city. The Panathenaic festival was the vehicle through which Peisistratus validated his authority. Homer’s poems encapsulated the ideal of the *basileus* or heroic leader of men; it prompted social cohesion and identification with the civic and political authority of the Peisistratidae tyranny over the *polis*.

For political reasons, therefore, a gazetted copy of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* would have been required to furnish rehearsal tracts to the regional Panathenaic organisers. Thus from a single text owned by the Peisistratidae, many separate sections could have been copied (or redictated to scribes) and distributed as required for each Panathenaea; a dissemination to *phratry rhapsodes* and choral groups to ensure an ‘politically correct’ version of the part they were to perform. In piecemeal fashion each *phyle, phratry* or *trittys* accumulated passages of Homer provided by the Peisistratidae machinery.

At the end of the century and the beginning of the next, a ready-made textual resource for teaching children to read was likely to be these rehearsal scripts for the simple reason that they were there. Private epinician or invective pieces were possibly also retained by ‘family rememberers’; as well as other private pieces dedicated in temples and family shrines for the magic power of the words. These examples of writing were probably less widespread than the accumulated rehearsal scripts for the Panathenaeae. There is, however, a disconnect, discussed in the next chapter, that highlights the skilled rhapsodist’s lack of need for any written text in performance. The reason for the ‘Peisistratidae redaction’ of Homer, therefore, should be seen as an attempt to unify the sequence of plot lines and outcomes rather than to attain ‘word-perfect’ poets. Conceptually these
texts did not resemble written work as it came to be regarded by prose writers such as Protagoras or Gorgias, Antiphon or Herodotus, or as is today. They were not kept for any interior intellectual process to be carried on at the individual’s convenience. The textual piece did not come alive until it was vocalised. In other words, the text had no intrinsic inner meaning. This is because writing in Athens in this period was used mostly in ritual and simple utilitarian labelling applications.

It has been suggested that the labelling of subjects on clayware art was a way for ceramicists to ‘show off’ their literacy or to favour ‘a certain kind of clientele.’\textsuperscript{97} Are we sure that, at this point, literacy was something to be inordinately proud of? The conception of a literate elite is misleading because the inscriptions appear on a wide variety of everyday utensils made by everyday artisans and exported widely. Furthermore, as so much of the clayware was made for the table, the pictorial message remained mnemonic, recalling the wide variety of mythic stories. Only one amphora, dated post-530 BC, specifically names one of the \textit{Iliad}’s more obscure characters.\textsuperscript{98} Although a sole extant example, it is evidence not only of both potter and customer’s specific knowledge of Homer, but of the ability on the part of the customer to read names phonetically. It suggests that, by this date, the \textit{Iliad} was quite familiar. Such amphorae, as well as the proliferation of \textit{kalos} vases, attests to a growing knowledge of the alphabet and its semiological use to identify living individuals by the letters of their name. It is, however, no evidence of a general ability to compose lengthy written tracts of spontaneous, continuous prose or poetry. Literacy for citizens in Athens did not get much further than phonetic ‘name’ or ‘list’ literacy throughout the sixth century and first quarter of the fifth BC.

Consistent with Herodotus’ reference to reading and writing classes around the beginning of the fifth century BC is the art depicting children with scrolls appearing around the same period.\textsuperscript{99} It is reasonable to propose that young

\textsuperscript{98} Beazley 1007818; Paris, Musee du Louvre: CP321; Black-figure Hydria; ODIO\textsc{s}, AIAX, NESTOR named. Cf. \textsc{Il}. 9.170; the embassy to Achilles in which Hodios is named. Cf. Snodgrass, \textit{Homer and the Artists}, pp. 124-125, 147.
\textsuperscript{99} Beazley 2881, Brussels, Musees Royaux A1013, Athenian Black-figure Phormiskos, Onesimos Painter, \textit{CAVI} dated ca.520; Beazley 203389, Berlin, Antikensammlung F2322; Athenian Red-
phratry members, meirakia and neaniskoi, even if only from the higher Solonic wealth classes, attending choral classes for the Panathenaic competitions, would take a look at the rehearsal scripts and find their curiosity aroused. Those few members of the phratry who had learned the alphabet, or the Peisistratidæ representative, would begin to pass on their knowledge of letters. Literacy education in Athens came from the ground up rather than any organised imposition from above; and the textual tools to teach it, a random situational phenomenon rather than any conscious choice.

figure Kyathos, Panaitios Painter, CAVI date early fifth century; Beazley 205092; Berlin, Antikensammlung F2285, Red-figure Cup, Douris, ca. 500-450.
CHAPTER V
WHY A TEXTUALISED HOMER WAS NOT IN ATHENS BEFORE THE LATE SIXTH CENTURY BC: THE SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CHRONOLOGY

It's wonderful, there's nothing else like it, you write in a trance. And the trance is completely addictive, you love it, you want more of it. Once you've written the poem and had the trance, polished it and so on, you can go back to the poem and have a trace of that trance, have the shadow of it, but you can't have it fully again. It seemed to be a knack I discovered as I went along. It's an integration of the body-mind and the dreaming-mind and the daylight-conscious-mind. All three are firing at once, they're all in concert. You can be sitting there but inwardly dancing, and the breath and the weight and everything else are involved, you're fully alive. It takes a while to get into it. You have to have some key, like say a phrase or a few phrases or a subject matter or maybe even a tune to get you started going towards it, and it starts to accumulate. Sometimes it starts without your knowing that you're getting there, and it builds in your mind like a pressure. I once described it as being like a painless headache, and you know there's a poem in there, but you have to wait until the words form.

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A Defence of Poetry,

V.1 ABSTRACT

The last chapter provided the historical argument as to how and why the Homeric canon came to have such an influential intellectual force in Athenian society.

In the classical period there were many contemporary references to the important place the epics held in education and their influence on thinking and decision-making.¹ This chapter looks to the nature of deliberation in Homer compared to other archaic literature. The reason is to establish what modes of problem-solving functioned in Athens at the time of the introduction of sophistic education.

Sophistic education introduced the conscious, formalised application of 'Protagorean' pro and contra reasoning which entailed probabilistic or abstract argument. The original innovation of the sophist Protagoras was to teach students the practice of composing opposed arguments, one speech for each side. The result was a student consciously mentally flexible and adept at looking at any proposition from more than one point-of-view. When formalised, the conscious application of Protagorean methods of problem-solving resulted in an alternative way of thinking that challenged the concrete, authoritative constructs of archaic thought.² The other educational innovation in sophistic training was the use of continuous prose writing. It produced another cognitive side-step in problem-solving. This is because prose writing greatly extends argument into sustained integrated stages of complex 'serially reasoned' problem-solving. This aspect is discussed in subsequent chapters.

This chapter traces the rhetorical elements inherent in Homer to establish the benchmark psychology for Athenians prior to sophistic influence. The position taken is that many sophistic elements of problem-solving are embryonic in Homer, but they operate under an over-arching recognition of authority by which individual opinion and volition is sublimated by ritualised language and behaviour. Furthermore, Homeric epic has a high emotional content because it is

¹ Cf. Appendix 3.2, General Education.
² In the same way as the concept of natural selection or quantum theory immediately challenged, and subsequently altered, broad areas of conceptual thinking in the modern world.
contextualised, culturally implicit, 'narrative thinking', as outlined by Bruner and Greenfield. It is also high in imagery and prosody. All of these features of Homeric epic have a cognitive right hemisphere dominance.

In this chapter, the first part considers the psychodynamics of 'oral' poetry and the scholarly controversies over the textualisation of the Homeric canon. The discussion takes a psychological perspective in order to outline why a textualised Homer was not needed before the Peisistratidae tyranny institutionalised the Panathenaea. Section 'V.2 The Nature of Oral Composition and the Textualisation of Homer' progresses in the following order:

1. The modes of 'oral' composition, transmission and recitation
This section considers the nature of oral composition and narrative consistency, concluding that oral performance by skilled rhapsodes 'reinstantiates' the the poem and therefore has no real need of written texts because the performance is a self-perpetuating cognitive process, involving predominantly right hemispheric language and right hemisphere visuo-spatial memory in functioning short term memory (STM). In the larger educational context of Athenians learning to recite Homer, the process is not quite the same. Recitation by non-professionals involves long term memory (LTM) and right hemispheric language.

2. Written dictation vs written composition
For the rhapsodic poet, the process feels like taking dictation. The sensation is quite different from that of generating written prose.

3. The controversy over the textualisation of Homer and the Peisistratidae redaction
The scholarship is discussed over the possible timing of the textualisation of Homer. The conclusion that is reached is that the Peisistratidae version reveals several types of argument, a few of which stand out as being more complex than the others. It is not possible to determine whether they were part of the 'original' Homer. However, the type of scribal literacy, as well as the rhapsodic practice of 'instantiation, make the question moot. A significant constraint relates to the efficacy of scribes to copy long tracts from manuscript to manuscript. Scribes were unlikely to have been able to copy from another manuscript as accurately as the 'Athenian' and the 'Corinthian' versions (notwithstanding the nearly fourteen hundred possible errors suggested by librarians Zeodotus, Aristophanes and Aristarchus at the Alexandria Museum), which were consolidated in Alexandria in the third and second centuries BC. The textualisation would more likely have required a rhapsode to sing his poem to a scribe (or to himself to write it down), and remembering point 1 - that his singing would be a self-perpetuating 'original' performance - the Peisistratidae text would have reflected the psychology of the period and the forms of argument practised at the time.

The next section, 'V.3 Sumbouleutikon constructed in Homer and persuasion in oral literature', considers the various types of problem-solving and decision-making apparent in the textualised canon. The focus on different types of thinking apparent and the discussion proceeds with the following divisions:

1. Sophistic argument before Protagoras and the scholarly debate over the beginnings of rhetoric - looks at pro and contra argument structures in Iliad and the Odyssey. It is argued that there are inherent rhetorical elements in Homeric persuasion that precede Protagoras and the sophistic movement. What is proposed is that these do not constitute the conscious application of abstract reasoning principles characteristic of sophistic education.

2. Paradigm and Ritual in Homeric Language and Argument - considers the use of alcohol, paradigmic argument and ritualised language as constraints for keeping persuasion within acceptable social procedure.

3. The function of archaic tact in persuasion is a discussion which examines the oblique arguments used by Homer, Hesiod and Pindar instead of confrontational or active deliberation of alternatives.

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4. The varying degrees of personal consciousness in archaic persuasion - an innate (inborn) linguistic feature of poetic narrativisation is a partial dissociation of individual self-consciousness. This poetic sensation that the words were not the poet's own manifests intermittently in archaic poetry. Likewise Homeric characters sometimes display this same psychology when in council.

The last section to this chapter, 'V.4 Ritual in Greek Society', discusses:
1. The ritualistic use of writing in Archaic Greece - argues that, although writing was used in Athens, it was not utilised as long tracts of either poetry or prose.
2. Ritual and its place in the symposion - discusses the ritualistic use of images or symbols and the role of writing to trigger memory; as an example the focus is on the use of eye cups. This leads to a consideration of the role played by ritual and poetry at the symposion. Following the view of Ezio Pellizer, it concludes that sophistic argument had origins in the symposion and, in particular, sympotic poetry.4

V.2 NATURE OF ORAL COMPOSITION AND THE TEXTUALISATION OF HOMER
1) The modes of 'oral' composition, transmission and recitation

a) Composition and narrative inconsistency

The nature of poetic composition in the mostly oral culture of sixth-century BC Athens sheds light on the psychology of Athenian society as a whole. Arguments relating to the dynamics of Homeric performance and its textualisation often revolve around whether the text was the work of a single poet, and how it was remembered intact in performance. For example, Kirk suggests that a unified composition of the *Iliad* could have been transmitted *verbatim* over six generations until it was textualised in the seventh century BC.5 The scholarship cited below has proved that verbatim reproduction is not possible because narrative inconsistencies are inherent in repeated storytelling, even though specific details in stories seem capable of surviving considerable centuries.6 Robb suggests a 'monumental' textualisation 'by committee' much in the same way the

6 David Rubin [Memory in Oral Traditions: The Cognitive Psychology of Epic, Ballads, and Counting-out Rhymes, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995, pp. 5-8, 245-256] tracks counting rhymes and other songs over three hundred years. Is it possible that highly specific details in oral poetry can survive for considerably longer?: ongoing research by Duane Hamacher (forthcoming, Research Centre for Astronomy, Astrophysics & Astrophotonics, Macquarie University) and the CSIRO Australia Telescope National Facility have discovered, mapped and analysed a previously unknown crater in Palm Valley in the Northern Territory and proven it to have been a large cosmic impact with a bowl-shaped structure under the surface of the ground. He began from an Arrernte Dreaming story that told of a star falling in the spot.
St. James bible or the Septuagint was created. Another view comes from Thomas, who argues for a 'monumental' poet 'at the end of a long line' of other poets. She suggests Parry's Bosnian oral guslari skillfully and consciously embellished the traditional works of dead oral poets who 'merged rapidly into a half-forgotten blur'. In fact no guslar had ever been named in this poetic tradition before the epics had been textualized; although the guslari themselves must have had some concept of an 'original' poem/poet, because they protested that they had not knowingly altered the poems (despite the contrary evidence of Parry's tape recorder). Parry and Lord's experiences with guslari poets developed the Parry/Lord Oral Formulaic Theory and proved that the poets themselves were unaware when they made a variation; each attested that he had sung the poem 'exactly as he had sung it before'. He noted that the poets themselves were mystified. Variation therefore appears to be an integral consequence of repeated storytelling processes that do not work from text.

Egbert Bakker suggests that the features of the Parry/Lord Oral Formulaic Theory are integral to spoken language and communication generally. He

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applies Wallace Chafe’s linguistic theory which sees spoken discourse constructed of sequences of 'speech units' which are the reflection of 'the flow of speech through the consciousness.' Coupling Nagy’s evolutionary theory of Homeric textualisation as a process between performance and text, Bakker, who terms poetic language 'special speech',\(^{13}\) sees the writing of Homer as a direct manifestation of the poet’s words, improvised afresh each time the epic is spoken. Michael Nagler holds the same view, but adds that the spontaneity 'at the moment of performance' was a manifestation of 'inherited, traditional impulses'.\(^{14}\) This makes the Peisistratidae recension a work which reflects the psychology of the period in which it was dictated.

This oral performance is not verbatim recall of words from memory. Elizabeth Minchin explains that 'professional story tellers work not so much from memory, but with memory'.\(^{15}\) 'Homer's models' (characterisation, situation, and behaviour) are not conglomerations of rote-learned poetic tracts but are recreated, understandable elements within the plot derived from 'the speech of the people around him'.\(^{16}\) Using Schank and Abelson’s theoretical framework of memory that knowledge 'is stored in an organized form', is 'episodic in nature', and 'constructed around personal experience rather than by abstract semantic categories',\(^{17}\) Minchin follows a model in which 'scripts, plans, goals and themes' encapsulate cultural knowledge and 'everyday experience'.\(^{18}\)

> Whether we are coping with everyday life or processing narrative, our essential resource is a reservoir of knowledge, stored in organised form, about themes (about beliefs, traits and emotions), about goals and about the plans (and the action scripts) through which they are fulfilled.\(^{19}\)

Bakker proposes further linguistic poetic constraints for 'special speech' (repetition, stress, intonation, intonation units, rhythm and metre, simile and metaphor, allusion, personification, synecdoche and metonymy, assonance, alliteration, parataxis, the hexameter, caesura, and end-stopping). These compel

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\(^{13}\) Bakker also identifies some rhetorical prose as 'special speech'. This is discussed in Chapter VII.2.


\(^{17}\) Minchin, *Homer and the Resources of Memory*, p. 323.

\(^{18}\) Minchin, loc. cit.

\(^{19}\) Minchin, op. cit., p. 327.
the singer to use a restricted vocabulary which also helps to maintain narrative consistency.\textsuperscript{20} Another constraint in oral poetry which sustains consistency over repeated 'reinstantiations'\textsuperscript{21} is a limiting factor to short term memory. These limits of memory make composition episodic\textsuperscript{22} and 'may in some degree restrict the richness of characterization'.\textsuperscript{23} Minchin refers to the work of Miller and later Cowan on capacity limits for 'the focus of attention'; oral poets 'cannot focus on more than a few chunks of information at any one time'.\textsuperscript{24} For example:

> Would Homer, for example, have been aware of these structures of memory? No more than the average person today. But if one had asked him whether he could sings variant of the chariot race, in which Antilochus might have yielded to Menelaus' protest and pulled back, the poet would have said he could not do so. It is not that the story itself will not allow this but that the information that he has about Antilochus' character (his themes, plans and goals) would not permit it. Such a variant would not be consistent with his character-mould.\textsuperscript{25}

It is not recitation through rote-learning, memorisation, or 'overlearning' in which precise tracts (derived from spoken or written sources) are retained with LTM.\textsuperscript{26}

Discussions on oral composition and rhapsodic transmission generally concentrate on performance contexts and the function and form of the language within the poem. They are not concerned with how and why Homer came to be used in Athens and hence terms for poetic language such as Kunstsprache (art-language), or 'special speech' do not focus on the cognitive differences between extended performances of Homer by aiodoi or rhapsodes and piecemeal recitation by non-professional/non-rhapsodic amateur performers from the general public. These issues need to be addressed in the argument below because the differences become important when they are examined from an educational point of view and within the historical context of sixth and fifth-century BC Athens. It is

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\item[\textsuperscript{20}] Bakker, \textit{Poetry in Speech}, pp. 3944, 125-138, 146-155.
\item[\textsuperscript{21}] Bakker, op. cit., p. 21. In memory theory this process can also be termed 'reconsolidation'; cf. Cristina Alberini, \textit{Memory Reconsolidation}, Amsterdam, Elsevier, Academic Press, 2013.
\item[\textsuperscript{22}] With Bakker’s sense of an episode in the plot.
\item[\textsuperscript{24}] ibid. pp. 330-331.
\end{itemize}
argued that there are significant differences between Homeric Kunstsprache or ‘special speech' as rhapsodic 'reinstantiated' composition and Kunstsprache as rote-learned recitation. Cognitive differences between 'writing' down dictation and composition in 'writing' also impinge on the understanding of how oral composition renews the poem each time. Likewise questions relating to the limits of memory, or 'cognitive capacity' also impinge on descriptions of 'oral' composition. These differences are addressed in turn below. The discussion also considers aspects of implicit memory and what part memory plays in cognitive capacity. The limits of poetic memory appear to be confined to 'chunks', as defined by Minchin, in relation to Homeric transmission. However, serial recall of poetic memory does not appear to be solely dependent on internal triggers, but may be affected by situational triggers that can refocus memory.

b) Thinking in 'chunks': cognitive capacity and the function of memory in the transmission of oral poetry

In the labyrinth of memory theory one significant aspect could be emphasised in relation to 'oral' composers and probably to most modern makers of poetry (‘special speech'): the cognitive process behind the 'instantiation' / transmission of oral poetry is the recreation of imagery rather than words. Badderley and Hitch talk about the 'visuo-spatial sketchpad', which subsequent research indicates may have right hemispheric dominance, the images becoming language via the 'phonological loop'. This language is not self-consciously or

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28 Cf. Evelyn Tribble ['Distributing Cognition in the Globe', Shakespeare Quarterly, Vol. 56, No. 2 (2005), pp. 135-155 at 149, 153] discusses memorisation in Elizabethan theatre noting that the notion of textual fidelity in that period is also an illusion and that 'letter-perfect renditions' were not expected. Furthermore, the verse (iambic pentameters) built into the plays functioned as a prompt which allowed the less expert performers to develop a cognitively-based ordering skill that restructures mental routines allowing them to 'chunk' (divide and restructure) the patterns of tropes and characteristic figures in the plays.

29 Tribble [op. cit., pp. 143-144] identifies the use of staging which 'orients mental activity in space'.


31 In explaining episodic working memory and LTM Alan Baddeley proposes a four-component model by which a 'central executive' coordinates the 'visuospatial sketchpad' and the 'episodic
explicitly drawn, but integrated. This was described by an Scottish oral poet in the 1970s researches of MacDonald:

You've got to see it as a picture in front of you or you can't remember it properly.... I could see, if I were looking at the wall there, I could see just how they were - how they came in - the people - and how this thing was and that and the other. ... Yes, it's easier to tell a story right through, from the beginning, because it's there in front of you to the end, all the way. All you have to do is follow it. It comes to me little by little there - it keeps coming to me as it goes on .... There's no vision ahead but just as you went ahead yourself, and the vision, kept pace with you just as if it were coming upon you, like that.32 [My italics]

Minchin sees visual memory as the primary locus for storing and creating similes.33 She focuses on Paivio's 'dual-coding' model which hypothesises that learning and recall entail mental pictures as well as linguistic access to meaningful words relating to the imagery.34 This seems right; however, Chapter III.3's discussion of Roy Harris' work suggests that there would be some difference between the literate poet's consciousness of 'words' versus the non-literate's concept of speech as a (non-visualised) phonic continuum. Furthermore, in view of Cohen and Dehaene's 'VWFA' in the left hemisphere of the literate brain, literates appear to have additional semiotic mental pictures of writing and separate words. This point is raised merely to suggest that literate poets sometimes visualise similes in alphabetics or logographics rather than pictorial imagery.35 Perhaps this signifies a divergent functioning of memory storing and the creating of similes.


34 A. Paivio, The Mind's Eye in Arts and Sciences, Poetics Vol. 12 (1983), p. 1-18. One problematic point on Paivio's research is that much of the testing involved literate subjects and word and letter recognition. For example, research cited by Paivio [at pp. 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 15, 16]: the subjects he cites who did not think in 'words' were, apart from poets Simonides, Baudelaire, Blake, Shakespeare and a few more, mathematicians: e.g., Einstein, Kekulé. But again, they are thinking in mathematics, another cognitive process with dominant RH function.

35 For example, non-rhyming rough/through, enough/though, said/maid, trait/wait, move/love.
Minchin relies on George Miller's theory of 'cognitive capacity' by which memory is limited to seven, ±two, 'chunks' in short-term memory (STM). It has been pointed our that this theory implies a single, self-conscious, 'unitary attentional focus or resource' which possibly overlooks other operating cognitive subsystems with 'independent attentional mechanisms'. These need not be self-conscious elements in recall. Alternatively, reducing cognitive capacity from 'chunks' into 'words', David Rubin cites the work of Ian Hunter, suggesting that the normal capacity for working memory is not much more than fifty words.

Most of these cognitive capacity tests concentrate on the number of words self-consciously recalled. But the words are not self-consciously cogitated in the experience of the oral poet. This is possibly because the sensate memory of the oral poet is constituted by pictures. Furthermore, Paivio states that anything imagined 'presents synchronously, as a spatial layout rather than as a temporal sequence resembling a verbal description.' In other words, it is non-chronological and non-linear. This, however, seems to contradict the description given by MacDonald's Scottish oral poet. The difference could be that the Scottish poet could also write. As noted in this work, this is because it is the knowledge of writing with words and sentences compartmentalised that makes conceptual thinking and recall more linear: 'the phonological word is being conceptualised after the image of the written word, not vice versa'. Memory for non-literate is different to literate recall, with its (left hemisphere) internal alphabetic spatiality, and a concept difficult for literates to grasp. A further description of the process of poetic imagery or oral 'instantiation' could include

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40 Roy Harris, Rethinking Writing, London, Continuum, 2001, p. 210; [my italics].
the addition of an initial or over-arching 'cognitive capacity' that is a visuo-spatial orientation process preceding the episodic chunking of words. In this regard, Snodgrass has an interesting observation relating to the archaic Geometric artist-potters and their method of rendering (external) images:

The essential feature of the method is to bring together in one frame a sequence of two or more episodes which in reality would happen at different times; and to do so despite showing the main actors once and once only, by letting the actions and attributes identify the sequence of events. Some such English term as 'synoptic' will describe the method, though without quite doing justice to its psychological complexity.\(^\text{41}\)

Along with 'episodic memory' active in oral transmission, it is probable that there is also a momentary 'vision', or LTM cue, a consciousness encompassing the whole of the poetic idea (in the Iliad, say, each plot episode). This 'synoptic' vision is not bound by chronology. In fact Snodgrass goes on to discuss Homer's description of the Shield of Achilles 'with its references to things happening 'next' or 'soon''. These 'synoptic pictures' are usually in a linear sequence across the art surface of the clayware but encompass story details that are not.\(^\text{42}\) For the poet it is an interesting sensation of seeming to know everything all at once without actually focussing on anything. Ezra Pound described it as 'that which presents an intellectual and emotional complex in an instant of time'.\(^\text{43}\)

This brings to mind the words of Homer that became for the Greeks, gnômâi - the cultural equivalent of 'one picture is worth a thousand words'. This is because, linguistically, 'special speech', song lyrics and poems (epic length ones in 'chunks') are synoptic, as research shows:

Songs, melodies, as well as many everyday prosaic passages, are remembered and produced as intact wholes. The parts of these units are not pieced together tone by tone, word by word, but rather are recalled all at once as a complete unit.\(^\text{44}\)

['prosaic passages' are usually delivered rhythmically.]

' Cognitive capacity' limits the oral poet's explicit construction of a particular part of the plot as it is 'reinstantiated'. In this episodic form it perhaps constitutes


\(^{42}\) ibid., p. 58. For a discussion of examples: pp. 56-64, 133-134.


autonoetic 'remembering' in right hemispheric language. The synoptic image that is mentioned by Ezra Pound and described above is likely to be the sensation defined by Tulving as that of 'knowing', a feature of semantic, noetic memory.\(^{45}\)

c) Thinking in *Kunstsprache* or 'special speech'
Following the linguistic model of Chafe, Bakker presents the construct of 'special speech' conceptualising that 'genre, repetition' and formulaic structures are inherent properties of language that are outside the confines of everyday language. He utilises Karl Meister's theoretical concept of *Kunstsprache* (art-language) as a specialised language apart from 'ordinary' (presumably conversational) Greek.\(^{46}\) Contrary to what is argued here, Bakker visualises 'special speech' as a conscious construct of the poet in which, 'the choice of the epithet'\(^{47}\) is up to the poet who 'deliberately alters the word-type of a given formula so as to make it fit into a desired slot in the verse.'\(^{48}\) He is clear about the conscious artificiality of the poet's language:

> Metre is not an active structuring principle, determining the actual form of phrases and formulas. Rather, we have to say that the poet constantly adjusts his choice of words and phrases to the metrical possibilities. ... His choice of epithet is constrained in systematic ways, and this is precisely the basis of the functionality of the noun-epithet formular system.\(^{49}\)

This is at odds with a more naturalistic view of *Kunstsprache* suggested here. Others, such as Richard Martin identify *Kunstsprache* as a capacity quite within the abilities of the general populace, who interact with the poet at Homeric performances, singing, chanting and even interrupting the poet with their own extemporised poetic lines.\(^{50}\) Martin identifies the interaction of *Kunstsprache* thus:

> In a living oral tradition, people are exposed to verbal art constantly, not just on specific entertainment occasions, which can happen every night in certain seasons. When they work, eat, drink, and do other social small-group activities, myth, song, and sayings are always woven into their talk. Consequently, it is not inaccurate to describe them as *bilingual, fluent in their natural language but also in the Kunstsprache of their local verbal art forms*.\(^{51}\) [My italics]

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\(^{48}\) ibid., p. 171.

\(^{49}\) ibid., p. 159.

\(^{50}\) Martin, *The Language of Heroes: Speech and Performance in the Iliad*, pp. 5, 8.

Surely this is a common feature of all languages and cultures, regardless of 'orality' or 'literacy'. Robb also suggests that the 'constant repetition in performances results in the people making at least pieces and parts of [poetry] their own in private speech, as we still do with popular songs.' Powell, on the other hand, maintains that 'no one ever learned the Kunstsprache found in Homer', 'no one conversed in it' and 'in no sense is it a dialect', yet he also claims that 'Greeks in all regions understood it'. He also appears to see Kunstsprache as orally dichotomous to writing:

Today omnipresent African-American rap music, where long narratives are spun out to the accompaniment of a powerful beat that determines the arrangement of the words, proves that 3,000 years of alphabetic literacy are unable to put a stop to such behavior.

*Kunstsprache* is beginning to look like an ambiguous contradiction in terms. In the model of Chafe, where speaking is a manifestation of thinking, the poets are therefore thinking in *Kunstsprache* or 'special speech'. When 'special speech' becomes spontaneous, or 'instantiated' metred poetry, as described by Bakker, it becomes thinking in metre. Furthermore, the rap singers, responding orally to a natural feature of language, go beyond quoting or reciting *Kunstsprache*. In other words, it is not a function of long term memory; *Kunstsprache* at this creative, compositional level, belongs to a different cognitive model than the *Kunstsprache* that is merely recited, sung and quoted by 'people'. There are cognitive differences between ποιεῖν ('making' / 'instantiating') and reciting, mimicking or quoting.

Although not everyone is capable of composing poetry on the scale of epic, poetic language is part of everyday language. At least Aristotle observed that this was so for the Greek language. While he notes that epic metre 'lacks the harmony of ordinary conversation' [ό μὲν ἡμῶν σεμνῆς ἀλλ’ ὀυ λεκτικῆς ἀρμονίας δεόμενος: Rh. 1408b.4], he recognised that metred language was

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53 Robb, op. cit., p. 11.
55 Powell, ibid., p. 134.
instinctual, and therefore, implicit: κατὰ φύσιν δὲ ὄντος ἡμῖν τοῦ μιμεῖσθαι καὶ τῆς ἁρμονίας καὶ τοῦ ῥυθμοῦ τὰ γὰρ μέτρα ὃτι μόρια τῶν ῥυθμῶν ἐστὶ φανερῶν [We have a natural instinct for representation and for tune and rhythm - for the metres are obviously sections of rhythms: Poetics 1448b]. He also explained that spoken conversational Greek closely resembled poetry:

... ὃ δὲ ἰαμβὸς αὐτῇ ἐστὶν ἤ λέξις ἢ τῶν πολλῶν (διὸ μᾶλλον πάντων τῶν μέτρων ἰαμβεῖα φθείγοντοι λέγοντες). [Aristotle Rhetoric 3.8.4; 1408b.4]

... the iambic is the language of the many, wherefore of all metres it is most used in common speech. [trans. Freese]

ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἰαμβεῖοις διὰ τὸ ὃτι μᾶλλον λέξιν μιμεῖσθαι

Because iambic verse largely imitates speech [Aristotle, Poetics 1459a.1]

The ability to persuade using special metrical speech lies as much behind advertising jingles as it explains Solon's choice of iambic Kunstsprache to persuade his fellow citizens to acquire Salamis and his political and civic innovations to sound reasonable.56 In the ancient world this method of thinking in 'special speech'/prosody/Kunstsprache extended across languages and cultures: Egyptians created 'admonitions', Israelites created parts of the Pentateuch in poetry just like the Hindu Vedic scripts, which were originally 'thought up' in metre.57 And, as Ruth Finnegans has shown, in the modern era the phenomenon still manifests in some literates, whether poets, or 'people', doing everyday things. For example, John Wilmont, Earl of Rochester could deliver extemporaneous poetry as easily in the House of Lords as he did in public houses and wrote everyday domestic letters to his wife in rhyme.58 This habit has also been attested in modern Greek life by 'ordinary people': in 1912 the mother-in-law of British poet J.E. Flecker reported that her Cretan housekeeper wrote all her correspondence in verse; likewise in the 1930s, by Professor Mikhailidis Nouraros, who noted μανινάδες (improvised couplets) were in everyday use on

56 Cf. Plut. Solon 8.1-2; Diog Laert. Lives 1.46-48. As Chapter III.2.2 notes, there is no epigraphical evidence that his initial 'laws' were not in Kunstsprache, the language he chose to explain the laws and his motives for the decisions.


Karpathos and notes that letters written by the locals were often partially or wholly in this *Kunstsprache* language.59

In the modern world poets have highly developed cognition in metre and prosody, but among the general population, children and adult *non-literates* are also shown to possess enhanced abilities to think in poetry.60 This suggests two things: that the ability to generate poetic language is innate (inborn) and that prose literacy education inhibits to some extent the ability to generate, or think in 'special speech' - at least in modern western society.

d) *Kunstsprache*, as part of everyday speech, becomes right hemisphere implicit knowledge stored in long term memory

As Chapter II established, the constraints of poetry ('special speech') are generally features of and have their locus in right hemispheric language. Kane adds somewhat to the Bakker's list of 'special speech' characteristics: prosody encompassing stress, intonation, rhythm, and metre, alliteration, simile and metaphor, allusion, personification, synecdoche and metonymy, emotion, connotation, symbol, assonance, alliteration, onomatopoeia, rhyme, line length, end-stopping, caesura, parataxis and parallelism.61 The evidence relating to poetry ('special speech') in this work attests only to phonics in speech production and not to conceptual constructs of meaning such as metaphor, simile, etc. However, some of these other constraints nominated by both Bakker and Kane also involve a dominance of the right hemisphere processes.

For example, the 'serial-recall' of oral poetry is an admixture of explicit (intentional) and implicit (procedural and declarative) memory, and cuing

59 R.M. Dawkins, 'Letter-Writing in Verse', *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, Vol. 53, Part 1 (1933), pp. 111-112; Dawkins [R.M.D. (Reviewer) of M.G. Mikhaïlidis Nouraros, 'Ἀσθενεία Σφυγμάτων Καρπαθίων,' Vol. 1, *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, Vol. 52, Part 2 (1932), pp. 335-336] states that Professor Mikhaïlidis attested modern everyday use of *Kunstsprache* on his native island, commenting: 'It has not seldom been remarked that ... verse composition precedes prose; on p. 55 our author tells us that letters written in Karpathos to friends abroad ... [do] not contain 'news', but is to convey the feelings of the writer, and these they have learned to express only in this metrical form.'

60 Julie Kane ['Poetry as Right-Hemispheric Language', pp. 21-59] provides further research to that presented in Chapter II.2 and Appendix 1.1.

61 loc. cit.
'proceeds in most cases without conscious awareness'. According to research, implicit learning and tacit knowledge is a cross-domain function involving right hemispheric processes. Therefore, poetic recall is an integrated 'nonconscious cognitive process' of implicit LTM using visuo-spatial imagery and 'instantiated' prosodic language. This is not to say the poet does not have executive control and is not sentient in normal waking-state awareness. As it was suggested in Chapter II.2, the non-conscious aspect of poetry ('special speech') is that it is 'instantiated' or composed in the right hemisphere and has the sensation of brushing, fully constructed, across consciousness (in Gazzaniga's storytelling 'interpreter mechanism' in the left hemisphere).

So far, the rhapsodist's poetry ('special speech') 'instantiation' process is as follows:

i) the oral poet consciously decides to tell the story to the audience,

ii) he/she calms themself to focus on the story and receive associative cues (in Hellas, manifested in the call to a god or the Muse),

iii) brushing over the consciousness of the rhapsode is a momentary 'synoptic' view of the story as a whole. In other words, the poet becomes conscious of the beginning and end and bits in the middle in one single unit of consciousness (a cognitive state pictorially reflected in the images on Archaic clayware).

iv) the poet interacts with the audience and his/her own recurring episodic imagery to narrativise.

The model constructed here is that the poet's memory functions in imagery (spatial memory), is translated to language that is 'constrained' by poetry('special speech') which research indicates are right hemisphere dominant processes. Again, this is not to say that memory is located in any particular locus in the

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64 As detailed in Chapter II.2-3.
Coherent reconstructed poetic memory (from encoded traces in the relevant loci for each constituent) is a cross-domain distributed process. Later it will be noted that memory recall involves more than internal stimuli, but for the moment, the point is that a considerable amount of poetic recall is a function of the right hemisphere of the brain; poetic ('special speech') language with right hemisphere dominance.

Another of the features of Kunstsprache is repetition which is also a normal feature of everyday narrative conversation. 'Modeled on prior utterances', it is 'relatively automatic' and 'functions in production, comprehension, connection and interaction'.65 One form of repetition in Kunstsprache is the recitation of unconsciously acquired LTM and right hemisphere language. This feature of 'oral' poetry, in the skilled rhapsodist, the process of 'instantiation' is creative and is unlike the general recall of rote-learned segments of poetry practised by general populations.

Because implicit knowledge can be stored 'special speech', the Kunstsprache of a population becomes implicit knowledge, its shared social/procedural memory. In this regard John Miles Foley agrees that Havelock argued 'persuasively and with considerable evidence' that Homer became the source of 'special speech' for the general public, 'the core of his educational equipment'.66 This use of Homer is unlike the oral performance of the rhapsode because finite excerpts of the canon would have been rote-learned in the form of gnômai, which 'are not composed anew each time they are uttered' and thus, 'it is doubtful to say the least' that Oral-Formulaic Theory can apply to this genre of repetition.67 This is relevant because Bakker's theory of oral transmission in 'special speech' does not apply to casual piecemeal amateur recitation. Therefore, Kunstsprache in the form of gnômai that is recited and sung by individuals other than rhapsodists cannot be viewed as the same as 'instantiation'. Such right hemisphere Kunstsprache had social relevance and was not confined to the Homeric canon. For example, Athenian children were brought up singing in choruses at religious festivals, a

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65 Deborah Tannen, 'Repetition in Conversation: Toward a Poetics of Talk', p. 601.
67 Foley, op. cit., p. xi.
practice continued into adulthood with hymns at religious festivals such as the Panathenaea and occasional participation in the tragedies of the Dionysia.68

2) Written dictation vs written composition
In the context of poetry (‘special speech’), there are cognitive differences between written composition and recitation to a scribe. Rather than see the textualisation of Homer as a ‘one dimensional dichotomy between orality and literacy’, the text and performance are interdependent: ‘the Iliad is real speech’.69 The text is reproducing ‘an ideal performance’, a transcript for the next performance, ‘with the actual text as nothing more (but also nothing less) than the preservation of the actual wording.’70 As Chapter III.3.2-3 discussed, writing as a direct substitute for speech is not an adequate explanation for what we do in modern literacy. However, there it was suggested that writing in Athens was probably highly, if not solely, phonetic without clear internalised word recognition and was therefore cognitively different to the way we read now; that full word comprehension was not part of the reading experience for archaic Athenians. In this context Bakker provides a reasonable explanation as to how Homeric epic was written down:

[T]here is an important difference between writing something down’ and ‘composing something with the aid of writing’. In the former case, writing is a medium transfer, the transcoding of a phonic discourse into a graphic discourse. One could do this without having anything to do with writing as composition, the production of a text that is written as to its conception. In other words, one could write in a technical and physical sense, without one’s thought processes being governed, or even touched, by writing as a compositional process.71

This sounds like Powell’s construct of reading, quoted in Chapter IV.2.4; that the script was ‘unintelligible to the eye or the mind until sounded out and heard aloud.’72 Several important points should be made about these observations. Firstly, the cognitive process they describe is not writing as we generally experience it, unless it is the cognitive sensation of writing poetry. Secondly, the

71 Bakker, op. cit., p. 25.
descriptions perfectly describe the sensation that the modern literate poets cited in Chapter II.2 described. The modern poet feels as if he/she is taking dictation rather than composing the piece 'explicitly'. That is, constructing writing from explicit memory, as one would compose any prose text from a shopping list or an extended forensic argument. A poem comes into existence without the premeditation that is usually associated with prose writing.

Secondly, anyone who experiences the process of 'making' prosody might suggest that there is one problem with Bakker's hypothesis. Whilst he recognises that part of the process can involve the sensation of someone else doing the thinking, he still maintains that the creative use of poetry ('special speech'), is a conscious process.\(^7\) Rubin, however, observes that with oral poetry, 'the singer may not know the contents of the line until it is sung'.\(^7\) Again, this does not mean that he does not have executive control or is without sentience. Chapter II.3 described the sensation as recognising the flow of right hemisphere dominant poetic language in the process of narrativising in what Gazzaniga called 'the interpreter mechanism', located in the left hemisphere of the brain. There is no denying that literate poets can attempt to compose purposefully, i.e. consciously, in the shopping list 'serial reasoning' mode. However, whenever a metred structure or rhyme sequence is artificially forced, written down line by line, stanza after stanza, the poem usually becomes stilted, psychologically uncomfortable to write and uncomfortable to read. It becomes anything but poetry.\(^7\) This does not appear to be the case with the skilled oral poets. As Finnegan notes, 'there is no clear-cut line between 'oral' and 'written' literature'.\(^7\)

Aside from this objection, Bakker's hypothesis of writing as a 'medium transfer' in the Homeric context adequately describes the stage of literacy in the mid-sixth century BC. His hypothesis of 'medium transfer' agrees with Havelock and others

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\(^7\) Bakker, op. cit., pp. 136-138. Anne Amory Parry, [Blameless Aegisthus, Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1973] promoted this view that Homer's oral formulas were consciously constructed.

\(^7\) Rubin, op. cit., p. 318.

\(^7\) This is not to say that poets do not again take pen in hand to edit their work. In an anecdote from Barry Gibb (The Bee Gees) on Radio 2GB Sydney (11am - 12noon, 6 December 2012) on a discussion he had had with Roy Orbison on song-writing, he said that Orbison told him to 'throw a song away' if it did not 'come easily' because 'it would be a bad song'. In effect, Gibb confirmed that songwriting for him was rather the same 'poiein' experience as the other 'makers' cited in Chapter II.2.

\(^7\) Finnegan, op. cit., p.2.
who maintained that, until the early to mid-fifth century BC, writing had 'not
technologically progressed beyond its primary use as a mnemonic tool.'

Since the 1860s, when Fennell first hypothesised that a Greek poet (Pindar) could
have composed without writing, scholarship has argued the finer points of 'oral'
and 'literate'. Those mentioned in the section below on the textualisation of
Homer who reject everything but an eighth or seventh century BC literate poet,
overlook the archaeology, some of which was discussed in Chapter IV. The
clayware and monumental inscriptive evidence reflect both non-linear
cognition in synoptic imaging and brevity in inscriptive incidents. These
scholars place unrealistic assessments of writing capabilities for the seventh and
sixth centuries BC. This is discussed at length below in Section V.4.1, however,
here is one example: Snodgrass reflects on 'the fluency and confidence with
which the script is handled on the [Dipylon] jug.' Surely this can be true only if
you accept the hypothesis that the second line comes from a second, far less sure
hand that peters out in the attempt to render an hexameter phonetically into
symbol; the author unable to complete the transition from oral to written. Such
views highlight a difference in degrees and types of literacy, something
sometimes overlooked in the argument that the epics were composed in writing
by the poet and could not have been dictated.

There is no psychological basis for the hypothesis that an oral poet could not
have accommodated the written word in the sense of 'dictation', or that literacy

77 Havelock, The Literate Revolution in Greece and Its Cultural Consequences, Princeton, N.J.,
78 C.A.M. Fennell, Pindar the Olympian and Pythian Odes, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
1893, p. xviii; cf. 'On the First Ages of Written Literature', Cambridge Philosophical Society, 1868;
79 Cf. Appendix 6 and seventh- and sixth-century BC examples at http://www.beazley.ox.ac.uk/pottery/
9016746, Athens National Museum 3774 (CAVI: ANM.192), LSAG Pl.I.1; 401, SEG. 30.46].
81 For example, Powell [ 'Why was the Greek Alphabet Invented: The Epigraphical Evidence',
century Athens: 'In Athens ca. 740 B.C. an aoidos composed the Dipylon verses at a dance contest
for which the jug was prize, a 'dance' may well have been an athletic event like the acrobatics of
the Phaiakian court. Somebody who knew how to write wrote down the first verse, and
somebody else tried his hand at the second verse before straying off into practising his ABC's.
My own guess is that the second hand belonged to the athlete-dancer who owned the pot, which
was, evidently, buried with him.'
per se prevents the ability to create poetic language.\textsuperscript{82} There is, however, enough research in neuropsychology to indicate that 'orality' and 'print consciousness' are two different types of cognitive physiology.\textsuperscript{83} The modern literate poet feels as if he is taking dictation and, as stated before, the sensation is not remotely like constructing extended prose.

A scribe could listen to a \textit{rhapsode} sing and then write it down. A literate \textit{rhapsode} could listen to himself sing, and then write it down. Either process has been attested. Milman Parry himself observed the relative ease with which oral poets adapt to dictation:

\begin{quote}
[Our] singers sit in the immobility of their thought, watching the motion of Nikola’s hand across the empty page, when it will tell them it is the instant for them to speak the next verse.\textsuperscript{84}
\end{quote}

Likewise, Rosalind Thomas points to the modern jazz musician who can improvise one minute and play from a script the next.\textsuperscript{85} However, what is not being clearly evaluated is the difference between composing in writing and reading from a script. William Harris identifies a further aspect, noting 'it is important not to go on thinking of 'writer' and 'reader' as occupying sempiternally the fixed roles that were [traditionally] allotted to them. ... Anyone who can both read [a] sentence aloud and copy it out in a notebook realises that writing and speech are quite different bio-mechanical activities. One involves the hand and the other involves the mouth. Hand and mouth engage quite different sensory motor programmes.\textsuperscript{86} So also is the difference between the poet and the scribe, even if he/she is the same entity. The scribe writes what he hears; the oral poet, whether he is creating, or dictating, produces the words in the same way as the rapper; without conscious construction.

There is therefore no psychological reason that the oral poet could not have dictated his poetry to another person. The scenario of each poem being sung by a single \textit{rhapsode} and a scribe writing it down, over however long it would take, is

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{82} For example, Kirk [\textit{The Songs of Homer}, 1962, pp. 71, 87]: orality is ‘an elaborate system which is quickly weakened when the poet begins to compose by writing ... literacy destroys the virtue of an oral singer’. \\
\item \textsuperscript{83} Cf. Chapters II.2, III.3.2-3; Appendix 1. \\
\item \textsuperscript{84} Parry, \textit{The Making of Homeric Verse}, p. 451 (written in January 1934). \\
\item \textsuperscript{86} William V. Harris, \textit{Ancient Literacy}, Cambridge, MA., Harvard University Press, 1989, at 214, p. xiii. Cf. Chapter II.3, Table 1.
\end{itemize}
the most reasonable explanation of the textualisation of oral composition. Either a visiting Homerides dictated to someone in Athens or an envoy went to Chios. The physical production of the Homeric canon is therefore a question of volume, logistics and level of literacy. For those reasons the textualisation of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* in Athens was unlikely to have been a single act before the Peisistratidae.

3) The controversy over the textualisation of Homer and the 'Peisistratidae Redaction'

Whether Peisistratus introduced a copy of the Homeric poems from Ionia, or whether he had a poet dictate the poems to an amanuensis, is not essential to the argument of why the canon became part of Athenian education, except in relation to the question of how the text was used in Athens in the sixth century BC. In view of the scholarship modelling oral poetic construction, described above, it is somewhat outmoded to look for a diachronic historical reconstruction of when the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* became written texts. It is, however, useful in this context. Behind the controversies over the textualisation of Homer are the issues of whether literacy functioned in the same way as it does now, how the texts were used, and whether Athenians were psychologically able to read, let alone write down, any text as long as the *Iliad* or the *Odyssey*. These questions are raised in several sections below; beginning with the debate over when Homer was first textualised.

Some scholars insist on a literate Homer: Snodgrass suggests that the potential for writing existed 'by or before the earliest likely date' for the *Iliad*'s composition; Leskey believes Homer wrote down the works himself; Wade-Gery thinks the *terminus post quem* is 700 BC because the hoplite phalanx Homer describes is dated to this period. Griffin, and Burns posit the seventh century BC

87 Herodotus [2.53.2] places Homer around 850 BC.
'at least,' whilst Powell and Kannicht accept 700BC.99 Others, such as archaeologist/art historian Karl Schefold opt for a fixed text in Solon's time.90

Nagy suggests that 'the very concept of a poetic transcript' could not have existed until around 550BC.91 Morris subscribes to Janko's 'sophisticated analysis' which, at first, fixed the Iliad's textualisation around 750-725BC and the Odyssey's around 743-713BC, but subsequently, pushed the date for the Iliad back to 775-750BC.92 He posits written transcripts kept in Chios and copied by Peisistratus and other autocrats.93 Davison also argues that 'the standard text for the Panathenae (perhaps between 530 and 520BC) was already in writing when it first reached Athens.'94 In view of the discussion above and in III.3.6, most of these positions suggest a modern conceptualisation of writing and literacy.

Cicero claimed that Peisistratus first arranged the books of Homer 'which were scattered about/mixed up.'95 The logistics of this proposition has spawned 'a perplexing chaos' of debate and 'an idiosyncratic treatment of orality'.96 The first objection comes from Davison who claims Cicero's source was Asclepiades and that his statement confuses bibliographic tussles between the Alexandrian

93 Janko, 'The Homeric Poems as Oral Dictated Texts', pp. 3, 7,8,13; cf. pp. 9-11; Homer, Hesiod and the Hymns, p. 188. He suggests that the original poet (Homer) was not present when the poem was first textualised and points to the 'vestiges of dictation' throughout the entire work and asks why did not Homer, 'or his putative editor', use writing to improve on some of the errors in his texts. He believes we have a wholesale redaction of Homer because, apart from a few interpolations, the overall internal unity of each poem is evidence of a single origin (for each work).
95 ... qui primus Homeri libros confusos antea sic disposuisse dicitur, ut nunc habemus. [Cicero De oratore 3.137]
scholars. On Cicero’s assertion that the Peisistratidae had any hand in the convergence of the epic into ‘books’, Stephanie West makes the relevant point that the divisions were ordered with an eye to performance, which is perhaps what should be expected in an oral poem and necessary for material for a Panathenaic festival. Segal makes the even more relevant point that such work would not have been necessary had the poems already been textualised:

[I]t furnishes one more argument against the hypothesis of an early writing-down of the poems.

There is no reason to doubt Cicero. The Peisistratidae, with family connections in Chios, home of the Homeridae, as well as the Troad would have had the socio-political knowledge and opportunity to textualise the Iliad and Odyssey for Athens. Furthermore, Cicero uses the word ‘dicitur’ implying that the story of a Peisistratidae textualisation was current in 55BC. Therefore, ‘in that bookish age of competitive scholarship,’ Cicero would not have made such an assertion if

97 Davison, loc. cit.
100 W.G. Forrest ['A Lost Peisistratid Name', The Journal of Hellenic Studies, Vol. 101 (1981), p. 134] details the inscriptional and numismatic evidence for a Peisistratidae family resident in Chios over centuries: The family of Peisistratus did not indulge in strikingly uncommon names but it is noteworthy that all but one of them also appear in Chios. Neleus or Neileus (e.g. c. Isoa, SEG xvii 381 A 1.2), Hippokrates (c. 420s, RE s.n. 14), Hipparchos (s. Ia, BSA li [1966] 199 no. 3.15), Heges[istrates?] (e.g. s. IVa, NCxv [1915] 430), Peisistratus, Hippias and Thessalos: only one lophon is certainly missing. ... no long filiations can be established, nor is there any positive argument that they all belonged to the same family, but for the late fourth and third centuries there is a hint. Chian social units had a family-based molecular structure. A catalogue of one of them gives us about 70 names c. 300 with an average of two additions p.a. thereafter (BSA lv [1960] 181-7 = SEG xix 580). On it there is a Hippias of the later fourth (father of the named member) and a Thessalos of the later third century. At least one Hippias appears on coins of the later fourth (NC xv [1915] 430) and another (or the same) on a subscription list of the mid third as father of the subscriber (SEG xix 578.12). A Chian Peisistratus dedicated in Rhodes in the second century (IG xii.1 113), a Peisistratidae son of Peisistratus made a patriotic subscription in the later third (BCH xxxvii [1913] no. 27. 18-19), a Chian Peisistratus, grandson of Peisistratus, is given proxenia at Delos in the mid third or a little earlier (IG xi.4 598), a Peisistratus put his name on coins belonging to the same chronological group as those of Hippias (NC xv[1915]430). That the Hippias-group and the Peisistratus-group were somehow related is put beyond doubt by the name which one fourth-century Hippias and one fourth-century Peisistratus gave to their sons. Given what we know of the Athenian family’s ties with Argos, Argeios Peisistratou (IG xi.598) and Argeios Hippiou (SEG xix 580) are no accident. ... that the Athenian family established some real connection, by marriage or emigration, with Chios. ... is made attractive by two other antiquarian names, Pindaros Hippiou (SEG xix 578.12) and Lykourgos Argeios (ibid. line 21), but antiquarianism is a third-century rather than a fourth- or fifth-century failing: we have a fifth-century Hippokrates and for that matter a fifth-century Hippias (NC xv 1915 430) lurking in the background. Some real connection must be the most likely guess - the Peisistratidae of Hdt. 8.52.2 will have had to settle somewhere. But in any case we are left with the problem of Argeios. Was he a real sixth-century Peisistratidae?
there was any knowledge of an earlier authoritative text.\textsuperscript{102} That other fifth or fourth century BC references, especially \textit{Athenaios Politeia}, did not mention a Peisistratidae textualisation of Homer accompanying the organisation of the Panathenæa is similar to why present-day contemporaries would not bother to say that a the referee in a modern football match will be using a whistle. It was assumed. Of the text we have, internal evidence shows it was written in the old 'Ionic' alphabet, yet with 'some degree of Atticismation', and therefore had its genesis 'beyond Attica.'\textsuperscript{103} Scholars in Alexandria and Pergamene had more than one version of the epics, just as Homeric citations from fifth and fourth century BC writers indicate there were moderate variations in circulation.\textsuperscript{104} Much of this scholarship reifies Homer, seeing interpolations and or redactions as evidence of 'inauthenticity'.\textsuperscript{105} Most of these may be explained with Bakker's theory of

\textsuperscript{102}Robb [op. cit., p. 255] thinks that Dicaearchus was probably Cicero's 'fairly reliable source'.


'instantiation', which makes the 'geography', 'religion', and 'language', as well as the psychology of the argument, a manifestation of the contextualised socio-cultural knowledge in the period of textualisation, which the argument here proposes to be the second half of the sixth century BC.

The discussion below on the types of argument and persuasion in Homer shows that *Iliad* 11 contains a persuasive speech from Nestor that consciously employs authority and paradigm and then attempts to manipulate, psychologically, with the proposition of abstract potentials. It is markedly different to other speeches.\textsuperscript{106} This speech, at the least, shows a conscious manipulation of antithetical argument and is evidence that the processes and techniques (if not the technicalities) of sophistic *pro* and *contra* rhetoric were known before Protagoras formalised sophistic rules. The discussion of 'interpolations' in Nestor's speech to Patroclus in *Iliad* 11 may be resolved if viewed as a manifestation of the

\textsuperscript{106} For example Walter Leaf [*A Companion to the Iliad*, London, Macmillan, 1892, pp. 213-214] considered that lines 664-762 were more like the *Odyssey* than the other speeches of the *Iliad*, that it was more 'prosaic'. Peter Toohey [Peter Toohey, 'Epic and rhetoric', in Ian Worthington (ed.), *Persuasion: Greek Rhetoric in Action*, pp. 153-175 at 159-60] considers that initially the speech was a 'simple ring pattern'. (A - *exordium* 656-665, B - *prothesis* 666-669, C - *paradeigma = pistis* 670-761, B.1 - *prothesis* 762-764) that could have ended 'after lines 762-764 perhaps with a simple *exordium* of how Nestor would have fought and a lament of the Achaeans' misfortune. Minchin [*Homer and the Resources of Memory*, p. 195] however, regards Homer's 'story rings' as a naturally occurring, human 'strategy for oral storytelling', rather than any premeditated 'template' for composition. Toohey notes the monologue then breaks into another 'digression' (D - *diegesis* 765-792) and then a conclusion (A.1 - *epilogue* 793-803). The *diegesis* shifts the logic of the speech away from Nestor and on to Patroclus. It is possible that an interpolation begins with this *diegesis*; the foregoing part of the speech, similar to Nestor's other speeches, a remnant of earlier versions. If it followed the simple ring pattern of Nestor's other speeches in the *Iliad*, it would not have the second digression and would thus seem more appropriate. William C. Scott [Similes in a Shifting Scene: *Iliad*, Book 11', *Classical Philology*, Vol. 101, No. 2 (2006), pp. 103-114 at 113] highlights another exceptional break with normal in Nestor's speech to Patroclus: 'except for the short simile at 747', similes 'totally disappear in the scene'. This speech is examined in V.3.1 below.
Nagy/Bakker 'evolutionary model' that 'instantiates' the poem with each performance of the *rhapsode*. This then is also evidence that the processes of *pro* and *contra* argument from probability were known when the scribes of Peisistratus recorded the poem. It suggests an audience capable of understanding such argument. Without Nestor's particular speech to Patroclus in *Iliad* 11, there is no ironical or fateful dimension of the plot. As it is fundamental to the epic's narrative structure some form of speech with similar intent would have occurred here. It is impossible to prove conclusively that it was not initiated by the archaic poet in the form it is, but its extended form and structural development makes it stand out from the other argument 'moulds' in the rest of the poem.

Other examples of different styles of *pro* and *contra* oratory in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* are also cited and discussed below. They are different to Protagorean-style formalised sophistic argument in that the persuasion relies on concrete paradigms (Bruner's contextualised 'narrative thinking') and not abstract propositions or probabilities. They do not, however, resemble the form that most of the persuasion in the *Iliad* takes. Cole defines this other form of argument as 'archaic', 'arhetorical eloquence' rather than 'the conscious manipulation of the medium in order to persuade'.\(^{107}\) Most of the speeches elsewhere in the *Iliad* fit into this model and are aimed at the tactful persuasion or pacification of an opponent. A further consideration of some paired speeches in the *Iliad* highlights these persuasive approaches: in addition to those in *Iliad* 9, *Iliad* 2 shows that Agamemnon, Nestor, Odysseus and Thersites employ different modes of 'archaic' persuasion and illustrate the archaic relationships between authority and deference that underpinned the dynamics of persuasion, deliberation and decision-making.

Opinion on the unity and/or the oral evolution of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* will forever be contested, but what is attempted below in V.3 is an historical assessment seeking similar psychological characteristics in other texts of the approximate period. Notwithstanding the need to justify each of the arguments that might be used here, the sheer volume of debate that has gone on over

centuries is enough to accept the argument that the Homeric canon altered over time.

Nagy’s evolutionary model, that sees composition and performance as a single process and the fixing of the text as ‘a process, not necessarily an event’, has been a useful construct for the scholarship of Bakker, and Minchin on composition discussed above. It can also recognise changes in modal thinking and methods of decision-making over time within a culture. Scholarship denying a Peisistratidae recension quibbles over whether the Alexandrians had the ‘authentic’ Homer and discounts the evident fluidity of the process. Powell provides a sensible modern analogy of how any textualisation and textual interaction of Homer could have occurred:

[T]he word-processor mocks the theory of a fixed, original text. It is not surprising that today some scholars claim a similar model for Homer’s text, also said to be ever shifting, refined, drifting in and out of the darkness of cyberspace on the tides of orality. ... there were many ‘oral texts’ of ‘Homer’ taken down repeatedly, whenever someone felt like it.

In this context one oral performance became a written text and then rehearsal scripts from that text became oral performances. The Peisistratidae Homer was not a redaction or recension in the sense that it was consciously or deliberately with motive edited by a scribe paid by the tyranny; it was merely the written record of a rhapsode’s oral conception of the work. However, in Athens, traces of the poems performed by Homeric rhapsodes were remembered/memorised, quoted, written down in other texts, even in practice pieces by schoolchildren, all out of the performance arena. As the discussion above suggests, the psychological dynamics of these processes are different between the skilled oral rhapsodist, ancient or modern, and unskilled recitation from rote-learning.

V.3 ΣΥΜΒΟΥΛΕΥΤΙΚΟΝ: PERSUASION CONSTRUCTED IN HOMER AND ARCHAIC ORAL LITERATURE
1) Sophisticated argument before Protagoras and the scholarly debate over the beginnings of rhetoric

Diogenes Laertius claims the sophist Protagoras was the first to recognise pro and contra argument; that there are (at least) two potentialities entailed for

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every situation in every matter; conflicting forensic aspects of any given circumstance or hypothesis.\textsuperscript{110} This hardly seems an original idea. Persuasion in the Homeric canon often argues between alternatives. For example, the sequencing and structure of some episodes in the \textit{Iliad} and \textit{Odyssey} show that a Protagorean-style composer is in evidence and there are instances of deliberative, forensic and epideictic oratory in which propositions and alternative courses of action are objectively recognised. There are three types of speech-making skills, two of which are in evidence in the \textit{Iliad} and the \textit{Odyssey}. The first is the ability to speak extempore; the second uses the language Bakker calls 'special speech'. Both of these skills are bound by their oral nature and the limits of 'cognitive capacity'. The third speech-making skill uses a pen to write prose. This written prose may contain poetic elements, but it is not generated in the same way as 'special speech'. The next two chapters consider how and why Sophists such as Protagoras and Gorgias introduced new self-conscious forms of argument that differ from forms of argument in the Homeric canon. Formalised Protagorean-style sophistic 'rhetoric' is not just the style of persuasion used, it is a 'bootstrapped' way of thinking and a manifestation of the type of language used.\textsuperscript{111} If it is 'special speech', then the arguments cannot be extended exercises of decontextualised abstract syllogism. The discussion below considers several examples of speeches which exhibit rhetorical elements of the type described by Aristotle.\textsuperscript{112} We begin with the embassy to Achilles in \textit{Iliad} 9; move on to Nestor's speech in \textit{Iliad} 11 and a comparison with Nestor's other speeches in the \textit{Iliad}. Discussions of Priam's persuasion of Achilles in \textit{Iliad} 24, then Telemachus and his father in the \textit{Odyssey} follows.

\begin{description}
\item[a) Sustained Protagorean \textit{pro} and \textit{contra} argument in the speeches made during the embassy to Achilles in \textit{Iliad} 9] The embassy scene reveals a substantial awareness of the processes of persuasion and the structure and sequencing of the episode itself is a display of Protagorean-style argument. To illustrate, the purpose of the embassy was to
\end{description}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{110} Diogenes Laert. 9.51: Καὶ πρῶτος ἔφη δύο λόγους εἶναι περὶ παντὸς πράγματος ἀντικειμένους ἀλλήλοις· (He (Protagoras) was the first to say there are two \textit{logoi} about every matter in opposition to each other). Mario Untersteiner, \textit{The Sophists} (trans. Kathleen Freeman), Oxford, Blackwell, 1954, p. 41 n. 93. discusses this passage in \textit{contra} to Diels and adopts Wilhelm Capelle's \textit{[Die Vorsokratiker: die Fragmente und Quellenberichte]}, Leipzig, A. Kröner, 1935, p. 325] translation of \textit{λόγοι} as 'points of view'.
\textsuperscript{111} Cf. Chapters II.3 and VI.2.4.
\textsuperscript{112} Ar. \textit{Rhet.} 1.3. Cf. Chapter VI.2.1 for a discussion on the etymology of \textit{ῥητορικής} [rhetoric].
\end{flushright}
persuade Achilles to return to the war. The three persuaders, Odysseus, Aias and Phoenix, offer three different forms of archaic argument that combine Aristotelian rhetorical categories (deliberative, forensic and epideictic). The speeches differ in arrangement and length and employ what Aristotle observed as three different proofs (ethos, pathos and logos). We may infer that this is a deliberate demonstration of the differing forms of persuasion for the following reasons. Firstly, three of the speeches are among the longest in the Iliad and the personal longest for all four participants which indicates their significance. Secondly, into the mouth of Aias Homer puts an unstructured and ultimately illogical argument which is also laced with subtle ironies that indicate the composer appreciated the relative linguistic dexterity of the other speakers. Thirdly, Homer reveals the relative effects of each persuasion within the response made by Achilles to each argument.

The first argument [9.225-306] comes from Odysseus. It outlines Agamemnon’s offer of recompense to Achilles and attempts to persuade him to return to battle. It is eighty-one lines and the longest speech from Odysseus in the Iliad. There is no usual paradigmatic structure; the argument relies on three relatively objective logoi that appeal to authority and an ambiguous reward (addressed shortly in relation to its significance as a 'gift attack').

Achilles’ reply to Odysseus [9.308-429] is his longest speech (121 lines) and combines into the argument Aristotle’s rhetorical categories of forensic, deliberative and epideictic. It appeals to logoi and pathos (all the more evocative because the audience knows that Achilles, hypothesising his future, will, in fact, die) and matches the sophistication of Odysseus’ speech. It is radically unlike any of his earlier speeches which manifest the characteristics of archaic oratory (discussed below).

After the traditional proem of ritual pleasantry, Odysseus’ argument clearly presents Protagorean pro and contra alternatives to Achilles more than do the

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The only other long speeches of over fifty lines are: Patroclus’ argument to persuade Achilles to rejoin the battle [16.21-45]; Glauicus to Diomedes detailing his lineage [6.145-211].

Even though it is the speech which wins a major concession from Achilles it is illogical in the sense that his direct appeal to Achilles that fighting over a single woman is not worth it overlooks the raison d’être of the entire war.
others. There are two simple alternatives: ἐν δοιή δὲ σασσέμεν ἢ ἀπολέσθαι νήας ἐςσέλους, εἰ νὴ σὺ γὲ δῦσαι ἀλκί. [The ships will burn if you do not act, or they will not if you save them] [230-231]. The persuasion Odysseus employs is archaic and formulaic revolving around shame – you will suffer agonies when you later remember what you have done [249-251]; authority – your father told you to ‘cool it’ and so do I [252-261]; dignity - Agamemnon did not bed Briseis [274-275], and reward – he will/we will give you valuables [262-303]. Achilles’ counter-argument does not really consider the argument put forward by Odysseus. Up-front he states his suspicion of anyone who tries to put forward another point of view. Placed within Achilles’ reply to Odysseus are other subtle contradictions that both move the story on and reveal that he is aware that he has alternatives – albeit a god-bound alternative told to him by his mother that the gods will allow him to die a hero, or live at home undistinguished [9.308-429]. Nevertheless his eloquent deliberation over Odysseus’ proposal does not address any perspective other than his own subjective needs. The argument he puts forward is faulty. Given the alternative of honour in war or dishonour at home, Achilles seems unaware of the non sequitur in prothesis 3 [367-400] by which he resolves to go home and live honourably. Of course, as the speeches move the direction of the plot, there is no need for them to be logical or successfully persuasive from any point of view.

Phoenix is next to persuade after Odysseus [9.433-605] and argues from ethos, encapsulating authority and paradigm (inductive reasoning using examples). He also employs pathos which appeals to the personal relationship between himself and Achilles and directly addresses Achilles throughout. At one hundred and seventy-two lines, it is the longest speech in the Iliad. It has been suggested it is so long merely because it is the only speech delivered by Phoenix. This rather ignores the context and the complexity of its structure.

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117 A (433-446 exordium): Don’t leave me; your father gave me authority, I have the authority because I am almost your stepfather and I’m old; I love you.
B (442 – 446 prothesis 1): Your father sent me to instruct you [so listen].
B (449-477 prothesis 2): I incurred my own father’s anger but escaped
B (478-497 prothesis 3): I reared you and I loved you; curb your anger,
B (498- 515 prothesis 4): Even the gods curb their anger.
B (515-526 prothesis 5): Be godlike; take the offerings that Agamemnon is offering.
At twelve lines in length, Achilles’ short reply to Phoenix [9.607-619] uses pathos to reproach Phoenix for supposed disloyalty. Phoenix’s argument is the only one that is successful in persuading Achilles to relent and consider further discussion. Achilles is again manifesting the archaic characteristics of argument that will be discussed below. Next is Aias’ speech of eighteen lines [9.624-642] which also argues from pathos (criticism, comradeship and reward) appealing to accepted tradition (nomos) with deductive, or enthymematic reasoning. The irony of Aias’ argument, that fighting over one woman is not worth it, is possibly a conscious pointer from the poet to his listeners that Aias is not good at making comparative logical connections. Although Achilles’ eleven line reply to Aias [9.644-655] states that he has considered the points made by Aias, it is again an example of Achilles’ intransigence and inability to consider another point of view.

One of the Iliad’s central themes is how Achilles deals with his alternatives and how others try to persuade him to accept the status quo. This is a central character attribute of Achilles and, as Minchin has stated, necessarily had to remain constant over repeated transmissions by rhapsodes. The significant point here is that Iliad 9 as a whole is a type of prothesis that sets up the diegesis (the narrative) as it would in a forensic speech.

b) Nestor’s persuasive style and the exceptional structure of his speech to Patroclus in Iliad 11

The foregoing should be sufficient to show that there is a conscious application of pro and contra deliberation and persuasion in the Iliad. Roisman, however, presents a different point of view stating that the Iliad puts no value on persuasion; that nowhere in the poem does Homer suggest ‘that the ability to persuade is a crucial - or even desirable feature’ of an advisor. She sees the

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C (527-599 paradeigma = pistis): Meleager’s anger and where that got him. (Meleger’s wife is Cleopatra, a mirror of Patroclus = she is the one who is instrumental in getting Meleager to return to the fight; a similar outcome is actuated by Patroclus’ death).

D (600-605 prothesis): Do not be like Meleager, take the money, do it now and you will be further rewarded and honoured after the battle.

A (epilogue): There isn’t one (unless we count the tears).

118 Enthymemes: elliptical argument in an incomplete syllogism with an unstated proposition considered self-evident. For example, ‘Be good and you will be rewarded.’ with the syllogism, ‘good people receive reward’ unstated.

ability to persuade to be negative, associated with with Odysseus' 'wiliness' and with 'riff-raff' such as Thersites who appeals to the soldiers' baseness.\(^{120}\) The pro and contra oratory of Thersites failed to persuade anyone, but, apart from the subtle and persuasive oratory in Iliad 9, this argument overlooks the abilities of Nestor in Iliad 11.

Toohey concedes to 'traces of later rhetorical habits' in Nestor's speeches in the Iliad.\(^{121}\) His persuasion of Patroclus in Book 11 [656-803] is the most striking example of deliberative argument in the Iliad. Although the finer details of this persuasion are debatable, it is also evidence of the extent of conscious pro and contra rhetoric in Homer. For example, the leitmotif of Nestor's advanced age and his epithet oðros 'Ἄχαιῶν (guardian of the Achaians)\(^{122}\) both give him the authority to use paradigmatic exhortation as a vehicle of persuasion (the norm for his other speeches in the Iliad.) Although in the speech in Iliad 11 'the form of logic is strictly linear and strictly paratactic', the 'persuasive strategy of this speech is as oblique' as Nestor's other speeches, it is the most complex speech in the Iliad.\(^{123}\) It is unlike unlike any of the others in that it sacrifices 'the aesthetic niceties' of ring structure in order to produce 'a more complex form of logic'.\(^{124}\)

This speech is also usually interpreted as an exhortation to Achilles, (as for example, Toohey, Pedrick, Minchin, Roisman\(^{125}\)). Roisman suggests it is 'Nestor's hope that Patroclus will be able to persuade Achilles to abandon his anger and join the battle,'\(^{126}\) in which case it could be viewed as a lesson in archaic pro and contra rhetoric. Conversely, it has been described as the 'most muddled story in the Iliad, [which] ... must be meant to illustrate the deliberate bumbling of

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121 Toohey, 'Epic and rhetoric', op. cit., 153.
122 Iliad 8.80, 11.840, 15.370.
123 Toohey, op. cit., p. 160.
126 Roisman, op. cit., p. 20.
Nestor.' Nevertheless it is persuasion that appears to consciously utilise authority and paradigm to manipulate, by means of a hidden suggestion, at a pivotal psychological moment.

To explain: the main aim of the argument is to get the Myrmidons (and not necessarily Achilles) back into the fight. The listener is forewarned in Achilles' instruction to Patroclus that he must return to him with the intelligence as soon as possible [11.608-612], so alarm bells ring when Nestor preemptorily invites an unwilling Patroclus to sit down and confronts him with the suffering of the Achaeans and the imperative that Achilles rejoin the fight [11.656-669]. Roisman notes that the speech follows a battlefield scene highlighting Nestor's admirable military ability and Minchin considers the physical context of the episode is pivotal to how the scene is to be understood. Homer sets a scene of wealth and comfort, of 'respectful attention and easy companionship'. All attest Nestor's position 'within the Achaean circle', to a lifetime's endeavour that has 'borne fruit which continues to be harvested' into old age. A change of setting in Homer is not there for variety or realism. It is 'the working context in which the action of the following scene is to be understood. Nestor's argument would lose much of its persuasive force, if Patroclus, and Homer's audience, were not invited to contemplate it as the rewards for a generous devotion to the active life.'

The setting therefore establishes Nestor's unquestioned authority as a competent counsellor and presumably successful problem-solver. The paradigmatic deviation that follows [11.670-761] is multi-faceted in its persuasive dimensions. For example, he relates his own youthful prowess in former battles and the fact that he did not make war on Patroclus' grandfather or grand-uncle (the Moliones twins) [11.670-762]. This establishes his own authority through aristeia and trustworthiness through friendship with Patroclus' kin. Nestor next reminds Patroclus of his father's instructions to be a mentor to Achilles as he is the elder [11.785-789], thereby assuring Patroclus that he has the authority to advise Achilles. He reinforces this by invoking divine authority τίς δ’ οἶδ’ εἶ κεν οἶ σῶν

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128 Roisman, ibid.
δαίμονι θυμόν ὃρίναις παρειπών; (Who knows what power may help a plea from you to stir his heart?) [11.792-3]. The next line, ἀγαθὴ δὲ παραίφασίς ἐστὶν ἐταίρου (The persuasion of a friend is good), seems a precursor to the ominous perspective Gorgias put forward in the Encomium on the evil potentialities of bad advice.130 It marks an ability on the part of the poet to recognise different forms of persuasion and their manipulative merits.131 The next few lines form a well-timed turning point, not seen elsewhere in any speech in the Iliad.132 Nestor implants an alternative proposition in the mind of Patroclus by suggesting that, if Achilles will not fight, Achilles might allow Patroclus to lead the Myrmidons into the battle [11.794-796]. For Patroclus it is the germination of an idea, an ‘ah-ha’ moment where he understands there is an alternative to the problem at hand by taking the initiative himself to lead in battle. That Nestor is manipulative and aimed to propel Patroclus into his own volition is suggested by the next line that appeals to Patroclus’ natural quest for arête and aristeia: σι κέν τι φῶς Δαναιοῖσι γέναι; (Victory light for the Danaans you may be!). Nestor is indirectly suggesting to Patroclus that he has both the authority and the ability to lead the Myrmidons if Achilles will not. He indirectly enlightens Patroclus on just how to lead the Myrmidons and win the field by again placing the volition and authority with Achilles rather than himself: Achilles will let you wear his armour and the Myrmidons will be fresh for fighting [11.798-803]. Pedrick recognises the manipulative impact of Nestor’s speech, but gives him the benefit of the doubt, suggesting it is an aristeia to remind Achilles of his responsibility and inspire him to seek glory. To him it is irony that Patroclus instead seeks his own aristeia.133

There is an echo of this ambiguous and manipulative persuasion from Nestor in Iliad 14 during the attack on the Achaeans’ defences. In the first lines we are told that Nestor deliberates his options, ὁ γέρων ὤρμαίνε δαιζόμενος κατὰ θυμὸν διχθάδι, ἃ μεθ’ ὦμιλον ἵοι Δαναιῶν ταχυπόλων, ἣ μετ’ Ἄτρείδην Ἀγαμέμνονα, ποιμένα λαῶν (the old man pondered with divided mind, whether to turn toward the Danaan mass or find and join Lord Marshall Agamemnon) [14.20-23].

130 See Appendix 7: translation, Gorgias Encomion to Helen and discussion Chapter VII.2.
131 In this regard, discussions on the relative success of Nestor’s advice generally point to the unfortunate consequences of most of his misguided counsels; it begs the question - are the listeners meant to tut-tut at the irony of line 794, or be chilled by it?
He chooses not to enjoin battle but to join the wounded: ὅδε δέ οἵ φρονέοντι
doάσσατο κέρδιον εἶναι (and so thinking, it seemed to be the better thing) [14.23];
an act that disappoints his comrades when they see him, making the hearts in
their chests ache (πτηξε δὲ θυμὸν ἐνι στήθεσιν Ἀχαιῶν) [14.39-40]. The advice
he then gives to the injured Agamemnon and the other princely casualties is:
ἡμεῖς δὲ φραζόμεθ' ὁποῖος ἔσται πάντες ἔργα, εἶ τι νόος ῥέξει. Πόλεμον δ' οὐκ ἄμμε
κελεύω δύμεναι· οὐ γάρ πώς βεβλήμενον ἓστι μάχεσθαι. (We must think what to
do, if any good can be achieved by thinking. I do not say that we should enter
combat; hurt men cannot fight) [14.61-63]. The ambiguity lies in the fact that
Nestor was not wounded. Does this imply spinelessness, even in view of the
garrulous accounts of his youthful heroics? The interpretation of Nestor's actions
and of the poet's intent is controversial. Aristarchus considered the line (ὅ δὲ
ξύμβλητο γεραῖος, Νεήτωρ, πτηξε δὲ θυμὸν ἐνι στήθεσιν Ἀχαιῶν) [14.39-40] to
be an interpolation, while Leaf suggests its authenticity by reading ἀχεύων for
Ἀχαιῶν, with Ernesti's conjection, πτηξε δὲ θυμὸς, as referring to Nestor's own
state of mind. In Homer, πτήσειν means to cower (Od. 8.190, 14.354, 14.474,
22.362), and later becomes 'fear' (e.g. Soph. Oed. Col. 1466 ἐπτηξα θυμὸν, Theognis
1015 ἐχθροὺς πτηξαι).\textsuperscript{134}

When coupled with Nestor's later words about whether 'we' fight or not the
implication is that he is more manipulative than courageous. Roisman cites this
sequence on the beach (as well as several other speeches) as evidence that, in
spite of Nestor's frequently flawed advice, his credibility as a competent
counsellor was never questioned. His advice increases Agamemnon's negativity
leading to his decision again to sail for home. Odysseus condemns the decision
but 'neither he nor anyone else attaches any responsibility to Nestor'.\textsuperscript{135} Nestor
appears to have more guile than he is generally given credit for. The sequence
amidst the fighting on the beach repeats the sort of manipulation apparent in
Nestor's speech to Patroclus in the earlier book. Unlike the heroic feats detailed
in his own speeches, it is another demonstration of Nestor's ability for the
forensic manipulation of alternative propositions. Listening to the \textit{rhapsode},
perhaps Athenians were not conscious of the irony, but we may infer an almost formalised consciousness of *pro* and *contra* argument in the poet himself.

c) *Iliad* 24: Priam's subtle persuasion and Achilles' reaction

Another, looser, example of *pro* and *contra* deliberation of alternatives is in *Iliad* 24 relating to the strategy of persuading Achilles to return the body of Hector; Hecuba sees a Protagorean δύο λόγους ἐναί περί παντὸς πράγματος ἀντικειμένων ἀλλήλοις when considering the merits of Priam’s proposition to visit Achilles to plead for the return of their son’s body [24.193-227]. She is objective (if you go you will be captured; better stay safe and mourn in the palace [203-209]), even though it exemplifies her fear of coercion (Achilles is a savage therefore he will behave in such and such a way); her wish for revenge (I want to cut out Achilles’ heart and eat it [200-216]) and her religion (portents and omens [285-298]). For his part, Priam’s reasoning and volition rest entirely on a religious perspective that sees no alternative [*Il.* 24.194-199; 23.223.224; app. 8.V.1]. As will be seen later, both points of view are perfectly logical within the framework of formulaic deductive reasoning.

Priam’s volition, however, is not so simple in his evocative pleading with Achilles in *Iliad* 24. A manipulation of symbolic authority is evident in his speeches to persuade Achilles to return his son. For example, as a supplicant, Priam is foregoing his authority: therefore when he asks where he is to sleep [24.634-635] he is usurping the privilege of a *xenos* rather than that of a supplicant. Lloyd sees the subtleties as ‘startling and problematic’. A guest may take the initiative of retiring to sleep (cf. *Od.* 4.294-5, 11.330-1), but dependants and suppliants are told when to retire (cf. *Il.* 9.617-18, 658-62; *Od.* 7.334-43): ‘Priam thus misinterprets his relationship with Achilles’.

Priam is still clinging to his authority and Achilles doesn’t like it; hence his own unmistakeable ‘symbolic violence’. Again, Lloyd takes issue with scholars who attempt to weaken the force of line 24.649 (τὸν δ’ ἐπικερτομέων προσέφη πόδας ὥκυς Ἀχιλλέως) to mean that Achilles is showing a joshing ‘friendly demeanour’ towards Priam. When Homer uses *kertomia/epikertomia* elsewhere its meaning is

aggressive or violent (Il. 1.539, 2.256, 16.260, 744, 20.202, 433; Od. 9.474, 20.177, 263, 22.194, 287) or denoting anger (Il. 4.6, 5.419; Od. 8.153, 24.240). 'Kertomia' is associated with words denoting insult, outrage, or provocation like veikéω (Il. 2.224, 20.251-4; Od. 20.267), ὄνδιξίζω (Il. 2.255), ἔρεθίζω (Il. 4.5, 5.419, 16.261; Od. 9.494), λωβη (Il. 2.275; Od. 2.323, 18.347), and ὑβρις (Od. 16.86, 18.381). Thersites' kertomia (Il. 2.256) Lloyd sees as humorous 'sarcasm' without 'its distinctive element of ironic politeness'. Underneath, Achilles is angry:

Achilles does not overlook Priam's faux pas, although he responds more politely than he did to his earlier gaffe [when Priam pressed Achilles to forego protocol and let him immediately see Hector's body] (552-70). ... [Achilles] resents Priam's disingenuousness. 137

Priam's disingenuousness is also evident in his conscious manipulation of Achilles' sympathy when he says all of his fifty sons are dead [493-448]. A hint for the listener is in his epideictic speech just prior to his expedition to Achilles. There he abuses his nine obviously still-living sons [248-252]. The kind of argument put forward by Priam to Achilles persuades restraint and prudence, with appeals to Achilles' intuitive sense of shame by identifying himself with Achilles' father [485-490]. At heart it mock Achilles because he has usurped his position from suppliant to xenos. Achilles' return speech is all about dignity [517-551] - and he glowers with anger and threatens Priam with violence [Il. 24.569-570; app. 8.V.2].

In itself, anger is not a bad thing within the ethos of archaic society. It is perfectly acceptable. The concern is the extent to which the anger is excessive. Achilles knows that he has overstepped the mark in not treating Hector's body with due respect. It is too easy to become sentimental over the shared tears in this last book. Priam's persuasion manipulates pathos and eleos with a sophistic precision balancing ethos and duplicity that almost equates to making a weaker argument seem stronger. Why should Achilles bend to Priam's persuasion? Achilles would not obey Agamemnon nor accept restitution until he considered his honour redressed. As will be seen later this is sometimes taken to indicate the uncontrollable dimension of Achilles' rebellion, or to highlight how Achilles was too heroic to accept gold. Even if it was not just Achilles standing on his dignity in the face of Agamemnon's brinkmanship (as was suggested earlier), Priam's

137 Michael Lloyd, op. cit., pp. 82, 87.
usurpation of authority and duplicity is a paler version of the same ethos even though it is suitably framed with ἀποινα. Achilles reins in his anger to irritation. Achilles does not display concern for another’s point of view until he is reconciled with Agamemnon in Iliad 23 when he instructs Aias (Oïleus) and Idomeneus to put themselves in another’s shoes [492-494]. With this new understanding perhaps he could see through Priam’s duplicity. It is Zeus who feels the pity [332-333] and Achilles who saw himself obliged to be persuaded by the god. Achilles says as much to Priam.

d) The pro and contra argument of Telemachus in the Odyssey

The pro and contra deliberation in the Odyssey is also evidence of a recognition of antithetical argument on the part of the poet. Odyssey 2 opens with a collection of forensic speeches setting out the case for Telemachus. The oratory develops into a series of antithetical arguments between Telemachus and his suitor-opponent which narrates the rationale of the story and reveals what is to come in the plot. The structure of the speeches sets in place the elements that later were taught by the Sophists. First, Telemachus makes his accusation speech (en katégoria).

A (39-47 prooimion): I have the authority to speak; Odysseus is my father
B (48-49 prothesis): my family and all I have are being ruined.
C (50-64 diegesis): (hypothesis 50-54) general situation and background; (pistis 55-58) the suitors are eating and drinking everything I own.
D (64-69 meleté): a demand for action under the laws of man and gods.
E (70-79 epilogos): I might be better to hand everything over to all of you; then you would be obliged to show me the kindness of neighbours; you injure me now ‘because my hands are tied.’
F (80-83 pathos): Telemachos throws down the skeptron and cries.

Next comes Antinous’ refutation (apologia).

A (85-86 prooimion): Telemachus you show-off trying to shame us.
B (87-88 prothesis): your mother is to blame.
C (89-112 diegesis): (hypothesis 1 89-96) general situation and background; (pistis 96-105) this is what she said and we found out that she lied to us deliberately to keep us on a string; (hypothesis 2 106-112) what we did about that.
D (113-126 meleté): send her to her father to marry; if this does not happen we will continue because she is worthwhile though in her present behaviour quite wrong.

To finish, an on-the-ball (πεπνυμένος) Telemachus makes a refutation of the opponent’s argument (lusis).

A (130-137 prooimion + lusis): I cannot do this; she does not want to return to her father; her father would demand money; I would suffer cosmic retribution.
B (138-145 epilogos): if you think you are doing the right thing, continue (not necessarily eironia [irony] or epitropé [deferring contrary to one's own interests]); but I shall appeal to Zeus for your slaughter in my halls.

Not bad considering it is the first Ithacan assembly meeting in twenty years (since Odysseus sailed to Troy - 2.25-27); however, as we have been told earlier, Athene had breathed 'spirit' [μένος] into him [320-321]; a fact Antinous had recognised (with suspicion!) in a previous discussion. What listeners had been led to believe was a helpful thing, possessing menos, becomes a liability to leadership on Ithaca [Od. 1.383-385; app. 8.V.3]. Such well structured argument became source material upon which later rhetoric was formalised.

Another example of the self-conscious development of an argument is the discussion between Odysseus and his son as to the problem of overcoming the suitors [16.233-321]. At first, Odysseus states the problem and the two opposing propositions [Od. 235-239; app. 8.V.4]. Then, Telemachos outlines the alternative likely outcomes and, on the question of whether they need backup, tells his father to 'think hard' on it [ὁ κέν τις νεώιν ἀμύνοι πρόφρονι θυμώ.] [243-257]. Odysseus replies that because Zeus and Athene have the situation in hand he has no need to think about anything, to which Telemachus voices doubts that, even though the gods are capable of defending them, they are not reliably omnipotent [Od. 260-261, 263-265; app. 8.V.5]. In his reply Telemachus is arguing the pros and cons of this particular alternative of whether the gods will help or whether they should opt for human assistance. But the listeners have already been told that Odysseus has previously made up his mind. During an earlier hallucination, Athena has told Odysseus that he will fight the suitors with his son and her own personal help because she 'desires battle' ἠθέμαι γένοιμαι μόχεσθαι [16.171]. Odysseus then outlines the plan of action to Telemachus which foregoes reinforcements and leaves the final decision-making to Athena, who will instruct Odysseus when to strike. At odds of over one hundred to one Telemachus' caution seems prudent; a point made later by Penelope [23.35-38]. This hallucinatory mode of decision-making runs throughout the Odyssey and Athena’s apparitions are familiar enough to Odysseus that he can actually read her facial expressions [Od. 16.164; app. 8.V.6].

138 Apart from visual hallucinatory behaviour, Odysseus also exhibits the auditory experiences of ASC in the murmuring voices of the dead around him.
dimension to the argument regarding reinforcements to defend themselves against reprisals from the families of the suitors. He provides a belated pro and contra consideration of his earlier alternatives when he considers [τὰ δὲ σὲ φράζεσθαι ἀνώγα] whether the excess of the massacre will cause outrage amongst the townsfolk [Od. 23.118-122; app. 8.V.7]. In view of the deliberative procedures that have gone into Odysseus’ earlier strategic decisions for dealing with the suitors (including the divinely directed volition), in the context Telemachus’ ironical reply that Odysseus is said to be considered the best among men for resourcefulness [οἷν γὰρ ἀρίστην μῆτιν ἔπ’ ἀνθρώπους φάν’ ἔμεναι] [23.124-125] marks at least the poet’s consciousness of the processes of pro and contra argument.

The foregoing speeches illustrate that the Iliad is a work focusing on the dynamics of authority, persuasive methods to maintain that authority and the nature of individual rebellion. The Odyssey describes the same internal dynamics of authority within the archaic context, but, whereas Achilles in the Iliad could really only submit to the status quo (κατὰ νόμου) to maintain his position, Odysseus’ adaptive behaviour negotiated novel environments in order to succeed. Hesiod and Theognis, as well as Pindar, also describe archaic concepts of authority and justice and exhibit similar elements of formulaic concrete deductive reasoning.139 Public speaking existed as part of the social and political process, but it was usually persuasion in the style of a ruler (archos, wanax) to subjects; of received wisdom rather than pro and contra deliberative (sumbouleutikon), of volition dictated by authority (sometimes god-bound), shame or voracity (in terms of honour as well as pecuniary). Not all archaic public-speaking in the canon utilised pro and contra argument. Some forms of forensic epideictic oratory, arguing blame (psoggos) or praise (enkomion), regularly occur throughout the canon using paradigm and didactic belligerence.140 But some of the speeches are clear indications that knowledge of pro and contra probability argument existed when the epics were textualised

139 Hesiod [fl. 700BC]; Theognis [fl. 550BC]; Pindar [522-443BC].
under the Peisistratidae - a generation before Protagoras, Empedocles, Corax or Tisias.141

e) The scholarly debate over Homer's conscious knowledge of the dynamics behind persuasive rhetoric

In the discussion on the evolution of the term 'rhetoric' in Chapter VI it is noted that the term was not defined until by Plato in the fourth century BC. The position of this thesis is that persuasive language and any type of speech-making have inherent rhetorical elements and rhythms. Nevertheless, a focus on the dynamics of this process was not consciously applied to deliberative argument in archaic times. What Protagoras did that was new was to develop a teaching technique to train an individual student to reason out both sides of an argument and to compose opposing speeches, thus creating a student consciously mindful, when reasoning and problem-solving, that there are two sides to every argument. There is not any extant corpus of oratorical or rhetorical theory from Homer, Hesiod or Pindar. But, 'if rhetoric means reflecting self-consciously and systematically about the power and efficacy of speech,'142 as indeed Cole describes the 'self-consciously manipulative character of the process [that] distinguishes rhetoric from eloquence,'143 then speech-making in hexameters can be seen to possess rhetorical elements that appear in later speech-makers such as Gorgias. If we consider that the function of later rhetorical theory was to assist in the conception and oral delivery of a set of ideas aimed at reinforcing existing concepts or persuading a change in the attitude of listeners, then archaic works such as epideictic poetry were 'inherently 'rhetorical' (i.e., directed toward persuasion)'144 and 'employ a 'rhetorical transaction' that requires their audiences to make ethical and political judgements.'145 Some examples cited are Alcaeus, Solon, Theognis, Bacchylides, Pindar and Hesiod. Strauss Clay even argues:

I would maintain – with only a little tongue in cheek – that Hesiod might well be considered the father of rhetoric.146

141 Protagoras [490-420BC], Empedocles [490-430BC], Corax or Tisias [fl. 467BC].
146 Strauss Clay, op. cit., p. 447.
Laurent Pernot considers that the concept of 'Homeric rhetoric', developed by the early theoretical rhetoricians, who 'made an industry of finding ... the distinctions and the rules of contemporary rhetoric,' is a case of not reading history 'in the right direction. ... We must be wary of a retrospective interpretation, overlaying a posteriori the art of rhetoric onto texts still unaware of it.' This is true, but problematic, unless an organically evolving oral, and then textualised, piece is accepted.

The discussion below focuses on aspects of this process viewed as an 'evolutionary model' based on the premise of 'instantiation'. As V.2.1 above noted, the poet composes, not from A to Z, but in episodes. In the 'evolutionary model' the poem 'kept on recombining its older and its newer elements in the productive phases of its evolution.' The poem becomes fixed when written down, but it is still transmitted orally to audiences by poets which makes it still flexible in performance. Thus it works as a model for a gradual change in some parts of the poem to keep it alive and understandable to audiences. It can also function as a model for the natural development of styles of persuasion (through analysis of probable alternatives rather than formulaic deductive reasoning).

Quintilian explains the semantics of the ancient dispute on the origins of rhetoric, which (as is discussed in the following chapter), continues today. Quintilian’s account of Homeric rhetoric ‘accord[s] with logic and with all the existing evidence.’


[Marcus Fabius Quintilianus, Institutio Oratoria, 2.17.5-9.]

147 Pernot, Rhetoric in Antiquity, p.5, 6-7.
[5] Some consider oratory to be a natural faculty which they concede may be improved by training. In Cicero’s book *The Orator*, Antonius is cited as thinking that oratory is essentially observation rather than a practised skill. [6] ... Lysias is said to have supported this opinion, the argument being that the uneducated, or the foreigners who cannot speak well, and slaves, when they speak for themselves, they have a similar opening assertion, tell the tale, extol, refute and (with the force of an epilogue) deprecate. [7] Then they quibbled that nothing in the manner of an art can be constructed before that art existed; and as men have always and forever been able to speak in their own favour and against others; and as teachers of the skill sprang up only later, beginning in the time of Tisias and Corax; oratory existed before the art, therefore it cannot be an art. [8] As to when this schooling in oratory began I will not endeavour to enquire. However, in Homer, Phoenix is a teacher not only of behavior but of speaking. Besides there is mention of several other orators and in all the three leaders’ speeches are the types of eloquence and contests ... Why even in the engravings on the shield of Achilles there are lawsuits and plaintiffs. [9] It is enough for me to point out that everything which technical skill has perfected originated in nature. [trans. Leiper]

Deliberation, persuasion and problem-solving in Homer is evident and the historical evolution of the poems to their incorporation into the Panathenaea, their textualisation in Athens and their unstructured institutionalisation into the educational system made them the most practical instruction for speech-making for those who were taught to read. As noted above Nestor’s complex speech in *Iliad* 11 is mouthed practically word for word by Patroclus in *Iliad* 16 in his persuasion of Achilles to let him take his place on the battlefield [*Il. 11.794-803; 16.36-45; app. 8.V.8*]. While repetition of messages are a common feature in Homer, it could be said that Nestor here gives the first recorded lesson in rhetoric. Just prior to the delivery of the speech Homer creates the imagery of a childlike Patroclus, as eager as an enthusiastic student bursting to display something he has learned. In a classroom setting it is tempting to see this as a signifier for those who have memorised the speech to recite it later along with a teacher.

2) Paradigm and Ritual in Homeric Language and Argument

a) Theories of organic deliberative, forensic and epideictic oratory and persuasion

Persuasive speech-making are key elements in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* and, even though most of the arguments are constructed on princely or divine authority with god- or shame-bound volition, there are instances of deliberative, forensic and epideictic oratory in which propositions and alternative courses of action are objectively recognised. But, just because some archaic oratory displays the
rhetorical characteristics that Aristotle later recognised and categorised,\textsuperscript{150} it does not prove that the composer(s) of these epics were cognisant of the dynamics of Protagorean pro and contra argument.

A most identifiable difference between Homeric argument and sophistic argument is that 'deductive logic' falls into two paradigms of thought which 'differ on the individualism-collectivism worldview': one, an individualistic habit of thought that is 'intrinsically decontextualized from its context',\textsuperscript{151} the other a collectivistic habit of thought by which 'a collectivist might recontextualize a deductive problem'.\textsuperscript{152} It is apparent from Patricia Greenfield’s discussion of the current research that these paradigms of thought exist side-by-side in different cultures in the modern world and are equally valid ways of solving problems. Jerome Bruner describes it thus:

There appear to be two broad ways in which human beings organize and manage their knowledge of the world, indeed structure even their immediate experience:

\textsuperscript{150} Ar. Rhet. 1.3.
\textsuperscript{151} Patricia Greenfield ['Paradigms of Cultural Thought', in Cambridge Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning, pp. 663-682, at 675] describes an incidence that highlights this type of 'decontextualised' thinking: '... Cultural models are so basic they normally remain implicit. ... when teachers and learners have different implicit understandings of what counts as thinking, [Such as this incidence ] ... In a pre-kindergarten class, the teacher held an actual chicken egg. She asked the children to describe eggs by thinking about the times they had cooked and eaten eggs. One of the children tried three times to talk about how she cooked eggs with her grandmother, but the teacher disregarded these comments in favour of a child who explained how eggs are white and yellow when they are cracked [Greenfield, Raef, & Quiroz, 1996]. ... What counts as thinking for the teacher is thinking about the physical world apart from the social world. ... Her focus is on one part of her instructions, 'Describe eggs'. The child, in contrast, is responding more to the other part of the teacher's instructions - 'Think about the times you have cooked and eaten eggs', and, based on a different set of assumptions about what counts as thinking, focuses on the social aspect of her experience with eggs ... the child who was passed over is providing a narrative, also valued in her home culture, whereas the teacher is expecting a simple statement of fact. Implicitly, the teacher is making Bruner's distinction between narrative thought and logical-scientific thought.

\textsuperscript{152} Greenfield, [ibid., p. 676-7] describes 'collectivist recontextualised' deduction: EXPERIMENTER: At one time spider went to a feast. He was told to answer this question before he could eat any of the food. The question is: Spider and black deer always eat together. Spider is eating. Is black deer eating? SUBJECT: Were they in the bush? EXPERIMENTER: Yes. SUBJECT: They were eating together? EXPERIMENTER: Spider and black deer always eat together. Spider is eating. Is black deer eating? SUBJECT: But I was not there. How can I answer such a question? EXPERIMENTER: Can't you answer it? Even if you were not there you can answer it. SUBJECT: Ask the question again for me to hear. EXPERIMENTER: (repeats the question) SUBJECT: Oh, oh black deer was eating. ... EXPERIMENTER: What is your reason for saying that black deer was eating? SUBJECT: The reason is that black deer always walks about all day eating green leaves in the bush. When it rests for a while it gets up again and goes to eat. [Cole et. al., The Cultural Context of Learning and Thinking, 1971, p. 187]. In essence, this participant rejects the abstract, decontextualized structure of the logical problem. This type of response was typical of a group of nonliterate Kpelle adults [examined by Cole in Liberia]. Experiments and responses of this type by nonliterate individuals in Khirgizia (adjacent to Uzbekistan) were earlier reported by Soviet neuropsychologist, Alexander Luria ['Towards the problem of the historicial nature of psychological processes', International Journal of Psychology, Vol. 6 (1971), pp. 259-272. Cf. Anne-Lise Christensen, Luria's Neuropsychological Investigation. Text, Copenhagen, Munksgaard, 1984.
One seems more specialized for treating of physical ‘things’, the other for treating people and their plights. These are conventionally known as \textit{logical-scientific} thinking and \textit{narrative thinking}.\footnote{Bruner, \textit{The Culture of Education}, p. 39.}

In Homer oratorical argument and persuasion are organic elements of language; that ‘the real aim of using language is not … the conquest of truth, but the simple fact of influencing the actions of others in the best interest of the user of the words’.\footnote{A. López Eire, ‘Rhetoric and Language’ in Ian Worthington (ed.), \textit{A Companion to Greek Rhetoric}, p.336-337.} A more general view is that problem-solving and persuasion in the archaic period was paradigmatic in nature with ritualistic language and little consciousness of alternatives. Homer more often describes an agonal\footnote{The term, ‘agonal’ in Greek scholarship refers to the type of fighting that the Greeks engaged in which involved a certain formalised, even ritualistic acceptance that the two sides must face each other, that some blood must flow, that honour is upheld, and that they then could all go home. It is a common term used by researchers into hoplite fighting and the dating of the Homeric canon. Cf. most recently, Hans van Wees, \textit{Greek Warfare: Myths and Realities}, London, Duckworth, 2004, Part IV, Total and Agonal Warfare’, pp. 115ff. The discursive competitions in ‘rhetoric’ that was part of sophistic education is also commonly referred to as ‘agonal contests’.} form of persuasion effected by authoritative or coercive methods, rather than \textit{pro} and \textit{contra} reasoning using either ‘polarity’ or ‘analogy’ to make the judgement. The decision-making part of the process being to accept the opponent’s point of view or to oppose it through force.\footnote{Cf. G.E.R. Lloyd, \textit{Polarity and Analogy}, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1966, pp. 6, 10-11, 41-48, 196-198, 209, 384-387, 415, cf. decisions based on probability, pp. 424-426.}

b) Cultural constraints for keeping the dispute calm: alcohol, example and ritualised language

Wine and its ritual use had a pacific application and the use of alcohol during the deliberation process was routine \([\text{Il.} 8.228-234, 9.224, \text{Od.} 3.40-85]\). Everyone found it pleasant \([\text{Il.} 1.470-474, 4.343-344, 10.578-579]\).ootnote{The heavenly equivalent is the golden council of Zeus with golden cups of nectar; not that nectar acts on the gods like wine does on humans \([\text{Il.} 4.1-4]\).} This notion of discussion as a pleasurable combination of wine and new knowledge is implied by Odysseus who stated that in council, after (ritual) libations that no-one wanted to listen to what they already knew \([23.787-788]\). Likewise Helen felt completely at ease to doctor the wine to stop old memories and therefore control discussion \([\text{Od.} 4.220-226]\). In \textit{Pythian} 4 Cole suggests Pindar also used a tactic in persuasion that relied on the combined effects of poetry and wine to win a novel argument. The ‘extreme’ length of the poem would have rendered Arcesilas fairly tipsy because the wine bowl would complete a round by the end of each of the identical rhythmical movements in the poem: Arcesilas was taking his thirteenth
turn at it by the time the poem finally concludes. In *Iliad* 1 Achilles implies that some of Agamemnon's behaviour and decisions were influenced by wine when he called Agamemnon a drunkard [*oινοβαρές Il. 1.225*]. Archilochos said that he could write dithyrambs when 'lightning-struck' by wine; Theognis attested to the existence of habitual oratorical drunks and advised moderation at *symposia*; Herodotos described a somewhat wine-soaked night of deliberation before the battle of Salamis and noted the Persians deliberated whilst drunk.

Thucydides implied that, by mid-fifth century BC, frequent religious and community occasions provided citizens with a break from work that afforded psychological relief. If the rituals resembled those described in Homer and the Homeric hymns, it is reasonable that alcohol played a significant part in reaching that psychological state [Thuc. 2.38; app. 8.V.9].

Ritual language functioned as a controlling device in argument. In four of Nestor's speeches Toohey sees the paradeigma as a psychological method of 'rendering more acceptable dangerous emotion'; the 'oral, paradigmatic, paratactic nature' of the speeches conform to Ong's construct of oral culture where harmful emotions are externalised and 'the most extreme instances' manifest as 'going beserk' or 'running amok'. Ritual language therefore functioned as a controlling device in argument and persuasion.

Likewise, the use of 'fossilised' language was formulated 'to answer or advise or petition a superior without seeming arrogant, or to praise him without seeming obsequious.' Cole cites an example of ritualised rhetorical conversation from China noting that 'the situation in the a-rhetorical societies of Asia and Africa is strikingly parallel to that in the pre-rhetorical society of early Greece.' He calls this ritualistic dialogue 'the rhetoric of tact and etiquette' suggesting that it was used 'with enough characteristically rhetorical self-consciousness that it received

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159 Archilochos DK.120; Theog. 467-496; Ht. 1.133.3-4; cf. 8.49-50, 57-83.
a name of its own: αἰνος [αἰνός = αἰνέω]. This is evident in Aias’ speech to Achilles which, as noted above, is not addressed directly to Achilles until halfway through when he appeals to the authority to speak as a guest-friend. Nestor’s speech to Agamemnon in Iliad 2 [337-368] also has this shifted focus of subject. The part of his speech that contains the criticism is initially addressed to the army in general and only near the end is it toned down and addressed directly to Agamemnon. Conversely, this shifting of focus (apostrophe) occurs in two other speeches of Nestor’s, the one to Patroclus in Iliad 11 [785ff.] and to Telemachus in Odyssey 3 [126-127]. Both were addressed to someone younger and less powerful and therefore cannot really be ascribed to arcaic tact, but perhaps rather to manipulation. Odysseus also provides an example of Homeric tact in his embassy to return Chryseis [Il. 1.440-443; app. 8.V.10].

Archaic Greek could not articulate abstract decontextualised concepts, and thought relied on allegory and personification as the simplest, most natural way of discussing justice, cultural and political issues. Therefore, while there is a two-fold consideration in the Protagorean sense, the parameters are constrained within conventional precedent and sensibility. An example is Phoenix’s use of the story of Meleager in the Iliad [Il. 9.527-605] as a paradigm for Achilles to consider the consequences of uncontrolled emotion. Likewise Hesiod’s personification of justice as Diké [Theogony 902-903]; compared to Aristotle’s Diké where ‘paradigm is understood as the rhetorical alternative to dialectical induction’ and where the vocabulary deals philosophically with ‘retribution’. The situation is the reverse in archaic epic. In the case of Phoenix’s speech, the argument [pistis], which revolves around ethos and its rewards, is embedded in the paradigm which contains the alternatives for Achilles to consider. Only in the last few parataxeis [600-605] did Phoenix specifically state the thrust of his argument; the rest is tactfully appeasing.

163 ibid. p. 163.
164 loc. cit. This argument could go further in that archaic understanding of conceptual abstracts was limited.
165 Phoenix aims to persuade Achilles to fight: women are to blame; I suffered through the sexual machinations of my step-mother; your father made me his proxenos and gave me authority over you; so on my authority and on divine authority be calm. Achilles’ reply rejects both persuasion on terms of authority and reward. Phoenix proceeds: do not allow them to make you angry enough to forget your duty; come out to fight. Then comes the paradigm: Meleager, who, like you and me, was the victim of female spite; he withdrew in anger and no one could
3) The function of archaic tact in persuasion rather than abstract deliberation of pro and contra alternatives

Aside from the examples of Protagorean-type pro and contra arguments cited earlier, speeches generally negotiate and reason within the parameters of archaic tact and without reference to alternative courses of action. Except for his speech to Patroclus in Iliad 11 (and when Homer allows us to see inside his mind), Nestor generally argued from paradigm that tactfully reinforced Agamemnon’s authority to lead. For example (keeping with the speeches singled out by Toohey), he intervened in the initial argument between Achilles and Agamemnon on the basis of authority, citing his age and experience in advising 'better men than they’ [1.254-273]. Nestor tactfully requested Agamemnon to relinquish Chryseis;\textsuperscript{166} told Achilles that he should concede to Agamemnon because of his Zeus-given authority to be leader [1.277-279] and gently implored Agamemnon to calm down.\textsuperscript{167} The argument revolves around authority and capitulation. Neither his age nor his structured paradigm speech carries weight with Agamemnon. Likewise Nestor’s argument in Iliad 7 [124-160] which, as usual, extends around behavioural archetypes at the cost of any practical assessment of the situation. In reaction to Hector’s taunting of Archaean cowardice, Agamemnon was opposed to reckless bravado citing Hector’s superior combat ability as evidence [109-119]. Nestor tactfully asserted his authority by reviving his illustrious companions and his own past military feats in order to shame the Achaeans into fighting [133-159]. His audience did not consider the pro and cons of their present circumstance but responded intuitively; all ready to draw lots to see who will fight. Later again, on being given a cup at the funerary games for Patroclus [ll. 23.626-650], Nestor’s thank-you speech asserted his authority and right to the tribute by stressing his age and past athletic triumphs, conceding superiority (again) only to Patroclus’ persuade him to defend his city even whilst his city was threatened with destruction by enemies. At the point of defeat his woman’s terror finally persuaded him to fight. Even though he saved the day, his disaffected comrades did not reward him with gifts. Phoenix restates the aim of the speech: concentrate, calm down, reconcile now by taking rewards and join the fight before when the enemy have got a hold; you will be rewarded again. Unlike Nestor’s speech to Patroclus, it ends here, but the ambivalent rotation of the motif of female blame and helplessness is somewhat manipulative in theme.]

\textsuperscript{166} ll. 1.274: ἀλλὰ πίθεσθε καὶ ἥμετροι, ἐπεὶ πείθεσθαι ἠμείνον [But please will you be persuaded by me, for to be persuaded/to obey is better].
\textsuperscript{167} 1.282-283: Ἀτρείδης σὺ δὲ πᾶσι τεὸν μένος· αὐτὰρ ἔγωγε λίσσοιξ Ἀχιλλῆι μεθέμεν χόλον [Agamemnon, let your anger cool. I beg you to relent].
grandfather and grand uncle. The speech is the quintessence of archaic tact as was Achilles’ preceding speech with its tactful whiff of irony that implies he recognised Nestor’s part in the death of Patroclus.\(^{168}\) This speech corresponds in paratactic structure to his earlier speeches in which the *paradigma* 'carries the weight of the *pistis*', occurs at the centre, and connects with the surrounding assertions only implicitly. In this way it too exemplifies the model for externalising violent emotion:

I wonder whether the use of the paradigm in this utterance does not suggest that there is more to it than mere apology? In [Nestor’s] three preceding speeches the paradigm acted as a means for defusing potentially injurious situations. ... Does, then, this paradigm act as a means of externalising potentially harmful emotions?\(^{169}\)

This could apply in Nestor’s reply to Diomedes’ criticisms of Agamemnon on the question of quitting the seige [ll. 9.53-77]. His *paradigma* is one line, ἦ μὲν καὶ νέος ἐσσί, ἐμὸς δὲ κε καὶ πάις εἰπ᾽ ὀπλότατος γενέθιν (I know you are young; in years you might well be my last-born son) [9.57] and he tactfully, even if strongly, rejected Diomedes without further argument on the issue. The speech asserted his seniority and the authority of his senior colleagues whilst, again with archaic tact, Agamemnon was indirectly urged to listen to advice. The relationship between archaic authority and archaic tact does not seem a simple matter of power. Diomedes’ criticism of Agamemnon [9.32-49] suggests that, if the use of tactful paradigm was one method of externalising volatile emotions, invective exhortation that ignored archaic tact was an equally acceptable method. In assembly *phylae* leaders recognised each had not only the right to make a speech, but the right to criticise and uphold their own honour [32-33]. In his like-it-or-lump-it argument Diomedes directly challenged Agamemnon’s directive to quit the war and called Agamemnon’s personal *aristeia* into question in retaliation for a previous slight on his [33-41]. Homer opens the sequence by stating that the Achaean were suffering extreme stress (φόβος; ἀτλήτος πένθος) [1-3]. As will be considered below, in such circumstances some in the high command externalised anger with aggression whilst others juggled with emotional paradigms, both of which had the potential to cause harmful psychological stress.

\(^{168}\) Therefore another example of Achilles awareness of another’s point of view. Cf. below.

\(^{169}\) Toohey, ‘Epic and rhetoric’, op. cit., p. 162.
Agamemnon personifies archetypal authority, the foil necessitating archaic tact. In *Iliad* 1, his reasoning rests on his own perspective and is justified solely on his sovereign and god-sanctioned authority. First in his rejection of Chryses’ tactful attempt to retrieve Chryseis (by asserting the authority of Apollo and offering the balm of ransom). Clearly his reasoning goes against the general ethos [Il. 1.22-25; app. 8.V.11]. Homeric persuasion through the medium of archaic tact is two dimensional entailing more than just ‘the Machiavellian issue of how one gets others to obey and more the Weberian question of the legitimacy of authority, why others choose to obey the leader.’

This aspect is reflected in the reluctance of augur Calchas to risk offending Agamemnon with an undesirable divination [1.74-83]. This social contract theme is repeated in his argument with Achilles [1.131-147]; Agamemnon demands Achilles’ recapitulation on the sole authority of his own desires in accordance with his honour. Achilles’ response is as much from the injury to his own honour as it is to Agamemnon’s abrogation of archaic manners. By his acts Agamemnon has created a leadership that has no interest in the welfare of the community and is invested only on the mute acquiescence of what Achilles refers to as ‘nonentities.’ Homeric persuasion turns on archaic tact and the endeavour to enforce another point of view. The ethos of ‘honour and excellence was a pivotal counterbalance to communal solidarity and the *Iliad* illustrates the dangerous results of splitting ranks in the name of personal glory.

Whilst praising personal glory, Pindar provides further examples of archaic tact worked into argument. Erasmus Schmidt was the first to analyse the epinicians from an oratorical forensic and deliberative point of view; more recent is Cole’s discussion citing *Nemean* 6 and 7, which deal with the Neoptolemus myth. These exhibit ‘the earliest extended example in Greek’ of a traditional myth ‘retold with the rhetorical demands of a new situation in mind.’ An indirect argument has been put forward wrapped in archaic tact. With the same archaic tact *Pythian* 4 aims to plead for the reinstatement of an exile by lauding Jason’s diplomatic talents in calming violent discord (*stasis*) and thus providing an example for

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171 ibid.
172 Roisman, ‘Nestor the Good Counsellor’, p. 38.
Arcesilas to follow when the request comes.175 There is also Pythian 3, which Bowra identified as 'a poetical epistle'176 and Cole described as 'the single most elaborate piece of rhetoric that has survived from the archaic age.'177 It combines an exhortation for Hieron to be wary of hubris cloaked in tactful and consoling epideictic. For example, in the first three triads the advice is redirected into the paradigm stories of Cheiron and Asclepius [1-69] and broadened in the fourth and fifth triads into the fates of Cadmus and Achilles [70-106]. Within these paradigms Hieron was indirectly advised not to ignore the gods [10-15]; not to dishonour them by wanting more than his due entitlement (moira) [20-24] and to expect hubris to be punished [29-30]. Like Nestor and Aias, the voice is tactfully indirect;178 only in the antistrophe of the fourth triad is Hieron directly addressed [Pin. Pyth. 3.80-84; app. 8.V.12].

Hesiod likewise emphasises the need for archaic tact [W&D 715, 720; app. 8.V.13], but Strauss Clay goes further, arguing that Hesiod analysed oratorical persuasion, setting out a theory of rhetoric in the Theogony and applying it in Works and Days. In Theogony the Muse has extended control over politics and law while Hesiod is conscious of the persuasive and deceitful potential of language, hence the fracture of truth by rhetoric:

[H]e exhibits an ability to speak about things that transcend human knowledge and to order them persuasively, but at the same time makes the muses opaque in truth so he cannot assert the truth of his poem ...

In Works and Days he creates a paradigmatic example of the type of rhetoric laid out in Theogony, with Perses and the kings misusing speech to deceive and himself adopting the role of the Muse-inspired king:

[B]y countering the unjust speech of both Perses and the kings with his just speech, and resolving the great quarrel with his brother, Hesiod in fact practises justice, and we his audience can award him the prize to which he himself lays claim: 'best is he who can think for himself'.179

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175 Cole, op. cit., p. 50.  
178 Pyth. 3.61: μὴ, φίλα ψυχά, βίον ἀδάνατον στεῤῥέ. [If it were proper for this commonplace prayer to be made by my tongue/ If with my lips I should utter all men’s prayers; so do not crave immortality, my soul].  
It is hard to confine such a conscious persuader within the limits of archaic tact, although this position rests on both works coming from the same individual.\textsuperscript{180} Both pieces, however, reflect an archaic understanding of the potential duplicitousness of persuasion within the context of oral poetry.\textsuperscript{181} They show a consciousness of the manipulation of truth through persuasion, as does Achilles when he states his suspicion and his mistrust of Odysseus' oratory in the embassy scene in \textit{Iliad} 9. Roisman's suggestion that Achilles' reply 'implies contempt for the skilled orator'\textsuperscript{182} reflects a traditional consensus and prevalent view of scholars, especially regarding Achilles' statement, 'I hate as I hate Hell's own gate that man who hides one thought within him while he speaks another' (\textit{ἐχθρὸς γὰρ μοι κεῖνος ὄμως Ἀϊδος πύλησιν ὃς χ' ἐτερον μὲν κεῦθη ἐνί φρεσῖν, ἄλλο δὲ εἴπη.}) [9.312-313].\textsuperscript{183} This view perhaps overlooks some of the subtlety therein. The sophistication of the \textit{pro} and \textit{contra} argument sequentially unfolding throughout the entire embassy scene has already been discussed and mention was made in an earlier footnote of Donna Wilson's explanation of Achilles' rejection of Agamemnon's gifts because they were 'culturally objectionable' to Achilles and constituted 'a gift attack'.\textsuperscript{184} It is, in effect, a subtle example of how Agamemnon generally seeks to persuade through authority backed by force, and an acknowledgement that Achilles is conscious of it. In relation to Hesiod, one passage quotes the Muse [\textit{Theogony} 27-28], and is often translated thus:

\begin{quote}
айдмев псеўδεα πολλα лεγειν ετύμωσιν όμωσ,
ёдмев δ', ευτ' ἐθέλομεν, ἀλήθεα γηρύσασθαι.
\end{quote}

We know how to tell many lies that sound like truth, but we know to sing reality, when we will. [trans. M.L. West (1988)]

We know enough to make up lies
Which are convincing, but we also have
The skill, when we've a mind, to speak the truth. [trans. Schmidt Wender (1973)]

We know how to speak many false things as though they were true; but we know, when we will, to utter true things. [trans. Hugh G. Evelyn-White (1914)]

\textsuperscript{180} A position not taken by Hesiod translator, Dorothea Wender [pp. 12-14] who finds it highly unlikely: [Solmsen, West and Lattimore argue unity] but the weight of opinion generally has come down on [two authors].

\textsuperscript{181} Muse-inspired poetry is taken up later in this chapter and discussed further in Chapter VII.2.

\textsuperscript{182} Roisman, 'Nestor the Good Counsellor', p. 23 n.20.


\textsuperscript{184} Note 105; Donna Wilson, 'Symbolic Violence in \textit{Iliad} Book 9', pp. 131-147 at 143.
Ψεύδεα ... ἵτύμοιοιν ὁμοία is usually translated as ‘lies resembling truth’, but the etymology of ὁμοίος and its usage in archaic literature shows that the early sense of ὁμοίος was indefinite and meant ‘equivalent with respect to a quality,’ with the quality specified in the context and ‘rarely if ever was the equivalence a deceptive resemblance’. A proper translation is therefore, ‘lies equivalent to truth’. There is, however, no context provided:

When Theogony lines 27–28 are translated correctly, we see that the Muses did not tell Hesiod that they spoke two separate and different things, both lies (Theogony 27) and truth (Theogony 28). Hard though it may be to understand, the Muses told Hesiod that they spoke only truth, ... the Muses’ lies were ‘equivalent to truth’.185

This early conceptual aspect of persuasion is also reflected in Hesiod’s Works and Days [W&D 39-41; app. 8.V.14]. The line, οὐδὲ ἵσσαιν ὀσοὶ πλέον ἡμῖν παντὸς (They do not even know how much more the half is more than the whole), demonstrates the same concept that a single assertion can be both true and false simultaneously; the riddle is a paradigm of the Muse’s assertion that a ‘lie is equivalent to truth’.187

Conversely, Havelock thought Hesiod was almost (but not quite) conscious that his role was to advise on ethos.188 Presumably this entailed persuasion. Likewise with aphorisms the lyric and elegiac poets were also functioned in society as ‘persuaders’ of ethos; though he stresses that these makers do not represent ‘the emergence of a purely private poetry of the personal consciousness. The impression is fostered by the fact that the verse is often ... spoken in the first-person, and perhaps addressed to a second person. But the psychology of composition cannot be understood within the limits set by the personal

186 loc. cit.
188 Havelock, The Literate Revolution in Greece and Its Cultural Consequences, p. 17.
pronouns.' Havelock also considered Pindar's lyric was 'not a product of personal temperament.' But note the ambiguity in the arguments of his odes.

For example, as in Pythian 3 above, most epinicia are exhortations and gnomics on fame, its endurance beyond death, noblesse oblige and, like the Iliad, the dangers of hubris. There is not a passage in Pindar (or Bacchylides) that is not primarily concerned with encomiastic speaking. However, his paradigmatic myths, followed by discriminating poetic judgements and his conscious focus on the dynamics of the ode itself, all coalesce to praise the laudandus whilst warning of the dangers of 'letting it go to one's head'. The arguments are not formulated in a pro and contra Protagorean sense, but they employ a 'rhetorical transaction' that requires [the] audiences to make ethical and political judgements. For all the structural intricacies and complex language, Pindar's celebrity PR usually follows a stock formula within which a relationship between singer/speaker and listener was established to endorse the argument that the victor was praiseworthy. All the odes display the elements of archaic tact, but in Pythian 3, especially, there is a subtle and conscious voice to his persuasion [Pyth. 3.107-115; app. 8.V.15].

4) The varying degrees of personal consciousness in archaic persuasion

a) A natural linguistic feature of poetic narrativisation is a dissociation of individual consciousness

The 'I' persona of Pindar's odes blends subject matter, author and audience as does a chorus in tragedy. An example is Isthmian 7.37, 'I suffered grief beyond telling'. Here the separate voice of Pindar, the voices of the singers of the ode,

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190 Havelock [ibid., p. 17, 19] stresses that 'the term 'lyric' as used today is post-classical [and] can have misleading overtones. It is absurd to suppose in the manner of histories of Greek literature that the forms of 'lyric' were suddenly invented in all their perfection at the point where the Alexandrian canon begins in the seventh century B.C. ... Pindar (Ol. 9.1) speaks of the melos of Archilochus and the usage recurs in classical authors; melopoios in Frogs designates the 'lyric' composer. Plutarch much later (2.348b and 120c) applies the adjective 'melic' to poesis, and to Pindar, but lurike to the techne of lyre playing (2.13b). LSJ quotes archaic use in Simonides and Pindar [Pyth.10.62] of phrontis in the sense of 'heart's desire', 'wishes', 'attention bestowed'; and in Homer as 'wisdom or knowledge gained through observation' rather than 'thought'.


192 Race [op. cit., p. 518] states 'they employ 'a definition of enthymeme as an argumentation intended to persuade the thymos (heart) of the listener ...' He is paraphrasing Walker [Rhetoric and Poetics in Antiquity, p.149-151].

and the voice of the audience are not indistinguishable because all are participants in grief at the loss of a fellow citizen and the comfort gained by the athletic victory of his nephew. On the other hand, we can identify a Pindar in *Pythian 3*, who knows he is privileged to be allowed to 'praise the worthiest of men' (which is still in accordance with the concept of archaic tact). This is a second 'I', one that fashions the whole ode. This second 'I' gives the impression that the ode is being created extemporaneously, exhibiting all 'the impulsiveness, the digressiveness, the false starts and self-corrections of ordinary unpreameditated speech.' This resembles the performance of Homeric *aoidoi*, and suggests that such poetic manifestations are a natural linguistic feature of storytelling, and one that is not necessarily self-consciously contrived. Indeed Havelock maintains, 'a Homer or a Hesiod would not have referred to his poetry as 'thought' (*phrontis'). In Homer, another, self-conscious 'I', apart from calling on the Muse initially, then occasionally throughout the poem, also makes various 'faded invocations'; aside to the audience. These 'faded invocations' could be viewed as manifestations of the cognitive process of narrativisation.

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194 Race, op. cit., p. 517; Bundy, op. cit., p. 3.

195 Bundy, p. 3.


197 Havelock, *The Liberal Temper in Greek Politics*, p. 235. LSJ quotes archaic use in Simonides and Pindar [*Pyth.10.62*] of *phrontis* in the sense of 'heart's desire', 'wishes', 'attention bestowed'; and in Homer as 'wisdom or knowledge gained through observation' rather than 'thought'.

198 Cf. Minchin [*Homer and the Resources of Memory*, p. 165, 172]: When we as speakers tell a story to a group which includes both first-time listeners and people who have participated in or witnessed the events which are the subject of our tale, we adapt our presentation in recognition of these differences in knowledge states. It is remarkable that when storytellers are aware of a 'knowing recipient' among their listeners, they display uncertainty about small points, even though they may be confident of their grasp of the tale; and they will hesitate, check details, and ask for confirmation. ... The storyteller, therefore, in consulting his knowing recipient is including her in his performance and confirming, for his unknowing listeners, the reliability of his tale. ... In Homer's telling of the *Iliad*-story we find behaviour of the same kind; the same etiquette is being observed. To be sure, nowhere does Homer tell us that his Muse is part of his audience as a knowing recipient or that she actually listens to his song. Minchin does not mean 'scripted' in the sense of written. Cf. C. Goodwin ['Designing Talk for Different Types of Recipients', in *Conversational Organization: Interaction between Speakers and Hearers*, New York: Academic Press, 1981, pp. 149-166, esp. 159.
They simultaneously put structure into the format whilst enhancing the poet's veracity and authority as storyteller. They may be part of the performance-dynamic of shared knowledge, but the dynamic gives these invocations a conscious, rather than instinctive, grasp of storytelling. Minchin and others suggest we should interpret 'faded invocations' as also being directed to the Muse. It is true that both lend authority to the poet, both serve as mnemonic devices, and both reflect this second 'I'. The poet, however, does not expect his audience to provide him with his words, as he does of the Muse.

In effect, these 'pseudo-exchanges' indicate that we have singers/speakers who have two states of awareness; one as the creator (poietes) and another as the performer (aoidos, rhapsodos, melopoios). The poetic sensation that 'the words are not our own' manifests intermittently in archaic poetry. Because the oral poet is arguing in right hemisphere dominant 'poetry' ('special speech'), the cognitive functioning is as described earlier and in Chapter II.2-3, with the resultant intermittent sensation that the words were not their own. At times the maker and the performer seem neither compatible nor interchangeable. Yet Hesiod, Theognis, Pindar and many other archaic poets are comfortable in both roles. This dissociative state is not uncommon even today; Homer's poietes/aoidos, Phemios, explained a feeling which resembles the passive extended sensation of the poet's 'I' persona getting lost in the process of making 'poetry' ('special speech') [Od. 22.347-349; app. 8.V.16]. At the same time Homer also suggests that the singer's own sensation that poetic conception was coming from within the individual rather than from any external entity could trigger an

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199 Minchin, op. cit., p. 173; cf. ll. 5.703-704; 8.273; 11.299-300.
200 Minchin, op. cit., p. 172.
202 See Chapter II.2. Whether he identifies this sensation with a god, or a divine being, or a force of nature or an internal working of the mind depends on cultural religious differences.
203 Cf. Μου ἄρ’ αοιδὸν ἀνίκεν σειδέμεναι κλέα ἀνδρῶν (the Muse arouses the singer to sing) [Od. 8.73]; ή σε γε Μου ἐδίδξει, Δίος πάις, ἂ γε Ἀπόλλων (you were taught by the Muse or Zeus or Apollo) [Od. 8.488]. Cf. Minchin, op. cit., pp. 163-164 with references and scholarship on the poet’s ability to ‘synthesise’ the ‘causal chains’ of storylines that are held in normal memory banks and his perception of such ability. She cites Charles Segal’s [Singers: Heroes, and Gods in the ‘Odyssey’, Ithaca, N.J., Cornell University Press, 1994, pp. 138-139] suggestion that the poetic performance is similar to the warriors who are inspired with a will for battle. Conversely she notes the poet sometimes recalls his audience from the storytelling world to reflect on the performance whilst himself not interrupting his performance; cf. pp. 167-168.
incapacitating psychosis [Il. 2.594-600; app. 8.V.17]. This state is discussed at length in Appendix 4 in regard to religious aspects of persuasion. In moments of stress decision-making sometimes involved a rapt, dissociative, or even hallucinatory, state. It was not just a literary conceit of poets in which physical and psychological states were attributed to deities. Human cognition was seen to be initiated by supernatural forces. Volition was initiated by personal 'daemons' or one of the larger pantheon who could also imbue certain states of mind.\footnote{Cf. Appendix 4.} The focus here is that general debate regarding the nature of archaic argument, oratory and its rhetorical consciousness substantially revolves around whether or not the poet is wholly or partly self-conscious during composition and delivery. As noted, some scholars, such as Cole, concede epinician as an early forerunner of fourth-century BC rhetoric, but maintain that 'even in Pindar, rhetoric rarely moves beyond the area of etiquette and tact.'\footnote{Cole, \textit{The Origins of Rhetoric in Ancient Greece}, p. 52.} It has been noted too that others maintain archaic persuasion used sophisticated, but formulaic, language resembling Homer’s paradeigmatic speeches. There is also the highly developed bond that a tactful \textit{poietes} can establish with the audience is by expressing 'praise as exhortation'; thus, the speaker avoids appearing to flatter his patron and 'instead of arousing envy in the audience, he enlists them in his counsel as witnesses'\footnote{Race, 'Rhetoric and Lyric Poetry', p. 517.} In another conscious technique Demetrius, following Theophrastus, points out that by omitting detailed explanation the speaker elicits the involvement of the listeners:

For when he infers what you have omitted, he is not just listening to you but he becomes your witness and reacts more favourably to you. For he is made aware of his own intelligence through you, who have given him the opportunity to be intelligent. [Demetrius, \textit{On Style}, 89, 97, trans. Innes]

This suggests a spontaneous 'I' capable of gauging audience psychology. Yet the self-conscious construction of persuasive argument is apparent in the \textit{Elegies} of Theognis and the dynamics of archaic argument was clearly understood and described by Pindar in \textit{Pythian I} [Theog. \textit{Elegies} 18-22; Pin. \textit{Pyth.} 1.81-85, 89; app. 8.V.18]. In regard to Hesiod, most units of the composition were 'self-contained proverbs [where] ... the poet is in fact aiming at an argumentative unity but that his unity is very difficult for him to achieve; the reason being that he is working with disjunct bits and pieces of verse drawn from his oral reservoir.'\footnote{Havelock, \textit{The Literate Revolution in Greece and Its Cultural Consequences}, pp. 211- 212.}
Theogony he believes the theme, phraseology and situational evocation recalls that of the Iliad creating novel dichotomies of quarrel and reconciliation into an argument defining justice. But:

Ultimately, the method of Hesiod can be viewed as one of topicalisation carried on within the existing matrix of narrative oral poetry. This is still some distance away from logically organised discourse, let alone abstract definition and analysis.288

A conflicting dichotomy is apparent: archaic tact that balanced violence in persuasion came face to face with the realisation of self-conscious authority. In view of the arbitrary nature of archaic power, in putting forward one or the other side of an argument, the psychological response seems to have been to rationalise and repress personal responsibility. Even if we accept two 'makers' for Theogony and Works and Days, they both conceded to a Muse.289

b) The psychology and behaviour of Homeric counsellors exhibit some of the same traits of the poetic sensation as Hesiod and Pindar

Homer presents several ambiguous portraits of the orator and of persuasion that do not fit in with the profile of his self-conscious pro and contra arguers of Iliad 9 or 11, or Odyssey 2 or 16. In the context of both epics Odysseus seems to be represented as a counsellor who readily grasps alternatives; Λαερτιάδη τοῦ μῆθον ἀκούσας· ἐν μοίρῃ γὰρ πάντα δίκεο καὶ κατέλεξας (To hear your words, son of Laertes, laying down and going through every part) [Il. 19.185-186]. One epithet in both the Iliad and Odyssey is πολύμητις (man of many counsels) [Il.1.311, 439; Od. 2.173, 21.274], whose oratorical skill was ostensibly equal to that of Zeus (‘Ὀδυσσήα Διὶ μῆτιν ἀτάλαντον) [Il. 2.169; 2.407].290 The ability to deliberate in an assembly of peers seems to have been a requisite skill expected of any leader. Achilles, although not as proficient as the other counsellors (ἐγὼ δὲ κε σεῖο νοήματι γε προβαλοίμην πολλών) [Il. 19.218-219]; (ἀγορη̄ δὲ τ’ ἀνθρώπων ἀπόλοιτο) [18.106], was taught oratory by Phoenix [Il. 9.441-442]. Telemachus performs well in the Ithacan boulê [Od. 1.39-79]; likewise Antinous, Icatha’s best counsellor and speaker in his generation (ἐν δήμῳ Ἰθάκης μεθ’ ὀμήλικας ἐμμεν ἀριστον βουλῆ καὶ μυθοίς) [Od. 16.419-420] when he is outlining the pros and cons of murdering Telemachus [16.364-390]. The quality of archaic

288 ibid., p. 219.
290 He is also given similar epithets, e.g. polyphron [always thinking], polymekhanos [many schemes], polytropos [versatile, shifting], poikilometes [adaptable mind].
oratory, however, is not consistently clear. For example, while Agamemnon (like Odysseus) is a favourite of Zeus the skilled counsellor (ἡ μητέρα τοῦ Ζεῦς) [Il. 2.197], the only epithet that implies any aptitude for oratorical skill (βουληφόρον ἄνδρα) [Il. 2.61] occurs in Agamemnon’s own dreams of Nestor advising him. More often he is unable to control his emotions (Ἡρῶς Ἀτρεΐδης εὐρίκριτον Ἀγαμέμνων ἁχώνους· μένος δὲ μέγα φρένες ἀμφιμέλαιναι πίμπλαντ’, ὡσε δὲ οἱ πορὶ λαμπετόκωμετε ἔκτην’) [Il. 102-104] and more likely to anger than persuade [Il. 18.111-113]. Likewise in the Odyssey his epithets run from δῖος [illustrious] Agamemnon [Od. 11.168] and ποιήμα λαοῖν (shepherd of the people) [Od. 14.497] to τοῦ δὲ γίνῃ τὸ μέγιστον ὑπουράνιον κλέος ἔστιν· τόσην γὰρ διέπερσε πόλιν καὶ ἀπώλεσε λαὸς (famed sacker of cities and mass killer) [9.263-266]; all without reference counselling skills. Likewise, one epithet of Menelaus is βοηγὸν ἄγαθὸς (good at shouting for war) [Il. 2.408, 586; 10.36; 15.565; 17.237, 516] an oratorical skill that was not apt to consider alternatives. And the forthright Nestor, the Iliad’s most respected counsellor, the οὖρος Ἀχαιῶν (guardian of the Achaeans)211 whose invaluable advice in the opinion of Agamemnon exceeded all other Achaeans [2.370-74] but was, as noted earlier, invariably bad advice.212 A good illustration is in Iliad 3 where Homer provides a picture of two distinct methods of archaic persuasion when Antenor compares the oratorical techniques of Odysseus and Menalaus:

When each of them stood up to make his plea, his argument before us all, then Menelaus said a few words in a rather headlong way but clearly: not long-winded and not vague; and indeed he was the younger of the two.

Then in his turn the great tactician rose and stood, and looked at the ground, moving the staff before him not at all forward or backward: obstinate and slow of wit he seemed, gripping the staff: you’d say some surly fellow, with an empty head.

But when he launched the strong voice from his chest, and words came driving on the air as thick and as fast as winter snowflakes, then Odysseus could have no mortal rival as an orator! The look of him no longer made us wonder.

[trans. Fitzgerald]

211 II.8.80, 11.840, 15.370
Homer does not say that the technique of either man involved ‘well-reasoned’ persuasion let alone any consideration of alternatives. Roisman notes:

[What is valued in the adviser is not his ability to persuade as such, but his ability to fit his words to the needs of the situation and to draw on and maintain the consensus.]

While much of what Odysseus advises is reasoned and we assume he has deliberated over the pros and cons of each, most of his speeches in the Iliad follow concrete formula and line of argument. An example in Iliad 2 is his behaviour throughout the marshalling of troops which was being carried out in response to an illogical resolution by Agamemnon to test the army. This ill-considered plan first proposed a full scale retreat and then a recall of the army to make a mass attack on Troy. Throughout this sequence are examples of argument and persuasion that recognise two points of view but do not consider alternatives. To begin with, Agamemnon, who has been under considerable psychological stress following the acrimonious loss of Chryseis and fallout with Achilles, conceives the plan to attack; a plan conceived in a waking thought. Even though Homer describes the plan as πυκνήν ἀρτύνετο βουλήν [a tightly-packed/subtle strategy - II. 2.55], the implication does not necessarily mean Agamemnon has thought it through. To add further lunacy, the wise Nestor supported Agamemnon solely on the grounds that Agamemnon must be right because he is the leader [2.79-83]. Of all the ‘staff-bearing counsellors’ (σκηπτούχοι βασιλῆς) [2.86] Agamemnon’s superiority is rationalized by the intricate description of the divine lineage of his sceptre which imbues him with supreme authority [2.101-109]. Agamemnon leaned on this sceptre (σκῆπτρον) and spoke to the army. Odysseus’ reaction to Agamemnon’s deliberation was anything but a pro and contra consideration of alternatives. He was in a confused state of anxiety (ἐπεί μὲν ἄχος κροδίην καὶ θυμὸν ἐκανεν) [2.171] when he experienced an aural hallucination; a cognitive state familiar to him because we are told he recognised the goddess’ voice when he heard it. As noted previously, Odysseus also experiences this cognitive state in the Odyssey. In the crisis situation of Iliad 2 Athena’s epideictic of blame does not ponder alternatives for Odysseus but supplies him with a directive: σοὶς δ’ ἀγανοίς ἐπέδασιν ἐρήτευ μὲν φῶτα ἔκαστον (with gentle words of your own restrain each person) [2.173]. When Odysseus took the floor he grabbed Agamemnon’s

213 Roisman, op. cit., p. 23 fn.20.
sceptre from him [185-86]. This is shocking; Odysseus was aggressively assuming Agamemnon’s authority. His following arguments, however, did not usurp Agamemnon’s authority but reinforced it. Holding Agamemnon’s staff he stopped any Achaean of note that he came across and presented an argument that appealed to authority (ethos) and pathos with a combination of insult and politeness [Il. 2.190-199; app. 8.V.19]. This sounds like the Odysseus Antenor described. But with the rank and file, Odysseus persuaded through violence, insult and the usual appeal to authority [Il. 2.198-206; app. 8.V.20].

As with the embassy to Achilles, Iliad 2 pairs speeches that highlight comparative persuasive approaches. Thus far Odysseus has provided two approaches. The argument is based on the same appeal to authority in a coalescence of ethos and pathos. This is the same pattern with the next four speeches in the deliberation over whether to retreat or attack. Next comes the linguistically violent speech of the individual rank and filer, who definitely saw the opposing sides of the situation – Agamemnon does nothing and gets it all, while the rank and file do it all and get nothing [Il. 2.225-241; app. 8.V.21]. This speech, plus the reaction to it, is a typical archaic argument sequence in which the participants appeal to or reproach authority employing pathos as the pistis.214 Odysseus’ response to Thersites likewise combines the same appeals to authority that he had used in his other speeches throughout the episode [Il. 2.245-263; app. 8.V.22].

Following this appeal for recognition of sovereign authority, he thrashed Thersites with Agamemnon’s staff [2.265-66]; behaviour in keeping with his other persuasive acts earlier in the night. The approval of the rank and file indicates that the comparative problem-solving powers of the majority of the army, while based on an awareness of the two sides of a matter in the Protagorean sense, did not exercise judgment that considered the pros and contras of any situation nor let that judgment interfere with capitulation to authority [Il. 2.270-277; app. 8.V.23]. Agamemnon’s ‘baser instincts’ had been apparent to the rank and file right from Iliad 1 [22-32, 102-120], so the reaction to Thersites’ speech is usually conceded to signify an objection to his lack of archaic

214 It is similar to the earlier sequence regarding Agamemnon and Nestor with the army.
tact rather than anything relating to class or rank.\textsuperscript{215} Even if Homer generally ‘united nobility of action with nobility of mind,’\textsuperscript{216} the rank and file in this case were sufficiently sensitive to Thersites’ lack of tact to find it objectionable.

Thersites and Achilles bookends in their tactless rebellion against kingly authority. They are physically antithetical whilst psychologically presenting dual aspects of rebellion. The historical unlikelihood of Thersites’ physicality permitting him to be on a battlefield points to his being a literary conceit with its attendant symbolic significance.\textsuperscript{217} When linked to the persona of Achilles a further agonal and ritualistic complexion to problem-solving arises: archaic values of beauty and tact equate to deference to authority, as Odysseus has pointed out and Nestor and Phoenix have illustrated. Thersites and Achilles both display antithetical elements in the archaic dynamics of persuasion–obedience or angry rebellion (μὴ νις). Homer emphasises Thersites’ ridicule of authority figures and laughter as a means of rabble-rousing his peers [2.213-216]. The consequence in the use of such humour is that it effectively demystifies authority. Hammer notes that ‘authority crumbles once the fear is neutralised.’\textsuperscript{218}

It can also dispel anger. There are twin reasons for Achilles to have disliked him (ἐχθιστος δ’ Ἀχιλῆι μάλιστ’ ) [2.220]. Thersites’ humour had the potential to incite Achilles’ elevated self-image, or to soothe his obsessive anger. Thersites seeks to persuade with humour, while Achilles could not be persuaded at all; Homer is skirting complex social elements in the νομίζ:

The hero on whom survival depends is, when enraged, its greatest threat, and no human, social force can constrain him. ... There is, then, another dimension to Homer’s defining narrative. The need for persuasion plays a continuous counterpart to the cyclical interaction of grief and wrath, for to yield to persuasion is to relent from anger. ... But there is an extra sharp edge to Achilles’ implacability. Homer’s world sets a limit to legitimate anger, a limit given in the paradigm of the gods and heroes of old, who, when enraged, were and are placated with gifts and persuaded with words (9.497-526). Achilles violates this limit, and this is a point that Homer does not want us to miss.\textsuperscript{219}


\textsuperscript{218} Hammer, ‘Who Shall Readily Obey?: Authority and Politics in the \textit{Iliad}’, p. 5.

\textsuperscript{219} Alles, ‘Wrath and Persuasion: the \textit{Iliad} and Its Contexts’, p. 175.
In this way the *Iliad* permits a focus on the dynamics of archaic authority, on the persuasive methods used to maintain that authority and the nature of individual rejection of that authority. Achilles goes beyond a 'breach of custom' and actually challenges the 'fundamental question of who shall govern'. Thersites was soon persuaded by his fear of Agamemnon’s golden sceptre, but the type of unappeasable anger felt by Achilles directly threatened Agamemnon’s ‘honoured ... sceptred ... god-given authority’ (ἐμορε τιμής σκηπτοῦχος βασιλεύς, ὁ τε Ζεὺς κῦδος ἔδωκεν.) [*Il. 1.278-279*]. Achilles’ own ambition to give orders and rule over all [*Il. 1.287-289*] came face to face with Agamemnon. Achilles’ anger was itself eloquent and ultimately persuasive when he directly challenged Agamemnon and threw the speaker’s sceptre to the ground [*Il. 1.244-45*]. His oath taken while holding the sceptre [*Il. 1.233-244; app. 8.V.24*] metaphorically equated him with the sceptre as the true basis of Achaean power, highlighting in its sterility his intransigence at the current impasse. At the same time the gesture of discarding it ridiculed the symbol of the archaic social contract. This symbolic gesture is the silent epilogue of his speech, extending the invective and indignation (*deinosis*). The sustained pathos of Achilles’ speech did not attempt to articulate the abstract parameters of his heightened emotion or give reasons. His persuasion was successful; hence the embassy.

This type of archaic oratory throughout the *Iliad* stands in contrast to the other noted examples of Protagorean-style deliberative oratory. The complexity of its symbolism in word and gesture shows how effectively an argument could be conveyed without the use of *symboloueutikon*. In the end though Achilles conceded the uncontestable authority of Agamemnon by awarding him, without any competition, the best prize at the games of Patroclus [*Il. 23.886-897*].

V.4 SOCIAL RITUAL IN GREEK CULTURE

1) The ritual surrounding the use of writing in Archaic Greek Society

Those who posit a pre-Peisistratidae textualisation of Homer need to account for the degree of ritual behaviour in the culture generally and in literacy

20 Hammer [op. cit., pp. 4-5] notes: Achilles inquires of Agamemnon, ‘With your mind forever on profit, how shall any one of the Achaians readily (προφρων) obey (πειθαί) you?’ (*I. 1.149-150*) ... Achilles adds the modifier προφρων, broadening the issue from obedience to the demeanor of those asked to obey.
particularly. Powell for instance envisages literate seventh century BC Greek travellers with copies of Homer in their pocket, ready to inscribe their host’s dinnerware with Homeric _bon mots_. It is a position which ignores the generally ritualistic and non-spontaneous uses of writing at that time and brushes aside any impediments to the physical production of large texts. Powell’s evidence, the Nestor Cup, the Tataean aryballo, and the Dipylon oinochoe do not constitute proof of urbane literate wit. Rather, they attest only to the fact that there were some individuals literate enough to scratch simple diaristic records, sometimes in hexameters and some, even high achievers, who could have trouble with their alphabet.\(^2\)

Powell thinks the Nestor Cup may parody the ubiquitous curse cups, but it is just as possible to point to hyper-ritualisation rather than conscious wit.\(^2\) The

\(^2\) Powell ['Why was the Greek Alphabet Invented’, p. 349; cf. pp. 338-339] interprets the Cup of Nestor, the Tataean aryballo and the Dipylon oinochoe as evidence that ‘early Greek alphabetic writing was in the hands of men who moved around ... These travelers had something written on the papyrus they carried with them - a copy of the _Iliad_.’ Cf. Homer and the Origin of the Greek Alphabet, p. 167.

References for the evidence is as follows: The Cup of Nestor from Pithekoussai [Ischia Museum; _LSAG_ Pl. 47.1; _SEG_ 14. 604]; the Tataean aryballo [British Museum 1885.0613.1; _LSAG_ Pl. 47.3; _IG_.14.865]; the Dipylon oinochoe [Beazley 9016746, Athens National Museum 3774 (CAVI: ANIM.192), _LSAG_ Pl.1.1; 401, _SEG_. 30.46].

In deciphering the Dipylon oinochoe Powell ['Why was the Greek Alphabet Invented’, pp. 337-338] constructs a believable scene for limited literacy and a degree of spontaneity in eighth century Athens: ‘In Athens ca. 740 B.C. an _aiōdos_ composed the Dipylon verses at a dance contest for which the jug was prize ... Somebody who knew how to write wrote down the first verse, and somebody else tried his hand at the second verse before straying off into practicing his ABCs. My own guess is that the second hand belonged to the athlete-dancer who owned the pot, which was, evidently, buried with him.’

Both Jeffrey [L.H. Jeffrey, A.W. Johnston, _The Local Scripts of Archaic Greece_, [LSAG], Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1990, _LSAG_, 68] and Powell [Homer and the Origin of the Greek Alphabet, p. 162]; The Dipylon Oinochoe and the Spread of Literacy in Eighth-century Athens’, _Kadmos_ Vol. 27 (1988), pp. 65-86] envisage two hands in the writing; a competent foreigner able to compose an hexameter and a struggling Athenian. Alternatively, Robb [op. cit., pp. 24-26] sees it as the work of a single hand whereupon the writer’s ability to phonetically capture memorised formulaic hexameters in the tricky new alphabet broke down half way through the second line. Snodgrass _Homer and the Artists_, p. 52] on the other hand remarks on the ‘fluency and confidence’ of the hexameters. Either way, the abecedary line shows a dancer youthful enough to win the competition and enthusiastic enough to wish to be taught and read and write.

\(^2\) While graffiti on both the Nestor Cup and the Dipylon oinochoe are hexameters, they are not the spontaneous products of literate elites. Powell interprets the Nestor Cup as evidence that ‘writing was in the hands of men who moved around ... These travelers had something written on the papyrus they carried with them - a copy of the _Iliad_. The inscription on the Cup of Nestor reads:

\textit{Νέστορος ε[υ]μ[ι]ε[υ]ποτ[ου] ποτήριον / ὃς δ’ ἄν τούδε πίησοι ποτηρίῳ αὐτίκα κήνου / ἵμερος αἱρέσαι καλλιστέφανον Ἀφροδιτίτις [Of Nestor I am the pleasant-to-drink-from cup. Whoever drinks from this cup, immediately a desire for fair-crowned Aphrodite will seize him].}

Thomas [op. cit., p. 59] notes parallels between ritual curses and the graffiti on the Nestor Cup, but Powell [Homer and the Origin of the Greek Alphabet, pp. 165-166] overstates the spirit and use of the inscription. Firstly, the three lines recall but do not echo _Iliad_ 11.632-637. Secondly, the first line, as Thomas notes and Powell concedes, is a proprietary formula but he suggests that the
'magical tradition' that created the Pithecussan inscription (on the Nestor Cup) is often not sufficiently appreciated and cannot be over-emphasised; it represents the type of everyday rituals that orally composed incantations in hexameters 'like the better known epics, hymns and oracles'. These incantations were not just 'descriptive' or 'mimetic', they were 'performative' and 'persuasive'. This hexametric language was believed to be 'something as concrete and immediate as blinding a thief, calming the anger of a homicidal young man or instantly inciting his desire for lovemaking'. Rather than parody, the Nestor Cup could just as easily attest to sympotic sexuality expressed in this ritualistic formulae; a point expanded later.

As evidence for a general competency in writing Powell also imbues graffitists of the period with more self-consciously literate spontaneity than is credible, first by interpreting the tone of the Theran erotic graffiti to be perjorative, then by assigning an age demographic. Most importantly he denies any links with religious ritualisation. Even though discussion on this aspect is current and contentious, Powell does not really address problems relating to literacy and the interpretation of the Thera inscriptions. Bain supports Powell on the grounds that the idea of sacred inscriptions mentioning sexual acts performed in a temple precinct 'goes against everything we know about Greek attitudes to pollution in

other two lines are a self-conscious parody of Homer's view of Nestor, as in, 'even old drunkard Nestor wrote his name on his cup; and look, here is Nestor's cup!' This disregards the emphasis Homer placed on the serious ritual involved in the preparation and drinking of wine, not to mention the cup's symbolism of Nestor's strength, power and arete. It is also noted here that Nestor was not considered a drunk by any of Homer's characters, nor did Homer's readers appear to have formed such an opinion and that even Plato [Laws 4.711e] attested to Nestor's reputation for temperance. Cff. Christopher A. Faraone, 'Taking the 'Nestor's Cup Inscription' Seriously: Erotic Magic and Conditional Curses in the Earliest Inscribed Hexameters', Classical Antiquity, Vol. 15, No. 1 (1996), pp. 77-112.

Faraone, op. cit., p. 112.


His argument centres around οἵων being a perjorative term in this period which is not substantiated and ignores the constructs of archaic sexuality and the degree of religious ritualism present. An analysis of Powell's and other scholarship on the Thera inscriptions and a discussion of the conceptual constraints of using modern terminology and constructs in relation to Hellenic sexual practice is detailed in Appendix 5.
holy places' and therefore the inscriptions must have been spontaneous.\textsuperscript{26} This misunderstanding the degree and function of ritual in Hellenic society that involved singing, chanting, libation, drugs, and sex. The Hellenes did not view sexual contact per se as 'pollution'.\textsuperscript{27} For example there are hints of sexual ritual in the \textit{Hymn to Aphrodite}.\textsuperscript{28} West too traces the presence of similar sexual ritual inherent in the Dionysia on Chios in this period whilst Theran and other archaic clayware also attest to such practices.\textsuperscript{29} Highlighting the mixture of wine and religious ritual, Plato also censured a whole township for being drunk during a Dionysian festival.\textsuperscript{30} Later, in the fourth century BC, Demosthenes attests to religious sexual ritual that extended back to archaic times being performed annually by the wife of Athen's archon basileus [Ag. \textit{Neaira} 74-76; app. 8.V.25]. The idea of ritual sexual communion with a god is not out of order; it is an old fashioned hypothesis, but still holds good.\textsuperscript{31} In Athens the ritualistic coalescence of sex and metre was a fact of life, and laughter [Aristoph. \textit{Archarnians} 264-276;
app. 8.V.26].232 Suggesting that sex and its graphic expression was not ritualised in Hellenic religious life ignores both art and archaeology.233 Hence, the Thera inscriptions and clayware cited by Powell, et. al., are not evidence of a literate population capable of writing spontaneous texts as if it was some form of ancient blogging.

The several scholars cited here represent a variety of approaches as to the initial function of writing in Greece. For example, Powell reinforces Wade-Gery's hypothesis that alphabetic writing was a direct response to the need to record hexameters.234 William V. Harris considers this hypothesis 'suspiciously romantic' because he believes the first uses of writing were to record mercantile transactions, despite evidence regarding the absence in extant material of numerals before 600BC.235 Robb opts for the writing-as-magic theory, stressing that there is 'hard, indisputable evidence' that early hexameters inscribed on artefacts usually permitted 'the artefacts that bear them to speak'. As such, the implications relating to 'the motive behind' the invention of Greek writing should not be ignored: 'the poetic eloquence and wide distribution of these popular inscriptions would be inexplicable on any other theory'.236 There is no need to attribute a single motive to the need for writing in a society; writing can


233 A sixth century BC example is a Pelike that looks like it may feature one, perhaps domestic, ritual process related to Dionysian worship. Both sides are embellished with a grapevine motif. One side depicts a draped man about to kiss a clothed woman; beside her a folded patterned garment sits on a chair. The illustration on the other side shows a Satyr carrying off a Maenad whose chiton is of the same pattern as the garment on the chair on the other side. Cf. Beazley 302865; London, British Museum 1865.11-18.40; Athenian Black-figure Pelike, ca.525; Acheleos Painter; A: Satyr and Maenad; B: Bearded Man embracing clothed woman; no inscriptions. Another contemporary vase by the Euphiletos Painter (Beazley 301725; London, British Museum B300; Black-figure Hydra; ca.525) also features the same patterned cloth worn by Maenads. Another example is on a sixth century BC cup painted by Makron [Beazley 204946; Munich, Antikensammlungen J507; Red-figure Cup; ca.575] which depicts a man approaching a column Krater in a costume that involves a strapped-on girdle with a hairy tail; his prominent erection, however, is his own. This pretend satyr would have played some part in the ritual.


235 William Harris, loc. cit.

236 Robb, op. cit., p. 45.
have more than one function, even today. Writing continues to be put to more
and more complex (though seemingly simplified, as with SMS) electronic
applications.

It is clear that ritualism permeated all aspects of Hellenic culture, including the
uses of public and private writing, at least until the second half of the sixth
century BC; the practice Thomas defines as 'non-rational.' Likewise methods of
recall. Harris terms this magic use of writing 'crypto-literacy' in which writing is
a symbolic signifier with certain apotropaic qualities. Leaving composition
aside for the moment, in this context writing not only symbolised, but literally
substituted for, the spoken word. Words on tombstones, curses and cups speak
in the first-person rather than function as a third person label or record of an
event or idea. Such writing is not addressed to the reader, but the god; in effect
it is the statue's voice.

If that is the motivation, the method should also be considered as evidence that
archaic literacy does not function in the same cognitive dimension as modern

237 Thomas, op. cit., pp. 74ff.
238 Roy Harris, Rethinking Writing, pp. x-xi.
239 1) For example, a Rhodian tombstone: 'I, Idameneus, made this tomb in order that I might
have fame. Whoever harms (it) may Zeus make him utterly accursed.' [LSAG 356.5, 415, Pl. 67.5
(=IG 12.1.737)].
2) Likewise, a curse on a proto-Corinthian aryballos from Cyme: 'I am the jug of Tataie. Whoever
steals me will go blind' [LSAG 240.3, 409, Pl. 47 (=IG 14.865); cf. Faraone, Taking the 'Nestor's
Cup Inscription' Seriously', p. 81].
3) A good example of a statue speaking is the Mantiklos Apollo, whose votive characteristics are
an inscription that winds up one leg and down the other of a statuette of a kouros. The composer of
these elegant hexameters manages to incorporate two of Apollo's Homeric epithets into his
inscription in addition to his own unusual name ... Mantiklos ... like another foot soldier of the
early seventh century, Achilochus, had thoroughly absorbed epical speech and had made it his
own. Cf. Robb, op. cit., pp. 58-59; cff. LSAG. pp. 90, 402, Pl. 7.1. A similar but much larger
element of a votive statue was excavated at Sounion. Dated c.550, [t]his is an inscription cut on the
thigh of a male statue, recording a dedication by Ζουτείος. This fragment and an even smaller
one found in the same deposit by the temple of Athena seem to be unique in Attike in having the
inscription cut into the marble statue itself,' [G.R. Stanton, 'Some Inscriptions in Attic Demes', The
1024]. Another example is a statuette inscribed up and down along the body perhaps from the
precinct of Artemis at Lousoi, ca.480 Arcadia [LSAG pp. 215.15, 417, Pl. 75.6].
4) Snodgrass [Homer and the Artists, pp. 102-103] draws attention to an early vase depicting a
chorus dressed in the same costume with the inscription 'MENELAS' denoting the name of the
song sung by the choristers. Cf. Beazley 1001741, Berlin Antikensammlung A.42, Protoattic Stand
fragments ca. 650; cf. Gloria Ferrari, Figures of speech: men and maidens in ancient Greece, Chicago,
University of Chicago Press, 2002. Later Red-figure examples of writing representing music or
song: Beazley 200421, Paris, Louvre S1435, Cup ca.500; Beazley 205174, Munich,
Antikensammlungen J371; Cup Douris painter, ca. 500; Beazley 201668, London British Museum
E270, Amphora, Neck, ca. 500; Beazley 207399, Brussels, Musees Royaux R339; Athenian Red-
figure Amphora, Neck, ca. 475.
literacy or, indeed the fifth century BC’s ‘officials’ literacy’. The randomness of retrograde, boustrophedon, and Schlangenschrift may be an indicator that this was not an integrated literacy in which the writer is consciously composing with an interior conception of what he is writing. Powell provides an insightful explanation that fits neatly into the hypothesis of Roy Harris regarding the ‘biomechanically’ different aspects of reading to writing:

The lack of sense of a certain direction for his writing suited the Greek’s compulsion to transcribe exactly what he heard without regard for the graphic orientation in space which assists the reader in other writings. The Greek evidently allowed his ear to guide his hand, careless of a consistent direction or a consistent orientation of the characters. ... [He will] translate directly into visible symbols what is heard.

In view of current cognitive auditory results, is it possible the artist writers were listening to someone spelling (or saying slowly) a name over their shoulder, or listening to someone walking around them dictating a hexametric curse, etc., or the inscriber himself walking around the statuette clamped in a vice in order to record the words dictated? These features suggest that there was no internal spatiality of single alphabetic words. Writing was not being used as a tool for recording constructs of conscious reflective thought. This point will be returned to in relation to inscriptions on sympotic clayware, but as a preliminary entrée to the subject, Harris summarises the work on phonological awareness thus:

[F]or literate communities, it is not the written word which is the image of the spoken word, but the spoken word which is the image of its written counterpart.

This is the reverse of a non-literate community. While the writer must have a specific locale (‘VWFA’) for an internalised alphabet, the metrical quality of early inscriptions, suggests the early Greek graffitists would have been less regionalised (and perhaps less lateralised). In other words, in this period, the linear, separate word contexts of our own literacy was absent, even though a

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20 Havelock, *The Literate Revolution in Greece and Its Cultural Consequences*, p. 197. Cf. pp. 26-27 re a sherd from Cumae [Jeffrey, *LSAG* 27] on which the writer begins to create an alphabet but his mistakes suggest that he is not consciously understanding or intending his message to be read for meaning. He is merely arranging the letters decoratively. Cf. Chapter III.2.1.

21 Roy Harris, op. cit. pp. 89-90.

22 Roy Powell, *Homer and the Origin of the Greek Alphabet*, pp. 121-122. We might also add, with some reservation, the lack of spaces between words; cf. Chapter III.3 (regarding the data suggesting that uneven spacing, more than no spacing, has a greater effect on reading ability).


24 Roy Harris, *Rethinking Writing*, p. 209.
knowledge of letters representing phonics enabled the hexameters to be meaningfully written down.

Homer’s single reference to writing (and not necessarily Hellenic alphabetic writing) implies that it was viewed with suspicion. There are indications that in Athens too Simonides may have distrusted stone inscriptions; an attitude Aeschylus shows lingered into the fifth century BC [Il. 6.169; Aesch. Suppliants 946-949; app. 8.V.27]. The underlying early functions of writing appear to be as manifestations of power or as a mnemonic, whether magical or political. For instance, suspicion and extra-literary meaning attached to the early monumentalising of Athenian law. Though they came to be honoured later, Dracoian and Solonian laws were not universally popular at this time. Draco’s laws were punitive and, if the anecdote placing him in Aegina is correct, he could not possibly have been popular in Athens. Likewise Solon describes his position was that of ‘a wolf at bay among the hounds’ and personal safety was

245 Il. 6.169-170.
247 Cf. Chapter III.2.2 and IV.2.4 for discussion on the possible chronology and methods for gazetting Athenian law.
248 They were accorded honour and were in force in Isocrates time [On the Exchange 232]. Aeschines [Against Timarchus 6-7] states: ‘Consider, fellow citizens, how much attention that ancient lawgiver, Solon, gave to morality, as did Draco and the other lawgivers of those days. ... And when they had inscribed these laws, they gave them to you in trust, and made you their guardians. [...] Likewise Demosthenes [Against Timocrates 24] states they were good and tested laws and used a spectacular comparative antithesis of Solon and his adversary in his prosecution [Against Timocrates 104].

Solon soon superceded most of Draco’s laws except those relating to homicide [Ar. Ath Pol. 7.1.] Draco’s laws were not popular and perhaps the early suspicion of writing even emanated from them because: 1) even though he did not alter the constitution, his laws were severely punitive [Ar. Politics 1274b15; Rhetoric 2.23.29; Demades (ca 350BC) cited by Plutarch [Solon 17], and, 2) the people opposed and agitated against the leaders [Ar. Politics 1273b35-1274a21 ; Ath. Pol. 2.1-2, 4.1-5.1]; 3.)

249 The anecdote is in the Suda [Lexicon 1495] : ‘[Draco crossed] to Aegina for lawgiving purposes and was being honoured by the Aeginetans in the theatre, but they threw so many hats and shirts and cloaks on his head that he suffocated, and was buried in that selfsame theatre [Δράκων ... οὕτως οὖς Ἀἰγίναις ἐπὶ νομοθεσίαις εὐφημουμένως ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀἰγίνητων ἐν τῷ θεάτρῳ ἐπιρρήματι τῶν αὐτῶ ἐπὶ τὴν κεφαλήν πετάσως πλέοντας καὶ χιτῶνας καὶ ἱματίαν ἀπεπνύμη καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ ἐτάφη τὸ τεάτρον.]’

Chronic ongoing hostility between Aegina and Athens had religious overtones with serious underlying commercial interests [Hdt. 5.80-89; 6.49-51, 73, 85-94]. This is evidenced by Solon’s later curbing of the activities of Aeginetan businessmen in the Athenian agora. The Aeginetans must have long been disliked or distrusted. Draco therefore could not have been a popular lawgiver in both Athens and Aegina. Perhaps the Suda records a redrafted urban legend that made Draco’s remaining statutes within Solon’s later code more acceptable to Athenians [Ar. Ath. Pol. 7.1-4].

probably a factor in his departure from Athens. In this period, by absenting himself for twenty years the graphic symbols he left painted on wooden ķυρβεῖς (kyrbeis) became the ‘voice of the law’ rather than that of the man who composed them; they became a suprahuman manifestation of power. There was no conceptual context of a unitary law code at this point because existing epigraphical evidence is not of codified laws but of random statutes (axones). The question perhaps should be, why did Solon explain the rationale behind his laws in poetry rather than prose; why did Aristotle not cite his written laws instead of quoting his poetry? This somewhat highlights the crypto-symbolism of the ķυρβεῖς and the limited use of them as records. When Peisistratidai authority added its own statutes, Hipparchus identified himself with the laws on the Herms simultaneously appropriating civic and magic power. Citizens learning to read possibly practised on them, whilst those who could not read were symbolically reminded rather than informed. Likewise official curses, which were routinely maintained to protect the polis in the same fashion as private votives. These items, with magical intent, contorted numbers and letters or arranged them in symbolic fashion, ‘a metaphor for what he or she hoped would happen to the individual being cursed. The very form of writing was being brought into the process of cursing beyond the actual words of the curse. This use of a glottic alphabet as a semiotic symbol, rather than for any phonological reconstruction, highlights the artistic dimension of writing:

It is a semiological reality ... that written communication does not depend either on the existence of an oral language which it transcribes, or on the existence of orthographic conventions which govern it. [O]nly the persistence of earlier and more rigid ways of thinking can prevent recognition of the conclusion that writing can create its own forms of expression.

251 Ar., Ath. Pol. 6, 10, 11, 12.5, 14.3.
252 Plutarch Solon 8.1-2; Diog Laert. 1.46-48.
253 Robb, op. cit., pp. 130-32.
254 It is possible Aristotle wrote a treatise entitled The Axones of Solon.
255 Cf. Inscriptions of Hipparchus on herms: Edmonds, Elergy and lambus, Hipparchus 3 (= Corp. Insc. Att. i. 522); Barnstone 407, 408 (= Diehl 1, 2).
256 Thomas, op. cit., p. 80.
257 Roy Harris, Rethinking Writing, pp. 224-225. He cites as modern examples the calligram poems of symbolist Stéphane Mallarmé, Un coup de dés and surrealist Guillaume Apollinaire’s Lettre-Océan. With its print ‘sometimes trailing across the paper like a drawing ... the concluding lines of Un coup de dés are set out not only in the shape of two dice ... but also in the shape of the constellation of the Great Bear’ [p. 217]. Lettre-Océan is written in angular or spiraling and daisy shapes with no linear beginning or end [cf. pp. 218-219]. [O]n Mallarmé’s page the reader sees the visual articulation of a syntax that is orally ‘impossible’. To call it ‘ungrammatical’ would be on a par with saying that Picasso’s Les Demoiselles d’Avignon shows a poor grasp of perspective’ [pp. 216-217]. ‘It took the genius of Mallarmé [and] Apollinaire ... as it had taken the genius of Picasso and Braque, to turn theoretical possibilities into semiological realities’ [p. 225].
Public curses were not inscribed on stelae in Athens as in other cities, but were sung in ritualistic chants.\(^{258}\) Like graphs, words were understood to have a separateness from human volition. There is an example of such an incantation in Hipponax, which is close to the invocation in the *Homeric Hymn to Aphrodite*.\(^{259}\) This fragment also reflects the language, metre and performative goals of chants and incantations in hexameter which were designed to expel 'famine demons' or to accompany 'scapegoats' out of the city.\(^{260}\) There seems to have been considerable symbolic gesture and ritual associated with the process. For example, Solon disguised himself and is said to have feigned insanity in order to introduce his controversial ideas to the populace in poetry.\(^{261}\) He had to perform. Which brings to the point the observations made by Plato and Isocrates (mentioned in Chapter IV.2.3 and quoted app. 8.IV.2-3) on the ritual associated with public performance and reading practices.

2) **Ritual and its place in the symposion**

Most everyday songs were never written down; this indicates a mainstream population still highly oral and ritualistic.\(^{262}\) The discussion earlier touched on skilled rhapsodic recall and related cognitive processes within the citizenry at large. For the general individual, remembering and performing without text appears to have been assisted by a symbiosis of role-playing and pictorial recall. There is a further aspect to be added here - the processes of remembering was then, as it is now, a process not confined to internal 'situated' intelligence. Cognitively, all recall is a combination of inner 'representations and traces' which are 'reconstructed rather than reproduced' and constitute a 'mnemonic stability [that] is often supported by heterogeneous external resources as well as,
and in complementary interaction with, neural resources.\footnote{263} In other words, ritualistic items such as sympotic eye cups could be practical aids to memory. As one would expect, an image can often prompt the recall of a story or a conversation. But the images on these cups - the eyes on the outside rim and the \textit{Gorgoneion} appearing on the tondo were ritualistic images reminding the viewer not only of the story of Perseus and the Medusa but of its subliminal cultural symbolism of correct masculine behaviour. Also, images used in ritual can have a greater effect on recall and as such the eyes represented a 'synoptic symbol'\footnote{264} to provide a focus and trigger for what was earlier called 'synoptic imagery'. The scholarship below suggests the ritual setting related to the psychology of the \textit{symposion} and Greek masculinity; in other words, the Perseus/Medusa story symbolised the victory of masculine values. How it relates to the Athenian experience of convergent literacy, and the psychology of the period before the introduction of literacy education, may be ascertained through the following discussion on the function and semiotics of Athenian eye cups associated with storytelling occasions; the image of the eyes on the cups constituting a ritualistic cue to remember the story and all it entailed.

\textbf{a) Ritualistic symbolism and memory triggers}

Athenian eye cups evolved from earlier Chalidean eye-bowls but exhibit exclusively Athenian refinements.\footnote{265} In Athens, between 550 and 530BCE, eye cups associated with storytelling occasions increased exponentially and, in the manner described above, probably functioned as a visual cue to bring to mind

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
  \item \footnote{264} Synoptic symbol in the sense of 'synoptic', constituting a non-linear and non-chronological synchronous consciousness of the entire plot of a story (as discussed in V.2(a) above) and 'symbolism' in the artistic sense, as not representing a lifelike image of something but an artistic metaphor representing a physical entity.
  \item \footnote{265} Guy Hedreen [Involved Spectatorship in Archaic Greek Art', \textit{Art History}, Vol. 30 No. 2, (2007), pp. 217-246, at 217, 220] claims the eye cup 'appears all of a sudden, fully developed ... between 540 and 530 BCE; possibly evolving from Chalidean 'eye-bowls'. Cf. The Beazley Archive statistics of extant eye cups by period: 600-550 (1); 575-525 (110); 550-500 (552); 525-475 (505); 500-450 (27); 475-425 (1) (http://www.beazley.ox.ac.uk/; reference 'Cup'/'Eyes' with a small proportion of these relating to eyes on shields within pictures. Cf. Ferrari, 'Eye-cup', \textit{Revue Archeologique}, Vol. 1 (1986), pp. 12; 13-14.}
\end{itemize}
the hexameters or iambs of sympotic and/or festive performance. This sudden increase points to a general upsurge in sympotic performance, while their rapid disappearance mid-fifth century BC could reflect a decline in the need for synoptic triggers because of a shift to linear recall processes in a citizenry increasingly taught from textualised cues. A tangible indication is possibly the slight increase of inscriptions on fifth century BC Red-figure eye cups over the earlier sixth century BC Black-figure.\textsuperscript{266} Athenian potters increasingly used writing to identify legendary characters on all manner of clayware, but on eye cups they mostly refrained from inscriptions other than the maker’s signature. Synoptic pictorial recall, by which a picture or artefact could be ‘read’, could explain the lack of inscription on eye cups. Significantly, in archaic times the use of writing within the artistic composition itself was avoided:

[O]ur prime example of the ‘reading’ of a work of art of this period [is] ... Homer’s own description of the Shield of Achilles. ... Homer himself takes on the rôle of the viewer, and we see him reading the work ... first grasping the overall composition of each scene, then deciphering gesture and movement, all the while inferring the passage of time. There is of course no writing to help him. ... He is, indeed, ‘making up stories’ about the pictures.\textsuperscript{267}

When writing was first used, the signing of work was outside the picture and even when it was inside the frame there was still ’the wish to avoid’ imposing a single identification of the scene and ’pining down the viewer’s imagination’.\textsuperscript{268}

Eye cups embody synoptic memory triggered by ritualistic symbolism within an artistic framework that, in line with the human predisposition to visualise faces out of inanimate shapes, combined all the components necessary for such a pictorial cognitive response. The eye cup constitutes a frontal face ‘not just a pair of eyes.’\textsuperscript{269} Further they generally represent specific Dionysian personages related ’most notably silens and nymphs, and not merely the human face in the

\textsuperscript{266} Shapiro [‘Old and New Heroes’, p.140] notes: ’As always, the paucity of preserved Attic vases, especially before ca. 560, warns against inferring too much from such correlations.’ Nevertheless, some of the earliest eye cups were inscribed with the maker’s name.

\textsuperscript{267} Snodgrass, \textit{Homer and the Artists}, pp. 161-162 (His discussion however relates to seventh and early sixth century works). Pauline Schmitt-Pantel discusses \textit{symposion} scenes on clayware noting the synoptic character: ’I do not feel I am confronting a simple image which has a single meaning. I do not perceive a precise moment in the course of the meal, be it consumption of food, drinking-session, or conversation, but rather a montage, a collage of different times and gestures, which precludes any realistic interpretation and which belongs to the abstract order … they work by an accumulation of signs.’ [‘Sacrificial Meal and \textit{Symposion}: Two Models of Civic Institutions in the Archaic City?’, \textit{Sympotica: a Symposium on the Symposium}, pp. 14-33, at 19].

\textsuperscript{268} Snodgrass, loc. cit.

abstract. The symposiast, holding up the cup and looking into the eyes, probably began with a dedication, as we find in the Homeric hymns, or a call to a muse. The eyes are always painted on both sides, therefore there is a mnemonic symbol on one side for the symposiast to focus on, whilst the eyes on the other side signal an audience to listen. Some suggest the eye cup functioned as a mask; a precursor to the tragic mask. However, its utility extended beyond mere pretense. As is discussed below, sympotic poetry comprises first-person language which involves for the performer a considerable degree of role playing and a degree of identification with the persona of the song. The ritual of using the eye cup is the moment of coalescence, the eyes of the cup providing the focus for recall; a transformation of consciousness in performance which Nietzsche suggested was almost to the point of trance, 'the bridge to the psychology of the tragic poet.' Guy Hedreen explains, less romantically, the psychology of simultaneous multiple mental visuo-spatial perspectives (something visual perception cannot do) whilst looking at an image or symbol representing a persona from poetry. An individual can experience an 'engaged spectatorship' whereby a 'twofold experience of inhabiting a dramatic role or persona, on the one hand, and being aware of oneself in the role, on the other'. The visual symbol triggers a type of disorientation that unites the exterior world with interior mentation:

A beholder taking on the point of view of a spectator located conceptually within the virtual world of a picture yet spatially on the spot where the beholder is located. ... Manipulations of pictorial conventions, including eye contact between the represented figure and the viewer as well as the elimination of pictorial space within the image ... put[ts] the viewer into the position of being an interlocutor. Both poetry and vase-painting ... induced them temporarily to identify with fictional or mythical figures.

270 Hedreen, op. cit., p. 229. Ferrari ['Eye cup', pp. 16-18] also discusses the frontal image of Dionysos between the eyes on several Athenian cups.
This art theory helps to explain the semiotic significance of the eyes on the cup and probably also the tondo image which was usually a Gorgoneion. This type of visual motif circulated at the period when 'sophisticated forms of mimetic poetry and drama' began to involve both performers and audience.

The tondo image of the Gorgoneion (after a ritual libation) had a similar mnemonic function even though, or perhaps because, it had early folk roots with origins in ritualistic dancing and mask-wearing. Because of the folklore relating to the Gorgoneion, it has been suggested that the eyes on eye cups were apotropaic rather than mnemonic devices. However, there are problems with this interpretation. For example the symposiast would not need an apotropaic device in the competitive, but non-threatening, atmosphere of the symposion. The same argument applies to the Gorgoneion: 'the extraordinary popularity of the Gorgoneion as a visual motif attests to its ineffectiveness as an apotropaic device in any literal sense, a point that even some ancient writers recognised.' Other images appearing on the tondo of eye cups also argue for a storytelling context rather than any curse or apotropaic function. There are equally ritualistic role-playing aspects to the image of the Gorgoneion as there are to the eyes on the cups. Although artwork of the Gorgoneion (or a decapitated Medusa) is found from the early seventh century BC, 'the specular motif' does not appear earlier than the end of the fifth century BC. Hedreen cites Jean-Pierre Vernant's argument that it was a narrative device related to intellectual development 'including the rise of perspectival illusion in painting, theories of mimesis in

274 The image on the inside of the cup, which when filled with wine would not have been visible. Only when an incantation or 'special speech' followed by the draining of the cup would the confronting image be seen.
philosophy, and developments in optical science.'\(^2\) With Rainer Mack, Hedreen rejects Harrison's famous identification of the Gorgoneion as a ritualistic mask and grounds its context upon 'ancient artistic practices of visual narration and pictorial convention, rather than notions of primitive magical belief.'\(^3\) But, in the pre-Greek root perse-, there is a clear interface between Perseus as a chthonic entity and rebirth symbolism.\(^4\) The Gorgoneion in the Odyssey, however, is 'a weapon of terror' used by Persephone, whose name bears the same root. 'By virtue of his name and of the myth in which he is the hero, he is the bearer (or even wearer) of the mask of the underworld daemon.' This therefore accords with the views of Mack and Hedreen that the narrative function of the Medusa is that she only exists to be defeated; 'her significance lies less in the monstrous power she embodies than in the defeat of that power by Perseus'. She is 'the emblematic face of the gaze' that transforms the sympotic performer into 'Perseus'.\(^5\) The eye cup therefore is the external catalyst functioning as a memory trigger for mythical stories and songs, learned and suddenly remembered:

[M]emory often takes us out of the current situation: in remembering episodes or experiences in my personal past, for example, I am mentally transported away from the social and physical setting in which I am currently embedded.\(^6\)


\(^4\) J. H. Croon [The Underworld of the Daemon-Some Remarks on the Perseus-gorgon Story, The Journal of Hellenic Studies, Vol. 75 (1955), pp. 9-16]: for example, perse- appears in Etruria as a chthonic persona who wears a mask. The Mycenaean period Argive hero, Perseus, who was 'connected with a masked dance-ritual' on Siphnos and in the Peloponnesse, is also probably of pre-Greek origin. The name of the mask used in this ritual was the Gorgoneion. Sappho refers to Timas, who was 'led into Persephone’s dark bedroom' [Willis Barnstone 243 = Diehl 158].


The eye cup was therefore an external, physical aid to memory; combining synoptic pictorial recall and the painted image with poetry to connect the circle of sympotic performance. It was one of Sutton’s heterogeneous external resources ‘spreading across world and body as well as brain.’

Very appropriate to a proto-literate society. Well almost - if letters and words added to any external mnemonic device and added their voice to the pictures. Contemporaries Pindar and Aeschylus, however, attest to a process of memorisation and recall unlocked by visualisation of letters or words that show the definite presence of an internal spatial literacy [Pin. Olymp. 10.1-4; Aesch. Suppliants 179, Choephoroi 450, Prometheus Bound 459-461, Prometheus Unbound 789-790; app. 8.V.28]. Indeed, in his youth Aeschylus would have benefited by the Peisistratidai inscriptions on the herms around his hometown, Eleusis.

Mack suggests ‘we should probably think of sympotic Gorgoneia as one part of the larger apparatus through which symposia did their social work (an apparatus that included, among other things, rituals of commensality, poetic and other performances, forms of instruction for young men, and, of course, initiatory practices like pederasty.)’ As mnemonic devices they go further than that. Under the gaze of a Gorgoneion and the prompts of sparkling eyes there is a glimpse of pro and contra reasoning emerging organically out of ritualistic sympotic poetry; a first indication of conscious deliberative argument carried out under the structure of competitive monody sung to demonstrate a point. Games such as ἕκκόνες (Comparisons) and ‘Riddles’ (γρίφοι / αἰνίγματα) played in later centuries also illustrate the process. They probably originated from lyric

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similes such as those of Sappho and certainly the tradition was that being able to solve riddles brought kudos - consider Themistocles deciphering Pythian oracles and Oedipus. Solon’s Ten Ages of Man sounds rather like the answer to a sixth century BC riddle whereas Xenophanes probably indicates the usual types of questions answered were of the ‘what is your family and where do you come from’ variety [Athenaeus 2.54e: Xenophanes DK.22; app. 8.V.29]. Xenophanes also gives a picture of the high degree of ritualisation involved in symposia [Athenaeus 11.462: DK.1; app. 8.V.30].

b) The psychological dynamics of the symposion and the development of pro and contra argument through ‘oral’ love songs

It is apropos to take a closer look at the dynamics of the symposion (συμπόσιον = the drinking party after the food) and some aspects of the communal dinner (σύνθειπνον, συσύτιο) in the era of the Peisistratidae where symposiastic poetry was actively patronised with a network of visiting poets. The environment appears to have been conducive for remembered bits of Homer to be reconstructed into the sympotikos logos which used epic, elegiac and lyric in monodic or choral performance. Havelock sees written excerpts from Homer to be particularly fragmentary because they functioned as mnemonic cues ‘to remind a reciter how to start, or for that matter how to stop,’ and the argument so far has maintained that these written excerpts were used as rehearsal prompts for the Peisistratidae Panathenaic recitals. The symposion, however, also would have provided a platform for Homer in two ways. Firstly, it could be sung/recited to the phorminx or beat of a rhabdos by those who were not proficient with citharan heptatonics. Secondly, it could be restructured into

writing a letter where the writing tablet is feminine and pregnant with all her little children, the letters.

207 Comparisons likely originated from lyric similes: e.g. Sappho; To me he seems like a god - φαίνεται μοι θεό [Campbell 31, Greek Lyric 5 vols. (Cambridge, MA, 1982-1993)]; What are you, my lovely bridegroom? / You are most like a slender sapling - τίω σ’, ὄ φίλε γάμβρε, κύλως εἰκάσδω; ὅρπακ πραδιώσει σε μάλιστ’ εἰκάσω. [Lobel and Page, frag. 115 [TLG] and Achilochos; This wheatless island stands like a donkey’s back [trans. Wallis Barnstone, Achilochos 1 = Diehl 18 = Edmonds 21]. Also the sixth century Cleobulina of Rhodes who wrote riddles in hexameters [Athenaeus Deipnosophistae 10. 448b].


210 Havelock, The Literate Revolution in Greece and Its Cultural Consequences, p. 180

211 In the late sixth century it became fashionable to learn the cithara but the degree of difficulty in playing meant it was mostly played by professionals. The simpler lyre could achieve an extension of two octaves by touching the string mid-point. M.L. West ‘The Singing of Homer and the Modes of Early Greek Music’, The Journal of Hellenic Studies, Vol. 101 (1981), pp. 113-129,
maxims for the hexametric line in extempopore lyric, which Thomas suggests was 'usually totally ephemeral and improvised.'\textsuperscript{292} An immediate post-Periander example is the 'moveable' lines of the Attic scoli about the tyrannicides, Harmodius and Aristogeiton 'capable of being combined with one another according to the pleasure of those whose turn it was to start or to cap the song. ... [T]he practice of capping ... makes it probable that new stanzas were constantly added as long as the practice of singing scolia at banquets remained a living tradition.'\textsuperscript{293} Indeed, Xenophanes' speculative statements were in hexameters.\textsuperscript{294} Homer also provided convertible tropes able to be fashioned into the question-answer type monody of \textit{sympotikos logos}; there are close linguistic parallels between epic hexameters and the dactylic metre of elegy and the close overlap in the subject matter of elegy (which is more formal) and iambic poetry.\textsuperscript{295}

One further point: these post-\textit{δειπνός} get-togethers were customary at the public and private level, in tribal, political and religious contexts to all strata. Ritual inculcating sexual norms seems to have permeated rite-of-passage milestones in education and symposiastic participation.\textsuperscript{296} Here young men learned the sexual rules of social engagement. Art featuring the symposiastic environment, however, is carefree, possibly admonitory, in the portrayal of sexual encounter and drinking to excess.\textsuperscript{297} Draco and Solon saw fit to initiate laws to curb sexual

at 123-124.] assigns a rhythmic value to the dactyl and reconstructs the opening of the \textit{Iliad} where he suggests it was first sung to the phorminx which later gave way to simple beats from the \textit{rhabdos}. Cf. West, \textit{Ancient Greek Music}, Oxford, 1992, p. 65; J.G. Landels \textit{Music in Ancient Greece and Rome}, London, 1999, pp. 60-61.

\textsuperscript{290} Thomas, op. cit., p. 106.
\textsuperscript{292} Havelock, \textit{The Literate Revolution in Greece and Its Cultural Consequences}, p. 234.
\textsuperscript{294} For example 1) Beazley 200906, Munich, Antikensammlungen J1168; Red-figure Cup [CAVI date ca. 520] portrays on education scene with a youth with a writing tablets and stylus on one side; on the other, youths with an oinochoe and shyphoi. The tondo features a youth at a column krate with a drinking cup. 2) Beazley 200126, Munich, Antikensammlungen 2421 / f6; Red-figure Hydria, [CAVI date ca. 510-500]; on the front shoulder a reclining youth and half naked female \textit{hetaira} play kottabos; a music lesson with two youths and two men appears on the body.
\textsuperscript{295} A good example is Beazley 205046; Vatican City, Museo Gregoriano Etrusco Vaticano 16561; Athenian Red-figure Cup; Douris Painter, ca. 475; with a frieze of all the types of drinking cups; a symposium scene with reclining men drinking and playing kottabos. On the tondo is a man reclining, vomiting into a basin with an \textit{hetaira} holding his head. Another by Douris is Beazley 4704, Karlsruhe, Badisches Landesmuseum, 70.395; Red-figure Cup B; ca. 475; featuring much the
behaviour;\textsuperscript{289} Plato, uneasy about sexual excess, noted that the present laws forbade only incest, which did not extend beyond parent/child or sibling/sibling. Incest was, nevertheless, a subject for humour.\textsuperscript{290} Pellizer describes the rituals associated with wine consumption and the 'ritual norms intended to regulate the use of alcoholic drink' at the symposion as 'a deliberate, controlled, collective exploration of the universe of passions.'\textsuperscript{290} Alcaeus and Anacreon give a somewhat ambiguous impression: 'Let us empty the dripping cups - urgently;' 'Bring out water and wine and an armful of flowers. I want the proper setting when I spar with a few rounds with love.'\textsuperscript{301} Even those too young to recline entered into the persuasive ritualisation of the symposion: at perhaps his first symposion Autolycus experienced deliberate, controlled 'grooming' by the notoriously uncontrolled Callias in the symposion constructed by Xenophon: Autolycus is under-age and not permitted by custom to recline or, by statute, to see comedic productions until he is able to drink and use a kline (couch).\textsuperscript{302} Callias is fully conscious that his admittance of Philippus, the gatecrashing professional joker, is a risqué move. Between the sometimes metred jokes of Philippus and the dancers of Dionysios, Autolycus certainly got a helping of surreptitious sexual persuasion through titillation.\textsuperscript{303}

The symposion envisaged as a exclusively elite or aristocratic pastime is an approach that does not accord with the evidence which indicates a reasonably widespread practice in Athens. In a region as large as Attica, levels of refinement may be expected, but, as Plato consistently points out, refinement does not

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\textsuperscript{289} Plut. Solon 20-21, 23.

\textsuperscript{289} Pl. Laws 8.839a. Aristoph. 'Wasps' alludes to father/daughter [617] and mother/son liaisons [1178]. Demosthenes' Against Neaira cites his (or the person for whom he wrote the speech) wife as the daughter of his sister.

\textsuperscript{290} Ezio Pellizer, 'Outlines of a Morphology of Sympotic Entertainment', op. cit., p. 179.


\textsuperscript{302} Xen. Symp. 1.8.

\textsuperscript{303} Xen. Symp. 1.11-12 – καὶ ἡμα ἀπέβλεψεν εἰς τὸν Ἀὐτόλυκον, δὴς ὅτι ἐπισκοπῶν τί ἐκείνῳ δόξει τὸ σκώμμα εἶναι; cf. Ar. Politics 7.15.9.
equate to intellectual rigor or a superior knowledge of music and poetry.\textsuperscript{334} That lyric and epic were not available to non-elite citizens ignores i) religious and tribal festivities; ii) the impact of the reforms of Solon and iii) sixth century BC military developments. It is true that 'regionalism and class dynamics' prevailed before the Cleisthenic reforms at the close of the sixth century BC,\textsuperscript{335} but for all the arguments regarding the introduction of class-bonding in army ranks at that time, it is relevant to note that fighting forces using hoplite tactics and panoply operated in the period of the Peisistratidae tyranny well before Cleisthenes' revisions.\textsuperscript{336} Likewise, the Solonic economic reforms shifted debt and therefore capital by a redistribution of agricultural land and brought relative prosperity,\textsuperscript{337} by recalling exiled families (even second or third generation individuals who could not speak Greek) new skills and trade contacts extended ἐμπορία providing markets for olive oil and clayware from the Kerameikon. By instituting measures against luxury and ἀφγία (leisure or non-productivity), output increased and coinage helped circulate sufficiency.\textsuperscript{338} Thucydides claims

\textsuperscript{334} Cf. Chapter VIII.5 in relation to sophistic education.


\textsuperscript{337} Cf. Γὶ μέλαινα, ... ὅρους ἀνέιλου πολλαχῆ πεπωγότας, πρόσθεν δὲ δουλεύουσα, νῦν ἔλευθέρα. – The black earth, ... once pocke with mortgage stones, / which I dug out to free a soil in bondage’ [Edmonds Solon 36 [Loeb] trans. Barnstone.]: the writer interprets the effects of this measure would be tantamount to a land redistribution, however, De Ste. Croix [op. cit., p. 282] does not consider this to be the case.

\textsuperscript{338} Argia did not mean 'laziness' or 'slothfulness' until the second half of the fifth century with Sophocles and Euripides; cf. LS. Cf. Solon [Frag. 4.5, West, Lambi et elegi Graeci, Vol. 2. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1972]: ἀστι ἀπλονται κρήισεις πειθόμενοι, / δήμου θ’ ἵμερόνοις ἀδίκος νόθος, οἴσιν ἐτόμοιο / ὕβριος ἐκ μεγάλης ἀλγείας πολλά παθέν / οὗ γὰρ ἐπίσταται κατέχειν κόρον οὐδὲ παρούσας / ἐφφρούσεις κοσμεῖν δαιμὸν ἐν ἰσχύι: It is the citizens themselves who, in their folly, wish to destroy the
that the prosperity continued under the Peisistratidae. While the introduction of klinai into the dining room mid-seventh century BC certainly indicates an elite familiar with luxury, other strata were also participating in symposia and the majority of symposia were conducted with chairs or benches; ‘reclining was a privilege.'

The events behind the assassination of Hipparchos likewise provide evidence of a broader participation. Thucydides states the assassin, Aristogeiton, was a middle-class Städter (ἀνήρ τῶν ἀστῶν, μέσος πολίτης).

Aristotle says that ‘under torture he accused [as his collaborators] many persons who were members of distinguished families and also supporters of the tyrants.' Aristogeiton and his lover Harmodius were Gephyraei, an old but foreign genos, entitled to some standing but not elite. Thucydides tells us that Hippias had several goes at the seduction of Harmodius whilst Aristotle suggests it was another Peisistratidae brother, Thettalos; either way, these attempts probably occurred at the gymnasion or the symposion. Tyrant and townies, therefore, were socialising in the same circles. It was the same for Landvolk. As unfamiliar with the furniture as were 'the serfs and the voiceless earth-coloured rustics,' the melic dimensions of public and religious symposia with their flute, harp and dancing would have been as customary and widespread as it was, in Socrates and Plato’s time, to their 'inconsequential and citizen-officebearer' descendants [τῶν φαύλων καὶ ἀγοραίων ἀνθρώπων] [Pl. Protagoras 347c-e; app. 8.V.31].

Xenophon indicates that Socrates, along with elite Athenians (both old and new wealth), also enjoyed the rustic delights of flute-players and other traditional forms of sympotic conversation. This involved problem-solving and

great city in yielding to the lure of riches, and likewise the unjust mind of the chiefs of the people, who prepare great evils for themselves by their great excess. They do not know how to restrain their greed or how to order their present happiness in the calm of a feast.


Thuc. 6.54.2.

Ar. Ath Pol. 18.4.


conversation through poetry rather than extemporaneous *dialexis* or discursive conversational prose [Xen. *Syp. 6.3-4*; app. *8.V.32*]. The dynamics of the *symposion* therefore deviates along levels of refinement rather than exclusivity. A final example, even if it is a late fifth century BC one, is Aristophanes' Philocleon who is confident about *symposion* performance procedure and can handle the singing, dancing and argument aspects for which his son is coaching him; only the luxury of the *kliniae* and the clothing is unfamiliar to him. If the audience were to appreciate the joke it would have needed a general understanding of the rules of behaviour at *symposia*.\footnote{Aristoph. *Wasps* 1125-73, 1207-1214.}

In what seems like an unproblematic progression Thomas states that 'in performance Greek orality shifted from poetry to oratory.'\footnote{Thomas, op. cit., p. 108.} In the Peisistratidae era, symposiastic performance and the linguistic material utilised suggest the process from poetry to oratory was far from simple as it advanced through ritualistic metre. To begin with, and despite the emphasis on *xenia* in banquet scenes in Homer, and traditional conversational meet-and-greet niceties,\footnote{Homer *Il.* 0.225-29; *Od.* 4.71-75; parodied in Aristoph. *Wasps* 1214-15. Cf. also farewell ritual *Od.* 13.38-62. Cf. Robb [op. cit., pp. 52-54, 71] where he argues, interestingly, that Thucydides' remark that the eleventh and tenth centuries following the Mycenaean collapse was a time when travel was 'hazardous in the extreme even in their own territory' [1.2] is a revealing indication that in the remote past 'Greece apparently did not know the protection of *xenia*; they had to be fostered. This may explain the extraordinary emphasis on instruction in *xenia* in Homer, and especially in the *Odyssey*.} the *symposion* was a competitive environment; the songs were agonistic, ritualistic in subject matter and in performance, and definitely aimed at winning [Dionysius Chalcus Frag. 1; app. *8.V.33*]. Along with wine drinking rituals, performance at the archaic *symposion* also entailed considerable ritualism and role playing in the *sympotic logos*. An example is the first-person complexion of most sympotic poetry that 'might be sung with equal relevance by any of the poet's companions.'\footnote{Bowie, 'Early Greek Elegy, Symposium and Public Festival', pp. 14-15. His example is Archilochos Frag. 1 [West], 'I am the servant of lord Enyalios and skilled in the lovely gift of the Muses.'} There are also examples of the performer taking on a female role.\footnote{Bowie, op. cit., p. 17. His examples, Theognis 257-260; Alcaeus Frag. 10B [David A. Campbell, *Sappho*, *Alcaeus*, Vol. 1, of Greek Lyric, Cambridge, MA., 1982]; Anacreon Frag. 385 [Greek Lyric, Vol. 2 (1982)].} Nagy remarks that 'you do not have to have the blues to sing the blues'; the same applies to the sympotic singer who did not need to lose his shield in
battle in order to sing about it. The symposion was a place heavy with ritualistic symbolism:

[M]imesis was ritual reenactment, and I stress that this word ritual is an apt designation of such institutionalized occasions as the symposium in archaic Greece. In a symposium, when one performs for the hetairaia a role that serves as a self-expression of the hetairaia—a role that reinforces the very identity of the hetairaia—then one is performing in a ritual context.\textsuperscript{323}

Sappho certainly shifts the personae in some works to Aphrodite, or to a male, to virginity personified and, in an extended quotation, the words of a third person until the last two lines which become first-person.\textsuperscript{324} Along with role-playing, the performance could entail a general gnomic comment which 'moves from reflection to advice', as in the case of Theognis and his advice to Cyrnus.\textsuperscript{325} Likewise sympathy for bereavement as in Archilochos' address to Pericles;\textsuperscript{326} Personal praise of individuals present at the symposion, or general encomia or epinicia also featured as part of the entertainment performed by symposiasts.\textsuperscript{327}

Gnomic and didactic works 'reflect on the nature of good and bad conduct and good and bad men'\textsuperscript{328} and Homer provided inspiration. One example is Callinos of Ephesus (ca.650 BC) whose call to arms against Cimmerian invaders evokes a scenario reminiscent of Phoenix's description in the Iliad's embassy scene of heroisms due of honour from the township of one's birth and of Achilles' lamentable reply.\textsuperscript{329} Noting that the large volume of anonymous pieces where advice given is often a combination of the poet's own words combined with maxims from 'the Seven Wise Men,' Pellizer cites especially Alcaeus and Anacreon who combine their own words with maxims.\textsuperscript{330} Semonides is another

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{324} Aphrodite: Edmonds 75; Diehl 110; Lobel and Page 159. Masculine persona: Edmonds 155, 156, 158; Diehl 128; Lobel and Page 112, 116. Virginity: Edmonds 164; Diehl 131; Lobel and Page 114. Multiple personas: Edmonds 82; Diehl 95; Lobel and Page 92. This is not to say that Sappho's works were initially sympotic rather than, for e.g., choral performances at weddings.
\item \textsuperscript{325} Bowie, 'Greek Table-Talk before Plato', p. 360.
\item \textsuperscript{326} Edmonds 9, 13; Diehl 7; West 12.
\item \textsuperscript{327} Personal praise: e.g. Pl. Symposion 215a4-222b7. Cf. Chapter V.3.4 for a discussion on Pindar and Chapter VII.2 for one on Gorgias.
\item \textsuperscript{328} Bowie, op. cit., p. 360.
\item \textsuperscript{329} Edmonds 1; Diehl 1; West 1. Cf. Il.9.433-605/607-619; V.3.1(a) above.
\item \textsuperscript{330} Pellizer 'Outlines of a Morphology of Sympotic Entertainment', op. cit., p. 180; cf. E. Pellizer and G. Tedeschi, 'Sei carmi conviviali attribuiti ai Sette Sapienti', pp. 6-23; Gentili, Anacreonte
poet who quotes 'the blind poet of Chios,' while Hipponax parodies Homer and Xenophanes criticises him on the usual religious grounds. Monodic works are 'never an utterly private comming of the poet with himself.' In this sense the didactic nature of much logos sympotikos (such as Theognis and Hesiod) is a ritualistic declaration of collective gnômai, while the persuasion inherent in erotic love songs reveals emergent concepts associated with pro and contra probabilistic deliberation. For example, within the psychological 'antithesis of 'bitter' and 'sweet,' of pleasure satisfied and pleasure denied', concepts of justice arise in the way the lover is 'defined in such terms as pitis/apistis, or even dike/adikia.' Pellizer stresses the prevalence of vocatives and the complex arrangement of pronouns in symposiastic lyric. This too highlights the persuasive aspect of symposiastic lyric. Likewise the optatives which tend to create hypothetical scenarios, even in erotic poetry; for example Simonides creates 'an erotic adventure' which becomes a 'form of fantasy rather than recollection.' His optatives effectively create a hypothetical pitis to persuade Echecratidas to love him. With Kypros and the soft-eyed Peitho [se μεν Κύπρις ἀ τ' ἀγανοβλέφαρος Πειθώ], amorists as well as belligerents sang the pros and cons of their logos:

οὐ φιλέω, ὡς κρητήρι παρά πλέω οἰνοποτάζων
νείκα καὶ πόλεμοι δακρύσειται λέγει,
ἀλλ᾽ ὀστίς Μουσέως τε καὶ ἀγάλα δῶρ᾽ Ἀφροδίτης
συμμίσσον ηράτης μνήσκεται εὐφροσύνης. [Anakreon Frag. 1, M.L. West]

I do not like the guy beside the brimming krater,
Drinking and ranting tearfully about war.
Rather give me the man who, with music and seduction,
mixes love and laughter. [trans. Leiper]

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333 Edmonds Sim. 97; Diel 29.
332 Diehl 77; West 128-29.
333 Edmonds 119; Diehl 92.
335 Pellizer, 'Outlines of a Morphology of Symptotic Entertainment', p. 180. An example comes from Theognis [Elegies 1353-56]: Μίκρος καὶ γλυκὸς ἐστὶ καὶ ἀρσάλεως καὶ ἀπηνόης, ὅφρα τέλειος ἐί, Κύρτη, νεόσιοι ἔρως. ἡ γὰρ τῆς τέλεια, γλυκὰ γίνεται: ἢν δὲ διϊκώς μὴ τέλεια, παντῶν τοῦ ἀνιμηστῶν. [Bitter and sweet and smooth and rough is love / For the young man, Kurnos, till it's satisfied. / When satisfied, it's sweet. If you pursue / But don't get what you want, it's miserable. - trans. Wender]
336 Bowie, 'Greek Table-Talk before Plato' p. 363; cf. Simonides West 22; Pap. Oxyrhynchus 2327 + 3965 fr. 27.
338 A literal translation would read: I do not like the guy who, while drinking his wine beside the full krater, speaks about teary quarrels and war, but I do like the man who, coupling the splendid gifts of the Muses and Aphrodite, reminds (me) of lovely merriment.
On the question of whether there was discursive spoken prose prior to the αὐτούς αὐτοῖς ἱκανούς ὄντας συνείναι ἀνευ τῶν λήρων (those contenting themselves with their own conversation) of Plato’s symposion in Protagoras [cited above in app. 8.V.31], Bowie suggests that from sympotic poetry ‘prose exchanges may cautiously be inferred.’ As evidence he cites a fragment from the Elegiaca Adespota:

χρή δ’, ὅταν εἰς τοιοῦτο συνέλθωμεν φίλοι ἄνδρες
πράγμα, γελᾶν παιζεῖν χρησιμένους ἀρετῆς,
ήδεθαι τε συνόντας, ἐς αλλήλους τε φλυαρεῖν [5]
καὶ σκόπτειν τοιαῦτ’ οία γέλωτα φέρειν.
ἡ δὲ σπουδὴ ἐπιθήκο, ὁκουμεῖν τε λεγοῦντων
ἐν μέρει; ἡδ’ ἀρετή συμποσίου πέλεται.
[Elegiaca Adespota (IEG), Fragmenta. [0234.001] TLG]

When we gather, friends that we are, for an occasion like this
we should laugh and joke, doing our very best
and take pleasure in each other’s company;
we should chatter to each other,
and make fun of people in the way that arouses laughter.
Let serious matters follow, and let us listen to people speaking in turn.
This is the best thing about a symposium. [trans. Bowie]

Line 7, ἀκουῶμεν τε λεγόντων, prompts the image of a Platonic-style discourse, while in line 5, φλυαρεῖν generally means 'to talk nonsense' or 'to play the fool' (LSJ). Elsewhere Bowie translates Theognis [763] as, πίνωμεν χαρίζεντα μετ’ αλλήλοιοι λέγοντες as, 'let us drink, talking entertainingly to each other.' In this period λέγοντες generally meant 'recite' [LSJ]. Herodotus describes a series of symposia held by Cleisthenes of Sicyon at which 'was a contest of musical and conversational (λέγοντες) skill' [οἱ μυστηρέοι ἔριν εἰχον ὁμφι τε μουσική καὶ τοῦ λεγομένω ἐς τοῦ μέσου]. To this Bowie comments that conversation was less important than dancing because 'it was in displaying his virtuosity in dancing that Hippocleides lost his poll position.' However, he also suggests that Odysseus may have told his story 'simply by talking' in prose. But of course Odysseus did not; he told them in hexameters - between Odyssey 7.209-347 and 9.1-11.335 - while his audience sat mesmerised:

οἱ δ’ ἄρα πάντες ἀκίν ἐγένοντο σιωπῆ, κηληθμόν δ’ ἔσχοντο
Everybody at this point was silent held in thrall. [trans. Leiper]

341 Bowie, op. cit., p. 357.
The later highly sophisticated examples of Plato and Xenophon’s accounts of the symposion both have philosophical agendas and, in themselves, are pro and contra discursive works. Nevertheless, they intimate that the balance between lucidity and alcohol-induced vagary, even vulgarity, was still an issue in the fourth century BC. Xenophon, however, implies that most of the time symposiasts had the decorum to leave the andron before they succumbed to the titillation of the symposiastic lap dancers.\(^3\) By Plutarch’s time ritualised alcoholism may have been marginally reduced, but not the ritualistic effect of lyric:

\[
\text{ότε καὶ Σαπφώς ἀν ἀδομένης καὶ Ἄνακρέοντος ἐγὼ μοι δοκῶ καταθέσαι τὸ ποτήριον αἰδοίμενος, [Plutarch Symotic Questions 711d].}
\]

When Sappho is being sung or Anacreon, I want to put down the drinking cup, in thrall. [trans. Leiper].

In relation to the pedagogical value of symposia Robb’s view is that ‘the progress of literacy’ began to diminish its value and ‘render it culturally more marginal and eventually trivial.’\(^3\) The appendix cataloguing pederastic/erotic art on clayware in Lear and Cantarella shows that this subject did not in fact drop off in the 470s, as Cantarella and others had previously maintained, but continued into the fourth century BC.\(^4\) What is interesting is that the incidence of cups and scyphi declined during the fifth century BC and pederastic erotica was mostly seen on symposion accoutrement (amphora, etc.). This decline does seem the obverse to a rise in literacy. Also perhaps related to the growing skills of deliberative logos sympotikos: eye cups seem to cluster around the period of the growth in lyric, just as hunt courtship scenes decline. While writing remained peripheral to thinking, the symposion was an important venue for paideia. Youths harmonised in choral encomia; \(ϕόρμιγγες οὐπωρόφιαι κοινωνίαν ιμαλθακῶν παίδων οὕροισι δέκονται \) (the lyre in partnership with soft-voiced boys) [Pindar Pythian 1.97] and learned the arguments of the poets:

\[
\text{κεῖται πὲρ κεφάλας μέγας, ὃ Αἰσιμίδα, λίθος}
\]

\[
\text{Lie down now, Aysimedes, you great big blockhead.}
\]

\[
\text{οἶνος, ὃ φίλε παῖ, καὶ ὀλάθεα}
\]

\[
\text{Wine, my beloved boy, and truth.}
\]

[Alcaeus Frags. 365-66, Page & Lobel; trans. Leiper]

\(^3\) Cf. Xen. Symp. 9.1-7; Pl. Laws 627a, 644c, 645d, 649a-b,e.

\(^4\) Robb, op. cit., p. 48; he does not, however, mean the Archaic or Classical periods.

As pro and contra probabilistic argument had its genesis in elegiac, lyric and hexametric metre so it is probable that, along with the hit parade of visiting elegists, remembered tracts of Homer increasingly featured in comparative thought as the Peisistratidae tyranny progressed. Lasos of Hermione for example enjoyed the symposia of the Peisistratidae and earned a literary term for himself: 'Lasisms' were 'entangled arguments.'

V.5 CONCLUSION
This chapter examined the scholarly controversies that bring into question i) how and when the Homeric canon was textualised in Athens and ii) the types of argument found in Homer. Its aim, coupled with Chapter IV, was to research the textualisation and Athens' use of Homer during the Peisistratidae tyranny and to develop a framework for the psychology of the beginning of the fifth century BC.

The position argued was that, in the sixth century BC, Athens had no need of lengthy poetic texts because rhapsodes did not recite from text, but recreated or 'instantiated' epic poetry. For this reason poets had no need of literacy. Nor do the psychological clues point to a citizenry who had any use for lengthy texts as ready references. Of the physical evidence we have, the writing was brief, often with ritualistic undertones. Undoubtedly the psychology of the period involved much ritual and a significant role for writing and symbolic images was to trigger memory traces, especially of poetry and song.

Archaeology and the inscriptive evidence does not bear out the hypothesis that Athenians could readily produce, or read, lengthy poetry or prose texts. The literary tradition that Draco and Solon monumentalised their laws provides the only evidence that lengthy texts could be produced in Athens at all. Draco's supposed three thousand word long textualisation was written in the quarter century before the sixth century BC and Solon's some thirty years later. Modern debate on the laws often revolves around public monumentalisation and a reading public. Writing that is not meant to be read seems a nonsensical proposition, but in this period any representation of the laws would have been

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346 Cf. Chapters III.2.2, IV.2.4.
more as a symbol of authority than a text meant to be read by the populace. Because in that period there was not a concept of accumulated 'law codes',\textsuperscript{347} it is more probable that shorter tracts were exhibited, as the tradition states, on manually manageable wooden boards (\textit{axones} or \textit{kyrbeis}).\textsuperscript{348} Logically, if Draco's laws \textit{could} be textualised then the Homeric canon could also, despite it being over forty times longer; twenty-eight thousand lines of verse compared to three thousand words. This chapter concluded that a scribe could theoretically accomplish writing twenty-eight thousand lines of verse only through the process of dictation; physically, if a scribe can take dictation for one hour, then he can, with breaks, take dictation for as long as it takes.

However, as section IV.2.4 in the previous chapter and returned to in V.2.2 suggested, the problem lies in the reading of long tracts of text, for scribes as well as the general public. The argument in Chapter III.3 from a cognitive point of view supports the view that reading at this time was essentially a phonetic process that transformed individual letters of the alphabet into the sounds of words; that is, whole word recognition was not an efficient process. Therefore, the practicality of accurately copying from one manuscript to another would be unreliable compared with dictation.

In other words, in Athens long texts could be accomplished through dictation but neither poets nor public had need to read them. The historical evidence indicates the textualisation of both laws and poems was through political will, but the reasons for writing down prose laws was not the same as for writing down Homer. Draco and Solon’s laws were meant to be marvelled at; Peisistratus meant poets to bend to an authorised version, even though that cannot mean that it was 'word perfect'.\textsuperscript{349} Perhaps they imported a text made by the Homeridae - they certainly had access to the literacy of Ionia. Whichever


\textsuperscript{348} There is debate as to exactly what \textit{axones} were: Gagarin [\textit{Writing Greek Law}, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 99] suggests they were revolving wooden stands. Sickinger [\textit{Public Records and Archives in Classical Athens}, pp. 17-18] suggests they could accommodate approximately 400 words (2,250 letters).

\textsuperscript{349} Robb [op. cit., p. 48] notes the motivation for textualising Homer would not have been to attain 'authenticity' because Hellenic literary art had no such conceptual limitations before the fourth century BC. Davison ['Literature and Literacy in Ancient Greece: II. Caging the Muses', p. 224] adds that, of the earliest surviving Ptolemaic texts, no two fragments tally exactly with any concept of a 'vulgate'.
way, there is every political and cultural reason why the first text in Athens should be posited to the Peisistratidae tyranny.

'Instantiated' texts, whether Chian or Athenian, would not have been identical and therefore can account for diverse copies of the Homeric canon throughout Greece. For this reason it is not possible to determine with any certainty whether an eighth century BC Homer devised any of the speeches precisely as we have them. What is more probable, accepting Bakker's analysis of 'instantiation', is that they evolved with each generation of rhapsode in order to accommodate the collective psychodynamics of the society in which the rhapsode and his audience interacted. Therefore, at the Panathenaea the Iliad was no mere 'passive reflection'.

This chapter also discussed the nature of deliberation in Homer compared to other archaic literature. The reason was to establish what modes of problem-solving operated in Athens before the introduction of sophistic education which taught probabilistic and abstract argument. It found that, while many sophistic elements of problem-solving are embryonic in Homer, they function with a contextualised collectivist narrative form of thinking. This embodied a deference to authority that sublimated individual opinion and controlled behaviour with ritual and ritualised language. Internal analysis provides a map of the paradigms of thinking manifest in the Homeric canon. The examination in V.2 of the rhetorical elements inherent in Homer therefore provides a benchmark psychology for Athenians prior to sophistic influence. Firstly, the methods of problem-solving and the sumbouleutikon constructed in Homer are high in imagery and emotion - all benchmarks of concrete 'narrative thinking' which, in the Homeric context, has been identified by some classicists as 'archaic'. In reality it is an everyday mode of problem-solving still practised worldwide. What the argument in the cannon does not reflect is argument constructed with the aid of literacy.

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350 Morris, 'The Use and Abuse of Homer,' p. 83.
The examples of different styles of *pro* and *contra* oratory that can be found in Homer cover many aspects of contextualised 'narrative thinking' whereby the world was perceived in the concrete and lifelike, different to the world of later phenomenologists who 'invented' the concepts of abstract potentiality in nature. It is also suggested that Pellizer's hypothesis that sophistic probabilistic *pro* and *contra* persuasion had roots in the love songs of the *symposion* is reasonable. Such songs were arguing the potential benefits for the potential lover of a liaison with the singer.

It was argued that persuasion in hexameters can be as deliberative and manipulative as the prose writing of the Sophists. One example is Nestor's speech to Patroclus in *Iliad* 11.656ff. As the episode is a plot driver, a speech probably always would have occurred there, but its extraordinary structure strongly indicates a breakway from 'narrative thinking' and conceptually argues probabilities; this complexity of the extant speech upholds the 'evolutionary' hypothesis of the canon's textualisation. Likewise the overall structure of the embassy of *Iliad* 9 which shows a *rhapsode* cognisant of how persuasive alternative arguments work. The embassy of *Iliad* 9 is 'sophisticated', exhibiting different 'rhetorical' forms of argument within its own over-arching narrative argument. The mentality of the *rhapsode* who dictated the poem to the scribe of the sixth century BC shows an individual aware of many of the varieties of persuasion that would eventually be identified and categorised by Aristotle.

Taken together, Chapters IV and V indicate that the most likely period of a textualisation was indeed during the Peisistratidae tyranny when the population at large were conscious of writing as a system for representing the sounds of speech.
CHAPTER VI
PROTAGORAS, GORGIAS, ET ALII AND THE DEVELOPMENT
OF PRO AND CONTRA ΣΥΜΒΟΥΛΕΥΤΙΚΟΝ

Pure thought is entertaining some content without either asserting or denying it.


VI.1 ABSTRACT
In this chapter the following hypotheses are argued:
1. The Sophists developed formalised public debate in a new way.
2. They did develop conscious forensic argument and abstract pro and contra persuasion.
3. The Sophists were serious teachers with a bona fide curriculum.
4. Continuous prose writing is necessary for extended forensic abstract argument.
5. Written prose extended the cognitive capacity of individuals in a different way to ordinary oral discussion.

Chapters IV and V have shown that, while deliberative argument and speech-making had always been a part of Greek culture, the features of pre-literate, archaic persuasion were demonstrative rather than abstract. Persuasion entailed concrete formulaic reasoning with ‘traditional’ wisdom rather than abstract extended pro and contra constructs. The previous chapter suggested that the forms of argument that can be detected in the Iliad and the Odyssey were not necessarily inherent to the eighth century BC. This is because the process of rhapsodic recitation involves subtle variations over time as a result of the necessity for the content of each epic to be relevant and understood by contemporary audiences. From an historical perspective, the textualisation of Homer in Athens, which occurred under the Peisistratidae tyranny, not only reflects remnants of its eighth century origin, but fixes the state of deliberative argument at the time of the tyranny.

The institution of the Athenian democracy followed the Peisistratidae tyranny at the close of the sixth century BC. This introduced a significant cultural change in that its broad participatory nature required collective civic decision-making, which in turn required the individual citizen to make abstract political assessments of risk vs benefit. This necessitated a method of persuasion other than the traditional exercise of authoritative or coercive power. Thus, the new political climate created a market for a new style of education. This involved techniques for abstract pro and contra thinking and persuasion. Protagoras and the other Sophists formalised extended debate using these methods of argument.

In accordance with the research of Roy Harris, David Rubin, Rosalind Thomas, Thomas Cole and others, such formal abstract arguments could not be accomplished without extended prose writing to sustain Dennett’s type of ‘serial reasoning’ that is inherent to such argument construction. Aristotle’s theoretical observations on language and its use in Poetics, Rhetoric, On Sophistical Refutations and Topics provide the evidence that the sophist teachers were presenting revolutionary new ways of persuasion and problem-solving. Likewise the extant writings of Athenian sophist students such as Antiphon, Alcidamas and Isocrates prove - by their very existence, as well as by their candid observations on social behaviour - that the Sophists had developed and taught innovative techniques for constructing extended written prose arguments.

While Chapter III demonstrated that a majority of Athenian male citizens during the fifth century BC were taught to read and write and attained a functional literacy within the context of Athenian society, this chapter deals with the minority who were taught new methods of argumentation developed by the Sophists. Section VI.2 deals with sophistic curricula and teaching techniques and their psychological effects. A common feature appears to be that curricula involved some form of prose literacy. It is suggested that, in consequence, a significant cognitive change was effected by sophistic education, even at the lowest level. It taught students to construct complex sentences in prose (καταλογόδην συγγραφεῖν), a skill that further
developed the 'VWFA' (visual word form area), the writing centre and the 'interpreter mechanism' in the left hemisphere of the brain.

It is suggested that the technique of using written rhythmic gnōmai and 'poetical' prose was devised by Sophists such as Gorgias in order that speeches could be learned by heart. As elementary literacy education was grounded in poetry and most procedural social knowledge was gained through the hexameters of epic and the lyric metres of tragedy, much implicit knowledge was in metre, a function of the right hemisphere. In educational terms, this 'poetical prose' curricula was a natural combination of techniques.

In V.2 the argument is structured under the following headings:

1) The development of formalised sophistic thought and practices for extended forensic debate

2) Tradition and the sophistic curriculum which discusses the ethics and political dimension of the Sophists

3) Public opinion and the reception of sophistic thinking - traces the growth of public understanding of sophistic arguments

4) The historical evidence that they taught extended written prose argument - according to the observations of Aristotle, and by the extant writings of sophistic students themselves, the Sophists developed techniques for teaching extended prose writing.

5) The significance of extended prose writing for the construction of abstract pro and contra argument - considers the evidence that extended prose writing is a specific product of 'serial reasoning' in the construction of deliberative argument.

VI.2 SOPHISTIC ΣΥΜΒΟΥΛΕΥΤΙΚΟΝ

1) The development of formalised sophistic thought and practices for extended forensic debate

Three respected giants of sophistic education, Protagoras, Prodicus and Gorgias developed curricula for teaching discursive pro and contra or extended forensic argument and formalised a style of delivery eventually called 'rhetoric'; that is they taught a method of problem-solving and a medium for articulating those thoughts. The scarcity of material from Prodicus makes assessment of his curricula cursory.1 However, the fragments of Protagoras and Gorgias deal with the empirical and abstract speculation of the time and so allow an assessment of their influence on education and decision-making. Their ideas influenced sophistic teachers in Athens whose pupils have left texts of varying degrees of competence in the skill of forensic argument. What follows in this chapter and

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1 In Laches [197d] Plato says that he was the cleverest of the Sophists (τῶν σοφιστῶν κάλλιστον) at distinguishing between words. In Theaetetus [151b] Prodicus counted among the wise and divinely inspired (σοφοίς τι καὶ θεοποιοῖς). In Protagoras [315e] he is all-wise (πάσοφος) and [340e] with wisdom gifted long ago from heaven (σοφία θεία ἀρξαμένη παλαιοτέρα). Cf. Aristophanes Birds 692, Clouds 362; Xenophon Symp. 1.5. However, in Meno [96d] Socrates accuses both Prodicus and Gorgias of being faulty teachers (οὐχ ἰκανῶς πεπαιδευκέναι).
the next looks at their surviving words, at their educational ethics, their critics and how they modified evolving methods of problem-solving.

Protagoras consolidated contemporary doctrines and formulated a theory of problem-solving. From the fragments it is clear Protagoras considered that i) all knowledge is knowable but relative to each individual, therefore, (ii) there are two sides to every story. Plato and Aristotle both confirm that this was the stand taken by Protagoras [Pl. *Theaet.* 151e-152b; *Cratylus* 385e-386a; Ar. *Metaphysics* 1007b.18-23 app. 8.VI.1]. Timon (a lampoonist), and Artemidorus (the dialectician), are also cited as confirming Protagoras as the innovator of probabilistic pro and contra argument. Diogenes Laertius (overlooking Protagoras' contemporary, Gorgias) even goes so far as to credit him with practically every innovation relating to public speaking up to and past his period: he was first to consciously delineate the structures and force of language, to train students in eristic moots (deixis or logon agon), to develop elenchus through dialectic, to manipulate metaphor to prevaricate, to categorise progression in argument [Diog. Laert. 9.52-53, app. 8.VI.2]. Protagoras was concerned with developing techniques around semantic (σημαντικός) ascent by which abstract concepts of truth may be thought about. Even though Plato criticised his teaching methods and his acceptance of fees, Protagoras’ work was obviously groundbreaking because Plato acknowledged him as one of the most respected thinkers of the time. In *Theaetetus*, Plato refined his own epistemology through the refutation of Protagoras’ established theories [Pl. *Theaet.* 161d-e, app. 8.VI.3].

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2 Diogenes Laertius 9.51; Frag. DK80.B.1: Sext. Adv. math. 7.60: πάντων χρημάτων μέτρου ἵστιν ἄνθρωπος, τῶν μὲν ὄντων ὡς ἵστιν, τῶν δὲ οὐκ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἵστιν. [Man is the measure of all things, of things that are that they are, and of things that are not that they are not]. Καὶ πρῶτος ἐφ’ ὁ δύο λόγους εἶναι περὶ πάντως πράγματος ἀντικειμένους ἀλλήλων: [He was the first to say there are two logoi about every matter in opposition to each other.]

Protagoras' great contribution to ancient education was to formally recognise that 'right' answers can change over time: that if 'reality was in motion' (τὴν φερομένην ταύτην οὐσίαν) and everything, including humans, are changeable (in a 'state of flux'), then humans have the capacity to prudently change their minds. In the *Theaetetus* Plato attributes this position to Protagoras, Heraclitus and Empedocles and playfully gets Theaetetus to renego on his original stance, and logically change his mind to agree with Socrates that human perceptions are liable to change [*Theae*. 152e, 154a, 179c-d, app. 8.VI.4]. Scholars continually debate over Protagoras' relativism, but regardless of its nature, it shows that he consciously recognised the intellectual potential of relative truth to solve human problems. Plato experiments with the concept when, like Protagoras, Theaetetus rejects the concept of absolutes: the wind is neither warm nor chill but relative to those who feel it; the individual who thinks it cold is no more wrong than the one who finds it warm. It was an innovative and potentially disruptive idea in a democratic society that relied heavily on traditional concrete procedural knowledge. At the heart of Plato's theory of education is a rejection of the Protagorean hypothesis that decision-making is relative to circumstance; it was counter to the static politics of his ideal city. Nevertheless, Protagoras remained a major contributor to the formalisation of propositional analysis as a method for problem-solving: Ptolemaic Egypt placed him alongside Plato, Heraclitus and Thales.

Gorgias also had a great influence on sophistic education in Athens in his development of writing styles. His surviving texts show an intricate use of language that is almost poetry. Indeed Bakker questions whether Gorgias should

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4 *Pl. Theaetetus* 179c.
5 For instance as to whether it is Subjectivist or Objectivist. Cf. Waterfield ['Essay', *Plato: Theaetetus*, p. 189]: What sort of relativism is it? Plato's illustration of the wind (152b) ... is ambiguous ... capable of three relativistic interpretations: (1) 'subjectivist' ... (2) 'objectivist'. The third option comes from Gregory Vlastos [*Introduction to Plato's Protagoras*, New York, Liberal Arts Press, 1956, pp. xxxviii-xl] with his view that Protagoras' relativism is entirely subjectivist because he denies 'wind' exists in reality.

6 G.B. Kerferd [*The Sophistic Movement*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 43-44] states: In the years 1851-54 some eleven statues in a half-circle of wall facing the end of the so-called Sphinx alley leading to the Serapeum at Memphis in Egypt were uncovered in excavations conducted by Mariette. They were left in situ and were covered again by drifting sand. They were rediscovered in 1938 but work was suspended during the Second World War. They were eventually uncovered once again in 1950 and then published in full; cf: J.-Ph. Lauer and Ch. Picard, *Les statues ptolémaïques du Sarapieion de Memphis*, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1955. See also, K. Schefold, 'Die Dichter und Weisen in Serapieion', *Museum Helveticum*, Vol. 14 (1957), pp. 33-38.
be classified as a writer of what we today call, prose. The next chapter deals more thoroughly with the techniques developed by Gorgias. For the present, the etymology of the term, ‘rhetoric’, is discussed below as well as the controversies accompanying the concept.

As the previous chapters show, the techniques to arrive at viable propositions were cultural, evolutionary processes, a point first articulated by Aristotle [De Sophisticis Elenchis 34.183b, 184b, app. 8.VI.5]. An agonal style of problem-solving was prevalent in archaic Greek culture generally. That is, an almost ritualised capitulation to the force of authority and/or strength rather than any abstract concepts, such as that of ‘justice’ or possibility. The decision-making part of the process was being able to accept the opponent’s point of view or to oppose it through force. Sophists and Presocratics such as Parmenides, Melissus, Zeno, Heraclitus and Gorgias shifted the perspective to recognise the existence of a potentially viable oppositional point of view and formalised the recognition of forensic antithetical argument.

Initially Aristotle’s emphasis was on language-use, rather than types of argument construction, that would constitute forms of ‘rhetoric’. In one work he states that the Eleatic poet Empedocles was the originator of rhetorical technique. Elsewhere he identified Zeno of Elea as the first to develop dialectic and the Syracusians, Corax and Tisias, also as the forerunners of rhetoric. Both of these Syracusians were also credited with works outlining practical

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10 Sext. Empiricus Ag. the Logicians 1.6-7: ἐμπεδοκλέα μὲν γὰρ Ἀριστοτέλης ἠθὶ πρῶτον ῥητορικὴν κεκυηκέναι, ἵς ἄντιστροφὸν εἶναι τὴν διαλεκτικὴν, τοιουτὸν ἰσοτροφόν, διὰ τὸ περὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ὑπὸν στρεφοῦσα, ὡς καὶ ἀντιθέου ὁ ποιητὴς ἐφ᾽ ὧν Ὅδυσσεα, ὥπερ ἦν ἰσοθέου: [Thus Aristotle says that ‘Empedocles first cultivated the art of rhetoric, to which dialectic is antistrophic (or corresponding), that is to say is isostrophic (or equivalent), inasmuch as it is strophic of (concerned with) the same subject - just as the Poet called Odysseus antitheos (god-like) which means isoteos (god-equal). (trans. Bury)]. Cf. Diog. Laert. [8.57, 58] who cites Aristotle’s lost work, The Sophist, as evidence that Empedocles was the inventor of rhetoric and one of the best rhetors. (Empedocles was the so-called student of Parmenides; both poets.)
techniques to develop argument, with Corax treating probability as the basis for argument (*eikotologia*). In this regard Gagarin credits Tisias and Corax, not with the origin of probability arguments, but with the 'reverse probability argument'. In tracking the development of *eikotologia* he cites the earliest extant example as being in the ca.500-450BC Homeric *Hymn to Hermes*. He notes that Herodotus frequently employed *eikotologia*, although overlooks the probabilistic forensic texts of his contemporary, Antiphon. The earliest extant probability argument to appear in tragedy is likely to be Pasiphaë's speech in Euripides' *The Cretans*, dated ca. 435BC, the period when sophistic teaching was gaining popularity in Athens. This coincides with the references cited below that examine the Athenian public's conceptualisation and understanding of sophistic argument when they heard it.

The ancient sources also suggest the exchange of ideas was spread throughout Greece, transcending geography and without modern demarcations such as 'sophistry' or 'philosophy' or 'phenomenology'. For example, Thrasymachus, in Athens ca 427BC, was said to have examined oratorical theory producing *The Great Textbook*; *Eleoi* (*eleoi* - pathos, mercy, to sway juries) and other works on persuasion. As well as ideas on atomic theory, Democritus likewise dealt with the oral presentation of ideas; *On Euphonious and Cacophonous Writing, On Delivering Words, A Vocabulary*. Gorgias, said to be the pupil of Tisias and Empedocles, contributed to rhetoric's evolution with essentially the same

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13 Plato [*Phaedrus* 273b-c] maintained their technique concealed or replaced unhelpful facts with plausibility (*πιθανον*).
14 The argument in the *Hymn* is that, because Hermes was a baby, he could not be a cattle thief [*265: οὐδὲ ... ἵοικα*] and therefore could not have stolen Apollo's cattle. Cf. Michael Gagarin ['Probability and Persuasion: Plato and Early Greek Rhetoric', pp. 51, 66, fn.11]. Regarding the dating of the *Hymn*, cf. R. Janko, *Homer, Hesiod and the Hymns*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1982, pp. 140-3. Cf. Aristotle *Rhetoric* 1402a17-28; Hdt. 3.38.2. Regarding Euripides' *Cretans*, Gagarin [op. cit., p. 66, fn.13] states that 'there are of course, many probability arguments in tragedy where the word *eikos* is not used, such as Creon's famous defence in *Oedipus the King* 583 ff'. Cf. George H. Goebel, *Early Greek Rhetorical Theory and Practice: Proof and Arrangement in the Speeches of Antiphon and Euripides*, Ph.D dissertation, Madison, 1983, pp.290-301.
15 *DK.85 B.3* [Schol. Aristoph. *Birds* 880]. The titles given to such works in antiquity were not necessarily given by the authors themselves.
17 *DK.85 A.1* [*Suda*].
18 Diog. Laert. 9.40, 48.
outcome in mind, a theory on the use of language. Likewise, Protagoras, who grew up in the same city as Democritus and was said to be his student. His extant works were influenced by Democritus' methods of argument.

Modern scholarship is divided as to how 'rhetoric' should be identified before Plato. Gagarin suggests that, while Plato misrepresented early rhetoric, he did not deny its actual existence. As noted in V.11.3, Cole calls 'rhetoric' pre-Plato 'arhetorical', even though he still sees it as the conscious manipulation of ideas via spoken language. In this vein Schiappa sees the Sophists as a valuable counterbalance to the influence of Plato and Aristotle, but warns, 'the notion of a monolithic 'sophistic rhetoric' in ancient Greece is problematic as history'. Rather, the emphasis should be on the individual educators who devised modes of forensic argument. In the historical context, 'rhetoric' and 'dialectic' as genres were not defined or categorised in the fifth century BC: ὁ ῥητορικός (he who is oratorical) and ῥητορεία (oratory/rhetoric) were coined by Plato. But, contemporaries Alcidamas and Isocrates (significantly both pupils of Gorgias) used ῥητορικός and Isocrates also used ῥητορεία. The rarity of appearance of these words constitutes the novelty. In Isocrates λόγος and ἔγειν dominate, but he prefers to describe his teaching as λόγων παιδεία, and defined his own education as φιλοσοφία. Sophistic education concentrated on the λόγος as a mode of thinking that coupled with an understanding of the psychological force of language as a medium for persuasion.

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20 Suda [Hippokrates] suggests Democritus was also Gorgias' teacher or at least he was a follower of some of Democritus' hypotheses.
25 ῥητορεία (oratory/rhetoric) appears in Isocrates Against the Sophists 21 (around 392BC); To Philip 26 (also ῥητορεύεθαι in 25); Panathenaiics 2. He uses ῥητορικός in Cyprian / Nicoles 8; Antidosis 256. Plato uses ῥητορεία only once in Statesman 304a.1; τῆς ῥητορικῆς he uses in Statesman 304c; Gorgias 449a; Phaedrus 266c-d, Phaedrus 260c.
Scholarly debate as to whether the Sophists saw themselves 'merely' as 'rhetoricians' or 'philosophers' focuses so much on semantics that historical context gets submerged beneath linguistic and philosophic considerations.\textsuperscript{26} What is important to note is that the absence of such modal terms as ῥητορεία and φιλοσοφία in the fifth century BC does not mean that sophist teachers were not cognisant of current 'philosophical' thinking and were not utilising the concepts in their curricula. 'It does not follow' that Sophists would not have had 'the unique self-conception' that came to be termed 'philosophical' by the fourth century BC.\textsuperscript{27} Techniques of written speech composition were well established before they were formalised by Aristotle and later theorists; an example is Isocrates' speech, Against the Sophists, which implies that there were well recognised elements in classical rhetoric not categorised until later into 'the five parts - invention, arrangement, style, memory and delivery'.\textsuperscript{28}

\[\tau\omega u\mu e\nu\gamma o\lambda o\gamma o\zeta\omicron\omicron\omicron\upsilon\omicron\ \delta\acute{\omicron}\nu\omicron\gamma\omicron\upsilon\ \	e k\alpha l\omega\varsigma\ \hat{e}\chi\epsilon\iota\upsilon\upsilon,\ \hat{h}n\ \mu\eta\ \tau\omicron\omega n\ \kappa\alpha i\omega\omicron\nu\varsigma\ \kai\ \tau\omicron\ \\pi\rho e\pi\omicron\upsilon\nu\tau\omicron\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\ \kai\ \tau\omicron\ \kai\nu\omicron\omega\varsigma\ \hat{e}\chi\epsilon\iota\upsilon\upsilon\ \mu\epsilon\tau\acute{o}\sigma\chi\omega\sigma\omega\sigma\iota\varsigma\varsigma\iota\nu\varsigma\ ...\ [\textit{Isocrates Against the Sophists 13.13}]

\[\text{Oratory is good only if it has the qualities of fitness for the occasion, propriety of style, and originality of treatment} \ldots \ [\text{trans. Norlin}]

Although 'memory' was not included, all the others, in order, are. Alcidamas fills this shortfall, making quite a point on the importance of memory by insisting that departure from a learned, rhythmic presentation was sometimes attempted, but in most cases not an option (\textit{Ag. the Sophists} 3, 5, app. 8.VI.6). Nevertheless, genre categories such as 'rhetoric', 'philosophy' or 'sophistic' were indistinct, rubbery concepts without definition throughout the fifth century BC.\textsuperscript{29}

2) \textbf{Tradition and the Sophistic Curriculum}

\textbf{a) Sophistic reputations concerning the Truth}

Plato and Xenophon initiated a literary tradition that the Greek Sophists taught morally unethical practices. The subsequent reputation gained by Protagoras, Gorgias and the other Sophists - that they deliberately attempted to teach

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{28} Gagarin, 'Probability and Persuasion: Plato and Early Greek Rhetoric', op. cit., p. 62.
  \item \textsuperscript{29} The same applies to specific technical terms such as \textit{peirastic, heuristic, maieutic, elenctic/elenchos, eristic, dialectic}.  
\end{itemize}
persuasion at the expense of truth - is at odds with their own extant words and the contemporary textual evidence other than Plato, Xenophon and Aristotle.\textsuperscript{30} Their texts did not entail the rationale that winning at any cost was the aim of the exercise. Just because a player cheats at chess does not mean that the game itself was designed for the purpose of cheating. In the historical context, the Sophists were responding to an educational need within the highly competitive Athenian community; their pupils would have had as many positive or negative personality traits as those in any society. In this vein, Plato’s Gorgias shows he is conscious of the competitive nature of public speaking by comparing himself to a gymnastics teacher (παιδευτὴς γυμναστὴς παιδοτρίβης) [Gorgias 456c-457d, app. 8.VI.7].

There is a view that Plato accurately reflected the views of the historical Gorgias.\textsuperscript{31} However, while the Gorgias of the Meno [95c] claims that he did not teach any specific ethical code (ἀρετή), the Encomium to Helen, the work of the real Gorgias, states that his technique did entail ethical aspects concerned with verisimilitude.\textsuperscript{32} Furthermore, Gorgias passed this view on to his students because Isocrates echoed the sentiment in Antidosis [15.252-3, app. 8.VI.8]. Isocrates also reiterated the point in his Cyprians, which Aristotle then echoed when he counted ‘rhetoric’ to be among the most highly respected of the arts.\textsuperscript{33} Even Plato himself did not say that everyone who had been educated by the Sophists was intent on cheating to get their own way, and the many Athenian sophistic pupils in his dialogues - Theaetetus, Chaerephon, Lysis and Menexenus, Euthyphro, Hermogenes (but not Cratylus), Pericles’ sons, Paralus and Xanthippus, Agathon, his own relatives Charmides and Critias - are forthright characters from Plato’s point of view.\textsuperscript{34} The historical Socrates also obviously trusted the bona fides of some Sophists, even women. There is no real

\textsuperscript{30} Plato didn’t specifically criticise Protagoras but Aristotle [Rhetoric 1402a.24] claimed people were ‘justifiably’ shocked at Protagoras’ statement regarding argument from probabilities.


\textsuperscript{32} E.g. Encom. 1, 14; cf. Appendix 7.

\textsuperscript{33} Ar. Nic. Eth. 1.6.1094b.17: ὁδῶν δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐντιμοτάτας τῶν δυνάμεων ὑπὸ ταύτην οὐσίαν, οἷον στρατηγικὴν οἰκονομικὴν ῥητορικὴν [We see even the most respected of the arts are under [political science], such as strategy, domestic management and rhetoric]. Cf. Rhet. 1.13-14.1355b. Cf. Isoc. Cyprian / Nicocles 3.3-4.

\textsuperscript{34} Theaetetus, Theaetetus; Chaerephon, Gorgias, Charmides, Apol.; [plus Xen. Apol. 1.2.48]; Lysis and his brother Menexenus, Lysis; the very devout Euthyphro, Euthyphro; Cratylus stole his brother’s, Hermogenes, money, Cratylus; Paralus and Xanthippus, Protagoras, Meno [where they are honourable, but unteachable]; Agathon, Protagoras; Charmides and Critias, Protagoras, Charmides.
need to doubt Plato’s statement that he had been taught rhetoric by Aspasia and subsequently took his own pupils to her (if in the social setting of symposia). However, (even if the Symposium’s female tutor, Diotima, is fiction) Plato’s picture of him crediting female Sophists and mantic remains. It is reinforced by Xenophon, who also attests to Socrates’ confidence in, and his referral of his own students to other Sophists [Memorabilia 4.7.1, app. 8.VI.9]. The issue is not as cut and dried as Plato and the ensuing tradition describe it. In Cole’s view, integrity was not the issue but ‘overingenuity, overcomplexity, and technical ostentatiousness’ Some of the reasons for this over-technologising of language and the logos is discussed later. For the present, a consideration of the Sophists’ social and political impact on the Athenian population follows.

b) Questions over the politically radical dimension of the Sophists

This early period for sophistic rhetoric was dysfunctional rather than intentionally devious. For example, Xenophon’s criticisms of sophistic techniques single out linguistic delivery rather than the content and motivation of speeches. Likewise, Aristophanes’ parody of sophistic argument in Clouds does not in itself deliver a win to either the weaker (τὸν ἠπτωμον) or the stronger (κρείτωμον) argument. Aristophanes is attacking Socrates, but it is not so clear that he disapproved of the argument or that he is ridiculing the father and son for wishing to argue their way out of debt via unethical grounds. The joke could be their stupidity at being unable to grasp the technicalities. When the criticisms of Plato are put into their historical context and compared with the fragments of Protagoras and Gorgias, there seems little radically at odds other than theoretical differences over abstract models of decision-making. The texts of Gorgias betray the ‘absurdity’ of Plato’s Gorgias agreeing to any of the ‘binary

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35 Plato [Menexenus 235e] claims Aspasia was Socrates’ tutor; Plutarch [Pericles 24] claims he brought students to Aspasia, the sophistic companion of Pericles, while the μοντική τέχνη of Diotima of Mantinea was sought by Athenians, including, apparently, Socrates [Pl. Symposium 201d, 207a]. Kathleen Freeman [The Pre-Socratic Philosophers, Oxford, Blackwell, 1949, p. 83] discusses female Pythagoreans.

36 Discussed in Chapter VIII.4.

37 Cole, op. cit., pp. 143-44.

38 Xen. On Hunting 13.1-6, 8-9; quoted in Appendix 8.VIII.3.


40 For example: Plato’s position is the reverse of Protagoras. In Laws [716c] the gods and not men are the measure of things, however he recognises that pro and contra consideration of an individual’s approach to decision-making is preferable: Which of the two methods do you think makes a doctor a better healer, or a trainer more efficient? Should they use the double method to achieve a single effect, or should the method too be single - the less satisfactory approach that makes the invalid more recalcitrant?” The double, sir, is much better, I think. [Laws 720]
oppositions’ set up by Socrates about rhetoric.\(^{41}\) One preoccupation of the time was speculation over perception and what constitutes reality. This entailed criticism of argument founded on probability rather than evidence-based fact.\(^{42}\) Protagoras as well as Gorgias had serious thoughts on the issue. Protagoras thought about it in a treatise, which Plato called *Truth*, and later scholars entitled *Counter Arguments* (Ἀντιλογιών).\(^{43}\) Gorgias addresses the same question in his work Περὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἢ Περὶ φύσεως (On Being and On Not Being), discussed in the following chapter. As stated earlier, these works genuinely theorise on the ideas of the phenomenologists current at the time.\(^{44}\) Yet Plato discounts their empirically-based arguments by rejecting visual and aural perception - the bona fides of any witness - as a legitimate basis of knowledge. This approach, however, formed the bedrock of fifth century BC litigation.

The ‘Protagorian doctrine’ was about finding the best solution to a given problem. The technique was to follow the argument where it led. In Athens, this is apparent in the fragments of Damon, Critias, Andocides and others who concerned themselves with the dynamics of how, what and why individuals thought (*eidō*), and what was right thinking (*eubolia*), and how to convince others of your opinion (*eudoxia*).\(^{45}\) Neither did the Sophists necessarily have politically radical ideas. As noted, in the *Theaetetus* Protagoras is represented as theorising that one opinion is likely to be better, but not truer.\(^{46}\) Therefore, with no objective truth, majority opinion becomes the criterion of truth; socio-cultural and behavioural norms and expectations are the better option; everybody, therefore, collectively decides what is correct or incorrect. This was (perhaps unintentionally) the system of justice inherent in the Cleisthenic reforms to the

\(^{41}\) Cf. McComiskey, *Gorgias and the New Sophistic Rhetoric*, p.21: [They were] three basic assertions: (1) rhetoric is not an art (*techne*) because it is irrational (*alogon*) (Gorgias 464e-465a); (2) rhetoric is flattery (*kolakeia*) because its goal is to elicit pleasure (*terpsis*) without concern for the greatest good (*beltitos*) (465a); and (3) rhetoric is a knack (*tribe*) because it cannot articulate its methods or their causes (*aitiai*) (465a). In order to validate this three-part claim, Socrates must coxa gorgias into accepting three respective binary oppositions: (1) knowledge (*episteme* or *mathesis*) versus opinion (*doxa* or *pistis*), (2) instruction (*didache*) versus persuasion (*peitho*), and (3) language (*logos*) versus content (*pragma*) in the definition of a *technē*.


\(^{43}\) Diog. Laert. 9.54-55; DK.80.B.1-5. In this he seemed confident that it was possible, through human volition, to understand what exists and what does not exist, or what is abstract.


\(^{45}\) Cf. Chapter VIII.3.

\(^{46}\) Pl. *Theaetetus* 162d; 195e.
Athenian political system; a core concept of democracy and anathema to Plato’s theory of Forms.⁴⁷ Protagoras then emerges as a democrat with an ethical argument to prove it.⁴⁸

Combine this pragmatic and democratic approach to problem-solving with the fact that Sophists were willing to take on any paying student regardless of their property ranking, and the political consequences were dangerous right from the introduction of sophistic education. The problem was not that the Sophists were disreputable with no regard for the truth. Nor was it that they taught their pupils to be deliberately disrespectful to their elders. It was that their techniques allowed any individual, regardless of pedigree, to challenge the traditional authority of conservative aristocrats.

3) Public opinion and the reception of sophistic thinking
The argument that only an elite minority learned to write and hence sophistic education did not affect the lives of the majority of Athenians, ignores the dynamics of direct democracy. All citizens were expected to have an opinion.⁴⁹ In the social environment of fifth-century BC Athens, as the literary works cited below portray, there was a general citizen population who was becoming increasingly cognisant of abstract alternative pro and contra argument.

Plato gives an example of one of the types of syllogistic argument taught by Sophists:

[Kτήσιππε] εἶπε γάρ μοι, ἔστι σοι κύων; ... [καὶ] ἔστιν ὁν ἀυτῷ κυνίδια; καὶ μάλ, ἔφη, ἄτερα τοιαύτα. οὐκόν πατήρ ἔστιν αὐτῶν ὁ κύων; ἔγειρε τοι εἶδον, ἔφη, αὐτόν ὀχεύοντα τὴν κύων. τί ὁν; οὐ σος ἔστιν ὁ κύων; πάνυ γ’, ἔφη. οὐκόν πατήρ ὁν σος ἔστιν, ὡστε σος πατήρ γίγνεται ὁ κύων και σὺ κυναρίων ἀδέλφος; [Euthydemus 298d-e]

DIONYSODORUS: Tell me Ctesippus have you a dog … and does he have puppies?
CTESIPPUS: Yes …

⁴⁷ Cf. Appendix 2.2-3 tribal nature of social structure.
⁴⁸ Protagoras is said to have drafted the constitution of Thurii [Diodorus Siculus 12.9f.; Eusebius, P.E.14.3.7 (DK.80.B.4)]. Cf. David Fleming ['The Streets of Thurii: Discourse, Democracy, and Design in the Classical Polis', Rhetoric Society Quarterly, Vol. 32, No. 3 (2002), pp.5-32] who suggests a very conscious attempt on the part of Pericles, Protagoras and Hippodamus to create a ‘international’ model polis where constitution, educational system and the town plan itself coalesced in an agonal harmony to promote a sophistical ideal.
⁴⁹ Aristotle [Ath. Pol. 8.5] claims Solon made this an intellectual requirement making it law that people make decisions and take sides.
DIONYSODORUS: So your dog is their father?
CTESIPPOS: Yes...
DIONYSODORUS: And the dog belongs to you?
CTESIPPOS: Yes...
DIONYSODORUS: He is a father, and he is yours - so he is therefore your father and you are brother to puppies. [trans. Lamb] 57

This might be an amusement by the fourth century BC, and such passages in the works of Plato are often considered to be there for comic value. It seems difficult to imagine that any citizen in the fifth century BC would be even mildly bamboozled by an argument that equivocates on possessive pronouns. Yet some of Plato's contemporaries agree that, at various points during the fifth century BC, citizens could become confused. 51 Diogenes Laertius' quotation of Solon's cautionary paradeigma also suggests that earlier generations of Athenians were also inept at such abstract pro and contra thinking [1.61, app. 8.VI.10]. However, by the first quarter of the fifth century BC, recognition that there were two sides to every question is evident in Aeschylus, even though abstract deliberation does not seem to be individualistic. An example is that of Orestes, who was torn between two alternatives, but was unable to consciously judge which was the better. He merely acts as he has been conditioned to act; the authority to judge rests with the gods and those in authority. 52 In the next generation, Sophocles shows the influence of Protagorean two-fold argument: in order to solve the problem of a drought, Oedipus wrestles with his own potential alternatives. The climactic revelation or kairos (καιρός) of the play, and the psychological tragedy of Oedipus, is his conscious decision to actively seek knowledge wherever it takes him. 53 A generation later, Euripides takes the issue of duplicity and circumspection further with the prevarication of Hippolytus who employs a series of bereft ethics to justify his actions which he later, with typical Euripidean irony, visits upon the head of woman [Hippolytus 612-645, app. 8.VI.11].

In formulating and teaching the two-fold argument technique for decision-making, the Sophists also revolutionised Athenian thinking in a collective way. Firstly, because those educated in this form of argument openly practised the

50 Aristotle [Rhetoric 3.5.5] notes that Protagoras formulated rules for consistency in gendered nouns and pronouns to avoid this type of argument. Plato [Euthydemos 306a]; Socrates says to Crito that there are good and bad practitioners in every field, i.e. test the pursuit yourself and reject the flawed ones.
52 Aeschylus Eum. 566-751.
method in the *ekklesia* and *dikasterion*. It is impossible to determine how many students learned to construct forensic abstract *pro* and *contra* arguments, but the evidence suggests they were a sufficiently large minority to influence the thinking of their fellow citizens. In any individual, the realisation or understanding of a concept can happen in a nano-second without any extended knowledge of the concept itself, just like an understanding of what semiosis is for the comprehension of language or number.\(^{34}\) The cognitive consequences of learning to write extended prose constructs is discussed below; it is the consciousness of the concept that is considered here. Not every citizen learned the techniques of conceiving, and/or constructing, these antithetical arguments. However, all Athens knew of them and grasped the concept that there was an abstract propositional dimension to decision-making different from their traditional concrete concepts. A modern comparison is the impact of the theory of evolution. The idea was not original, but Darwin codified it into a theory of natural selection.\(^{35}\) When it was made public and was understood, the knowledge of it changed human perception indelibly and forever.\(^{36}\) Even those who vehemently oppose Darwin’s ideas are changed and moulded by them.\(^{37}\)

Around the close of the fifth century BC, Aristophanes shows his audience was beginning to grasp sophistic argument. In *Clouds*, the sophistics of the plot itself, as well as the arguments put forth by the characters within the plot, challenged his audience, and he taunted them, saying that he respected his audiences because he knew they were clever enough to decipher the concepts proferred in his plays [Aristoph. *Clouds* 519-526, 738-756, 1201-1204, app. 8.VI.12]. *Clouds* was not the most popular comedy of 423BC, so he did not carry a majority of his audience in the subtleties of Protagorean sophistcs. However, when they saw the *Frogs* eighteen years later, they were clearly aware of, and capable of recognising, different approaches to logic. In the same vein, Plato’s own observations on the Sophists, and the widespread effects of their teaching on the


\(^{36}\) He knew, once he published, what impact it would have on society (and to his own family’s place in it) and so kept his theory to himself for over twenty years.

\(^{37}\) One stunning example: http://evolutioninternational.net/index.php
body politic, in themselves attest to the popularity of sophisic approaches to problem-solving [Republic 6.493a, app. 8.VI.13].

The argument that the average citizen was suspicious of sophistic argument because orators began to use written speeches is at odds with the evidence. As noted in earlier chapters, Athenians gleefully embraced literacy; otherwise comic alphabet games would not have been so popular in the theatre. Plato, too, implies that written bibloi were regarded with the same respect as the oracles from Delphi [Theaet. 162a, app. 8.VI.14]. Furthermore, while he criticised the work of individual Sophists, his Socrates had no objections whatever to the practise of writing public speeches, only to the content and techniques employed [Phaedrus 258d, app. 8.VI.15].

The table in Chapter III.2 indicates that, in the early decades of the century in Athens, not many areopagites and elder office-holders would have had the necessary higher education to master extended continuous prose writing. An overview of the evidence suggesting the Sophists taught extended prose writing follows. The discussion then examines how this aspect of sophistic training would have turned that first generation gap into a cognitive chasm.

4) The evidence that Sophistic teaching techniques included the teaching of extended written prose argument

Gorgian and Protagorean 'rhetoric' did teach abstract pro and contra argument, but there is debate as to whether it involved instruction on how to develop original antithetical arguments in prose, or whether it followed the prevailing educational methods of imitatively copying and learning the teachers' texts by heart. What follows looks at the evidence of specific teaching methods and why, historically, the emphasis has often focussed on some of the negative aspects of sophistic techniques.

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58 For example, that of Scenters-Zapico ['The Case for the Sophists', Rhetoric Review, Vol. 11, No. 2 (1993), pp.352-367, at 357-358] who argues on the grounds that the general public regarded the veracity of written documents as dubious. He notes that other expressions of sincerity, such as gifts etc., were employed to seal an oath. Such time-honoured practices were already operating in the traditional Hellenic society. For example (apart from the usual exchange of women through marriage) the sealing of sumarchia (peace treaties) in 478/477BC associated with the Delian league involved the ritual of dropping iron ingots into the sea. Cf. Ar. Ath. Pol. 23.5; Plut. Aristides 25.1. Consequently, they do not therefore constitute evidence of suspicion of writing.
Frederick Beck’s compact reconstruction of how speech making developed does not lay enough stress on the complexities of the move to continuous prose writing. It does, however, show that the success or failure of the Sophists’ techniques lay in their application:

[Prose gradually came to usurp the pristine exclusive function of verse as the sole method of transmitting knowledge and ideas. But though verse gave way to prose, the techniques so laboriously hammered out by the epic poets were reflected in the methods of teaching rhetoric which were developed to a high level of excellence by the sophists. ... The formulae and stock situations of epic poetry and the facility acquired through long study and training in recombining and adapting them to current purposes are paralleled in the common-places, the stock proems, the stock arguments for and against given themes and cases, and in the methods of training logographi and rhetoricians.]

There are controversies over the details of this scenario. Questions such as, how were students taught? Were the teaching techniques involved predominantly oral or written? Did students learn whole speeches, or reusable modular components, or did they compose their own speeches? Did students learn to deliver competitive display speeches extempore?

As mentioned earlier, works on argument construction and delivery techniques consistently appear in the scholasts’ lists of texts written by most Sophists.60 Plato suggests Protagoras claimed he taught euboulia (prudence) while other Sophists taught mathematics (τέχνας λογισμούς τε και ἀστρονομίας καὶ γεωμετρίαν καὶ μουσικῆν).61 He makes no specific reference to any sophist teaching literacy skills. However, in view of Diogenes Laertius’ list of Protagoras’ written works and the other surviving examples of his work, it seems improbable that he would have carried out his tuition on polar arguments orally. Extant works and references to sophistic textbooks by later writers suggest that continuous extended prose writing, including the manipulation of hexametric and iambic gnōmai, was a significant element in the sophistic curriculum that involved treatments in a wide variety of subject. For example, Prodicus wrote Horai, a work on ethics and education in extended prose writing (τῶ συγγράμματι)62 and thought speeches should be concise with attention paid to right length.63 Some of his work,

60 Titles to these works were not applied by the writers but in later centuries.
61 Pl. Protagoras 318e-319a.
63 Ar., Rhetoric 3.17; Pl. Charmides 163d; Phaedrus 267a; Euthydemus 187e; Meno 75c; Cratylus 384b; Laches 197d; Protagoras 340a-341a.
however, was in poetry in imitation of Simonides. Protagoras produced two books of forensic speeches in opposing arguments and a technical work on argument: τέχνη ἐριστικῶν. Democritus of Abdera wrote a corpus, which indicates he understood the works of other Presocratics (Oenopides, Parmenides, Zeno, Protagoras). He also provided hundreds of gnōmai and technical books on linguistics and language useful in argument construction. Resident foreigners and home-grown writers of Athens provide enough examples that at least some Sophists taught their students to think about, develop and record argument in their own words. Such texts cover subjects that deal with speech-making as well as current thinking in ethics and physics, which indicates a diverse curriculum to sophistic training. For example, Crito wrote seventeen dialogues (gathered into a single volume in antiquity). The titles suggest a concern with educational, ethical and technical linguistic subjects. Simon, a citizen cobbler, wrote thirty three dialogues on social, ethical and linguistic issues relating to speech-making. Likewise Archelaus is reported to have written a work called Physiologia, while Andocides, a sophistic student in the same period as Xenophon and later oligarch and informer, was educated well enough to construct and plead plausible and practically gnōmai-free arguments in On the Mysteries (forensic defence), On His Return (forensic plea), and On the Peace with Sparta (symbouleutic). Critias (born 480BC) perhaps reflects the educational transition between metred and non-metred language: he wrote competent hexameters on poets and poetry, experimental combinations of iambics and hexameters, elegiacs on innovation, and discourses on civic and

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64 Pl. Protagoras 339c, 340d, 341b.  
66 Diog. Laert. 9.42.  
68 E.g. Οτι οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ μαθείν οἱ ἀγαθοὶ. Περὶ τοῦ πλέον ἔχειν [That men are not made good by instruction: Concerning Excess]; cf. Diog. Laert. 12.121.  
69 Diog. Laert. 2.122-123.  
70 Diog. Laert. 2.16; (no fragments remain).  
72 DK.88.B.1.  
73 DK.88.B.4.  
74 DK.88.B.2.  
75 DK.88.B.30-38.
ethical\textsuperscript{76} subjects in written prose.\textsuperscript{77} One work, \textit{Polity of the Spartans}, he produced both in prose and poetry.\textsuperscript{78} Like other sophistic students considered below, Critias appears to have been intensely interested in how to communicate ideas. And, as Alcidamas indicated, the competent use of metred \textit{gnômai} within a extended prose argument was a method used with general audiences who had themselves been educated in poetic \textit{gnômai}.

Of the home-grown theorists, Antiphon (Rhamnus/sophist/poetic seer) is another example of the reluctance of some scholars to recognise the educational transition experimenting with language forms in this period. Thucydides claimed that Antiphon of Rhamnus was a most impressive exponent of persuasion, as is indicated by the extant fragment of \textit{On the Revolution}, his own written defence speech to avert execution.\textsuperscript{79} His \textit{Tetralogies} contain legalistic innovation which was so advanced it was not, at the time, put into Athenian legal practice.\textsuperscript{80} It is probable that his \textit{Tetralogies} were teaching aids, or 'performance pieces', rather than actual court tracts.\textsuperscript{81} This, therefore, is one piece of evidence that argues for the identification of Antiphon of Rhamnus (\textit{Tetralogies}, \textit{The Murder of Herodes}, \textit{On the Choreutes}, \textit{Against the Step\texttext{\text{m}}other}) and one Antiphon the Sophist (\textit{On Truth}, \textit{On Concord}, \textit{Dream Interpretations}) as the same person, and identifiable also as Antiphon the Seer. The reluctance of later scholars to accept the versatility of Antiphon's literary skills is a reflection of, and reaction to, Plato's criticisms of sophistic teaching. The work of Antiphon the Sophist addressed the phenomenological issues of the day in the style of other Sophists, such as Gorgias and Protagoras.\textsuperscript{82} Subsequently, a further Antiphon was hypothesised by Hermogenes because Aristotle (in a lost work on poetics) mentioned an Antiphon the Seer ('\textit{Aντιφων ο τερατοσκόπος}'). This was an unnecessary complication in the identification of a single, versatile prose writer.\textsuperscript{83} Furthermore, Aristotle's Antiphon 'the Seer' would seem a likely candidate for

\textsuperscript{76} DK.88.B.42.
\textsuperscript{77} DK.88.B.39.
\textsuperscript{78} DK.88.B.6 and 33.
\textsuperscript{79} Thuc. 8.68.1; Antiphon, \textit{On the Revolution}, Fragments B.1.1-4.
\textsuperscript{81} Cole, op. cit., p. 77-78.
\textsuperscript{82} Cf. Freeman, \textit{The Pre-Socratic Philosophers}, pp.394-404; DK.87.B.1-78.
\textsuperscript{83} Diog. Laert. 2.46; Ar. Poetics, Hermogenes \textit{On Style} B.399; Harpocr.ation.
the authorship of the *Dream Interpretations* said to be authored by 'the Sophist'. At religious sites the interpretation of dream states by acolytes went hand in hand with the administration of herbal medicine; Antiphon of Rhamnus could therefore also have written *Dream Interpretations*, because his *deme* was the centre for an important temple complex and surrounded by *Rhamnus cathartica*, a herbal medicine of considerable potency.\(^8\) Furthermore, there is a Socratic link to claim all three Antiphons were one. Firstly, Socrates conversed with a Xenophonian 'Sophist'\(^5\) and received tuition from a Platonic 'Rhamnus'.\(^6\) It is Plato and Xenophon who append the two monickers. Secondly, the traditionally described textual incompatibilities of Rhamnus and Sophist do not prevent them being a single individual.\(^7\) Thirdly, as Rhamnus and Sophist argued probabilities - an abstraction that can focus on past and future - they could be described as seers in the pre-categorical era before Aristotle when 'wise men' was the usual term for all who wrote and spoke speculatively. Finally, Socrates was not known to retreat from such individuals.\(^8\) To deny that all of these Antiphons could not have been one is like saying that Philip Vellacott (1907-1997) could not have been the enthralling Aeschylean philologist, poet and piano-player that he was.\(^9\)

There is also a cognitive dimension to this question of sophistic concern with stylistic technicalities of speech construction. The discussion below develops the position that sophistic extended conceptual argument is explicit knowledge bootstrapped beyond the limits of oral 'cognitive capacity'; is constructed 'serially' in the left hemisphere of the brain, and is processed with the aid of literacy. Protagoras' students, at the least, copied down the prose arguments laid out in his own written works, just as other sophistic teachers would have their students copy down their own texts. Cicero suggests that this was the case:

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\(^6\) Pl. *Menexenus* 236a.


\(^8\) Socrates learned from the μαντικὴ τέχνη of Diotima; a teacher who would better fit into the profile of Antiphon the Seer [*Pl. Symposium* 201d, 207a]. Yet another trusted intellectual confidant was Aspasia, a sophist with nicknames that suggest a knowledge pharmacology, perhaps similar to that practised at Rhamnus [Plut. *Pericles* 24, 32].

The method for elementary literacy (after alphabet training, which would have entailed the phonetic writing of single letters into words) was that the students copied out Homeric and lyric poetry for their own practise and reference. It is probable that this was the initial procedure for sophistic students as they created their own handbooks of gnômai. Plato implies that some teenagers were quite widely read in works written, not only in poetry, but in Ionic as well as Attic prose [Lysis 214b, app. 8.VI.16]. Even if they were learning to compose arguments out of a whole collection of gnômai, or easily recalled hexametric or iambic sequences, students were still developing mental strategies for Protagorean abstract 'serial reasoning'. However, the mature works of sophistic students such as Antiphon and other contemporaries such as Critias and Thucydides, are the only evidence needed to show that some sophist teachers turned students into highly literate individuals, competent in extended written prose thinking beyond the memory 'chunks' of poets. Whatever the training Alcidamas and Isocrates received under the tutelage of Gorgias, it was certainly more than the rote learning of other people's speeches. Even though their respective written prose styles were not as 'metred' as Gorgias', in one speech, Against the Sophists, Isocrates describes a process of speech composition that closely resembles structural features in his teacher's extant works [13.16, app. 8.VI.17]. Likewise, Alcidamas' encomium on speech making, About the Sophists, resembles Gorgias' Encomium to Helen, structurally, as well as in its stylistic use of paradoxologia. With Gorgian contradiction, he devalues written speech as against extempore speaking, whilst still wishing to be remembered as a sublime speech-writer. Like Gorgias, he ends with the humorous paradoxologia that he presents his written speech as a testimony to his abilities for extempore speaking

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90 Kerferd [op. cit., p. 31] states that Cicero 'has taken from a lost work of Aristotle, probably his collection of early rhetorical handbooks known as the Technon Synagoge (Techniques Collection).
91 Cf. Ill.3, IV.2.
[Ag. Sophists 29, 32; app. 8.VI.18]. It also presents a detailed series of observations in relation to the composition, delivery and reception of speeches around 390 BC.\textsuperscript{92} No matter the context and \textit{stasis} of this speech,\textsuperscript{93} conclusions may be drawn regarding the public speaking skills of sophistic teachers and their students, as well as the general public’s ability to follow sophistic \textit{pro} and \textit{contra} argument.

Firstly, Alcidamas suggests that even the ‘untutored’ were able to cobble together a speech with a cut-and-paste use of texts from other authors and that this technique was the norm [Ag. Sophists 3-4; app. 8.VI.19]. Secondly, it appears that most sophistic speech-training educators could not, themselves, speak extemporaneously, or teach students to ‘think on their feet’. We have a profile of a general group who were trained to write speeches and were capable of developing \textit{pro} and \textit{contra} argument, and a minority with special training capable of extemporaneous speech-making [Ag. Sophists 3, 5; app. 8.VI.6]. Several of his statements indicate that whole speeches \textit{were} sometimes learned by heart [Ag. Sophists 18-19; app. 8.VI.20]. This tallies with Aristotle’s general observation of sophistic teaching, although he gives Gorgias special mention by saying that his students were required to learn set speeches and sequences of question and answer debate [On Sophistical Refutations 34.183b.36-184a.4; app. 8.VI.21]. If Gorgias taught his \textit{guômai} by rote, as Aristotle claims, other teachers would have imitated his techniques with varying degrees of success, just as Alcidamas implies. Around the turn of the century Xenophon (cf. On Hunting 13.1-6, 8-9; app. 8.VIII.3, discussed in VIII.3 below) also criticised the sophistic curriculum, particularly the fact that Sophists no longer taught the ‘authorised version’ of moral norms (\textit{γνωσμὴ ὀρθός}).\textsuperscript{94} This suggests his own education in the last fifteen years of the fifth century BC did involve this method. That there was also further literacy training is confirmed by Antisthenes, another pupil of Gorgias, who expected his own students to engage in writing [Diog. Laert. 6.3; app. 8.VI.22].

Antisthenes had a wide ranging curriculum which seems to contradict Aristotle’s assertion that the Sophists did not teach their students to think. To judge from

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{92} Isocrates was born in 436 BC and so would have been studying sometime in the last two decades of the century. Alcidamas was a contemporary. Therefore the adult speakers he describes would have been educated in the fifth century BC.
\textsuperscript{93} The translator, LaRue van Hook, suggests it is a response to Isocrates’ \textit{Against the Sophists}.
\textsuperscript{94} Marchant translates this as ‘wholesome maxims’.
\end{flushleft}
the subject matter of extant works by Gorgias, Antisthenes appears to have tailored a curriculum along similar lines. He is said to have written ten volumes on extensive subject matter. One treatise was on expression, or styles of speaking \( \pi e r i \, \lambda e \xi e w o s \, \eta \, \pi e r i \, \chi a r a k t i r o w o n \). Other subjects dealt with ethical, phenomenological, physiological, physiognomy, education, music, poetry and religious matters, as well as defense speeches. He also wrote comparative works on Lysias and Isocrates, and tracts about Aspasia, Homer, and Plato.\(^95\) If, as Diogenes Laertius says, he was the first to mark out the parameters of assertion (\( \pi r o t o s \, t e \, \omega r i s a t o \, \lambda o g o u \, \epsilon i p \omicron \omicron \omega, \, \lambda o g o s \, \epsilon \eta \tau i \, \omicron \, \tau o \, t \, \tau i \, \eta \nu \, \eta \, \epsilon \tau t i \, \delta e l \omega \nu \)),\(^97\) it is clear that his students were taught continuous prose literacy in the development of 'serially reasoned' composition. It is possible each student developed his own book of gnômai containing rhythmic, harmonious sentences possibly learned by rote or simply absorbed implicitly through constant use. It is significant that, when discussing delivery styles, Aristotle made no distinction between tragedians, poets and speechmakers, except in the metres they used. Otherwise, he thought that all their performances must involve the same three qualities, volume (\( \mu e \gamma \epsilon \theta o s \)), harmony (\( \alpha r m o n i a \)) and rhythm (\( \rho \theta \mu o s \)) \( [A r. \, R h e t o r i c \, 3.1.4; \, a p p. \, 8.VI.23] \).

Ryle and Cole both hypothesise that complete arguments were learned by heart.\(^98\) However Ryle goes further, suggesting that students did not learn how to construct arguments at all, but merely learned, by rote, complete arguments taken down verbatim during classroom or public eristic moots.\(^99\) He suggests that Plato was the first Athenian to 'excogitate' probability arguments without another person present.\(^100\) In view of the fact that the sophistic curriculum did teach extended prose writing, this is patently improbable because, as has been demonstrated in Chapter II, learning to write continuous prose extends interior 'serial reasoning'. It is also noted that Aristotle included dialectic question-and-answer debating in his remarks on Gorgias’ rote teaching technique. This part of

\(^95\) Diog. Laert. 6.15.
\(^96\) Diog. Laert. 6.1-2, 15-18.
\(^97\) Diog. Laert. 6.3: He was the first to define assertion by saying that a statement is that which sets forth what a thing was or is.
\(^99\) This recalls Phaedrus learning by heart the work of Lysias: Pl. Phaedrus 228b.
Gorgias’ curriculum perhaps represents a level or stage in his tuition. The discussion in Chapter VII.2-3 argues that his elaborate, almost poetic style was his method to assist Athenian students whose elementary education had been heavily influenced by the hexameter and iambic poetry. Nevertheless, by teaching a Gorgian-style prose to students, it gave them the ability to ‘serially’ reason out extended sequential prose compositions.

Alcidamas’ earlier statement that there were very few teachers who could teach extempore speaking (αὐτοσχεδίασμα = αὐτοσχεδιάζω) highlights a flaw in modern debate over the existence, or not, of public and semi-private eristic debates. It revolves around the words agon logon (competitive debate), dialectic (discussion) and epideixis (display speech), and ties together styles of argument and public speaking that confuse both content and delivery, and therefore, sophistic teaching methods. For example, Kerferd considers the exercise of eristic mops is ‘just possibly supported’103 by the following statement of Hippocrates:

πρὸς γὰρ ἀλλήλως ἀντιλέγοντες οἱ αὐτοὶ ἄνδρες τῶν αὐτῶν ἑναντίου ἀκροατέων οὐδέποτε τρις εφεξῆς ὁ αὐτός περιγίνεται ἐν τῷ λόγῳ, ἄλλα ποτὲ μὲν αὐτὸς ἐπικρατεῖ, ποτὲ δὲ ὁ ὅτι ἡ γλώσσα ἐπίρρευσα πρὸς τὸν ὅχλον. Κατὰ δὴ δικαιὸν εἰτὶ τον ἡμῖν ὁρθὸς γινώσκεις αὕτη τῶν προηγμάτων παρέχειαι ἐπὶ ἐπικρατέοντα τὸν λόγον τοῦ ἐσωτοῦ, ἐπεὶ ἐσωτι νὰ γινώσκει καὶ ὁρθὸς ἄποφαίνεται. Ἀλλ’ ἔμοι γε δικέουσιν οἱ τοιούτῳ ἄνθρωποι αὐτοὶ ἑσωτοὺς καταβάλλειν ἐν τοῖς ἐνόμοις τῶν λόγων αὐτῶν ὑπὸ οἰκουσίας...

[Hippocrates De Natura Hominis 1.16-24]

Given the same debaters and the same audience, the same man never wins in the discussion three times in succession, but now one is victor, now another, now he who happens to have the most glib tongue in the face of the crowd. Yet it is right that a man who claims correct knowledge about the facts should maintain his own argument victorious always, if his knowledge be knowledge of reality and if he set it forth correctly. But in my opinion such men by their lack of understanding overthrow themselves in the words of their very discourse. ... [trans. Jones]

Ryle takes this same reference as evidence that eristic mops were an established practice well before the close of the century and were judged by an audience.102 Guthrie and Kerferd both take the opposite position and are sceptical that any debate would be repeated three times over in public. They conclude that agon logon only meant ‘the kind of conflict between arguments found in all cases of Antilogic, written or otherwise’.103 This underplays the frequency and nature of the sophistic public performances that are described in Plato’s dialogues. One

101 Kerferd, op. cit., p. 29.
102 Gilbert Ryle, op. cit., p. 117.
instance is in *Theaetetus*, where the disputants arrange to return after noon to argue further. Also, as other performances and social interaction in Hellenic life were competitively structured in sets, such a practice is predictable. Tragedies were presented at the Dionysia in trilogies, with a satyr play to follow. Likewise, five comedies by different authors were performed each festival. And, as noted in Chapter V.2 considerable scholarship maintains that *rhapsodes* would have competitively performed Homer in a similar way to Parry and Lord’s *guslari* poets who performed in ‘sessions’. Considering educational techniques involved rote learning, as well as thespian and choral performances, it is reasonable to suggest that Sophists performed several ‘sessions’ over a day. Costumed display speeches did occur at Olympia and Delphi, while Plato also stated that Parmenides and Zeno came to Athens for the Great Panathenaea. Therefore, public display speeches seem perfectly natural, just as the public display of physical prowess and musical training was exercised by school children, *epheboi* and adults. A further point on the naturalness of competitive public moots is that they elicited as much public involvement as the epics, tragedies and comedies, and discussions in the *ekklesia*. The characteristic λοιδορία (ranting and railing) often turned discussion abusive and not only the disputants, but the audience at times got angry. This was not because they sided with one or other of the competitors, but when they felt they were having their time wasted. Also, recognition on the part of the disputants of the audience’s part in the debate brought applause. It indicates degree to which the audience understood the complexities of the argument.

The question of whether, or not, there were public debates confuses content and delivery, revolves around the term *agon logon* and ties together different styles of argument and public speaking only later given their modern classifications by Aristotle. Such rigid categorisations between public debate, lecture and/or public performance ignore the nature of Athenian exchange of ideas. Aristotle’s comments relating to rote learning and the Sophists’ Gorgian techniques (cited

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105 For citizen choruses, not for the skilled Homeric *rhapsode*.
106 Pl. *Parmenides* 127a-b. Discussed further in Chapter VII.2.2.
107 Cf. Appendix 3.2-3, 5.
earlier, *On Sophistical Refutations* 34.183b.36-184a.4; 8.VI.21), state clearly that
dialectic was taught alongside display speeches (*epideixis*) and, at some stage,
they were rote learned. In this context Plato portrays the form of teaching
employed by Hippias to be neither tuition in *epideixis* nor *logon agon*, but
something more like dialectic [*Protagoras* 315b-c; app. 8.VI.24]. Putting too fine a
distinction between categorisations of content and method in the curriculum of
the early Sophists overlooks the wide ranging interests and subject matter
covered by them. 109 Gorgias made no demarcation between texts detailing cosmic
phenomenology, psychological or ethical subjects, and neither did Alcidamas
[Gorg. *Encomium on Helen* 13, Alcid. *Ag. Sophists* 2; app. 8.VI.25]. Likewise,
Isocrates united the constructs of philosophy and eristic debate in his speech
entitled, *Helen*. Although a fourth century BC work, the speech throughout
compares the practices of the previous generation of sophist educators with
Isocrates’ own [*Helen* 10.6; app. 8.VI.26]. Furthermore, Aristotle observes that the
‘uneducated’ majority appreciated the more theatrical displays of poetical
Gorgian speeches [*Rhetoric* 3.1.9; app. 8.VI.27].

Regardless of the criticism regarding written and rote learned speeches,
Alcidamas confirms that literacy and the use of writing were significant
elements in the sophist’s technique [*Ag. Sophists* 17; app. 8.VI.28]. Gagarin makes
the significant point that finely detailed and intricately wrought pieces such as
Gorgias’ *Encomium* are ‘unimaginable’ without writing. 110 And, even though
Alcidamas ridiculed stylistic artifice and incompetence in presentations that
were learned by rote and recited, Plato indicates that this was, indeed, one of the
teaching methods employed by some of the leading Sophists in Athens - even
when the style was the newer, ‘easy-listening’ (strongulos), less ornate (sape, 
sapheneia) accurate and precise (akribos, akrieia) argument composed by Lysias
[*Phaedrus* 228a-b, d-e, 230d; app. 8.VI.29]. 111

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109 For example, Kerferd [op. cit., pp. 32-34] maintains that the *logos/antilogos* method practised by
Protagoras is Platonic-style dialectic (truth-seeking discussion), or at least an early form of it. In
the same context, Ryle [op. cit., pp. 126, 128] notes that Aristotle’s use of the word ‘dialectic’ is
what others meant by ‘eristic’ (persuasive debate), which is how ‘we get the contrast credited to
Protagoras and constantly made by Plato and Aristotle between the match-winning and the
truth-hunting spirits in which the question-answer exercise may be conducted, with the adjective
‘dialectical’ used just as Aristotle uses it’.

110 Gagarin, ‘Probability and Persuasion: Plato and Early Greek Rhetoric’, in Ian Worthington

The significance from a cognitive point of view is that, at whatever level, the curriculum involved the exercise of copying and manipulating extended written prose. Sophistic teaching of extended written prose argument, even of the cut-and-paste variety that contained what Xenophon called accepted metred γνώμη ὀρθός, educated the writer in a different way to the elementary student who copied only hexametric verse. Just learning the alphabet produces a ‘VWFA’ (visual word form area) in the left hemisphere of the brain; reading and copying poetry involves right-hemisphere dominant language. Continuous prose generation is a dominant left hemisphere function and any tuition in extended prose literacy developed (bootstrapped) the complexity of left hemisphere literacy, including the ‘serial reasoning’ capacities of the ‘interpreter mechanism’. Alcidamas’ evidence above suggests that some students acquired extended prose writing and learned techniques for argument construction in the same manner as they had learned their elementary literacy skills; they learned to write prose just as they had learned to write poetry, by copying down set texts and repeating them by rote. Progress to individual and original composition was an extension that the evidence attests only to some students achieving. Nevertheless, to restate the point, any level attained in extended prose composition produced a further psychological and cognitive shift in those who learned to use continuous prose writing. It is a different, more complex literacy to that identified in individuals with ‘name literacy’, ‘list literacy’, ‘banking literacy’ or ‘officials’ literacy’. It extends, by a bootstrapping effect, the ability for ‘serially reasoned’ constructs. Gorgias, Alcidamas, Isocrates, Plato and Aristotle attest to techniques involved with rote learning and the mimetic use of borrowed sentences and phrases. As we also have examples of complex and individualistic logographs from Athenian authors, the conclusion should be that there was a wide variety in teaching competency and different levels of student proficiency in the prose construction of extended argument.

The psychological gap between hexametric and prose orientated ‘serial reasoning’ could have been a reason sophist teachers designed writing styles that could be understood in the various forums of citizen participation. As Chapter V

112 Cf. II.3, III.3.
suggested, concrete paradigmatic arguments from polarity and analogy had been a traditional method of decision-making. However, the contention that proof could be ascertained with arguments from probability, especially without witnesses to the fact, was a significant feature of sophistic training, along with Protagorean-style abstract argument. These types of arguments were used in Athens early in the second half of the fifth century BC and, as the distinction between fact and opinion (δόξα) is not as clear in arguments from probability, it is understandable why many Sophists examined the dynamics of language and written argument development.

Gorgias, Antiphon, Critias, Thucydides, Alcidamas, Andocides all indicate that in the last quarter of the fifth century BC, the population at large were listening to a variety of arguments devised by their students, and delivered at variable levels of competence, in the courts and legislature. The speeches ranged from the manipulation of gnômai into arguments based on analogy, to abstract pro and contra arguments from probability. The logographers, with their complex argument construction, show that some pupils of the Sophists attained a very good grasp of how to interpret facts and probabilities and develop extended written pro and contra argument. And, if the comments of Alcidamas may be believed, audiences were increasingly able to follow complex constructs. Gorgias and Antiphon make it clear that forensic probability arguments confronted juries. Alcidamas even suggests that citizen juries were 'eager' to hear and hopeful of ascertaining which logoi reached the truth (εὐστοχία, εὐβουλία), an audience in which a significant proportion of citizens preferred to follow forensic argument rather than poetic speeches [Ag. Sophists 12-13; app. 8.VI.30]. This is in stark contradiction to Aristotle, who maintained that the majority in audiences preferred the Gorgian 'poetical style' (cited at 8.VII.2). Thucydides and Aristophanes both attest that, by the last quarter of the fifth century BC, collective decision-making was often confused and that the ekklesia and dikasterion were not

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114 An example is Antiphon’s first Tetralogy. Also his On the Choréutes 30.31, which broached ‘a new approach in forensic oratory. … [Whereby] if someone had given a verbal account of the facts, without providing witnesses, one might say that his words lacked witnesses; if he had provided witnesses, without providing inferences (tekmeria) to support the witnesses, one might make the same criticism. But in [Antiphon’s] case he has presented plausible arguments (logous eikotás); cf. Craig Cooper, ‘Forensic Oratory’, in Ian Worthington (ed.), A Companion to Greek Rhetoric, p. 211.
always successful in reaching a satisfactory decision. Thucydides’ opinion is quoted in Appendix 8.VIII.14 [2.65.9-11] and discussed below in Chapter VIII.6.

Because a significant common feature of the sophistic curriculum involved some form of extended prose literacy, even the exercise of devising and weighing up pro and contra arguments with borrowed gnômai and set techniques of structure, developed, in itself, the cognitive skills that Ryle suggested only originated with Plato. Learning by heart a text which has been in any way composed by the speaker himself is different to rote learning a speech written by someone else.

5) The significance of extended prose writing for the construction of abstract pro and contra argument

Significantly, in Cole’s idea of early rhetoric, the definitive thing that separated 'rhetoric' from archaic 'oral eloquence' was writing. Simon Goldhill also holds the view that prose writing was both a 'sign' and a 'symptom' of a new mindset that challenged traditional authority. The democracy of Athens was the impetus that transformed the sixth century BC written prose of xenoi residents and Athenians such as Anaximander, Anaximenes, Pherecydes, Hecataeus, etc. into a civic and political reapplication. In this sense, it was an invention: prose writing became 'the medium' of the so-called 'Greek enlightenment'. From a different, psychological, viewpoint David Rubin rightly calls writing a 'cognitive prosthesis'. None of these scholars, however, actually state that it is not possible to mentally construct a tightly coherent extended forensic argument without a pen. Rubin comes closest when he recognises that, in oral construction, only approximately fifty words can be remembered without some sort of poetic constraint. The pro and contra arguments taught by the Sophists, of which the collection called the Dissoi Logoi is an example, entail extended

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115 Cole, op. cit., pp. ix-x.
119 Ryle [op. cit., p. 204] equates conceptualising argument with that of the chess-player’s 'combinations', where it is not possible for most players to imagine moves in advance without the mental construct of counter moves by an imagined opponent on an imagined board. In this sense a corresponding mental image for a literate composer (which Ryle is imagining) would be Plato’s inner conversation with oneself, and the visualisation of alphabet letters and words.
'serial reasoning' of the type defined by Daniel Dennett in Chapter II.2. The evidence presented in Chapters II and III indicates pro and contra reasoning to be a left hemisphere process and prose writing to be a manifestation of this process in a similar way that Wallace Chafe’s ‘intonation units’ are a manifestation of thinking using speech. Writing is indispensable to extended ‘rhetorical’ forensic or pro and contra double-sided argument because prose writing is itself a product of extended ‘serial reasoning’. As such it is inconceivable that Sophists of the calibre of Protagoras or Gorgias did not employ extended written prose construction in their curriculums.

It is one thing to have alphabetic ‘name literacy’, ‘list literacy’ or ‘officials’ literacy’ and quite another to be able to produce extended texts of abstract thought in prose. The cognitive extent of the difference between being able to write, and not being able to write, was discussed in Chapter III.2.1-2 regarding the impact of alphabetic/phonetic literacy on the individual learning to read and write. What might seem self-evident, but is often overlooked, is that being able to write two-fold Protagorean argument is a far more complex dimension of literacy. Consider the differences between speaking and writing. Olson sees writing as ‘a subclass of speech’; ‘a quotation’ of a spoken proposition that has lost its ‘illocutionary force’ to become ‘pure thought’.121 Admittedly he is investigating the processes of reading, but, when applied to writing, this view does not account for the limits of Miller’s ‘cognitive capacity’ in illocutionary speech per se, nor how, in the construction of extended cohesive propositions, the text itself becomes an element in the construction of ‘pure thought’. Another view comes from Rubin, who states simply that ‘speech is not writing’; he sees ‘no reason to expect expertise in writing to produce the general changes in thought and memory that have been claimed for it, no matter how large the general effects caused by the cognitive tools and other changes that occur with writing’.122 He says this for ethical reasons, because he goes on to talk about how scholarship on literacy/illiteracy leads to ‘general conclusions that divide people into primitive and sophisticated thinkers’. It is true that ‘primitive thinking’ and ‘sophisticated thinking’ entail qualitative connotations that are distasteful in their conceptualisation and impossible to assess. However, this is a cultural response,
not a scientific one. It is not that simple. Rubin suggests writing does not bring about a 'change in consciousness'. This denies the repeatable research which shows that writing does introduce a change in the processes of reasoning, firstly through the development of the 'VWFA' (visual word form area) in the left hemisphere, and secondly, in the accumulation of sequential explicit knowledge constructed into argument with a pen. It may not constitute a change in, or to, consciousness, but it is an alteration in processing knowledge compared to speaking, singing, and making poetry. These differences may be explained by comparing Chafe's 'intonation units', which are talking events that reflect 'the information active in the speaker's mind at [the intonation unit's] onset'.

'Intonation units' are phrases, sentences of working memory, thoughts translated into sound. As such speech is fragmented and transitory. Writing, conversely, is linear and integrated and can build 'serially reasoned' ideas into an external abstract framework.

This construct is not quite so clear cut when prose writing includes considerable tracts of, or elements of prosody, Bakker's 'special speech' (V.2.1). This is considered in the following chapter dealing with Gorgias. The point here is to contrast two types of thinking, explicit and implicit and the complex, sometimes lateralised, language processes that definitely produce 'general changes of thought and memory'. David Rubin rightly reiterates Havelock's point that abstract constructs, the gristle of sophistic argument, is not a property of oral epic, which is the province of metaphor and image-rich language. When these sophistic abstract arguments were constructed with poetic extracts, the result appears to be a complex interhemispheric hybrid of language and writing processes. What is required is more research into unravelling this phenomenon. And, the results may require some rethinking in regard to the cognitive processes of writing specifically in regard to the style of language used. Throughout this research the argument is developed that poiesis is essentially a right hemisphere dominant brain process using synoptic and spatial imagery, poetic language and implicit knowledge. Many poets cited in this work have explained the sensation of writing poetry as feeling more like taking dictation,

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and making poetry more like watching internal and/or external, non-verbal imagery. It is a different cognitive experience to writing extended prose.

VI.3 CONCLUSION

The Sophists helped to develop a wider consciousness of abstract deliberative argument and developed techniques for the authoritative use of language itself. The forms of rhetorical argument that Plato and Aristotle defined were not clearly identified in Protagoras’ time. Such categories and subtleties of problem-solving were only recognised in the fourth century BC. To some degree their techniques were still rooted in the oral tradition. These points are argued over by modern scholars, whose disciplinary approaches often lay stress on aspects of literary art, rather than on psychological and historical contexts. This aspect is considered in the next chapter investigating how Gorgias developed communication techniques and written language. Bakker provides a constructive framework by placing Gorgias between poetry and what today is labelled prose. His curriculum was a response by an educator who was teaching in a society grounded in metre.

As to the question of whether the students constructed their own unique arguments or merely copied and learned sophistic argument by heart: the evidence suggests that there were levels of competence from the very good, as exemplified by Antiphon himself, to the less competent, as described by Antiphon in his description of various speechmakers in his work Against the Sophists. The revolutionary contribution of sophistic education was that prose writing itself was used in written study notes and that students were taught to write complex continuous prose sentences.

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124 Cf., for example, Ezra Pound or the Scottish oral poet mentioned in the researches of MacDonald (Chapter V.2.1(b), or the discussion on the possible ritual use of eye-cups (V.3.2(a).

CHAPTER VII
GORGIAS: TEACHER, PSYCHOLOGIST AND THE CONCEPT OF ΚΑΙΡΟΣ

Two men who were arguing came before a rabbi. ‘Rabbi’, began the first, ‘that man is a robber and has cheated me in business’. ‘I know’, said the rabbi. ‘But rabbi! I am no robber: that fellow has cheated me!’ ‘I know’, said the rabbi. ‘But rabbi’, said his students, ‘they can't both be right’. ‘I know, I know’, said the rabbi.

It is only knowingness that will allow us to appreciate this story. Simon Goldhill ('On Knowingness', Critical Enquiry 32 (2006), p. 723)

VII.1 ABSTRACT

According to Plato, Gorgias, like Protagoras, was an influential teacher. Plato disapproved and generally gave him a bad press, but the extant works of Gorgias present coherent and perceptive epistemics. They show he was abreast of current thinking; his concept of knowledge (pistis) was relative, his argument (logos) empirical, and his assessment of fifth century BC audience response as insightful and (almost) as methodical as any twentieth century psychologist. Gorgias thought about ‘thinking’ and used the language of the day to frame his arguments into understandable units. His calibre as a teacher who could competently produce extended written prose and frame forensic discourse may be judged by the competence of students such as Alcidamas, Isocrates and Thucydides.1

The discussion below, VII.2 ‘Gorgias: Teacher, Psychologist’, examines aspects of Gorgias’ reputation and his sophistic style of speech-making and his ability to construct deliberative argument. It is in the following sequence:

1) The competence of Gorgias and his students to read their audience: this introduces the observations of one of Gorgias’ students, Alcidamas, through his work About the Sophists. Polemical and full of Gorgian humour, it still provides valuable clues to the psychology of his audience and the deliberative capabilities of his colleagues as well as himself. His style resembles his teacher, who also provides insights into the psychology and interaction between audience and persuader in the fifth century BC.

2) The discussion in this section considers the use of myth as a vehicle for argument by Gorgias, Pindar, Parmenides, Empedocles. It also considers the mantic techniques in delivery and the use of formulaic language.

3) This section considers the recognition and development of individual and public opinion and its relationship to persuasive poetic speech.

4) Gorgias demonstrated in the Helen that he completely understood the dynamics of persuasion and audience psychology. This is considered in this section.

In VII.3, ‘Gorgias and the concept of Kairos’, discusses the scholarly debate over the meaning of ‘kairos’ (Section 1) and then considers in Section 2 if Gorgias held a concept of ‘kairos’ as the realisation of ‘serial reasoning’, as described by Daniel Dennett in Chapter II. It is suggested that, understanding his words in the Helen, Gorgias recognised in himself the moment in cognition when the direction of an argument is conceptualised, a type of ‘ah-ha’ moment; he also recognised that there was a moment in the delivery of an argument when the audience itself also reached this point of realisation, the ‘kairos’ moment when the audience is won over, is persuaded to the argument.

1 Ar. Frag. 30; Quintilian 3.1.13; Diog. Laert. 6.2; Suda Lex. G.388.1-2; I.652.6-7, Theta.258.2; Philostratus Lives of the Sophists 1.9.
VII.2 GORGIAS: TEACHER, PSYCHOLOGIST
1) The competence of Gorgias and his students to read their audience

Alcidamas, the pupil of Gorgias, gives us a perplexing and contradictory glimpse of how audiences reacted to speech-makers and the style of argument in their speeches, suggesting that whilst poetic style sometimes irritated them, extempore delivery was usually not fully understood. The contradiction comes when he notes that in the law courts (dikasteria) argument delivery was simplified for better understanding [Alcid. About the Sophists, 12-14, 31 app. 8.VII.1]. This resembles Xenophon's assessment of some sophist speech-makers whom he described as using language that was 'far-fetched' [On Hunting 13.1-9; app. 8.VIII.3]. Alcidamas clearly defines the complex differences between 'thinking on one's feet' and reciting verbatim a text, especially one favouring hexameters, memorised earlier; mental processes occupying different combinations of brain architecture and memory traces. He intimates that the first technique was rare and confirms that a rote technique was routinely practised in his time. Aeschylus says the same for the previous generation. For the generations taught to read and write throughout the fifth century BC, the methods and levels of competence of orators in forensic pro and contra analysis varied considerably. Likewise, not everyone in the audience was familiar with abstract explicit problem-solving and was more comfortable with implicit/intuitive thinking. Alcidamas' other observation was that audience response to rhyme and metre was strong, and this continued to the next generation because Aristotle notes that, in his day, audiences also reacted in much the same way in, and out, of the dikasteria [Ar. Rhetoric 1.1.3-5, 3.1.9, app. 8.VII.2]. Gorgias sheds more light on the psychology of the audience in the last quarter of the fifth century BC with its susceptibility and high degree of responsiveness to metre:

tin poitenon apasian kan vomiçw kai onomazw logon exousta metroun ws tovs akouontas eisphale kai frikh perifobos kai elos poluðakry kai pðhos filosvenh; ep anotriw te pragmatow kai srmatow evutychias kai diaphragias idioi ti paðhma dia tov logon epathen ñ psyche, ferne ñ pro tllon at allou metastrw logon. ... (14) ñouto kai tis logon oi men eluphman, oi de õterpen, oi de êphoðman, oi eis tharros katesthman tis akouontas, oi de peibo tiis kai kai tis psychei efarhseusen kai êgeoihtesapen.

[Gorgias, Encomium to Helen 9, 14]

2 Aeshy. Prometheus Bound 461 - 463: εξηρουν αυτοίς, γραμμάτων τε συνθεσις, μνήμην ἀπάντων, μουσαμήτορ ἐγράφην [Zeus: I invented for them the putting together of letters, the mother of the Muses and all arts, which makes everything remembered]. Rote learning also assisted memory in the sixth century BC; cf. Chapter V.4.2(a) relating to eye cups.
I define all poetry as speech with metre. Poetry enters the heads of those who hear it and they shudder in great fear, cry for pity and yearn with sad longing. Through the effects of the words, the mind experiences unfamiliar perceptions of the good fortune and bad luck of other peoples’ deeds and lives. But come, let me put this in another way [take another position]. ... (14) ... so is the way of words, some produce pain, some delight, some frighten, others bring courage to the audience, while others drug and beguile the mind by some evil persuasion. [trans. Leiper]

There is no reason to discount these comments as merely being exaggerated overstatements of the very emotions that, in the present day, are palpable at the performance of good theatre or on the delivery of a well composed eulogy. Gorgias’ surviving texts reveal that he was as conscientious as Plato about attempting to define truth, construct cogent argument and understand audience psychology. Neither Plato nor Aristotle valued his techniques, but, like the pioneering linguists of the nineteenth and twentieth century, Gorgias invested considerable thought into the problems of knowing and the relationships between language and communication. The ‘Ελένης ἐγκώμιον [Encomium to Helen] is often overlooked as merely a display exercise. This ‘casual attitude’ is packed with modern bias entailing religious, gender and cultural attitudes:

[1] Helen herself is no more than a figure from mythology, so a composition about her can only have been a display-piece intended to advertise Gorgias’ expertise, and perhaps a model for students as well.
[2] Underlying this deprecatory attitude is an implicit conviction that epideictic cannot be important because it is not serious. It is designated by the Greek noun epideixis which, like the cognate verb epideixai, refers to showing, an act of display. ... [and] display, especially showing off, suggests frivolity rather than weight.

From another perspective, the Encomium examines aspects of the λόγος, and elements of the argument in the Encomium, which will be addressed below, demonstrate the depth of theoretical thought Gorgias addressed to his craft. He is the bridge between those we ‘conventionally’ call Sophists and philosophers whose method of refutation was to subordinate a thesis into subordinate theses (of which one must be true) and then demolish each subordinate thesis in turn. Περὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἢ Περὶ φύσεως [On Not-Being (or On Nature)] and Τοῦ ἀντοῦ ὑπὲρ Παλλαμήδους ἀπολογία [Defence of Palamedes] also show that Gorgias was familiar with current phenomenology and in his works presented a coherent

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5 DK.82.B.1-5.
6 DK.82.B.11.
thesis 'intricately interrelated and internally consistent'. He was certainly cognisant of the psychological force of language well before any literary genres were categorised by Aristotle and was foremost among the Sophists to recognise that 'with an ear to poetry' speechmaking and the process of poetics in decision-making could be reformatted. Bakker maintains the assumption often made, even in antiquity, that he introduced 'poetic, metrical elements into prose' overlooks the likelihood that he was really more interested in 'the development of a performance genre sufficiently close to poetry (i.e., special speech in performance) to be rhetorically effective (i.e., have a similar emotional or psychological effect), yet sufficiently different from the way in which poetry deviates from ordinary speech to rank as a separate genre'. This separate genre, he suggests, lies between poetry and modern prose writing. Looked at from an educational perspective, his poetically embellished prose writing, packed with antithesis, chiasmus and anaphora which have their own rhythmic constructions, would have served well as a practical technique to train students who had been brought up to read dithyrambs, iambics, hexameters, and to sing or recite in the same metres on social and civic occasions. The ambivalence to the importance of Gorgias masks an underlying 'insensitivity towards what he was really about'. An example is the attitude present in Bertrand Russell's dismissive and subtle 'Gorgian' irony that still typifies many a modern attitude towards Gorgias:

We do not know what his arguments were, but I can well imagine that they had a logical force which compelled his opponents to take refuge in edification.

2) Gorgias, Pindar, Parmenides, Empedocles and the evolution in myth as the medium and mantic techniques in delivery and use of formulaic language

To begin with, it is illogical for the Encomium to be considered a less than serious argument because the subject matter is mythical. The use of myth in sophistic writing was as natural a phenomenon as it was for the contemporary tragedians and epideictic poets to illustrate and communicate in the current cultural mediums. Even Plato at times continued to use constructed myth as allegory to

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10 Wardy, op. cit., p. 8.
convey his philosophical ideas. Likewise it is a mistake to emphasise the literary usefulness of the myth as a stylistic device in prose writing rather than to accept its socio-cultural metaphorical function as indicators (memory traces) of acceptable behaviour (εὐδοξία, εὐδοξοῦ = esteem, good opinion of a person or thing). For example, Gorgias accounts that the very mention of Helen's name has become 'an epithet synonymous with disaster' [Encom. 2]. Related to this question of mythical allusion is Gorgias' use of words specifically in the magical context; something which also robs him of a reputation for philosophical seriousness while the same verdict is not applied, for example, to Parmenides or Empedocles.

It is worthwhile to consider the extent to which the literary devices and words with magical connotations constitute affectation or have a practical and dynamic application. Lloyd suggests that audience reaction to Gorgias aligning himself with witchcraft and magic would have been negative, citing the contemporary medical treatise On the Sacred Disease as evidence that the populace was suspicious of incantations and ritualistic purifications; a text clearly at odds with the Adonia and the other ritualistic practices discussed elsewhere in this work.12 In the same vein Gagarin notes 'we can hardly imagine that Gorgias was not aware of the shock value of both the form and content of works like the Encomium and On Non-being'.13 True, but there is more going on in the Encomium (and Defence of Palamedes) than stylistics. Examine the development of the literary composition and the psychological implications of the magic words in the Encomium, and it is found that words such as ἐπῳδαῖ (mantra song), θελγείν (to spellbind), γοητεία, (bewitchment, cheatery), μαγεία (the means for charming or bewitching) refer to magic 'au sens propre du terme'.14

De Romilly emphasises the consistent perception of magic within the society and traces 'd’une longue évolution' from the Odyssey through Orphicism to the tragedians and Sophists of the fifth century BC. Whenever a 'magic' word was

12 Lloyd, Magic, Reason and Experience, pp. 15-17, 99.
14 Jacqueline de Romilly [Gorgias et le pouvoir de la poésie, The Journal of Hellenic Studies, Vol. 93, (1973), pp.155-162 at 155] also states: elle confirme aussi que la parole poétique, mentionnée en même temps, l’est, elle aussi, pour son effet puissant et mystérieux. 'it also confirms that the poetic word, mentioned in concert, also has a powerful and mysterious effect'.
used it generally related to religiosity, rather than magic per se. Prayers, curses and oaths, etc., were ritual formulas which the gods then made magic. Likewise, the ritual incantations that were essential to early medicine also resembled the formulas of sorcerers. 'L’efficacité du ressort des dieux' is found in the Odyssey as much as in Orphicism, and in tragedians such as Aeschylus. The very existence of these rituals and formulas are enough reason for Gorgias to use 'magic' words to illustrate the mysterious power of words. Gorgias originated a significantly different twist because he identified the word 'magic' as a techne [τέχνη], which in effect constitutes humanity usurping a power normally in divine control.

There occurred a parallel transition of 'the magic spell of poetry' (les sortilèges de la poésie) in which the poet moved, from the conduit of the divine, to a creative collaborator with the gods, and then on to a sophistical controller. After Homer, the individualisation of the conscious poet was a progression where, for example, Hesiod, the first (extant) Greek poet to identify himself, celebrated the bewitching capacities of song at the beginning of Theogony. It was not a human attribute, but was initiated by the Muses, and behind them, the gods. It made Hesiod a poet who acted from the 'sincere vision of an initiate' (d'une véritable épiphanie et d'une véritable initiation): thus he was simultaneously highlighted as an individual as well as a sacred poet.

There is a transition in Pindar, who in many odes first solely credits the Muse. In others he acknowledges their aid, and then in others, proclaims his own poetic consciousness as an attribute of excellence:

Le génie poétique devient une aptitude de naissance, comme les autres mérites dans la pensée aristocratique. ... Mais cette opposition même implique le dernier avatar et le plus important; car la critique de Pindare suppose que certains poètes l'étaient par métier. Pindare est, pour un temps, le dernier des inspirés. [trans. Leiper]

[The poetic genius becomes an aptitude [attribute] of birth, like the other merits of aristocratic thought. ... But this opposition even implies the last most important metamorphoses; because the criticism of Pindar supposes that some poets were there by trade. Pindar is, for a time, the last of the inspired. [trans. Leiper]]

Granting, for the moment, that Gorgias was first to technologise formulaic language, de Romilly's position still neglects some of Pindar's contemporaries.

15 de Romilly, op. cit., pp. 155-56.
16 de Romilly, Magic and Rhetoric in Ancient Greece, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1975, p. 156. (Plato imitates Gorgias in applying the same techne to Diotima’s magic in Symposium; referenced earlier.)
18 de Romilly, ‘Gorgias et le pouvoir de la poésie’, pp. 157, 158, 159-60.
19 In some ways de Romilly is probably correct: every poem Pindar made was in a different, unique metre - no two are alike - and the structures - strophe, antistrophe and epode - are
Parmenides, for example, and his use of formulaic language and mythical metaphor; his hexameters dealt with problems of phenomenological analysis and deductive reasoning. \(^{20}\) Whether his own, or the hypotheses of others, \(^{21}\) Parmenides mythologised his position and scholarship is divided as to why this phenomenologist wrote in poetry. In Bowra’s view, it was self-consciously in order that it have the weight of ‘a religious revelation’. \(^{22}\) Kathleen Freeman too believes Parmenides ‘used the epic form because it seemed to him the only worthy vehicle for a doctrine which he regarded as a divine revelation’. \(^{23}\) Kirk and Raven believe his decision to write in hexameter was ‘prompted’ by the metre of Xenophanes. \(^{24}\) Freeman dismisses this hypothesis, somehow reasoning that Xenophanes was simply ‘by profession a bard’ and that Parmenides’ subject-matter ‘does not seem to go easily into verse’. Likewise she questions Plutarch’s suggestion that Parmenides and others used epic metre merely to avoid the flatness of prose, because ‘this implies that Parmenides thought his subject-matter lacking in interest, so that it needed the dressing of metre and metaphor to make it acceptable.’ In itself this seems illogical considering Parmenides’ reverence for truth and his exaltation at his discovery of it. Probably Parmenides simply found that thinking in formulaic language and myth was easier in forming concrete hypotheses from abstractions.

extremely formal. However, Maurice Bowra [Pindar, The Odes, London, Penguin, 1969, p. xiii] notes: ‘his patterns are based on recognisable principles and that rhythmically his odes may be divided roughly into two classes, which may be called Dorian and Aeolian, but each single poem has its ownmetrical individuality’. This could suggestss automatic creation.


The general position of Parmenides (515-430) and the Eleatics: the whole of reality consists of a single uniform unchanging substance. The problems of 'being': is (esti); to be (einaí); what is (to on). i) statements of non-existence are unintelligible: 'the fountain of Youth does not exist'. ii) all negative statements are statements of non-existence: 'X is not a Y' or 'X is not Y' means 'Y' is a non-being. iii) all statements of change presuppose negative statements: 'A child was born yesterday and the old man died' - coming into being, or passing out of being are outside of what presently exists, to times when the present existents did not exist or shall not exist. What is real cannot contain anything non-existent, negative, or in a state of change. Therefore what we perceive is not any process of condensation or composed of elements; it is an illusion. Reality - that which is - can only be reached by the mind, and not by the physical senses.


\(^{23}\) Freeman, op. cit., p. 141.

\(^{24}\) Kirk, Raven and Scofield, op. cit., p.222.
Freeman hits the salient point which supports the view that it was a natural educational response for Gorgias to use formulaic language to communicate abstract ideas:

It is also possible that Parmenides believed the verse-form to be a good medium of instruction for minds younger and less mature than his own: for instance his pupil Zeno, who was twenty-five years younger than himself, and became the official defender of his doctrine. It is not unnatural to suppose that he was trained by Parmenides to this end, and that the writing in metre was a device of the teacher to impress difficult and unfamiliar ideas.\(^\text{25}\)

Accepting that Parmenides believed in his mantic inspiration, and applying the concept of a developing self-consciousness of literary composition, there uncovers a subtlety in Parmenides' perspective in the proem that shows self-consciousness over the Muse. He has similar charge over the making process as Hesiod and Pindar. He is in control. The goddess' acolytes may be showing him the way and justice and right, rather than letting chance (μόνορο κακί) (άλλα θέμισς τε δικη τε) motivate his travel, but he goes of his own volition 'as far as his heart wishes' ("ιπποι ταί με φέρουσι, ὠσον τ᾽ ἐπί θυμός ἑκάνοι, πέμπου")\(^\text{26}\) and the goddess welcomes him as a guest-friend [DK.28.B1, app. 8.VII.3]. There are instances of obligation or command, but they entail Parmenides' active intellectual participation rather than divine knowledge simply 'bestowed' [DK.28.B1, app. 8.VII.4]. However, generally, his attention is entreated rather than commanded and it is the goddess who explains herself to him rather than the other way around [DK.28.B2, B4, B7-8 app. 8.VII.5].

Cornford read Parmenides' texts as an allegory on two ways of thinking, rather than on two systems of philosophy or cosmology.\(^\text{27}\) Kahn also emphasises the 'essential motive' of the poem is epistemological; an analysis of what underlies rational thought, 'not the problem of cosmology but the problem of knowledge'.\(^\text{28}\) Throughout the work there is a degree of self-consciousness which, in the Way of Truth, presents a logical argument that begins with the premise ἔστι, 'it is'

\(^{25}\) Freeman, op. cit., pp.140-141.

\(^{26}\) In [1] The horses that carry me, sending me as far as my heart desired.


(comparable with Descartes' 'cogito'\textsuperscript{29}), reasons without reference to perception or the senses, and concludes that the senses are not valid and what they perceive is not real. The elephant-in-the-room contradiction between the \textit{Way of Truth} and the \textit{Way of Seeming} (which, conversely, accepts perception and appearance a priori in a traditionally envisaged cosmology) resembles the antithetical arguments used by the Sophists and mimicked by Plato.\textsuperscript{30} It is also worthwhile to note also that the \textit{Way of Seeming}, in its antithetical stance to the \textit{Way of Truth}, is rather like the mystic ‘Satzparallelisms’ appearing in Aeschylean rituals in which antithetical propositions were present; but where no analytical decision-making need occur when the divine had control over all that could happen - as with advice and decisions obtained from oracles such as those from raving mouth of the Sibyl [Plut. \textit{Pythia}, DK.22.B92, app. 8.VII.6].\textsuperscript{31}

There is another perspective to the relationship between magic and the \textit{mantiké} of Presocratics that indicates the non-differentiation between poet, mantike, philosopher and sophist on any cognitive or intellectual level until Plato’s generation matured. Firstly, Presocratics often imitated \textit{rhapsodes} or \textit{magi} in oral performance, and secondly, later there grew anecdotal stories about how psychologically unconventional they were.\textsuperscript{32} For example, at Olympia Gorgias dressed as a \textit{rhapsode} in purple clothes and Persian gold girdle to present pieces of his work.\textsuperscript{33} So did Hippias.\textsuperscript{34} Earlier, Empedocles (before he threw himself into the caldera of a volcano) had frocked up in purple robes, golden belt, bronze shoes and a Delphic garland of laurel.\textsuperscript{35} (When not dressing as a \textit{rhapsode}, he employed one: Cleomenes, who performed his treatises at Olympia.\textsuperscript{36}) Pythagoras dressed in white Persian trousers (\textit{ἀνωξυρίδας}) and a golden garland

\textsuperscript{29} Kirk, Raven and Scofield, op. cit., p. 241, 245.
\textsuperscript{30} Perhaps the contradictions and style differences between \textit{The Way of Truth} and \textit{The Way of Seeming} could represent two separate arguments of a single work. As they did not have titles at the time, combining two separate arguments into a not-to-cohesive whole would not have been difficult.
\textsuperscript{34} Aelian loc. cit.; cf. Pl. \textit{Hippias Minor} 368b; although Antisthenes, one of Gorgias’ pupils, got stage fright at the Isthmian games; cf. Diog. Laert. 6.2.
\textsuperscript{35} Diog. Laert. 8.73.
\textsuperscript{36} Diog. Laert. 8.63.
Anaxagoras donned a nice coat to perform at Olympia, but Socrates did say that he eventually went mad (Ἀναξαγόρας παρεφρόνησεν = παραφρονέω). Democritus, a brilliant atomic theorist, lived in tombs, poked his eyes out and was reputed to have gone around laughing hysterically or screaming at people in the street. No wonder Anaxagoras would not receive him! He was destitute and unable to support himself when he returned home to be looked after by his brother. Antiquity gave Heraclitus several erratic behaviours: The Obscure (σκοτεινός / obscurus); The Riddler (αἰνικτής); the Impulsive (μελαγχολία), coprophiliac, mountain, 'weeping philosopher', hermit who fed on grass. Vlastos calls the Socrates created by Plato a typical 'street evangelist', 'floundering in perplexity'; an 'honest arguer', in a 'confused and troubled state of mind'. He did, however, have his quiet moments: if we can believe Diogenes Laertius' anecdote that at Potidaea he stood in what modern science would identify as a catatonic state for a whole night. The ambiguity of Plato's Socrates may be a literary conceit, nevertheless, the disassociated (νυμφόληπτος) I-feel-like-a-poem-coming-on syndrome described by Plato would have been recognisable to Socrates' contemporaries [Pl. Phaedrus 238d, app. 8.VII.7]. And then there is Socrates' defence: δαιμόνιον γίνεται, φωνή … ἄει ἀποτρέπει με τοῦτο ὁ ἀν μέλλω πράττειν, προτρέπει δε οὐποτε (I did what

37 Aelian loc. cit.
38 Diog. Laert. 2.3.10.
41 Diog. Laert. 9.7.39.
42 Cicero de finibus 2.5.15, Simplicius Phys. 24, 17, Diog. Laert.9.1, 9.6.
45 Pl. Symposium 220c-d .
46 Vlastos [Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosophers, pp. 50-91] proposes that the Socrates of the earlier dialogues represents the thinking of the historical Socrates. Plato, 'sharing Socrates' basic philosophical convictions, 'sets out to think through for himself ... whatever he - Plato - thinks at the time of writing would be the most reasonable thing for Socrates to be saying just then in expounding and defending his own philosophy' [p. 50]. A precedent for this practice is evidenced by Thucydides' own words at 1.12. With the maturation of Plato's philosophical progress 'Plato strikes out along new unSocratic lines of his own' [p. 91]. The later dialogues are transformed from elenctic argument in which Socrates 'pursues moral truth by refuting theses defended by dissenting interlocutors' [p. 49]. Later dialogues are 'not only different but, in important respects, antithetical' [p. 81]. For example in Phaedrus or Meno Socrates 'is a didactic philosopher, expounding truth to consenting interlocutors' [p. 49].
the voices in my head told me to do). Dodds likewise sees Socrates’ old companion/pupil, Charephon, as a kind of ‘sorcerer’s apprentice’; old and faithful, manically enthusiastic and therefore ‘a favourite butt of the comic poets’. He was the one who asked the oracle if Socrates was smart - obviously not one to deliberate on his own when making decisions, even though, presumably, he had been trained in dialectic by Socrates. Before we dismiss these anecdotes as whimsical and without value, consider the 1994 survey of two hundred and ninety one modern world-famous intellects and creatives. Under all the anecdotes there are recognisable psychological states.

Gorgias’ supposed teacher, and another of Pindar’s contemporaries, was Empedocles, who was inspired by the gods and sometimes presented himself as a god (est inspiré par les dieux, qui se présente lui-même parfois comme un dieu), and wrote his scientific treatises in verse. Even with the Ionian prose

47 Pl. Apologia 31d.
49 Pl. Apologia 20e, Xen., Memorabilia 1.2.48.
50 φοδόρος = Pl. Apologia 21a; μανικός = Charmides 153b.
52 Felix Post ‘Creativity and Psychopathology: A Study of 291 World-Famous Men’, British Journal of Psychiatry, Vol. 165, (1994), 22-34, at 22] presents his findings of eccentricity and intellectual creativity: ‘This investigation sought to determine the prevalence of various psychopathologies in outstandingly creative individuals, and to test a hypothesis that the high prevalence of mental abnormalities reported in prominent living creative persons would not be found in those who had achieved and retained world status. The family background, physical health, personality, psychosexuality and mental health of 291 famous men in science, thought, politics, and art were investigated. The membership of the six series of scientists and inventors, thinkers and scholars, statesmen and national leaders, painters and sculptors, composers, and of novelists and playwrights was determined by the availability of sufficiently adequate biographies. Extracted data were transformed into diagnoses in accordance with DSM-III-R criteria, when appropriate. [Results were as follows:] All excelled not only by virtue of their abilities and originality, but also of their drive, perseverance, industry, and meticulousness. With a few exceptions, these men were emotionally warm, with a gift for friendship and sociability. Most had unusual personality characteristics and, in addition, minor ‘neurotic’ abnormalities were probably more common than in the general population. Severe personality deviations were unduly frequent only in the case of visual artists and writers. Functional psychoses were probably less frequent than psychiatric epidemiology would suggest, and they were entirely restricted to the affective varieties. Among other functional disorders, only depressive conditions, alcoholism, and, less reliably, psychosexual problems were more prevalent than expected in some professional categories, but strikingly so in writers. ... Similar findings have been reported for living artists and writers, and this suggests that certain pathological personality characteristics, as well as tendencies towards depression and alcoholism, are causally linked to some kinds of valuable creativity.’ (Further references and research are on p.34. None of his 291 subjects were from classical periods.)
53 de Romilly ‘Gorgias et le pouvoir de la poésie’, pp.155-162] quotes Dodds [The Greeks and the Irrational, London, University of California Press, 1951, p.146]: ‘Empedocles represents not a new but a very old type of personality, the shaman who combines the still indiffereniated functions of magician and naturalist, poet and philosopher, preacher, healer, and public counsellor’
developed and used by earlier Presocratics\textsuperscript{54} available to him, Empedocles emulated the styles of Parmenides and Xenophanes\textsuperscript{55} when he put his scientific observations and opinions into hexameters; a practice Plato criticised generally\textsuperscript{56} and particularly in reference to Empedocles.\textsuperscript{57} Plato exaggerated to make fun of all the Eleatics but, in Theodoros’ expressed opinion of them, the implication is that they were untrained in dialectic argument and delivered their thoughts after the fashion of a rhapsode - even if they wrote their observations in continuous prose, they were unable to discuss them without indecipherable metaphors [Pl. \textit{Theaetetus} 179e-180c, app. 8.VII.8].\textsuperscript{58}

Empedocles is a helpful example of the variety and ambiguity surrounding literary styles and literacy skills of fifth century BC Presocratic thinkers and teachers and their sophist students. For example, like many predecessors, he implored Calliopeia for poetic inspiration in hexameter and was cited as also being competent in tragic verse and speech writing [DK.31.B131, Diog. Laet. 8.58, app. 8.VII.9]. The \textit{Suda} records an opinion that Empedocles also wrote a medical text, and the common assumption that it was in prose rests on the presumption that medical writing was a priori prose; 'ιατρικά καταλογάδην should probably be interpreted to mean a ‘detailed’ (καταλογάδην) medical text, only possibly in simple prose rather than metre.\textsuperscript{59} Empedocles’ own words give that impression of expertise, but not that he was using prose writing, because he mentions crowds seeking oracles and cures for disease and pain from his 'words of healing' [DK.31.B112, app. 8.VII.10]. His purple robes and rhapsodic garb at Delphi has already been mentioned. It has also already been noted that Aristotle named him the inventor of rhetoric,\textsuperscript{60} so it is possible that the medical treatise


\textsuperscript{55} According to Diogenes Laertius [8.55-56] Empedocles was so motivated to imitate Xenophones [527-480] the Ionian poet who went to Athens.

\textsuperscript{56} Pl. \textit{Lysis} 214d.

\textsuperscript{57} ibid. 214a.

\textsuperscript{58} Cf. above for some anecdotal stories on how distracted and un-conventional some Presocratics were.

\textsuperscript{59} ιατρικά καταλογάδην [DK.31.A.1.77; Suda E.1002].

\textsuperscript{60} Diog. Laert. 8.57, citing Aristotle's \textit{Sophist}. 
was in a language intended for oral delivery rather than any reference manual. Aristotle too appears ambivalent regarding Empedocles. This could be symptomatic of Aristotle’s linguistic argument regarding prose writing and poetry that laid emphasis on subject matter for classification rather than style. For example, in *Poetics* he frequently⁶¹ uses Empedocles’ metaphors as examples without a hint of criticism and identified his poetic style with ‘Homer’s school … powerful in diction, great in metaphors and in the use of all other poetical devices’.⁶² On the other hand, in *Meteorology*, he highlighted the incompatibility of Empedocles’ style with that of recording scientific research [Ar. *Meteorologica* 2.3.25-29, app. 8.VII.11]. Aristotle’s speaks from his own generation and his own empirical point of view, and his criticisms do not necessarily sit with fifth century BC society in which, on evidence, Empedocles would have gained the comprehension and approval of the majority. As Empedocles composed in hexameters when thinking about cosmological questions, the medical treatise could just have easily been in hexameters.⁶³ Aristotle perhaps confirms this when he echoes Plato’s criticisms of entranced Eleatics [Ar. *Rhetorics* 3.4.4, app. 8.VII.12]. It cannot be proven one way or the other that Empedocles was not competent in early Ionic prose,⁶⁴ but to suggest, as Aristotle does, that his scientific insights were in metre merely by preference, does not go far enough to explain the literary form his work took. This is also applicable to Parmenides. It cannot be proved one way or the other that he did not also write in prose, but to speculate that his use of metre was merely a literary conceit goes against the point made by Freeman that he regarded his research as intensely serious. It is more than a literary conceit’ because the very act of writing poetry is, in itself, an act of thinking in metre. Poets do not write out their thoughts in prose and transform them into poetry.⁶⁵ The creative act of making poetry is a dynamic spontaneous

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⁶¹ Five times: 1447b.18; 1457b13-14, 24; 1458a5; 1461a24.
⁶² Cf. Ar. *Rhetorics* 1447b.18; 1457b.13-14, 24; 1458a.5; 1461a.24. Also, ἐν δὲ τῶ Ἐπεδοκλῆς καὶ δεῖνος ἐν τῷ περὶ ποιητῶν ἰδίᾳ καὶ Ὀμνήθη ἐπεδοκλῆς καὶ δεῖνος σείματα γέγονεν, μεταφορητικὸς τέκνος [Diog. Laert. 1.4.57].
⁶³ Cf. Chapter V.2.1(c) for a discussion on *Kunstsprache*.
⁶⁴ Pherecydes is said to be the first to write in prose [Pentemychos] in the mid sixth century, ca. 600BC-550BC; cf. Ar. *Metaphysics* 1091b.8; Diog. Laert. 1.11.116; *Suda* DK.7.A.2.
⁶⁵ Donatus [Life of Virgil 22ff] said that Virgil wrote the *Aeneid* in prose first. William Harris [Humanities and the Liberal Arts, http://community.middlebury.edu/~harris/] suggests that ‘this seems surprising’. It is his opinion that ‘the prose version was not a complete text but just an outline in note-form’. Most importantly he observes that ‘mechanical versification of a full prose version doesn’t sound like Virgil’s style’. Donatus [scholarship suggests his source was Suetonius] provides us with a detailed description of how Virgil versified; we find out that i) he ‘dictated’ verse he had thought about already; ii) that he edited the text and iii) that the
manifestation of poetic language. Furthermore, in the fifth century BC rhapsodic poetry was not a redundant medium for transmitting new or developmental concepts. Like Protagoras, the extant texts and references to Empedocles reflect the difficulties of emergent individual problem-solvers to communicate their ideas to a society whose thinking was in most social and religious contexts confidently cohesive (under the guise of nomos=social knowledge and norms and, as is argued below, endoxon=the collective agreement/accepted, common opinion of what is upright/to be respected).

3) The recognition and development of individual and public opinion and its relationship to persuasion through poetic speech

When considering fifth century BC text such as Parmenides' The Way of Truth and The Way of Seeming/Opinion or Gorgias' Encomium to Helen; On Not-Being or Defence of Palamedes, it is preferable to keep in mind that the complex meaning of doxa at times lacked the individualistic connotations it later gained. It is critical to note that doxa at this period did 'not express a private belief but was always the common opinion of a community.' Ekkehard Eggs' examination of Aristotle's thoughts on what constituted doxa and the use of poetry and language sheds some light on the issue. To begin with, Aristotle considered the parameters of problem-solving the same for either poet or public speaker, no matter the style of delivery; both had to recognise the necessary (anangkaion) and the probable (eikos). The concept that dialectical or rhetorical everyday inferences are based

_Aeneid_ was versified spontaneously. It does sound as if the prose was a structural plot framework rather than a line-by-line rendition. Donatus’ description of Virgil’s methods implies a poet who allowed poetic ‘inspiration’ unchecking Translation [P.T. Eden A Commentary on Virgil: Aeneid VIII, Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1975, p. 26]: ‘We are told that every day he used to dictate a very large number of verses which he had worked out in the morning, and during the whole day he would work them over and reduce them to a very small number, aptly saying that he gave birth to a shapeless poem like a mother bear giving birth to a cub, and that at long last he licked it into shape. The _Aeneid_ was first sketched in prose and set out into twelve books, and he began to versify it piece by piece as any part took his fancy and not taking anything systematically (nihil in ordinem arripiens); and, so that nothing should check his inspiration, he passed over some things which were unfinished (quaedam imperfecta transmissit) and others he propped up with trivial words, which he used to say were placed at intervals through a passage to serve as props (pro tibicinibus), to hold the work up until solid columns arrived.’

Cf. Chapters II.2, V.2.1-2.


Eggs, op. cit.

Eggs [op. cit., p.8] notes that such an opinion ‘has a reputation’ and reflects what is ‘usually the case or seems to be the case [Rhetoric 1402b 15], that is, the eikos, the probable.’ Cf. Eggs, ‘Logik’, in G. Ueding (ed.), Historisches Wörterbuch der Rhetorik, V, Tübingen, Niemeyer, 2001, col. 414-615; M. Mignucci, ‘Hos epi to poly und ‘notwendig’ in der Aristotelischen Konzeption der
on common opinion (endoxon) (as opposed to scientific inferences, which are based on necessarily true premises) is endorsed in the Topics and Analytics, as well as Rhetoric [Ar. Topics 100b.21-23; Analy Prior et Post. 70a.305, Rhetoric 1357a.15, app. 8.VII.13]. Furthermore, Aristotle believed accepted public opinion (ένδοξον) was best transmitted in metre, and this meant that 'the entire field of rhetoric, of linguistic-argumentative behavior in a community, must also - this is Aristotle’s basic conviction - be reflected in poetry. This is 'particularly true for the expression of thought'. As evidence for this Eggs cites this passage in Poetics:

> τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν ἐν τοῖς περὶ ῥητορικῆς κείσθω· τοῦτο γὰρ ἅδιον μᾶλλον ἔκεισθι τῆς μεθόδου, ἐστὶ δὲ κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν τούτα, ὡσα ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου δεί παρασκευασθῆναι, μέρη δὲ τούτων τὸ τε ἀποδεικνύει καὶ τὸ λείπει καὶ τὸ πάθη παρασκευασθείν (οἷον ἔλεον ἢ φόβον ἢ ὀργήν καὶ ὁσα τοιάντα) καὶ ἐτὶ μέγεθος καὶ μικρότητας, δήλων δὲ ὅτι καὶ ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν ἱδεῶν δεὶ χρῆσθαι ὅταν ἡ ἔλεεινα ἢ δεινὰ ἢ μεγάλα ἢ εἰκότα δεὶ παρασκευασθείν. [Aristotle Poetics 1456a 34-b4]

All that concerns Thought may be left to the treatise on Rhetoric, for the subject is more proper to that inquiry. Under the head of Thought come all the effects to be produced by the language. Some of these are proof and refutation, the arousing of feelings like pity, fear, anger, and so on, and then again exaggeration and depreciation. It is clear that in the case of the incidents, too, one should work on the same principles, when effects of pity or terror or exaggeration or probability have to be produced. [trans. Fyfe]

Aristotle's position is misunderstood by modern scholars whose perspective on poetry is that it plays a 'subsidiary' role in language. He viewed poetry as 'a particular form of reflective acquisition or appropriation of reality'; it is neither inferior, nor superior, to other forms of language, just different in the way it directs the 'appropriation of reality by means of aesthetic-mimetic experience'.

In view of Aristotle's criticisms of Empedocles' and Gorgias' excessive or inappropriate use of metaphor and, in Gorgias' case, excessive rhapsodic, Egg's

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70 Eggs, op. cit., p. 403.
71 Eggs, loc.cit.
72 Translator Fyfe gives his views in a footnote to 1456a: 'Thought'—no English word exactly corresponds with διάνοια—is all that which is expressed or effected by the words (cf. Aristot. Poet. 6.22, 23, and 25). Thus the student is rightly referred to the Art of Rhetoric, where he learns 'what to say in every case.' Aristotle adds that the rules there given for the use of ideas will guide him also in the use of incidents, since the same effect may be produced either by talk or by 'situation.'
74 Eggs, op. cit., pp. 418-419.
hypothesis seems to be going too far as it relates to extended written prose dialectic and pro and contra argument in rhetoric generally. Whilst it is true that elsewhere Aristotle does state that poetry, regardless of its metre, is ‘more philosophical’ (φιλοσοφώτερον) than non-metred history writing [Ar. Poetics 1451a-b, app. 8.VII.14], this seems to contradict his premise that Empedocles should be regarded, not as a poet, but as a writer on physics (τὸν φυσιολόγον) [Ar. Poetics 1447b.14-19, app. 8.VII.15]. Perhaps Aristotle’s solution can be discerned in his insistence of ‘the right mixture’ of meaningful metaphors and of elevated and common words that make sense [Ar. Poetics 1458a.20-34, app. 8.VII.16].

Perhaps there is too much stress on Aristotle’s blanket approval of ‘poetry’. Poetics opens with the statement that, while everyone else considered all forms of metre generically as ‘poetry’, and all who used any of the various metric forms as ‘poets’, Aristotle was making a distinction by which he judged subject matter the decisive criteria for linguistic categorisation of the various metres. Aristotle’s key emphasis was on the appropriateness of the language within each style and the creator’s ability to make appropriate connections between dissimilar subjects or things to connect concepts. As Chapter II.5-6 examined, in the fifth century BC generations before Aristotle, the transition from culturally collective orality to significant portions of the population being exposed to forms of explicit abstract prose-literate argument would have entailed periods of linguistic experimentation as to what was ‘appropriate’.

Within the concept of ‘appropriateness’ there is a dimension of time and place. This resembles the specific mental technique for recognising kairos (καίρος) accredited to Gorgias. In the discussion below of kairos as a rhetorical term, the concept of kairos appears as individualistic as doxa was a firm collective concept. Through these words can be traced a shift in perspective in the process of problem-solving and decision-making and relates directly to the teaching of the Sophists. For example, Parmenides exhibits an early indication of a shift in the meaning of doxa in which occurs the individualisation of problem-solving. Freeman describes the treatise as a ‘revelation’ and ‘exposition’ put ‘into the

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26 Cf. Ar. Poetics 1459a.
mouth of a goddess' who welcomes Parmenides into 'the realm of light in the 
Prologue' and 'throughout the rest of the poem instructs him in the ways of truth 
and falsehood, addressing him directly and speaking of the doctrines he is not to 
accept as 'the opinions of mortals'.

Parmenides is mythologising his own doxa 
into a form of endoxon (as explained by Aristotle). By presenting his thoughts 
through the voice of the goddess he legitimised his own individual opinion by 
initiating it into the collective endoxa.

From a psychological perspective this could be a written syntonic (not 
confronting audience values = endoxon) exercise of glossolalia, 'a mask for 
indicating unacceptable truths ... [where] compelling requests may be made, not 
only of one's fellow men, but also even of the gods themselves'. Glossolalia has 
recently been shown to have some peculiar characteristics in the 'explicit-
implicit' dichotomy that may relate to (to use Dennett’s term again) 'serial 
reasoning'. It is not a trance state and is unrelated to any psychic dysfunctions 
(such as schizophrenia, as has previously been suggested). Neither is the state 
the same state as singing. Neurological imaging found 'decreased activity in the 
prefrontal cortices' with the left hemispheric structures appearing to have 
significant decreases that were not observed in the right hemisphere: although 
it may be frenzied, subjects remain self-conscious and orientated yet unable to 
control movement or emotions. In some features then, it resembles the 
extended instances of the sensation, or fleeting consciousness of right 
hemispheric language processing as outlined in Chapter II.2. To some extent it 
also assists in understanding the hexametric approach Parmenides took to define 
judgement and how Gorgias, in prose writing, sought to explain his own 
thought processes. In the telling of unpalatable truths or propositions, public 
reaction / common opinion (endoxon) is a sensitive respondent. This has some

77 Freeman, The Pre-Socratic Philosophers, p. 141.
78 Ar. Topics 100b.21-23; Rhetoric 1402b.15; Prior Analytics 2.27, 70a.3-5; cf. Eggs, op. cit., pp. 402-05.
79 Rosemary Firth ['Speaking with Tongues', RAIN (Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain 
and Ireland), No. 20 (1977), pp. 6-7] reporting on the research of Loudon. Cf. J.B. Loudon (ed.), 
Religious Language', in Keith Brown et. al., (eds.), Encyclopedia of Language & Linguistics, 
80 Cf. Chapter II.2.
81 Andrew B. Newberg, Nancy A. Wintering, Donna Morgan, Mark R. Waldman, 'The 
Measurement of Regional Cerebral Blood Flow During Glossolalia: A Preliminary SPECT Study', 
4) Gorgias demonstrates he understands the psychology of his audience and the dynamics of persuasion

Regardless of de Romilly’s emphasis on Gorgias’ sincerity regarding his use of magic words and efforts to present himself as a mantiké, an acceptance of common opinion (ἔνδοχον) in the revelations relayed by divine inspiration is not featured in his surviving works. For example Gorgias’ On Not-Being (Περὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἤ Περὶ φύσεως) answers Parmenides’ poem. On Not-Being argues that nothing exists; that if anything does exist, it would be unknowable, but if it is the case that things do exist and can be known, the knowledge cannot be communicated to others. Like the other surviving Presocratic texts, it enquired into what constituted fact and what opinion. Parmenides addressed the issue by contending (as noted earlier from the mouth of the goddess) that, because truth is immutable while opinion is relative, one should not believe everything one sees or hears but instead should consider the reasonableness and logic of any proposition; that is, seek an intellectual analysis rather than take any empirical position. While his technique differs, as does his final hypothesis, Gorgias’ conceptual approach is similar to that of Parmenides and, according to Olympiodorus, was σύγγραμμα οὐκ ἀκομψόν (not without skill). Gorgias is original in the way he tackles the phenomenologists’ question of existence. Taking the relativistic approach like some, he nevertheless argues against both views; denying the ability to represent or recreate reality, contending that knowledge is reliant on human perception, dependent on situation and bound within a time-frame. McComiskey puts the ideas behind On Not-Being simply and clearly:

Humans can only think about things; they cannot think the things themselves. Thus, once a real thing is perceived by a human, it ceases to exist in a real sense, thereby distorting the existential nature of the thing perceived. Gorgias’ view that the act of human perception distorts reality allows him to deny the possibility of pure knowledge and atemporal rational thought. [p.24] … If things outside the psyche do not exist, Gorgias argues, then surely they do not exist inside the psyche.

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82 This is a sufficient overview however there are questions over the reliability of the two versions of the surviving text; cf. Hans-Joachim Newiger, Untersuchungen zu Gorgias’ Schrift über das Nichtseitende, Berlin, de Gruyter, 1973. For example, Wardy [op. cit., p. 152] criticizes Kerferd [op. cit.] because he tries to merge the two versions arguing that MXG is the ‘real’ Gorgias and that Sextus departed from the original. He stresses, ‘the general moral is that to aspire ‘to recover Gorgias’ original argument’ is to court disaster’.

83 DK.82.B.2
either...we can not 'know' in our psyches external realities as they exist (if they exist at all) external to our psyches.\textsuperscript{84}

Gorgias construes that truth cannot exist outside time and circumstance. Therefore, without immutable truth, there is no dishonour or disingenuity to seek the truth through the application of probabilities. His \textit{Defence of Palamedes} constructs an ethical argument from probability covering tripartite likelihoods (past, present and future). Gorgias blends this relativistic approach with psychological assessments of the tripartite dynamic, the speaker, the opponent and the body of judges.\textsuperscript{85} The same structural thinking is apparent in his \textit{On Not-Being} answer to Parmenides. Parmenides and Gorgias both identify and deliberate the function of power; defined in our own era as: authoritative power (religion, government, law); coercive power (physical offence/defence, judicial, military); charismatic power (personality) and manipulative power (exercised without the recipient's knowledge).\textsuperscript{86} Parmenides and Gorgias collapse three of these four categories into a single concept of persuasive power; which at first seems to be contradictory. Parmenides equates words with power, which effectively collapses the truth/opinion (τὰληθη/το δόκημα) dichotomy. He fuses the 'real' with the 'true' and suggests that truth/reality is objectively persuasive, something which is not a quality of opinion:

> Persuasion in this special sense recurs significantly throughout the deduction: ... [and] since the most conspicuous feature of Parmenidean persuasion is that it is ostensibly correlated with an objective factor, \text{alētheiē}, [truth] rather than being relative to a subjective or variable factor: it is not, say, 'persuasive for Peter' (but not for Paul), or 'persuasive today' (but not tomorrow).\textsuperscript{87}

Gorgias makes a similar move in the \textit{Encomium}, when (at the \textit{kairos} moment) he unexpectedly overturns common, accepted expectations (\text{éndoxa}) that he will argue that Helen did not allow herself to be persuaded but was abducted, and instead argues that she is innocent because she was virtually the victim of 'psychic rape'.\textsuperscript{88} It is 'the most illuminating example of the \textit{paradoξologia} to which Philostratus attributed Gorgias' fame - he unnervingly collapses the polarity ... between force and persuasion'.\textsuperscript{89} For example in \textit{Encom. 7, 8} and again in \textit{12} he equates abduction and rape with inventive and persuasion [quoted in app.

\textsuperscript{84} McComiskey, op. cit., pp. 24, 35-36.
\textsuperscript{87} Wardy, op. cit., pp. 9-10, 12-13
\textsuperscript{88} ibid., p. 43.
\textsuperscript{89} ibid., p. 35.
8.VII.17]. For Parmenides also (if his links between truth and persuasive power are as reliable as he proposes\textsuperscript{80}), the primary criteria for a successful speech is winning over an audience; which also collapses the concept of coercion with manipulation [DK.28.B8, app. 8.VII.18].

It is worthwhile to follow the argument further as it relates to the Encomium's deft compression of the coercive and manipulative aspects of power inherent in persuasion and its equation with the victimisation and manipulation of an audience. This 'looms large both in Gorgias' own writing, and in Plato's writing about him'.\textsuperscript{91} Often dismissed by 'pedestrian critics' as a whimsical and unimportant piece of sophistic, the Encomium 'fingers itself as a perfect specimen of underhanded persuasion'.\textsuperscript{92} It is not an egotistical 'Diese ist ein Kunststück der Worte, hinsichtlich der Gedanken nichts als leichte Spielerei',\textsuperscript{93} nor 'Unsachlichkeit ... [und] ... rein scherzhaft', as Blass and Gomprez judged.\textsuperscript{94} Schiappa calls it 'metarhetoric that attempts to theorise about oratory\textsuperscript{95} which somewhat coincides with the opinions of Cole, who nevertheless casts doubt on Gorgias' dexterity in the use of analogy. He questions the views of 'some critics' that Gorgias meant his analysis of the power of the logos to be 'an indirect glorification of his own profession'. Rather his intention was to extrapolate on his analogy of a drug-user providing defence evidence for another (Helen) who has committed a crime whilst under the influence of drugs:

A fairly lengthy expatiation on the power of such drugs to make a person do things he or she would not do otherwise is perfectly appropriate in such a situation, but one would not expect a general eulogy of them, much less an attempt on the part of the speaker to impress on the audience the exceptional powers his own pharmacological expertise confers. If this is the thrust of Gorgias's rhetoric at this point, it is rhetoric of a fairly inept sort.\textsuperscript{96}

This ignores the contemporary fifth century BC interest in the pharmacology of Hippocrates and his teacher Democritus, and neglects a deeply ingrained aspect

\textsuperscript{80} ibid., p. 13.
\textsuperscript{91} loc. cit.
\textsuperscript{92} ibid., p. 50. Wardy's line itself is a Gorian metaphor transposed into modern language.
\textsuperscript{93} [A masterpiece of words, but, intellectually, nothing but a crass gimmick]. Cf. F. Blass, \textit{Die attische Beredsamkeit}, (2nd ed.), Leipzig, 1887, p.81.
of Hellenic culture, a reverence for the intoxication of the symposion and before the battle and the cults of Dionysios, Asclepius and cththonic female cults relating to good- and ill-health.\footnote{Helen herself was knowledgeable about mind-altering drugs: cf. Odyssey 4.219-226.} The entire Encomium self-consciously documents the psychology of decision-making, illustrating the methods and processes of the imagination on deliberation. To take the final sentence - 'I did this as an amusement for myself' - as an indication that Gorgias tacitly approved of deception does not take into the account his warning that some speeches are 'written with skill, but not delivered with truth' (Encom. 13). Likewise, the piece generally explains how a listener reacts to a speaker, and his defence of the listener (Helen) over the persuader (Paris) is an indication that he is warning against the consequences of being unconsciously, unwittingly persuaded or manipulated; whether by a god or a person. The entire Encomium is a warning against gullibility in the face of entertainment. Plutarch attributed to Gorgias a conceptual framework on the psychology between audience and actors in the theatre which clearly theorised a different ethical construct regarding persuasion than the one seemingly presented in the Encomium.\footnote{Wardy, op. cit., p. 36. Cf. Thomas Buchheim, Die Sophistik als Avantgarde normalen Lebens, Hamburg, F. Meiner, 1986, Fragment 23.} This concept attributed to Gorgias by Plutarch ran along the same lines as Plato's, and later, Rousseau's 'social contract'; that a co-operative conspiracy is entered into between audience, performers and plot (logos). Gorgias recognised that myth in Tragedy, and the audience's sympathetic identification with characters and their experiences within the plot, constituted a co-operation between the 'deceivers' on stage who are doing a 'more just' thing than the audience, because the audience who is 'deceived' is wiser because they knowingly accept the deceit.

Gorgias also recognised the link between 'those technai that operate by means of drugs' (Encom. 14) or 'inspired verbal incantations' (10); and when a whole throng is charmed and persuaded (13) by a speech 'professionally writ' (technēi grapheis), not 'truthfully spoken' (alētheiai lextheis) was 'power, not artfulness'.\footnote{Cole, op. cit., p. 148.} In one sense the power is equal between himself and his audience. In Encomium 18 Gorgias states that his audience exercised their freedom to listen, just as they choose to look at beautiful objects, which, as he explained at the beginning of his speech (1), was the appropriate thing (endoxon) to do for any wise individual in
any ordered society.\textsuperscript{100} And, by telling them something new, he expected that they would react with the usual pleasure [quoted in app. 8.VII.19]. Conversely, he tells the audience that they do not have to listen if they do not wish to - the choice was the same as the choice to seek medical attention, look at a painting or sculpture, engage in religious ritual or listen to poetry. Gorgias exercised his power over words for the entertainment value, to himself and, with no disrespect, to his audience. Even Aristotle commended Gorgias on his sense of humour\textsuperscript{101} and recognised the broad knowledge of phenomenology expressed in his On Not-Being: ἀπαντεῖς δὲ καὶ οὗτος ἐτέρων ἀρχαίοτέρων εἰσίν ἀπορίαι (all philosophers [of them] including Gorgias are here dealing with difficulties of other older thinkers).\textsuperscript{102} In the Encomium Gorgias also shows he has knowledge of the current phenomenology and sophist thinking but, unlike Parmenides, he presented his own individual opinions on current phenomenology in the face of the collective ἐνδόξον, self-consciously and without glossolalia-like recourse to divine inspiration [Encom. 13-15, app. 8.VII.20].

Presocratics such as Parmenides and Empedocles stand between de Romilly’s muse-inspired creator who is a vehicle for the words of a divine and the conscious rhetorical techniques put to work by Gorgias and Protagoras. Whilst Plato refused to acknowledge the technology behind Gorgias’ methods, it is clear from his pedagogics, outlined in the Republic and a reference in Theaetetus [Republic 412e-413c, Theaetetus 201c-d, app. 8.VII.21], that he had paid serious attention to them. He recognised Gorgias’ effective use of language. Gorgias, was understood by the majority of his audiences; even though his poetic (‘special speech’) style was much criticised by Aristotle [Rhetoric 3.1.9-10, app. 8.VII.22]. The Encomium to Helen shows without a doubt that Gorgias understood the psychology of his audience, the dynamics of persuasion (πείθω) and the constitution of abstract pro and contra argument. In his On Not-Being and Encomium to Helen he considered the processes of reasoning and decision-making. In his Defence of Palamedes - still warning of the dangers of doxa (δόξην πιστεύω, ἀποστοτάων πράγματι (a most untrustworthy thing\textsuperscript{103}) - he demonstrated the use of probability to construct an ethical argument. There too

\textsuperscript{100} Thucydides [3.43] also puts this idea into Cleon’s speech.
\textsuperscript{101} Ar. Rhetorics 3.18.7 : 1419b.7.
\textsuperscript{103} DK82.B11.a.24.
he observed that the deliberative capacities of audiences can vary and therefore the message should be tailored by the medium [DK.82.B.11.37, app. 8.VII.23].

VII.3 GORGIAS AND THE CONCEPT OF KAIROS

1) The scholarly debate over the definition of kairos

It has been noted that Gorgias was accredited with developing a mental technique for recognising kairos which is variously interpreted as the ability of knowing the right moment to speak. In the extant texts we have belonging to Gorgias, the word καίρος is used only once and the connotation, it would seem, is in no way technical. In view of Aristotle’s criticisms of Gorgias, if the concept of kairos had a tangible technical and teachable application, he would probably have made mention of it. More probably it was a vaguer concept. The inference from Gorgias’ Defence of Palamedes, as well as the Dissoi Logoi, is that the best kairos was relative, and that peitho at kairos needed to be syntonic: For example:

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αλλά γὰρ οὐκ ὁ δὲ παρὼν καίρος ἤμαγκασε, καὶ ταῦτα κατηγορημένου, πάντως ἀπολογησασθαι [Gorgias, Defence of Palamedes, DK.82.B.11a.32]
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While it is not right for me to praise myself, the current circumstances [parὸn kairos] make it necessary to defend myself in any way possible. [trans. Leiper]

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καὶ γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων ὡδὲ θυμητῶσιν νόμων ὃμη διαίρων οὐδὲν ἐν πάντῃ καλὸν οὐδ’ αἰσχρόν, ἀλλὰ ταῦτ’ ἐποίησεν λαβὼν ὁ καίρος αἰσχρὰ καὶ διαλλάξας καλὰ διαιρῶν [Dissoi Logoi DK.90.2.19]
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Thus you will see that this other law of man divides itself. For nothing is fine or dishonourable in all respects, but the right moment/twisting moment takes the things that are dishonourable and changes them into fine things. [trans. Leiper]104

What follows suggests that kairos was something like a knack or some indefinable quality of thinking that plays a part in what Daniel Dennett in Chapter II.2 identified as ‘serial reasoning’. There are, however, many theories on kairos.

We have established that Gorgias consciously observed that an audience willingly allowed itself to be manipulated. De Romilly has suggested Gorgias believed that the right combinations of words were actually magic and could hypnotise or enthral a listener; in his Encomium he definitely states that magic

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words can manipulate a listener [Encom. 10, app. 8.VII.24]. It is clear that Gorgias could mould his logos to the intellectual capabilities of his audience. This is possibly a starting point to look for evidence of the mental technique of establishing kairos, and to consider where it fits in with the concept of doxa and peitho. There has been extensive definitional discussion.

In the first century BC Dionysus of Halicarnassus reported that Gorgias was the first to write specifically about the rhetorical concept of kairos, whilst Diogenes Laertius says Protagoras was first 'to emphasise the importance of seizing the right moment' (καὶ πρῶτος ... καιροὺ δύναμιν ἔξεχετο). Kerferd considers a doctrine of kairos fitted into a well-wrought conception of rhetoric, covering 'the whole art of public relations and the presentation of images', during the fifth century BC, even though he concedes that the technical term 'rhetoric' was not then in use:

When we put together the doctrines of the Probable or Plausible and the Right moment in Time, in relation to Opinion (or what men think or believe), it is clear that we have already the elements of a theory of rhetoric which can stand comparison with modern accounts of the technique of advertising.

Schiappa is far more cautionary, warning that an established technē of sophistic rhetoric was invented by Plato (as discussed in the previous chapter); and that 'the absence of a clear concept of rhétorikê or logôn technê in the fifth century BC requires a careful reconsideration of what is asserted in statements defining or describing the Sophists'. It is dangerous to neglect the significant differences in vocabulary used by fifth and fourth century BC writers. What is apparent is a growing complexity in the meaning of cognitive terms relating to cognitive processes. The word eidos (idea) has somewhat the same vagueness in meaning in the pathfinding exercises of the Presocratics and Sophists. Eidos is used to refer to general modes of discussion such as rhetorical or dialectical topos or 'to

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105 Dionysus of Halicarnassus, On Literary Composition 81.012, DK.9.52.
106 Kerferd, op. cit., p.82.
109 For example, Gilbert Ryle [Plato’s Progress, London, Cambridge University Press, 1966, pp.129-130] traces the evolution of peirastike which in the fifth century BC was clearly a practice without a name: ‘What Aristotle calls ‘peirastic’ (e.g. Topics 169b26, Met. 1004b26) is the dialectical method as employed to prick the bubble of an individual’s intellectual concept. He thinks he knows things, but is driven to concede propositions which he recognises to be inconsistent with what he thought he knew. Plato does not use the noun ‘peirastike’ but he and Aristotle both use the phrase πείρας παραηγήσαν (Topics 171b4; Pl., Gorgias 448a; Protagoras 348a; Euthydemus 275b; cf. Theaetetus 157c).’
one of the ultimate components of reality’ such as the atom of Democritus or to Plato’s Forms.

What seems a rhetorical metaphor can just as well be a heuristic analogy designed to extend the boundaries of knowledge; and a rhetoricial overstatement may be hard to distinguish from a straightforward exhortation to transform the character of attitudes and institutions.¹¹⁰

Süss reflects earlier modern views relating to Gorgias’ concept of kairos: it was calculating the incalculable (Erfassung der Imponderabilien).¹¹¹ Carter also discusses the rhetorical concept of kairos along with a later technique called stasis (stand). He compares Richard Enos’ view that they were opposing epistemologies (kairos=Empedoclean relativism and stasis=Aristotelian rationalism) and the view of Kathleen Freeman, who believes stasis emphasised political and judicial rhetoric whereas kairos was an earlier tradition of epideictic. He notes that ‘the most telling difference’ is Sprague’s view that stasis was a specific rhetorical strategy whereas kairos was no such techne; just as Aristotle had stated in Sophistical Refutations, ‘the results of an art but not the art itself’.¹¹²

It is tempting to blame Aristotle’s position on Plato’s influence, but because of his general independence of Plato’s point of view,¹¹³ other reasons need to be found to account for his dismissal of Gorgias as a speech-writer and teacher without a method [Ar. Rhetoric 3.1.9-10, app. 8.VII.22; On Sophistical Refutations 34.183b.36-184a.4, app. 8.VI.21]. There really is no clear contemporary evidence that Gorgias appropriated and technologised the word, kairos, but it is possible to infer a conceptual genesis from his extant works. To begin with, as already mentioned, he only uses the word once (in his extant works): in the passage in Defence of Palamedes quoted above. The meaning seems more linguistically organic than technical, and while a quasi conceptual use of kairos is mentioned by Gorgias’ students, Alcidamas and Isocrates, it is not clear that the term had any technical


context to these fourth century BC men either. For example Isocrates uses the word with the loose connotation of 'timing' or opportunity as 'the moment for action has not yet gone' and 'the ability to make proper use of [something] at the appropriate time' [Isoc. Panegrycus 4.9, 5, app. 8.VII.25]. Liddell and Scott list the contexts of kairos before it was elevated into the terminology of later theorists and they follow the sense as used by Isocrates and his fellow speech-writers.114

As noted, if kairos had any specific technical meaning at the time Aristotle was defining rhetoric as a literary genre, he would have mentioned it when categorising the processes of composition, but he mentions it only once in Rhetoric and only in the usual context of time and place [Rhetoric 3.14.9, app. 8.VII.26]. We may infer then that he did not elucidate because he did not possess any specific technical corpus on the matter from either Protagoras, Gorgias, Isocrates or anyone else. It is therefore probable that Gorgias was simply passing on a vague non-specific concept. That it was necessary at all to give students a conceptual grasp of time recalls Hesiod’s advice to an earlier generation whose concept of time was solely a cosmic construct. Cole, in the reverse of Kerferd’s position, suggests that Gorgias might have made reference 'via brief pronouncements as to its necessity or desirability' in texts that demonstrated how kairos functioned. But 'the slowness’ over the following century to develop rhetorical theory suggests that there were no oral antecedent theories.115 Plato leaves us with the inference that 'timing' was simply left to the student and suggests that Gorgias regarded it 'a matter he regarded as beyond his power as trainer for contests in excellence to control - perhaps beyond anybody’s power'.116

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114 Καιρός: 1. due measure, proportion, fitness, Hes., etc.; καιροῦ πέρα beyond measure, unduly, Aesch., etc.; μείζων τοῦ καιροῦ, Lat. justo major, Xen.
II. of Place, a vital part of the body, like τὸ καίριον, Eur.
III. of Time, the right point of time, the proper time or season of action, the exact or critical time, Lat. opportunitas, καιρὸς βραχὺ μετρὸν ἔχει ‘time and tide wait for no man’, Pind.; καιρὸν παριέναι to let the time go by, Thuc.; καιροῦ τρεῖξιν Eur.; καιρον λαμβάνειν Thuc.; ἔχειν καιρὸν to be in season, id=Thuc.—καιρός ἑστι, c. inf., it is time to do, Hdt., etc.
2. adverbial usages, εἰς ὅπερ ἐκ καιροῦ in season, at the right time, opportune, Hdt., etc.; so, ἐπί καιροῦ Dem.; κατὰ καιρὸν Hdt.; πρὸς καιρὸν Soph., etc.; and, without Preps., καιρῶ or καιρόν in season, attic—all these being opp. to ἀπὸ καιροῦ, Plat.; παρὰ καιρὸν Eur.; πρὸ καιροῦ prematurely, Aesch.
3. pl., ἐν τοῖς μεγίστοις κ. at the most critical times, Xen., etc.
IV. advantage, profit, fruit, τινὸς of or from a thing, Pind.; τί καιρὸς καταλεῖβειν; what avails it to ..., Eur.; óν κ. εἰπ where it was convenient or advantageous, Thuc.; μετὰ μεγίστων καιρῶν with the greatest odds, the most critical results, id=Thuc.
There is considerable scholarship that disagrees with this point of view. For example, Untersteiner, following Funaioli and Nestle, considers that Gorgias introduced the concept of kairos as a technique for speaking extempore, 'that which is fitting in time, place, and circumstance'. He sees a binary position for kairos that in rhetoric is 'a capacity', as well as 'a precept', entailing an ability to use kairos through a rule 'that guides somebody’s action':

[T]he speech must by means of καιρός, penetrate into δόξα, ... it is the capacity to improvise speeches, which Gorgias may have been the first to practise.

Scenters-Zapico takes up the concept of kairos as a cognitive capacity. Taking the 'concept of kairos in conjunction with On Nature [On Not-being]’ he suggests that Gorgias considered kairos as the 'will' or 'decision' of a speaker 'to break into the cycle of oppositions', and then to highlight a point, and therefore create a new perspective. Kairos, in effect, was a technique to bring about the moment of persuasion and made sophistic rhetoric 'a psychagogein guiding our souls to knowledge'. To add, Engnell’s reading of kairos is that it 'works as a guide for action, acting as an integrative concept that brings to light previously hidden logos'; the term is integral to Poulakos’s definition of sophistical rhetoric as: 'the art which seeks to capture in opportune moments that which is appropriate and attempts to suggest that which is possible'. To this can be added several other perspectives on kairos: ancient kairos covered many dimensions including 'ethical, epistemological, rhetorical, aesthetic, and civic - of human social activity'; Gorgias saw kairos as 'a radical principle of occasionality' where the force of persuasive language does not rest in truth or what is preconceived as

117 Cf. Pl. Mem 70b: καὶ δὴ καὶ τούτῳ τὸ ἴθως ὑμᾶς εἴδικεν, ἀφόβως τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς ἀποκρινεσθαι ἕαν τίς τι ἔρηται, ὡσπερ εἰκός τούς [...] he has given you the regular habit of answering any chance question in a fearless, magnificent manner, as befits those who know
119 Untersteiner, op. cit., p. 197.
realism, but is relative to the immediate context and whoever is doing the speaking.\textsuperscript{124}

Segal notes Dupréel considered Gorgias was the first to place a moral dimension on the concept of \textit{kairos}; a 'la morale de l'occasion',\textsuperscript{125} but himself sees a much more organic crystallisation of Gorgias' technical concepts. The fact that an organised ontological theory is absent in the works of Gorgias 'does not preclude the presence of a real rhetorical-aesthetic theory with some psychological basis'. The interest Gorgias showed in the problem of Being and in \textit{doxa}, 'whilst admittedly not to be construed as a sign of a systematic metaphysics', nevertheless may constitute 'a theory of communication and persuasion'; even 'a kind of psychology of literature'.\textsuperscript{126} The essential 'qualitative' element in the general conception of \textit{kairos} in the extant texts is relativistic; Gorgias' methodology in argument is 'to seize the opportune moment (\textit{kairos})' when language may persuade each individual listener into a 'communal desire for action'.

\textit{Kairos} cannot function as the basis of a rhetorical methodology within a foundational epistemology, since any time is the 'right time' when one possesses truth. ... \textit{kairos} functions best in the context of a contingent world view since universal truth does not know space or time.\textsuperscript{127}

A fragment of Dionysius of Halicarnassus stated that \textit{kairos} was not attainable through learning or knowledge \([\varepsilon \pi \sigma \tau \iota \mu \eta]\), but had something to do with opinion. This fragment is 'unfortunately not included in \textit{DK}' and therefore not widely commented upon.\textsuperscript{128} Dionysius confirms that Gorgias owned the concept, but gives the impression that even Gorgias did not try to ascribe to it a concrete technique. Here is the tract; Stephen Usher, the translator, explains \textit{kairos} as 'a theme of deliberative oratory' and chose 'good taste' as the meaning of \textit{kairos} following, for example, Aristotle and Quintilian in the sense of 'propriety', and earlier, Plato, in the sense of 'proper time'. This somewhat ignores other uses


\textsuperscript{126}Segal, op. cit., p. 102, 115.

\textsuperscript{127}McComiskey, \textit{Gorgias and the New Sophistic Rhetoric}, p. 18, 63. Cf. [p. 63]: 'Although Plato included a conception of \textit{kairos} in his own philosophical rhetoric, its purpose lies only the adaptation of universal truth to various audiences. But a sophistic and epistemic view of \textit{kairos} elevates its function to the very construction of knowledge in discourse, and it is this sophistic and epistemic view of \textit{kairos} that has been appropriated by Neosophists.'

\textsuperscript{128}Kerferd, op. cit., p. 82.
current in the fifth and fourth centuries BC such as Herodotus, Thucydides or Demosthenes’ meanings of ‘profit’, or ‘seasonable’, or ‘state of affairs’, or ‘changed circumstances’.

Such translations highlight the abstract nature of the concept:

\[ \text{άλλ' ἐπὶ πάντων οἴσαμε δεῖν τὸν καιρὸν ἠρᾶν: οὗτος γὰρ ἁδονῆς καὶ ἀριστίας κράτιστον μέτρον. καιροῦ δὲ οὕτε μήτερ οὔδεις οὔτε φιλοσοφεῖς εἰς τὸ δὲ γε τέχνην \δύρειν, οὐδὲ ὅπερ πρῶτοι ἐπεχείρησι περὶ αὐτοῦ γράφειν Γοργιαὶ τὸ Λεοντῖνος οὐδὲν ὑπὲρ τί καὶ λόγου δεῖν ἐγγράψιν: οὔδὲ ἔχει φύσιν τὸ πράγμα εἰς καθολικὴν καὶ ἐντεχνῶν τινα περιλήμνει πεσεῖν, οὐδὲ \δόλως ἐπιστήμη θηρατὸς ἐστιν ὁ καιρὸς ἀλλὰ δοξῆ.} \[Dionysius Halicarnassus, On Literary Composition 12.37-46]\]

I think we must in every case keep good taste [τὸν καιρὸν] in view ἠρᾶν, for this is the best measure of what is pleasurable and what is not. But on the subject of good taste [καιροῦ] no rhetorician or philosopher has produced a definitive treatise up to the present time. Even the first man who set his hand to writing about it, Gorgias of Leontini, succeeded in writing nothing that was worth mentioning. Indeed, the nature of the subject is not such that it can be covered by an all-embracing, technical method of treatment, nor can good taste [καιρός] in general be pursued successfully by science [ἐπιστήμη], but only by judgment [δοξῆ]. [Trans. Usher]

2) Kairos as an instance of ‘serial reasoning’; a moment of rational realisation and the decisive moment of successful persuasion

Thus in fact it would seem that kairos is not a technique, but a recognition of a spatial moment in the intellectual process of ‘serial reasoning’ or analysis. The arrival at stasis. It would seem McComisky’s remark about universals comes near the mark. In the Encomium, Gorgias equates the cognitive processes with other physical visceral functions and malfunctions (nosemata). Segal notes the significance: ‘The psyche is thus elevated to the place of physical reality’. Gorgias therefore collapses time and space, just as he did with power and persuasion. This makes sense of his opening paragraph of the Encomium which Cole dismissed as ‘a largely irrelevant introduction’. With dual aspects of time and place, Gorgias’ concept of kairos stands at the juncture between chaos (not-knowing) and cosmos (knowing); it is the moment of realisation, of decision-making. This is another Satzparallelism occurring in the Gorgian concept of kairos; a unity of opposites accomplished through the occurrence of kairos.

Gorgias speaks of the acquisition of new knowledge as pleasure [Encom. 5, app. 8.VII.27]. The word used, terpsis, applies to the same sensation of poetic

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130 Segal, op. cit., p. 104.

131 Cole, op. cit., p. 76.
inspiration and for audience response, and equates to the sudden realisation that new knowledge has been acquired; what neuroscientists call 'the ah-ha! moment'. Gorgias' idea of the pleasurable moment of knowledge acquisition, therefore, can be equated with the *kairos* moment. It correlates with the sudden realisation of new knowledge that enables one to discriminate between alternatives or random thoughts; the moment when the potential for a decision to be made has arrived. That Gorgias was conscious of, and seeking to explain, such processes of serial thinking may be surmised from another of his methods:

Gorgias developed a method sometimes called 'apagogic', in which the speaker sets out all the possibilities and then argues against each in turn. Gorgias makes use of this method in *Helen* and *Palamedes*, as well as in *On Not-Being*, and the plaintiff in Antiphon's *First Tetralogy* catalogues the other likely suspects, arguing against each in turn. [see Kennedy *Art of Persuasion*, pp.306-314] ... The apagogic method can be seen as a forerunner of Plato's method of *diaeresis*, [*diaerein* = to divide] whereby a subject is broken down by repeated division into parts. Plato's method seeks to eliminate the 'loophole' [too many possibilities] in the apagogic method, ... but the apagogic method is often more useful in the kinds of cases for which rhetoric is actually used.  

*Apagoge* is more useful than *diaeresis* and its prerequisite is the ability to generate original written prose and not rote learned *gnômai* (*loci communes*). Furthermore, this concept of *kairos* as an ah-ha! moment is binary in that it can be applied to both the composer of the speech, when he realises how to argue the case, and to the audience, when they are drawn to the conclusion. The mental technique of establishing *kairos* is to bring the audience to their ah-ha! moment - which resembles Gorgias' last comments in the *Encomium*. Gorgias' meaning is that it is not through audience manipulation, but by taking the audience into his confidence, 'to share or even, if possible to anticipate for themselves, the excitement and exhilaration of discovery or pseudodiscovery'. He notes that the *ekklesia* was keen to listen to new forms of argument. In the dual speeches of Cleon and Diodotus, Thucydides presents a situation in which 'speaker and audience alike are afflicted by a misplaced faith in discourse as a panacea ... [compared to] ... Diodotus’s attack on the opposite situation, in which distrust of discourse is so widespread that speakers must be cautious of sounding too

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134 Cole, op. cit., p. 143
informed and intelligent'.\textsuperscript{135} Thucydides therefore gives precedent to Alcidamas' observations on the ambiguity of audience response and echoes Gorgias' tenet of pleasure in realisation [Thuc. 3.38.5-7, app. 8.VII.28].

VII.4 CONCLUSION

In the extant works available it is apparent that the calibre of sophistic students varied. By the very existence of the texts of Alcidamas, Isocrates and the other logographers who were themselves the students of Sophists teaching in Athens, it is clear that students were taught to construct extended written prose composition. Not all attained the heights of dialectic excellence as Alcidamas or Isocrates, but there are indications that the curriculum left them well-versed in contemporary thinking and with composition influenced by Gorgias. For example, the Dissoi Logoi, dated ca.399\textsuperscript{b}C,\textsuperscript{136} shows sophistic teaching encompassed contemporary issues and current theories. Freeman considers them 'superficial and casuistic'.\textsuperscript{137} Does she mean that the pieces were designed to mislead and justify deceitfully, or that they merely use commonplace/general principles to reach conclusion between opposing sets of premises? The second meaning would be a fairer description of the calibre of the Dissoi Logoi. Although a mishmash of Doric, old Attic and Ionic, the writings reveal a knowledge of the teachings of Protagoras, Hippias, Heracleitus and perhaps Socrates, whose (reported) negativity towards poetics for analytics is voiced in some of the alternate arguments which swing on the usual Platonic dichotomy - metre is not efficacious to argument (καὶ τοῖς ποιητοῖς οὗ [το] ποτὶ ἀλάθηαν, ἀλλὰ ποτὶ τὰς ἀδονάς τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὰ ποίηματα ποιέοντι)\textsuperscript{138} - whilst a knowledge of poetical, tragic and the plastic arts surface in the contra arguments. The influence of Gorgias is apparent in one relativistic case made for justice; it reflects the relativistic influence of both Protagoras (in form) and Gorgias (echoing the Defence of Palamedes and On Not-Being), and possibly the concept of kairos within the last section (5) of the piece [Dissoi Logoi 4.1-5, DK.90, app. 8.VII.29].

\textsuperscript{135} Ibid., p. 144; cf. Thuc. 3.43.2-3.
\textsuperscript{137} Freeman, op. cit., p. 417.
\textsuperscript{138} DK.90.3.17.
The *Dissoi Logoi* also provides a rundown of the curriculum and the ethical responsibilities an average sophist student must learn [*Dissoi Logoi* 8.1-12, DK.90, app. 8.VII.30] and the *Anonymus Iamblichus* mirrors the same teaching. Wilamowitz, followed by Freeman, consider the anonymous schtick quoted by Iamblichus to be small-minded (geringer Geist), without 'any touch of inspiration or originality'.\(^{139}\) It is probably the work of an Attic student, and for all its faults, shows considerable tuition in contemporary thinking, albeit conservative. The treatise, in old Attic, praises the pursuit of φιλοσοφία, dedication to study and the acquisition of knowledge,\(^{140}\) and to the conscious consideration of intellectual ethics.\(^{141}\) It counsels respect for the law\(^{142}\) and a striving for excellence through adherence to traditional civic and military values and dedication to the collective.\(^{143}\) It has the 'poetic colouring ... diffuseness ... artificial word echoes ... pairing phrases, and clauses of similar meaning' as well as a structure 'in the manner of Protagoras as a set of contrasted λόγοι.\(^{144}\) Its observations on the consequences of a bellicose and factional legislature anticipates elements of Plato's *Republic*,\(^{145}\) while other sections recall Gorgias' *Encomium* in its comprehension of the power of persuasion and appeal for reason [*Anon. Iamblichus* 1.3-7, DK.89.2, app. 8.VII.31].

The following chapter attends to the generalised status of Sophists; the extent to which sophist teaching became common property; the psychological consequences of 'greats' such as Protagoras and Gorgias and the effect on the Athenian collective.

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140 DK.89.2. p.96.1.1; 96.1.6-7.
141 DK.89.2. p.96.2.7-8; 3.p.97,16.1.
142 DK.89.6.p.100.5.1-5; 7.p.10111.1-16.
143 DK.89.5.p.99.18.1.
CHAPTER VIII
CONTEXT AND CONSEQUENCES:
THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF SOPHISTIC EDUCATION,
STUDENTS, TEACHERS, TECHNIQUES
AND THE SEARCH FOR 'ΕΒΟΥΛΙΑ AND ΕΥΔΟΞΙΑ

What a monument of human smallness is this idea of the philosopher-king.


VIII.1 ABSTRACT

Section VIII.3 examines the historiography on the Sophists generally, with section VIII.4 considering the students and their particular influence on sophistic education.

A prevalent view that only a small wealthy elite were educated by the Sophists is challenged. While this scenario may apply to education for the pentacosiomedi
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noi pre-480s,\(^1\) the Laurium silver finds of that period and the expansion of the fleet shifted the dynamics of the economy. It extended wealth to more citizens who could then afford to educate their children for increasingly extended periods. The result was more ephebes with a firmer grasp on functional literacy and some with further education in the development of extended written forensic arguments.

As in earlier generations, the Athenians’ pragmatic approach to wealth did not change. It is most important to note that Athens was an open society where citizens could move within the ranks.\(^2\) In a fluid economy, where the state put heavy financial obligations and punishments on wealth, especially during state crises, the survival of the oikos (including the extended family) and phratry (brotherhood groups) were paramount.

The beginning of the Peloponnesian war in 431BC again altered the socio-cultural balance. The first years saw Spartan raids on crops and the evacuation of land-holding farmers from Attica into city villas, or camps between the long walls.\(^3\) This would have resulted in economic hardship for those who lost their means of production. Following that, around 10,000 individuals died of the plague. The resultant skills shortage, for males between 14 and 60, would have made those wealthy enough to sponsor training programmes resolved to so so; not just for the children in their direct family but for other intimates of their extended families, if their phratry or deme required it. Apart from agricultural and trades-based vocations, the Athenian democratic structure required a significant and consistent number of literate citizens to hold office. Therefore, with 25% of all office holders dead, it would have been natural that young clan members who showed aptitude in elementary reading and writing would have been chosen, regardless of their wealth ranking, for further education to train them in civics. The power dynamics within oikoi, phratries and demes was an unrelenting imperative.

Section VIII.5 considers the political dimensions of sophistic education and its influence on political and civic events in the last decades of the century. It considers the psychological dysfunction caused within the community by those who were trained to write extended abstract pro and contra arguments in prose and to deliver them with varying degrees of competency to their fellow citizens; citizens who were learning, through listening, to decipher some of the

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\(^1\) The highest of Solon’s property ranks was the pentacosiomedi
di

noi, expected to produce above 500+ medimnoi (an agricultural weight calculated to money ratio roughly equivalent to one drachma) of agricultural goods. Next came the hippeus with expected output of 300+ medimnoi, zeugitai at 200+ medimnoi and thetes, who were citizens producing less than 200 medimnoi or those without land. However, this was no indication of real wealth because income from commerce and trade was not counted. Cf. Appendix 2.2.

\(^2\) Cf. Appendix 2.

\(^3\) Thuc. 2.13-14, 17.
complexities of abstract probability arguments, even though they were unable to compose such cohesive extended written arguments themselves. The problem manifested itself mostly in the *dikasterion* and *ekklesia*.

**VIII.2 OVERVIEW**

After the two year *ephebia* the Athenian male became a full citizen. The majority took up their vocations, along with their civic and military duties. A minority pursued further education. This was generally designed to make them more capable in the supervision of civic tasks (‘banking literacy’ and ‘officials’ literacy”) and better at public speaking (extended prose literacy). What proportion of the citizen population actually received sophistic training cannot be statistically determined. Those belonging to influential families were educated to take their part in maintaining the clan’s influence in the direct democracy. However, to judge by the numbers of conservatives who resisted sophistic teaching, not all wealthy families sent off their youth to be taught by Sophists. In itself, this did not mean that these men could not function politically in the *ekklesia* and *boulê* or *dikasterion*; just as Aristotle observed, the ability to persuade was an innate characteristic of human discussion [*Rhetoric* 1.1-2; app. 8.VIII.1].

The historiography has sometimes coloured the picture of who were the students, and what impact such sophistic teaching had on the decision-making capabilities of Athenians. The general reputation and educational competence of the sophistic teachers is considered below.

**VIII.3 THE PRESOCRATIC SOPHIST TEACHERS**

It is difficult to form a realistic profile of Sophists because they were maligned in antiquity for philosophical reasons, and have been given a bad reputation by the scholiasts and subsequent scholars. They were disliked by some of their contemporaries, but it was for pragmatic, rather than philosophical, reasons. The Sophists were developing innovative theories and methods of teaching and problem-solving which upset the status quo. As the previous two chapters noted, some Sophists were well acquainted with the hypotheses of the Presocratic

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4 *Ar. Ath. Pol.* 42.3-5; cf. Appendix 3.5.
phenomenologists, but this has not prevented them being misunderstood when not firmly situated in their proper historical period before words such as 'philosophy' and 'rhetoric' had been coined and categorised. Isocrates, for example, only a few generations after, saw no difference between the Presocratic phenomenologists and Sophists, yet, as examined below, some accidents of history and later scholarship created a divide. Here are some of the various approaches over the last two centuries:

i) George Grote thought the Sophists were disparate teachers without any unified philosophical doctrine

ii) Eduard Zeller and Wilhelm Nestle considered 'sophistry' and 'philosophy' so alike that both were part of a single 'educational discipline'

iii) W.K.C. Guthrie maintained the Sophists' interest in natural phenomena was typical of most of the Presocratics and considered the empiricism and scepticism of the Sophists comparable with the idealism of Plato

iv) Mario Untersteiner suggested the Sophists 'agree in an anti-idealistic concreteness' which discarded 'the mythopoeic mode of thought' even though they continued to use myths as 'an externalised form of thought''

v) Henri Marrou denied the Sophists any part in philosophy or science, considering them 'only' teachers.

Lloyd adds a further point that, while none of the famous Sophists of this period could be described as 'an original scientist', they pursued interests in astronomy, physics and biology, and raised the general level of education in scientific subjects as well as politics and rhetoric. It is clear that one of the main reasons for the many negative attitudes towards sophistic education is bound up in philosophical study and not in the history. For Chambliss, they were viewed unfavourably because they were 'the losers' against Socrates' dialectics or, 'opportunists' in Isocrates' orations, or as theoreticians 'refuted by Aristotle'.

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6 Isoc. *Antidosis* 15.258.
11 Chambliss, op. cit., p. 43.
Alternatively, Kerferd, sees the sophistic movement as 'a social phenomenon,' suggesting that an historical approach is 'clearly essential' in order to make sense of the individual Sophists and their ideas. The quote below regarding the mood of pre-WWII scholarship, provides a clear example of how a scholar's own experience can impact on setting the Sophists in their correct historical space:

The Great Age of Greek Enlightenment was also, like our own time, an Age of Persecution - banishment of scholars, blinkering of thought, and even (if we can believe the tradition about Protagoras) burning of books. This distressed and puzzled nineteenth-century professors, who had not our advantage of familiarity with that kind of behaviour. ... Hence a tendency to cast doubt on the evidence wherever possible; and where this was not possible, to explain that the real motive behind the prosecutions was political.

Whilst Dodds' opinion is insightful, this pre-ordained approach to Sophists colours and distorts the perspective. A modern analogy is how, whenever the history of flight is cinematically represented, it invariably begins with eyewitness footage of men, equipped with flapping devices attached to their arms, belly-flopping off cliffs or bridges. The underlying symbolic message mocks the innovators whilst lauding present-day aviation technology. The same effect is generated by Plato's passing parade of Sophists. Although they were historical figures, Plato worked his own theories by pitting his ideas against these leading innovative thinkers of the previous century. Naturally he cast them in an agonal position, because his viewpoint differed from theirs. It would have been pointless to allow their propositions to defeat his own hypotheses, especially as his dialogues were probably intended as educational tools.

The scarcity of extant texts is, as mentioned, another problematic aspect in determining the calibre and influence of many Sophists. De Romilly also highlights additional problems associated with text interpretation in the modern

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12 Kerferd, op. cit., pp. 12, 22.
14 The epitome which incorporated all the stock footage of early aviation attempts is Those Magnificent Men in their Flying Machines, 20th Century Fox, Ken Annakin (Director), 1965.
era: scholars need to be both philologist and philosopher, ‘two skills that are seldom evenly balanced’. Translation ends up being either a ‘Hegelian’ or a ‘Nietzschean’ interpretation, ‘a way of thinking that is more specialised, and more modern, than the thinking of the Sophists’. Closer to the period is Plato, who allows Protagoras to relate the historical context of Presocratic sophistry:

My own view is that the sophist’s profession has been around for a very long time; it’s just that people who practised it in the past devised covers for their profession and disguised it, because they were worried about offending people. Some of them used poetry as their cover: Homer, for example, and Hesiod, and Simonides. Others used religious cults and oracular songs: Orpheus and Musaeus. And I’ve noticed some people even use athletics-training, like Icicus from Taras, and another who’s still alive and as good a sophist as any: Herodicus from Selumbria (although he’s from Megara originally). And music; that was used as a cover by your own Agathocles - a great sophist - and by Pythoclines from Ceos, and plenty of others. All these people, I’m saying, hid behind the screens of these various professions, because they were scared of people’s resentment. But in my case, that’s exactly where I do things differently from all of them. ... They completely failed to achieve what they intended: they never fooled the powerful people in their cities; and they’re the only ones the disguises were aimed at (because, let’s face it, ordinary people never notice anything anyway; they just repeat whatever’s dictated to them by the powerful). ... I freely admit that I’m a sophist and that educating people is my job; and I believe that method of protecting myself - admitting what I do rather than denying it - is far better than theirs. And I’ve taken a number of other measures besides that, the result of which is that nothing terrible ever happens to me - touch wood - through my admitting that I’m a sophist. And I’ve been practising my profession now for many years. [trans. Adam Beresford]

As an example of de Romilly’s point, a footnote to this passage in Adam Beresford’s popular translation reads as follows:

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25. The claim that these poets were sophists disguised as poets, taken literally, is a tongue-in-cheek absurdity (typical of the sophistic style). But poets were widely regarded as moral educators, and that is how Protagoras sees himself.\textsuperscript{17}

This philosophical perspective builds a smokescreen around the historical Sophists, and Plato’s views on them and their place in time. As Hecataeus, Herodotus, Thucydides and Xenophon had already produced their works, Plato would have had a sense of history. It was a sense to which he adhered, because he did not place any sophist out of his period. Also, while the words of Plato’s Sophists are not verbatim\textsuperscript{18}, he probably gives the general drift of each sophist’s intellectual position. Their teaching methods are also likely to have been recognisable, because Plato would not want contradiction by contemporaries who had been students of the particular Sophists in question.\textsuperscript{19} Plato’s manipulation of the argument to give him the winning hand does not equate to a misrepresentation of the sophist’s point of view. A further point to Beresford’s footnote is that, as has been illustrated elsewhere, some Presocratics did compose in poetry and so were poets, while some performed with a poetical delivery similar to the \textit{rhapsode}. Plato’s description of Protagoras is a prime example of what Egbert Bakker would call a speechmaker using ‘special speech’ \textit{[Protagoras 315b; app. 8.VIII.2].}\textsuperscript{20} Likewise, in the opinion of translator Adam Beresford, Protagoras’ myth (in Plato’s \textit{Protagoras}) is written in an ‘artificially rhythmic language with many unusual turns of phrase’.\textsuperscript{21} It is a set piece, and even if it is Plato experimenting with literary style, it is likely a reasonable reflection of the way Protagoras delivered his lectures. In the passage quoted above, Plato may have been working to develop his own theories against the hexameter, but Protagoras’ decision not to ‘hide’ behind poetry, and the music and language of ritual, in order to escape censure \textit{was} courageous. It is also in keeping with other evidence; consider the rhapsodically-styled performances noted in the previous

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{17} Adam Beresford, \textit{Plato: Protagoras}, London, Penguin, 2005, p. 146, fn. 25. This is the next footnote, 26: In the Phaedo (69c) Socrates makes a rather similar claim about \textit{[Orpheus and Musaeus]} ... i.e. that the Mystery cults that these mythical singers were connected with, and supposedly founded, were perhaps a form of philosophy in disguise.
\item \textsuperscript{18} Just as Thucydides [1.22] makes clear was the case with the sophistic speeches in his work.
\item \textsuperscript{19} For example Diogenes Laertius [6.24-27, 40, 53] cites various anecdotes relating Diogenes of Apollonia’s contempt for Plato’s teaching. Another adversary was Antisthenes, Diogenes teacher, who wrote a dialogue, \textit{Sathon}, against Plato’s theories and another was Aristippus, tutored by Socrates and a fellow student of Plato; cf. Diog. Laert. 6.3, 7-8; 3:35-36.
\item \textsuperscript{21} Beresford, op. cit., p. 147.
\end{itemize}
chapter by other Presocratics.\textsuperscript{22} The only extant Athenian prose writers known to be active in Protagoras and Pericles’ generation were Phercydes, the genealogist whom Thucydides considered, ‘cleverest of them all’, and a younger Antiphon.\textsuperscript{23} Furthermore, Xenophon’s criticism of the Sophists lays more emphasis and criticism on styles of writing and delivery \textit{[On Hunting 13.1-6, 8-9; app. 8.VIII.3]}. The distinction between philosophy and sophistry is contemporary to the fourth century BC and is one of aspect in problem-solving techniques and methods of teaching it, rather than a \textit{nom de profession}. In this regard the historical Socrates may be identified as a sophist because he was both teacher and thinker in a period when terms such as ‘philosophy’ and ‘rhetoric’ had not been coined.\textsuperscript{24} The discussion on this topic in Chapter VI.2 concluded that the absence of genre classifications did not mean that sophist teachers were without a 'self-

\textsuperscript{22} Chapter VII.2.2.
\textsuperscript{23} Thuc. 8.68.1.

The first Athenian prose writer \textit{[History of Leros, Iphigeneia, On the Festivals of Dionysus, Genealogiai (extant)]} is generally recognised to be Phercydes of Leros and/or Phercydes of Athens who was active early in the fifth century BC. There is however controversy over which was the precise generation (Miltiades’ or Cimon’s) in which he was active. There is also controversy as to whether this is also history’s Phercydes of Syros (from the south-easterly island not too far off the coast of Attica). Phercydes of Syros was purported to be the earliest writer of prose (ca. 540BC) \textit{[Diog. Laert. 1.11.116-122; DK.7]}. He wrote an allegory myth/history \textit{Heptamykos} \textit{[Ar. Metaphysics 1091.b.6-12]}. Some ancient writers maintained that there were three Phercydes. Cf. F. Jacoby, ‘The First Athenian Prose Writer’, \textit{Mnemosyne}, Vol. 3, No. 13 (1947), pp. 13-64; George Huxley, ‘The Date of Phercydes of Athens’, \textit{Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies}, Vol. 14, No. 2 (1973), pp. 137-143; G.S. Kirk, J.E. Raven and M. Schofield, \textit{The Presocratic Philosophers}, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1957, pp. 50-71; William V. Harris, \textit{Ancient Literacy}, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1991, p. 50.

Aesop of Samos is said to have lived mid-sixth century, but there is no evidence that he wrote in prose. Herodotos [2.134-5] is the earliest reference and he is described as a \textit{logos} maker (\textit{Αἴσχωτο τοῦ λογοσισιβοῦ}) as are other oral poets. Socrates \textit{[Phaedo 61b]} indirectly indicates that Aesop was metred and that his own imitation of him would also be \textit{μυθολογικός}. Hecataeu of Abdera (ca. b.550) wrote \textit{Travels}, and \textit{Genealogiai} \textit{[DK.73]}. The early Ionian prose writers evolved from antecedents who wrote in poetry and include (possibly) Anaximander (610-546) \textit{[cf. F. Solmsen, American Journal of Philology, Vol. 87, (1966), pp. 99-105 at p. 104; Eric A. Havelock, Preface to Plato, Cambridge, Mass., Belknap Press, 1963, p. 308, n.38; Harris, op. cit., p. 50, n.22]; Anaxagoras (500-428); Anaximenes (585-525) and Heraclitus of Ephesus who followed on from the oral or poetic thinkers Thales, Pythagoras, Alcmene and Empedocles. Atomist Leucippus probably taught Democritus of Abdera (460-370) his prose \textit{[DK.68.B.1-298]}. Eleatic Melissus of Samos \textit{[DK.30.B.1-10]} and Zeno of Elea (Aristotle said he invented dialectic, so if he wrote anything, he probably wrote in prose \textit{[cf. Diog. Laert 9.5.25 citing Aristotle]}. Both followed up the thinking of poets Xenophanes of Colophon (570-470), and Parmenides of Elea (510-440). Hellanicus (ca. 490-405) wrote prose history of Attica \textit{[Thuc. 1.97.2; F. Jacoby, Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker (FGrHist) No. 4, Leiden, Brill, 1954-1969]}. Plato \textit{[Symposium 177b]} confirmed their works were known in Athens and the use of prose writing in sophistic education by ca. 430: Or take our good professional educators, the excellent Prodicus for example; they write prose eulogies \textit{[πανου χαλογιδην συγγραφευ]} of Heracles and others.

conception' of teaching what the fourth century BC would call a 'philosophical' curriculum.

Like Marrou, Beresford, et al., Kirk and Raven did not consider that their list of 'Presocratic philosophers' should include the Sophists, 'whose positive philosophical contribution, often exaggerated, lay mainly in the fields of epistemology and semantics'. The problem is, much of Plato's philosophy is exactly concerned with defining the fields of epistemology and semantics, and no one would exclude Plato's philosophical contribution because of that. What is more, their educative value was not lost on Plato, who included elements in the curriculum of his ideal state. While Plato, Xenophon and Aristotle were generally unsympathetic to sophistry as a practice, they also praised and clearly respected some individual Sophists. In fact, Aristotle also designated Gorgias as a philosopher when he wrote his treatise, On Gorgias. In addition to earlier citations in previous chapters, Plato also writes that Prodicus was the best (ὁ βέλτιστος Πρόδικος), a brilliant man (Προδίκου πάσσαφος) and that Protagoras was the greatest thinker alive at the time. Plato's Socrates was most keen to hear Gorgias and was impressed by his dialectical talent; Hippias, while generally represented as egocentric, was nevertheless an intellectual and a fine expert. While Aristotle notes 'men were justly disgusted' with Protagorean alternative arguments in which lies and truth 'appear equally probable', he approved of Protagoras' attention to linguistic precision. And, Aristotle was not averse to using probability argument himself. In the same vein, he thought Gorgias' style was 'too much like poetry', yet he praised his use of irony and wit and even quotes from one of Gorgias' epideictic speeches.

27 Ar. On Gorgias 980b.20, quoted in Chapter VII.2.4.
28 Pl. Symposium 177b, Protagoras 315e. (This was in 432BC when Protagoras was 58 and Socrates 38.)
29 Pl. Gorgias 447b, 449d.
30 Pl. Protagoras 337c, Hippias Mai. 281a.
31 Ar. Rhetoric 2.24.11: καὶ ἔντευθεν δικαιῶς ἐδυσκέραινον οἱ ἀνθρώποι τὸ Πρωταγόρου ἐπάγγελμα· ψεύδος τε γὰρ ἐστιν, καὶ οὐκ ἄλληθες ἄλλα φαινόμενα εἰκὸς ... [Wherefore men were justly disgusted with the promise of Protagoras; for it is a lie, not a real but an apparent probability ... .]
32 Ar. ibid. 3.3.4, 3.7.11, 3.18.7, 3.14.2.
Such ambivalence towards the Sophists suggests that the reasons for their unpopularity at the time were more complex than philosophical differences and a blanket rejection of teachers who took money for tuition. The evidence indicates that Sophists were disliked by some of their contemporaries because they were developing new theories and methods of teaching which both intellectually and politically upset the status quo. This was vocalised in 423/2 BC when Aristophanes had the Presocratics and Sophists en masse in his sights. In Clouds, not only did he ridicule Socrates as a bare-footed, badly dressed, aged, 'Muse-loving hunter of reason' (ὡς πρεσβύτα παλαιογενής θηρατὰ λόγων φιλομούσων), he parodied several hypotheses of the phenomenologists. While it is obvious that Aristophanes understood the various theories and had possibly read the written works, it is possible that Aristophanes was not himself totally conscious of the subtle contradictions he had created in The Clouds. An example is the parodying of Socrates and the processes of antithetical argument, yet Aristophanes singles out Prodicus, a teacher of public speaking, as the only one of the 'specialist cosmologists' worthy of respect for his intellect. Although a pupil of Prodicus, Socrates, according to Plato, rejected epideictic and probability arguments in favour of question-and-answer peiristic dialectic. Yet, Aristophanes entraped him in the pose of a sophist teacher, willing to instruct Strepisides in antithetical argument. Aristophanes appears against Presocratic and sophistic investigation, yet he parodies equally the traditional 'old days' and 'old ways' as well as contemporary Athenian education in his development of the Logos and Antilogos characterisations. The generation after, in the Frogs, Aristophanes presents zeugitai and thetes practising the analysis through dialectic that Plato praised [Frogs 1069-1073; app. 8.VIII.4].

Too much Plato leaves the impression that Sophists were patronised only by eupatriae. But these words of Aristophanes suggest that, in the two generations

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34 Cf. Wasp 1044-1049.

35 Cf. Chapter II.2.
between 423 and 405BC methods of problem-solving appear to have altered at all levels of society. The new thinking of the Sophists permeated the whole society as 'intellectuals constantly influence the evolution of the community', with one section admiring them, while another resisted any of their new ideas, but they nevertheless changed 'not simply philosophical reflection but the very mentality of those involved'.

It is self-evident that all ideas and new thinking eventually permeate mass consciousness. But it is more than that. Rosalind Thomas considers the phenomenon of sophistic learning to be 'a kind of cultural (and political?) inflation'. There is also an inherent psychological interaction between leading innovators, mass consciousness and historical space. This interaction is best described thus: 'intellectual' leadership is a qualitative term more like 'beautiful' than 'freckled'; the latter attribute crosses cultures, the former depends on social mass acceptance and a time frame.

If the young Freud had grown up in Calcutta at the end of the last century, where beliefs about the relation of sexuality to anxiety were very different from those in Vienna, he would not have invented the idea of a repressed libidinal motive causing a phobia of horses. And even if he had, this suggestion would have been ignored by the Indian community. Mendel's discoveries on the genetics of peas lay undiscovered for several decades because biologists were not prepared to accept them. ... Sartre's existential philosophy, which emphasised the present and encouraged rejection of the past, contained a message that French society wished to hear after World War II because many citizens were feeling some guilt over their country's collaboration with the Nazis. The same philosophical stance in the People's Republic of China in 1955 would have been satirised; Mao continually reminded Chinese peasants that they must never forget the bitter past.

In Athens, the same relationship applied to the Sophists, their pupils, and the community at large. The need for this type of education preceded the Sophists' arrival in Athens. The vibrant social and educational exchange, as pictured by both Plato and Xenophon, would have influenced a sophist's teaching techniques in response to both market forces and the students' cultural and political aspirations. Plato's traditional distinction between 'philosophers' and Sophists, resting on whether or not fees were charged, somewhat ignored the realities of the very marketplace he described, and the Sophists' place in it. Aside from his criticisms regarding Protagoras' tuition fees, and Diogenes Laertius' claim that Protagoras even sued a student for fees owed; Aristotle remarks that he was, after all, sensitive to the market, allowing the student to determine the value of

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36 de Romilly, op. cit., p. 239.
37 Kerferd, op. cit.; de Romilly, op. cit.; Beck, op. cit.
38 Thomas, 'Writing, reading, public and private 'literacies': functional literacy and democratic literacy in Greece', pp. 42.
his tuition [Nic. Ethics 9.1:1164a25; app. 8.VIII.5]. Wealthy students who travelled
with their sophist teacher were especially close enough, for long enough, to have
greatly influenced their master’s teaching approach, the development of his
thinking and his profile within the social context.\(^{40}\) The relative wealth of a
student enhanced the prestige of the sophist. The tradition often gives it that
sophistic students were aristoi sons of eupatridae, but the social and political
structure of Athenian life, and the general interaction between them, makes this
view somewhat simplistic.\(^{41}\) Because the primary motivation and method of
survival was to maintain family and clan standing and influence, the following
suggests that any neos or meirakion in a phratry who showed promise had the
potential, should circumstances require it, to be bankrolled by relatives who
could help.

VIII.4 THE STUDENTS
Access to sophist ideas and methods of problem-solving was not restricted just
to the sons of aristoi pentacosiomedimnoi. General opinion often suggests that only
the wealthy enjoyed learning from the Presocratic phenomenologists and sophist
teachers of public speaking. For example, Beck considers that, although in theory
the Sophists believed that everyone could be educated, in reality only the rich
elite received higher education; 'this is clear then from the high cost of
Protagoras' instruction', even though Protagoras' social theory claimed education
was open to everyone.\(^{42}\) Likewise Jaeger, Marrou, Ober,\(^{43}\) and Kerferd also claim
sophistic education 'was in no sense a contribution to the education of the
masses'; it was ‘a kind of selective secondary education, intended to follow on

\(^{40}\) The tradition is that it was normal practice to travel with one’s teacher: Diogenes Laertius [2.23]
relates claims made by Ion of Chios, Aristotle and Favorinus that Socrates accompanied
Archelaus to Samos, Delphi and the isthmus of Corinth.
\(^{41}\) The term, ‘wealthy’, as it applied in the social environment of fifth century BC Athens, is
defined by David Pritchard ['Fool's Gold and Silver: Reflections on the Evidentiary Status of
Finely Painted Attic Pottery', Antichthon, Vol. 33 (1999), pp. 1-2]: where ‘rich’ and ‘poor’ were
social divisions in which the truly wealthy were considered ‘rich’, whilst the rest of the citizen
population were lumped together as ‘the poor’, even though they were zeugitai, hippeus or
\(^{42}\) Beck, op. cit., p. 161.
4-14; 21-22, 111-113, 308, 310; H. I. Marrou, Histoire de l’éducation dans l’antiquité, Part I, Chapter I,
pp. 5-13 in Chambliss, op. cit., pp. 31-32; Josiah Ober, Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens: Rhetoric,
170-174; ‘Power and Oratory in Democratic Athens: Demosthenes 21, against Meidias’, in Ian
after the basic instruction received at school in language and literature
(Grammatike and Mousike), arithmetic (Logistike) and athletics (Gymnastike). This
cannot be strictly so. If these scholars are thinking of the sort of education to be
had by those travelling in the entourage of one of the famous Sophists, it is
probably true that the student would need to have access to considerable wealth.
Plato claims that Protagoras earned more than the combined earnings of
Pheidias and ten sculptors and that Gorgias, Prodicus and Hippias also
accumulated wealth. Accommodation and service costs for these accompanying
students could partially account for the high fees charged by some such as
Protagoras. Isocrates furnishes the evidence that Sophists were not generally
wealthy, and that even the wealthiest, Gorgias, left a modest estate on his death
[Antidosis 15.155-156; app. 8.VIII.6]. Other later sources present a varied picture
of fees ranging from half a mina to five minas to one hundred minas. Clearly
such amounts indicate variations in quality or quantity of teaching. There is not
sufficient evidence to assume that only the children of the ‘wealthy’ were trained
by the Sophists. Socrates’ remark that he attended a display lecture for one
drachma suggests that some access to the ideas of the Sophists was available to
anyone for no more than what would today be the cost of a theatre ticket.

The educational tradition of technical knowledge handed down from one
generation to another, is documented in Appendix 3.2-3. Mentor training of this
type also appears to be one of the educational methods practised by the Sophist

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42 Pl. Meno 91d.
44 Kerferd, op. cit., p. 30.
45 Cf. Kerferd, op. cit., p. 27.
46 The average daily wage (μισθοφόρον) in Athens for the second half of the fifth century was one
408/9BC], architects and labourers [Thuc. 3.17.4], attendees in the ekklesia [Aristoph. Wasps 690],
public advocates [Ar. Athenian Constitution 62.2] and attendees in the curia received one and a
half drachmas, while the dikasteria received five obols (6 obols = 1 drachma). A flute girl could be
had for a drachma [Aristoph. Thesmophoriazusae 1195-1197] as well as a book on the works of
Anaxagoras [Pl. Apologia 26d-e].

Nevertheless, wages, like prices, were not stable: in 411BC soldiers and sailors received a 50%
pay cut to three obols per day [Thuc. 8.45.2] and again in 408 [Xen. Hellenica 1.5.4-8, Lysias On a
Wound by Premeditation 4.5.-6]. William T. Loomis ['Pay Differentials and Class Warfare in Lysias'
Against Theozotides': Two Obols or Two Drachmas?], Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik, Vol.
107 (1995), pp. 230-236; at pp. 135-36] also detects a 33-1/3% pay cut for a hippeis and hippotoxotai
due to financial recession (rather than any class conflict, as has been hypothesised). Between 410-
404BC the dole was two obols [IG I 375, 377 passim], possibly cut to one obol in 407/5 [IG I 377.10-22]. A handicapped citizen received one obol, while ophans faced restrictions on their one
obol per day allowance [Lysias On the Refusal of a Pension 24.13; SEG 28.46]. Therefore subsistence
could be achieved for less than one obol per day.
teachers in Athens throughout the fifth century BC. For example, Themistocles learned to construct pro and contra arguments and was mentored by Mnesiphilus, a fellow deme member who came from a long line of 'thinkers' stretching back to Solon. Also there was Prodicus, mentor of Socrates and a mentor to Damon. Pericles' circle ranged from phenomenologist Anaxagoras and artist Pheidias, to Sophists Protagoras and Socrates. It is reasonable to assume that the males of Pericles' clan were mentored by those entertained within the society of his symposia. Therefore, many slightly less than wealthy individuals connected to Pericles' oikos were exposed to these Presocratic thinkers, and their ideas, during their discourses in the home of Pericles. Plutarch says Pericles educated his servant, Evangelus, to become an excellent estate manager which would have entailed 'banking literacy' and 'officials' literacy' at least. It is probable that Evangelus was also exposed to some degree to Anaxagoras and the others. The same appears to be the protocol in the house of Callias; Plato talks of three visiting Sophists, each attending to numerous students. Some were disciples, but others would have been young men selected to attend by Callias and his friends (ergo Socrates presence with the young Hippocrates, son of Apollodorus and brother of Phason). This practice is mentioned by Plato, who notes Prodicus and Gorgias were able to entice young men from other Sophists. Protagoras related a similar situation when a sophist came to stay at an Athenian oikos; the implication being that he was speaking of an earlier personal experience and that he incurred 'hostility and intrigue' because he attracted youth away from male relatives and friends [Protagoras 316c-d; app. 8.VIII.7]. This sounds either like young men being invited to symposia sponsored by patrons belonging to phratries other than their own, or, for a popular sophist, the reverse, with patrons having to accommodate enthusiastic, non-phratriy

50 Plut. Themistocles 2.1-4; Themistokles' deme was Phrearrus; his tribe Leontis and family Lycomidae.
51 Plut., Pericles 4-5, 13, 36; Themistocles 2.3.
52 For example, Plato [Protagoras 320a-b] says that Alcibiades and his brother were brought up by Pericles and his brother, Ariphron, as 'guardians' and they were 'at a loss what to do with him [because he - in a rather Protagorean style - would not learn the rules] And there are a great many others whom I could mention to you as having never succeeded, whilst virtuous themselves, in making anyone else better, either of their own or of other families'. Both parents of Pericles and Ariphron were Alcmaeonidae, as were both parents of Alcibiades and his brother.
53 Plut. Pericles 16, 24, 36.2.
54 Pl. Protagoras.
55 Pl. Apologia 19e-20a.
gatecrashers; as when Socrates advised his students (such as Critobolus) on 'how to get their man' and joked about his own abilities as a sexual procurer.\textsuperscript{57}

Like the utilitarian apprenticeships in agrarian training and trades, sophistic education involved the institution of mentoring. And, mentoring still involved a pederastic sexual dimension, even though sexual etiquette (such as intercrural contact) within courting behaviour had altered considerably since the seventh and sixth centuries BC.\textsuperscript{58} Considering the nature of the society at the symposion, and of its long tradition, numbers of pupils could have been mentored, even for a short time, in the houses where Sophists stayed with their patrons. For instance, to mention Callias again, where Plato places Socrates and the other Sophists. Historically, Callias had a reputation as a (gender non-specific) lecher whose wife attempted suicide in sorrow, or shame.\textsuperscript{59} Likewise Aristophanes' sexual jokes belittling effeminism is not evidence that paedophilic relations were not acceptable to the mainstream at the close of the fifth century BC. Of the next generation, Aeschines outlines the sexual ground rules: rape, even of slaves, is against the law; slaves were not allowed to exercise because they would become physically attractive and therefore desirable, or, worse, get ideas they were 'as good as' citizens; the age of sexual maturity / consent was on registration to the list of citizens. Before that age, sexual welfare was in the hands of relatives and teachers.\textsuperscript{60} Aeschines, who discussed his own numerous erastic relationships,\textsuperscript{61} provides the evidence that pederasty was lawful and had been so in previous centuries. He specifically argues that the 'lawgiver' who, in instituting a law prohibiting slaves to be the lovers of free boys, did not include the words 'slave or free man'; therefore, there could not have been a law forbidding 'free men' sexual access to boys.\textsuperscript{62} Sophocles gives us a further hint, because it might be inferred from Oedipus' statement on incest - 'it is improper to mention what it is improper to do'\textsuperscript{63} - that speaking about matters erastic was taboo and, therefore, not 'improper': either way, they certainly did a lot of

\textsuperscript{56} Xen. Memorabilia 2.6.21, 28: γενόμενος θηράν ἐπιχείρει τούς καλούς τε κάγαθος.
\textsuperscript{57} Xen. Symposium 3.10.
\textsuperscript{58} Cf. Appendix 5.
\textsuperscript{59} Andoc. On the Mysteries 125-127. Callias earnestly practised incest with three generations of his family.
\textsuperscript{60} Aesch. Against Timarchus 17, 138; 18; Ar. Ath. Pol. 42.3-5.
\textsuperscript{61} Aesch. Against Timarchus 135-136.
\textsuperscript{62} Aesch. ibid. 139.
\textsuperscript{63} Sophocles Oedipus Rex 1409-1410.
talking (and painting) about it, even making one pair of by no means wealthy, lovers the national heroes. Tradition also links other names as lovers: Alcaeus lover of Melanippus Ephialtes and Pericles, Eutherus and Socrates. The sexual dimension to mentoring idealised the physical as well as intellectual and, in such circumstances, property class, clan and phratry allegiances appear to have been relaxed, or ignored, when it came to who was permitted to attend the symposion.

For a time Gorgias was the guest of Callicles, whose family would also have experienced similar tutelage by the sophist. If you were a hippeis, or zeugites belonging to the phratry of a pentacosiodimnos family, your handsome, promising son could have been asked to attend. It is probable that the same socio-educational process operated further down the ranks in the phratries who produced triarchs: the promising sons of rowers would have been as useful to influential pentacosiodimnoi triarchs in the ekklesia or dikasterion as their

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64 For example, Herodotos 1.35.1,5.95; Antiphon Prosecution of the Stepmother for Poisoning 1.18; Thuc. 8.48.4; Xen. Memorabilia 2.6.28; Symposium 8.1-4; Lysias Against Eratosthenes 12.43; Aristoph. Plutus 150-155 (male prostitutes); Thesmophoriazusae 50-51; Knights 589; The Banqueters in Athenaeus, Deipnosophistae 13.601-606; Pl., Symposium 178d-181b ; 191e; Phaedrus 89e, 227a, 239a; Gorgias 482a, 487; Republic 603b.
65 Harmodius and Aristogeiton; cf. Chapter V.4.2(b).
66 Hdt. 5.95.
67 Plut. Pericles 10.6-7.
68 Xen. Memorabilia 2.8.1. Eutherus is Xenophon's example of how the Peloponnesian war brought great changes in wealth to individuals and families. And, how the impoverished aristos would rather go down the property class scales and work his own business in a trade, than to work managing the land for another oikos.
69 Pl. Gorgias 447b.
70 The men listed below are not definitely known to have been literate, but they still suffice as examples of the educational process. For example: (i) Themistocles was from a modest family but was related to the family Lycomidae and received an education alongside the sons of aristocrats, with special training from Mnesiphilus, a teacher 'trained in sophia' from a line going back to Solon [Plut. Themistocles 1.1-2.4]. (ii) Socrates is another mysteriously educated Athenian from a modest background, whose mother was a midwife [Pl. Theaetetus 149a] and father probably a sculptor or stonemason [Euthydemus 297e, Hippias Mai, 298c Diog. Laert 5.18]. Socrates father had connections by way of friendship to the pentacosiodimnoi family of Aristides,** the son of Lysimachus in the tribe Antiochis in the same deme, Alopece, as Socrates' family [Plut. Aristides 1.1-2; Pl. Laches 180d.], Socrates' wife, Xanthippe (perhaps a cousin, or second cousin as is traditional), likely had better connections because the couple named their first born after her father, Lamprocles, rather than after Socrates' father, Sophronicus [Xen. Memorabilia 2.2; Symposium 2.10]. Diogenes Laertius [5.21-22] cites an earlier source who says that Crito educated Socrates. (iii) Archedemus managed to become an influential speaker despite the fact that he may have been brought up in less than affluent circumstances (Aristophanes [Frogs 420-426] casts doubts on his parents.
There was no class-based objection to literacy education: Pericles' education of Evanagorus was noted earlier and Plato has Socrates demonstrate .
71 Plat. [Life of Aristides 1-4] states that Lysimachus was the son of a modest family with associations to the pentacosiodimnoi Alcaeonid family. Perhaps he too had an educational patron.
hippeus or zeugitai compatriots. In this way it is possible that the influence of a sophisticated education in varying levels of complexity permeated throughout the citizenry.

Along with mentoring, the other educational methods employed by the Sophists were public lectures or displays, and group tutorials (ἐπίδεικτικος λόγος).\textsuperscript{71} The cost of attending these was much less than the cost of being in the sophist's entourage. The Sophists in Callias' house in Plato's *Protagoras* employ various teaching methods; from a participatory tutorial to a lecture from Hippias, and eventually, to an eristic moot between Socrates and Protagoras to which the other Sophists, their students and friends listened. Did Protagoras intend to pass around the hat after the discussion? It would seem that the educational methods and curriculum quality and quantity delivered by each sophist varied considerably and there was no exclusivity per se. There was opportunity in the top three ranks to some level of sophisticated understanding, if not training. Some could devote themselves entirely to study [*Protagoras* 318d-e; app. 8.VIII.8]. Other students could not and, as noted above, their exposure to the Sophists would have been less formalised, more random. For instance, the sophist Euthydemos (who owned writings of the best known Sophists) set himself up in the corner of a zeugites saddler's shop, whilst Simon, the cobbler who produced thirty-three dialogues, also held discussions in his workshop.\textsuperscript{72} When Hippocrates and Socrates arrived at the house of Callias to visit Protagoras, the slave was stressed by the considerable numbers arriving at the door to hear the Sophists inside. Plato (in a parody of the opening scene of Aristophanes' *Clouds*) was using a stock joke about the insolence of slaves, but the reference to the volume of attendees to the Sophists need not be unreliable. For instance, Euripides was supposed to have studied under Anaxagoras, Protagoras and Prodicus\textsuperscript{73} and his work does reflect knowledge of the Presocratics, well before his tragedies won prizes for his patrons when he was in his forties and fifties.\textsuperscript{74} His comfortably *nouveau riche* mother would have needed considerable wealth to

\textsuperscript{71} Cf. Chapter VI.2.  
\textsuperscript{72} Xen. *Memorabilia* 4.2.1-2 Diog. Laert. 2.13.  
\textsuperscript{73} Pl. *Protagoras* 341a; *Meno* 96d; cf. *Cratylus* 384b.  
\textsuperscript{74} Born ca 480/79BC he wrote *Alcestis* when in his 40s and *Medea* in his 50s. Diogenes Laertius [2.5.18] suggests Socrates was reputed to have helped him with his plays.
cover lengthy tuition from all three. 75 These examples suggest that the exposure to sophistic tutelage was varied and great wealth not essential. Likewise, even though Diogenes Laertius says that Socrates had enough capital to lend out at interest, and Xenophon and Plato both confirm he was able to provide financially for the education of his sons, 76 Aristophanes had him shabbily dressed, while Plato made him barefoot, and Xenophon referred to his old cloak. 77 Plato’s accolade that Socrates did not charge for his pedagogical tutorials does not explain how he paid for his own professed education. 78 As mentioned earlier, in the Cratylus, Socrates says he attended Prodicus’ one-drachma lecture because he couldn’t afford the fifty-drachma lecture; but he still professed to have been a student of several Sophists. Diogenes Laertius suggests he was also the pupil of Anaxagoras, Damon and Archelaus and cites Demetrius of Byzantium as the source that Crito took Socrates out of his father’s workshop and educated him. 79 Neither was he too poor to have books at home. Socrates himself, as well as Plato’s characterisation of him, fulfils the profile of the less than wealthy Athenian with clan connections keen to participate in Presocratic sophos.

A point, ‘not much stressed in modern literature’, is that the objections of Plato and Xenophon to Sophists have an ‘extra feature’: they reveal the dissemination of sophos to ‘all kinds of people’. 80 Fees meant that Sophists ‘deprived themselves of the right to pick and choose’ their pupils, permitting anyone with funds to secure what Protagoras described as ‘matters of state’. 81 In Clouds Aristophanes made a joke of it, but in spoofing the unrefined accent of Hyperbolus, he makes it clear that higher education was available to anyone who could pay for it [Clouds 873-877; app. 8.VIII.9]. 82

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75 Perhaps Aristophanes’ joke is about the ridiculous wealth of the family.
76 Diog. Laert 2.20; Pl. Crito 45c-d, Xen. Memorabilia 2.2.10.
78 His father was a stonemason and his mother a midwife; cf. Note 71, above.
79 Diog. Laert. 2.5.19-21.
80 Pl. Hippias Mai 282d.1; Xen. Memorabilia 1.2, 1.5.6, 1.6.5., 1.6.13, 1.7-8. Cf. Kerferd [op. cit., p. 25-26] notes the term used by Plato is pejorative.
81 Pl. Protagoras 319a1-2.
82 Aristoph. Thesmophoriazusae 840-845. Hyperbolus came from a family who had been successful in the same business as Socrates - money-lending.
Apart from the evidence that tuition fees were not as excessive as claimed; it is also probable that tuition fees did not always come from the pocket of the student or his parents, as is tacitly assumed. As mentioned above and outlined in Appendix 2.2, self-interest equated to survival of the oikos; especially in wealthy families where ostracism, accusations of misappropriation of state funds or military misjudgement could, at the least, diminish political influence. It motivated all strata of Athenian society to be flexible: and for two centuries, the lives of leaders such as Solon, Peisistratus, Cleisthenes, Aristides, Themistocles, Miltiades, Pericles, Ephialtes, Cleon, Critias or Alcibiades show evidence of the pragmatic side of the Athenian psyche that could, and did, guide social and political innovation. In this context the plagues of 430, 429 and 427/6 BC caused a serious decrease in population and circumstances that would have prompted wealthy men to innovate. It was a demographic necessity that they pay for poorer extended family members or brotherhood citizens to be educated by the Sophists to some degree efficacious to the family oikos. Some effects of the plague are discussed at length in Appendix 2.6, but it is enough here to state that 25-33% of the 300,000± population died. The plague was no discriminator; therefore of the 60,000 adult male citizens, there would have been a skills shortage. Pritchard objects to 'the new orthodoxy' that assumes the decrease in the population would have caused a democratisation in education. His grounds are that the pool of wealthy youths still would have been numerous enough to furnish participants for the dithyrambic choruses during the period. While the

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83 Cf. Appendix 2.


Thucydides [2.58] records a 25% death rate among plague victims in the Athenian troops at Potidæa. He also states that before 430 BC troop numbers were 29,000 hoplites (13,000 hoplites, 16,000 homeland garrison), 1,200 cavalry, 1,600 archers and 300 trireme crews [2.13, 2.31] whereas in 411 manpower was stretched when the oligarchic government needed 5,000 assembly members but there were not 5,000 men of hoplite (and above) rank in the city [8.72, cf. 8.47.2]. (There were however much reduced numbers still serving abroad, after losses of more than 32,000 in Sicily.)

statistics are correct, it is not evidence that the elite fathers of these youths would have remained aloof from educating a poor relation in skills useful to the oikos, including alphabetic, 'name literacy', 'list literacy', 'officials' literacy' 'banking literacy' and training in sophistic pro and contra double arguments. The emphasis here is on a sustainably survivable oikos, rather than a choral performance with all its unchanging aristocratic ritual. The pragmatic imperative, especially in the years after the plague (which then set a social precedent) would have outweighed status sensitivities. Apart from the personal trauma of losing one in three of the beloved sons and child-bearers of the oikos, this skills shortage in some families would have equated to a diminishment of power; it would have been motivation enough for wealthier phratry members to train up as many likely young relatives as possible in this demographic catastrophe. Any of those wealthy enough to sponsor training programmes would have done so, not just for the children in their direct family, but also youths from their phratry or deme. The Athenian democratic structure required a significant and consistent number of literate citizens to hold office. As more than a quarter of the ekklesia and a quarter of all office holders were dead, it would have been naturally prudent that young clan members, who showed any aptitude whatsoever in reading and writing, be given further education.

More evidence is provided by Thucydides, who states that the plague caused radical changes, through unexpected inheritance, in social behaviour and

suggests [pp. 216-217] that parents of poor children would not have been able to afford music lessons required for such performances. This need not have prevented them from participating in ephbic dancing; cf. Appendix 3.5, Ephebic Education.

Pritchard [David J. Phillips & David Pritchard (eds.), Sport and Festival in the Ancient Greek World, Swansea, The Classical Press of Wales, 2003, pp. 330-331] discounts this approach suggesting that the fear of society misconstruing any financial assistance for education as a mask for pederastic prostitution would deter any poor father from allowing his son an education. At the same time it begs the question, of how much influence would poorer fathers have within family and phratry groups. And indeed sexual pairings were often within family groups. Cf. Appendix 2.2, 6.

For example, before Pericles himself died in the plague, he lost his sister, his two eldest sons and his first wife [Plut. Pericles 24.5, 36.3-5]. Thucydides highlights the tragic dilemma with Pericles speech the year earlier; he had directed grieving Athenian women who had lost sons in action to have more children to replace them [Thuc. 2.44]. Twenty five to thirty percent of those pregnant would have been dead before they could have come to term.

accepted decorum [Thuc. 2.53.1-3; app. 8.VIII.10]. Through him we also know that this period of *nouveau riche* profligacy subsided with the panic of the plague, because politics continued under the same core systems. Therefore, *phratry* relations and the power structures within remained the same. The beneficiaries of plague deaths, suddenly moved up the property scale inheriting power over male seniors, widows and lesser minors, once dependent on the benefactor. These new patriarchs of their *oikoi*, would have needed the support from their immediate family and (soon-to-be-educated) associates to cover their backs; a sufficient reason to educate numbers of young *phratry* members in public speaking and administration. It is post- this period in which sophistic education expands.

Plato’s Protagoras suggests that any study under Protagoras would give the student good judgement in personal and civic life, with the ability to become a statesman with a talent for public speaking [Protagoras 318e-319a; app. VIII.8.11]. De Romilly is one scholar who finds issue with any interpretation that emphasises a political, rather than vocational, curriculum; ‘instead, he speaks of good management, the ability to take political action, and good citizens … of a techne, with the particular knowledge and rules that any techne implies.’ Such attempts to separate the political from the social in the integrated Athenian system is to ignore the underlying psychology of the individual citizen (*iδιον*) and the forces shaping collective (*κοινόν*) identity.

**VIII.5 POLITICAL DIMENSIONS OF SOPHISTIC EDUCATION**

The lingering social concept of the *polis* as an inseparable collective (formed when Athens had a *basileus* and perpetuated and reinforced by the continued teaching of Homer) would have consistently conflicted with the obversely competitive concept of the *genê* and *phratry*. As the legal system attested, everything was at once political and social, religious and military, and this was manifested in aspects of individual psychology as well as the definitive concept of the *polis*. In this sense, the Sophists’ influence was all pervasive. For example,

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98 Until 411BC.
99 This was a time honoured practice; for example, Cimon retained a large number *Laciadai* members who participated as state officials [Ar. Ath. Pol. 27.3; Plut. Themistocles 5; Cimon 10].
100 de Romilly, op. cit., p. 218.
the contemporary premise that Euripides studied under Anaxagoras, Protagoras and Prodicus; Isocrates under Prodicus, Gorgias and Socrates, and Thucydides under Prodicus, Gorgias, and Antiphon may rest on 'obvious similarities', but 'the similarities themselves are indisputable and impossible to overlook'.

Not all elite families, however, were enthusiastic about sophistic education. Plato attests to a conservative element that specifically distinguished themselves from 'the wealthy' and 'the educated'. The reason for their antagonism was that the influence of those who were educated under the Sophists was simultaneously political and social. It would be clearer to see that those studying under the Sophists as coming from both planes of society, i.e., the vertical (genê/phratry/deme/tritty) and the horizontal income-based ranks. From the evidence of prosecutions, it is obvious that not all influential families patronised the Presocratics and Sophists, and attitudes toward them reflect the dynamics of Athenian politics and competing phratries, rather than any widespread or theoretical objection to dialectic or elenchus.

Sophist teachers were of all political colours; something that is often overlooked. This is evident by the diversity of those Presocratic and sophist thinkers already mentioned to be under the patronage of Pericles. They were prosecuted on charges such as asebeia (impiety) or eisangelia (denunciation), or if an Athenian citizen, ostracised or brought to court on a hefty fiscal charge. Anaxagoras was charged with asebeia by the political opponents of Pericles. Even though acquitted, he exiled himself to Lampsacus, which indicates his safety, through patronage, could no longer be assured. Protagoras was banished from

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92 de Romilly, op. cit., pp. viii-ix.
93 Pl. Phaedrus 232c: φοβοῦμενοι τοὺς μὲν οὐσίων κεκτημένους μὴ χρήσασιν αὐτοὺς ὑπερβάλωνται, τοὺς δὲ πεπαιδευμένους μὴ συνέει κρείττους γένωνται: [They fear the wealthy, lest their money give them an advantage, and the educated, lest they prove superior in intellect.]
94 Appendix 2.2-3 highlights that social strata in Athens should not be viewed as static vertical ‘class-by-birth’ divisions. Genetic pedigree did not prevent descent from or ascent to the highest wealth class (pentecosoi, or zeugitai levels. Social strata in Athens had distinctly horizontal planes, as well as vertical levels Families spread across wealth ranks and phratry ties were more important than any recognition or respect for wealth per se. Attitudes to money were also far removed from modern day concepts. Wealth in Athens was not viewed as entirely belonging to one person; a wealthy person had the financial responsibility for many civic projects and events.
95 de Romilly, op. cit., pp. 24-29; 214-225.
96 Plut. Pericles 31-32.
Athens and tradition says his books were burned in the Agora. Pheidias, a citizen, was charged with embezzlement. Citizen sophist, Damon, was ostracised and exiled for his political influence on Pericles. This could have further threatened the position of Prodicus, Damon’s intimate associate, who was also part of Pericles’ circle. His actions highlight the interacting political and social forces. There are claims that Prodicus was executed for asebeia. If this was so, his situation exemplifies the volatile political position of sophist teachers, regardless of their personal politics. Why did xenos Prodicus not escape into exile, as was usual practice and expected of those convicted? The reason was probably related to access to funds. With automatic confiscation of personal effects, a xenos sophist without the support of proxenoi would have found it difficult to find the funds necessary for any escape. With his friend Damon already ostracised and exiled, it is possible that Prodicus had also run foul of his other proxenoi patrons, such as Callias who, as a political enemy of Pericles, may not have cared to effect Prodicus’ escape. As a member of Pericles’ circle, why was he not helped as Pericles had helped Anaxagoras? It is understandable Prodicus would endeavour to make allies, but they were on opposite sides of the political spectrum. Even if this story of Prodicus’ execution is a confusion with that of Socrates, any prosecution was probably the result of his alliance with Pericle, because Prodicus himself was no radical. For instance, he visited Athens on several embassies from Ceos and was so popular he was asked to stay on to teach. As a theoretician in linguistics he was praised by contemporaries and

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67 Plut. [Nicias 23] says this happened in 411bc. Diogenes Laertius [9.55-56] relates reports from Philochorus that Protagoras was either shipwrecked, or that he died at ninety, whilst en route to exile; and from Apollodorus, who says he was seventy.


69 Ar. Ath. Pol. 27.4; Isoc. Antidosis 15.235.

90 DK.84.A.1 (Suda)

101 Pl. Protagoras 315d.

102 Kerferd [op. cit., p. 46] notes: There was a tradition in later sources (DK.84.A.1) that Prodicus died at Athens by drinking the hemlock apparently after condemnation for ‘corrupting the young’; This is usually and probably rightly dismissed as involving a confusion between Prodicus and Socrates - if it had been true we would surely hear much more about it in earlier sources. But there was a story, preserved in the Pseudo-Platonic Eryxias (398e.11-399b.1) that Prodicus was expelled from a gymnasion for speaking unsuitably in front of young men, so it is not impossible that he did have to face the kind of opposition which Protagoras spoke of as the common lot of all Sophists.

103 Pl. Laches 197d: You see, you don’t seem quite to have realised that he has acquired this cleverness from Damon, a friend of ours, and that Damon spends a great deal of time with Prodicus, who is thought, of course, to be the best of the Sophists at distinguishing terms like these. Hipp. Mai. 282b-c: Take our eminent friend Prodicus, who often came here on public business, but the high point was his recent visit on public business from Ceos when he gained considerable
Socrates often recommended him to pupils. Sextus Empiricus and Cicero say Prodicus was atheistic but, to judge by Xenophon’s rundown of one of his public lectures, he seemed to enthusiastically uphold the orthos ethos. Furthermore, in accepting hippeus or zeugitai pupils like Euripides and Socrates along with wealthier pupils such as Theramenes, he likewise did not discriminate. Isocrates also suggests he had a teaching policy in line with the political ideals of the city.

In Athens most xenoi Presocrats and Sophists were without citizen rights and, as Aristotle emphasises, were not politicians. On the other hand, Diagoras of Melos, who was also prosecuted in Athens for asebeia, seems an overtly political sophist. His attack on Athenian religious cults was a protest against the Athenian attack on Melos. Also, when a sophist was on an embassy, as was Gorgias on one of his visits, he was able to address the ekklesia directly. It is, therefore, splitting hairs to consider the prosecutions against the Sophists as not having a political dimension. Especially at the end of the century, prosecutions of home-grown Sophists had a highly political flavour. Influential Athenian-born Sophists such as Antiphon, Critias, Theramenes, Lysias and Andocides

fame in the council as a speaker, as well as earning an incredible amount of money from giving lectures as a private individual and meeting with our young men.  

Charmides 163d: I have heard Prodicus drawing his innumerable distinctions between names.  

104 Pl. Theaetetus 151b.  

105 Xen. Memorabilia 2.1.21-34.  


108 Lysias Ag. Andocides 17; Dio. Siculus 13.6.7; Athenagoras A Plea for the Christians 4.  

109 As does Dodds [The Greeks and the Irrational, pp. 189-90], quoted earlier.  

110 Antiphon [Thuc. 8.68, 90, Xen. Hellenica 2.3.40].  

111 Critias returned from exile in 403BC [Lysias, Against Eratosthenes 43] to take a substantial political role [Xen., Hellenica 2.3.2, 11-13, 36, 47-56; 2.4.8; Pl., Seventh Letter 324d]. Cf. a possible earlier involvement in the mutilation of the Herms [Andocides, On the Mysteries 47]; the prosecution of Phrynicus [Lycurgus, Against Leocrates 113]; the assassination of Alcibiades [Plut. Alcibiades 38.5].  


113 Lysias Against Eratosthenes 6, 14-20. Plato [Phaedrus 227b] outlines the political undercurrents surrounding the sophistic education that young Phaedrus is seeking. He places Lysias in the house of citizen Epicrates who became a mover and shaker in the overthrowing of the Thirty Tyrants. The residence, near the Olympieum, Epicrates has (somehow) acquired from Morychus, wealthy and pleasure-loving to excess [Aristoph., Archarnians 887; Wasps 504]. While Lysias had been born in Athens, his father was Syracusan and so was not a citizen. Phaedrus’ admiration of Lysias, while part of Plato’s conceit, resembles other accounts of the reception of other Sophists (Xenophon, Alcidamas, Thucydides) cited throughout. And then he sought out Socrates! Plato does not mention his patronym; he is the generic version of the sophistic student; the dialogue is about love, but the political subtext is unmistakeable.  

114 Andocides On the Mysteries 1-7; On his Return 7-8, 13-14; On the Peace with Sparta 1-2ff.; Against Alcibiades 1. (This is not the first occasion upon which the perils of engaging in politics have come home to me.)
were embroiled in the political *stasis* between 415 and 403BC. All were either exiled or executed. The complex reactions, to the arrival of the Sophists was ‘an inseparable mixture of socio-political and intellectual factors, aspects of a single complex process’. The picture of a stratified rejection of sophistic innovation from reactionary sections of the community should be tempered. In the Athenian context, such conservatism ran contrary to modern socio-cultural concepts generally interpreted as conservative equals oligarchic, and innovative equals *nouveau riche* democratic. The complexity of the social and political divide between conservative and innovative is mirrored in Plato’s portrayal of the democrat leader, Anytus, compared with the other contemporary references to the man. The political and intellectual profile of Anytus does not appear to be so staunchly reactionary. Anytus’ conservatism is in his aggressive support of social tradition (*nomos*). This same man, however, supported the amnesty of Eucleides, which pardoned all political factions during the oligarchic tyranny of the Thirty. He is said to be the first to bribe a jury which, at the least, is innovative. If there was an intellectual aspect to Anytus, it was not like Plato’s picture of a knee-jerk reaction against sophistic teaching generally, because his own son was a student of Socrates and other sophistic educators. On the personal side, Anytus was an *erastes* of Alcibiades, and so was possibly harbouring competitive resentment against Socrates due to Alcibiades’ devotion to him. Altogether, these factors suggest a complex combination of a personal, political and intellectual animosity to Socrates. Anytus’ reaction to Socrates was not prejudice to new ideas, but a response to the damage done by Alcibiades and the abovementioned factions in the *stasis* which led to the Spartan blockade of Athens in 406/5BC.

The chronology of the reaction against the Presocratics and Sophists is also often clouded by the criticisms levelled at later teachers, post-403BC, especially by Isocrates, who should not be seen as an opponent of Sophists or sophistic education. There is a political dimension to Isocrates’ comments that rests more

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115 Kerferd, op. cit., p. 22.
116 Pl. *Apologia* 18b, 23e, 28a, 36a.
118 Ar. *Ath. Pol*. 27. (Perhaps really the first to be caught.)
in the fourth century BC than the fifth.120 For example, Isocrates, whose family was part of the losing faction, opened his school within the decade and was always at pains to distance himself from his exiled, or executed, teachers.121 His arguments contra the Presocratic curriculum are themselves nicely sophistical; his arguments pro sophistic methods reflect just how much he had learned.122 To uneducated nincompoops (τῶν ἄνωτων νομιζομένης), he advocated the study of thinking and speech-making as far superior to phenomenological studies.123 His ethical complaints against sophist teachers were against his contemporaries,124 or in praise of himself.125 However, in one speech he dismissed the earlier Sophists as being model professors of ‘officiousness and greed’ (πολυπραγμοσύνης καὶ πλεονεξίας), whilst in another, he commended them as good and modest teachers.126 Overall, Isocrates thought that young men should be encouraged to attain the excellent training offered by a sophistical education127 and attests to numbers of internationally renowned Sophists of competence and reputation living in Athens; in fact his general opinion of past and present Athenian sophistic education was positive, saying its excellence attracted students from many countries around the Mediterranean [Antidosis 231; app. 8.VIII.12]. What a credit to Gorgias, Isocrates’ teacher.

Opposed to this view stands Aristotle, who was of the opinion that young men should not hear lectures on political ethics (τῆς πολιτικῆς ὡκ ἐστὶν οἰκείος ἀκροατῆς ὁ νέος).128 Where did this opinion come from? It is possible that Aristotle’s attitude, and (ergo) his earlier education, is a measure of the negative reaction to sophistic teaching of argument in the aftermath of the political stasis since 411BC. For instance, in Republic 7, Plato states that his ideal educational facility (and therefore, presumably, his own Academy) would teach only

120 Cicero de Oratore, 3.141; Quintilian Institutio de Oratoria 3.1.14; Philodemus 1967. Cf. Benoit, ‘Isocrates and Plato on Rhetoric and Rhetorical Education’, p. 68. Isocrates, as the other fourth century BC logographers mentioned in this chapter, received their sophistic education in the previous century.
121 Plut. Lives of the Ten Orators 837a.
123 ibid., 15.261-269.
124 ibid., 15.1-4, 162, 168, 193, 203, 215, 221; Against the Sophists 13.19. (This is in line with the criticisms Alcidamas levels as his contemporaries and their techniques.)
125 Isoc. Antidosis 15.1-4, 168, 188, 195, 210, 211; Against the Sophists 13.19
126 Isoc. Against the Sophists 13.20 (Ar. Rhetoric 1.10 makes the same assessment); Antidosis 15.155-156.
127 Isoc. Antidosis 15.304.
mathematics and theoretical astronomy. It is quite possible therefore that Aristotle did not learn dialectic or sophistic argument construction. Ryle clambers through the argument:

[In some] elenctic dialogues and in his Apology the young men had been represented as benefiting supremely from training in the Socratic Method [elenchus]. ... We can be sure that for a time Plato had not only composed dialectical dramas; he had also taught elenctic argument to young men. He had tutorially conducted eristic Moots. ... Yet before Aristotle joined the Academy, indeed before the Academy was started, Plato was compelled, somehow, to stop composing eristic mimes, because he had been compelled, somehow, to stop conducting eristic Moots for the young men. ...

[At the end of his De Sophisticis Elenchis, ... Aristotle says that unlike the composers of other Training Manuals, for example of rhetoric, he himself in composing his Art of Dialectic, that is, our Topics, had had to start from absolute scratch. ... For the theory or methodology of dialectical argumentation he owes no debts to anyone. It follows that Plato had not taught Aristotle dialectic. ... Aristotle may have sat at Plato's feet for instruction in the scientific content of the Timaeus, though even this can be contested. But not for instruction in the strategy or tactics of the Socratic Method deployed in the Charmides, the Euthydemus, the Gorgias or Book 1 of the Republic.]

This explanation for Plato's rejection of the dialectic (a period of imprisonment) is improbable: it is unlikely that not one of Plato's erudite students would have mentioned such an event; even if it was to absolve himself of any intellectual or political suspicion inherited from his teacher (as did Isocrates). It is a convoluted argument that collapses several philosophical terms relating to argument category, yet there remains the strong hint that Aristotle's education was restricted in the tuition of argument construction. It would seem that, for a period post-403BC, the popularity of sophistic education had became a casualty of war.

Plato outlines this antagonism towards sophistical teaching in the Apologia and, while Socrates claimed no political affiliations, many of those associated with him had been involved in the political stasis. Another indication of some reaction towards sophistics at this time is that the reinstalled democracy reinstated the areopagus as the body to vet office holders, overlooking Ephialtes' reforms of the early 460s. As noted in Chapter III.2, by this time there would have been a full complement of literates in the areopagus and, consequently, its political outlook would have been less nomos-Homerica than in the 460s. Nevertheless its reinstatement implies a reaction against the political influence of an expanding educated elite. One example was Lysias. Born in Athens, Lysias was an alien
whose father had been invited to Pericles’ house. He grew up in Thurii until the Athenian defeat at Syracuse, whereupon he returned to Athens. Banished by the Thirty, he was active in the democratic resistance but, in the amnesty of Eucleides a promise of citizenship was dishonoured and he continued to live as an isoteles, with no office bearing rights or right to vote. Plato profiles him ensconced in the oikos of Epicrates, the epitome of the influential orator [Phaedrus 227d; app. 8.VIII.13]. Perhaps the menace implied by Plato is that the oikos once belonged to Morychus, a political opponent of Lysias and Epicrates, who, like Antiphon, lost all their property in the stasis. And Socrates, like other sophist teachers, was caught up in the political brinkmanship of their pupils.

VIII.6 CONCLUSION
Disrespectful youth were more than just an irritation in the generation gap. It had serious implications for any influential family’s position. As noted, Plato specifically mentioned young men who went against their family and friends in order to learn from the Sophists. No meirakion could pay fees for extended tuition himself - and a conservative father could simply withhold funds. But, if attractive young men were being courted and supported by other members of their phratry, or even other phratries, enabling them to defy their clan members, they were seriously upsetting the system politically. This was one facet of politics that caused the backlash against sophistic argument, especially after the stasis of the last decade of the fifth century BC. The evidence also shows that some sons were encouraged by their families to study with the Sophists for the political and civic benefit of the family and phratry. The popularity and prestige of many Sophists were thus perceived to have a political dimension in connection to competing factions.

The litigious nature of Athenian society would have also provided sufficient motivation for many young men to further their education in forensic argument.

130 Plut. Lives of the Ten Orators 836.
132 Pl. Apology 23c-d.
133 This is why Socrates was so incendiary - because he taught for free.
134 Taught strategies for forensic argument by considering probabilities, young men were suddenly intellectually capable to assessing their sexual power in a different light. The modern equivalent of such sexual enlightenment was the Women’s Liberation Movement of the 1970s. Cf. Andrew Lear and Eva Cantarella, Images of Ancient Greek Pederasty: Boys Were Their Gods, London, Routledge, 2008; Appendix 5.
In Athens *pentecosiomedimnoi* citizens were obliged to finance religious festivals and games, and the only way to get out of the commitment was to go to court and argue hardship. Likewise, in the performance of civic duties, political rivals could allege misuse of public money and often sought advantage through financial retribution.\(^{135}\) It was useful to be able to convincingly plead innocence before the five hundred odd public jurors in the court. Furthermore, the maintenance of any such debt was inter-generational, as the theme of Aristophanes’ *Clouds* expounds. The comedic father and son in *Clouds* are an echo of many of the forensic texts of Antiphon, Aeschines and Isocrates. Even though Aristophanes’ Strepsiades had married wealth, he was worried about the gambling debts his son was accumulating. This caricature of reckless youth is mirrored by Thucydides who suggests that, by 415BC (at least), there were groups of young men generally behaving in an anti-social manner.\(^{136}\) As a father and head of the *oikos*, Strepsiades, was liable for all his family’s debt whilst alive. However, as he reminds his son, in Athens debt was inherited (τὰ δὲ χρέα τουτ᾽ ἵσθ᾽ ὃτι ἐς τὴν κεφαλὴν ἀπαντᾷ τὴν σήν τρέψεται. φεῦ).\(^{137}\)

Sophistic educational methods and the curriculum responded to the environment. For those not afraid of innovation, the practical effect of sophistic training was better dialectics and better management skills in the fields of farming, commerce and civics; things of everyday concern to Athenians since the acceptance of Solon’s reforms. Alcidamas and Thucydides observed that the individual citizen’s ability to speak well found its own level; the skill could be just as important to exercise influence at the *deme* level, as it was for the more powerful citizens in the *ekklesia*. Whilst the assembly had the right to shout down an incompetent speaker, theoretically, every citizen had the right to address the assembly. Citizens felt free to heckle, and Thucydides describes how some Athenians were especially hard-wired to seek leadership [Thuc. 2.65.9-11; app. 8.VIII.14].

135 Cf. Appendix 2.4.
Speech construction techniques ranged from the manipulation of γνώμαι into simple arguments based on analogy, to innovative abstract pro and contra arguments based on probability. Alcidamas suggests that the norm was to cut-and-paste the texts of other authors into a speech, and there is evidence that training did in fact involve learning γνώμαι by rote.\(^\text{138}\) High calibre students obviously went beyond the level of regurgitating metred ‘ethically authorised' γνώμαι (γνώμη ὑπόθεσις\(^\text{139}\)). Students such as Antiphon, Thucydides, Isocrates and Alcidamas, whose complex argument construction and dexterity in written composition show that, at least some pupils of the Sophists, attained a very good grasp of how to ‘serially reason' out facts and probabilities and construct abstract pro and contra argument.

Alcidamas observed two things that, if taken together, could explain why Gorgias and other Presocratics and Sophists spent so much time cogitating over language use. Firstly, he suggested that many speech-training educators could not themselves speak extempore, or teach students to develop sophistic arguments without first writing them down.\(^\text{140}\) Secondly, he stated that, although Athenian students found it difficult to memorise entire speeches, many continued to do so. These observations mark the methodological transition between metred, or rhythmic, 'Gorgian-style' prose writing and the non-metred 'plain style' of later fourth century BC logographers such as Lysias, Isocrates and Alcidamas. Gorgias devised an elaborate poetical style to assist students in learning whole speeches. Athenians did not have the same capacity to remember ordinary speech (ἀνευ μέτρων) as they had to remember metre, which had been an essential part of their elementary education and continued to be their experience in choral performance in phratry religious and military activities, and participation in the many choruses needed for each Panathenaeae, Dionysia or Lenaea festival. Thucydides and Aristophanes both attest that collective

\(^{138}\) If this sounds unlikely to modern minds, consider the practice with regard to poetry. In rhapsodic or sympotic composition, the concept of originality eschewing ‘borrowed' lines or metaphors did not exist.

\(^{139}\) Cf. Xen. On Hunting, 13.3.

\(^{140}\) Extempore speeches can be of two varieties: the solely ‘oral', in which case the usual constraints of ‘cognitive capacity' apply in that the argument cannot remain a cohesive whole over fifty words, or three to five ‘chunks' of excogitation. Cf. Chapter V. The other ‘extempore' speech is where the speaker has constructed his/her extended argument with the aid of writing and is working from written abbreviated notes. The emphasis of this thesis is however the construction of the speech rather than the delivery of it.
decision-making was at times dysfunctional and that the ekklesia and dikasterion were listening to multiple argument forms delivered with variable competence. The competent use of metred gnômai within a written prose argument was a versatile method used with general audiences who had themselves been educated in poetic gnômai. It explains why some citizens preferred such arguments, just as Aristotle said. With this statement, Alcidamas pinpoints the psychological gap between problem-solving via poetic language and implicit procedural knowledge, and prose orientated 'serial reasoning'. Athenians recognised that the distinction between fact and opinion was not as clear in arguments from probability, which they designated as the 'weaker argument'. The works of Gorgias and Antiphon make it clear that forensic probability arguments confronted juries in the second half of the fifth century BC. In the search for ἐϋβουλία and ἐὑδοξία, a gap arose between those who had been taught to construct extended written prose argument and those who had learned to problem-solve with remembered hexameters. Audiences, composed of many individuals who had only learned functional literacy with tracts of poetry, developed an imperfect ability to discriminate between abstract pro and contra and probability argument, which they could not have constructed themselves, because they had not been taught to compose continuous extended written prose. By the century's end Alcidamas even suggested that some citizen juries were 'eager' to hear, and hopeful of ascertaining, which logoi reached the truth (ἐὕστοχία, ἐὕβουλία). The evidence of Alcidamas and Aristotle confirm that agon logon display speeches and exhibition debates excited a keenness in the general citizenry to enter into the exercise of abstract deliberative problem-solving.

The sophist teachers were like rock stars. Some were good performers, some were very talented; others were second-rate back-up acts. At the concert, the sons of pentacosimédimnoi got to sit in the front seats. A really wealthy, or beautiful, neanias or meirakion got to sleep with them backstage. The less-rich still pestered the head of their oikos for tickets to whatever seats could be afforded. They did not hear, nor understand, the lessons as well in the bleachers; but they were there! And they went home whistling the main themes. For those learning to compose extended continuous written prose into abstract arguments, some of the tunes gave a workout to their ever expanding 'VWFA' and writing centre and to the 'interpreter mechanism' of the left brain.
CHAPTER IX: CONCLUSION

All psychologists who have studied the intelligence of women, as well as poets and novelists, recognise today that they represent the most inferior forms of human evolution and that they are closer to children and savages than to an adult, civilised man. They excel in fickleness, inconstancy, absence of thought and logic, and incapacity to reason. Without doubt there exist some distinguished women, very superior to the average man, but they are as exceptional as the birth of any monstrosity, as, for example, of a gorilla with two heads; consequently, we may neglect them entirely.

Gustave Le Bon


This thesis addresses five questions:
i) What type, or types, of literacy were taught in Athens?
ii) How and with what materials was literacy taught?
iii) Who taught reading and writing?
iv) When was it taught and over what time frame did it progress?
v) What was the affect of general literacy and higher sophistic education on the community’s ability to problem-solve?

The research provides an overall picture of how the growth of literacy affected the psychology of the individual Athenian citizen and the society collectively during the fifth century BC. It found that trust in collective judgement was an essential facet of Athenian democracy just as it was conscientiously applied in the military context. At the same time, the competitive nature of individuals and phratries provided the impetus for a trend towards sophistic education. This followed several generations after the introduction of general literacy education in the early years of the century. On the collective side, Athenian children and youth were trained in gymnastics, singing and dancing which induced mental states with reduced self-consciousness; such states accompanied Hellenic religious ritualisation. Ephebic education also involved training methods that engaged the same type of ritual behaviour in order to induce cohesion, reduce individual ‘serial reasoning’, and enhance feelings of extended collective cognition. For the student, a functional literacy was attained by elementary education which achieved an ability to read phonetically, to phonetically compose words and construct simple sentences of ownership, dedication or admiration. The skill did not extend to the ability to innovate argument strings in written prose form.
'Reading and writing' as we understand the construct today is not an accurate description for the type of literacy most Athenians attained. Firstly, because it is unlikely that they developed a 'whole-word identification' sub-process, a significant element in modern reading literacy. Secondly, the multi-faceted technology that is 'writing' today is routinely accepted as a model for all literacy without sufficient appreciation of the complex differences in, and degrees of, cognitive processing involved. While motor processes may be the same, this work has shown that psychological differences may be determined in the language genre inscribed. There is a cognitive difference between writing down single words, or simple sentences of a few words, and constructing extended sequential sentences in prose writing. The writing of single words, or the ability to construct a list or simple three to five word sentences, does not initiate the 'bootstrapping' effect that extended continuous prose writing has on 'serial reasoning'. In a minority of the citizenry,¹ sophisticated education added this other layer of skill by the introduction of extended 'serially reasoned' continuous prose writing.

Rather than 'levels' of literacy, Thomas has identified 'types' of literacy practised in Athens.² She categorises them as 'name literacy', 'list literacy', 'banking literacy' and 'officials' literacy'; these adequately provided for the running of the political machine. To this must be added the extended continuous prose of sophistic education. Sophistic students were taught how to generate extended discursive written arguments, a method which they then used to present abstract probabilistic forensic and deliberative constructs to the ekklesia or the dikasteria. At first these forms of abstract argument and persuasion were unfamiliar. Such complex 'serially reasoned' constructs were not initially a medium through which many citizens formulated their ideas. Goldhill stresses 'one simple point': that 'in archaic Greece, what's authoritative, what matters, is performed and recorded in verse.'³ This use of image-rich right hemispheric language is a

¹ It was argued that this minority was not restricted to those of the highest property rank, but was governed by the pragmatics of Athenian society and the need to maintain phratry or family position.
method of problem-solving that involves concrete constructs of implicit procedural knowledge, and, in many different forms of performance and interaction within a culture, is a particular feature of non-literate societies. In literate individuals and their communities, this type of 'implicit thinking' co-exists with abstract probabilistic constructs derived at by writing. However, in Athens in the century of interface between the sentient authority of verse and the abstract hypothetical arguments of prose-literate individuals, there was a disjunction in decision-making at the collective level. Over the second half of the century those who were trained to write probabilistic pro and contra arguments in extended prose delivered them with varying degrees of competency. Their fellow citizens learned, through listening, to decipher some of the complexities of extended discursive abstract argument, even though they were unable to construct such extended arguments themselves due to the limits of human 'cognitive capacity' in short term memory without writing. Thucydides, Aristophanes and the logographers themselves all refer to the unfortunate results of dysfunctional collective decision-making in the legislature.

The writer has tried not to frame this work to reflect the '-ism' of any discipline. The research has avoided the approach that puts theory first with facts assembled later. This work has tried to put the chronology of history in the forefront. While the method here was to look for symptoms, the writer has not knowingly excluded any evidence in the texts of contemporary fifth century BC writers that might have run contrary to the two main hypotheses relating to language and literacy; hypotheses which posit both universal cognitive characteristics across cultures and culturally sensitive differences in cognition. These hypotheses are:

a) Cognition can be altered by cultural and environmental factors. Literacy is one such factor; a process of 'neuronal recycling' that makes no genetic change but occurs developmentally during the learning of literacy skills. In the Athenian context this meant that individuals, once taught the alphabet and reading and writing, were cognitively different to individuals who were not. This is because they had developed a 'VWFA' (visual word form area) in the left hemisphere of

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the brain. They had also developed ‘phonemic awareness’, a conceptual grasp of language that creates a linear conception and form to words. The ‘VWFA’ is absent in non-literates and probably phonemic awareness also.

b) Damage to the left hemisphere language centre results in individuals being unable to speak, whilst still being able to sing poetic language. Thus prosodic left hemisphere narrativisation (the song) uses metred image-rich metaphor that has originated in the right hemisphere of the brain. This right hemispheric locus is also indicated in current melodic intonation therapy (MIT) for stroke victims. It brings into question necessarily bi-hemispheric models of speech production when training using intoned words can successfully produce speech. Therefore the textualisation of right hemispheric language in the left hemisphere writing centre is of a different kind to the process of prose writing, which is dominant in the left hemisphere using left hemispheric language. Extended prose writing itself becomes an integral component of ‘serial reasoning’.

The research has shown that the contemporary fifth century BC texts bear out these hypotheses that there are significant cognitive differences between prosodic speaking (ποιεῖν), conversational prose discussion (καταλογάδην / ψιλοὶ λόγοι), and continuous prose writing (συγγράφειν). The texts are quoted in Appendix 8. They are there in full because only from the words and views expressed by the contemporaries at the time can we gain a proper historical perspective.

The discussion in Chapter II stressed that the processes of cognition are complex and, with ever improving technology, knowledge is expanding so rapidly that it is impossible for any one person to grasp the total output. Sometimes the argument in this work is simplified and the fundamental and/or subtle differences between the various schools, both within and between the disciplines, have not been given sufficient explanation. The only defense, and the prime motivation to attempt such a multidisciplinary work, is that the writer was moved by Eric Dodds’ recommendation to an earlier generation (noted in

Chapter I), to focus on recent cognitive science and bring it into ancient Greek historical research. As the introductory quote above from the illustrious Dr. Le Bon illustrates, perspectives change with the times. The ranges of research cited in this work all indicate that cognitive function and problem-solving are influenced by literacy or the lack of it ('orality'). The neuroscientific evidence for this differentiation between 'orality' and 'literacy' was detailed in Chapter II and Appendix 1.1. In some instances, the work uses an unorthodox application of 'universalist' cognitive studies and applies them to a 'culturalist' approach with the placement of some experimental research alongside other evidence from opposing positions. I have cited the research of linguists and placed them beside evidence from seemingly contradictory perspectives in cognitive science. At the risk of attracting criticism for dissecting or cherry picking from widely differing positions and disciplines, the aim was to build the evidence for the main hypotheses that highlight the important differences between poetic language processing and prose writing; that help define the processes of 'orality' and measure the degrees of 'literacy' in Athens during the fifth century BC. This work combines the research of Wallace Chafe and his explanation of the transient flow of conscious thought manifested in 'intonation units' of spoken language with the work of George Miller and Nelson Cowan on the finite 'cognitive capacity' for oral argument constructs in a finite number of 'chunks'. Both concepts are placed alongside the work of Roy Harris on writing, and Daniel Dennett on 'serial reasoning'. Combined, they provide enough evidence to suggest that there can be no cohesive extended abstract reasoning without writing. And, the writing has to be prose because the act of writing poetry (right hemispheric language into the left hemisphere writing centre) is unlike the experience of left hemispheric 'serial reasoning'.

Further interdisciplinary application was to add the work of Stanislas Dehaene and Laurent Cohen in regard to the 'VWFA' in the left hemisphere of the brain. This research was examined to identify how and why knowledge of letters and

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writing systems transforms cognition. His most recent research continues to strengthen the hypothesis for the 'VWFA's intense participation in literacy. It is of interest that during rhyme and melodic testing tasks the 'VWFA' showed deactivation (shown in fig. 4 of this work). In relation to its role in writing, this indicates the 'VWFA' is principally involved with the reading or generation of written prose. Dehaene notes 'the absence of top-down 'VWFA' activation in illiterates', therefore this is a cognitive feature that is absent in an 'oral' society (where individuals do not use writing to read/decipher). Dehaene's neural 'culturalist' approach has then been considered alongside Michael Gazzaniga's work into functional lateralisation and his identification of an 'interpreter mechanism' which is crucial to the narrativisation of an individual's world. The outcome of placing these two lines of research together was to highlight the multidisciplinary perspectives that specify the differences between left and right hemispheric language and the cognitive role of poetry in pre-literate societies. They have helped to set the neurological and psychological parameters by which the work identified the mental state of 'orality'. The chain of cognitive research that sets these parameters is summarised here:

i) Learning and thinking do not require the self-consciousness of Daniel Dennett's 'serial reasoning'. Within the context of 'implicit knowledge', reasoning can take place without self-consciousness (Bruner, Litman & Reber, Greenfield).

ii) Consciousness entailing 'serial reasoning' is a process and is intermittent. It can be 'oral' but is extended by writing.

iii) Culture and environment can alter cognition (Lloyd). In this context learning to read and write develops a 'VWFA' and other capacities in the left hemisphere of the brain, otherwise non-existent in pre-literate individuals.

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iv) Implicit 'non-conscious' knowledge is a substrata, or in Gazzaniga’s term, a modular subprocess to narrativisation by the 'interpreter mechanism'. In pre-literate societies traditional oral stories provide implicit background, or procedural knowledge (concrete blueprints encoded with behavioural and emotional paradigms for concepts such as 'responsibility', 'love', 'justice', 'honour') for experiential constructs and problem-solving strategies. In Greece, as in many other societies, this background knowledge was often in the form of poetry.

v) Prosodic narrativisation uses rhythmic, metred metaphor which originates in the right hemisphere of the brain (Gazzaniga, Schlaug, Ross and Monnot, Faust and Mashal, Coch et al.11).

vi) Self-conscious reasoning entailing concrete implicit knowledge learned through prosody is a feature of non-literate societies. This can create the sensation the Greeks identified as as poiein, which is the conscious realisation of implicit right hemisphere knowledge narrativising in the left hemisphere 'interpreter mechanism'. Modern poets often describe this self-evident experience as a type of non-'serial reasoning'.12 Poiein is therefore an intermittent mental state, as is 'serial reasoning'.

vii) The 'interpreter mechanism' located in the left hemisphere of the brain uses language as it seeks to explain experience. Here narrativisation of personal identity and social and phenomenal context takes place. Literacy education creates a 'bootstrapping' effect in that writing skills further develop narrativisation of abstract probabilistic argument which, in itself, cannot go beyond Miller's ±7 or 4 'chunks' or Hunter's 'fifty words'13 without prose writing. 'Prose writing' in this context is a form of 'serial reasoning'.

12 The references appear in Chapter II.2, Note 24
13 I.M.L. Hunter, '[Lengthy Verbatim Recall (LVR) and the Myth and Gift of Tape-Recorder Memory], in Psychology in the 1990s, ed. K.M.J. Lagerspetz and P. Niemi, Amsterdam, New Holland, 1984, pp. 425-440; 'Lengthy Verbatim Recall: The Role of Text', in Progress in the
Along with theoretical approaches to define ‘orality’ and how it differs to ‘literacy’, historical evidence examined in Chapters IV and V indicated that Homer was used as the main text in the educational curriculum in Athens, including literacy tuition. The reason for this is two-fold; firstly, because the Peisistratidae tyranny actively promoted its competitive performance at the Panathenaea festival during the sixth century BC and, for political reasons, wanted some uniformity of plot. Secondly, when organised (but not institutionalised) literacy education was introduced, Homer was viewed as the paradigm for social behaviour. As such, the Panathenaic rehearsal scripts or the memorised recreation of them eventually became text for classroom application. Elementary literacy education classes appear around 500-490 BC. Therefore the historical chronology of how Homer came to be the primary teaching tool posits an organic process that produced ‘authorised’ rehearsal texts from the Peisistratidae tyranny for organised choral competitions. These texts then remained in the possession of local phratries and leading families. Then, through use in teaching literacy, extracts were randomly copied as gnōmai that became mnemonic references. This was a contributing factor as to why, throughout the fifth century BC, Athenians relied on dominant right hemispheric language to maintain the social memory. Thus Homer was joined by poetic Aeschylus and the other tragedians; even social commentary on collective anxieties by way of Aristophanes and the other comedic tragedians relied on metred poetry. The use of poetry in tuition enhanced the ability to remember laws, songs and prayers laid down in metre and used as reference in problem-solving.

These two chapters examined the interrelated historical and psychological grounds for dating the Athenian redaction of Homer to the mid- to late-sixth century BC. One reason is that amanuenses would have found the copying out of long texts psychologically challenging. This is because archaic literacy did not involve the ‘interiority’ of literacy as conceptualised by moderns. Reading was not a single identification of whole words which the scribe could then copy. As

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14 They could not, however, achieve ‘word perfect’ when the epics were sung by a rhapsode. Cf. Egbert J. Bakker, Poetry in Speech: Orality and Homeric Discourse, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1997.
Powell has identified, it was an aural experience of phonetic identification of letters. Thus the type of reading competence attained restricted their capabilities of accurately copying long manuscripts. The most likely method of textualisation of the poems would have been through dictation rather than by copying from another manuscript. This brings out another reason for dating the Athenian redaction to the Peisistratidae tyranny: *rhapsodes* did not themselves need written texts, therefore a political or civic reason for their textualisation should be sought. Chapter IV noted the historical circumstances in which the Peisistratidae were the most likely faction in Athens with the opportunity and the means for textualising the Homeric canon. Chapter V suggested that the complex mechanisms of rhapsodic recitation, meant that the *rhapsode* recreated a meaningful story through the interaction of his memory of the plot and the reaction of his audience. Thus the types of thinking manifest in Homer's epics reflect their recitation over generations (in the changing memories of the *rhapsodes*) as well as the period in which they were textualised (the need for understanding between *rhapsode* and listeners). The needs of the *rhapsode*, the interaction with his audience, and the ability of the scribe, make the textualised Homeric canon a model of the psychology of the period. Chapter V also traced the psychology of the period through an examination of other archaic literature and found that the origins of sophist argument can be found in sympotic love poetry as well as the in Homeric canon. Chapter V investigated the rhetorical elements inherent in archaic deliberation and found that persuasion and argument in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* mostly took the form of concrete paradigmatic, or declarations of received wisdom, rather than argument based on abstract probability or evidential proof. There are also examples of complex probabilistic argument in Books 9 and 11. The work therefore reflects the variety of problem-solving techniques current in Greek society in the sixth century BC.

The discursive techniques developed by the Sophists encompassed abstract forms of extended 'serial reasoning' that required written construction. The three most decisive curricular innovations were the introduction of probability and

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relativism into persuasion and the introduction of prose writing itself. Chapters VI to VIII examined how sophistic teachers, Protagoras and Gorgias in particular, formalised Presocratic methods of deliberation and made a significant change to problem-solving in Athens through the application of discursive abstract pro and contra argument. Protagoras’ own words provide the evidence that he valued the intellectual potential of relative truth to solve problems; that he taught students that arguments were relative to circumstance and therefore an individual may choose one from the other according to their own opinion. From this perspective sophistic teaching of the two-fold argument revolutionised Athenian thinking by introducing relativism into persuasion. Athenians experienced a further innovation in the Gorgian technique of probability arguments constructed in a largely poetic style of written prose. The later accusation that this type of argument was intentionally aimed to conceal facts with refutations based on plausibility is not borne out by the writings of the Sophists themselves, although it is clear from Gorgias’ Encomium to Helen (translated in Appendix 7) that his understood the potential for such arguments to mislead. In Athens the techniques of Protagoras, Gorgias and the other sophistic teachers were simply responding to an educational need within the community, albeit with political ramifications. In the competitive environment it would have been inevitable that some students would seek any advantage they could over auditors who had not the same training as themselves.

A generation or two later, Isocrates and Aristotle both confirm that speech-making was a highly respected skill; as Aristotle generally implies in his Rhetoric, it is probable that this early period in the teaching of argument was more dysfunctional than deceitful. The extant texts of Antiphon and the Dissoi Logoi indicate that training in literate techniques for argument construction was a significant part of the sophistic curriculum and brought extended prose writing to Athens. Aristotle, however, raised questions as to the extent of competency students achieved in extended written prose composition. Contemporary critics (Alcidamas, Xenophon, Plato) indicate that a student’s abilities to construct coherent argument depended on the competence of their teacher's techniques in style and delivery and varied accordingly. Those learning euboulia (good, careful thinking) in the style of Protagoras and Gorgias certainly learned to compose original extended written prose arguments, and, to judge by the extant
fragments of Protagoras, the texts of Gorgias, Antiphon, the Dissoi Logoi and the extant works of Athenian sophist pupils such as Critias and Alcidamas, the sophistic curricula encompassed ethical and empirical speculation and left students at least familiar with contemporary phenomenological thinking. Even if most students only learned to compose arguments from collected gnômai, or memorised hexametric or iambic sequences (topoi) and used embellished 'Gorgianic' language, the construction of written Protagorean-style prose arguments based on probability still would have involved extended 'serial reasoning' beyond the 'cognitive capacity' of seven, ±two, 'chunks'.

Gorgias may have learnt his prosodic form of prose writing from his Syracusan teachers, but it is said he was also the pupil of Empedocles who competently wrote his phenomenological deliberations in verse. Therefore it is possible that his written prose style was an innovative combination of both Empedocles' poetic approach and whatever style the Syracusians employed. He could have chosen the type of prose written by other Ionian phenomenologists but he did not. The innovation Aristotle ascribes to Gorgias is that he technologised formulaic language, merging some of the techniques of the rhapsode into a new style of formulaic thinking. Gorgias' comments relating to muse-inspiration (detailed in Chapter VII.2.2) indicate a consciousness of what he was achieving. In cognitive terms he combined right hemisphere metre into extended prose composition, a different process to poiein no matter how many remembered gnômai were incorporated into the argument. Even though the Presocratics did not identify any intellectual difference between the rhapsode, mantikê, sophist or those with a 'love of wisdom' (philosophia), Gorgias makes it clear in his Encomium to Helen that he was conscious of both the technical and the psychological differences between poiein and the process of written prose composition. Gorgias was esteemed by his Athenian auditors simply because he was speaking in a metre style they understood. In this sense his Encomium gives an indication of argument development at the time. The speech is a tour of contemporary speech-making in which Gorgias reveals the pleasure of problem-solving: in effect the moment the 'interpreter mechanism' consciously narrativises an answer or explanation. He also provides an insight into the psychology of the average Athenian citizen and the mental processes involved in decision-making at several levels in Athens at the time. The internal construction
of the speech reveals Gorgias was highly conscious of how to build Protagorean-style forensic argument, in part from probability, in order to persuade listeners. He states that he relishes the moment when he realises that he has nailed his argument with the right words at a revelatory moment in the speech. This moment becomes the turning point for his audience to understand, and agree with, the justification of his argument. It is suggested that this moment of realisation is what Gorgias identified as 'kairos’. It has a double aspect in that a kairos occurs to the writer when devising the speech; it is the turning point in the construction of a 'serially reasoned' argument when an individual is conscious that he has formulated, from the random input of facts and language, a competent, cognisant logos that accords a proposed solution for the problem at hand. The 'kairos’ moment occurs again when, on delivery of the speech, those listening suddenly understand the line of argument. The evidence suggests that audiences gradually came to recognise and understand some of the subtleties in both probability and abstract pro and contra argument, even though most were themselves unable to write extended prose and construct such arguments.

Thus, the extant texts produced in this period provide the first account of a population experiencing en masse the cultural overlay of literacy to left hemisphere cognitive processing. The diachronic analysis of citizen education and the spread of literacy in Athens carried out in this work has underscored the point that writing has a multidimensional character that goes beyond it being a mere substitute for the spoken word. The work has also emphasised the fact that the teaching of literacy is sensitive to forms of language, especially right hemispheric language constituting image-rich metaphor and metre. In Athens the introduction of general literacy education and then higher education for a minority affords the earliest example of how the development of extended discursive argument necessitated the use of prose writing. It also provides evidence that, in literacy teaching, omitting exercises in poetry composition risks diminishing an innate cognitive capacity.
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APPENDIX 1
NOTES TO CHAPTER II

1.1 NEUROSCIENCE EVIDENCE

Whilst these articles and experiments are from widely disparate research areas in the cognitive neurosciences, they are cited here to further the propositions that:

1. Dissociative cognitive states, in which the individual experiences a diminished sense of self or is unaware of a conscious self, have a neural, chemical and cultural, therefore evolutionary, basis. These four distinct bases interrelate in diverse ways that respond to changes in the environment. For example, cultural food taboos, ritual drug taking and the like as well as regional food availability can alter chemical balances in the brain. Likewise language use in mantic ritual is environmental and cultural. Dissociative states are discussed in II.3 with discussion specifically related to ancient Athens in II.6.

2. Laterality between right and left hemisphere is evident in specific language functions,
   a) in prosody,
   b) in singing and music,
   c) in reasoning and in narrative interpretation,
   d) in the perception of illusory contours, which has a bearing on reading script.

This is not intended to place too much of an emphasis on laterality, but to recognise that modular function within the two hemispheres have relevance to language when defining the parameters of 'orality' and 'literacy' and describing the transition between the two.

3. There are numerous kinds of psychological and neural differences identified in the works cited below. They are gathered together without any strict demarcation of disciplines in order to help this work assert that the main differences between reading and writing, and, between prose construction (simple conversation and written argument) and prosodic (rhyming, metred, melodic, formulaic metaphor) have modular and sometimes lateralised bases.

Furthermore, although the research covers a number of quite distinct issues or topics, within these experiments - even if it is not within the main specification or motivation for the research - are indications that there are profound differences in language construction that have a bearing on how they are written down and consequently how their script can be taught.

The aspects of the particular research which is of specific relevance to Table 1 have been emboldened and italicised. The research motivation and findings do not necessarily have relevance to literacy and reasoning, merely to the identification of some aspect of modularity related to the differences between right hemisphere dominated prosody, metre and melody and left hemisphere dominated writing and prose construction.

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Below is an index to the chief research listed

NOTE (1) Dissociative states cause sensations of alien control:

NOTE (2) Models of human reasoning, domain specificity and modularity:

NOTE (3) Right and left hemisphere language lateralisation and domain specificity:


NOTE (4) Prosody is formulaic and a function of the right hemisphere:


NOTE (5) Music, rhythm and melody are processed in the right hemisphere, have connections to speech modules and processing with a relative neural independence between verbal and musical semantic memory:


NOTE (6) Further evidence: speech cannot be generated by the right hemisphere, but prosody and rhythm can be generated without the assistance of the left hemisphere language centres:


NOTE (7) The right hemisphere is able to produce vocalisation only if it is in prosody and singing:


NOTE (8) Across ethnic and cultural differences, prosody and melody and the ability to process pitch information are inborn and evolutionary:


NOTE (9) Differences in the degree of lateralisation and variation in dominance:

NOTE (10) Left hemisphere is dominant in 'problem-solving' while the right hemisphere takes the simple approach choosing the more probable alternative:


NOTES (15) - (16) The right hemisphere cannot write even though it can spell and rhyme: A. M. Proverbio, A. Zani, R. Adorni, ‘The left fusiform area is affected by written frequency of words’, Neuropsychologia, Vol. 46, Issue 9, 2008, PP. 2292-2299.

NOTE (17) The right hemisphere and metaphor:

NOTE (18) The right ear, processed in the left hemisphere is more accurate with linguistic signals while the left ear, processed in the right hemisphere is dominant for non-verbal signals, such as music: David Crystal, The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Language, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. 260-263.

NOTE (19) Left hemisphere cannot do illusory contours for letter construction:


(1) The research of Previc corroborates Socrates’ assertion quoted early in Chapter II.2 that dissociative states can create a sensation that there is an ‘other’ or divine presence within the individual. It may also help to explain the sensation poets experience when they find prosodic language surfacing on their consciousness without active introspection. This is discussed in Chapter V.2.1 as it relates to the production of hexametric epic in pre-literate
Greece and in V.3.4 as it relates to alternating states of conscious rhapsodising in ‘orality’ with poets such as Hesiod, Pindar and the lyric poets. The sensation evolves, perhaps recedes, but definitely changes, with the introduction of prose. Previc’s conclusion that there is an evolutionary chemical component merely adds to the hypothesis that reasoning is relative to environmental and cultural changes:

Fred H. Previc [The role of the extrapersonal brain systems in religious activity', Consciousness and Cognition Vol. 15 (2006), 500-539]: The neuropsychology of religious activity in normal and selected clinical populations is reviewed. Religious activity includes beliefs, experiences, and practice. Neuropsychological and functional imaging findings, many of which have derived from studies of experienced meditators, point to a ventral cortical axis for religious behavior, involving primarily the ventromedial temporal and frontal regions. Neuropharmacological studies generally point to dopaminergic activation as the leading neurochemical feature associated with religious activity. The ventral dopaminergic pathways involved in religious behavior most closely align with the action-extrapersonal system in the model of 3-D perceptual–motor interactions proposed by Previc (1998). These pathways are biased toward distant (especially upper) space and also mediate related extrapersonally dominated brain functions such as dreaming and hallucinations. Hyperreligiosity is a major feature of mania, obsessive-compulsive disorder, schizophrenia, temporal-lobe epilepsy and related disorders, in which the ventromedial dopaminergic systems are highly activated and exaggerated attentional or goal-directed behavior toward extrapersonal space occurs. The evolution of religion is linked to an expansion of dopaminergic systems in humans, brought about by changes in diet and other physiological influences.

(2) Identification of the different methods of and routes to human reasoning have varied approaches that involve laterality, modularity, language-based syntactics and evolutionary components. The research below covers some of the approaches. All can with varying degrees be reconciled with Gazzaniga’s findings that ‘co-operating modular subprocesses’ utilize implicit and deductive knowledge in the ‘interpreter mechanism’ (see notes 11, 12, 13 and 14).


In relation to domain specificity and/or modularity there are, for example, theories of reasoning, the Mental Logic theory, Mental Models theory and Dual Mechanism theory (which divides in several directions) which all accept that there is a degree of modularity and that some regions process language or visuospatial information.


The Mental Model theory: Models of the propositions expressed in language are rudimentary in comparison with perceptual models of the world, which contain much more information - many more referents, properties, and relations. [P.N. Johnson-Laird, How We Reason, Oxford, Oxford University Press 2006, p. 234] There is a core competence knowledge of the meaning of a language’s closed-form or logical terms (e.g. all, some, none) and ‘internal representations of spatial layouts … a mental model is iconic’ [p. 25]. Part of the power of language is that it too can lead us to construct iconic representations of the world’ [p. 37]. Cf. Johnson-Laird, 'Mental Models, Deductive Reasoning and the Brain', in

Multiple Drafts Model: Daniel Dennett and Marcel Kinsbourne [Brainchildren: Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge, MA., MIT Press, 1998] suggest that 'the judgmental tasks are fragmented into many distributed moments of micro-taking (Damasio, 1989; Kinsbourne, 1988). The novelty lies in how we develop the implications of this fragmentation. … How can manifest coherence, seriality, or unity of conscious experience be explained? … As ‘realists’ about consciousness, we believe that there has to be something - some property K - that distinguishes conscious events from nonconscious events. Consider the following candidate for property K: A contentful event becomes conscious if and when it becomes part of a temporarily dominant activity in the cerebral cortex’. Cf. 'Escape from the Cartesian Theater. Reply to Commentaries on Time and the Observer: The Where and When of Consciousness in the Brain', Behavioral and Brain Sciences, Vol. 15 (1992), pp. 183-247.


(3) Notwithstanding the integrated nature of cognition, some brain function is considerably lateralised. Research into cases of dissociation of brain functions due to surgery which severed some of the connective routes between the left and right hemispheres and cases of language acquisition of feral children have shown distinct modular functions of language, including right hemisphere dominance of prosody and formulaic language. This has relevance in the argument defining what constitutes ‘orality’ and how it functions using prosody. Likewise, it also corroborates other evidence that reading and writing are functions of the left hemisphere and are absent until some form of literacy education is instituted. Furthermore the presence or absence of vowels in written script may bear some relationship to how vowels and tonal aspects in particular languages have evolved and are processed.

Michael S. Gazzaniga, Director of the Sage Center for the Study of Mind, University of California: with colleagues Roger W. Sperry, Joseph E. Bogen, P.J. Vogel (et al) carried out tests on three patients who had undergone surgery for epilepsy and had their corpus callosum severed. These were quite famous experiments carried out about forty years ago and have been repeated and corroborated in other laboratories around the world. This work is summarised in M.S. Gazzaniga, 'The Split Brain Revisited', Scientific American Special Edition, Vol. 12, Issue 1, Aug 2002, pp. 27-31. Gazzaniga notes: This finding is in keeping with other neurological data, particularly those from stroke victims. Damage to the left hemisphere is far more detrimental to language function than is damage to the right. Cf. 'Organization of the Human Brain', Science, New Series, Vol. 245, No. 4921 (1989), pp. 947-952.

In Michael S. Gazzaniga & Charlotte S. Smylie ['What does language do for a right hemisphere?', Handbook of Cognitive Neuroscience, Michael S. Gazzaniga (ed.), New York Plenum Press, 1984, 199-208] he notes: Of the approximately fifty split-brain patients studied in America during the past twenty years, five, to date, possess language of some kind in the right hemisphere. Of the five, two have lexical knowledge, some syntax, and

David Crystal [The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Language, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 260] states that ninety-five percent of right-handed people have left hemisphere dominance over language. However variations are known and are likely examples of brain plasticity due to language-specific or environmental factors. This is suggested by rescued feral children's language acquisition and education which suggests that language initially is processed in the right hemisphere. One example1 was the feral child 'Genie' discovered in Los Angeles in 1970 at thirteen and a half. Genie had been abused to the extent she was 'severely disturbed and underdeveloped, and had been unable to learn language ...' Great efforts were made to teach her to speak. She had received next to no linguistic stimulation between the ages of two and puberty ... Analysis of the way Genie developed her linguistic skills showed several abnormalities, such as a marked gap between production and comprehension, variability in using rules, stereotyped speech, gaps in the acquisition of syntactic skills, and a generally retarded rate of development [although the regression and retardation is mostly attributed to environmental factors by P.E. Jones]. After various psycholinguistic tests, it was concluded that Genie was using her right hemisphere for language. This possibly suggests an optimal period for learning language, but 'the critical-period hypothesis has been controversial. ... The neuropsychological evidence generally fails to support [it] showing lateralisation to be established long before puberty - some studies suggest this may even be as early as the third year. ... On the other hand lateralisation plainly takes some years before it is firmly established. [David Crystal, The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Language, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 265].

P.E. Jones ['Contradictions and unanswered questions in the Genie Case: a fresh look at the linguistic evidence', Language and Communication, Vol. 15, No. 3 (July 1995), pp. 261-280] questions the validity that 'this verdict on Genie's language which has been repeated, uncritically throughout the wider linguistic and psycholinguistic literature (see for example, Aitchison, 1989; Akmajian et al., 1992; Harris, 1990; Taylor, 1990, [Rymer, 1993], etc.). The linguistic findings, in turn, have been variously presented by Curtiss and others as critical evidence on such questions as the existence of critical periods in language acquisition, the modularity of mind, and on innate syntactic ability [p.261].' Cf. Susan Curtiss, Victoria Fromkin, Stephen Krashen, David Rigler, Marilyn Rigler, 'The Linguistic Development of Genie', Language, Vol. 50, No. 3 (Sep., 1974), pp. 528-554. Re-examining the evidence he especially notes that 'Genie was able to acquire the morphology and syntax of English and was still in the process of acquiring it when she was eighteen years old' [p.278].

Other examples contrary to the norm of left hemisphere language dominance are indicated by Harold W. Gordon of the Technion Medical School Unit of Behavioral Biology in Haifa, Israel ['Cognitive Asymmetry in Dyslexic Families', Neuropsychologia, Vol. 18, Issue 6 (1980), 645-656]. He notes: Ninety percent of the first degree family members of dyslexics

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1 The case of 'Genie' has been controversial on ethical and methodological grounds. It is not the point here to assess or judge the case, except to note the observation was made that her speech initially was 'stereotyped' (which the writer infers was formulaic) and that the testing carried out suggested that she was right hemisphere dominant in this language.
also had the same, right dominant profile. ... it was hypothesised that dyslexics were 'locked' into a right hemisphere mode of processing which governed all their cognitive activity.

This requires further investigation. Hebrew has no vowels, which, in light of the experiments cited below, suggests there may be further aspects to the hypothesis proposed by Wade-Gery and progressed by Powell that the Greek alphabet was designed to annotate prosody (discussed in chapter IV). In the case of Greek script, the relationship between prosody and the need to record vowels would have been in the necessity to maintain the metric length to the hexameter without variation.

Régine Kolinsky, Pascale Lidji, Isabelle Peretz, Mireille Besson, José Morais ['Processing interactions between phonology and melody: Vowels sing but consonants speak', Cognition, Vol.112, Issue 1, July 2009, 1-20]: 'The aim of this study was to determine if two dimensions of song, the phonological part of lyrics and the melodic part of tunes, are processed in an independent or integrated way. In a series of five experiments, musically untrained participants classified bi-syllabic nonwords sung on two-tone melodic intervals. Their response had to be based on pitch contour, on nonword identity, or on the combination of pitch and nonword. When participants had to ignore irrelevant variations of the non-attended dimension, patterns of interference and facilitation allowed us to specify the processing interactions between dimensions. Results showed that consonants are processed more independently from melodic information than vowels are (Experiments 1-4). This difference between consonants and vowels was neither related to the sonority of the phoneme (Experiment 3), nor to the acoustical correlates between vowel quality and pitch height (Experiment 5). The implication of these results for our understanding of the functional relationships between musical and linguistic systems is discussed in light of the different evolutionary origins and linguistic functions of consonants and vowels.'

(4) Gazzaniga ['The Split Brain Revisited', Scientific American Special Edition, Vol. 12, Issue 1, Aug 2002, pp. 27-31] reports that the right hemisphere has lexical knowledge and a simple, non-complex capacity for syntax.

Prosody is formulaic language and is a function of the right hemisphere. The research below appears to carry aspects of this further by indicating a right hemisphere ability to process (construct) metaphor in new ways. When this is connected to further research on the right hemisphere's association with prosody, it recalls Aristotle's comments on the use of metaphor and its connections with prosody. He maintained that, in Greek, metaphor was appropriate to prosody, but inappropriate to dialexis. In view of the criticisms of prosody of Thucydides, Aristophanes, Xenophon and Plato listed in chapter II.6 and the further comments of Gorgias and Alcidamas on audience reaction to elaborate dialexis, noted and discussed throughout chapter VIII, it suggests highly active right hemisphere in fifth-century BC Athenians, even in literates.

A most wide-ranging and important work relevant to the hypotheses relating to fifth-century BC Athens is that of Elliott D. Ross and Marilee Monnot. Other research by Sambeth, et al. [2008]; Trehub and Hannon [2006]; Stewart and Walsh [2002]; Schmithorst [2005] is cited below.

Ross and Monnot ['Neurology of affective prosody and its functional-anatomic organization in right hemisphere', Brain and Language, Vol. 104, Issue 1 (2008), pp. 51–74] explain the overall experimentation and findings: Unlike the aphasic syndromes, the organization of affective prosody in the brain has remained controversial because affective-prosodic deficits may occur after left or right brain damage. However, different patterns of deficits are observed following left and right brain damage that suggest affective prosody is a dominant and lateralized function of the right hemisphere. Using the Aprosodia Battery, which was developed to differentiate left and right hemisphere patterns of affective-prosodic deficits, functional-anatomic evidence is presented in patients with focal ischemic strokes to support the concepts that (1) affective prosody is a dominant and lateralized function of the right hemisphere, (2) the intrahemispheric organization of affective prosody in the right hemisphere, with the partial exception of Repetition, is analogous to the organization of propositional language in the left hemisphere and (3) the
aprosodic syndromes are cortically based as part of evolutionary adaptations underlying human language and communication.

Furthermore, Ross and Monnot note that 'over the last three decades, there has been growing realisation that the right hemisphere is essential for language and communication competency and psychological well-being through its ability to modulate affective prosody and gestural behavior, decode connotative (non-standard) word meanings, make thematic inferences, and process metaphor, complex linguistic relationships and non-literal (idiomatic) types of expressions (Benowitz et al., 1983; Borod, Koff, Perlman, Lorch, & Nicholas, 1986; Brownell, Potter, Michelow, & Gardner, 1984; Brownell, Potter, & Bihrlle, 1986; Carton, Kessler, & Pape, 1999; Cicone, Wapner, & Gardner, 1980; DeKosky, Heilmann, Bowers, & Valenstein, 1980; Foldi, 1987; Mitchell & Crow, 2005; Myers 1999; Ross, 2000; Van Lancker, 1990; Van Lancker & Kemplet, 1987; Winner & Gardner, 1977). ... In addition, functional imaging studies assessing language processing always show, at minimum, bilateral activations of the peri-Sylvian regions when using low-level types of subtraction techniques (Binder et al., 1997; Demonet, Thierry, & Cardebat, 2005; Larsen, Skinhoj, & Lassen, 1978; Petersen, Fox, Posner, Mintun, & Raichle, 1988; Wildgruber, Pihan, Ackermann, Erb, & Grodd 2002; Zatorre, Evans, Meyer, & Gjedde, 1992, ...). Thus, the traditional concept that language is a dominant and lateralised function of the left hemisphere is no longer tenable' [p.51].

M. Faust, N. Mashal, [The Role of the Right Cerebral Hemisphere in Processing Novel Metaphoric Expressions Taken from Poetry: A divided visual field study], Neuropsychologia, Volume 45, Issue 4, 2007, 860-870]: Previous research suggests that the right hemisphere (RH) may contribute uniquely to the processing of metaphoric language. However, most studies have focused on familiar metaphoric expressions. The present study used the divided visual field paradigm to examine the role of the right cerebral hemisphere in processing novel metaphoric expressions taken from poetry. ... [Results] showed that responses to LVF/RH presented target words were more accurate and faster than responses to RVF/LH target words for novel metaphoric expressions, but not for other types of word pairs. These results support previous research indicating that during word recognition, the RH activates a broader range of related meanings than the LH, including novel, nonsalient meanings. The findings thus suggest that the RH may be critically involved in at least one important component of novel metaphor comprehension, i.e., the integration of the individual meanings of two seemingly unrelated concepts into a meaningful metaphoric expression.

Donna Coch, Tory Hart, Priya Mitra [‘Three Kinds of Rhymes: An ERP Study’], Brain and Language, Vol. 104, Issue 1 (2008), 230-243]: It is possible that the observed visual ERP rhyming effect is in fact a phonological priming effect: rhyming targets that match primes phonologically would theoretically require less processing (having been primed) than non-rhyming targets that phonologically mismatch with primes. Similar ERP rhyming effects have been observed in the auditory modality (e.g., Cock, Grossi, Skendzel, & Neville, 2005; Praamstra, Meyer, & Levelt, 1994; Praamstra & Stegemann, 1993). These effects have been attributed to phonological, as opposed to lexico-semantic, processing, providing support for this interpretation of the visual ERP rhyming effect. The difference between rhyming and nonrhyming targets is maximal over the right hemisphere is somewhat paradoxical, given that the right hemisphere has traditionally been thought to have little phonological processing capability. ... However, recent direct recordings have shown that the right hemisphere is activated, albeit later than the left hemisphere in rhyme tasks (Schwartz, Haglund, Lettich, & Ojemann, 2000); moreover, the right hemisphere asymmetry may reflect differential activity in neural networks ‘responsive to the outcome of phonological processing’ rather than phonological processing itself (Barrett & Rugg, 1990, p.435). Alternatively, the typical right-greater-than-left distribution of the rhyming effect may simply reflect orientation of the contributing dipole(s)[p.230-231].

(5) Elements of the research below indicate that music, rhythm and melody are processed in the right hemisphere and have connections to speech modules and processing. It highlights the right hemisphere dominance in the hexametric epic stories of Homer and the other metre oral poets that formed the knowledge base in Greek oral society. This is discussed especially in chapters IV and V.
Atsuko Gunji, Ryouhei Ishii, Wilkin Chau, Ryusuke Kakigi, Christo Pantev ['Rhythmic brain activities related to singing in humans' NeuroImage, Vol. 34, Issue 1, 1 January 2007, 426-434]: To investigate the motor control related to sound production, we studied cortical rhythmic changes during continuous vocalisation such as singing. Magnetoencephalographic (MEG) responses were recorded while subjects spoke in the usual way (speaking), sang (singing), hummed (humming) and imagined (imaging) a popular song. The power of alpha (8–15 Hz), beta (15–30 Hz) and low-gamma (30–60 Hz) frequency bands was changed during and after vocalisation (singing, speaking and humming). In the alpha band, the oscillatory changes for singing were most pronounced in the right premotor, bilateral sensorimotor, right secondary somatosensory and bilateral superior parietal areas. The beta oscillation for the singing was also confirmed in the premotor, primary and secondary sensorimotor and superior parietal areas in the left and right hemispheres where were partly activated even for imagined a song (imaging). These regions have been traditionally described as vocalisation-related sites. The cortical rhythmic changes were distinct in the singing condition compared with the other vocalising conditions (speaking and humming) and thus we considered that more concentrated control of the vocal tract, diaphragm and abdominal muscles is responsible.

Lawrence M. Parsons, Justine Sergent, Donald A. Hodges, Peter T. Fox ['The brain basis of piano performance', Neuropsychologia, Vol. 43, Issue 2, 2005, 199-215]: Performances of memorised piano compositions unfold via dynamic integrations of motor, perceptual, cognitive, and emotive operations. The functional neuroanatomy of such elaborately skilled achievements was characterised in the present study by using 150-water positron emission tomography to image blindfolded pianists performing a concerto by J.S. Bach. The resulting brain activity was referenced to that for bimanual performance of memorised major scales. Scales and concerto performances both activated primary motor cortex, corresponding somatosensory areas, inferior parietal cortex, supplementary motor area, motor cingulate, superior and middle temporal cortex, right thalamus, anterior and posterior cerebellum. Regions specifically supporting the concerto performance included superior and middle temporal cortex, planum polare, thalamus, basal ganglia, posterior cerebellum, dorsolateral premotor cortex, right insula, right supplementary motor area, lingual gyrus, and posterior cingulate. Areas specifically implicated in generating and playing scales were posterior cingulate, middle temporal, right middle frontal, and right precuneus cortices, with lesser increases in right hemispheric superior temporal, temporoparietal, fusiform, precuneus, and prefrontal cortices, along with left inferior frontal gyrus. Finally, much greater deactivations were present for playing the concerto than scales. This seems to reflect a deeper attentional focus in which tonically active orienting and evaluative processes, among others, are suspended. This inference is supported by observed deactivations in posterior cingulate, parahippocampus, precuneus, prefrontal, middle temporal, and posterior cerebellar cortices. For each of the foregoing analyses, a distributed set of interacting localised functions is outlined for future test.

Charles M. Epstein, Kimford J. Meador, David W. Loring, Randall J. Wright, Joseph D. Weissman, Scott Sheppard, James J. Lah, Frank Puharovich, Luis Gaitan, Kent R. Davey ['Localization and characterization of speech arrest during transcranial magnetic stimulation', Clinical Neurophysiology, Vol. 110, Issue 6, 1 June 1999, 1073-1079]: Objective: To determine the anatomic and physiologic localisation of speech arrest induced by repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS), and to examine the relationship of speech arrest to language function. Methods: Ten normal, right-handed volunteers were tested in a battery of language tasks during rTMS. Four underwent mapping of speech arrest on a 1 cm grid over the left frontal region. Compound motor action potentials from the right face and hand were mapped onto the same grid. Mean positions for speech arrest and muscle activation were identified in two subjects on 3-dimensional MRI. Results: All subjects had lateralised arrest of spontaneous speech and reading aloud during rTMS over the left posterior-inferior frontal region. Writing, comprehension, repetition, naming, oral praxis, and singing were relatively spared (P<.05). Stimulation on the right during singing abolished melody in two subjects, but minimally affected speech production. The area of speech arrest overlay the caudal portion of the left precentral gyrus, congruous with the region where stimulation produced movement of the right face.
Conclusions: The site of magnetic speech arrest appears to be the facial motor cortex. Its characteristics differ from those of classic aphasias, and include a prominent dissociation among different types of speech output.

M. Groussard, F. Viader, V. Hubert, B. Landeau, A. Abbas, B. Desgranges, F. Eustache, H. Platel ['Musical and verbal semantic memory: Two distinct neural networks?', NeuroImage, Vol. 49, Issue 3, 1 February 2010, 2764-2773]: 'Semantic memory has been investigated in numerous neuroimaging and clinical studies, most of which have used verbal or visual, but only very seldom, musical material. Clinical studies have suggested that there is a relative neural independence between verbal and musical semantic memory. In the present study, ‘musical semantic memory’ is defined as memory for ‘well-known’ melodies without any knowledge of the spatial or temporal circumstances of learning, while ‘verbal semantic memory’ corresponds to general knowledge about concepts, again without any knowledge of the spatial or temporal circumstances of learning. Our aim was to compare the neural substrates of musical and verbal semantic memory by administering the same type of task in each modality. We used high-resolution PET H2O15 to observe 11 young subjects performing two main tasks: (1) a musical semantic memory task, where the subjects heard the first part of familiar melodies and had to decide whether the second part they heard matched the first, and (2) a verbal semantic memory task with the same design, but where the material consisted of well-known expressions or proverbs. The musical semantic memory condition activated the superior temporal area and inferior and middle frontal areas in the left hemisphere and the inferior frontal area in the right hemisphere. The verbal semantic memory condition activated the middle temporal region in the left hemisphere and the cerebellum in the right hemisphere. We found that the verbal and musical semantic processes activated a common network extending throughout the left temporal neocortex. In addition, there was a material-dependent topographical preference within this network, with predominantly anterior activation during musical tasks and predominantly posterior activation during semantic verbal tasks.'

(6) Further evidence that, while speech cannot be generated by the right hemisphere, prosody and rhythm can be generated without the assistance of the left hemisphere language centres.

H.W. Gordon, ['Auditory Specialization of Right and Left Hemispheres', in M. Kinsbourne and W. Lynn Smith (eds.), Hemispheric Disconnections and Cerebral Function, Springfield Ill., Thomas, 1974, p. 126-136]: reports that, even after removal of the entire left hemisphere due to glioma, patients are able to sing previously learned songs ('America' and 'Home on the Range').

Gordon and Bogen ['Hemispheric lateralization of singing after intracarotid sodium amylobarbitone', Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery and Psychiatry, Vol. 37, (1974), pp.727-738] explain further: [W]e conclude from our observations that these right-handed patients normally depend more upon the right hemisphere for singing than upon the left hemisphere. It is emphasised that the major deficit in singing after right carotid injection was the production of correct pitch. Rhythm was hardly affected at a time when singing was either monotonic or markedly off-key. Rhythm was also not affected during left hemisphere depression. Apparently, rhythmic production is possible by either the left or right hemisphere alone, independent of the ability to sing on pitch. Lack of hemispheric specialisation of rhythmic aspects of music has been implied in previous studies (Milner, 1962; Gordon, 1970).

Whereas tonal control was the characteristic deficiency of singing after right carotid injection of amylobarbitone, there was no evidence of similar tonal defects in speech. The patients did not speak in a monotone; they maintained natural voice inflections in spite of the dysarthria associated with the systemic distribution of the barbiturate. It can be concluded that pitch control for singing is a function separate from pitch control for propositional speech, and that it is better represented in the right hemisphere. Furthermore, it can be inferred, though not directly observed, that tone control for speech is better represented in the left hemisphere. This conclusion is consistent with the results of a recent dichotic listening experiment using a tone language (Thai), showing right ear (left hemisphere) dominance in native speakers for detection of pairs of words whose meanings depended only on differences in pitch (Van Lancker and Fromkin, 1973). The importance of the left hemisphere for pitch in language was seen in another recent dichotic study where a
right ear dominance for nonsense sentences disappeared when the original phonetic pitch contours were reduced to a monotone (Zurif and Mendelsohn, 1972).

The dichotomy between language and speech on the one hand, and singing on the other, may be differentiated on a level related to their construction. For example, a sentence, paragraph, phrase or, in short, speech is composed from several morpheme units which are retrieved from memory according to grammatical rules and are ordered into a specified temporal arrangement. In contrast, songs, melodies, as well as many everyday prosaic passages are remembered and produced as intact wholes. The parts of these units are not pieced together tone by tone, word by word, but rather are recalled all at once as a complete unit. The ability to store and recall intact such large units may be an important aspect of those tasks for which the right hemispheres of most individuals are dominant (Zangwill, 1961; Hecae and Angleluegos, 1963; Bogen and Gazzaniga, 1965; Levy-Agresti and Sperry, 1968; Bogen, 1969a, b; Milner, 1971; Sperry and Levy, 1971; Sperry, 1972). It is convenient to suppose that these tasks have some underlying process in common. **We may call this common process, 'appositional'** (Bogen, 1969b), a usage parallel with Jackson's use of the word 'propositional' to encompass the left hemisphere's dominance for speaking, writing, calculation, and related tasks including what he called 'internal speech' (Jackson, 1878). Although it would be premature at this time to believe that we know in any final way of what appositionality consists, we would like to introduce a preliminary hypothesis based on our observations and those of others that absence versus presence of the dimension of time is instrumental in distinguishing appositionality from propositionality. The emphasis on time is not a new description of cerebral function (Efron, 1963). It is related to the simultaneous-successive (or sequential) dichotomy discussed by Luria (1966) and of the different but interactive temporal-spatial mechanisms of Lashley (1951). While both authors discuss speech as an example of successive or serial order, and both suggest that two functions of different types—for example, simultaneous vs. sequential—do not coexist in the same cortical areas, neither Luria nor Lashley differentiates between right and left cerebral functions. We propose, as others have suggested (Levy-Agresti and Sperry, 1969) that these simultaneous and sequential functions, described by us as time-independent—that is, complete units unrelated to others—and time-dependent—that is, units related to others successively in time—are specialised abilities of the right and left hemispheres, respectively. Previous characterisations of the right hemisphere's ability as 'spatial' is ill-applied to audible stimuli, unless 'spatial' is understood to mean 'having no time dimension'. Reliance upon 'time' as a principle of organisation may better distinguish the left from the right hemisphere: the left is crucially concerned with it, whereas the right is not [p.732-33].

Later research by Özdemir, et al. [2006]; Dogil, et al. [20002]; Teraoa, et al. [2006]; Schmithorst [2005] quoted below comply with these findings that the right hemisphere is the functional centre of prosody generation:

Elif Özdemir, Andrea Norton, Gottfried Schlaug ['Shared and distinct neural correlates of singing and speaking', *NeuroImage*, Vol. 33, Issue 2, 1 November 2006, 628-635]: Using a modified sparse temporal sampling fMRI technique, we examined both shared and distinct neural correlates of singing and speaking. In the experimental conditions, 10 right-handed subjects were asked to repeat intoned ('sung') and non-intoned ('spoken') bisyllabic words/phrases that were contrasted with conditions controlling for pitch ('humming') and the basic motor processes associated with vocalisation ('vowel production'). Areas of activation common to all tasks included the inferior pre- and post-central gyrus, superior temporal gyrus (STG), and superior temporal sulcus (STS) bilaterally, indicating a large shared network for motor preparation and execution as well as sensory feedback/control for vocal production. The speaking more than vowel-production contrast revealed activation in the inferior frontal gyrus most likely related to motor planning and preparation, in the primary sensorimotor cortex related to motor execution, and the middle and posterior STG/STS related to sensory feedback. The singing more than speaking contrast revealed additional activation in the mid-portions of the STG (more strongly on the right than left) and the most inferior and middle portions of the primary sensorimotor cortex. **Our results suggest a bihemispheric network for vocal production regardless of whether the words/phrases were intoned or spoken. Furthermore, singing more than humming ('intoned speaking') showed additional right-lateralised activation of the superior temporal gyrus, inferior central operculum, and inferior frontal gyrus which may offer an explanation for the clinical observation that patients with non-fluent aphasia due...**
to left hemisphere lesions are able to sing the text of a song while they are unable to speak the same words.

G. Dogil, H. Ackermann, W. Grodd, H. Haider, H. Kamp, J. Mayer, A. Riecker, D. Wildgruber ['The speaking brain: a tutorial introduction to fMRI experiments in the production of speech, prosody and syntax', Journal of Neuro Linguistics Vol. 15, (2002), pp.59-90]: to establish the neuroanatomical basis of prosody, carried out a comprehensive testing of healthy, right-handed German speakers from using a logatom consisting of five syllables (dadadadada) with various pitch accent types ad locations (the FOCUS condition), various boundary tone types (the MODUS condition) and various kinds of emotion state marking (the AFFECT condition). As a baseline for statistical analysis, subjects produced the logatomes (dadadadada), (dididididi), (dododododo), (dududududu) in a monotonous voice (with syllable frequency of ca. 5 Hz). ... We used reiterant syllables and meaningless words in order to minimise the influence of syntactic, semantic, morphological and segmental factors on prosody generation [p.76]. ... The obtained results suggest exclusively neocortical areas to be critically involved in prosody generation. Neither the limbic system nor the midbrain structures displayed activation during the model-controlled prosodic tasks. Human control of prosody, thus, seems to be substantially different from the way in which primates control their emotional calls.

The results support the view that both hemispheres subserve the processing of prosodic features of speech. Obviously this type of processing is highly localised (superior temporal gyrus) and lateralised in accordance with the required prosodic task (FOCUS assignment vs MODUS assignment and AFFECT expression). The lateralisation is not consistent with the distinction between the linguistic and the emotional functions of prosody: Both FOCUS and MODUS assignment are characterised as linguistic functions. It is rather the case that prosodic features which require a short address frame (e.g. focused syllable) are lateralised differently as compared to prosodic features comprising a long address frame (the whole intonational phrase for linguistic modus and paralinguistic affect). Thus, prosodic frame length seems to be the basis of lateralisation and not the linguistic/affective function.

... Prosodie frame length (short, e.g. syllable or mora vs long, e.g. intonational phrase) seems to be the cognitively relevant factor in prosody generation. ... [R]ecent neuroimaging studies of prosody perception also lend support to the localisational findings of our production study. J. Gandour, D. Wong, D. van Lancker, D. Hutchings, [A PET investigation of speech prosody in tone languages', Brain and Language 60, 1997, p.192-4] [found that] tone is tied to the smallest prosodic units [with] increased activity in the left superior temporal gyrus. ... Wildgruber and co-workers [D. Wildgruber, U. Kische, H. Ackermann, U. Klose, W. Grodd, [Dynamic pattern of brain activation during sequencing of word strings evaluated by fMRI', Cognitive Brain Research 7, 1999, p.285-94] ... study on the perception of affective prosody, found activation in area 22/42 of the right hemisphere. This region was significantly activated during the task in which hearers were asked to assess the prosodic expressiveness of digitally edited stimuli, while individual acoustic cues (duration, intensity and pitch) were altered systematically ... they all activated the same area in the right hemisphere. ... apparently the same areas are involved in both the production and perception of prosody [cf. M. Pell, S. Baum, 'The ability to perceive and comprehend intonation in linguistic and affective contexts by brain damaged adults', Brain and Language 57, 1997, p.80-99; D. van Lancker, 'Cerebral lateralization of pitch cues in the linguistic signal', International Journal of Human Communication 13, 1980, p.227-77]

We were able to identify in a general speech production experiment the speech network consisting of Motor Cortex - Supplementary Motor Area - Cerebellum - Anterior Insula of the dominant [left] hemisphere. ... As soon as we asked the brain to perform linguistically constrained complex tasks it stopped showing us the widely distributed activity and told us that abstract function is localised in focal areas. This was most clear in the prosody experiment [p.86].

'The results of [the] experiment (3) indicate that it is not the function of prosody (linguistic vs affective) that controls lateralisation of prosodic processing, but that more general characteristics of the processing units like the size of the prosodic frame are responsible for the activation of different cortical regions [p.59].

This experiment is part of a larger study, investigating covert and overt singing as well, [published - A. Riecker, H. Ackermann, D. Wildgruber, G. Dogil, W. Grodd, 'Opposite hemispheric lateralization effects during speaking and singing at motor cortex. Insula and Cerebellum', NeuroReport 11, 2000: 1997-2000.]. An overt and covert reproduction of a melody ('Eine kleine Nachtmusik - W.A. Mozart') with a syllable 'la' was required. ... [T]he
results of the singing task are an almost complete mirror image of the results of the speaking task [p.67].

Yasuo Teraoa, Tomoyuki Mizunob, Mitsuko Shindohc, Yasuhsa Sakuraid, Yoshikazu Ugawaa, Shunsuke Kobayashia, Chiyoko Nagaie, Toshiaki Furubayashia, Noritoshi Araia, Shingo Okabea, Hitoshi Mochizukif, Ritsuko Hanajima and Shouj

Vincent J. Schmithorst ['Separate cortical networks involved in music perception: preliminary functional MRI evidence for modularity of music processing', NeuroImage, Vol.25, Issue 2, 1 April 2005, 444-451]: Music perception is a quite complex cognitive task, involving the perception and integration of various elements including melody, harmony, pitch, rhythm, and timbre. A preliminary functional MRI investigation of music perception was performed, using a simplified passive listening task. Group independent component analysis (ICA) was used to separate out various components involved in music processing, as the hemodynamic responses are not known a priori. Various components consistent with auditory processing, expressive language, syntactic processing, and visual association were found. The results are discussed in light of various hypotheses regarding modularity of music processing and its overlap with language processing. The results suggest that, while some networks overlap with ones used for language processing, music processing may involve its own domain-specific processing subsystems.

(7) The findings below confirm that the right hemisphere is able to produce speaking, only if it is in prosody, and singing. The experiment of Straube, et. al. was conducted with an aphasic subject (GS) who suffered a left hemisphere stroke and had only right hemisphere function. Healthy [both hemispheres functioning] subjects were used as a control group. Therefore only the results for GS are relevant and considered here. There are several interesting and relevant issues raised by this work that suggest prosody is retained in long-term memory and implicit knowledge:

1. GS was asked to sing the lyrics of a song prescribed for the experiment, one that GS knew. GS could sing the lyrics at 58.8% efficiency. GS was then asked to speak the lyrics and attained a 30.5% efficiency. Therefore, GS could speak. But it is relevant that what GS was speaking was prosody and not conversational prose. GS was speaking prosody without the assistance of the left hemisphere.

2. GS performed poorly when he was asked to perform new songs he had not seen before. When asked to sing the new lyrics and the new melody together he achieved only 8.3% correct words. When asked to sing unseen lyrics to an already learned melody, he achieved 0% correct.

Thomas Straube, Alexander Schulz, Katja Geipel, Hans-Joachim Mentzel, Wolfgang H.R. Miltner, ['Dissociation between singing and speaking in expressive aphasia: The role of song familiarity', Neuropsychologia, Vol. 46, Issue 5, 2008, 1505-1512]: There are several reports on the ability aphasic patients have to sing familiar songs, despite having severe speech impairments.... This study investigated the role of singing during repetition of word phrases in a patient severely affected with non-fluent aphasia (GS) who had an
almost complete lesion of the left hemisphere. GS showed a pronounced increase in the number of correctly reproduced words during singing as compared to speaking excerpts of familiar lyrics. This dissociation between singing and speaking was not seen for novel song lyrics, regardless of whether these were coupled with an unfamiliar, a familiar, or a spontaneously generated melody during the singing conditions. These findings propose that singing might help word phrase production in at least some cases of severe expressive aphasia. However, the association of melody and text in long-term memory seems to be responsible for this effect.

Gottfried Schlaug, Sarah Marchina, Andrea Norton, ['From Singing to Speaking: Why singing may lead to recovery of expressive language function in patients with Broca's aphasia', Music Perception: An Interdisciplinary Journal, Vol. 25, No. 4, April, 2008, pp. 315-323]: It has been reported that patients with severely nonfluent aphasia are better at singing lyrics than speaking the same words. This observation inspired the development of Melodic Intonation Therapy (MIT). ... Using two patients with similar impairments and stroke size/location, we show the effects of MIT and a control intervention. Both interventions' post-treatment outcomes revealed significant improvement in propositional speech that generalized to unpractised words and phrases; however, the MIT-treated patient's gains surpassed those of the control-treated patient. Treatment-associated imaging changes indicate that MIT's unique engagement of the right hemisphere, both through singing and tapping with the left hand to prime the sensorimotor and premotor cortices for articulation, accounts for its effect over nonintoned speech therapy.

... if there is a bihemispheric representation for speech production, then the question of why an intervention that uses singing or a form of singing such as MIT has the potential to facilitate syllable and word production, still remains. In theory, there are four possible mechanisms by which MIT's facilitating effect may be achieved: (1) Reduction of speed: in singing, words can be articulated at a slower rate than in speaking, thereby reducing dependence on the left-hemisphere; (2) Syllable lengthening: provides the opportunity to distinguish the individual phonemes that together form words and phrases. Such connected segmentation, coupled with the reduction of speed in singing, can help nonfluent aphasic patients become more fluent, and may receive greater support from right-hemisphere structures; (3) Syllable "chunking": prosodic features such as intonation, change in pitch, and syllabic stress may help patients group syllables into words and words into phrases, and this "chunking" (Chase & Simon, 1973; de Groot, 1965) may also enlist more right-hemisphere support; and (4) Hand tapping: it is likely that MIT engages a right-hemispheric, sensorimotor network through the tapping of the patient's left hand as each syllable is sung (one tap/syllable, one syllable/s), which may in turn provide an impulse for verbal production in much the same way that a metronome has been shown to serve as a "pacemaker" in other motor activities (rhythmic anticipation, rhythmic entrainment; Thaut, Kenyon, Schauer, & McIntosh, 1999).

Junko Murayama, Toshihiro Kashiwagi, Asako Kashiwagi, Masaru Mimura ['Impaired pitch production and preserved rhythm production in a right brain-damaged patient with amusia', Brain and Cognition, Vol. 56, Issue 1, October 2004, 36-42]: Pre- and postmorbid singing of a patient with amusia due to a right-hemispheric infarction was analyzed acoustically. This particular patient had a premorbid tape recording of her own singing without accompaniment. Appropriateness of pitch interval and rhythm was evaluated based on ratios of pitch and duration between neighboring notes. The results showed that melodic contours and rhythm were preserved but individual pitch intervals were conspicuously distorted. Our results support a hypothesis that pitch and rhythm are subserved by independent neural subsystems. We concluded that action-related acoustic information for controlling pitch intervals is stored in the right hemisphere.

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(8) The experiments below indicate that, across ethnic and cultural differences, prosody and melody (music) are inborn and evolutionary.
Anke Sambeth, Katja Ruohio, Paavo Alku, Vineta Fellman, Minna Huotilainen ['Sleeping newborns extract prosody from continuous speech', Clinical Neurophysiology, Vol. 119, Issue 2, February 2008, 332-341]: Objective - Behavioral experiments show that infants use both prosodic and statistical cues in acquiring language. However, it is not yet clear whether these prosodic and statistical tools are already present at birth.

Methods - We recorded brain responses of sleeping newborns to natural sounds rich in prosody, namely singing and continuous speech, and to two impoverished manipulations of speech. A total of 11 newborns were presented with continuous speech, singing, and degraded speech, while MEG was recorded.

Results - We found that a brain response elicited to the prosodically rich singing and continuous natural speech conditions decreased dramatically when the prosody in the speech was impoverished.

Conclusions - We claim that this response is the indicator of the infants' sensitivity to prosodic cues in language, which is already present at birth during natural sleep.

Significance - The indicators of detection of prosody may be crucial in assessing the normal and abnormal cortical function in newborns, especially of those infants at-risk for language problems.

Sandra E. Trehub, Erin E. Hannon ['Infant music perception: Domain-general or domain-specific mechanisms?', Cognition, Vol.100, Issue 1, May 2006, 73-99]: We review the literature on infants' perception of pitch and temporal patterns, relating it to comparable research with human adult and non-human listeners. Although there are parallels in relative pitch processing across age and species, there are notable differences. Infants accomplish such tasks with ease, but non-human listeners require extensive training to achieve very modest levels of performance. In general, human listeners process auditory sequences in a holistic manner, and non-human listeners focus on absolute aspects of individual tones. Temporal grouping processes and categorization on the basis of rhythm are evident in non-human listeners and in human infants and adults. Although synchronization to sound patterns is thought to be uniquely human, tapping to music, synchronous firefly flashing, and other cyclic behaviors can be described by similar mathematical principles.

We conclude that infants' music perception skills are a product of general perceptual mechanisms that are neither music- nor species-specific.

Lauren Stewart, Vincent Walsh ['Congenital Amusia: All the Songs Sound the Same, Current Biology, Vol. 12, Issue 12, 25 June 2002, R420-R421]: Recent evidence from individuals born with a profound musical impairment suggests that the ability to process pitch information is normally present from birth. This finding supports the idea that the perception and appreciation of music, both of which critically depend on pitch processing, have a biological basis in the brain.

Vincent J. Schmithorst ['Separate cortical networks involved in music perception: preliminary functional MRI evidence for modularity of music processing', NeuroImage, Vol.25, Issue 2, 1 April 2005, 444-451]: Music perception is a quite complex cognitive task, involving the perception and integration of various elements including melody, harmony, pitch, rhythm, and timbre. A preliminary functional MRI investigation of music perception was performed, using a simplified passive listening task. Group independent component analysis (ICA) was used to separate out various components involved in music processing, as the hemodynamic responses are not known a priori. Various components consistent with auditory processing, expressive language, syntactic processing, and visual association were found. The results are discussed in light of various hypotheses regarding modularity of music processing and its overlap with language processing. The results suggest that, while some networks overlap with ones used for language processing, music processing may involve its own domain-specific processing subsystems.

(9) Differences in the degree of lateralisation appears in autistic subjects and some variation in dominance may occur.
Robert A. Mason, Diane L. Williams, Rajesh K. Kana, Nancy Minshew, Marcel Adam Just ['Theory of Mind disruption and recruitment of the right hemisphere during narrative comprehension in autism', *Neuropsychologia*, Vol. 46, Issue 1, 2008, 269-280]: The intersection of Theory of Mind (ToM) processing and complex narrative comprehension in high functioning autism was examined by comparing cortical activation during the reading of passages that required inferences based on either intentions, emotional states, or physical causality. Right hemisphere activation was substantially greater for all sentences in the autism group than in a matched control group suggesting decreased LH capacity in autism resulting in a spillover of processing to RH homologs. Moreover, the ToM network was disrupted. The autism group showed similar activation for all inference types in the right temporo-parietal component of the ToM network whereas the control participants selectively activated this network only when appropriate. The autism group had lower functional connectivity within the ToM network and also between the ToM and a left hemisphere language network. Furthermore, the within-network functional connectivity in autism was correlated with the size of the anterior portion of the corpus callosum.

Jerome Kagan [*Three Seductive Ideas*, Cambridge, MA., Harvard University Press, 1998, p. 59] reports that he observed that a small proportion of boys did not begin to speak until they were three or four years old but became 'very talented' at music and mathematics when they grew older.


Matthew Roser & Michael Gazzaniga ['Automatic Brains - Interpretive Minds', *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (2004), pp. 56-59] notes that the 'thinking' done by the right hemisphere is at times more competent as regards outcomes as the left. The right hemisphere takes the simple approach and consistently chooses the more probable alternative, thereby maximising performance. By contrast, the left hemisphere does what neurologically normal subjects do and distributes its responses between the two alternatives according to the probability that each will occur, despite the fact that this is a suboptimal strategy (G. Wolford, M.B. Miller & M.S. Gazzaniga, 'The left hemisphere's role in hypothesis formation', *Journal of Neuroscience*, Vol. 20, (2000), RC64, pp. 1-4): It seems that the left hemisphere is driven to hypothesise about the structure of the world even when this is detrimental to performance. The left hemisphere interpreter may be responsible for our feeling that our conscious experience is unified [p. 58].


(11) Gazzaniga ['The Split Brain Revisited', pp. 27-31] adds: Each hemisphere is able to direct spatial attention not only to its own sensory sphere but also to certain points in the sensory sphere of the opposite ... The intact brain appears to inhibit the search mechanisms that each hemisphere naturally processes. The left hemisphere, in particular, can exert powerful control over such tasks. ... The left hemisphere is 'smart' about its search strategies, whereas the right is not. In tests in which a person can deduce how to search efficiently an array of similar items for an odd exception, the left does better than the right. Thus, it seems that the more competent left hemisphere can hijack the intact attentional system.

(12) Rather than viewing the 'consciousness' of right hemisphere as merely different to that of the left, Gazzaniga ['The Split Brain Revisited', pp. 27-31] hypothesises that the left hemisphere is more 'conscious': it appears that the inventive and interpreting left hemisphere has a conscious experience very different from that of the truthful, literal right
brain. While both hemispheres can be viewed as conscious, the left brain’s consciousness far surpasses that of the right.

Gazzaniga qualifies this with later research [Matthew Roser & Michael Gazzaniga, ‘Automatic Brains - Interpretive Minds’, Current Directions in Psychological Science, Vol. 13, No. 2 (Apr., 2004), pp. 56-59]: Many of these processes are highly automatic and take place outside of consciousness awareness. Conscious experience, however, seems unitary and must involve integration between distributed processes. … this integration occurs in a constructive and interpretive manner and that increasingly complex representations emerge from the integration of modular processes. At the highest levels of consciousness, a personal narrative is constructed. This narrative makes sense of the brain’s own behavior and may underlie the sense of a unitary self. The challenge for the future is to identify the relationships between patterns of brain activity and conscious awareness and to delineate the neural mechanisms whereby the underlying distributed processes interact.


(13) The ‘interpreter mechanism’ has been identified by Gazzaniga ['Organization of the Human Brain', Science, New Series, Vol. 245, No. 4921 (1989), pp. 947-952; cf. 'The Split Brain Revisited', pp. 27-31]. It is suggested by experiments conducted with the right eye blindfolded thus circumventing visual information to the left hemisphere. The right hemisphere was asked to point to a particular object. The left hemisphere was then asked why and to what it was pointing and it did not know because the decision to point was made by the right hemisphere. Nevertheless, the left hemisphere promptly made up an explanation.

Gazzaniga ['The Split Brain Revisited', pp. 27-31] notes: The left hemisphere interpreter affects memory. Elizabeth A. Phelps, now at New York University, Janet Metcalfe of Columbia University and Margaret Funnell of Dartmouth College found that the two hemispheres differ in their ability to process new data. When presented with new information, people usually remember much of what they experience. When questioned, they also usually claim to remember things that were not truly part of the experience. If split-brain patients are given such tests, the left hemisphere generates many false reports. But the right brain does not; it provides a much more veridical account. … In reconstructing past experience … people develop a schema about what happened and retrospectively fit untrue events - that are nonetheless consistent with the schema - into their recollection of the original experience.

Gazzaniga relates experiments of George Wolford of Dartmouth [cf. Wolford, G.L., Miller, M. B. & Gazzaniga, M., 'The left hemisphere’s role in hypothesis formation', Journal of Neuroscience, Vol. 20, (2000), RC64 .Vol. 20, RC64 (electronic)] who has 'lent even more support to this view of the left hemisphere. In a simple test that requires a person to guess whether a light is going to appear on the top or bottom of a computer screen, humans perform inventively. The experimenter manipulates the stimulus so that the light appears on the top 80 percent of the time but in a random sequence. While it quickly becomes evident that the top button is being illuminated more often, people invariably try to figure out the entire pattern or sequence - and they truly believe they can. Yet by adopting this strategy, they are correct only 68 percent of the time. If they always pressed the top button, they would be correct 80 percent of the time. But rats and other animals are more likely to 'learn to maximise', pressing only the top button. The right hemisphere acts in the same way: it does not try to interpret its experience and find deeper meaning. It continues to live only in the present and to be correct 80 percent of the time. But the left, when asked to explain why it is attempting to figure the whole sequence, always comes up with a theory, no matter how outlandish. This narrative phenomenon is best explained by evolutionary theory.

Below, Parsons et al, just might provide a clue as to why prose was the favoured form in the development of ancient argument. While they do postulate a non-linguistic problem-solving function, they detect ‘fine detail’ language a requirement for judgement. It might

L.M. Parsons, D. Osherson, ['New Evidence for Distinct Right and Left Brain Systems for Deductive versus Probabilistic Reasoning', *Cerebral Cortex*, Vol. 11, (2001), pp. 954-965]: Deductive and probabilistic reasoning are central to cognition but the functional neuroanatomy underlying them is poorly understood. The present study contrasted these two kinds of reasoning via positron emission tomography. Relying on changes in instruction and psychological 'set', deductive versus probabilistic reasoning was induced using identical stimuli. The stimuli were arguments in propositional calculus not readily solved via mental diagrams. **Probabilistic reasoning activated mostly left brain areas whereas deductive activated mostly right.** Deduction activated areas near right brain homologues of left language areas in middle temporal lobe, inferior frontal cortex and basal ganglia, as well as right amygdala, but not spatial–visual areas. Right hemisphere activations in the deduction task cannot be explained by spill-over from overtaxed, left language areas. **Probabilistic reasoning was mostly associated with left hemispheric areas in inferior frontal, posterior cingulate, parahippocampal, medial temporal, and superior and medial prefrontal cortices.** The foregoing regions are implicated in recalling and evaluating a range of world knowledge, operations required during probabilistic thought. The findings confirm that **deduction and induction are distinct processes**, consistent with psychological theories enforcing their partial separation. The results also suggest that, except for statement decoding, **deduction is largely independent of language, and that some forms of logical thinking are non-diagrammatic.**

We postulate the existence of a logic-specific network in the right hemisphere comparable to the language-specific network in the left. ... Just as linguistic rules are encoded in the left hemisphere, deductive rules are encoded in the right. ... We hypothesise that **probabilistic judgement is achieved via non-linguistic left hemisphere areas** that are involved in the recall and evaluation of world knowledge. Note that in contrast to the reliance of deductive reasoning on course linguistic representations, **probabilistic judgement must rely on the fine detail of sentences, since every word contributes to overall plausibility.** Our hypotheses are thus consistent with the conjecture that right hemisphere regions are specialised for processing relatively coarse aspects of stimuli whereas left hemisphere regions are favored for fine aspects.

(14) The left hemisphere with its ‘interpreter mechanism’ seeks to answer questions and make sense of experience. Section II.2 notes that this function uses implicit knowledge and prosody as well as left hemisphere generated prose.

Gazzaniga ['The Split Brain Revisited', pp. 27-31] explains: My colleagues and I studied this phenomenon by administering a test. Each hemisphere was shown four small pictures, one of which related to a larger picture also presented to that hemisphere. The patient had to choose the most appropriate small picture. The right hemisphere - that is, the left hand - correctly picked the shovel for the snowstorm; the right hand, controlled by the left hemisphere, correctly picked the chicken to go with the bird’s foot. Then we asked the patient why the left hand - or right hemisphere - was pointing to the shovel. Because only the left hemisphere retains the ability to talk, it answered. But because it could not know why the right hemisphere was doing what it was doing, it made up a story about what it could see - namely, the chicken. It said the right hemisphere chose the shovel to clean out a chicken shed.

George Wolford, Michael B. Miller, Michael Gazzaniga ['The left hemisphere’s role in hypothesis formation', *Journal of Neuroscience*, Vol. 20, (2000), RC64, pp. 1-4] note 'the left hemisphere of humans houses a cognitive mechanism that tries to make sense of part occurrences. .... the neural processes responsible for searching for patterns in events are
house in the left hemisphere. ... Some of the common errors in decision making are consistent with the notion that we are prone to search for and posit causal relationships even when the evidence is insufficient or even random. We find that the search for causal explanations appears to be a left hemisphere activity, consistent with previous research on the interpreter.'

(15) The right hemisphere cannot write even though it can spell and rhyme.

Gazzaniga ['The Split Brain Revisited', pp. 27-31] notes: the right hemisphere could match words to pictures, do spelling and rhyming, and categorise objects.

Alice M. Proverbio, Alberto Zani, Roberta Adorni ['The left fusiform area is affected by written frequency of words', Neuropsychologia, Vol. 46, Issue 9, July 2008, 2292-2299]: The recent neuroimaging literature gives conflicting evidence about whether the left fusiform gyrus (FG) might recognise words as unitary visual objects. The sensitivity of the left FG to word frequency might provide a neural basis for the orthographic input lexicon theorised by reading models [Patterson, K., Marshall, J.C., & Coltheart, M. (1985). Surface dyslexia: Cognitive and neuropsychological studies of phonological reading. London: Lawrence Erlbaum]. The goal of this study was to investigate the time course and neural correlates of word processing in right-handed readers engaged in an orthographic decision task. Three hundred and twenty Italian words of high and low written frequency and 320 non-derived legal pseudo-words were presented for 250 ms in the central visual field. ERPs were recorded from 128 scalp sites in 10 Italian University students. Behavioural data showed a word superiority effect, with faster RTs to words than pseudo-words. Left occipito/temporal N2 (240ms) was greater to high-frequency than low-frequency words and pseudo-words. According to the swLORETA inverse solution, the underlying neural source of this effect was located in the left fusiform gyrus of the occipital lobe (X=-29, Y=-66, Z=-10, BA19) and the right superior temporal gyrus (X=51, Y=6, Z=-5, BA22), which are probably involved in word recognition and semantic representation, respectively. Later frontal ERP components, LPN (300-350) and P3 (400-500), also showed strong lexical sensitivity, thus suggesting implicit semantic processes. The results shed some light on the possible neural substrate of visual reading disabilities such as developmental surface dyslexia or pure alexia.

(16) Gazzaniga ['The Split Brain Revisited', pp. 27-31] states: A left-handed patient spoke out of her left brain after split-brain surgery - not a surprising finding in itself. But the patient could write only out of her right, nonspeaking hemisphere. This dissociation confirms the idea that the capacity to write need not be associated with the capacity for phonological representation.

(17) Cf. Appendix 1.2 below which examines Julian Jaynes' famous hypothesis that suggests human reasoning once operated without self-consciousness; the discussion has relevance to Gazzaniga's 'interpreter mechanism' and hypothesises further its use of prosody.


(19) Illusory contours would have played a part in recognising the forms of early Greek script.

Mendola JD, Dale AM, Fischl B, Liu AK, Tootell RB. (Massachusetts General Hospital Nuclear Magnetic Resonance Center, Charlestown, Massachusetts 02129, USA.) ['The representation of illusory and real contours in human cortical visual areas revealed by functional magnetic resonance imaging', Journal of Neuroscience, Vol. 19, Oct. 1, 1999, 8560-72]: Illusory contours (perceived edges that exist in the absence of local stimulus borders)
demonstrate that perception is an active process, creating features not present in the light patterns striking the retina. Illusory contours are thought to be processed using mechanisms that partially overlap with those of 'real' contours, but questions about the neural substrate of these percepts remain. Here, we employed functional magnetic resonance imaging to obtain physiological signals from human visual cortex while subjects viewed different types of contours, both real and illusory. We sampled these signals independently from nine visual areas, each defined by retinotopic or other independent criteria. Using both within- and across-subject analysis, we found evidence for overlapping sites of processing; most areas responded to most types of contours. However, there were distinctive differences in the strength of activity across areas and contour types. Two types of illusory contours differed in the strength of activation of the retinotopic areas, but both types activated crudely retinotopic visual areas, including V3A, V4v, V7, and V8, bilaterally. The extent of activation was largely invariant across a range of stimulus sizes that produce illusory contours perceptually, but it was related to the spatial frequency of displaced-grating stimuli. Finally, there was a striking similarity in the pattern of results for the illusory contour-defined shape and a similar shape defined by stereoscopic depth. These and other results suggest a role in surface perception for this lateral occipital region that includes V3A, V4v, V7, and V8.

Progress in this field has been swift ever since David H. Hubel and Torsten Wiesel of Harvard University provided the first clue for how brain circuits represent the shape of a given object, by demonstrating that neurons in the primary visual cortex were selectively tuned to respond to edges oriented in varied angles. Hubel and Margaret S. Livingstone, also at Harvard, later showed that other neurons in the primary visual cortex respond selectively to color but not shape. And Semir Zeki of University College London found that brain regions that received sensory information after the primary visual cortex did were specialised for the further processing of color or movement. These results provided a counterpart to observations made in living neurological patients: damage to distinct regions of the visual cortices interferes with color perception while leaving discernment of shape and movement intact.

Antonio R. Damasio ['How the Brain Creates the Mind', Scientific American Special Edition, 15512991, Vol. 12, Issue 1 (2002), pp. 4-9] suggests that a large body of work, in fact, now points to the existence of a correspondence between the structure of an object as taken in by the eye and the pattern of neuron activity generated within the visual cortex of the organism seeing that object.


(20) Regarding illusory contours Gazzaniga [The Split Brain Revisited', pp. 27-31] writes: Paul M. Corballis and Robert Fendich of Darmouth, Robert M. Shapley of New York University and I studied in many split-brain patients the perception of what are called illusory contours. Earlier work had suggested that seeing the well-known illusory contours of the late Gaetano Kanizsa of the University of Trieste was the right hemisphere's specialty. Our experiments revealed a different situation. We discovered that both hemispheres could perceive illusory contours - but that the right hemisphere was able to grasp certain perceptual groupings that the left could not. Thus, whereas both hemispheres in a split-brain person can judge whether the illusory rectangles are fat or thin when no line is drawn about the openings of, say 'Pacman' figures, only the right hand can continue to make the judgment after a line has been drawn. This setup is referred to as the amodal version of the test. What is so interesting is that Kanizsa himself demonstrated that mice can do the amodal version. That a lovely mouse can perceive perceptual groupings, whereas a human's left hemisphere cannot, suggests that a capacity has been lost. Could it be that the emergence of a human capacity like language or an interpretive mechanism - chased this perceptual skill out of the left brain? We think so and this opinion gives rise to a fresh way of thinking about the origins of lateral specialisation.

(21) Reading and writing skills are not dependent on IQ.

Reading and writing appear to be non-parallel processes and their developmental asynchrony suggests structural independence of the two systems. Furthermore, each system is organised into distinct processing components which can be developmentally fractionated. … [This] suggests that domain specific mechanisms are responsible for the acquisition of literacy. Within a modular hypothesis, an appropriate educational environment suffices to trigger the child’s orthographic competence, which includes pre-specified processing components, specifically tuned to reading and writing computation (Marshall, 1989), [pp. 253-254].

The data show that impairments in a wide range of non verbal domains, though frequently correlated with disorders of reading and writing, have no detrimental effects on the reading thereof. The data also rules out a number of linguistic and metalinguistic variables which are currently taken as a bench-mark for literacy acquisition [p 249].

Clinical experiments documented by Cossu show that:

[1] It appears that congenital motor impairment is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition to prevent the acquisition of full literacy skills [p. 249].

Reading and writing acquisition can also circumvent mental retardation, clumsiness and disorders in space representation [p. 249].


[3] In the early stages of reading (and spelling) acquisition, the construction of the orthographic architecture is documented by the increase of correct performances with non words (or any new word) [p. 249].

[4] …[I]n the current literature, phoneme awareness is recognised as a prerequisite for reading acquisition. The data … presented here, however, raise some doubts about the commonly held view of a causal relation between reading acquisition and phoneme awareness. … [Subject 1, T.A.], the hyperlexic child, fails in metalinguistic tasks in spite of his excellent reading and writing skills [p. 250].

[5]. Ten Italian children with Down's Syndrome [performed] reading tasks … [plus control group] … the Down's syndrome children and the normal children were 88% and 82.5% correct respectively. No statistically significant difference for reading ability was detectable between the groups (Cossu, Rossini and Marshall, 1993) [p.251].

Overall, these results undermine any hypothesis claiming a causal link between reading and other cognitive functions and, in particular, they undermine the notion of phonemic awareness as an essential prerequisite for reading acquisition. … the explanations of reading disabilities are left with only one logical possibility: a modular architecture disorder [p. 251].

APPENDIX 1.2: A NOTE ON JULIAN JAYNES & MATTERS GREEK

In the cognitive sciences the connections between metaphor, prosody and right hemisphere lateralisation have a particular research history that has involved discussion of the ancient Greeks and this needs to be outlined here. It relates to Julian Jaynes’ controversial 1976
The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind.² Jaynes' hypothesis was that a spatial, individual identity as we know it was not always the way the human brain functioned; that self-awareness and the concept of the ‘I’ inside our brains began around 1000BC with the Dorian invasions and developed steadily over the next 600 years [pp.21-66]. Discussion and judgement on the broad hypotheses of Jaynes' is not within the scope of this work. However, as he applied his hypotheses to Greece in the period under examination in this work; that is, ca. 550-390BC, the period from the Pisistratid tyranny and the Pisistratid resension of the Homeric cannon to the aftermath of the Peloponnesian war and the death of Socrates, it needs to be examined and refuted.

The theory has elicited hysterical support and hysterical criticism. Some from post-modernist psychology and behaviorism winced at his lampoons [e.g. p. 291, 442-443], whilst he used their research methods to test his counter themes such as ‘learning without thinking’ [p. 15]; religious groups object to his contention that the individual operated from a ‘bicameral mind’ which obeyed hallucinated voices that were identified as gods [p. 75], even though Previc’s experiments, outlined in note 1 here, go some way to validate this part of Jaynes’ theory. Jaynes claims that consciousness rests on the language of metaphor; that the ‘I’ of self-consciousness and the concept of ‘me’ is ‘the work of lexical metaphor’ [p. 58]; consciousness is therefore an evolutionary mutation [p. 34]. He also observed that it is not possible to be conscious of when you are not conscious [p. 24] and in this context consciousness itself is intermittent and ‘knits itself over its time gaps and gives the illusion of continuity’ [pp. 23-25]. A summary of Jaynes’ various hypotheses is as follows:

i) Bicamerality is
- a mental state
- a less intense version of ‘the florid state’ of unmedicated schizophrenia [p.407-432]

ii) 'Consciousness' is
- based on the language of metaphor
- a process
- intermittent

iii) Learning
- can take place without consciousness

iv) Cognition can be altered by
- cultural and environmental influences

With the exception of the first hypothesis suggesting that a bicameral mind would be in an intense schizophrenic frame devoid of any form of physiological self-consciousness, this work generally accepts these hypotheses (however, as chapter II argues, generally for different reasons than those proposed by Jaynes). It is understandable why many discussions revolve around Jaynes’ definition and explanations of consciousness. McVeigh, for example discusses the ‘polysemantics’ of the word ‘consciousness’ across the disciplines and prefers to call it ‘interiority.³ Gary Williams has defined Jaynes’ explanation of ‘consciousness’ as intermittent, and he labels it, ‘J-consciousness’. Other discussions over Jaynes’ definition entail arguments over phenomenal consciousness, such as Thomas Nagel’s ‘What is it like to be a bat?’⁴ and Ned Block’s P-consciousness (phenomenal consciousness) and A-consciousness (a state of readiness for creating premises for reasoning, rational control over behaviour and speech) that are constant states of ‘consciousness’ without the need for language.⁵ These arguments over the dimensions of

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consciousness and what constitutes 'non-consciousness' in relation to Jaynes' theories have recently been approached again by Gary Williams who, with economy, concludes:

Phenomenality is simply a different explanandum than J-consciousness. To explain the origin of consciousness is to explain how the analog ‘I’ began to narrate in a functional mind-space. For Jaynes, to understand the conscious mind requires that we see it as something fleeting rather than something always present. [p. 20]

This work also takes 'J-consciousness' to mean the type of self-consciousness that entails Daniel Dennett's 'serial reasoning' as is defined in chapter II.2. A second point relating to Jaynes' constructs of 'consciousness' vs 'non-consciousness' and Block's rejection of constructivist cultural influence over cognition and the possibility of 'consciousness' being an evolutionary social construct is that, the very point that writing is a social construct (a technology) that has demonstrable cognitive overlays on brain architecture is enough to accept the possibility that some forms of 'consciousness' are cultural constructions. In this regard as to whether 'consciousness' can be a social construct Jan Sleutels wrestles a chicken and egg argument of whether Jaynesian 'consciousness' preceded a concept of consciousness. He observes that, 'at the fringes of mind', psychology judges 'non-linguistic' creatures (infants, early hominids, animals) ... to have beliefs and desires, mental representation, as well as thinking and reasoning', concluding therefore that Jaynes' ‘zombie’ Greeks of the Iliad were just 'fringe minds'. In a sense Sleutels has effectively argued away Jaynes' theory of 'bicamerality' - as does the argument below. Whether Jaynes' ‘bicameral mind’ describes earlier cultures is outside the time frame of this work. As it relates to the Greeks of our textualised version of the Iliad and the Odyssey and other works of sixth and fifth century BC epic and lyric metre, Jaynes' first hypothesis on bicamerality as a mental state and its diagnosis as an hallucinating schizophrenic state has proved to be inaccurate and mistakes a cognitive function of right hemisphere language for the constant cognitive state Jaynes labels 'bicamerality'. Here is a quick rundown of the objections which will be discussed below:

- Bicamerality is not a fixed mental state. While Jaynes seems to imply this at one point [pp. 202-203], he does not specifically state it. If bicamerality existed, perhaps it should also be understood as a process, as he defines 'consciousness'.

- Bicamerality should not be viewed as an intense schizophrenic state because schizophrenia is a disorder whose symptoms are degenerative and can (sometimes does) result in suicide. Jaynes claims his personal experience with schizophrenic patients was the genesis of his hypothesis of bicamerality in pre 1200-1000BC. The state described as bicamerality has many more positive, non-threatening, aspects of dissociation.

- The positing of narrativisation in the right hemisphere as the basis of consciousness was proven incorrect when subsequent experiments by Gazzaniga et al identified the 'interpreter mechanism' in the left hemisphere.

- Jaynes notes that ideas are catching [p.216], observing that the spread of writing in Mesopotamia played a part in the breakdown of the bicameral mind. Yet his lack of emphasis on the importance of writing as anything more than a mnemonic device to recall the voice of a god is a significant flaw. He does not look into the technology of script. Nor does he attend to the possibility of writing changing brain physiology.

- The writer suspects Jaynes did not have Greek; his subsequent adjudicators also generally appear 'Greekless'.

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8 M.S. Gazzaniga and Joseph E. LeDoux published The Integrated Mind [New York, Plenum Press] in 1978; around the time Jaynes was working on his thesis and this book does not label the 'interpreter mechanism' but hypothesizes that the left hemisphere 'verbal system provides for a personal sense of conscious reality' [pp. 146-147].
• Though the sins of the philologists are well noted [p. 68], the Homeric canon is not interpreted with sufficient regard to historical chronology. The *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* are grouped with pre-1000BC scripts from Egypt, Israel and Mesopotamia.

• The method of dealing with the cultural evolutionary hypothesis also rides over historical inconsistencies.

Jaynes does not locate 'consciousness' anywhere, but describes it as an intermittent process based on metaphor [p. 22-59]. He notes further that the bicameral mind is also 'an offshoot of language' [p. 216]. Therefore, at any point in a culture's evolution, if language is present, by the same criteria, 'bicamerality' could be something that was also intermittent and without locus. Metaphor as the basis of 'consciousness' is one of the lynchpins of Jaynes thesis [pp. 54-66]. In his scenario, until a metaphor for the self - 'an analog [mind] space with an analog 'I' that can observe that space, and move metaphorically in it' - came into existence, human beings were not conscious but operated with a 'bicameral mind' [p. 65]. This 'bicameral mind' had 'voices of gods' hallucinated in the right hemisphere directing the individual's volition and transmitting the 'voices' to the left hemisphere for comprehension and action. In itself, the process (if not the precise identification of 'gods'), is borne out by subsequent demonstration; as note 4 above indicates, metaphor is processed in the right hemisphere; notes 13 and 14 posit Gazzaniga's narrativising 'interpreter mechanism' in the left. Pević's aural hallucinations creating divine feelings are also located in the left hemisphere. Furthermore, there is general acceptance of 'cross-talk' between the hemispheres.\(^9\) Jaynes' hypothesis however posits narrativisation in the right hemisphere; as a learned function of language:

Narratisation is a single word for an extremely complex set of patterning abilities which have, I think, a multiple ancestry. But the thing in its larger patterning, such as lifetimes, histories, the past and future, may have been learned by dominantly left-hemisphered men from a new kind of functioning in the right hemisphere. The new kind of functioning was narratisation, and it had previously been learned, I suggest, by the gods [meaning right hemisphere 'voices'] at a certain period of history [p. 218]

This is the opposite of what is demonstrated by Gazzaniga's work that the narrativisation is a process of 'the interpreter mechanism' in the left hemisphere.

Furthermore, in defining the evolution of 'consciousness' Jaynes hypothesises 'the acquisition of narratisation from epic [meaning the *Iliad*]’ [p. 221]. What does that mean? The epic itself is already a product of a narrativisation created by a ποητής (a maker). As the 'interpreter mechanism' makes the individual's personal narrative as well as prosodic narratives such as the *Iliad* (if you are a singer (σόιδος) or rhapsode), there is no apparent reason why such an individual, even with hallucinated voices, would not have a sense of 'I'.

Examples of this from the *Iliad* are cited below in reference to Jaynes' interpretation of the Homeric cannon. It does not require Greeks of the sixth and fifth centuries BC to be without 'self-consciousness' just because they hear 'voices' or feel that another entity is providing the words for their metre narrativisations (logoi). As chapter II.2 notes, the sensation of ποιεῖν, which is prosodic metaphors from the right hemisphere rising to the consciousness of the narrativising 'interpreter mechanism' in the left, is 'something like' a voiceless version of Jaynes' god-songlines, which he describes as if from personal experience:

Why does poetry flash with recognitions of thoughts we did not know we had, finding its unsure way to something in us that knows and has known all the time, something, I think older than the present organisation of our nature?

Jaynes ascribes the rise of 'consciousness' in humanity as a response to extreme stress [pp. 258-259]. A faint hint as to how this hypothesis possibly came about lies in the comments of a friend who states that Jaynes did actually write poetry. He may himself therefore have experienced the sensation of ποιεῖν in a time of personal stress, because, just prior to his work on *Origins*, he had experienced the trauma of a painful relationship that had ended in

\(^9\) Chapter 11.3 notes that current thinking is that there is far greater integration of hemispheric modular processes than previously thought.
tragedy. The quote below likewise gives a hint that he knew the difference between the 
ποιέω and the literate process of revising what you have written:

And then indeed toward the end of the first millennium B.C., just as the oracles began to become prosaic and their statements versified consciously, so poetry also. And conscious men now wrote and crossed out and careted\(^ {11}\) and rewrote their compositions in laborious mimesis of the older divine utterances. [pp. 374-375]

Poets generally report that a necessary ingredient for their work is the stress of heightened emotion (references from modern poets are cited in chapter II.2 and accounts of ancient poesis are in chapter VII). E.R. Dodds, the Irish classicist quoted in the outline of this work whom Jaynes 'used as a handbook in these [Greek] matters' [p. 322] observed that individuals think the way they do because they are told (and taught) to think in that way.\(^ {12}\) Curiously self-evident, but not yet a truism. Some people are taught that the land exists only because we continue to sing it into existence and, despite a Western prose-orientated education, continue in that belief. In this context the ancient Greeks described ποιέω in terms of allowing another entity to put words explaining the world into the individual's mind; it was simply the Greek way of explaining the cognitive sensations that Jaynes describes above.

Prosodic narrativisation is not an illness, otherwise history would have reported a great many rhapsodes and seers suicidal or with thought disorders.\(^ {13}\) Yet Jaynes identified his bicameral state as an intense schizophrenia, or rather, that schizophrenics experienced 'a vestige of bicamerality, a partial relapse to the bicameral mind [p. 405, cf. 404-432]. However, a defining symptom of schizophrenia is the failure of narratisation [pp. 422-424] and it should be no surprise that, with aural hallucinations in schizophrenia, it is the left hemisphere that experiences disruption\(^ {14}\) presumably affecting the 'interpreter mechanism' that weaves the story into logical constructs. But Jaynes' bicameral characters in the Iliad and Odyssey, as well as their ποιηταί, interpret the world with coherent narrativisations. The connection with schizophrenia therefore appears not quite accurate. Additionally, Jaynes mixes together the aural and visual hallucinations described in the Iliad and assesses them in the same manner. While the visual phenomena may be similar to schizophrenia, it seems sensible to identify some of the aural hallucinations described in the Iliad as belonging to the same category of linguistic experience as ποιέω - the poet's self-conscious statements about his 'recitation' for a start [2.483; 11.218; 14.508; 16.112]. The features of 'bicamerality' in this sense appear to have more in common with the process of other dissociative states that are not now identified as disorders. In Cycladic and early Mycenean periods, when oral metred metaphor was the only language used to explain the world\(^ {15}\) possibly


\(^{11}\) Possibly Jaynes is being enigmatic. He could mean marking the places where words are missing, or, Greeks adding diacritics to their written down words, but at the stage he is speaking of, 'the first millennium BC' writing did not have diacritics, nor spacings between words, nor full stops, question marks, semicolons, etc; cf. chapter IV.3-4. OED states that the origin of 'caret' = ^ is Latin and means 'it lacks'.

\(^{12}\) Quoted in full in appendix 4.

\(^{13}\) Chapter VII.3 discusses some idiosyncracies displayed by rhapsodes and sophists that are not at all clearly identifiable with symptoms of schizophrenia.


\(^{15}\) John Chadwick [The Decipherment of Linear B, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1958, p. 142] has this to say how Linear B was not used to record poetry or any extended tract of language: 'Looked at from the point of view of our modern alphabets it may well seem strange that the Greeks of the Mycenaean Age were content with so ill-adapted a system. But we must remember, and the evidence goes on increasing, that the Mycenaeans never used Linear B except for accounts, inventories and similar brief notes; there is no example of continuous prose, which would demand a system providing an accurate notation of inflexional elements; the script is appropriate to its actual use, which is no more than an elaborate kind of mnemoic device'. It did not record prosody or epic hexameters.
dissociative states were more frequent and dependent on the cultural inputs and religion and leisure rituals practised.

Furthermore, in the Homeric canon (and for that matter in the earlier Mesopotamian Gilgamesh stories, etc.) Jaynes' bicameral shows an intermittent self-consciousness that he denies them. True, there are many instances when Iliadic figures display the symptoms of dissociative mental states. But Homer's characters at other times also display a conscious sense of self. Jaynes proposes that any such references are later interpolations; that it is only in the Odyssey that Homeric characters take on a self-conscious persona. But the instances of self-identification of a personal identity in both epics are too numerous and interlaced into the metre to be mere interpolations. What about the Iliad's Agamemnon who lies to cover up and excuse 'himself'? Agamemnon tells us he blames a god for the actions that were performed by an individual he clearly identifies as 'himself'. There is no reason within the logical narrative of the poem to think that he does not believe what he says; that he does not identify both god and 'himself'. Jaynes might dismiss this type of deceit as 'instrumental learning' [p. 219], but he recognises sustained or pre-mediated deceit as an indication of consciousness and thus surely one cannot dismiss the deceit in Iliad 24. Priam's ability to deceive and manipulate Achilles in this book shows a 'self' that pursues its own interests. And then there is Achilles who tells us all about his own concept of a life destiny and future for a person he clearly identifies as 'himself'. The 'himself' of Thersites is acutely aware of his 'perceived' rights as an individual being neglected. There are a number of 'her selves' in the story too. All of these instances are discussed at length in chapter V and appendix 4, which also details and discusses the periods of dissociation under stress experienced by Iliadic personas. Appendix 4 also examines the character of the Homeric cognitive terms that Jaynes calls into question: psyche, thumos, phrenos, nous, soma and ate [p. 69-70]. These cognitive terms do not necessarily point to a lack of introspection as Jaynes suggests, but more to a lack of introspective locus, or better, an intermittent lack of locus of the 'I' inside the head; and is it necessary to locate the introspective 'I' inside the head for an individual to be conscious? In the case of the Greeks, when they fought hoplite battles, or observed certain religious ritual, the analog 'I' and the metaphor 'me' was not always the construct of 'self-consciousness'; sometimes it was replaced with an analog 'we' and a metaphor 'us'. Aspects of this dissociative state is examined in appendix 3.5 on ephabetic military training and discussed in chapter II.6 in relation to religious ritual. These dissociative states appear to have been intermittent and cannot be indications of a permanent absence of self-consciousness.

Jaynes claims that 'there is no general consciousness in the Iliad' [p.69] and that the Greeks of the fifth century BC were still experiencing a 'bicameral mind'. This is where considerable qualifications are needed: qualifications related to the history of Greek epic, as well as the questions above regarding over emphasis on laterality. Jaynes' 'bicameral mind' over the time span he envisaged and his use of Homeric epic and lyric prosody to identify a bicameral Greek mind [pp. 257-292] are also weaknesses in his work.

Jaynes and the majority of scholars who praise or criticise his hypothesis do not have archaic Ionic or Attic Greek. In the Greek context Jaynes' theory is not generally disprovable, especially when applied to Mycenean archaeology and the etymology of Mycenean Linear B use of terms such as οὐναξ (wanax = god, evolving later to master/leader) [pp. 80-81] and to the complex question over the time frame of the textualisation of the Homeric cannon (which is examined here in chapter IV). However, any close study of the Iliad and the Odyssey - such as the ones undertaken in chapter V and appendix 4 of this work - will find flaws in a theory of bicamerality that treats 'orality' and its complex relationship to poetry with a mere passing mention [p. 208, 302]; that overlooks the incidence of εγώ, εγών, ἐμείο, ἐμεύο, ἐμεύω, ἐμεύθεν (I, me) in the Iliad; that suggests 'consciousness and morality are a single development' [p.286] yet denies the honour obsessed Iliadic characters 'any ego whatever' [p. 73]. Julian Jaynes did not sing with Homer; he did not recognise the intricacies of formulaic oral ring poetry as did, for example, Lord and Parry, Havelock or Kirk, research carried on by Gagarin, Minchin and Cole, among others (cited in chapters IV and V). It is not possible to ignore the self-

conscious poet who, periodically throughout the poem, recognised his own enthrancement in creating (ποιεῖν) the metred metaphor of his formulaic story. As to when this element entered the poem, it could have been as early as its first telling, or as late as the period of its textualisation in the sixth century BC. This is discussed at length in chapter IV maintaining a terminus ad quem for Athens of the Pisistratid period. Jaynes posits the first textualisation of Homer in the ninth century BC [p. 69] but this position raises strong objections which are also covered in chapter IV and appendix 5.

In recognising that ideas are catching [p.216], Jaynes hypothesises cultural influences on brain plasticity, suggesting that the spread of writing in Mesopotamia played a part in the breakdown of the bicameral mind and indicating that he thought writing alters consciousness and heralds the beginning of self-consciousness. Yet he still posits bicamerality as a steady state of mind in Greece even after they possessed textualised versions of the Homeric cannon. Jaynes posits bicamerality in Athens as a continuing hallucinatory state of mind well after the mid-sixth century BC period of Solon and the verifiable textualisation of the Homeric cannon in that period (cf. chapter IV), and yet he identifies Solon as the first recognisably modern conscious mind, a long way from the automaton 'zombie' status of bicameral man [p. 285-286]. Jaynes really leaves no room for a linguistic cognitive transition between orality and literacy. For him consciousness arises in states brought about by confusion and stress. He misses the significance of writing as having personal narrativisation potential beyond the bicameral mind:

Writing up to this time … had been primarily an inventory device, a way of recording the stores and exchanges of a god’s estates. Now it becomes a way of recording god-commanded events, whose recitation after the fact becomes the narratisation of epics. Since reading … may have been hallucinating from the cuneiform, it may, then, have been a right temporal lobe function. [p. 218]

Gazzaniga relates a current view on what ‘consciousness’ constitutes:

> Overall, the data indicate that a sense of self arises out of distributed networks in both hemispheres. It is likely that both hemispheres have processing specializations that contribute to a sense of self - and that same self is constructed by the left hemisphere interpreter on the basis of the input from these distributed networks.\(^{17}\)

Literacy provides a tool for the ‘interpreter mechanism’ to make different externalised argument structures that enable ‘serial reasoning’ to be accessed for sustained periods by the individual ‘maker’ or by another ‘reader’. Jaynes did not give enough of his attention to other researchers who at the time were looking into the transforming cognitive possibilities of writing.

Issues over Jaynes’ theory are still being discussed in some disciplines: for example (some have been cited earlier), Daniel Dennett, Antonio Damasio, Charles Siewert, Gary Williams, Jan Sleutels, and Ned Block.\(^{18}\) Criticism such as that of Ned Block claims that Jaynes'
hypothesis that the ancients lacked consciousness is an 'obvious absurdity' and supporters such as Dennett, Damasio, Siewert, Williams, and Sleutels, for example, concern themselves with constructs and models of 'consciousness' and generally pass over any extensive exploration into Greek history and culture. Daniel Dennett criticises philosophers who refuse to treat Jaynes' hypothesis seriously, censuring 'the barrage of nitpicking objections and criticisms until we have seen what the edifice as a whole is' [p.121]. Taking the hypothesis as a whole, David Stove19 considered Jaynes' theory 'the rarest of things: an absolutely original idea' and compared him to Kepler, whilst Richard Dawkins described it as 'either complete rubbish or a work of consumate genius'.20 He leans towards the 'rubbish' side, but is, as usual, hedging his bets. Stove too judged that Jaynes' theory needed to be watered down. If one thing is clear, the 'whole edifice' is mostly being judged by scholars without Greek (or, for that matter, knowledge of Egyptian hieroglyphs or cuneiform). In that regard Classical historians can look to Dodds or Snell21 or others back into the nineteenth century, well before Jaynes, for half-formed hypotheses resembling that of Jaynes' (references are littered throughout chapters IV and V and appendix 4 of this work). For this Greek scholar the most surprising aspect of Jaynes' work is that Eric Havelock's 1963 book, Preface to Plato, which closely examines the mechanics and psychology of 'orality' and deals with Homeric oral poetry, and covers much of the same ground as Jaynes in relation to Greek language and poetry, is hidden in a footnote on page 375, which refers to 'mimesis' and manipulates historical sequence. Jaynes' gift is that he attempted to tie the pieces together and to posit that cultural and environmental pressures can radically alter cognition. Among other things, he provided an impetus to Dennett's computer models of cognitive function and his insights on brain plasticity is probably vindicated by the Flynn Effect (cf. II.4).

It is difficult to escape Julian Jaynes' overall theory of bicamerality and it is practically impossible to prove or disprove it in any general way. As Dennett pointed out, there are only elements which can be attacked or proved. For the writer, this remarkable book was read in youth and never forgotten. Undergraduate study journeyed through the histories of Egypt, Mesopotamia, Israel and Mycenean Greece and many times did another piece of evidence awaken the thought, 'that could be added to Jaynes' theory'. But the flaws in the theory of bicamerality are in the time frames, where he lumps together vast centuries of Mesopotamian and Egyptian texts with seventh century BC Greek. Flaws lie in the existence of formulaic metre and the Homeric pronoun. Jaynes did not deal with these pronouns that recognise individuality and self, and it is a mystery that, when he discusses the etymology of cognitive terms [pp. 69-71, 257-276] he does not mention the concept of the daimonion (δαίμονιον) as it appears in the Homeric cannon, nor does he mention Socrates' description of the workings of his own daimon (δαίμων) as it is described in Plato's Apology. The only reference to this work refers to Socrates' views on how other people think [p. 340-341, cf. 292, 323 fn.4]. 'Spontaneous possession' (daemonizomai = δαιμονιζομαι) is introduced as a new phenomenon of early Christianity mentioned in the gospels. Jaynes' historical time frames are inconsistent both across cultures and within each culture he examines, especially Hellenic history. The best is his dismissal of Thucydides' excruciating complexity of thought and language as coming from an author 'at the last edge of the verbal tradition' [p. 256]. As the 'whole edifice' depends on these little 'nitpicking' pieces of evidence it remains the enigmatic work of an enquiring man who, in a period of stress, perhaps himself experienced the peculiar cognitive process of poiein.


APPENDIX 2

THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE, CULTURAL IDEOLOGIES AND THE INFLUENCE OF
FINANCIAL AND POLITICAL CHANGE DURING THE COURSE
OF THE FIFTH CENTURY BC

2.1 INTRODUCTION

There is considerable scholarship on the Athenian politeia during the fifth century and
merely a representative sample is cited in this appendix. Following the scholarship of
Beloch; Busolt, De Sanctis, Jacoby, Wade-Gery, Gomme and others, the seminal works of
the past fifty years are by Hignett, Davies, Loraux, de Ste. Croix, Ober, and Rhodes. They
and others contribute to this short rundown on the major events that influenced social
change in the period covered by this work.

Notwithstanding Lloyd’s position on the conceptual difficulties of identifying consistent
cultural and social norms within populations, the focus here is on the following significant
changes to the socio-cultural dynamic of Athens during the fifth century BC:
(i) the constitutional changes made by Cleisthenes in c.508/7BC which demanded, in
the years before the Persian invasion, a new social mind-set aligned with an altered tribal
identification;
(ii) Themistocles’ institutionalisation of the silver mines at Laurium and a state-capitalised
navy which created an economic revolution that shifted power from cult control to a
dynamic of ‘Expenditure’ carried out by a liturgical class;
(iii) the cumulative psychological effects of warfare with a militarily extended horizon,
where the legacy of the battles of Marathon and Salamis was an ideology of a hoplite
ethos. This ideology disseminated through all strata of the citizenry even though the axis
of civil and military strength had shifted to the Athenian allied navy.

22 The word incorporates several modern concepts such as citizenship, constitution and
governance including, deliberation = τὸ βουλεύομενον περί τῶν κοινῶν; governmental
offices and officers = τὸ περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν; judgment according to law = τὸ δίκαζον; cf. Ar.
Politics 1297b35-1298a3; Thuc. 2.37.1; Eurip. Supplices 403-408, 426-455; P.-Xen.
Athenian Politeia. 43.2-49, 50-54, 55-59, 60-62, 63-69; Demosth. Against Aristogiton 1, 25.20.
23 J. Beloch, Die attische Politik seit Perikles, (Unveränderter reprodrgatricer Nachdruck der Ausg.
Leipzig 1884), Stuttgart, Teubner, 1967, Griechische Geschichte, von Karl Julius Beloch, Berlin,
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(1898), Whitefish, Montana, Kessinger Publishing LLC, 2009. Felix Jacoby, Atthis: The Local
25, No. 3 (1931) pp. 129-143; 'Studies in the Structure of Attic Society: II. The Laws of
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Athens: The Funeral Oration in the Classical City, (trans. Alan Sheridan), Cambridge, Mass.,
Thousand', Historia, Vol. 5 (1956), pp. 1-23; The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World,
24 G.E.R. Lloyd, Cognitive Variations: Reflections on the Unity and Diversity of the Human Mind,
26 Ideology: (n). A systematic scheme of ideas, usually relating to politics, economics, or
society and forming the basis of action or policy; a set of beliefs governing conduct. Also:
the forming or holding of such a scheme of ideas [http://www.oed.com:80/Entry/91016].
(iv) Pericles’ follow up on the reforms to the areopagus instituted by his colleague, Ephialties, and his broadening of political participation. Also his adjustment to the rules of citizenship which possibly caused an adverse shift in the demographic, especially during the years of the plague.

2.2 FAMILY AND CLAN STRUCTURES

The first point of emphasis is that the oikos was the core of Athenian life.27 It was a family network that stretched out bilaterally amongst relatives and between generations, it claimed loyalty above civics. Oikoi formed part of Solon’s wealth ranking system of four telê (τελῆ) which made annual agricultural production,28 rather than birth, the measure of citizenship: were expected to produce 500+ medimnoi; hippeus 300+; zeugitai 200+ and anyone producing less than 200, or indigenes without land, were classified as thetes. A medimnos was roughly equivalent to a drachma and the assessment did not take into account income from commerce.29 It would seem that Solon aimed to reduce famine and increase production by restricting the leisure which in the next century became the hallmark of elite pentacosiomedimnoi and, though the assessments were proportional, in effect a pentacosiomedimnos could be reduced to a lower rank through farm mismanagement or misadventure.30 It is likely however that, because agricultural innovation remained static and Solon’s introduced weights and measures remained uniform, and the ingrained attitude that disgrace attached to the diminishment of inherited assets held firm, family rankings would have remained on par and properties would have produced reasonably consistent yields until the beginning of the Peloponnesian war and the plague years when shifted inheritance patterns altered concentrations of wealth.31 The pogroms and land confiscations during the revolutions of 411BC further shifted the standing of some family fortunes that were never quite retrieved.32 Davies provides an alternate view suggesting that, without primogeniture,33 it was an ‘built-in’ tendency of Athenian estates to split apart at the death of an owner’ which resulted in fragmented land holdings around Attica and accounted for ‘the curious lack of emotional involvement’ that made Athenians merely regard their property as an income stream.34

This though is unlikely to have applied to families with phyle (clan, ancestral association) or phratri (brotherhood) ties living on land near cult sites.35 The phyle from which military contingents were raised will be considered below. In regard to the oikos it was an ancient

This is not to say that an ideology cannot be ideological; i.e. the result of an intuitive process evolved collectively over time.

28 Crops of barley, olive-oil, wine or combinations thereof, ‘wet or dry’; cf. Ar. Athenaiion Politea. 7.3-4. 24.3; Plut. Solon 18.1.
31 Leaving less than one inherited was considered shameful; cf. Andoc. 1.133-134; Thuc. 7.28.
32 For example, the genos of Kerykes, the family of Callias [Davies, Athenian Propertied Families, No. 7826 pp. 254-270]. Cf. Hignett, op. cit., Appendices XII XIII and XIV, pp. 356-359; Davies, Wealth and the Power of Wealth in Classical Athens, pp.73-87, 122-125.
33 E.g. Lysias In Defense of Manthitheus 16.10.
34 Davies, op. cit., pp.75-76; cf. 50-54.
association of oikoi and had regional and cult affiliations under the guidance of a basileus (king). Originally four in number (the Geleontes, the Argadeis, the Hopletes, the Agigoreis), the reforms of Cleisthenes initiated ten new phyleis (Erechtheis, Aigeis, Pandionis, Leonitis, Acamantis, Oineis, Cecropolis, Hipponthotis, Aiantis, Antiochis). Within the phyle were subgroups genê and phratria. Davies describes genê as ‘an organic part of a phratry’ with ‘cult-power’ amongst the members, and who, along with senior-member phrateres, had control over citizenship. Such jurisdiction created an elite within the phyle with power to limit the manpower of individual oikoi. Cleisthenes’ reform creating hereditary deme membership as the criterion of citizenship lessened the power of the genê and phratria, though not from a religious and regional point of view. Hendrick notes that phratry shrines were scattered throughout Attica and meetings were held in situ and not in the city.

Thucydides indicates that at the time of the Peloponnesian war when Pericles evacuated regional populations to within the city walls, the citizens identified strongly with their phratry region rather than the polis itself. Hignett suggests a good comparison between inscriptions regarding phratria and demos is that of parish records and civil registers. In this sense the phratry would have continued to have a traditional local influence over behaviour. Phratry groups were made up of extended oikoi and other families with old and new ties of intermarriage. The organisation and functions of phratria, though still controversial with questions as to whether they were a product of the polis or originated in an earlier tribal structure, appear to have been that they were local groups with phratry shrines that were attended by a membership drawn mostly from the immediate vicinity.

In discussing a very early fourth century inscription from the deme Paiania in the foothills of Hymettos naming members of a phratry called Paania, Hedrick notes the random linkages that attest to religious and kin groups as well as generational ‘brotherhood’ ties:

Individuals are not grouped with their immediate relatives, but are listed without regard for family tie, from eldest to youngest. … this list provides the only positive evidence for the operation of such a principle of seniority within the Attic phratry … The ancient Greek family was indisputably dominated by the father, and kinship groups such as the phratry are extensions of the oikos. The limited age spread attested within this list is interesting and a little puzzling. In no case are individuals from more than two generations of a family listed. Since boys were normally enrolled in phratries at puberty, it might be expected that in at least one or two instances three or more generations of a family should be listed. … It would be natural to suppose that the members of the phratry were members of the deme. … [perhaps] none of these phraters are described by a demotic because it is readily understood … all individuals listed here are members of the same deme, Paania … a demotic would only be given in those exceptional cases where a phrater is not a demesman of Paania.

36 An hereditary regionally combined electoral subdivision; cf. P-Xen. Athenaiion Politea. 21.4-5.
38 Thuc. 2.16.
42 Hedrick, Jr., 'Phratry Shrines of Attica and Athens', pp. 255, 267.
Consanguinity and intermarriages between oikoi formed power structures within the institutionalised political and civic organisation. Though Ober believes women ‘could hardly be considered members of the highest status groups of Athenian society,’ Wolpert examines the communication and information networks of women rather than just the space they occupied, and concludes that they exercised considerable social control with the ability to ruin reputations - especially the legitimacy of children - with gossip.\(^44\) Davies refers to the ‘conglobulations’ of oikoi that constitute the evidence for seeing fifth century politics in dynastic terms. He applies a similar theoretical approach to power structures as that of Sir Ronald Syme and C. Wright Mills, concluding that Athens was ‘a hierarchy of socio-economic power, closely dependent on ownership and wealth, income and property’ that was outside any existing political architecture.\(^45\) The especial importance of family ties in the fifth century is perhaps highlighted by the lack of familial political marriages and the demise of political dynasties in the fourth.\(^46\)

Survival of the oikos resided with influence attained through wealth. Inheritance laws kept the wealth within the group, but without primogeniture, sustaining a concentrated level of wealth required more than inherited land. For example:

Buselos, men of the jury, was a member of the deme Oeon, and to him were born five sons, Hagnias and Eubulides and Stratus and Habron and Cleocritus. And all these sons of Buselos grew up to manhood, and their father Buselus divided his property among them all fairly and equitably, as was fitting. And when they had divided the property among themselves, each of them married a wife according to your laws, and sons and grandsons were born to them all, and there sprang up five households from the single one of Buselus; and they dwelt apart, each one having his own home and begetting his descendants.

\(^44\) Andrew Wolpert, ‘Lysias 1 and the Politics of the Oikos’, The Classical Journal, Vol. 96, No. 4 (2001), pp.415-424. Plutarch \([\text{Solon} 23.2]\) indicates the powerful relationship between reputation and gossip with its potentially serious consequences. Otherwise Solon would not have empowered family members with the right to sell a citizen woman into slavery if she had lost her virginity in any way other than the accepted one.


\(^46\) Davies, op. cit., pp. 120-121.
... To show you to whom the law-giver grants the right of succession and inheritance, the clerk will read you these laws.

Law: Whenever a man dies without making a will, if he leaves [no sons, only] female children his estate shall go with them, but if not, the persons herein mentioned shall be entitled to his property: if there be brothers by the same father, and if there be lawfully born sons of brothers, they shall take the share of the father. But if there are no brothers or sons of brothers, their descendants shall inherit it in like manner; but males and the sons of males shall take precedence, if they are of the same ancestors, even though they be more remote of kin. If there are no relatives on the father’s side within the degree of children of cousins, those on the mother’s side shall inherit in like manner. But if there shall be no relatives on either side within the degree mentioned, the nearest of kin on the father’s side shall inherit. But no illegitimate child of either sex shall have the right of succession either to religious rites or civic privileges, from the time of the archonship of Eucleides [403-402BC]. [trans. A.T. Murray]

It is estimated that pentecosiomedimnoi and hippeus combined made up between six and seven percent of the adult citizen population.\(^{47}\) Of this small percentage an even smaller group (approximately one third of the pentecosiomedimnoi) represented those wealthy enough to be leitourgia or trierarchia (those who finance public liturgies): around four to five hundred individuals in the first decades of the Peloponnesian war.\(^{48}\) The growing trend as the fifth century progressed was that families did not remain in the top leitourgia and trierarchia strata for many generations. The only exceptions in the fourth century were the military families who provided career strategoi and many were of the hippeus wealth classification.\(^{49}\) Davies explains:

As a tentative formulation, it is fair to say that an Athenian politician would be distinctly lucky if he managed both to occupy and to transmit to his heirs a position in the Athenian propertied class.

To a greater or lesser extent most of the major political figures of the sixth century and of the first two-thirds of the fifth century either initiated a political tradition, to be continued by their sons and grandsons, or were themselves heirs to such a tradition. Again, there are two obvious exceptions (on our present evidence), Themistocles and Ephialtes, and they are two of the men principally responsible for a political climate wherein after the 430’s the value of a political inheritance of this kind apparently diminished very considerably among non-military public figures. ... Yet, in contrast to, e.g. the six or more continuous generations of political activity attested for the Alkmeonidai, at least five for the Kimonids and the families of Andokides and Kallias, and at least three for the families of Perikles and Alkibiades, in only two families active between 400 and 300 B.C. is a comparable continuous family political tradition from father to son known to have extended beyond the second generation.\(^{50}\)

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\(^{48}\) This calculation is based on the three to four hundred ships needing one trierarchos each, plus the requirements for the yearly agonistic military and religious festivals. Cf. Davies, op. cit., pp. 15-16, 19-20. Cf. Thuc. 2.13.8; Aristop. Ach. 545; P-Xen. Athenaiion Politea. 3.

\(^{49}\) Davies, op. cit., pp. 122-123.

\(^{50}\) Davies, op. cit., pp. 82, 120-121; cf. 84-87.
Aristotle put it another way:

εξισταται δι τα μεν ευφυα γενη εις μανικωτερα ηβη, οιον οι απ’ Άλκηβιάδου και οι απ’ Διωνυσαφ του πρωτου, τα δε στασιμα εις αβελτειαν και νοθροτητα, οιον οι απ’ Κιμωλος και Περικλεος και Σωκρατους.

[Aristotle Rhetoric 2.15.3: 1390b.27]

Highly gifted families often degenerate into maniacs, as, for example, the descendants of Alcibiades and the elder Dionysius; those that are stable into fools and dullards, like the descendants of Cimon, Pericles, and Socrates.

(trans. Freese)

Underlying these structures was the psychology of the adult male citizen. It was one of responsibility, for the oikos first, then the polis; it also fed on competition and jealousy:

τις γαρ ουκ οιδε των παντων, οτι τοις μεν ζωαι πασιν υπεστι τις η πλειον η έλαιτων φθονος, τους τεθεωτας δ’ ουδε των εχθρων ουδεις έτι μισει; ουτως ουν έχονταν τουτων τη φυσι, προσ τους προ έμαυτου νυν εγα κρινομαι και θεαρμαι; μηδαιμος ουτε γαρ δικαιον ουτ έσον, Αισχινη, αλλα προς σε και άλλον ει τις θευα τουτα σοι προσημειων και ζωντων.

[Demosthenes On the Crown 18.315]

Everybody knows that against the living there is always an undercurrent of more or less jealousy, while the dead are no longer disliked even by their enemies. Such is human nature; am I then to be criticised and canvassed by comparison with my predecessors? Heaven forbid! No, Aeschines; that is unfair and unjust: compare me with yourself, or with any living man you choose, whose principles are identical with yours. [trans. Vince]

The psychology of competition in adult male Athenians was an integral part of how the oikos fared over time. The ‘conglomerations’ of oikoi were all factions of self-interest that sought the respect and favour (charis) of supporters to maintain their influence. The concept of doing what was ‘right’ at the expense or to the detriment of self or oikos was not on the agenda.

2.3 CHANGES MADE BY CLEISTHENES IN C.508/7BC

Cleisthenes changed the parameters of political rivalry. First, by a restructured tribal system from four hereditary to ten geographically structured phyles. For most individuals, this was likely to have caused social dyslexia by redefining political and social loyalties as it simultaneously disrupted old tribal allegiances and dismantled traditional geographical political groupings. It was the first time genê were distributed into different phyles. For example, the Alcmaeonidae, the family to which Cleisthenes belonged, were members of three demes in the city trittyes (Thirtieth, regional divisions) of three different phyles: Alopece (Antiochis); Agryle (Erechtheis), Xypete (Cecropis). Sealey suggests Cleisthenes’ motivation for the new structures could not possibly have been the diminution of his own clan’s power, rather its increase. Alcmaeonidae wealth would have extended the influence of Alcmaeonidae leitour gia three times over. Sealey follows Lewis in this, noting that though there is no evidence that this family had a local cult, it had influence in Delphi and land

51 C W. Robert Connor [New Politicians of Fifth Century Athens, Indianapolis, Hacket Publishing, 1992, pp. 74-75] argues that ostracism proves that personal rather than collective ties were at the heart of Athenian politics.

52 Plutarch [Flaminius 11] observed that the competitive dynamics of the Greek civics remained a constant until the city state system was put to an end: ‘Greece fought all her battles against and to enslave herself … and she owed her ruin above all to the misdeeds and rivalries of her leaders.’


55 Especially in trittyes in or around the city itself, because the divisions had resulted in an increase in power of those in the city; cf. Sealey, op. cit., p. 162.
holdings across Attica. He also highlights that, for some *genê* whose influence had depended on the control of a local cult, the loss of geographical identity would have been a definite disadvantage. As detailed in chapter IV, during the sixth century political rivalry had resulted in forty odd years of tyranny under the Pisistratidae which had been won and maintained through geographical loyalties that coincided with tribal affiliations. Therefore the new *deme* and *phyle* structure would have caused angst amongst those citizens who had to adjust to different clan and geographical power groups.

In a few generations the new *phylæ* became hereditary whilst those born to *deme* members were registered in the same *deme* whether the family continued to live in that *deme* or not. At the time of the Persian invasion, however, a considerable proportion of the citizen body would still have been conditioned to also identify with the earlier structures. Also, because the eligibility age for office was thirty, archons, *strategoi* and all other magistracies would have been able to remember old loyalties with the earlier tribes and social divisions.

Cleisthenes’ most important reform was in the mechanics of the *ekklesia*. It took the final decision making process from Solon’s *boule* of 400 and replaced it with the *ekklesia*. Though leading men always led and the Cleisthenic *boule* of 500 members decided what issues needed to be decided upon, the restructuring required individuals at all levels to make political decisions with new, different, people persuading them how to think and how to vote. The fact that the *ekklesia* possessed and actively exercised new and random powers is attested in the absence of any particularly prominent men on the archon list from 508/7BC until those of Telesinus in 487/6BC. The result was thirteen years of relatively equal competition among the elite with the first ostracism not occurring until 487. Why the need for ostracism and for Telesinus’ constitutional changes by which some officials were from then on elected by lot rather than by popular election?

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56 Lewis, ‘Kleisthenes and Attica’, pp. 37, 39. Sealey [op. cit. p. 162] also notes that ‘there is only the argument from silence for saying that the Alcaeonidae did not control an important local cult; the argument from silence has some force, since more is recorded about the Alcaeonidae than about any other Athenian clan’.

57 Ar. Athenioi Politia. 13.3-19.6. Aristotle [Politics 5.12] notes that Pisistratos ‘submitted’ himself to the areopagus, thereby indicating that his ascendancy was supported by a powerful faction. During the Pisistratidae tyranny the areopagos and the Boule of 400 members was allowed to exercise a certain amount of dissent, but evidence indicates that the *ekklesia* was not a decision making body before Cleisthenes’ reforms. Cf. Ernst Badian, ‘Archons and Strategoi’, Antichthon, Vol. 5 (1971), pp. 1-34 at 21.

58 Cf. Thucydides 2.16 cited earlier.


60 Badian [‘Archons and Strategoi’, p. 21] observes: ‘The prominent leaders of the period after liberation had held the archonship: Isagoras, Kleisthenes, Miltiades - held it before the Kleisthenic reform. ... After that reform ... only two certainly held it: Hipparchus and Themistokes; possibly Aristides (doubtful) ... The only possible answer is that Kleisthenes had made a significant change’.

61 Aristotle says it was designed by Kleisthenes as a method of public expulsion decided by the *ekklesia* [Athenioi Politia. 22.4, cf. 22.5-7, 27.5].

62 There is however controversy over the exact structure of the constitutional changes. Badian [‘Archons and Strategoi’, p. 19] notes, ‘the demes as electoral units can be accepted only with grave suspicion: if at all, then only in the sense that each tribe may have been divided into a certain number of electoral units (possibly equal in population) for this purpose, each unit consisting of a certain number of demes and responsible for electing one or more candidates’. His main argument is that the reform of Telesinus was not radical and was concerned only with the sorting of the archons and *strategoi* as against their being elected. Therefore a significant point about Kleisthenes’ reforms is that *phratria* remained traditional and apart from the formal structure of the state. Frank J. Frost [The Athenian Military Before Cleisthenes, Historia, Vol. 33 (1984) pp.283-294 at 284] adds a further point that even though *phratry* lists (phratereikon grammateion), rather than the new *deme* lists, would have been the most effective for mobilisation, they remained outside the political and civic structure. As Aristotle stated they were the equivalent of pre-Cleisthenic trittyes, they were likely not used because they would have mustered fighters in old clan structures not conducive to Cleisthenes’ own group. Cf. Ar. Athenioi Politia. 21.6 and P. Rhodes, [A
sociology of selection procedures’ in Athens finding that, while election favoured *demes* near the city, magistracies selected by lot saw a wide representation throughout Attica.\(^{63}\) Likewise Forsdyke examines ostracism identifying a duality of function that moderated and usurped the ‘aristocratic politics of exile’ symbolically reminding elites of the power of the *demos*.

Pearson suggests that ostracism prevented party-politics - low level *stasis* - from developing; that Cleisthenes left intact the *dunasteia* [δυναστεία = power, lordship, later oligarchy] of every individual and did not increase the political powers of the magistracies:

Here lies the important difference between his aims and those of Solon; for Solon was legislating to prevent tyranny, Cleisthenes to prevent anarchy.\(^{65}\)

Whatever the exact specifics of the electoral restructuring, *genê* and *phratry* loyalty remained the dominant factor in how an individual made political and civic decisions. Families therefore remained the main political movers. And, though it is generally agreed that all political leaders were from wealthy families, opinion differs as to the social mix of power. For example Karavites suggests that elites had always ruled the masses even though they catered to them; that the majority were only concerned with economic rights and betterment.\(^{66}\) Ober rejects such an elitist view preferring to see the genesis of democracy, not as a benevolence from the elite to a passive *demos*, but a collective identification and ‘self-definition’ creating ‘a politics of consensus’ where ‘the masses ruled and the decisions of the majority were binding upon the minority’.\(^{67}\) Pritchard considers the ancient evidence soundly bears out this opinion.\(^{68}\) By the second half of the fifth century Ober sees a standoff where ‘envy was what the lower classes felt’ and where aristocrats and the wealthy ‘driven into the political underground by Pericles still cherished political ambitions and were unwilling to degrade themselves in front of the mob’.\(^{69}\) Pritchard adds a further nuance:

The poor (οἱ ῥώμητες) were not only marked out by their inability to lead an affluent lifestyle and to finance such public benefactions, but also were thought to be compelled by their lack of resources to work for a living and to conduct moderate and frugal lives. Importantly, since this lower class vastly outnumbered their wealthy compatriots, they formed overwhelming majorities in the city’s democratic institutions, like the assembly, law courts and theatre, where the ideology of the civic community was adjudicated and elaborated. ... the popular culture of classical Athens was a product of their judgements and prejudices. This fundamental and indigenous dichotomy between rich and poor citizens is the main class classification.\(^{70}\)

\textit{Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaios Politeia} for explanation of the subsequent contradiction in Aristotle’s *Politics* 1319b19.


\(^{66}\) Peter Karavites ‘Realities and Appearances, 490-480 B.C.’, *Historia* Vol. 26, No. 2 (1977), pp. 129-147 at 140, 141] defines these ‘elites’ as social, economic or educational.


\(^{68}\) Pritchard, ‘Cleisthenes, Participation, and the Dithyrambic Contests of Late Archaic and Classical Athens’, p. 208. Cf. Hdt. 5.65.5-5.73.1; Ar. *Athenaios Politeia*. 20.1-21.2.


Vlassopoulos suggests it is however a mistake to underestimate the *Lumpenproletariat* and its active participation in the cultural and political life of the *politeia*, while Patterson maintains that the moderately well-off third of the population (the *mesoi*) able to provide hoplite soldiers should not be ignored.\(^7\) At the same time, money and estates require leadership and management if they are to function let alone make a profit. For ‘the rich’ to secure the time to fulfil their public duties reliable relatives would have had to supervise estate management. Even in Isocrates time he notes how his students were expected to take part in the management of the *oikos* and as a consequence neglected their studies.\(^7\)

Scattered land holdings were leased for the working, possibly on a preferential basis to extended family or clan members. Nevertheless, financial management would still have necessitated the family’s involvement. A dynamic of Athenian society was that it could elevate, or at least educate, promising young *phratry* members if it was in the interests of maintaining clan influence within the *phratry* group, or ascendancy over rival factions. Though not all citizens belonged to *phratry* by the end of the fifth century, the membership always contained both wealthy and poor individuals at least to the *zeugitai* stratum.\(^7\)

Likewise with families, Demosthenes cites the law condoning marriage between *pentacosiomedimnoi* and *thetes*:

> Νόμος – τῶν ἐπικλήρων ὅσαι βητικῶν τελουσιν, ἦν μὴ βουλήται ἔχειν ὁ ἐγγύτατα γένους, ἐκδίδοντο ἐπίδονς ὁ μὲν πεντακοσιομεδίμνοις πεντακοσίας δραχμάς, ὁ δ’ ἵππεις τριακοσίας, ὁ δὲ ζευγίτης ἔκατον πεντήκοντα, πρὸς οἷς αὐτής. ἦν δὲ πλείους ὡσιν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γενει, τῇ ἐπικλήρῳ πρὸς μέρος ἐπιδίδοντο ἐκατόν. ἦν δ’ οἱ γυναικεῖς πλείους ὡσι, μὴ ἐπάναγκες εἶναι πλέον ἢ μίαν ἐκδοῦναι τῷ γ’ ἐνι, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἐγγύτατα δι’ ἔκδοναι ἢ αὐτὸν ἔχειν, ἦν δὲ μὴ ἔχοι ὁ ἐγγύτατα γένους ἢ μὴ ἐκδοῦναι ἢ ἄρχων ἐπάναγκετο ἢ αὐτὸν ἔχειν ἢ ἐκδοῦναι. ἦν δὲ μὴ ἐπαναγκασθῇ ἢ ἄρχων, ὀφειλέτω χιλίας δραχμάς ἱέρας τῇ Ηρᾷ. [Demosthenes Against Macaratus 43.54]

Law: In regard to all heiresses who are classified as *Thetes*, if the nearest of kin does not wish to marry one, let him give her in marriage with a portion of five hundred drachmae, if he be of the class of *Pentacosiomedimni*, if of the class of Knights, with a portion of three hundred, and if of the class of *Zeugitae*, with one hundred and fifty, in addition to what is her own. If there are several kinsmen in the same degree of relationship, each one of them shall contribute to the portion of the heiress according to his due share. And if there be several heiresses, it shall not be necessary for a single kinsman to give in marriage more than one, but the next of kin shall in each case give her in marriage or marry her himself. And if the nearest of kin does not marry her or give her in marriage, the archon shall compel him either to marry her himself or give her in marriage. And if the archon shall not compel him, let him be fined a thousand drachmae, which are to be consecrated to Hera. [trans. Murray]


\(^71\) Inoc. *Antidosis* 201.

The circumstances of Euripides’ *Electra* leads one to assume that it was *thete* women, rather than *thete* men, who rose through the ranks via marriage (hence the tragic dimension of the play) and often issues of rivalry lay behind it.  

It is easy to get the wrong picture of how and where loyalties lay in the first half of the fifth century and to fall into the assumption that just because an Athenian individual was on a particular ‘rung’ in the social scale that he automatically supported those leaders who promised his ‘betterment’. Solon’s reforms show that excessive wealth and power concentrations could produce imbalances to the point at which the economy of the *polis* was in crisis. The reforms of Cleisthenes and Telesinus did not substantially alter Solon’s evening-out of wealth, but to view Athenian society in terms of stratified class loyalty is to misread its structure and function:

Our sources on Solon tend to mislead us when they speak of the aristocratic state in terms later popularised by democracy. To be sure, there was a horizontal division of aristocratic society into noble and common; but cutting through this division were the more important and more numerous vertical divisions, those of family or clan loyalties. … Forrest, in a description of the aristocratic state, puts forward a useful analogy: These vertical divisions may be likened to pyramids. At the head of each stood an aristocrat; beneath him the members of his immediate family; beneath them a wider circle, the more distant relatives; beneath them again the members of the household, in the broadest possible sense of the word, free retainers, important or humbler, and slaves. And the personal bond between low and high was all important. … In view of this it would be misleading to stress such terms as *demos* and *oligoi*, because they imply an absolute horizontal division within the society. It is more to the point to use the terms ‘rich’ and ‘poor’, remembering that, although referring to horizontal divisions, are horizontal within the overriding vertical or ‘pyramidal’ divisions.

Solon’s reforms did create four horizontal stratum based on wealth, but the *genê* and *phratry* were still the fundamental ties that influenced civic behaviour. With Cleisthenes’ and Telesinus’ reforms influence and political decision making by the *areopagos*, the archons and *strategoi*, and the reconstituted, enlarged *boule* - even with a *genos* being distributed throughout the *phyles* and *demes* like a suit of cards shuffled into a new deck - it was likely that political rivalry between elites continued as an entrenched part of the process. Thucydides records how *stasis* racked the political scene from the time of Solon and Pisistratos to the period of the Peloponnesian war and, while *stasis* and anarchy may be a structural characteristic of tyranny rather than democracy, in regard to party-politics in Athens, Pearson notes:

[The absence of a highly developed party-system in Athenian politics. … If Themistocles, Cimon, Pericles, and Cleon were all party-leaders, one would expect them to have subordinates … But we never once hear of such a lieutenant in the fifth century. … Themistocles and Aristides, when they are ostracised, appear to leave behind them no influential representatives, who may keep alive their policies, develop and continue their plans, nurse their supporters, and generally hold together their party.]

True, political decision making throughout the fifth century was dominated by individuals, but they were supported by *genê* and *phratry* structures as well as *deme* support. Political rivals openly nurtured all potential voters. Cimon, for example, retained Laceadae *deme*  

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74 Euripides fashions Electra as a resentful woman who was prevented from making a consanguinous marriage with her cousin, Castor, but married to a poor (but morally noble) *só toungs* (a *thete* or at the most a *zeugites* who works his own land) by her step-father, Agesthus: cf. Eur. *Electra*. 20-42; 239-261; 304-314; 357-390.


76 Thuc. 1.59.

77 As noted earlier.

members en masse. They, along with his phratry members, would have voted as he wished in the ekklesia and dikasteria. Navarch trireme outfitters would have likewise harboured the votes of their crews. This practice made active military service (especially in the case of siege) a political liability if a player could only command a slim majority in the ekklesia. Sealey comments that if the Pisistratidae had been reinstated after Cleisthenes and had maintained a stable regime, later Athenians would have viewed the Alcaemonidae as tyrants and the Pisistratidae as the liberators. Even though by the 450s Cleisthenes was credited as the conscious deviser of the Athenian democracy, Sealey suggests the accreditation was 'an irony of history':

[It was not the purpose of Cleisthenes to establish demokratia; indeed it is unlikely that the word or the notion had been invented in his time. By his reforms Cleisthenes achieved victory in a 'regionalist' struggle.\textsuperscript{83}

Karavites attributes the 487/6BC adjustment of magisterial voting solely to Themistocles' drive to eclipse the Alcaemonidae.\textsuperscript{84} Rivals also increasingly turned to the ekklesia and its powers of ostracism as an effective method of maintaining power and removing competition. However to achieve political goals, competition at times gave way to cooperation. For example, Miltiades' political undoing and Themistocles' rise shows the process of public popularity and political rivalry at work. First, the ekklesia permitted their hero, Miltiades, to risk the fleet on a discretionary empire or revenue-building enterprise. Its failure allowed Xanthippus (Pericles' father) to orchestrate a smear campaign followed by a capital charge in the ekklesia - judged ὑπὸ τῶν δῆμου.\textsuperscript{86} Litigation was a method of aggrandisement and Xanthippus stood to profit in popular influence.\textsuperscript{87} However, the frequent ostracism indicates political rivalry was moving away from the old clan loyalties into something new.\textsuperscript{88} For example, the decline of the Alcaemonidae was achieved not through litigation, but through organised political subversion and ostracism.\textsuperscript{89} Karavites sees this as evidence of a factional coalition between Themistocles and aggrieved supporters of the late Miltiades.\textsuperscript{90} It also suggests coalitions changed allegiance when expedient; a sure indication that rivalry was centred on individuals competing for power rather than any fixed party or ideology. For instance, at first Themistocles, Cimon, and Callias opposed Xanthippus, Megacles and Aristides - even though Cimon and Xanthippus were related.\textsuperscript{91} After the ostracisms of Megacles and Xanthippus, Themistocles and Cimon realigned with 'Alcaemon and others' to remove Aristides.\textsuperscript{92} Within five years however, Aristides was back aiding Themistocles' naval strategy, while Xanthippus was commanding the fleet.\textsuperscript{93} Possibly these men were recalled pre-Salamis (480BC) for security

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\textsuperscript{79} Athenaion Politea. 27.3; Plut. Themistocles 5; Cimon 10. Cf. chapter III.2.
\textsuperscript{80} The best example occurred in 462 when Ephialtes made use of Cimon's eastern naval cruising to push through constitutional reform [Plut. Cimon 15].
\textsuperscript{81} Sealey, A History of the Greek City States, p. 158, cf. chapter IV.
\textsuperscript{82} Hdt 6.131.1. Harmodius and Aristogeiton were also credited with making it happen; cf. chapter IV; Ar. Athenaion Politea. 18.
\textsuperscript{84} Karavites, 'Realities and Appearances, 490-480 B.C.', pp. 142, 144, 147; cf. Ar. Athenaion Politea. 22.5.
\textsuperscript{85} Hdt. 6.133.
\textsuperscript{86} Hdt. 6.136.1. Xanthippus did not get his requested death penalty: The ekklesia commuted it to a fine instead which was a debt inherited by his son Cimon [Hdt. 6.136]. Cf. Plut. Themistocles 5; Aristides 4; Pericles 9.
\textsuperscript{87} Ostracism was first used only three years after Marathon [Athenaion Politea. 22.5-7].
\textsuperscript{88} Herodotos [6.124] indicates the story of the flashing shield at Sounion after the battle of Marathon was believed; otherwise his strenuous denial of Alcaemonidae involvement would be pointless.
\textsuperscript{89} Karavites, 'Realities and Appearances, 490-480 B.C.', p. 146.
\textsuperscript{90} Both had Alcaemonidae wives: Xanthippus, also an Alcaemonidae, was married to Agarista [Hdt. 6.131, 136] and Cimon to Isodice [Plut. Cimon 4]. Aristides had phyle connections with the Alcaemonidae, both belonging to Antiochis [Plut. Aristides 1.1-7].
\textsuperscript{91} Plut. Aristides 25.
\textsuperscript{92} Hdt. 8.79, 131; Athenaion Politea. 22.8, 23.5; Plut. Themistocles 11, 20.
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During this period Davies sees the aristocratic elite morphing into a liturgical class and describes the power structure developing from the earlier forms of ‘Cult-power’ to that of a state run by ‘Expenditure’. Economic prosperity and shifting ideologies clearly altered social networks. The progress and dynamics of these changes are detailed below.


Themistocles’ proposal to use the capital from a new strike at the Laurium silver mines (located in Themistocles’ deme Phrearrioi) to begin a shipbuilding fund was a master-stroke that had far reaching economic consequences. Ship building was institutionalised, slavery became industrialised and new financial products evolved to make trade by a private sector easier to carry out. At the battle of Salamis in 480BC, the areopagus allocated one hundred and eighty trierarchs with funds to outfit the fleet; by the 420s each year four hundred self-funded trierarchs were appointed.

The more wealth, the greater influence: post-Marathon economic and ideological factors shifted the goal-posts in relation to wealth and the primary concerns of an oikos. As Pritchard noted earlier, Athenians saw ‘rich’ and ‘poor’ as the basic social division where the truly wealthy were considered ‘rich’ whilst the rest were lumped together as ‘the poor’ even though they were zeugitai, hippheus or pentacosiomedimnoi and possessed crop-bearing agricultural land. Because most of the references for this date to the fourth century, it is likely that this shift in perspective occurred during the fifth. Likewise another trend, as Davies suggests, was that Solon’s property scales had ceased to have legislative or social relevance by the fourth century. The case is not as clear for even late in the fifth century.

Themistocles lay the foundations of the Athenian empire by persuading ‘his fellow citizens’ to build a navy in 483BC; in Thucydides opinion, an ancient Gordon Gekko:

\[\text{τὸ ξύμπαν ἐπεὶν φύσεως μὲν δυνάμει, μελέτης δὲ βραχύτητι κράτιστος δὴ οὗτος αὐτοσχεδιᾷκειν τὰ δέοντα ἐγένετο.} \text{[Thuc. 1.138.3]}\]

94 We find Pericles doing the same before the battle of Tanagra [Plut. Pericles 10].
95 Thuc. 1.91.
96 Ar. Athenaiion Politea. 24.1-3.
97 Thuc. 1.135; Ar. Athenaiion Politea. 23.3, 25.4.
98 Timodemus of Aphidna deme [Hdt. 8.125]; Timokreon of Rhodes [Plut. Themistocles 21].
100 Davies, Wealth and the Power of Wealth in Classical Athens, pp. 105, 115, 126.
101 Ar. Athenaiion Politea. 22.7; Hdt. 7.144; Plut. Themistocles 4.
102 Hdt. 8.44.1; P-Xen. Athenaiion Politea. 3.4. Cf. Davies, op. cit., pp. 15-16.
103 Davies, op. cit., p.4
To sum him up in a few words, it may be said that through force of genius and by rapidity of action this man was supreme at doing precisely the right thing at precisely the right moment. [trans. Warner]

The decision to build the navy is sometimes viewed as a feat achieved against huge political opposition because the original proposal, to distribute a ten drachma bonus to each citizen, would have appealed most to the greed of the demos. This underestimates Athenian financial nous. Though it is unlikely the decision would have been unanimous because a maritime policy was counter to a prevailing ideology that strongly inclined toward traditional hoplite methods of defence. The proposal would have appealed to many citizens from the top to the bottom strata for purely financial reasons. Letitourgia rivals such as Aristides (phyle Antiochis) are likely to have opposed it, but those pentacosimédimnoi who were allocated the funds to construct the fleet would not have opposed. Likewise, Themistocles could look forward to increased grassroots support as naval construction brought widespread employment and prosperity, with more no doubt grateful supporters moving up the financial scale and qualifying to stand for public office.

A sophistication in the use of money also impacted on the property ranks, creating a broader dimension of wealth. Finley’s Weberian view that Athenians valued money solely in terms of ‘status derived’ (by status-maximising: homo politicus) has come under criticism by Christesen, among others. Christesen presents his evidence and argues for economic rationalism (from income-maximising: homo economicus) evident in the fourth century. However, as his chief evidence is the existence of the Laurium silver mines and the observations of Xenophon (which often relate to a generation before), the genesis of the homo economicus could well be pushed back into the fifth century. There are critics, such as Paul Christesen [‘Economic Rationalism in Fourth-Century BCE Athens’, Greece & Rome, Second Series, Vol. 50, No. 1 (2003), pp.31-56 at 34] states, ‘no account, either historical or ethnographic can hope to capture the full complexities of real-world economic activity, even in those instances where sufficient documentation is available’. On homo economicus and homo politicus cf. M.I. Finley, The Ancient Economy, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1999, passim; W. Nippel, ‘Max Weber’s The City Revisited’, in K. Raaflaub, J. Emlen & A. Molho (eds.), City-States in Classical Antiquity and Medieval Italy, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1992, pp. 19-30.

In this sense Cohen decries modern jargon and any claims that deny the existence of banks in ancient Athens or an economy per se ‘is as fashionable as it is false, arising from the prevailing tendency to attribute a primitiveness to ancient economic activity, and a lack of sophistication to ancient businesses’. Ian Morris suggests ‘the debate is becoming stale
and unproductive' and asks for an examination of the functions of banks in Athens.\textsuperscript{111}

Jargon and semantics aside, there were controlled financial products available in the free market. The law permitting interest bearing loans was so old it was ascribed to Solon,\textsuperscript{112}

and, along with the money changers (trapezae), and acceptance of deposits, there were assayers (docimastes) who enforced the monetary law, introduced at some point late in the fifth century, that regulated coinage.\textsuperscript{113} Cohen further notes that trapezai also 'provided loans, accepted deposits, and served as intermediaries in facilitating commerce, becoming what we would term 'bankers'.\textsuperscript{114} Though silver was a major export, the prosperity attained in fifth century Athens could not have been achieved had it depended on the physical exchange of coin or ingots alone without any mechanism for creating credit or some form of institutionalised scrip.\textsuperscript{115} As they did not have scrip, bottomry loans constituted the financial product negotiable in the fifth century.\textsuperscript{116}

Prior to Themistocles' 493/92BC archonship, silver mining and the production of Athenian coinage (from ca. 520BC) operated on the same scale as the ceramics industry, employing on average, five slaves per workshop.\textsuperscript{117} The industrialisation of slavery on a grand scale to work the mines and the institutionalisation of shipbuilding shifted the balance of wealth within the elite as well as increasing the number of slaves engaged in commercial activities in the city. For example, Callias and his sons became Athens' richest men through the leasing of thousands of miner slaves with an additional concession paid per tonnage mined,\textsuperscript{118} while for many domestic and trades-based slaves, the relationship between master and slave appears to have been closer and operated more on incentives rather than fear, with slaves able to accumulate portions of the money they generated for their owners, which enabled them to buy their freedom and gain the status of metic. These slaves sometimes worked alongside their owners while others were engaged in the commercial production of goods under designated supervisors, who were sometimes slaves themselves. Other slaves lived and operated businesses in separate establishments to their owners.\textsuperscript{119}

\textsuperscript{112} Lysias Against Theomnesteus (1) 10.18; cf. Davies, Wealth and the Power of Wealth in Classical Athens, pp. 62-63.
\textsuperscript{113} Cf. Thomas J. Figuerira [The Power of Money: Coinage and Politics in the Athenian Empire, Philadelphia PA, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998, pp. 540-541] discusses the evidence that fourth century references to these public slaves were a 'crucial inheritance of the fifth-century fiscal regime' and discusses the similar assessments of Ronald S. Stroud ['An Athenian Law on Silver Coinage', Hesperia, Vol. 43, No. 2 (1974), pp. 157-188 at 176-177].
\textsuperscript{114} Cohen, Athenian Economy & Society: A Banking Perspective, pp. 6-7.
\textsuperscript{116} Lysias Against Diogeiton 6; cf. Davies, op. cit., pp. 60-61.
In 447BC Clearchus instituted a further refinement to finance and commerce with coinage legislation that imposed Athenian coinage and standardised weights and measures on allies, thus making wealth easier for Athenians to acquire. It took until the close of the fifth century for the Peloponnesian League to choke Athenian trade routes and cut off trading profits, but since 431BC, the damage to Attica’s mining resources had seriously disrupted wealth generation. For example, Thucydides notes that twenty thousand slaves escaped during the war. Theoretically citizens could not move up and down the telê scale without the accompanying Solonic property qualifications. However, by the mid fifth century property was bought and sold for improvement. Aristoteles states that at some stage census classes were ignored, therefore it is possible that, allied to his 451/50BC reforms to citizenship eligibility, Pericles altered the laws regarding the inalienability of land, allowing fiscal qualification to the criteria defining the ranks.

The evolution from an embedded economy (based around the oikos and its production) to a market economy during the fifth century was an ad hoc consequence of individuals conducting business with others increasingly outside their social stratum. It brought a disconnect between an individual’s public wealth, entailing non-negotiable agricultural land and property by which he was accorded status, and private wealth from commerce, which Cohen describes as ‘invisible’ and Davies notes ‘practically insignificant as an avenue for social and economic advancement’. In criticising the excessive wealth of his own time, Demosthenes states that the houses and lifestyle of ‘greats names’ such as Miltiades and Themistocles were ‘no more impressive than that of the common people’ while the public buildings constructed in Pericles’ time were, by his generation, ‘unsurpassable’. He also observed that, in the fourth century, a citizen’s wealth belonged to the polis. It would have been natural for an oikos to conceal as much of that wealth as possible. The dichotomy between individual oikoi and the polis collective gathered a nuanced ideology after the battle of Salamis and after Ephialtes and Pericles made politics more democratic. This shifting ideology is discussed below.

2.5 POPULAR IDEOLOGY AND THE DEMOCRATISATION OF POWER

One barometer of Athenian ideology accompanying wealth and attitudes to governance is the change in male fashion over the fifth century. Thucydides observed the change around the second quarter of the fifth century: the old men still wore the fashion of the sixth century, long chitons with hair fastened with golden grasshoppers; the younger men wore an unadorned pared down version. Geddes stresses how the ideology behind male clothing in this period expressed a pride in ‘like-minded’ equality and the possession of leisure to keep fighting fit: ‘it is important for historians to understand that it is these qualities, rather than wealth or status, that Athenians chose to boast about’. This seems to coincide with the lack of pretension in private architecture mentioned by Demosthenes, although it too could indicate a subliminal attempt to conceal wealth. Perhaps the ostentatious exceptions like Cleon and Alcibiades prove this hypothesis. For example, the

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120 Thuc. 7.27.5.
121 For example, Isomachus; cf. Davies, Athenian Propertied Families, p. 267.
122 Ar. Athenaios Politeia. 7.3-4.
125 Thuc. 1.6.3-5.
strictly traditional method of draping the himation was flouted by Cleon to reflect his militant political stance. Likewise, there was a fashion swing in the political stasis of the last decades to distinctive ostentation by those who defied the democratic ethos. The arrogant swirl of Alcibiades’ himation brought criticism that had deeper connotations than reflections on vanity.

Another barometer is the idealisation of the battle of Salamis into a symbol embodying statehood as an heroic personification of the collective. This conceptualisation began with the reforms of Cleisthenes and with the battle of Marathon and had its apogee in the battle of Salamis. Pritchard suggests that the ideological ethos of Athenian culture during the fifth and fourth centuries BC was the same for all property classes and was, in effect, that of the leisureed leitourgia and trierarchia. It is likely that this ideology had its genesis in the battle of Marathon. For example, to be a successful public figure required arete as well as the charis obtained from public liturgies. The arete of Marathon veterans, Aristides and Miltiades, was first gained through bravery in hoplite battle and such acts of heroism were recognised along with their pentacosiomedimnoi status. Unlike the huge amounts of money required to maintain a political lead, huge amounts of heroism were not required to sustain this status; once gained, arete cloaked a citizen’s civic stature for the rest of his life (in the first half of the fifth century, on average, a military opportunity came around every three years), or until ostracised. This ethos developed in the following ways.

Until the battle of Salamis, Athenian thinking about status was deeply entrenched in a hoplite psyche; as Spence notes, the domination of hoplite military theory was general and widespread anywhere south of horse-owning Thessaly. Cartledge puts a ‘class’ complexion on this hoplite ideal, maintaining that hoplites disliked psiloi thetes (javelin fighters) specifically because they were thetes and were thus reluctant to allow the devolution of political power to them. However, allied to the hoplite view of arete, was a long-standing belief that killing should be done eye-to-eye and this is therefore the likely source for the dislike of psiloi thetes. As triereme warfare was also not conducted face-to-face, this could equally apply to a reluctance to recognise the value of naval warfare; Thucydides notes that before the Athenian naval bill there were no significant navies at all in Greece.

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132 Thuc. 1.14.
In Adcock's view, the land battles of Marathon (and Plataea) perpetuated the general psychology that hoplite tactics were superior. If so then at Marathon the very fact of the Athenians winning the victory would have influenced Athenian psychology, post-battle, in two more subtle ways. Firstly, Athenians had not previously experienced the military potential of their own united collective under the new Cleisthenic system. Ten newly aligned pentacosiomedimnoi strategoi and the hoplite zeugitai class itself could find confidence and pride in their successful military structures. In consequence, they came to identify success on the battlefield with the political system, thus enhancing a greater confidence in the collective power of the hoplite citizen-zeugites. The second subtle bolster to the psychology is the fact that Sparta had not assisted at Marathon. If Sparta had helped, the Athenians would have deferred much of the glory (at least subconsciously) to Spartan expertise because Athenians unquestioningly accepted the notion of Spartan superiority: a belief developed and nurtured by Sparta well before the battle of Marathon. This too perpetuated the ideology of Athenian reliance on land troops for defence.

Then came the victory at Salamis. Once again there was an opportunity to notice the relationships between Athens' constitution and its military organisation; between competition and cooperation. It is probable that this was the point at which the collective first identified the potential of its own sovereign power. Thucydides articulated the outcome in Pericles' funeral oration. Frost sees the psychological shift in these terms:

> [T]he commons lost its awe for the gnorimoi [well-known and well-understood leading men] ... in the same way that Americans in the early nineteenth century lost their awe for their founding fathers. ... [In Athens] political stature was not a matter of office-holding but of confidence and consensus ... [even though] Athenians continued to be manipulated by an aristocratic elite.

Recognition of the worth of naval manpower in a more equal distribution of battle honours between hoplites and seamen was not instituted until around the time of Ephialtes' constitutional reforms in 462BC. Even though these reforms restricted Areopagite power, they did not alter the prevailing ideology of hoplite superiority. For example, whilst the areopagus, at the time of Salamis an august body of old soldiers, lent weight to the hoplite ideology and propagated the ethos by the very fact of being themselves, they

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136 Sparta's reputation as the best ground fighters and the belief that they could provide superior defence assistance appears to be the rationale behind other states joining the Peloponnesian league under Spartan leadership. Cf. Thuc. 1.71.4-7; Cartledge, op. cit., pp. 11-12. Also Sparta's victory at Plataea merely legitimised Spartan military conservatism and the general belief in it. Cf. Adcock, loc. cit.
140 It is seen over a century later when Demosthenes criticised Philip of Macedon for breaking the rules of hoplite battle and when both Plato and Aristotle both theorised an ideal city predominantly defended by hoplites. Cf. Demosth. *Philippic 1* 4.31, 3.47-52; Ar. *Politics* 1297b1-2, 1326a21-25; Pl. *Republic* 5.467c, 468a.
simultaneously enjoyed status as heroes-of-Salamis because they were the body who allocated the Laurium levy and paid each sailor.\textsuperscript{141} Furthermore, whilst marine battle had the same collective imperative, it was not conducted face-to-face; hence a disconnect with political ideology embodying a hoplite ethos that kept the naval crews from the kudos and influence they might have enjoyed. With the acquisition of an empire, post-Salamis, Hignett pronounced the hoplite ethos ‘a manifest anachronism’.\textsuperscript{142} Still, the ethos remained; killing and fighting should be close and personal. It is notable how Aeschylus idealised the battle in \textit{Persians} and by not naming any (Greek) individual; the Athenian collective was turned into a single heroic identity.\textsuperscript{143} This is very different to the treatment of the battle given by Herodotus where rivalry and heroics are celebrated by individuals, not the group.\textsuperscript{144}

\section*{2.6 PERICLES AND THE DEMOGRAPHIC REVOLUTION}

Ober sees Pericles’ constitutional reforms removing the last ‘institutional bastions of elite political privilege’ while Hignett considers the regulations were moves against ‘the aggrandisement of the various magnificences’.\textsuperscript{145} He carried Ephialtes’ reforms further,\textsuperscript{146} whether to thwart political rivals or promote a more theoretical equality through wider representation in governmental magistracies and administration, his constitutional reforms laid the ground for a professional meritocracy drawn from a the three top (if not all four) telés, and a concept of the state as a single entity in the political consciousness of citizens:

\begin{quote}
The symbolic value of ordinary citizens conducting all levels of state business must have been considerable. The awe that an Athenian might feel upon confronting a magistrate (e.g., the basileus, about some problem to do with religion) would now be a function of the office itself, not of the private status of the officeholder. Awe would therefore be ascribed to the reflected grandeur of the state, which the magistrate in some sense symbolised. The dislocation of elite status from the awe-inspiring (assuming they were so) figures of the state’s official representatives thus tended to lower the potential influence of the elite collectively over the minds of the masses.\textsuperscript{147}
\end{quote}

Experienced \textit{strategoi} now served more than one term\textsuperscript{148} and forensic debate became the criterion for influence in the assemblies and law courts, where deliberative speech making,

\begin{quote}

\textsuperscript{141} Ar. \textit{Politics} 1304a.20-21; \textit{Athenaion Politea}. 3.6, 23.1, 25.2; Plut. \textit{Pericles} 9-20; Cimon 15.2-3.
\textsuperscript{142} Cf. Hignett, \textit{History of the Athenian Constitution} pp. 147; 193-213.
\textsuperscript{143} Hignett, op. cit., p. 192. A survey of subject types on fifth century vases in the Beazley Collection also shows that naval subjects are not well represented; cf. http://www.beazley.ox.ac.uk/xdb/ASP/testSearch.asp?searchBy=Subject&txtValue="#S.
\textsuperscript{144} Aeschylus mythologised the battle by individually naming only characters who were Persian.
\textsuperscript{145} The Herodotean description of the agonal and chaotic behaviour of the Hellenes is familiar: \textit{συνις ἐγνεῖτο λόγων ὀμφασθή} [Hdt. 8.81]. F.W. Wallbank ['History and Tragedy', \textit{Historia}, Vol. 9 (1960), pp. 216-234 at 221] cites Gomme [\textit{Commentary on Thucydides} I, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1945, p. 149], suggesting the ‘wrangling’ of Themistocles and the allied admirals was merely ‘historical romance’ - but there are many similar incidents (both on and off the field) on record. For example, i) the battle of Lade [Hdt. 6.11-15] was lost due to the Ionians’ inability to accept allied command; ii) Persia intervention in the Peloponnesian war and the century after capitalised on the inability of the city-states to form a united resistance [Thuc. 8.5-6, 45, 48; Xen. \textit{Hell}. 5.1.25, 29, 6.3.19, 6.13.19, 7.1.27, 1.33.38; Isoc., \textit{Panegyrics} 4.171-78]; iii) Philip of Macedon did not need to divide and conquer [Isoc., \textit{Philippic} 5.30, 41-42, 53-5; Demosth., \textit{For Megalopolis} 16.1-5, \textit{Philippic I} 4.39-42, 45-48; Aeschines 2.34-9]; iv) Pericles was challenged regarding his defence strategy for Athens [Thuc. 2.59]; v) the uncoordinated Spartan command at Arginusae [Xen. \textit{Hell}. 1.6.2-5]; vi) the disputing Athenian command at Aegospatomai [\textit{Hell}. 2.125-26]; vii) Demosthenes and Nikias regarding withdrawal from Sicily [Thuc. 7.49-50].
\textsuperscript{146} Ober, \textit{Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens}, p. 75; Hignett, op. cit., p. 214.
\textsuperscript{147} Ar. \textit{Athenaion Politea}. 25-27; Plut. Cimon 16.8, \textit{Pericles} 10.6-7.
\textsuperscript{148} Ober, op. cit., p. 80.
\textsuperscript{149} Pericles was continuously re-elected general between 443 and 429 and after him two generals from the same tribe at times served simultaneously. Ober [op. cit., p. 86] suggests
financial competence, administrative skills became a further means to power, thus making literacy and sophistic education a useful commodity. The introduction of pay for assemblies and especially juries, however, placed the aforementioned ideological parameters around that meritocracy. All telêς exerted the same control over private behaviour as they did state policy, which was enshrined at this time, as Hignett suggests, by Pericles, who was the most likely archon to have introduced an early form of the γραφὴ παρανόμων (graphê paranômon) which made it an indictable offence to attempt to change prevailing laws.149 Such legislation would have contained excessive policy change whilst at the same time increasing the symbolic divide between the state and the individual.

Probably far reaching, but difficult to detect, is the demographic effect of Pericles’ 451/50BC adjustment to the rules of citizenship, which required a citizen to have an Athenian mother as well as father.150 Davies’ ‘statement of the obvious,’ that Athenian citizenship was more than just an hereditary group but an interest group holding onto privilege in opposition to all others living within their city, gives a fair hint of what the reaction would have been when the city’s population swelled with returning (mostly enriched) cleruchs, metics and slaves, the result of Athens’ hegemony in the Aegean in the period between the battle of Salamis and the 451/50BC citizenship law.151 This reform to the politeia suggests a cultural backlash to this rapid demographic shift. It is possible that Pericles merely wished to restrict the citizenry because it had reached a level beyond which administration would be difficult.152 Ober, however, considers the primary reason for the citizenship law was to close off foreign diminution of what was perceived as the favourable, inheritable Athenian characteristics of ‘native intelligence, quickness, patriotism, public-spiritedness, innate love of equality; and respect for the traditions of the state’.153 These characteristics came from a wide Hellenic gene pool. Solon’s boundary between free residents and citizens had always been ‘permeable’ and the aristocracy had always fathered children with foreign wives and brought them up as Athenian citizens along with children from their endogamous unions.154 From this point of view the influx of slaves would have increased the incidence of slave children to Athenian fathers also being recognised (as in ‘passed-off’) as legal heirs.155 Added to this was a new phenomenon in that Athenian cleruchs around the Aegean had produced a crop of mixed blood citizens from hippês, zeugités and thetê fathers as well as pentakosimêdimnos ones.156 Then, as now, offspring from mixed groups reduce the incidence of autosomal recessive disorder, a positive biologic consequence hitherto a prerogative of the foreign-heiress-marrying elite. Whatever Pericles’ reasons for restricting the criteria for citizenship, it would have rapidly altered the dynamics of the Athenian genetic pool. For example, the legislation would have encouraged a wider section of the population to engage in consanguinous marriages. Hitherto, citizens with property rights could marry

that the constant election of Pericles to the generalship served to institutionalise the position and give it a continuity that represented symbolic and constitutional power.


150 Ar. Athenain Politea. 26.3; Plut. Pericles 37.3-4.


156 Ober Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens, pp. 80-81.
metic women in the knowledge that her relatives could never inherit a share of the oikos. With metic women out-of-bounds, the best insurance to keep wealth away from political rivals was to marry within the family.

Whilst there is no obvious detectable deterioration on the general health of surviving children found in studies to date, there is a two fold risk of birth defects with consanguineous parents,\(^\text{157}\) as well as birthing complications in women born of consanguineous parents.\(^\text{158}\) In Greece Plato and Aristotle both provide evidence of the presence of congenital problems within the population and the normality of infanticide (for various reasons).\(^\text{159}\) Though Gomme argues desperately against Athenian acceptance of the practice, he maintains that there is no evidence that infanticide distorted the population gender balance.\(^\text{160}\) Perhaps it distorted the figures in other ways. Aristotle’s observation that many young women died during childbirth in comparison to older women may be related.\(^\text{161}\)

Therefore, for these reasons, it is possible that the results of Pericles’ citizenship law had a demographic consequence when plague struck in 430, 429 and 427/6BC. Thucydides specifically states that the disease was more virulent in Athens than anywhere else in the Aegean. He also notes it caused more deaths there than anywhere else.\(^\text{162}\) If the law had been complied with, many, if not all, citizens twenty years-old and under would have inherited some deleterious recessive alleles (homozygosity), with the possible consequence of making them more susceptible than metics or slaves to the severe respiratory strain described by Thucydides.\(^\text{163}\)


\(^{159}\) Plato *Thetetetus* 160e-161a implies that first-time mothers were beside themselves [φόδρα χαλέπανεις] when phratry judges pronounced that their children would be put away [αποτίθημι]. Cf. *Republic* 407d, 459e, 461c, *Timaeus* 19a; *Ar. Politics* 1335b19, 1335b26.


\(^{161}\) *Ar. Politics* 1335a6.

\(^{162}\) Thuc. 2.47.

\(^{163}\) The opprobrium and reluctance historians attach to this subject is palpable. Nevertheless, in all the genetics joints, in all the universities in all the world, the abhorrence at the history of Eugenics comes face-to-face with increasingly unpleasant, and as yet incomplete, statistics on consanguinity and birth defects. How to deal politically correctly with the issues is beyond the scope of this work. It is however a consideration in the consequences of the plague on Athenian society and the population generally. Cf. Thuc. 2:40-50. Cf. Jim Moore, ‘Primates: What’s Wrong with ’The Dispersing Sex’, *pp* 392-426, esp. 394-96; Jeffry B. Mitton, ‘Theory and Data Pertinent to the Relationship between Heterozygosity and Fitness’, in Nancy W. Thornhill (ed.), *The Natural History of Inbreeding and Outbreeding: Theoretical and Empirical*, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1993, pp. 17-41; Daniel J. Howard 'Small Populations, Inbreeding, and Speciation‘ in *ibid*, pp. 118-142; Abdulbari Bener, Hanadi R. El Ayoubi, Lotfi Chouchane, Awab I Ali, Aisha Al-Kubaisi, Haya Al-
At the same time, the negative biological consequences of Pericles' citizenship law does not appear to have been complied with for long. Despite the positive cultural benefits of consanguinity, it seems that, with Pericles' death (due to the plague) and the heavy toll on Athenian youth, the law was not as strictly applied or became less important over the next few generations. It may have been even earlier: a 445/44BC distribution of corn had brought on a disenfranchisement of some 4,760 citizens, but a foot in the biological door probably did recur for metics, because by 440BC, they were participating in the Lenaea and in 431BC were sharing the battle as hoplites. It would seem that the letter of the law had not been adhered to for some years: otherwise in the last decade of the century Antiphon would not have sought to reimpose Pericles' citizenship law when food concerns again became as pressing towards the end of the war when the Chersonnese was coming under attack and blocking food supplies to Athens. The strength of family fortunes depended as much on the health and fitness of its members as on its numbers.

Vlassopoulos states that establishing and maintaining identity and status was a serious issue that caused ‘debate, anxiety and disagreement’. The everyday reality was that, in the public spaces, the agora, the workplace, the temple, Athenian citizens, metics and slaves were virtually indistinguishable; Citizen-sons were often mistaken for slaves, metics moved about with confidence and slaves were liable to road rage:

τῶν δούλων δ' αὖ καὶ τῶν μετοίκων πλείστη ἔστιν Αθήναις ἀκολούθια, καὶ οὔτε πατήσαί έξεστιν αὐτοῦ οὔτε ἐπεκατοστάσεται σοὶ ὁ δοῦλος. οὐ δ'. ἐνεκέν ἔστιν τούτο ἐπιχώριον ἕγα γέφυρα. οἱ νόμοι ἕν τον δούλον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐλευθεροῦ τυπέστεθά ἐν τοῖς μέτοικοι ἐν τοῖς ἀπελευθεροῦν, πολλάκις ἃν οἰκεῖος ἐν οἴκειος τῶν Ἀθηναίων δοῦλον ἐπάτωμεν ἃν ἐδοξάζατε τα γαρ οὐδὲν βέλτιον ὁ δήμος αὐτοῦ ἢ οἱ δοῦλοι καὶ οἱ μέτοικοι καὶ τὰ εἴδη οὐδὲν βέλτιος εἶναι. [P.-Xenophon Athenien Politeia 1.10]

Now among the slaves and metics at Athens there is the greatest uncontrolled wantonness; you can’t hit them there, and a slave will not stand aside for you. I shall point out why this is their native practice: if it were customary for a slave (or metic or freedman) to be struck by one who is free, you would often hit an Athenian citizen by mistake on the assumption that he was a slave. For the people there are no better dressed than the slaves and metics, nor are they any more handsome. [trans. Marchant]

In the closed spaces, too, in a slave society, a citizen could also create and perpetuate his own anxieties with emotion for ambiguous children. And, for all the reasons stated above, it was not possible during the fifth century to separate the family from politics.

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166 Davies, ibid., pp. 106, 111.

167 Vlassopoulos, 'Free Spaces: Identity, Experience and Democracy in Classical Athens', pp. 34-35.

168 Cf. e.g., Lysias Ag. Panceleon 23.1-3, 5-6; Demosth. Ag. Evergus & Mnesibulus 47.61, Ag. Nicostratus 53.16, Ag. Neaera 59.1-2, 9, 13; Ag. Eubulides 57.1-4.
APPENDIX 3
GENERAL EDUCATION : ELEMENTARY & EPHEBIC

3.1 INTRODUCTION

Greek education was of a skills-based utilitarian nature, aimed at teaching a child to fit into his place within the society and to fulfil his religious, economic and military responsibilities to the family, the phratry and the polis. Its objective was what Beck defines as ‘social habituation’ where ‘there was no concept of education purely for its own sake, nor was mental training an end in itself’. The relevance of this appendix on elementary education to the thesis, and especially the chapter on elementary literacy education, is to show that educational objectives were pragmatic; that the ability to understand the alphabet, to be able to decipher letters and read words and be able to write words, and for the few, to be able to construct written prose argument, was merely an extension of that pragmatism. Literacy was not seen as the foundation of education as it is today in modern societies.

The first section of this appendix considers the educational objectives and the curriculum content of general elementary education which was not institutionalised but followed directives at the family end from the head of the oikos and under the eye of local phratry groups.

3.2 ELEMENTARY EDUCATION - UTILITARIAN AND VOCATIONAL OBJECTIVES

Though Plato has Socrates declare that the object of education is τελευταῖα τὰ μουσικὰ εἰς τὰ τοῦ καλοῦ ἐρωτικὰ (to teach us to desire what is beautiful) Xenophon presents him with more utilitarian views firmly focused on human socialisation rather than intellectual speculation:

αὐτίκα γεωμετρίαν μέχρι μέν τούτου ἐφῄ δεῖν μανθάνειν, ἡώς ἱκανός τις γενοῖται, εἰ ποτε δήσει, γὴν μέτρων ὀρθῶν ὢν παραλαβεῖν ἄρα παραδούναι ἢ διανεῖμαι ἢ ἔργον ἀποδεῖξασθαι· οὕτω δὲ τοῦτο ῥᾴδιον εἶναι μαθεῖν ὡστε τὸν προσέχοντα τὸν νοῦν τῇ μετρίᾳ ἁμα τῇ γῇ ὠπόσῃ ἐστὶν εἰδεῖν καὶ ὡς μετερεῖται ἐπιστάμενον ὑπείκαι, ... τὸ δὲ μέχρι τῶν δυσσυνέτων διαγραμμάτων γεωμετρίαν μανθάνειν ἀποδοκιμαζέων. ὃ τι μὲν γὰρ ὠφελοῖ ταύτα, οὐκ ἐφῄ ὀραν· [Xenophon Memorabilia 4.7.2-3]

He thought that geometry should be learnt so far as to enable one to receive or to convey or to apportion land accurately in point of measurement, or to carry out a task. ... [3] But he deprecated the learning of geometry so far as figures difficult of comprehension. He said that he didn’t see the use of them. [trans. Tredennick]

ἐκέλευε δὲ καὶ ἀστρολογίας ἐμπείρους γίνεσθαι, καὶ ταύτης μὲντο δὲ μέχρι τοῦ νυκτός τε ὀραν καὶ μηνὸς ... καὶ ταύτα δὲ ῥᾴδια εἶναι μαθεῖν παρὰ τε νυκτοθηρῶν καὶ κυβερνητῶν...τὸ δὲ μέχρι τούτου ἀστρονομίας μανθάνειν, μέχρι τοῦ καὶ τὰ μὴ ἐν τῇ αὕτῃ περιφορᾷ ὀντα, καὶ τοὺς πλανήτας τα καὶ ἀσταθήτους ἀστέρας γνώσαι, καὶ τὰς ἀποστάσεις αὐτῶν ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς καὶ τὰς περιοδοὺς καὶ τὰς αἰτίας αὐτῶν ζητοῦσας κατατρίβεσθαι, ... ὥσπερ εἶπεν μὲν γὰρ οὐδεμιὰν οὐδ' ἐν τούτοις ἐφῄ ὀραν· ... οὕτω γαρ εὐρῆ αὐθαρσίας αὐτὰ ἐνομίζειν εἶναι ὡστε χαρίζεσθαι θείου ἢ ἑυτείου τοῦ ζητοῦσα τὰ ἐκεῖνα σαφῆναι σὺν ἐξουλήθησαν κινδυνεύσαι. [Xenophon Memorabilia 4.7.4-6]

170 Pl. Republic 3.403c.
171 Cf. Xen. Memorabilia 1.1.11-16 where Socrates criticises the other Presocratics Parmenides, Leucippus and Democritus; Heraclitus, Zeno. This coincides with several references in Plato where Socrates criticizes Anaxagoras and other Presocratics as ‘lunatics’; cf. Apology 26d-e; Phaedo 97b-99d. Cf. chapters VI-VII.
He told them to become acquainted also with astronomy, but here again only so far as to be able to recognise the time of night and the day of the month and the day of the year, ... This was easy to learn from night-hunters and pilots ... But to learn astronomy to the extent of even acquiring a knowledge of bodies moving in different orbits, such as the planets and other irregularly moving bodies, and to wear oneself out with trying to discover their distances from the earth and their paths and the cause of them ... He said that in these studies too he saw no utility ... he thought that these facts were not discoverable by human beings, and he did not consider that a man would please the gods if he pried into things that they had not chosen to reveal. [trans. Tredennick]

Socrates recommended the study of arithmetic ... and he himself helped them in their investigations and explanations only so far as was useful. [trans. Tredennick]

He also strongly encouraged his companions to be careful about their health, not only learning all that they could about it from those who knew, but also each one studying his own constitution all through life. [trans. Tredennick]

If anyone wanted help beyond these resources of human wisdom he advised him to take up divination. A man who knew the means by which the gods made revelations to men about events, he said, was never in lack of divine counsel. [trans. Tredennick]

He sent them to consult an oracle whether action action should be taken at all. He said that anyone who proposed to run a household or a state efficiently needed the help of divination. [trans. Tredennick]

It is hard to reconcile Xenophon’s report of this anti-scholastic approach to education and decision-making with the Socrates of Plato’s early dialogues (except that all discussions (dialogia) ended in confusion (aporia). It does though resemble the Socrates of the Apology who upheld Athenian religious values stressing his belief that the Delphic oracle and his daimon initiated much of his volition and decision-making.172

172 Pl. Apologia 31c-d.
From the parents' point of view Plato indicates that the chief educational objective was discipline to instil right behaviour rather than academic achievement:

> ὤστερ ἐξὸν διαστρέφομεν καὶ καμπτόμενοι εὐθύνουσιν ἀπειλαῖς καὶ πληγαῖς, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα εἰς δίδακτας πέμποντες πόλις μᾶλλον ἐντελέχειον ἐπιμελεῖσθαι εὐκοσμίας τῶν παιδῶν ἢ γραμμάτων τε καὶ κιθαρίσσεως·

[Plato Protagoras 325d-e]

They [parents, nurses, paidagogoi] straighten him with threats and beatings, … Later on when they send the children to school, their instructions to the masters lay much more emphasis on good behaviour than on letters or music. [trans. Guthrie]

Aristotle also outlines the emphasis put on social habituation and the limits of teaching:

> τῆς μὲν διανοητικῆς τῆς δὲ ἡθικῆς, η μὲν διανοητικὴ τὸ πλεῖον ἐκ διδασκάλων ἔχει καὶ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν αὐξήσιν, διόπερ ἐμπειρίας δεῖται καὶ χρόνου, ὡς ἡ ἡθικὴ εἰς ἐθοὺς περιγίνεται, ὅθεν καὶ τούτων ἐσχήκει μικρὸν παρεκκλίνει ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐθούς. εἰς οὐ καὶ δήλων ὅτι οὐδείς τῶν ἡθικῶν ἀρτέτων φύσει ἦμιν εὐγίνεται: οὐθὲν γὰρ τῶν φύσει ὄντων ἄλλας ἐξῆται, οἷον ὁ λίθος φυσεί κατά φερόμενον οὐκ ἃν εἰςθείην ἄνω φέρεσθαι, οὕτως ἀν μιριάκης αὐτὸν εἰθίζει τῆς ἄνω σάρκας ... οὐτ' ἄρα φύσει οὔτε παρὰ φύσιν ἐγγινονται αἱ ἀρτέται, ἀλλὰ περικόσι μὲν ἡμῖν δεξαμεθαί αὐτάς, τελειομένους δὲ διὰ τοῦ ἐθούς.

[ Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 2.1.1-3: 1103a.14-26]

… intellectual virtue in the main owes both its birth and its growth to teaching (for which reason it requires experience and time), while moral virtue comes about as a result of habit, whence also its name (ἡθική) is one that is formed by a slight variation from the word ἐθοὺς (habit). From this it is also plain that none of the moral virtues arises in us by nature; for nothing that exists by nature can form a habit contrary to its nature. For instance the stone which by nature moves downwards cannot be habituated to move upwards, not even if ones tries to train it by throwing it up ten thousand times; … neither by nature, then, nor contrary to nature do the virtues arise in us; rather we are adapted by nature to receive them, and are made perfect by habit. [trans. Thomson]

Plato's idealism and Aristotle's categorisation applied to traditional literature and educational practices often distort the evidence of what was actually being taught in the century previous to their writing. Two examples are Aristotle's rhetorical theory and Plato's criticism of sophists and poets. It led to the view that there was something disreputable about Presocratics en masse; something that the evidence presented in chapter VIII.3 and 4. shows was not the case. The point here is to emphasise that education in the fifth century was primarily skills-based and taught by traditional methods that can be identified in Homer. Plato’s and Aristotle's theoretics did not equate to what was happening on the ground:

173 διανοητικός, ἡ, ὢν, was coined by Plato [Timaeus 89a]: τῶν δ' ἀν κινήσεων ἤ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὑφ' αὐτοῦ ἀριστή κινήσεως—μάλιστα γαρ τῇ διανοητικῇ καὶ τῇ τοῦ παντὸς κινήσει συγγενῇ [Regarding movements, the best is that which we make in ourselves of ourselves - for this is most like the workings of intelligence and the workings of the Universe]. Aristotle’s use above [τῆς ἁρετῆς ὑσίας, τῆς μὲν διανοητικῆς τῆς δὲ ἡθικῆς] indicates a growing identification of the difference between analytical and intuitive thinking. He uses the word elsewhere with more or less the same connotation. In Metaphysics [1025b6]: καὶ ὁ λόγος δὲ πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη διανοητικὴ ἢ μετέχουσα τι διανοηῶν περι αἰτίας καὶ ἀρχῶς ἐστὶν ἢ ἀκριβεστέρας ἢ ἀπλουστέρας. [And in general every intellectual science or science which involves intellect deals with causes and principles, more or less exactly or simply considered.] and also Poetics [1460b4]: τῇ δὲ λέξει δει διασπούνει ἐν τοῖς ἀργοῖς μέρεσι καὶ μήτη ἡθικῶς μήτη διανοητικῶς· [The diction should be elaborated only in the 'idle' parts which do not reveal character or thought.] It is not used again until later; cf. LS].

174 Cf. chapters II, VI and VII.
When we abuse or commend the upbringing of individual people and say that one of us is educated and the other uneducated, we sometimes use this latter term of men who have in fact had a thorough education - one directed towards petty trade or the merchant-shipping business, or something like that. … we are not going to treat this sort of thing as 'education'; … a training which produces a keen desire to become a perfect citizen who knows how to rule and be ruled as justice demands. … the title 'education' for it alone. A training directed to acquiring money or a robust physique, or even to some intellectual facility not guided by reason and justice, we should want to call coarse and illiberal, and say that it had no claim whatever to be called education.

First, no citizen of our land nor any of his servants should enter the ranks of the workers whose vocation lies in the arts and crafts. A citizen's vocation, which demands a great deal of practise and study, is to establish and maintain good order in the community, and this is not a job for part-timers. [trans. Saunders]

We therefore call mechanical those skills which have a deleterious effect on the body's condition, and all work that is paid for. For these make the mind preoccupied and unable to rise above lowly things. [trans. Sinclair]

Practical experience is tied fast to circumstances and needs. ... Stock rearing ... tillage ... bee-keeping ... are the three main branches of the first and most appropriate ways of acquiring wealth. ... Shipping ... carrying goods ... offering goods for sale ... then money-lending and working for pay whether as a skilled mechanic, or as an unskilled worker useful only in manual
Traditional Hellenic education consisted of two categories which Marrou defined as technical and ethical.\(^{176}\) He gives as an example Achilles, who learned combat skills and knowledge valuable on the battlefield from Cheiron.\(^{177}\) Later Phoenix accompanied him to Troy to tutor and mentor him in the attainment of the masculine ideal (an ethos of arete and time) and the capacity to speak well before an audience:

> νήπιον οὖ πω εἰδόθ' ὁμοίου πολέμοιο
> οὐδ' ἀγορέων, ἵνα τ' ἀνδρεὺς ἀριτρέπετες τελέσασθαι.
> τούτα με προείκη διδακτέμεναι τὸδε πάντα,
> μῦθων τε ηρήηρα ἔμεναι πρηκτήρα τε ἔργοιν. [Iliad 9.441-43]

Still a boy, you knew nothing of war that levels men to the same testing, nothing of assembly where men become illustrious. That is why he [Achilles’ father] sent me, to instruct you in these matters, to be a man of eloquence and action. [trans. Fitzgerald]\(^{179}\)

The tradition was for fathers, tutors and mentors (paidagogoi) to hand down their knowledge to youth: Asclepios passed his pharmacological knowledge to his son, Machaon\(^{180}\); Telemachus was left to Mentor and the prudent Medôn until Odysseus returned to give him a few tips in archery and sword play;\(^{181}\) Hesiod tutored his younger brother, Perses, in agrarian matters and life skills.\(^{182}\) This continued into the fifth century where, for example Aeschines was taught his oratorical skills by his father\(^{183}\) and Pericles, unsuccessful in his remedial mentoring of the orphan Clinias (the unteachable brother of Alcibiades), passed him over to his other official guardian, Pericles’ brother, Ariphron.\(^{184}\) Likewise Socrates (if not a Platonian conceit) was trained as a midwife by his mother and likely gained his discerning eye for sculpture from his stonemason father.\(^{185}\)

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175 Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 2.9, in his discussion on love and friendship, commends such individuals who earn their own living such as agriculturalists and those who work with their hands.


177 Skills such as hunting, javelin [taught to Achilles’ father by Cheiron: *Iliad* 16.143; 19.387], surgery & pharmacopae\(a^{\text{ }}\) [Iliad 11.832]; cf. Xen. *On Hunting* 1.1-5.

178 The term τε ῥήτηρ (te rhetor) did not then have the same complex connotations as it came to have in the fourth century. The methods and impact of rhetorical tuition are addressed in chapters VI, VII and VIII, however it is worthwhile to stress that the ability to speak well in public was a traditional and utilitarian skill.

179 Cf. Patroclus was also sent to mentor Achilles: You are older. Your part should be to let him hear close reasoning (οὐ οἱ φάσθοι παύειν ἐτῶς = ‘well-said compact words’ which is not exactly ‘close reasoning’) and counsel, even commands. He will be swayed by you for his own good. These were your father’s [Menoetius, the son of Actor] words to you [Iliad 11.785-789, trans. Fitzgerald].

180 Cheiron also taught Asclepios [*Iliad* 4.219; Pindar *Pythian* 3.4-7].

181 Odysseus in his turn fathered only one, and left me in his hall alone, too young to be of any use to him. [*Odyssey* 16.118-125]; I am that father whom your boyhood lacked and suffered pain for lack of me. [*Odyssey* 16.186-192]; Mentor, a ‘warm voice in a lucid flight of words’ [*Odyssey* 2.243245]; ‘Medôn, he cared for me from boyhood’ [*Odyssey* 22.356-361]; sword fighting [*Odyssey* 22.265-361].


184 Pl. *Protagoras* 320a. Pericles own sons, Paralus and Xanthippus, were passed over to Protagoras when he was in Athens (if we can believe Plato placing them at Caiillas’ house in 432) cf. *Protagoras* 315a.

Young men in the fifth century continued to be taught traditional skills streamed to suit their destined occupation within the society. For those who were to be involved in Athenian maritime business, rural or military affairs (such as the standing cavalry) there was practical technical subject matter and utilitarian training to cover animal husbandry and farm management and elementary skills to form a base for military and weapons training:

καὶ κυβερνῆται ἄγαθοί γίγνονται δι᾽ ἐμπειρίαν τε τῶν πλόων καὶ διὰ μέλετίνων ἐμέλετον δὲ οἱ μὲν πλοῦν κυβερνῶντες, οἱ δὲ ὄλκαδα οἱ δὲ ἐνευθύνον ἐπὶ τριήρεισι κοιτάσθησαν οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ ἔλαυνεν εὐθέως οἴοι τε εἰσαβάλλοντες εἰς νοὺς ἀτε ἐν πάντι τῷ βίῳ προμελετητόκτες. [P-Xenophon Athenion Politeia 1.20-25]

Experience of voyages and practise makes them good helmsmen, some learning in smaller boats, others in merchantmen, and others graduating to triremes; the majority are competent rowers as soon as they board their ships because of previous practice throughout their lives. [trans. Marr, Rhodes]

It was not then the test of a man
As to who could orate the finest
Or deliberate some slander
But who could row the best. [trans. Leiper]

From the very earliest times the really great poet has been the one who had a useful lesson to teach. … Hesiod explained about agriculture and the seasons for ploughing and harvest. And why is Homer held in such high esteem, if not for the valuable military instruction embodied in his work? Organisation, training, equipment, it’s all there. [trans. Barrett]

I charge the young not to despise hunting or any other schooling. For these are the means by which men become good in war and in all things out of which must come excellence in thought and word and deed. … The first pursuit, therefore, that a young man just out of his boyhood should take up is hunting, and afterwards he should go on to the other branches of education, provided he has means. [trans. Marchant]

The net-keeper should be a man with a keen interest in the business, one who speaks Greek, about twenty years old, agile and strong, and resolute, that,
being well qualified to overcome his tasks, he may take pleasure in the business. [trans. Marchant]

Πολύ δὲ κρείττου τοῦ πολεοδομεῖν εἶναι τῷ μὲν νέῳ εὐεξίας τε ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῆς ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ἵππικήν ἐν ἑ ἐπισταμένῳ ἡ δ ἰππάζεσθαι μελέταν, τὸ δὲ πρεσβυτέρῳ τοῦ τε οἴκου καὶ τῶν φίλων καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν καὶ τῶν πολεμικῶν μᾶλλον ἢ ἀμφί πάλευσιν διατρίβειν. [Xenophon Art of Horsemanship 2.1]

It is far better for a young man to get himself into condition and when he understands the art of horsemanship to practise riding than to be a horse-breaker; and an older man had far better devote himself to his estate, his friends and affairs of state and of war than spend his time in horse-breaking. [trans. Marchant]

ἔγωγεν ἣδη τινὶ ἐνετυχὼν βιβλίῳ ἀνδρὸς σοφοῦ, ἐν δὲ ἐνῆσκαν ἄλλας ἐπαινοῦ θαυμάσιον ἔχοντες πρὸς ὤφελίαν, καὶ ἄλλα τοιαύτα. [Plato Symposium 177b]

I once came across a book by a learned man in which the usefulness of salt was made the subject of a wonderful panegyric, and you could find plenty of other things that have received similar treatment. [trans. Hamilton]

βαναυσόταται δ’ ἐν σίς τὰ σώματα λαβώνται μάλιστα, ... περὶ ἕκαστον δὲ τοῦτων καθόλου μὲν εἶρηται καὶ νῦν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ μέρος ἀκριβεσεῖσθαι χρήσιμον μὲν πρὸς τὸς ἐργασίας, φορτικὸν δὲ τὸ ἐνδιαρίβειν. ἐπεὶ δ’ ἐστιν ἐνόιος γεγραμμένα περὶ τούτων, οἷον Χαρίτιδη τῷ Παρισί καὶ Ἀπολλοδόρῳ τῷ Λημνίῳ περὶ γεωργίας καὶ ὕλης καὶ πεφυτευμένης, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἄλλοις περὶ ἄλλων. [Aristotle Politics 1.11: 1258b33-1259a]

The most mechanical [occupations] are those which cause most deterioration to the bodies of the workers. ... Moreover, people have written books on these topics. Charetides of Paros and Apollodorus of Lemnos have manuals on agriculture, both crops and fruits, and others on other subjects. [trans. Sinclair]

Plato confirms that most Athenians set a high priority on vocational skills:

ἄλλα διὰ τὴν τοῦ χρυσοῦ τε καὶ ἄργυρου ἀπλαστίᾳ πάσαι μὲν τέχνῃ καὶ μηχανή, καλλίᾳ τε καὶ ἀσχημονεῖσθαι, ἐβέλειν υπομένειν πάντα ἄνδρα, εἰ μέλει πλούσιος ἐσεθαι, καὶ πράξει πράττειν σοὶ τέ καὶ ἀνύσιον καὶ πάντως αἰσχράν, μηδὲν δυσχεραινοῦτα. [Plato Laws 8.831d]

Everyone is out for himself, and is very quick off the mark indeed to learn any skill and apply himself to any technique that fills his pocket; anything that doesn’t do that he treats with complete derision. [trans. Saunders]

Though Plato and Aristotle did not consider trades and technical training a worthy part of education, they and others provide ample evidence that practical apprenticeships were an established and functional part of the curriculum:

χρή μέντοι ὡσπερ τὸν παιδὰ ὅταν ἐπὶ τέχνῃ ἐκδῶ συγγραφόμενον ἄ δείησε ἐπισταμένων ἀποδουντί αὐτῶς ἐκδίδοναι. [Xenophon Art of Horsemanship 2.2.]

Still, he should put in writing what the horse is to now when he is returned, just as when he apprentices his child to a profession. [trans. Marchant]

Κίθαρος γεγενήθηκαι καγοράζειν κίθαρος ἰμ. ἀγαθὸν γ’ ὁ κίθαρος· καὶ πρὸς Ἀπόλλωνος πάνυ ἔκειν βράττει μ’ ὃτι λέγομαι, ὃ γαθῆ, ἐνεστὶν ἐν κίθαρω τ’ ἐκκόμοιν. [Pherecrates The Slave Teacher Frag. 1.1-4]
SLAVE STUDENT: I had to become a kitharos-fish and was doing my shopping like that.
TEACHER: The kitharos is a good omen and is clearly connected with Apollo.
SLAVE STUDENT: What disturbs me, my good woman, is that they say 'There's some trouble in a kitharos!' [trans. Olson]

If you looked for a teacher of the sons of our artisans in the craft which they have in fact learned from their father to the best of their ability, and from his friends in the same trade. [trans. Guthrie]

If you looked for a teacher of the sons of our artisans in the craft which they have in fact learned from their father to the best of their ability, and from his friends in the same trade. [trans. Guthrie]

To produce constantly new doctors in addition to those already existing, and ... to produce health. And of these the latter result is no longer in itself an art but an effect of that art which both teaches and is taught, which effect we term 'health'. So likewise the operations of the joiner's art are a house and joinery, of which the one is an effect, the other a doctrine. In like manner let it be granted that the one effect of justice is to produce just men, as of the other arts their several artists; but as to the other, the operation which the just man is capable of performing for us, what do we say that is? [trans. Burnet]

SOCRATES: Suppose, Callicles, that in some undertaking for the city we were advising one another on a building contract for the most important type of public works, walls or dockyards or temples. Would it or would it not be our duty first of all to examine ourselves and ask whether or not we understood the art of building and from whom we had learnt it?

It is clear then that there should be laws laid down about education, and that education itself must be made a public concern. But we must not forget the question of what that education is to be, and how one ought to be educated. ...[T]here are opposing views about the tasks to be set, for there are no generally accepted assumptions about what the young should learn, either

for virtue or for the best life; nor yet is it clear whether their education ought to be conducted with more concern for the intellect than for the character of the soul. The problem has been complicated by the education we see actually given; and it is by no means certain whether training should be directed at things useful in life, or at those conducive to virtue, or at exceptional accomplishments.

[trans. Sinclair]

[504x799]59

... they must take part only in those useful occupations which will not turn the participant into a mechanic. ... the established subjects studied nowadays, as we have noted, have that double tendency. [trans. Sinclair]

The craftsman has to learn how to make things, but he learns in the process of making them. ... Men will become good builders as a result of building well, and bad builders as a result of building badly. Otherwise what would be the use of having anyone to teach a trade? [trans. Thomson .]

Athenian education was not institutionalised and trades-based education there had no formalised curriculum other than the works of poets and no minimum accepted levels of competency. The technical and agrarian writings cited above by Plato and Aristotle suggest that along with literacy, the beginnings of some technical trades were taught in schools. The fourth century poet Alexis of Thurii listed the contents of a school library including 'all sorts of prose works' though he names only one, a cookery-book by Simos.

The extent of prose works studied in school is discussed in chapter III. For now the point is that though works of a technical and trades-based nature were available, there was no benchmark level of educational competency. This is apparent in Plato's description of the differing training and competency levels of physicians (oligarchic philosophy aside):

These [doctors' assistants] (who may be free men or slaves) pick up the skill empirically, by watching and obeying their masters; they've no systematic knowledge such as the free doctors have learned for themselves and pass on to their pupils. ... This kind of [slave] doctor never gives any account of the

187 E.g. Demosthenes [On the Crown 18.257] went to a 'respectable' school which implies there were others not as prestigious.

particular illness of the individual slave, or is prepared to listen to one; he simply prescribes what he thinks best in the light of experience ... The visits of the free doctor, by contrast, are mostly concerned with treating the illnesses of free men; his method is to construct an empirical case-history by consulting the invalid ... He gives no prescription until he has somehow gained the invalid’s consent; then, coaxing him into continued cooperation, he tries to complete his restoration to health. [trans. Saunders]

If one of those doctors who are innocent of theory and practise medicine by rule of thumb were ever to come across a free-born doctor conversing with a free-born patient … engaging in a discussion that ranged over the source of the disease and pushed the inquiry back into the whole nature of the body. But our other doctor would immediately give a tremendous shout of laughter, … [saying] you are not treating the patient, but tutoring him. Anybody would think he wanted to become a doctor rather than get well again.[trans. Saunders]

The Acropolis itself attests to the high expertise in architecture, construction and the plastic arts in Periclean Athens. The literacy and technical development of Keramikos ceramicists is outlined in chapter IV.5, but, while Plato criticised the craftsmen painters and sculptors, he also confirmed that apprenticeships in these crafts were available from highly paid and outstanding technicians (at least in Socrates opinion):

\[
\text{Ippokratēs} \; \text{δόδε} \; \text{ἐπιθυμοῦσαι} \; \text{τής} \; \text{συνουσίας} \; \text{τοῦτού} \; \text{τού} \; \text{νεανίσκου} \; \text{τού} \; \text{ψυχ} \; \text{νεωστί} \; \text{ἐπιθυμοῦσιν}, \; \text{Ζευξίππου} \; \text{τοῦ} \; \text{Ηρακλεώτου}, \; \text{καὶ} \; \text{ἄφικόμενο} \; \text{παρ’} \; \text{αὐτοῦ}, \; \text{ὡςπερ} \; \text{παρὰ} \; \text{σε}. \; \text{[Plato Protagoras 318b]}
\]

[Hippocrates may] fancy to study with that young man who has just lately come to live at Athens, Zeuxippus of Heraclea. [trans. Guthrie]

\[
\text{εἰ} \; \text{δὲ} \; \text{παρὰ} \; \text{Πολύκλειτον} \; \text{τῶν} \; \text{Ἀργείων} \; \text{ἡ} \; \text{Φειδίας} \; \text{τῶν} \; \text{Ἀθηναίων} \; \text{ἐπενοεὶ} \; \text{ἄφικόμενο} \; \text{μισθὸν} \; \text{ὑπὲρ} \; \text{σαυτοῦ} \; \text{τελείν} \; \text{ἐκείνοῖς}, \; \text{εἰ} \; \text{τέσσερ’} \; \text{τελείν} \; \text{τοῦτο} \; \text{τὸ} \; \text{ἀργύριον} \; \text{ὡς} \; \text{τίνι} \; \text{ἐν} \; \text{μοί} \; \text{ἐχεῖς} \; \text{Πολύκλειτω} \text{τε} \; \text{καὶ} \; \text{Φειδία;} \; \text{[Plato Protagoras 311c]}
\]

Suppose your idea was to go to Polyclitus of Argos or Phidias of Athens and pay them fees for your own benefit. [trans. Guthrie]

From this we can determine that technical training led not only to sustainable occupations but constituted no real handicap to social or political advancement. The skill and training required to fulfil such occupations were not the criteria by which tradesmen were ranked in the society. For example, medicine and the teaching of letters was regarded as a craft-skill ranked along with architecture, building, sculpture, painting.

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189 Paintings create illusions or false impressions: Republic 10.596e, 605a, etc.; Sophist 235d, 266d. Freeman [op. cit., pp. 115-116] notes that while idealised painting is hinted at in the Republic [472d, 484c] ’in the diatribes of the Republic the possibility of idealised painting seems to be forgotten’. Cf. Theaetetus 208e: skiaographia (shadow drawing) which Plato thought conjuring.

190 Cf. Pl. Meno 91d.


3.3 CURRICULUM CONTENT AND DELIVERY

In *Laws* Plato reserved the teaching profession for foreigners, which for Freeman implies it was neither well paid nor well respected. Elsewhere he advocated public beatings for teachers who were unable to control their students. With laws inhibiting a citizens' freedom to attack a fellow citizen, it is another indication that teachers were often *metics* (non-citizens). Here Plato also expressed his attitude to child discipline:

πᾶς ὁ προστυγχάνων τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἀνδρῶν κολαζέτω τὸν τὸ παιδὰ αὐτὸν καὶ τὸν παιδαγωγὸν καὶ διδάσκαλον, ἕαν ἔξαρπαν τὴν τοῦτον, ὅ ὁ ᾧ προστυγχάνων τὴν μὴ κολαζῇ τῇ δίκη, ὀνείδει μὲν ἐνεχέσθω πρῶτον τῷ μεγίστῳ. [Plato *Laws* 808e]

Both the boy himself and his tutor or teacher must be punished by any passing citizen who finds either of them behaving badly. [trans. Saunders]

Plato was against the tide. It does however constitute evidence that there were incompetent teachers. Aeschines thought this was reflected in the stringent legislation Solon devised which placed considerable responsibility upon teachers to protect students from outside sexual predators as well as the teachers themselves. The profitability of a school relied on its reputation:

ό γὰρ νομοθέτης πρῶτον μὲν τοῖς διδάσκαλοις, οἷς εἰς ἀνάγκης παρακαταθεμένων τοὺς ἴμητροις αὐτῶν παιδᾶ, οἷς ἐστὶν ὁ μὲν βίος ἀπὸ τοῦ σωφρονεῖν, ἢ δὲ ἀπορία ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων, όμως ἀπιστῶν φαίνεται, ... τὰς ἐρμίας καὶ τὸ σκότος ἐν πλείστῃ ὑποψίᾳ ποιομένος ... καὶ ἀρχὴν ἴτης ἐστὶ τοῦτων ἐπιμελημένης, καὶ περὶ παιδαγωγῶν ἐπιμελείας ... καὶ τὸ τελευταῖον περὶ τῆς συμφοίτησεως τῶν παιδῶν καὶ τῶν χορῶν τῶν κυκλών. κελεύει γὰρ τὸν χορηγὸν τῶν μέλλοντα τὴν ύσιαν τὴν ἱαστῷ ἐς ύπατεῖς ἀναλιθεύειν ὑπὲρ τετταράκοντα ἐτῶν γεγονότα τούτο πράττειν, ἵν' ἐδή ἐν τῇ σωφρονεστᾷτῃ ὑσίᾳ ἴμηρα ὧν, ὡς τοῦτο ἐνυπνηχθηνα ἴμηροι παιδᾶ. [Aeschines *Against Timarchus* 9-11]

In the first place, consider the case of the teachers. Although the very livelihood of these men, to whom we necessarily entrust our own children, depends on their good character, while the opposite conduct on their part would mean poverty, yet it is plain that the lawgiver distrusts them; ... for he is exceeding suspicious of their being alone with a boy, or in the dark with him. ... He provides for a public official who shall superintend them ... he regulates the companionships that the boys may form at school, and their cyclic dances. ... [The choregus] shall be a man of more than forty years of age ... in order that he may have reached the most temperate time of life before he comes into contact with your children. [trans. Adams]

κλείεται δὲ πρὸ ἡλίου δυνοτος. καὶ μὴ ἔξεσται τοῖς ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν παιδῶν ἴμικίαν ύσιαν εἰσίν τοιασι τῶν παιδῶν ἵππων ὧτως, εἰ μὴ υἱὸς διδάσκαλοι ἡ ἀδελφὸς ἡ θυγατρὸς ἀνήρ; εάν δὲ τῆς παρα ταύτ' εἰσί, θανάτῳ ζημιοῦσθω. καὶ οἱ γυμνασιάρχαι τοῖς Ἐρμοίοις μὴ εἴσωσαν συγκαθίσαι μηδένα τῶν ἐν ἴμικια τρόπῳ μηδενί; εάν δὲ ἐπιτρέπῃ καὶ μὴ ἔξεργη τοῦ γυμνασίου, ἐνοχὸς ἐστῶ ὁ γυμνασιάρχης τῷ τῆς ἐλευθέρων φθόρας νομοῦ. [Aeschines *Against Timarchus* 12]

No person who is older than the boys shall be permitted to enter the room while they are there, unless he be a son of the teacher, a brother, or a daughter's husband. If any one enter in violation of this prohibition, he shall be punished with death. The superintendents of the gymnasia shall under no conditions allow any one who has reached the age of manhood to enter the contests of Hermes together with the boys. A gynasiarch who does permit this and fails to keep such a person out of the gymnasium, shall be liable to the penalties prescribed for the seduction of free-born youth. [trans. Adams]

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193 Pl. *Laws* 804c-d (though it does mention 'with salary'); cf. Freeman, op. cit., p. 81.
194 The question of paedophilia is discussed in Appendix 5.
It seems that the reputation and status of teachers derives from Solonic times and that the high value placed on physical education was tempered by ambivalent attitudes to paidotribes. This attests to a difference in the standards of individual palaistra. Aristophanes paints a similar picture of traditional tuition in palaistrai praising the positive physical results that students achieved but lampooning the palaistra as a place where young boys were vulnerable to predatory sexual experiences. Plato gives a picture of the metic padagogo who, even in their cups, were conscientious enough to insist their charges did not go unsupervised:

κατὰ τάς διδασκαλίαις τινες, προσελθόντες οἱ παιδαγωγοὶ, ὃ τε τοῦ Μενεζέου καὶ τοῦ Λύσιδος, ἔχοντες αὐτῶν τῶν ἀδέλφων, παρεκάλουσι καὶ ἐκέλευσιν αὐτῶν ὁ Λύσις ἀπίδευσεν ἐν τῷ ἐν Οὔεσ. ἢ τοις ὑπὸ πρῶτοι καὶ ημεῖς καὶ οἱ περιεχόμενοι αὐτὸς ἀπηλὼνομεν· επείδη δὲ οὐδὲν ἐφρονίζον ημῶν, ἀλλ’ ὑποβαρβαρίζοντες ἐγκαίνισαν τοίς καὶ οὐδὲν ἦττον ἐκάλουσι, ἀλλ’ ἐδόκοι ημῖν ὑποπεποκότες ἐν τοῖς Ἐρμαίοις ἀποροί εἶναι προσφερεθαί, ἢττιθέντες ὑπὸ αὐτῶν διελεύσαμεν τὴν συνουσίαν. [Plato Lysis 223a-b]

Just then, like evil spirits, Lysis and Menexenus’ tutors came over with the boy’s brothers, called to them and told them to come home. It was already late. At first, with the support of those standing around us, we tried to chase them away; but since they took no notice of us, but began to shout angrily in their rather foreign accents and went on calling the boys (we were of the opinion they’d had a bit to drink at the festival of the Hermae, which made them impossible to handle), we then conceded defeat to them and broke up our party. [trans. Watt]

There are other indications that in the fifth century schools varied in quality. For example, Demosthenes attacked Aeschines with: ‘I went to a proper school (προσοκοντα διδασκαλία) … while you sat beside your father … a slave with letters and collar in the grammar school (διδασκοντι γραμματο) of Elpias.’ However, Aeschines’ father was well-connected and wealthy enough in the second half of the fifth century to be influential and ensure his children were well-educated. The subsequent experiences of the family and the way Demosthenes described them reveal two things about education in Athens. Firstly, that from political exile and impoverishment the family still achieved political prominence and the necessary wherewithal; which shows the open nature of Athenian society where expertise in literacy enabled a citizen to rise above economic hardship. Demosthenes himself maintained that no-one should hold poverty or wealth as a reproach. Secondly, the school of Elpias shows a degree of professionalism likely to have delivered a good level of tuition; it provided students with ink for use on expensive parchment and papyrus and employed as teachers once wealthy ex-refugees who probably would have themselves been educated to a higher level than the ‘tradesmen’ grammaristes insinuated by Demosthenes. Aeschines provides another example, the Eupolemus, the uncle of Timarchus, who was a gymnasticus teacher who clearly belonged to a family wealthy

197 Aeschines’ father, Atrometus, from a phratry with connections to the Eteobutadae, a noble priestly family helped return the democracy in 403BC [P-Plut. Lives of the Ten Orators, ‘Lycurgus’; Aesch. On the Embassy 2.78, 147]. Aeschines learned from his father and read books [τελεοτη γὰς βιβλίων ἀνεγίγνωσκε] for his mother in her capacity of priestess of Sabazios, Dionysos and Hecate [Dem. On the Crown 18.129, 130 and 259; Aesch. On the False Embassy 19.281]. His brothers, Aphobetus and Philochoares were literate, one a clerk (γραφοντα) and the other produced inscribed alabastar boxes and tambourines [Dem. On the False Embassy 19.237]. Aeschines father-in-law, Philodemus, was also prominent and he inherited five talents (forty-five years’ worth of labourers’ pay) from him [Dem. On the Crown 18.312]. His brothers-in-law were also prominent [Aesch. On the Embassy 2.150, 153].
198 Democrates conceded Aeschines’ brothers were respectable and accomplished, both attaining the rank of general which necessitated some wealth [Dem. On the False Embassy 19.237]; Philochoares was elected strategos three times [Aesch. On the Embassy 2.149].
enough to fulfil the obligations of a choregus or trierarch. The status, level and profitability of elementary teaching probably resembled the sliding scales of fees charged by sophists; some of whom enjoyed good repute and fair profits, while others commanded less.

Herodotos remarks that the view prevalent in the ancient world and almost universal in Greece was that tradesmen ranked lowly on the social scale:

εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ τοῦτο παρ᾽ Αἰγυπτίων μεμαθήκασι οἱ Ἑλληνες, οὐκ ἔχω ἀτρικέως κρίναι, ὥς καὶ Θρήκεας καὶ Σκύθως καὶ Πέρσας καὶ Ἰδυῶς καὶ σχεδὸν πάντας τοὺς βαρβάρους ἀποτιμῶτες τῶν ἄλλων ἡγεμόνων πολιτεῶν τοὺς τὰς τέχνας μαθάντας καὶ τοὺς ἐγκόνους τούτων, τῶν δὲ ἀπαλλαγμένων τῶν χειρωναξίων γενναίους νομιζόμενοι εἶναι, καὶ μάλιστα τοὺς ἐς τὸν πόλεμον ἀνεμιμένους ἀμφιθηκήσας δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦτο πάντες οἱ Ἑλληνες καὶ μάλιστα Λακεδαιμόνιοι. ἤκιστα δὲ Κορίνθιοι ὄντοι τοὺς χειροτέχνας.

[Herodotos 2.1671-2]

I could not say for certain whether the Greeks got their ideas about trade, like so much else, from Egypt or not; the feeling is common enough, and I have observed that Thracians, Scythians, Persians, Lydians - indeed, almost all foreigners - reckon craftsmen and their descendants as lower in the social scale than people who have no connexion with manual work: only the latter, and especially those who are trained for war, do they count amongst the 'nobility'. All the Greeks have adopted this attitude, especially the Spartans; the feeling against handicraft is least strong in Corinth. [trans. de Séliecourt]

Xenophon provides an example of this view:

καὶ γὰρ αἱ γε βαναυσικαὶ καλομέναι καὶ εἰπίρημοι εἰσὶ καὶ εἰκότως μέντοι πανω ὀδοξούνται πρὸς τῶν πόλεων, καταλυμαίνονται γὰρ τὰ σῶματα τῶν τε ἡραξειμένων καὶ τῶν ἐπιμελεμένων, ἀναγκαζόμεθα καθήσαται καὶ σκιατραφεῖσθαι, ἐνοι δὲ καὶ πρὸς πῦρ ἡμερεῖν τῶν δὲ σωμάτων θηλυκομένων καὶ αἱ ψυχαὶ πολὺ ἄρυσσότεραι γίγνονται. καὶ ἀσχολίας δὲ μάλιστα ἔχουσι καὶ φίλων καὶ πόλεως συνεπιμελεῖσθαι αἱ βαναυσικαὶ καλομέναι.

[Xenophon Economics 4.2-3]

The illiberal arts, as they are called, are spoken against, and are, naturally enough, held in utter disdain in our states. For they spoil the bodies of the workmen and the foremen, forcing them to sit still and live indoors, and in some cases to spend the day at the fire. The softening of the body involves a serious weakening of the mind. [3] Moreover, these so-called illiberal arts leave no spare time for attention to one's friends and city. [trans. Marchant]

Ranking lower on the social or economic scale however, did not equate to being intellectually inferior or incapable of educating. This is illustrated by Plato when his Socrates takes a young slave, who is numerically literate, through a series of geometrical observations in order to arrive at a correct answer. Though the philosophical theory expounded by Socrates is that reasoning is remembrance of knowledge inherent at birth, there is no hesitation that the uneducated slave cannot forge neural pathways on demand:

φύλαττε δὲ ἀν ποὺ ἐύρης με διδάσκοντα καὶ διείξοντα αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὰς τοῦτον δόξας ανερμώτων. ... ἐστιν ἢντινα δοξαίν ωνα ἀυτού ὁτος ἀπερίναστο; εὖκ, ἀλλ᾽ ἕαυτο. καὶ μὴν ωκ ἤδει γε, ὃς ἐφαμέν ὀλίγων πρότερον. ... τω ωκ εἰδότι ἄρα περὶ ὅν ἔνδει ἢνεις ἀληθεὶς δοξαὶ περὶ τούτων ων οὐκ οίδε;... καὶ υἱὸν μὲν γε αὐτού ὁπερ ἀρτι ἀνακεινόμεθα αἱ δοξαὶ αὐτα; εἰ δὲ αὐτὸν τις ανέρμωται συνάεξειν τὰ αὐτὸ ταύτα καὶ πολλαχι, οἴσθ᾽ ὅτι τελευτῶν ὑπονοῖς ἢτον ακριβῶς ἐπιστήμης περὶ τούτων. ... οὐκούν ὑπονοῖς διδαξάντος ἀλλ᾽ ἐροτοῦσαν ἐπιστήμην, ἀναλαβὼν αὐτοῦ εὐ αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐπιστήμην; [Plato Meno 84d-85d]

201 Aesch. Against Timarchus 1.101-102.
202 Cf. chapter VIII.5.
See whether it seems to you that he is learning from me or simply being reminded ... Has he answered with any opinions that were not his own? No, they were all his. Yet he did not know, as we agreed a few minutes ago. ... So a man who does not know has in himself true opinions on a subject without having knowledge ... At present these opinions, being newly aroused, have a dream-like quality. But if the same questions are put to him on many occasions and in different ways, you can see that in the end he will have a knowledge on the subject as accurate as anybody’s. ... This knowledge will not come from teaching but from questioning. He will recover it for himself. [trans. Lamb]

This ambivalence towards technical trades was merely, as Herodotos says, a class bias and belies the reality that there was always social mobility within Athenian society and trades occupations, including technically and intellectually challenging ones, did not prevent the accumulation of wealth or political influence. In the dialectic on the relationship between tyranny and citizenship, Χένωφον puts the following words into the mouth of the poet Σίμωνιδες:

διαλεγόμενοι τε ἀγαλλόμεθα τοῖς προτετιμήμενοις μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς ἐκ τοῦ ίσου ἰμίν οὐσί. ... ὥστε γὰρ τὸ τετιμηθαί μάλιστα συνεπικομεῖ, ὥστε τὰ μὲν δυσχερὴ ἀφανίζειν, τὰ δὲ καλὰ λαμπρότερα ἀναφαίνειν. [Xenophon Hiero 8.5-7]

We take more pride in the conversation of those who rank above us than in that of our equals. ... For high rank in itself is a most striking embellishment to the person: it casts a shade over anything repulsive in him and shows up his best features in a high light. [trans. Marchant]

While the dialogue expounds Χένωφον’s oligarchic philosophy it also reflects the fluidity of the society in which Σίμωνιδες lived; born aristos, he was happy to cultivate the patronage the Athenian Pisistratidae and Syracusian tyrannies as well as the friendship of Themistocles; all men with self-made power.

εἰστὶ δὲ πάση γῆ τὸ βέλτιστον ἐναντίον τῆς δημοκρατίας ... δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι ... ὅτι τῶν χεριῶν αἰροῦνται ἐν ταῖς πόλεις ταῖς στασιαζοῦσαις.

[P-Xen. Athenaion Politeia 1.5, 3.10]

Everywhere on earth, the best element is opposed to democracy ... Athenians prefer lower classes in other cities [trans. Marchant]

The attitude to class is clear from the comedies of Aristophanes, where audiences were entertained with jokes satirising the origins of those successfully involved in trade or crafts as soon as they achieved any social or political prominence. For example, Euripides wears the epithet ‘the cabbage-woman’s son’, Cleophon is another rustic, Cleon is an aggressive ‘whale-like monster’ who ‘stinks like his tanners yard’, Hyperbolos has a money-lender mother. The most often quoted lampoons are Aristophanes’ attacks on

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203 Xenophon’s general political view also reflects the acceptance of social fluidity in that a tyranny or oligarchy can be exercised by anyone with merit and the consensus of the people, regardless of birth: ‘Government of unwilling subjects and not controlled by laws, but imposed by the will of the ruler, is despotism’ [Memorabilia 4.6.2]; ‘Despotic rule over unwilling subjects the gods give, I fancy to those whom they judge worthy to live the life of Tantalus, of whom it is said that in hell he spends eternity dreading a second death’. [Economics 21.12, trans. Loeb].
204 Xen. Hiero 1.2; Hdt. 5.102.1, 7.228.3-4; Thuc. 1.138, 1.74; Plut. Themistocles 1-2. Cf. chapter VIII.3.5; appendix 2.4.
205 Thesmophoriazusae 385-390. Cf. ‘I know you by the green stuff you’re carrying’ [Thesmophoriazusae 910]; ‘just like your mother’ [Acharnians 456-458]; ‘a person of your rustic ancestry’ [Frogs 840-843].
206 Frogs 1532-1533.
207 Wasps 35-40, 1031; cf. 1284-1289; Clouds 585-589.
208 Clouds 551-552; Thesmophoriazusae 840-843.
demagogues, however throughout his surviving works he really spares no sector of the population except 'the demos' (probably because there was a law against slagging the political system itself\(^{209}\)). Aristophanes is even handed in his satire; tradesmen, farmers (landed and otherwise), politicians of all colours, poets, and thinkers: his lampoons are not evidence for his support of any aristocratic or other minority elite. A few more examples; while the plot of *Knights* is an indictment of Cleon's political thuggery, in *The Acharnians* Cleon is victim to certain knights who use the same questionable tactics and methods against him.\(^{210}\) In *Wasps* he makes Procleon a despot but gives the baking-woman, Mytia, an interesting dignity.\(^{211}\) There are jokes about *pinein kai binein* aristocrats: Lysistratus is a masochistic practical joker;\(^{212}\) Callias a spendthrift womaniser;\(^{213}\) Pericles is guilty of 'creative accounting' and nepotism;\(^{214}\) Alcibiades is effeminate (*kinaidos*) and impudent to Thucydides, a revered aristocrat.\(^{215}\) Aristophanes freely poked fun at sexual deviants,\(^{216}\) gluttons\(^{217}\) and drunkards of all ranks,\(^{218}\) brothel keeping,\(^{219}\) conservatism\(^{220}\) and eccentricity.\(^{221}\) There are also jokes at the expense of his fellow poets who come from all ranks.\(^{222}\) To judge from Aristophanes, the social mobility of Athenians was more accepted and class rather less fixated, than is maintained. Pericles' speech in Thucydides' reflects this as well:

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μέτεστι δὲ κατὰ μέν τους νόμους πρὸς τὰ ἱδια διάφορα πάσι τὸ ἵσον, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἀξίωσιν, ὡς ἔκαστος ἐν τῷ εὐδοκιμεῖ, οὐκ ἀπὸ μέρους τὸ πλῆθος ἐς τὰ κοινὰ ἡ ἀρέτης προτιμάται, οὐδ’ αὐτὶ κατὰ πενίαν, ἔχων γε τὶ ἀγαθὸν δράσαι τὴν πόλιν, ἀξιωμάτος ἄφανει κεκώλυται. ἐλευθέρως δὲ τὰ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν πολιτεύουμεν καὶ ἐς τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους … ἀνεπαρχόμεν δὲ τὰ ἱδια προσφορώμεντες τὰ δημοσία διὰ δέος μᾶλιστα ὡς παρανομοῦμεν, τῶν τε αἰεὶ ἐν ἀρχῇ ὑπόθεν ἀκροσείς καὶ τῶν νόμων. [Thuc. 2.37.1-3]
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When it is a question of settling private disputes, everyone is equal before the law; when it is a question of putting one person before another in positions of public responsibility, what counts is not membership of a particular class, but the actual ability which the man possesses. No one, so long as he has it in him to be of service to the state, is kept in political obscurity because of poverty. And, just as our political life is free and open, so is our day-to-day life in our relations with each other. ... We are free and tolerant in our private lives; but in public affairs we keep to the law. This is because it commands our deep respect. [trans. Warner]

\(^{209}\) P-Xen. *Athenaion Politeia* 2.18.

\(^{210}\) *Acharnians* 5-8, 300-301.

\(^{211}\) *Wasps* 1396-1412.

\(^{212}\) *Acharnians* 854-856; also *Knights* 1265-1274; *Wasps* 787-793.

\(^{213}\) *Frogs* 432-434.

\(^{214}\) Pericles' creative accounting [Aristoph. *Clouds* 859]; his nepotism [*Acharnians* 515-528].

\(^{215}\) Alcibiades [Acharnians 716-718; *Frogs* 1420-1430]; Thucydides [Wasps 946-947 *Acharnians* 708-718].

\(^{216}\) Aristophanes freely poked fun at sexual deviants,\(^{216}\) gluttons\(^{217}\) and drunkards of all ranks,\(^{218}\) brothel keeping,\(^{219}\) conservatism\(^{220}\) and eccentricity.\(^{221}\) There are also jokes at the expense of his fellow poets who come from all ranks.\(^{222}\) To judge from Aristophanes, the social mobility of Athenians was more accepted and class rather less fixated, than is maintained. Pericles' speech in Thucydides' reflects this as well:

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\(^{216}\) *Acharnians* 854-856; also *Knights* 1265-1274; *Peace* 884-886, *Ecclessiazusae* 125-129]; Cleisthenes [Clouds 355, *Frogs* 422-424]; Philoxenos [Clouds 684-688; Alcibiades: *Acharnians* 716]; Prepis [Acharnians 842-843].

\(^{217}\) Cleonymus [Acharnians 843].

\(^{218}\) Archedemus [Frogs 588]; Cleigenes [Frogs 708-710].

\(^{219}\) Orsilochos [*Lysistrata* 724-728].

\(^{220}\) Old soldiers' (*Acharnians* 1-18).

\(^{221}\) Timon the hermit [*Lysistrata* 809-821]; a dueling sculptor Bupalos & satirist Hipponax [*Lysistrata* 360264]; starving sculptor Pauson [*Acharnians* 854, *Thesmophoriazusae* 949; *Plutus* 601-604].

Likewise Euripides dignifies the rustic farmer in his *Electra*, while Plato and Aristotle do not equate agrarian management or the technical aspects of farming with other trades; the bias was around the degree of wealth generated by the landholding. It highlights Athenian attitudes to class and occupation; the greatest social sin was poor wealth management and a failure to fulfil private and public financial commitments. The importance placed on technical education can be judged by Solon’s legislation that put the onus on a father to have his son taught a trade or forfeit his legal right to be supported in his old age. Plutarch adds that Solon legislated to invest the trades with dignity (ταίς τέχναις ὀξέωμα περίθηκε). Though Plato and Aristotle focus on the elite, the Athenian system attempted to educate all young citizens in a sustainable occupation with training in letters, simple maths and the social skills of music and games. In this open society anyone with an elementary education could be successful and was. As with Aeschines and Timarchos social mobility moved both ways; up or down. In *Clouds* as well, the laughs revolve around the comparison of the citified Pheidippides and the unsophisticated manners of Strepsiades, his 'hands-on' farmer father, who nevertheless, was of sufficient social standing to have married a woman born to one of the city’s oldest Eupatriadae families. Likewise, Cleon’s family-owned tannery was a profitable business which would have used *metics* and slaves to do the unpleasant work of processing hides. Families in such businesses would have taken a mangement role and achieved economic success before their children were educated to a literacy level beyond vocational competency. Other examples are Themistokles whose father, Neocles, was undistinguished and Aristides whose father ‘according to some accounts’ lived in extreme poverty. Both men became spectacularly wealthy and powerful. Eupatriadae powers were diluted by the newly educated population engaged in trade and commerce and also by the plague that hit Athens in 430. It killed approximately thirty percent of the population and Thucydides observed that there was a destabilising shift in the property ranks:

> ἀγχιστροφον τὴν μεταβολὴν ὀρῶντες τῶν τε εὐδαιμόνων καὶ αἰνινδιῶς θησακότων καὶ τῶν οὐδὲν πρῶτον κεκτημένων, ἐσθης δὲ τὸκείμενα ἐξονταν.  
> [Thuc. 2.53.1]

How quick and abrupt were the changes of fortune which came to the rich who suddenly died and to those who had previously been penniless but now inherited their wealth. [trans. Warner]

Success in Athenian society was equated with political influence over competitive compatriots and their *phratries*. The close phratry ties, the religious cohesion, and the expected political participation of the entire [male] citizenry meant therefore that there was a particularly utilitarian requirement for reading and writing skills and physical fitness.

Beck considers that simply growing up in Athens’ socially mobile society was in itself educative:

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223 Eurip. *Electra* 36-47: Well, I belong to a good family; I’ve nothing to be ashamed of there - we’re good Mycenaeans, And always have been; but we’re poor; and when you’re poor, good breeding counts for nothing; ... She is a virgin still. Her father was a king; I’m not her quality; therefore I’d be ashamed to take advantage of her [trans. Vellacott]. Cf. *Electra* 261.


225 Rustic manners: ... So I went to bed that night sleeping as usual of bad wine, drying-racks, fleeces, profits, that kind of thing [Aristoph. *Clouds* 43-51]; farting at dinner [ibid 408-411]. Conservative manners: I first requested my son to take his lyre and sing something by Simonides. ... And right away he said it was old-fashioned to play the lyre and sing whilst people are drinking - as if he was a woman grinding barley. [ibid. 1355-1358]. ‘Hands-on’ farmers marry into wealthy old families such as the Alcaenon: I was happy with my bees and my sheep and my olives. Then I married this city girl, the niece of Megacles, very classy. [ibid. 46-50]. The social structure of Athens is discussed in appendix 2.


229 Cited and discussed further in chapter VIII.5.

230 Cf. appendix 2.2.3.
The youth of the late fifth and early fourth century Athens ... could hardly escape from the educational experience of living in Athenian society, and being exposed to its culture. The drama, art, architecture, must all have left their mark on him, no less than the cultivated atmosphere of the symposia with its song, fellowship and moral poetry.  

Xenophon describes such an experience for the young victor of a pancratium at the house of Callias in the Piraeus. He sits while adults recline but he still experiences the conversations and entertainments. Freeman suggests that 'such a dignity was rarely accorded to an Athenian boy ... [and] ... stricter parents, knowing the dangers which surrounded their sons, tried to keep them entirely from any knowledge or experience of the world'. Appendix 5 addresses scholastic coyness, ambiguity and problems in deciphering the part of sexuality in paidēa while chapter IV.3 looks at the traditions and protocol of symposia. There is however an unmistakeable ambiguity in the figure of the youth. At the beginning of the dialogue his physical beauty is both idealised and imbued with sexual power; in the middle of the dialogue he shyly cuddles up against his father exemplifying the naiveté of youth, whilst at the end, Xenophon implies the youth is aware of the power of his sexual attractiveness to influence his older admirer to enter public affairs.

Freeman suggests the phratries provided free education for citizen boys in 'dancing and perhaps other subjects'. As evidence he cites the tracts from Aristophanes and Xenophon detailed below; both of which tend to reinforce the impression that the emphasis was not on letters but singing, music and rhythmic physical movement. Pritchard, however, in dealing with the question of training for the dithyrambic dances for the Panathenaeae, suggests such training ran concurrently with other classes and was restricted to the higher property ranks because poor citizens could not have afforded the required extra music lessons. He notes also that families on restricted budgets concentrated on tuition for literacy, giving up music and gymnastics in favour of grammata as the most useful education for future participation in business and politics. He details cultural impediments, logistics and demographics which would have tended to stack the choruses with Athenian elite. There were though other festivals, including the rural Dionysia and local cultic festivities, at which a wider representation of the property ranks likely took part, simply because religious involvement was so deeply ingrained into the Athenian psyche. There is an element of local organisation in both tracts:

εἶτα βαδίζειν ἐν ταῖσιν ὁδοῖς ἐυτάκτως ἐς κιβαριστὸ τοὺς κωμῆτας γυμνούς ἀθρόους. [Aristophanes Clouds 964]

All the boys of the district were expected to walk, naked and in a group, through the streets to their music-master's house. [trans. Sommerstein]

ἐν ταῖς χορηγίαις αὐτοὶ καὶ γυμνασιαρχίαις καὶ τριπαρχίαις ... δὲ ὁ δήμος ... ἂξιοὶ γούσιν ἀργύριοι λαμβάνειν ὁ δήμος καὶ ὄδων καὶ τρέχων καὶ ὁρχομένων καὶ πλέων ἐν ταῖς ναυσίν. [P-Xen. Athenaión Politeía 1.13]
For the staging of dramatic and choral festivals, the superintending of the gymasia and choral festivals, the superintending of the gymasia and the games and the provision of triremes ...[it is] the common people for whom such things are arranged ... they think it right to receive pay for singing, running and dancing, and for sailing in the fleet. [trans. Marchant]

Furthermore, Athens had a song-culture as entrenched as anywhere else in Hellas. And even though festival dancing was not particularly institutionalised and allowed the choregos who paid for it personal management over whom would participate, it took place at the grassroots phratry level reinforcing the collective corporeality as well as the psychology associated with community by synchronous words and movement.\(^{239}\) Plato recognised its value and advocated rythmic movement as an essential part of education.\(^{240}\) To play a musical instrument; to dance in time to rhythm and to attain a degree of physical fitness and hand-eye co-ordination laid the foundations for further ephebic education intended to develop the adequate physical endurance and combat skills necessary for both infantry and marine service. In Athens it was not envisaged that education should interfere with the status quo. For the majority a rule-of-thumb approach to education was the norm. Like Socrates’ comments on the degree of mathematical or cosmological knowledge (quoted earlier) literacy was only meant to go so far.

### 3.4 SUMMARY OF ELEMENTARY EDUCATION

General elementary education included behavioural, basic literacy, music and physical training with further vocational ‘in-house’ apprenticeship at various levels (some of which entailed further literacy and sophistic training). The emphasis was on utilitarian usefulness:

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\text{καὶ τὴν ἀκρίβειαν μὴ ὁμοίως ἐν ἀπασίν ἐπιζητεῖν, ἀλλ’ ἐν ἑκάστοις κατὰ τὴν ὑποκειμένην ὕλην καὶ ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἕφ’ ὅσον οἰκεῖον τῇ μεθόδῳ, καὶ γὰρ τέκτων καὶ γεωμέτρης διαφέροντος ἐπιζητοῦσι τὴν ὀρθήν’ ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐφ’ ὅσον χρησίμως πρὸς τὸ ἔργον, ὡδ’ τι ἑστίν ἢ ποίον τι, θετήσῃς γὰρ ταλήσεις τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ποιητέοι. [Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 1.7:1098a27-33]
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We must not look] for the same exactness in all we study or labour at, but only as much as the subject-matter in each case allows, or is appropriate to the particular method followed by the student or workman. For example the carpenter and the geometrician alike try to find the right angle, but they do it in different ways, the carpenter being content with such precision as satisfies the requirements of his job, the geometrician as a student of scientific truth seeking to discover the nature and attributes of the right angle. [trans. Thomson]

Young Athenian men were were set free from padagagoi and schoolmasters as soon as they became meirakia, at about fourteen or fifteen.\(^{241}\) This was likely the time many joined the family business whether it was mercantile, agrarian or the crafts. For the majority any formal education in literacy probably finished at this point. In the gap between fourteen and the time meirakia entered the two year ephebic training at eighteen, they were free to study further. Plato also implies that there was extra tuition outside the ephebic training period available in military-style fitness and weapons training which could have occupied


some meirakia. Some meirakia received further training by sophists and Plato opens the Protagoras with such a teenager keen to further his studies and, in Lysis, the young meirakion states he knows not only Homer, but the works of Empedocles (who wrote in metre) and Democritus (who wrote in prose). This implies young men like Lysis were taught to read prose; it could however have been Democritus’ mathematical works that exercised Lysis rather than reading his prose treatises on ethics, physics; one of which was a work on metre and therefore likely in metre.

3.5 EPHEBIC EDUCATION

Ephebic training was compulsory for all male citizens. It was highly group-centred and aimed at sublimating the individuality. It provided triggers for cultivating group mentality via poetry and music and physical endurance. It was the final period of education for the majority.

The ephebic part of education was predominantly physical with no reading or writing involved. It was compulsory military training for male Athenian citizens from the rank of zeugitai upwards. This factor is often glossed over; Pericles, Socrates, Aristophanes and Euripides were epheboi alongside the prosperous potters, sausage makers and brothel owners. Some epheboi needed, and were probably ear-marked, to learn to lead whilst others were trained to follow, nevertheless the unity of the collective was the imperative. Its importance to Athens can be gauged by a fact noted by Hanson:

More Greeks died fighting alongside or against Athenian democrats than in all the other wars of the Greek city-states put together.

It was recognised that courage (andreia) for battle could be taught and an institutionalised basic military training for epheboi was in operation by at least the late fifth century, although it was probably instituted earlier as there is evidence the practice was in place in other parts of Greece prior to the fifth century. Exactly what was taught is unclear. For example, Wheeler suggests hoplomachoi taught fencing, while Anderson considers there is no evidence for any sword-drill at all. Plato lists the varieties of arms

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242 Pl. Laches 183a-b. Cf. the sophists Euthydemos and Dionysodorus were specialists in armoured fighting and were therefore likely to offer training in this fighting technique [Euthydemos 271d, 273e].

243 Pl., Protagoras 310b-d; Lysis 215a-c where they discuss Ioniian phenomenology.

244 Democritus probably also wrote in metre because he wrote treatises on metre [cf. Diog. Laert. 8.77].

245 Plato [Laws 829] discusses how a minority ought to compose speeches commending or criticising military performance in ‘war-games’ stating that the speechmakers must be at least fifty years old: therefore, the age and the potentiality of the ‘ought’ suggests it was not then a practice. He also notes the speeches are to be in metre and not prose.


247 Class bias clouds the fact that these people were necessary for the defence of the polis.


and field training. Aristotle however provides a reasonably comprehensive description of how Athenian epheboi trained:

When they are eighteen years old [and] ... the Ephebes have been approved, their fathers meet by tribes and choose under oath three members of the tribe over forty years old whom they consider best and most suitable to take charge of the Ephebes, and from them the people elect one from each tribe as guardian, and they elect a controller from the rest of the citizen body for all of them. These men take the Ephebes, and after visiting the temples they go to the Peiraeus and take up guard duties, some at Munichia and others at Akte. The people also elect two trainers for them, and two men to teach them to fight in armour, and to use the bow, the javelin and the catapult. ... They live together by tribes, and ... this is how they spend the first year of their training. At the beginning of the second, at a meeting of the ekklesia ... they demonstrate to the people their knowledge of warfare, and receive a shield and spear from the city. For the year thereafter they patrol the countryside and man the guard posts. ... After this two years, they join the main citizen body. [trans. Rhodes]

Then there is also evidence that they received drill. There are many instances where Athenian hoplites attempted (not always successfully) synchronised movement of spears and manoeuvres indicating that they were drilled. While Xenophon defined the nature of hoplite fighting as instinctive and emotional (προθυμίας) rather than an acquired skill, he provides his own historical examples of hoplite masses carrying out synchronised tactical movements. Perhaps, like other contemporaries, he was alluding to a psychological aspect of military training that involves operant conditioning accomplished through drill.

252 Pl. Laws 7.813d-e: γυμνάσια γάρ τίθεμεν καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον ἁπαντὰ τοῖς σώμαις διαπονύματα τοξῆς τε καὶ πᾶσις ρίψεως καὶ πελταστικῆς καὶ πᾶσις ὀπλομαχίας καὶ διεξόδων τακτικῶν τε καὶ ἀπενεργών στρατευόμενων καὶ στρατηγεύμενων καὶ ὃσα εἰς ἱππική μαθήματα συντείνει. [We are establishing gymnasia and all physical exercises connected with military training,—the use of the bow and all kinds of missiles, light skirmishing and heavy-armed fighting of every description, [813e] tactical evolutions, company-marching, camp-formations, and all the details of cavalry training. (trans. Bury)]. Cf. 8.830b where he mentions boxing training.


254 Xen. Cyr. 2.3.8-11; cf. 2.2.6-9, 2.3.21-24.


For example, Xenophon's military mentor, Kyros, placed great value on the psychological elements of training and drill to develop obedience and mental preparedness for war (θητεία δὲ τὰς ψυχὰς εἰς τὰ πολεμικά). Robert Graves echoes this when he observed the same phenomenon that parade drill during WWI had remarkable effects in battle:

Arms-drill ... is beautiful, especially when the company feels itself as a single being, and each movement is not a synchronised movement of every man together, but the single movement of one large creature. ... Those that were good at drill ... fought by far the best.

Drill in Athens probably involved the same system of psychological focussing as was practised in Hellenic and other Eastern cults, and by many later armies. The ancient literature hints at this. For instance, Plato considered collective psychology the most important weapon in war:

τὸ χωρίς τι τῶν ἄλλων πράττειν διδάξαι τὴν ψυχήν ἔθει μῆτε γιγνώσκειν μῆτε εἰπίστασθαι τὸ παράπαν, ἀλλ’ ἀδρόν ἰεὶ καὶ ἀμα καὶ κοίνον τοῦ βίου ὧτι μάλιστα πασὶ πάντων γίγνεσθαι – τούτου γὰρ οὔτ’ ἕστιν οὔτε ποτὲ μὴ γενήται κρέιττον οὔτε ἀμείνοι οὔτε τεχνικῶτερον εἰς σωτηρίαν τὴν κατὰ πόλεμον καὶ νίκην. [Plato Laws 12.942c]

[In military service] we must condition ourselves to an instinctive rejection of the very notion of doing anything without companions; we must live a life in which we never do anything, if possible except by combined and united action as members of a group. No better or more powerful or efficient weapon exists for ensuring safety and final victory in war. [trans. Saunders]

Likewise, Thucydides notes that 'the best and safest thing of all is when a large force is so well disciplined that it seems to be acting like one man.' Ritual movements, once learned become intuitive, non-conscious actions - like riding a bike, driving a car or playing the piano. In battle, Graves' modern troops were not actually performing the drill learned on the parade ground, but they had been pre-conditioned to respond in a desired way. They were automatically making the correct moves and responses to the battle situation without consciously being aware of every mental and physical process that was going into it. Most Athenian epheboi probably did not receive anywhere near the level of drill visited upon Graves' troops. However, because their elementary education and tribal cultural activities had focussed on learning music and metre (mousike), through the ritualistic use of melody, metre and repetitive movement, the training they did receive would likely have been sufficient to produce the same receptivity to the psychology of the collective as Graves had observed in his troops. As with all armies, training physically and psychologically develops confidence in the individual and the group as a collective. Ephebic training was highly group-centred and aimed at subliminating individual initiative. As well as physical co-ordination many triggers for cultivating cohesive group mentality were employed. For example, the ritual performances of dances-in-arms. Though Anderson and Wheeler consider the military value of armed dances to be limited, there are indications that the Athenians in the fifth and fourth centuries considered dancing played a significant part in developing military competency. Homer mentions dancing warriors and Socrates is his own first hand WWI experience drilling troops and observations of their predictable and improved behaviour under battle conditions.

256 Xen. Cyrrus 2.1.20, 1.22, 3.19.
257 Robert Graves, op. cit., p. 165.
258 Thucydides 2.11.9: κάλλιστον γὰρ τὸ δὴ καὶ ἀσφαλέστατον, πολλοὶ ὄντας ἐνί κόσμῳ χρώμενος φαίνεσθαι.
260 As is noted in chapter II.6 military innovation usually met with censure or indictment.
reported to have said that the best dancers made the best warriors. That Plato argued the 262 pros and cons of the value of military dance exhibitions indicates that some of his contemporaries valued them. 263 The ritual Pyrrhic dance was practised in Athens and elsewhere, and a lekythos in the Walters Art Gallery, Baltimore, shows hoplites dancing to the accompaniment of a salpinx. 264 Whether dancing was part of ongoing training, or just something learned during ephetic training, it seems to be instance where music and ritual movement were used to create a conditioned response, which in this case, would have aided the synchronised movement of the phalanx in battle as it made its advance.

As it is possible to identify elements of the process of attaining dissociative states in pre-battle behaviour, it seems probable that many, if not a majority, of hoplites went into action, not necessarily in a trance state, but largely unaccompanied by any developed sense of self. For example, in the religious and sacrificial duties of the strategos, the ritual pre-battle purification of the soldiers, the spagia and the war cry, awareness and rational concern for individual safety were lulled. 265 Also, the metre and melody of the paian, the flute (ulos) and the trumpet (salpinge) were important psychological triggers that helped to induce a pre-conditioned trance-like response in the hoplite. 266 Plutarch notes the close relationship between music, singing and rhythmic movement and military action in Spartan society:

"Ολως δέ ἂν τις ἐπιστήμης τοὺς Ακακωικοῖς ποιήμασιν, ὡν ἔτι καθ' ἡμᾶς ἐνα διασαζότα, καὶ τοὺς ἐμβατηρίους ρυθμοὺς ἀναλαβών, οἵς ἐχρύμοντο πρὸς τὸν ἄνευ ἐπάγωντες τοῖς πολεμίοις, οὐ κακῶς ἠγάπησαν καὶ τὸν Τέρπανδρον καὶ τὸν Πλατανὸν τὴν ἀνδρείαν τῇ μουσικῇ συνάπτειν. ... Μουσικώτατος γὰρ ἀμα καὶ πολεμικώτατος ἀποφαινοντι ἀυτοὺς: [Plutarch Lycurgus 21.3-4]

Anyone who has studied Spartan poetry and has examined the marching rhythms which they used to an accompaniment of pipes when advancing upon the enemy, would not think both Terpander and Pindar wrong to connect bravery and music ... The two poets portray the Spartans as being at one and the same time the most musical and the most warlike of people. [trans. Perrin]

The repetition of sounds as well as movements also work upon conditioned responses. The onomatopoëic ἐλελεῦ ἐλελεῦ ἐλελεῦ of the war cry and, possibly, the beating of spear upon shield could thus also be seen as further operant cues that evolved to initiate a desired conditioned response (which was the resolve to stay in the collective mass and advance). 267 Likewise the use of drugs to sublimate personal concerns and enhance the rhythm and movement. Throughout history drugs, ritual and music have produced such psychological effects in the military context, though it is not suggested that any of these cues were

262 Iliad 7.2.38-41, 16.617-18; Athenaeus 14.628f.
263 Pl. Laches 179e-84c; cf. Euthydemus 271b-73c; cf. Laws 12.942d.
264 The salpinx was the instrument that signalled the advance into action: Xen. Cyras 2.3.17-20; Pl. Laws 7.796b-c; Eurip. Andromache 1129-41; Athenaeus 4.631a; Plut. Lycurgus 21.3-4, Moralia 238b. Cf. P. Krentz, 'The Salpinx in Greek Warfare' in Hanson, (ed.), Hoplites: The Classical Greek Battle Experience, p. 119n.11.
265 War cry: e.g., Xen. Anabasis 1.8.18; 4.2.12; Agesilaus 2.10; Hellenica 4.3.17 Arrian 364. Spagia: e.g., Herodotus 6.112.6, 9.41.4, 45.2, 61, 62; Thucydides 6.69; 3.4.23; Xen. Anabasis 1.8.15, Constitution of the Lacedaemonians 2.1.13.8.
266 Trance-like response: Thucydides 5.69-70; cf. Aeschylus Seven Against Thebes 270; Persians 389; Xen. Cyras 3.3.58; Plut. Lycurgus 22.2-3. Paian: Thucydides 1.50.5, 4.43.3, 96.1, 5.70, 7.44.6, 83.4; Xen. Hellenica 4.2.17, Anabasis 1.8.17, 10.10, 4.2.19, 3.19, 29, 31, 8.16, 5.2.14, 6.5.27; Aeschylus Seven Against Thebes 268, Persians 393; Plut. Moralia 238b, Lycurgus 22.2-3. Aristotle [Rhetoric 1408a] notes the salpinx could play harmonically, '[it was] melody without the lyre'; cf. Krentz, 'The Salpinx in Greek Warfare' op. cit., pp. 110-120. Cf. Hanson [The Western Way of War: Infantry Battle in Classical Greece, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1990, p. 100] who sees the paian’s function as the reverse of this, he recognises that, in the period before the advance, there was a marked change in the psychological state of the hoplite: 'it may have been in order to dispel that hypnotic trance-like state that armies institutionalized the paian.' that prepared each hoplite for engagement.
267 Cf. Xen. Anabasis 4.5.18.
consciously applied by some ephic controller or strategos during basic training. More likely training practices and pre-battle reinforcements merely evolved through the ritualisation that permeated other aspects of the culture.

Ephebi also participated in the military components in the calendar of religious festivals. Psychologically this would have reinforced the validity of hoplite credentials and justified killing, or being killed, on the battlefield. Athenian religion sanctified death and justified killing, or being killed, on the battlefield. 


Festivals (including annual ceremonies at Marathon and Plataia), funeral games, thank offerings, memorials, honour-lists of war dead and epitaphs. Trophies and spoils of past battles adorned the temples at Delphi. Cf. Pritchett [The Greek State at War, Vol. 3, pp. 246-
blood letting outside the confines of the polis. That there were no purification ceremonies after the battle suggests a guiltless view of killing on the battlefield.\textsuperscript{271} As religious acknowledgment was a mainstay of psychological commitment to the hoplite ethos, ephebic training was heavily imbued with religious overtones. Likewise, the Athenian ephebic oath, was made in the name of archaic military and agricultural deities. With this oath the ephebos pledged his political identification with and responsibility to the state; his personal commitment to comrades; the righteousness of killing recognised in the sanctity of his weapons.\textsuperscript{272} Many complex cultural ideologies were working within this oath reinforcing religious and tribal affiliations:

\begin{quote}
'Ορκος ἐφήβων πάτριος ὕπατος ὑπὸ ὅμων ἔδει τὸ ἱερά ὑπὸ ὅμων. (I) Οὐκ ἀσίχυνω τὰ ἱερὰ ὑπὸ τὸν παραστάτην ὅπου ἐν τοῖς στοιχ极端. (III) ἀμιλω δὲ καὶ ὑπὲρ ἱερῶν καὶ ὅσιῶν (IV) καὶ ὡς ἐλάττων παραδώσα τὴν πατρίδα, πλείω δὲ καὶ αὐτίκα κατὰ τὸ ἱερὸν καὶ μετὰ ἀμαντῶν. (V) καὶ εὐχάριστος τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν θεμίστων ἀμπέλαν ὑπὸ ὅμων ἢ τὸ λόγον ἰδρυσάμαντες ἐμφάνονται. (VI) ἐὰν δὲ τὸ ἄναρρες, οὐκ ἐπιτρέπεσκατὰ τὸ ἱερὸν καὶ μετὰ τὰτὼν. (VII) καὶ τιμήσω ἱερὰ τὰ πάτρια. [Tod, \textit{GH}².204]
\end{quote}

(I) I will not disgrace these sacred arms (II) and I will not desert the comrade beside me wherever I shall be stationed in a battle line. (III) I will defend our sacred and public institutions (IV) and I will not hand over (to the descendants) the fatherland smaller, but greater and better, so far as I am able, by myself or with the help of all. (V) I will obey those who for the time being exercise sway reasonably and the established laws and those which they will establish reasonably in the future, (VI) if anyone seek to destroy them, I will not admit it so far as I am able, by myself or with the help of all. (VII) I will honour the traditional sacred institutions. [trans. Siewert]

The success of hoplite battle was co-ordinated cohesion and this was the aim of ephebic education. Hanson notes, for epheboi, 'hoplite battle was always one of emulation, of a shared experience of killing with an older generation, rather than a wild initiation rite among youthful peers'.\textsuperscript{273} In Athens, tribal (φυλαὶ, φρατρία) fought together - fathers, sons, brothers, cousins, tribal friends.\textsuperscript{274} Connor notes the recruiting system under the ten ἐπονομαὶ (Erekhtheis, Aigeis, Pandionis, Leontis, Akamantis, Oineis, Kekropis, Hippothontis, Anaitis, Antiochis) created 'a network of protecting heroes'.\textsuperscript{275} Though these were not clan-based, they would still have reinforced a comforting sense of generational continuum and strong identification with the regiment.

For the hippeis, the period between school and ephebic training could have been spend in developing horsemanship. Xenophon mentions that further training was practised for the cavalry:

\begin{quote}
47] for a list of military festivals. Xenophon [\textit{Cavalry Commander} 4.7, 3.1] also mentions epheboi participating in reviews at the academy in the Lycedra.\textsuperscript{276} P. Siewert [\textit{The Ephebic Oath in Fifth-Century Athens}, \textit{Journal of Hellenic Studies}, Vol. 97, (1977), pp. 103, 109-111] argues for a pre-Solonic origin of the oath, noting the inclusions of Athens and Ares are later fourth century additions because the earliest inscription (334BC) from the deme of Akhanai was probably set up by the priests of the Ares and Athena Areia sanctuary there. Cf. Pritchett, op. cit., p. 160. It is interesting that Demosthenes [\textit{On the Crown} 18.260] mentions something crumbled and put into a liquid at a religious ceremony. The substance, ἐνθρυπτως, is translated as a cake however there is no reference that it is cake at all - it could very well be a drug, especially as the reference to the Orphic Sabazios.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{273} Hanson, \textit{The Western Way of War: Infantry Battle in Classical Greece}, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1990, p. 94. During the Peloponnesian war epheboi spent periods manning border camps throughout Attica and Thucydides and Xenophon both mention epheboi seeing action [Xen. \textit{Cavalry Commander} 4.7, 3.1].


The next business is to train the men. First they must learn to mount from the spring, since many before now have owed their lives to that. Secondly, they must practise riding over all sorts of ground, since any kind of country may become the area of war. As soon as they have acquired a firm seat, your next task is to take steps that as many as possible shall be able to throw the javelin when mounted and shall become efficient in all the details of horsemanship. 

[trans. Marchant]

He also confirms the existence of written mid fifth century (Periclean) training manuals for hippeis students, which implies that some military tuition involved reading:

There is already a treatise on horsemanship by Simon, who also dedicated the bronze horse in the Eleusinium at Athens and recorded his own feats in relief on the pedestal. [trans. Marchant]

To read/know these suggestions a few times is enough; but it is always necessary for the commander to hit on the right thing at the right time, to think of the present situation and to carry out what is expedient in view of it. To write out all that he ought to do is no more possible than to know everything that is going to happen. [trans. Marchant]

It is likely that after ephebic training most citizens simply went to their farms or pursued their vocations until they reached maturity when they would also be called upon to participate in the ekklesia and fulfil their duties in the various offices. In Athens it seems that after ephebic training fitness and weapons practise were generally left to the individual to maintain in the gymnasium. For example, Xenophon and Thucydides state that the Athenians did not have ongoing organised training. Xenophon and Plato both refer to the prevalence of unfit hoplites, while Isocrates notes that by his time hoplites had to be paid as an inducement to participate in military displays. Nevertheless, the psychological bonds formed with fellow ephebi during training would have been renewed during the annual religious and military observances (even if, later in the century, they had to be initially induced to participate). Ephebic training was a most important educational component in the indoctrination that strongly emphasised the collective.

276 Aristophanes [Knights 242] names a knight by the name of Simon. There was also a cobbler named Simon who wrote dialogues and conversed with Socrates [Diog. Laert. 2.13.122].
277 Diogenes Laertius [2.13.122] does not mention such a treatise.
278 J.K. Anderson [Military Theory and Practice in the Age of Xenophon, p. 95] notes the historical link between the gymnasium and hoplite warfare.
279 Xen. Memorabilia 3.12.5; Thucydides 2.39.1. However, as noted above, Plato [Laches 183a-b.] also implies that there was extra fitness and weapons tuition available outside the ephebic training period.
280 Xen. Hellenica 6.1.5; Memorabilia 3.5.15, 12.1-8, Lakaidamion Politea 2.10; Pl. Laws 830d, 831e, Republic 422b; Isocrates, Against the Areopagus 7.82; cf. Plut. Moralia 192c-d.
APPENDIX 4
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION IN HOMER

ATE, MENOS AND DAEMONS EXPLAIN A LACK OF LOCUS AND RESULTANT HALLUCINATIONS

In *Iliad* 2, after the mutinous disturbance on the beach where he averted the stressful crisis by assaulting Thersites, Odysseus returned to Agamemnon to argue in council. Athena stood beside him [II.2.278-279]. His argument, orchestrated by the goddess, came to Odysseus in muse-like inspiration. His oratory was not the Protagorean-style of *Iliad* 9 but relied on portents, omens and the augury of Calchas to decipher a future predetermined by divinity [II.2.284-332]. It seems a far cry from the Odysseus of *Iliad* 9 and Antenor's description of the cool-headed, steady-sceptred orator. Homer's consistent descriptions of how individual cognition and problem-solving was seen as emanating from external sources may be regarded as primary evidence for the absence of any pro and contra deliberation at some point in archaic times. This appendix summarises the underlying religious structure and concepts in Homer as well as the cognitive language of the poems where divine intervention was seen; was felt; was normal. The Hellenic pantheon defined most psychological parameters of how deliberation and persuasion was experienced or at least explained: ὃς γὰρ θεοφάτων ἵστοι (for thus it is the decree of the god) [II.8.477].

To begin with, human cognition was seen to be initiated by supernatural forces. Volition was initiated by daemons, Athenatoi or deities of the larger pantheon who could also imbue certain states of mind. One such state was menos; manifesting as anxiety or hyper-calm which enabled the recipient to accomplish actions outside normal parameters (super-human as well as sub-human). Another daemon-given state was atē, explaining a past state of mind, which in Homer, seems to imply a past state of mind to which an individual attributed a past action that had proved to be imprudent [e.g. II.9.377, 12.234, 15.724, 19.86ff.]. Responsibility for actions was therefore not generally equated with intent. Personal responsibility was rare and decisions were not recognised as coming from the individual.

Snell, Voigt, Fritz, Dodds and others maintain that, even with limited self-consciousness, there was no intellectual capacity to abstract the future. This view is problematic. What about the original poet abstracting the future of the whole story? What about Achilles abstracting his future during the embassy scene in Book 9? Achilles does say, 'if I get home, then I will ……'. Nevertheless he thinks that this future, and a possible alternate future, has been told to him by his divine mother.

As an example of the human personality at the time, Snell defines the general cognition of Odysseus:

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281 Discussd in chapter V.4.
283 The plot, past, present and future, is summarised for the listeners in Book 15.59-77.
His knowledge, as far as it is based on visual perception, consists in rich and abundant experiences; but he has not gained this knowledge by his own activity and his personal investigation; ... [it] is curiously separated from his activity in the field of ἰπτισταιμα. This 'know-how' is limited to the finding of means by which he can reach a definite goal ... [I]n the third sphere of understanding and interpretation of deeper meaning, Odysseus, like all men in Homer's epics, is dependent upon clearly developed speech that everyone can understand. When events, deeds, or men do not signify explicitly what they mean, then a god can reveal the meaning in plain speech. ... the god can tell it to a seer, who can impart it to other people, or the Muse can express it to the poet.285

Achilles, Priam, Nestor, Agamemnon, Penelope, Nausicaa and Telemachus all have similar cognition explained as supernatural manifestations which deny human responsibility for actions with cognitive words which convey physical rather than abstract concepts.

Decision-making was experienced or at least explained through hallucinated episodes of what Dodds calls 'psychic interventions'286 which Homer accords the result of atê, daemons and menos. To begin with, atê (and its cognate aasasthai) was an external influence on volition. Atê was administered either by a personal eriny (or daemon) or an Olympian divinity and is described by Dodds as:

[A] state of mind - a temporary clouding or bewildering of the normal consciousness. ... [I]t is ascribed, not to physiological or psychological causes, but to an external 'daemonic' agency.287

He is emphatic that there is no abstract concept of atê as moral retribution for imprudent or antisocial behaviour and no original association with the cognitive concept of guilt, except for a single 'exceptional'288 passage of Iliad 9.505-512 in which atê is personified 'Ατη. Murray, on the other hand, chose to translate 'Ατη as 'Sin':

The meanings of atê range all the way from moral blindness to the sin resulting therefrom, and even to the ruin that ultimately ensues. That the abstract idea becomes personified in the present passage is in harmony with the methods of Homeric thought.289

In either case the concept of atê still retains the sense of a cognitive state attributed to an external force. Dodds, however, further emphasises that the LSJ definition of atê, 'mostly as a punishment of guilty rashness', which also implies a moral dimension, 'is quite untrue of Homer'.290 There was an evolution in nuance in Attic tragedy291 and LSJ notes that the word was no longer used in Attic prose except in quotations of earlier times.292 Therefore, the

286 Dodds, op. cit., p. 8.
287 Dodds, ibid., p. 5.
288 Dodds, ibid., p. 6; Il. 9.505 which adds evidence for the redaction of Book 9. Cf. chapter IV.
290 Dodds, op. cit., p. 6.
291 E.g., Aesch. Agamemnon 386, 1268, 1230, 1433; Persae 653, 822, 1037; Soph. Ajax 363, 848; Antigone 533.
292 For example: Plato used it: ... ὅ δὲ μοι δοκούσιν παθεῖν καὶ οἱ τὸ ὑπερτων γράμματα ἀναθέτες, τὸ τε μηδὲν ἄγων καὶ τὸ Ἐγγυμ παρὰ δ' ἀτη. καὶ γάρ οὕτω συμβουλὴν ὁμήραν εἶναι τὸ Ἄγαβος σατοῦ, ἀλλ' οὗ τῶν εἰσύντων ἐνεκεν ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ προσόρεσαν ἐνὶ ἠν δὲ καὶ σφεῖς μηδὲν ἴπτων συμβουλὴς Χρήστους ἀναθέτειν, τούτω γράφας ταῖς ἀνάθεσαν. [... the inscription and I declare, though one is enough to think them different - an error into which I consider the dedications of the later inscriptions fell when they put up 'Nothing overmuch' and 'A pledge, and thereupon perdition'. For they supposed that 'Know thyself!' was a piece of advice, and not the god's salutation of those who were entering; and so, in order that their dedications too might equally give pieces of useful advice, they wrote these words and dedicated them. Plato Charmides 165a, trans. Lamb]. In the mid fifth century BC
meaning does not need to hold a sense of transgression. It could just as easily allude to the conflicting emotions that sometimes arise when a promise or commitment inhibits a favoured or planned course of action in order to avert misfortune. Dodds suggests 'the rashness is itself the atē'.

However, in conceding that a moira (a portion of fate) had implications of 'ought' and 'must', he appears to have disregarded this definition of punishment or guilt-free atē in his own job-profile of the Erinyes who dole out portions of moira, one of the causes of atē:

Erinyes as ministers of vengeance ... [were thus] enforcing the claims to status which arise from family or social relationship and are felt to be part of a person's moira: a parent, an elder brother, even a beggar, has something due to him as such and can invoke 'his' Erinyes to protect it. ...[In Homer] moira is still quite concretely used for, e.g., a 'helping' of meat [Od. 20.260].

Divine identities allot moira forcing individuals to non-conscious volition not always in their best interests; a rational way to explain human vulnerability and insecurity and the hope of receiving menos.

Memos, the third cognitive state, was the manifestation of superhuman capability invested into an individual by a divinity. For example on the battlefield Diomedes receives menos from Athena, Glaucus is helped by Apollo and Zeus also holds the power to give or take away courage. It can be breathed into an individual or even administered by a skeptron or rhabdos. Dodds explains the cognitive complexion of menos:

This menos is not primarily physical strength; nor is it a permanent organ of mental life like thumos or noos. ... The connection of menos with the sphere of volition comes out clearly in the related words μυστα, 'to be eager', and δεμονία, 'wishing ill'. ... But to Homer it is not caprice: it is the act of a god, who 'increases or diminishes at will a man's arete (that is to say, his potency as a fighter). But to Homer it is not caprice: it is the act of a god, who 'increases or diminishes at will a man's arete (that is to say, his potency as a fighter)."

Also dispensers of atē, daemons were responsible for creating mental states ranging from calm resolve to manic incomprehension. Dodds explains:

Cratinus also quoted 'Εγγύα πάρα δ' ατη as a gnômai (and therefore not a paraphrase); cf. W.R.M. Lamb, Plato Volume VIII, London Heinemann, 1955, Charmides 155a.

Diomedes gets menos: Diomedes, be brave to fight against the Trojans, [125] for in your breast have I put your father's might (menos), the fearless might, that the horseman Tydeus, wielder of the shield, possessed. And the mist that was over your eyes I have also taken from them, so that you can identify both god and man right to the end. So now if any god comes forward to make a trial for you, [130] do not dare fight face to face with any other immortals, excepting Aphrodite, daughter of Zeus. If she enters the battle slash her with a thrust of the sharp bronze. ... And though his heart had been eager to engage the Trojans before, now he was gripped with three times the ferocity for fight. [ll. 5.125-132, 135].

Glaucus gets menos: Glaucus] prayed and Phoebus Apollo heard him. Immediately he made his pains to cease, staunched the black blood that flowed from his terrible wound and put menos into his heart. Glaucus knew this in his mind and was glad that the great god had quickly heard his prayer. [ll. 16.527-531].

ll. 20.242: Zeus controls bravery: As for valour (ārete), it is Zeus that puts it in men or removes it, just as he himself wills because he is the mightest of all.

By breath: Then the heart of Odysseus was stirred, and up through his nostrils shot a keen pang, as he beheld his dear father. [Od. 24.318-319]. By a skeptron or rhabdos: Then Zeus, the Enfolder and Shaker of Earth struck them both with his staff, and filled them with powerful menos. [ll. 13.59-60].

For example, My comrades stood round me and a daemon breathed into us great courage [Od. 9.381]. Some one of the immortals (ἄνωντος) injured his φρίνος (mind, feelings, midriff) [Od. 14.178]. The gods have made you mad (aphrona), they who can make foolish even one who is very wise, and set the simple-minded on the road of understanding [Od. 23.11-14].
[T]hey are also credited with a wide range of what may be called loosely 'monitions'. Whenever someone has a particularly brilliant or a particularly foolish idea; when he suddenly recognises another person's identity or sees in a flash the meaning of an omen when he remembers what he might well have forgotten or forgets what he should have remembered he or someone else will see in it, if we are to take the words literally, a psychic intervention by one of these anonymous supernatural beings.\(^{299}\)

With daemons administering atê and menos and Athena and Zeus intervening in the hallucinatory visual field, the implication is that there was no conscious individual deliberative or problem-solving volition. Dodds, following Voigt and Snell, points out that there is no word for an act of choice or decision in Homer but pushes their final position further:

[Voigt's] conclusion that in Homer 'man still possesses no consciousness of personal freedom and of deciding for himself'. ... I should rather say that Homeric man does not possess the concept of will ... and therefore cannot possess the concept of 'free will'.\(^{300}\)

Without a concept of choice or decision or 'free-will, an ability to abstract future determinates would be absent. Yet Nestor tells his son Antilochus to have a plan of how to run his chariot race [23.306-348].\(^{301}\) Noted earlier is Achilles, also conceptualising a future and a choice of alternatives. In the Odyssey divine intervention is separated from or even antagonistic to spontaneity [Od. 3.26, 4.712, 7.263, 16.356], therefore the characters display aspects of all three. Harrison tackles an explanation of how Homeric individuals can both conceptualise a future, recognise the need for choice or decision all without abstracting the singing:

Homeric man feels himself to be exposed to impulses which he does not recognise as originating from him. Anger and fall into his θυμός [Il. 14.207, 17.625], grief seizes it [Il. 14.475], and helplessness grips it [Od. 9.295]. Madness possesses his κροδιν [Il. 21.542], grief comes to his κροδιν [Il. 23.47], desire seizes his φθόνοι [Il. 11.89] and it is taken or struck by grief [Od. 19.471, Il. 19.125]. And his θυμός ... the main target for these impulses, is felt to be an entity quite distinct from his ego, and even alien to it, 'ordering' him and 'impelling' him, like some external agent [e.g. Il. 4.263, 7.68, 10.389]. ... [He] succumbs to the pressure [e.g. Il. 9.109, 13.280; Il. 9.109] ... [but] recognises the need to control them, and he frequently displays the ability to do so .... even Achilles (cf. Il. 9.255, Od. 11.105; Il. 18.113; 19.66). Homerian man emerges as an independent agent capable of spontaneous acts: he is no mere plaything of the gods.\(^{302}\)

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\(^{299}\) Dodds, op. cit., p. 11. Cf. examples - Brilliant ideas: A god has put a greater fear in my heart [Od. 19.10]. Some god breathed the thought in my heart to set up a great web in my mind [Il. 9.255]. Nestor tells his son Antilochus to have a plan of how to run his chariot race [23.306-348]. Sudden recognition of another: You have discovered who I am because a god has put it into my heart [Il. 9.109, 13.280; Il. 9.109]. Sudden understanding of an omens: I will prophesy as the immortals put it into my heart [Il. 19.10]. Either from some apprehension or because a god made him do so he did not leave a single one outside [Od. 9.339-340]. Foolish ideas: For as long as she follows the advice which the gods now put in her heart (thumos) [Od. 2.124-125]. It must be that you were instructed by some god who wish to grant glory to the Trojans [Od. 4.274-275]. Eurylochus spoke and all gave assent. I then knew that some god was surely making trouble. [Od. 12.294-295]

Sudden recognition of another: You have discovered who I am because a god has put it into your mind (thumos) [Od. 19.485]. Cf. Od. 23.11-12 cited above. Sudden understanding of an omen: I will prophesy as the immortals put it into my heart [Od. 15.172]. Remembering: A god shall put it into your mind. [Od. 12.38]. Forgetting: The cold is killing me, for I have no cloak. Some god beguiled me to wear my tunic only [Od. 14.488-489].


The point here is that Greek religion is a negotiated belief system. The gods may be capricious, but human intervention (mostly through sacrificial bribes) can influence outcomes. Harrison notes that there is no concept of any 'dark power loose in the world'. Nor is there any moral dimension. The dissociative states experienced by Homeric man and ascribed to atê, menos and the intervention of deathless beings, still exist today and are defined as psychoses. By what Homer describes, there is no need to disbelieve that such states could not have existed then as they do now; nor that the Olympian pantheon then featured as anything but a rationalising mechanism for behaviour, certainly more than a literary embellishment to the epic narrative. Perhaps not even 'overdetermination' as Dodds suggests. Likewise the lack of conscious centrality indicates this function as the genesis for Greek religion.

To explain: in Homer cognitive terms have functional meanings and are experiential, with no word meaning 'to think' in the abstract. It is more a 'coalescence of mental activity' by what Snell termed 'mental organs'. For example, the heart (κραδίη, κρή, ἔτορ) was both a bodily organ which could jump in the chest at the thought of combat [Il. 10.94; 16.266] and the originating locus of fear [Od. 5.389]. Harrison remarks that while today we carelessly use such terms as mere façon de parler, in Homeric man it was 'something much more positively felt'. Another example is the midriff or diaphragm (φην, φένες) which can also be the seat of anger [Il. 2.241] injured both by spear [Od. 9.301] or insult [Il. 5.493]. Φένες can also mean 'wisdom' [Od. 21.288] and ἀφεον 'foolish'. There is a dominant rationality to φην, φένεσ with an emotional element that is quite different to that of the θυμός (agitated or abnormal breath). Conceptually the θυμός has no abstract, but is confined to experience felt as a separate entity to the individual; it became the significant locus of Homeric mental life when the individual panted with excitement, choked with rage, sobbed with grief, sighed with regret. Emotion can make the θυμός throb (it is also associated with the κραδίη), sink down into the feet or be iron [Il. 23.370, 15.280, 22.357]; feelings such as anger, fear, courage and desire originated there. Only living things can possess it [Il. 15.383; 6.182, 18.607] and all the verbs associated with θυμός refer to 'weakening' rather than 'breathing out'. Harrison notes that Homer puts the θυμός as a counterpart to the νόος [Il. 4.303ff]. The νόος is a type of knowledge receptor able to take in a circumstance as it is presented to the senses (νοείν) but not having to 'think' about it [Od. 14.490; 14.273; Il. 9.600, 20.310]. Snell describes νοείν as 'ein geistiges Sehen' (a spiritual vision). Its etymology is from sνυ- 'to sniff'. Further to it being a receptor organ the νόος can also be an 'idea', a 'state of mind', a 'plan', or 'understanding' [Il. 15.699; Il. 2.192; Od. 1.66]. Likewise νοείν is to use the νόος in the sense of 'to notice' [Il. 12.143] to 'see' or 'hear' [Il. 15.422, 15.128-129; Od. 19.467; 17.290ff; 17.291, 20.365-366].

There is reason to believe that cognitive words had a physical origin; even νόος and θυμός which were not bodily organs. Nor was there any sense of the 'spiritual' as Plato later defined. Harrison explains:

303 Harrison, op. cit., p. 71.
304 Cf. appendix 1.2.
305 Dodds, op. cit., p. 7.
306 Cf. G. Finsler, Homer, Leipzig, B.G. Teubner, 1924, pp. 1, 2, 78;
307 Harrison, op. cit., p. 67.
308 Snell, Discovery of the Mind, p. 12
309 Harrison, op. cit., p. 77.
310 Cf. Harrison, ibid., pp. 64-65, 74.
315 Harrison, op. cit., pp. 66, 72-73.
If we find it hard to envisage a diaphram (φρήν) that thinks, as well as growing tight with worry, we should remember that neither could Homeric man for his part have envisaged a thinking brain. ...

Thus thought tends to be worried thought, angry thought, and so on. ... [T]he θυμός is often involved in activity of this sort: indeed, it is the main locus of Homeric man’s deliberation and decision. ... [It is in] a coalescence of mental activity that we must explain the frequent attribution of thought processes to the θυμός and (more especially) φρήν. ... νός (in the sense of ‘activity of the mental organ νός’) can in fact be referred to the θυμός or the φρήνες, as can νοεῖν, ‘to use the νός’; [Od. 14.490; 14.273; Il. 9.600, 20.310], and similarly the activity of the φρήν is located frequently in the θυμός. [Il. 2.36; Od. 21.105, 21.302]. 317

Even the ψυχή – which came to mean ‘mind’ in the fifth century BC, and ‘soul’ in the centuries post-Christ – ‘can scarcely be called a mental organ’ in the Homeric epics.318 While Harrison notes that ψυχή ‘lacks energy of any sort’,319 in some ways it is like the electricity that powers the computer: doing none of the processing, but essential to the process nevertheless. Its two functions relate to ‘exhalation’ - in a swoon or at the point of death [Il. 13.763; Il. 21.569, 24,754, 16.453]:

It is his ‘life’ only in the sense that a cat has nine ‘lives’. ... Indeed whenever it is mentioned, the shadow of death lurks in the background. It is the stake man risks in battle; he fights, runs, and plans desperately to preserve it. ... [It never returns ... ψυχή descends to Hades ...‘an image’ of him [Od. 11.476] ... It alone, and not θυμός, φρήν, or νός, is left behind when a man dies.320

Dodds explains how Snell identifies archaic cognition as a process lacking interior self-consciousness:

Homeric man has no unified concept of what we call ‘soul’ or ‘personality’ ... Homer appears to credit man with a psyche only after death, or when he is in the act of fainting or dying ... the only recorded function of the psyche in relation to the living man is to leave him. Nor has Homer any other word for the living personality. The thumos may once have been a primitive ‘breath-soul’ or ‘life-soul’; but in Homer it is neither the soul nor (as in Plato) a ‘part of the soul’. It may be defined roughly and generally, as the organ of feeling. ... A man’s thumos tells him that he must now eat or drink or slay an enemy, it advises him on his course of action, it puts words into his mouth: qumo\(\alpha\)nw/gei he says, κε/letai de/ me qumo/j. He can converse with it, or with his ‘heart’ or his ‘belly’, almost as man to man. Sometimes he scolds these detached entities (κραδι/ης πυρε/πει μύθοι); usually he takes their advice, but he may also reject it and act, as Zeus does on one occasion, ‘without the consent of his thumos’ (ικών ἀκούντι γε θυμώς).321

This though really only identifies a lack of locus; as does Theognis, Οιβάλμοι καὶ γλώσσα καὶ υἱάτα καὶ νός ἄνδρον / εἰς μεσώι στηθέων εἰς συνετοίς φύτει: (The eyes and tongue and ears and mind of a man / To stay within his chest if he is wise) [Elegies 1163-1164], and Hesiod - which extended to deity:

318 Harrison, ibid., p. 69.
319 Harrison loc. cit.
320 Harrison, ibid., pp. 75-76.
None of this discussion should be taken as evidence that the archaic brain physically functioned any differently to the way brains function today. In this regard a further look at menos also shows its physical manifestations recall particular cognitive sensations experienced today when individuals are passing in or out of consciousness or are in a manic or seizure state. As one example Dodds relates the incident in which Athena yanks Achilles hair and, with glowering eyes, stops him from harming Agamemnon:

Now Zeus, king of the gods, first took to wife Metis, wisest of all, of gods and men. But when she was about to bear her child Grey-eyed Athene, he deceived her mind With clever words and guile, and thrust her down Into his belly, as he was advised By Earth and starry Heaven. In that way They said, no other god than Zeus would get The royal power over all the gods Who live forever. For her fate would be To bear outstanding children, greatly wise, First, a girl, Tritogeneia, the grey-eyed, Equal in spirit and intelligence To Zeus her father; then she would bear a son With haughty heart, a king of gods and men. But Zeus, forestalling danger, put her down Into his belly, so that the goddess could Counsel him in both good and evil plans. [trans. Wender]

This description resembles that of Odysseus in-conference with Agamemnon in Iliad 2 (mentioned above) as it describes the experiences of individuals when under psychological stress. The sensation of someone standing behind one is activated by the amygdala.

The lack of locus or disorientation would have been exacerbated by the use of alcohol. Homer claimed that too much wine could bring on atē. Dodds feels ‘the implication, however, is probably not that atē can be produced ‘naturally’, but rather that wine has something supernatural or daemonic about it. However, for individuals who have trouble locating their consciousness within their own physical frame, would the effects of

322 Cf. chapter V.4 for a discussion on mētis (thinking knowledge / discursive deliberation).

323 Notwithstanding the cognitive differences between ‘orality’ and ‘literacy’ discussed in chapters II.2-3, and III.2.

324 E.g. ll. 16.712ff., 13.43ff.

325 ll. 1.198.

326 Dodds, op. cit., pp. 15, 25.


328 Od. 11.61; 21.297ff.

329 Dodds, op. cit., p. 5.
alcohol on thinking even be noticed? Such lack of locus and disorientation, especially during religious observances, appears to have produced a distrust of human judgment. Coupled with the beliefs that individual psychological states were attributed to deities and external divine forces directed events, it is understandable how Zeus gained the epithet 'crooked-counselling son of Cronos'. Agamemnon saw Zeus as the liar who had tricked him [Il. 9.18-25] even though they had entered into a binding agreement. Negotiation and persuasion therefore were integral facets of religious psychology because the gods could destabilise human fortunes even though they were themselves subject to moira. The religious psychological dimension of Homeric man is one of helplessness and negotiation. Divinity and humanity came together in religious ritual in which man attempted to negotiate with the gods; hence the persuasive elements in prayer and hymns. The parameters of divine relationships defined concepts of power and probability - just how far could you go before having your head boxed.

In the narrative sections featuring the pantheon in action Homer provides human and divine counterparts. More than 'a burlesque of the human scene', the Olympian pantheon mirrors the psychology and arbitrary nature of mortal deliberation and archaic power. Like the councils of Agamemnon, the fraternity of gods appear deceptively democratic:

Ποσειδάων δὲ μεθήσαει ὅν χόλον ὅ μὲν γὰρ τι δυνήσετοι ἀντία πάντων ἀθανάτων ἄκειτι θέων ἐριδιαίνεμεν οἶος. [Od. 1.77-79]

Poseidon must relent for being quarrelsome will get him nowhere, one god, flouting the will of all the gods [trans. Fitzgerald]

But Zeus, like Agamemnon, demands his full gamit of kratos, to οὐ κράτος ἐστὶ μέγιστος (for his power is above all) [Il. 9.25, cf. 20.1-12] and Themis, convenor of human and divine assemblies ἦ τε ἀνδρῶν ἀγορὰς ἦμεν λείπει ἦδε καθείζει (convenor of assemblies of men) [Od. 2.68-69, cf. Il. 20.1-12], and all the other divinities, including Athena, treat Zeus with the same archaic tact as Agamemmon received in his council:

οἱ δ’ ἄρα πάντες ἀκήν ἐγένοντο σιωπη, μῦθον ἄγασασμένοι μᾶλα γὰρ κρατερῶς ἄγορευσεν. οἴε δὲ δὴ μετέειπε θεὰ γλαυκών Λήθης; "ὁ τάτηρ ἡμέτερες Κρονίδη ὑπάτε κρείστων εὐ να καὶ ἡμεῖς ἱδέμεν ὦ τοι οἴνοις οὐκ ἐπεικτόν." [Il. 8.31-32]

They were all awed and silent, he put it with such power.

After a pause, the grey-eyed goddess Athena said:

330 For example, Il. 9.37, cf. 1.494 ff (a discussion between Thetis and Zeus). Hesiod [Theog. 980] noted that Zeus got part of his deliberating ability by swallowing his magically cunning first wife Metis - though he had enough ability to devour her with his own cunning/lying words.

331 Agamemnon states: ὃς πρὶν μὲν μοι ὑπέσχετο καὶ κατένευσεν / Indeed earlier he had in fact given me his sealed assent [Il. 9.19]. Cf. οὐ γὰρ ἔμοι πολινάγρετον οὐδ’ ἀπατήλοιο οὐδ’ ἀτελεύτητον, ὣ τι κεν κεφάλη κατανεύσω / my word is not revocable nor ineffectual, once I nod upon it [Il. 1.526-527].

332 For example, Zeus allowed the other deities to assist favourites in battle [2.23-40]. However, he alone could alter individual moira whilst still destabilising other human activity as when he balanced the fate of Hector in golden scales [22.208-213]. however The other gods were subject to moira as when Poseidon was reminded the Erinyes would punish him if he harmed Zeus [15.209]; Ares recognised that if he avenged his own son, the fates would kill him [15.113-118]. Zeus though was cautioned against altering moira as when Hera cautioned him about the consequences when he suggested he change Sarpedon's fate [15.439-443].


334 In Homer κράτος means mastery, victory as well as sovereignty. authority.
'O Zeus, highest and mightiest, father of us all, we are well aware of your omnipotence'. [trans. Fitzgerald]

Thetis adhered to the supplicant's tact when approaching Zeus [Il. 1.525-527] and Iris was astounded by Poseidon's indignation with Zeus: ἰσόν οἱ φασθαί, τόν τε στυγεύοντι καὶ ἄλλοι (You claim equality of whom the other gods are in aweful dread) [Il. 15.182-183].

Zeus generally solved problems in the same manner as Agamemnon; by the self-interested exercise of authoritative power or the exercise of force. Both exercise power without recourse to much persuasion:

μήτε τις οὖν θήλεια θεός τό γε μήτε τις ἄρην πειράτω διακέρασαι είμοι ἐπος, ἀλλ’ ἀμα πάντες αἰνεῖτ, ὡφρα τάχιστα τελευτήσαι τάδε ἔργα.

[Il. 8.7-9]
Let no one, god or goddess, contravene my present edict; all assent to it that I may get this business done, and quickly. [trans. Fitzgerald]

οὐν δ’ ἂν ἐγὼν ἀπάνευθε θεῶν ἐθέλοντα νοησώ ἐλθον’ ἦν Τρόωςεων ἀργοµένων ἣ Δαναοῖς πληγεῖς οὐ κατὰ κόσμον ἔλευσεται Οὐλυµπῶν δὲ’ ἢ μιν ἐλῶν ρίψω εἰς Τάρταρον ήρεοντα τίμλε µαλ’, ἢι βάθιστον ὑπὸ χθόνος ἐστὶ βέρεθρον,

[Il. 8.10-15]
If I catch sight of anyone slipping away with a mind to assist the Danaans or the Trojans, he comes back blasted without ceremony, else he will be flung out of Olympus into the murk of Tartarus that lies deep down in the underworld. [trans. Fitzgerald]

Violence permeated divine relationships:

To Mother my advice is - what she knows - better make up to Father, or he'll start his thundering and shake our feast to bits. You know how he can shock us if he cares to - our of our seats with lightning bolts! Supreme power is his. Oh, soothe him, please, take a soft tone, get back in his good graces. [Il. 1.573-583, trans. Fitzgerald]

We everlasting gods, ah, what chilling blows we suffer - thanks to our own conflicting wills Whenever we show these mortal men some kindness And we all must battle you. [trans. Fagles]

The interactions between Zeus and Hera, Poseidon and Athena resemble the same dynamics and strategies adopted by Agamemnon and his colleagues. Hera’s domestic

335 Additional examples: Zeus threatens to beat Hera and reminds her of a previous punishment when he bound her in golden chains attaching anvils to her ankles and hung her up in the sky [Il. 15.14-24]; Zeus threatens both Hera and Athene [Il. 8.446-456]; Athena speaks of her father’s οὐφός φρει παίνεται οὐκ ἄγαθήσι (raging cruel and evil mind) [Il. 8.360-365]; and Ares twice complains about Athena’s reckless violence to everyone [5.875-880; 21.394-395].
position complicates the comparison but Hera is the combined counterpart of Achilles and Odysseus - rebellious and crafty against authoritative kratos:

> ἢρα δῆμος ἡμῖν, γένος δὲ μοι ἐνθεν ἔθεν σοί, καὶ με πρεσβύτατην τέκνον Κρόνος ἀγκυλομήτης, αἰμφότερον γενέτει καὶ νῦνεικα σή παράκοιτις κάλλημα, σύ δέ πάσι μετε ἀθανάτωσιν ἀνάσαις. ἀλλὰ ἦτοι μὲν ταὐθ' ὑποεἴςομεν ἀλληλοισι, σοὶ μὲν ἔγω, σὺ δ' ἐμοί: ἐπὶ δ' ἐξονται θεοὶ ἄλλοι ἀθανάτοι.[II. 4.58-64]

> Our father, Cronos of crooked wit, engendered me, to hold exalted rank, by birth and by my standing as your queen - since you are lord, of all immortal gods, Come, we'll give way, to one another in this affair: I yield, o you and you to me; the gods will follow. [trans Fitzgerald]

Hera, whom I keep but barely in my power. [trans. Fagles]

Though Zeus can 'barely' keep in his power their relationship pivots on fear. She is one exemplar of the futility of raging against naked kratos. Persuasion was accomplished only through deception or manipulation cloaked in archaic tact.\(^{336}\) She, unlike Achilles, asks permission to remove herself from duty 'so that you will not rage at me for going' [14.310]. Kratos over Poseidon, however, was exercised with some negotiation.\(^{337}\)

Zeus however was capable of compassion towards humanity\(^{338}\) and the possibility of pity was important, because in the Homeric context, feelings of insecurity (no territorial security; no personal safety; no personal identity due to lack of locus brought on by stress) would have been regularly present, and hope of compassion provided a counter mechanism. Chronic insecurity in Homer led to an inability to assess the truth, a lack of confidence to deal with the unknown and a resultant paralyzing lack of confidence to make judgements.

A view that the supernatural in the Iliad and the Odyssey is a literary conceit, 'a delightful, gay invention of poets [which] has of course no relation to real religion or to morality'\(^{339}\) and

\(^{336}\) Hera pussyfoots around Zeus, even attempting magic and drugs, which indicates that he was not one for deliberative discussion [II. 14.198-291]. Hera's 'guile' however is Zeus' own desire [292-300] and embarrassment at the suggestion of sex au naturel is probably not part of the beguilement because she acquiesces through fear: 'But if you must, if this is what you wish, and near your heart, there is my own bedchamber. Your dear son, Hephaestus, built it, and he fitted well the solid door and door-jamb. We should go to lie down there, since bed is now your pleasure' [II. 14.331-340]. She surely could not have been aroused by his discussion of previous lovers [14.317-328]. Nevertheless, Hera is quite at home to lie to him [15.34-46 cf. 8.200-207].

\(^{337}\) E.g., Hera attempts to negotiate with Poseidon to unite against Zeus [8.209-212]. Hera swears to Zeus that she had not persuaded Poseidon to join her against the Trojans or to harm Hector, but states that Poseidon helped the Achaeans because he pitied them. She then proposes that she 'should counsel him to go where, Zeus, command him'.[15.45-46] Zeus replies that 'for all Poseidon's will to the contrary, he must come round to meet your wish and mine'. He sends Iris to Poseidon with his demands, 'Quit the war and go home' [15.49-58].Whilst he accedes to the request, Poseidon nevertheless is resentful at Zeus' exercise of power in this way [15.184-219]. In the Odyssey Poseidon still has no wish to provoke Zeus' anger: 'I respect, and would avoid, your anger' [Od. 13.147-148].


not relevant to the conceptualisation of the inner and outer archaic world overlooks their canonical status prior to the 'moralisation' of certain psychological or abstract notions by later ancient writers. For example, Grube thought that a god's appearance to assist a hero was poetic symbolism because it was 'ex hypothesi impossible for that greatness to be tarnished by the help of the god'.

Deitrich notes:

>Some modern scholars [have] lost their way in the philological detail of the poems. ... Thus we may unhesitatingly reject extreme views that the Homeric gods had no religious meaning at all. ... modern interpretations of Homer's 'Weltanschauung' illustrate the tremendous variety of opinions which tend to advocate one or two particular theories at the expense of others that may be equally plausible.

While Deitrich believes that the use of cognitive words 'reveals thought processes in Homer which do not coincide with our own' he nevertheless considers that the view of Snell and Dodds 'underrates Homer's refinement of thought and language'. Considering the frequency of religious ritual throughout the works and archaeological evidence of religious observance during the sixth and fifth centuries, it seems reasonable to accept that poet and listeners alike believed the pantheon and chthonic deities to exist. It follows that the composer and audience also thought his protagonists' volition was initiated through divine intervention; especially as the composer himself received his story-telling abilities in the same way. Further, Deitrich has two observations that seem relevant to the equation of deities with interior cognitive states. Firstly he points out that in both poems the appearance of a deity on the scene is announced by the narrator and not a character within the plot, not even an officiating priest at a ceremony or sacrifice. Above are quoted many instances where a character has alluded to a personal god. It makes sense that the poet has to tell us because the phenomena was a personal experience and not observable by others. Secondly, he notes that the appearance of the Olympic pantheon on clayware decoration increased after 566BC with the introduction of Homeric recitals to the Panathenaic festival. This is evidence of the growth of 'epic influence on the minds of all citizens'.

From a psychological point of view the artwork also reflects a diminishment of personal interior gods likely reflecting a growth in the conscious locus of self:

>... But after 500 B.C. the Olympians generally appeared more in isolation, remote and separated from their proteges.

Clearly, many of these deities explained behavioural and psychological processes and articulated a variety of cognitive states. How literally we should accept Homer's Weltanschauung is unresolved, as evidenced by Bowra, Snell, Murray, Kirk and others, cited above and below. Dodds posits a deceptively simple behavioral explanation that they thought the way they did because they were taught to think in that way:

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342 Deitrich, ibid., p.53; cf Dodds, op. cit., p. 14 and Snell, Discovery of the Mind, p. 31.
343 Dietrich, ibid., pp. 53-79
345 Deitrich, ‘Views of Homeric Gods and Religion’, p. 150. Cf. chapter IV.2 notes it is not necessarily Homer that is being illustrated.
346 Deitrich, loc. cit. Cf. Boardman, Black Figure Vases, pp. 216, 219; Athenian Red Figure Vases, p. 224.
The recognition, the insight, the memory, the brilliant or perverse idea, have this in common, that they come suddenly, as we say, 'into a man's head'. Often he is conscious of no observation or reasoning which has led up to them. But in that case, how can he call them 'his'? ... So he speaks of it noncommittally as 'the gods' or 'some god' or more often (especially when its prompting has turned out to be bad) as a daemon. ... And I suggest that in general the inward monition, or the sudden unaccountable feeling of power, or the sudden unaccountable loss of judgement, is the germ out of which the divine machinery developed.348 ... So, instead of saying with Nilsson that Homeric man believes in psychic intervention because he is impulsive, we should perhaps say rather that he gives way to his impulses because he is socially conditioned to believe in psychic intervention.349

The gods then function in the same psychological space as the Muse. Furthermore, there is little difference between 'I am not responsible for my words' and 'I am not responsible for my actions'. This state of mind is most apparent in the Androktasiai which Beye notes is the earliest section of the Iliad.350 In the Odyssey, on the other hand, humanity takes responsibility:

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ω πόποι, οίνον δ' νυ θεοῦς βροτοί
αιτίονται:
εξ ἡμέων γὰρ φαιν κάκε ἐμμεναι, οί δ' καὶ αυτοὶ
σφησιν ἄτοσθαλίσιν ὑπὲρ μόρον ἄλγε'
ἔχουσιν,
ός καὶ νῦν Αἴγισθος ὑπὲρ μόρον Ἀτρείδαο
γῆμ ἄλοχον μηστήν, τον δ' ἔκτανε
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My word, how mortals take the gods to task!
All their afflictions come from us, we hear.
And what of their own failings?
Greed and folly
double the suffering in the lot of man.
See how Aigisthos, for his double portion,
stole Agamemnon's wife and killed the soldier

348 This statement is perhaps the germ of Julian Jaynes' hypothesis which is discussed in appendix 1.2.
However, the reverse is true as it relates to homicide. A genetically determined instinct to reject death and a general psychological need for transference of responsibility for homicide is evidenced throughout the ancient world and is no less evident in the Homeric epics. For example, Achilles, οὐ γὰρ τι γλυκόθυμος ἀνήρ ἢν οὐδ’ ἀγανόφρων (not sweet-tempered, without gentle moods, very fierce) [II. 20.467-468] also has a spear that has its own volition; craving blood and raw manflesh [21.70; 191]. There is a moment though when Achilles almost takes personal responsibility for the death of Patroclus before transferring it to ἀνατολῆς.

Achilles is sometimes possessed by anger which swings wildly from acceptance of his moira to manic rejection of his senses. For example, his reaction to Agamemnon’s attack on his timē was a feeling of acharos (righteous indignation, agrieved rage) in which he deliberated whether to kill Agamemnon or χόλων παύεσθαι ἐρήμωσε τοῦ θυμοῦ (check his rage and control his fury). As noted above, the stress produced an hallucination of Athena standing behind him pulling his hair. Likewise after a frenzied killing spree on the...
battlefield [21.20-60, 120-123, 179-183, 202-211], Achilles hallucinates a river, ‘cold with rage, in likeness of a man’ with a voice coming out of a whirlpool [21.212-215]. Hector also exhibits dissociative psychic trauma readily recognisable today:

Εκτορα Πηριαμίδην μάλα περ μεμαώτα καί αὐτών.
μαίνετο δ’ ὡς ὥτ’ Ἄρης...
άφλοιτος δέ περί στόμα γίγνετο, τῶ δε οἰς
λαμπεάθθην βλοσυφήνυ ὑπ’ ὄφραίναι, ἄμφι δὲ
πήλιν.
συμπολέον κροτάφοις τινάσατο μαρναμένοιο
Εκτορος’
[Iliad 2.604-609]

Hector, furious in arms as Ares raging ...

In this vein, Homer does not mention Sibyl or similar instances of possession and much is made of the fact that there is only one reference to prophecy in Homer:

One of the basic confusions in Vernant’s argument is his failure to distinguish between ecstatic and non-ecstatic inspiration either in prophecy or in poetry. For example, the ‘don de voyance’ of which Vernant speaks is highly appropriate to Cassandra as she is depicted in the Agamemnon. In her frenzy she does have a direct and personal vision of various episodes relating to the past, present and future of the house of Atreus. That she actually sees what she describes is clear from her words at, for example, [1125 ἵσε ιδείς. [cf. 1114, 1217] It has long been recognised, however, that, with the exception of Theoclymenus at Od. xx 351-7, prophecy of this visionary nature is absent from Homer.355

One explanation is that any of these states which present as manic were (initially) recognisable to the listeners and not seen as particular or uncommon. Achilles’ response to the personal crisis of Patroclus’ death includes an hallucinated ghost of Patroclus [23.113-118, 23.123-129]. Taplin calls it a ‘dream-ghost’356 Yet Achilles speculates about the ghost which reveals an interior consciousness with the ability to question abnormal or confusing stimulus: ‘Why have you come ...’ [23.94]; why are you telling me what to do ...’ [23.95]; how strange, psyche and physical form (eidolon) are separate and are able to be in two places at once, odd ... [23.103-107]. Iliad 23 is also relatively free from god-ridden ate; the Olympian gods are mostly an external, not internal, element.357 Bye suggests Achilles’ ‘self-exile’ has

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357 For example, Iris merely passes on Achilles’ prayer for a wind-change; she does not appear to him, nor does he speak to Boreas or Zephyrus in first person (however he promised offerings) [23.194-205]; the rituals connected with the burial of Patroclus does not include religion or gods [23.219-226, 236-259].

In the first chariot race, Apollo struck the whip out of Diomedes’ hand, while Athena gave it back to him and strengthened his horses, but either god did not interfere with the person of Diomedes [23.384-391]. Athena later does give Diomedes’ horses strength to give Diomedes glory (kudos) [23.400-401]. Athena interferes with Eumelos’ harness, but not Eumelos; [23.393-397].

Odysseus prays to Athene to ‘speed up’ his feet for assistance in athletic performance; she made his feet ‘feel light’ and procured to make Ajax slip in ox dung [23.770-778]. Antilochus comments that gods involve themselves in the affairs of ‘older’ men somewhat implying a consciousness that they had not involved themselves in his own or his comrade Ajax [23.787-792].

Hand-to-hand combat is left to Telamonic Ajax and Diomedes without divine assistance [23.812-824]; Teucer does not bother to promise hecatombs to Apollo [863-864]; Meriones does and wins the archery with with a shot aimed and executed by his own hand without any internal aid from Apollo [23.872-882].
led him to self-examination. Significantly, in Book 23 he is now able to see two sides of the matter:

\[ \text{μικέτι} \text{ νῦν} \text{ χαλεποίσιν} \text{ ἀμείβεσθον} \text{ ἐπέφεσιν,} \text{ Αἴαν} \text{ Ἰδομενεύ} \text{ τε, κακοίς,} \text{ ἐπὶ} \text{ οὐδὲ} \text{ ἐοικε. καὶ} \text{ δ' ἀλλω} \text{ νεμέστον, ὅποις} \text{ τοιαύτα γε} \text{ ρέζοι.} \text{ [II. 23.492-494]}
\]

No more of this railing back and forth, Aias, Idomeneus! Not on this occasion! If someone else behaved so, you'd resent it. [trans. Fitzgerald]

Hammer notes:

[T]his ability to place oneself in another's position stands in dramatic contrast not only to Agamemnon's inability to place himself in the position of the other warriors - a point made by Achilles [II. 1.149-151] and Nestor [II. 1.272-274] - but to Achilles' earlier refusal to 'take pity on all the other Achaians' [II. 9.301-302].

Such self-consciousness somewhat contradicts the concept of the god-generated volition running rampant in the rest of the Iliad. The gods in Homer articulate the effects of extreme anger and extreme stress. Homeric man, susceptible to god-ridden manic states because, as Dodds has observed, he had been taught to think in such terms. It did not happen every day, but in a war zone, it likely happened more than normal. To seventh and sixth century BC hoplites, it was likely a recognisable event.

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APPENDIX 5
THE THERA ERASTIC INSCRIPTIONS
AND GREEK PAEDOPHILIA

The reason for this appendix, dealing with the Thera erastic inscriptions but diverging into a discussion on homosexuality and/or pederasty in Hellenic culture is because most of the scholarship on ancient literacy skirts the issue of the Thera inscriptions with the barest of mentions. Further, those who accept a pejorative and spontaneous motivation for these inscriptions do not address the degree of literate consciousness and sophistication inherent in such an interpretation. The inscriptions were not idly chalked or quickly spray-canned on a wall; as Bethe and Marrou noted, they were inscribed in rock, in letters ‘so large’ and ‘of enormous size’, sufficiently deeply ‘that they are still clearly readable after twenty six centuries’. Dover noted in a letter to Brongersma that ‘to us, incising words on a rock is strenuous’, but at the time of the Thera inscriptions, when the use of papyrus was only beginning and people did not carry ink round with them, incision was commonplace. True. However, the interpretation of dedications to Apollo as superfluous oaths rather than a call for the god to witness of the act rejects the common sense of the chisel. Brongersma replied: ‘Even if we accept this, one cannot dispute that carving fifteen characters (n-a-i-t-o-n-d-e-l-p-h-i-n-o-n) … is quite a lot of work. … Would any person in his right mind set himself such a heavy task just to add a senseless exclamation to a frivolous, insulting or boasting text?’ Therefore:

The inscriptions are unlikely to be spontaneously literate rock schlock because the wording is formulaic and in line with other formulaic dedicatory or monumental seventh century inscriptions, as are the other graffiti around the same site, which constitute dedications lauding excellence in the name of Apollo and point to religious observances relating to the Karneia. Further, there is no proof that the inscriptions are pejorative; various interpretations of οἰγοθος and οἰφω rely on much later evidence. The ambivalent tone of Powell’s translations, for example, make them simultaneously pejorative and playfully joyful. He sees the Theran inscriptions as ‘a Theran capping game’ obviously with malice involved and interprets and translates as follows:

1) No. 63, 173 (IG xii.3 543) - Βάρβας ὑρκΗιτάι τ[ε] ὁγαθό[ς] έδίδο [τε] ποταυε~ - - : Barbab dances well and he’s given [me] pleasure (?).

2) No. 64, 174 (IG xii.3 544) - ᾿Εσειρα μάξης ὁγαθός : Tharumakhas is swell.

3) No. 65A, 175 (IG xii.3 540) - Λακυδίας ὁγαθός : Laqydidas is good. No. 65B (IG xii.3 540,II) - Εύμηλου ἁρπωτός ὑρκητά[ς] : Eumelos is the best in the dance. No. 65C (IG xii.3 540,III[2] - Κρίμων πράττωτος ὑρκητοί Σιμιαν ιάνετο : But Krimon, best in the ‘whanger bop’ warmed the heart (entrails) of Simias.

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361 For example, Rosalind Thomas [Literacy and Orality in Ancient Greece, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 62 n.37, 87] only mentions stone markers or ‘natural rocks’ inscribed with names associated with Thera.


366 Brongersma, ‘The Thera Inscriptions’, p. 34.


(Dover also sees a jocular connotation in that οἰνοσάλος = κοινόσαλος = κοινόσωλω connotes to Krimon's own penis, but also notes οἰνοσάλος = κοινόσαλος equates with a priapic daemon as well as a ritualistic satyric dance.369)

4) No. 66, 177 (IG xii.3 537, a) - [τὸν δέωνα] καὶ τὸν Δελπίσιον τῷ Κρίμων τεδέ οἴπολε παίδα, Βαθυκλέος, ὀδηπίπλεον[v] δέ τοι δεωνος: By Apollo, right here did Krimon fuck [So-and-so], the son of Bathylkes, brother of so-and-so.

(Dover suggests 'we should not imagine that Krimon, or whoever wrote no. 537, was on very friendly terms with the Bathylkes over whose brother he triumphed'.370 Davidson comments on this inscription: 'There is no sign of any name after the word 'brother'. You cannot simply take texts you don't like and add things to them until they mean what you want them to mean. As it stands it can only mean 'his brother', 'Crimon's brother', not a reference to homosexual incest but ... a relationship of 'brothers'.371 De Lannoy also has a slight complaint regarding Powell's punctuation of this inscription where there is none.372)

5) No. 67A, 178 (IG xii.3 538/1411) - Αμοτιονα ὀἵπος Κρίμων τεδέ: Here Krimon fucked Amotion.

6) Nos. 67B-E, 179 (IG xii.3 538) - Ἰσοσάρθυς (?) / Παισοφής Ευαισφής / Κραειλας

7) No. 67G, 179 (IG xii.3 538) - Ευπόνως οἰ / πῆς: Eupono joy fucked ...

8) No. 68A-C, 179-80 (IG xii.3 536) - Πλειδιπίδας οἴπος. Τιμαγάρας καὶ Ἐντερής καὶ ἐγ' οἰπή[με]: Pheidippides fucked [So-and-so; or more likely, as we say intransitively, 'got fucked']. Timagoras and Empheres and me - we got fucked too; Ἐντπυλος τάδε: Emp[hylos] [did] this [got fucked too? carved these words?] ...; faggot!

(Davidson claims πόρνος was inscribed 'several centuries later,' which is possible.373)

9) No. 68D, 180 (IG xii.3 536) - Ἐντεδοκλής ἐμφόππετο τάδε ὁρκετο μᾶ τὸν Ἀπόλο: Empedokles wrote this. And he danced, by Apollo.

Likewise Powell considers ἀγαθος to be 'a common formula of homosexual praise'374 a reading supported by Dover who does not go quite so far but suggests it may be a euphemistic formula for the καλός praise prevalent on later clayware and evident on a later inscription at the same site.375 The communis opinio however is to reject as erastic the inscriptions containing names with ἀγαθος appended, as for example Bain.376 Therefore, most of the inscriptions in the area other than those containing variations of οἴφω likely have a dedicatory and/or a religious element within the temple precincts.

In relation to οἴφω, Bain notes 'it cannot be denied that οἴφω and related words were often used pejoratively'. However, he states the etymology is 'totally obscure' and considers that

375 Powell, Homer and the Origin of the Greek Alphabet, p. 173; Why was the Greek Alphabet Invented, p. 343.
376 Dover, The Greeks and their Legacy, p.118.
oīφω was 'generally regarded as a kind of Doric equivalent of ἔνίω, as forthright perhaps, but not quite as offensive'. Only five of the inscriptions on Thera contain oīφω among so many formulaic dedications; e.g., Lakydiadas is agathos; ---]x is aristos; Pykmedes of the Skamotas is aristos; Korax, the son of [-]ronos is agathos. They are therefore unlikely to be the dysphemisms connoting spontaneous sexual license that Powell suggests or, abuse, as Bain suggests. Further as oīφω appears twice in the Gortyn code c.480-450BC relating to (unspecified gender) intercourse, it is unlikely to have been abusive slang prior at least to that period. Likewise, Achilichos [ca. 680-645BC] and Mimnermus [630-600BC] used forms of the word extolling sexual practice (between genders) and much, much later Plutarch used it in an anecdote in which it had a sentimental rather than abusive connotation.

All the examples of oīφω and variations in abusive connotations used to interpret the pejorative tone of the Thera inscriptions occur in later centuries:

1) Black Sea ca. 550BC [IGDO1bia 27 : SEG 32.724 ; Olbia: Berezan Isl.,] δανθείμοι τοίφωλη ἔτωι ὀἰφωλη = ὀἰφωλη] (I. 6 'ἀρώτικός)

2) Naxos 450-425BC [IG xii.5 97: Δωροφέων (Kn) / Καρίων / ὀἰφώλης; cf. Jeffrey, LSAG Pl.55.14] (Bain considers 'the last word seemingly the work of some malicious third party' which, as stated, is likely to also be the case for the last line in inscription IG xii.3 536.)

3) Tenos 525-475BC [SEG 15.523 = Jeffrey, LSAG 298, Πυρίς Ακρατόρος οἰφώλης: Θρήσκο katapuygwn [or tentatively] Πυρίς Ακρατόρος οἰφώλη εβήμα, καταπυγων.]

4) Bain cites even later references linking oīφω, oἰφώλης, oἰφών, φλοιφά etc., to abusive connotations even though lexicographers cite oīφως as a common-or-garden term for the penis. One example cited as evidence for a pejorative interpretation by Powell and others such as Dover and Marrou was written on the wall of a Pompeiian brothel seven hundred years later. The absurdity of such a comparison is stressed by Brongersma (not a Classicist but Director of the Brongersma Foundation for the Research Into the Sexuality of Youth, Netherlands), who points out that some Dutch words now considered vulgar were once formal and literary terms without prejudice and that this likely also applies to the graffito, 'Hic ego cum veni futui', on the wall of the Pompeiian brothel; Catullus used it humorously and Martial used futuere forty two times.

In the same vein Carl Blegen published an inscription at Hymettos ca. 650-625BC: Νι[κός] Φι[----]δες καταπυγων Αε[----]δες ερι. Blegen considered it a 'vituperative graffito somewhat analogous to the Thera inscriptions.' Powell identifies the Theran inscriptions with oīφω as contemporary with the katapuygwn inscription and comparable in a 'spirit of contumely.' The words and this spirit of contumely then ricochet between Thera, Hymettos and the comedic barbs of Aristophanes nearly two hundred and fifty years later.

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377 Bain, op. cit., pp. 72, 74.
380 Bain, ibid., pp. 73-74; Theocritus 4.62 and Scholia in Theocritum 5.43. Bain, ibid., pp. 73-74; Theocritus 4.62 and Scholia in Theocritum 5.43.

Powell is not the only scholar to interpret the inscriptional evidence in this way. For example Percy also compares the Thera inscriptions with the later Pompeian graffiti, though noting that ‘they do not contain threats as certain Roman graffiti do’, and identifies ὀίφω as a synonym for κατατάγονον, maintaining ‘these Thera inscriptions are our most explicit, unambiguous evidence for anal intercourse in Archaic times. … [where] ‘Krimon’ is mentioned so often that some regard him as a sort of pederastic Don Juan’. Bain has exhaustively followed the ambiguities and shifting nuances of these words and nowhere does he presume to equate the two terms. Davidson makes a further point: ‘niπheiro does not need an object. It is not necessarily something you do to someone, but something you can just do’. He has further philological reservations on the interpretation of κατατάγονον: ‘καταταγον/καταταγος sounds exactly like ‘right-up-buttocks’, ‘buttocks-oriented’, ‘buttocks-bound’ … [we] might just as easily deduce someone with a predilection for going up other people’s buttocks … just as the -er ending on the word ‘bugger’ might mislead someone into thinking he was probably a ‘doer’, a ‘buggerer’. A comparison with ‘contumely’ Elizabethan words and modern English slang is enough to demonstrate that connections such as the above easily slip from the context of historicity. Patzer may be correct; the Thera inscriptions need not be using pejorative ‘keinen niedrigen Klang’. Lear and Cantarella believe ‘it is difficult to believe in the hypothesis, advanced by some, that we are dealing here with ‘obscene inscriptions’. The idea that the Thera inscriptions could celebrate a joyous initiation or be ritualistic in any way generates cultural and religious interpretations that do not fit the historical context. There is no indication of the age of the graffitists yet much of the scholarship interpreting the inscriptions revolves around whether they were pre-pubescent, pubescent or post-pubescent, which, in turn, has engendered a certain repressive angle over sexuality. Whether it was young adults proving or passing into ‘manhood’ through dominance, or adolescents being initiated into the group, the angst remains. It seriously colours the tonal interpretation of the Thera inscriptions. For example, Powell sees them as ‘obscene graffiti’, Dover as ‘frivolous buggery’, Davidson as some kind of cliff-top pair-bonding circle jerk. Bain sees them as ‘a mixture of boasts and insults’. Marrou considered them

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387 Percy, op. cit., p. 334.
388 Percy, op. cit., pp. 62-62. Percy applies this sense to Aristophanes’ use of the word in _Knights_ [639-40] with considerably logicality. It could equally apply to the sense of Lysistrata’s comment that the women being unwilling to enter into the sex strike were _pantakatapugen_ [Lysistrata 137] which implies an active sexual inclination; likewise _Lysistrata_ 775. Of the other instances in Aristophanes, accepting the sense ‘lewd’ or ‘sex-mad’, most are ambiguous: cf. _Acharnians_ 79, 664; _Wasps_ 84, 687; _Clouds_ 529, 909. Ostraka containing κατατάγονον graffiti from the Athenian agora (ca.483 and ca.460), some in hexameter, also could be interpreted in Davidson’s sense; cf. M. Lang, _Graffiti and Dipinti: The Athenian Agora_ xxi, Princeton, American School of Classical Studies, 1976; C 12, C 18, C 24, C 25, C 26 C 27); ‘P 5157’, _Hesperia_ Vol. 5 (1936), p. 36 fig. 36, pp. 346-7 fig. 15; ‘P 5169’, op. cit., pp. 350-1 fig. 20.

The sense of _Clouds_ 1021 however is hardly ambiguous: He will fill you with the lewdness of Antimachus [τῆς Ἀντιμάχου καταταγούσης ἀσαπλήσει.] Neither is _Thesmophoriazusae_ 200: γ’ ὧ κατάταγον ἐνυψάσκετος, unless it be regarded as a redundancy. Marjorie J. Milne and Dietrich von Bothmer [ΚΑΤΑΠΙΤΥΓΩΝ, ΚΑΤΑΠΙΤΥΓΑΙΝΑ,’ _Hesperia_, Vol. 22, No. 4 (1953), pp. 215-224 at 221] state that κατατάγονον has been ‘used in Athens at least as early as the seventh century B. C. and that its use persisted at least until 411 B. C., the date of Aristophanes’ _Thesmophoriazusae_, in which the latest instance that we have found occurs’.
389 Harald Patzer, _Die griechische Knabenliebe_, (Sitzungsberichte der wissenschaftlichen Gesellschaft an der Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main), Wiesbaden, Franz Steiner Verlag, 1982, pp. 43-45.
392 Dover, _Greek Homosexuality_, p. 195; cf. 123.
393 Davidson, _The Greeks and Greek Love_, p. 335.
Much of the argument maintaining the Theran inscriptions to be flippant rather than ritualistic tends to gravitate to one or the other premise that either the act involved elements of 'homosexual desire' or that 'ritualistic sex' did not involve sexual gratification; that the two constructs were mutually exclusive. In this way the interpretation of the Theran inscriptions skirts issues of pederasty. For example, E. Bethe generated the hypothesis of Knabenliebe (boy-love) as an initiatory practice consistent with other anthropological studies on other culture groups. This has been updated by H. Patzer who argues that pederasty and homosexuality were two different things in Greece, with pederasty involving ritual aimed at 'the transfer of virility from man to youth' (Übertragung einer numinosen Kraft vom Mann auf den Jüngling) in an act 'not primarily based on a sexually orientated drive but rather as a social duty' [beruht nicht (oder nicht primär und notwendig) auf dem Antrieb sexueller Neigung, sondern sic ist gesellschaftliche Pflicht]. Patzer argues that pederasty then could not be homosexuality because the individual male took on both the passive and active roles at different stages in life and because the active role was practised concurrently with heterosexual performance.

Dover initially rejected this hypothesis outright. However he had second thoughts on the initiatory aspect of sexual ritual: 'I have no doubt that the case for a link between Knabenliebe and initiation procedures deserved a better run for its money [in Greek Homosexuality]. This he does in a Postscript to the 1989 edition of Greek Homosexuality and, in The Greeks and their Legacy, he concludes that: i) Overt homosexuality began ... at the end of the seventh century BC; ii) Wherever there existed procedures analogous to age-graded initiation, these procedures became charged with an overt homosexual content and, iii) The didactic relationship between erastes and eromenos was superimposed on the erotic, not vice versa'. He discounts ritualistic insensation of adolescents as the origin of Greek pederasty because, if the practice outlived the ritual belief ('not attested for the historical period'), then the continuance of the practice was for other reasons and therefore these other reasons would have been a sufficient first cause: 'There is nothing arbitrary about copulation; it is sought as an end in itself, so that there is always a reason for importing it into a variety of social procedures, to say nothing of inventing new procedures in order to give it more scope. ... [O]nce social approval has been given to an activity which is physically, emotionally and aesthetically gratifying to the adult males of a society it is not easily suppressed.'

Within the historical context of Dorian (therefore Theran) society, why ever would it need to be suppressed? Herodotos [1.65] recounts what fifth century Lacedaemonians believed to be the origins of their institutionalised pederasty; one version was that their teenage king, Labotas, prompted by his uncle guardian and Regent, Lycurgus, introduced to him the laws from Crete to Sparta. Another version was that the laws came from Apollo Delphinios and

\[395\] Marrou, Histoire de l'éducation dans l'antiquité, p. 376.
\[399\] Patzer, Die griechische Knabenliebe, pp. 29, 84ff, 89.
\[400\] Patzer, op. cit., pp. 44, 50-67, 125-128.
\[403\] Dover, op. cit., pp. 121, 125, 132.
another that they came from Zeus.404 Either way, pederasty got the tick from the most powerful man in the kingdom, plus the authority of the patron god of all young men initiated at the festival of naked dancing, the Karneia.405

Following Veyne, Halperin suggests that Greek pederasty was so ‘idiosyncratic … that the application of the modern concept of homosexuality to it can only lead to misunderstanding.’406 He suggests ‘we should free ourselves from the conceptual tyranny of current sexual categories’407 and construct Greek sexuality in terms of ‘active and passive, aggressive and submissive’ rather than male / female or male / male; a social ‘modality of power-relations that informed and structured the act.’408 In this vein Sutton has noted that art, like vocabulary, reflects sex allied to aggression (therefore power): on vases battle scenes adorn one side while sex scenes ornament the other.409 Likewise sexual vocabulary at times equated also to military terms;410 while Dover suggests that in ceramic art the different manifestations of the penis variously symbolised modesty, subordination on the one hand or a warrior’s ‘concealed weapon held in reserve’ on the other.411 Davidson however dismisses such ‘high-falutin academic work’ opting for a recognition that Dorian society institutionalised homosexual marriage rituals.412 Elsewhere he criticises modern scholarship that promotes ‘a fantasy based on modern preconceptions of sex as power; a fantasy driven by a desire to prove that (Greek) homosexuality was (is) not ‘real’; a fantasy based, paradoxically, on a twentieth-century impulse to fight against Victorian inhibition and hypocrisy’.413 Elsewhere, ‘[T]here are countless modern scholars who understand Greek Homosexuality on the basis of what they have heard or seen on trips to twentieth-century Italy or Greece, claiming a straightforward continuity from once upon a time in the ancient world until suddenly last summer in the Mediterranean.’414 Sutton though (ironically?) highlights current conceptual glitches in his review of recent ‘good, some even brilliant’ works from Halperin, Winkler and Zeitlin: ‘These collections … [are] well beyond the sexual and feminist revolutions, firmly set on post-modern soil. Human sexual feeling and practice are not considered to be facts of nature, but constructed social artifacts that shape and are shaped by particular cultural and historical conditions. Some authors, discounting the possibility of disinterested, ‘objective’ scholarship, write from perspectives explicitly identified as feminist or gay, yet without resort to subjectivity or illogic’.415

404 Cf. Pl. Laws 636c-d and below.
407 Halperin, ‘One Hundred Years of Homosexuality’, p. 45.
408 Halperin, op. cit., p. 39.
411 For example, Aristoph. Birds 1256, στύμωι τρίμισθολος [three times as stiff as a ship’s ram, or, three times as hard as an infantry wedge formation]; Thesmophoriazusae 59-62, συγγογγύλας καὶ συστρέψας τούτο τὸ πῶς χωράνυσαι, [I’ll mould myself into a hard round iron to break your defences]; Xen. Cyropaedia 1.31-33, ληφθεὶς ἵρωτι [seized by eros].
413 Davidson [The Greeks and Greek Love, pp. 123, 481] ties together the evidence of Xenophon Lac. 2.12-12 and a Black-figure three footed pyxis showing three illustrations of pair-bonding and ritual sharing of a single pharos (cloak) pertaining to marriage, cf. Beazley 7285; University of Mississippi, 1977.3.72, David M. Robinson Collection, University Museum.
Again, why are the Thera inscriptions pejorative? Young girls in their early teens were married to older men and produced children early. If this aspect of Hellenic culture, which in effect recognises the sexuality of pubescent girls, finds general academic acceptance, why the apparent aversion to pederasty that denies boys of the same age their sexuality, even if it is situational sexuality? Young wives were loved and nurtured by their husbands, even though married love was seemingly not idealised and there are no representations of married couples in Greek art as there are in Roman art. (John Boardman expresses the opinion that 'the excitement of heterosexual pursuit and triumphant machismo were expressed, it seems, through the satyr', although it is not clear whether he is thinking 'citizen wives' as well as the hetairai who feature on satyr clayware, or ignoring them, as most scholars have until recently.) Representations of pederasty on the other hand were prolific on Attic clayware and celebrated the fact. Herodotos likewise attests to how proud the Greeks were of their pederasty, while Xenophon notes how only male lovers of Zeus and never his female lovers experienced apotheosis.

Halperin's will-to-power context of relationships surely cannot mean that either aspect of Greek sexuality was unaffectionate. Notwithstanding Dover's observation that 'sexual-objects do not like to be told that they are only sex-objects', even he altered his earlier view that '[the] eromenos does not derive pleasure from copulation' in the second edition of his work Greek Homosexuality. Moreover, power aspects of sex are physiologically inherent in heightened senses, just as the excitement of the hunt and the catch of the quarry (and it does not have to be just masculine, or else there would be no Circes or Helens or Penelopes). The emotional and sensual closeness of love / hate; soft touching / hard (violent) touching manifests linguistically and is recognised in most languages. This suggests therefore that sexual practices are not imposed culturally, not even from elites. Species regulate behaviour according to specific environments; Dover's remarks about the risks of applying anthropological comparisons are therefore relevant. There is though a hint for an anthropological model when Aristotle states that Dorian (Cretan) law institutionalised same sex union \[\text{τὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἄρρωνας ποιήσας ὁμιλίαν,}\] to inhibit overpopulation. This may reflect a natural behavioural phenomenon tested in the now almost apocryphal research into rodent overpopulation which produced significant increases in homosexual activity - though Plato as well as Plutarch would not have believed it, as both thought homosexuality an exclusively human trait. Fifth and fourth century


John Boardman, ‘Review of Greek Homosexuality by K.J. Dover’, Journal of Hellenic Studies, Vol. 100, Centenary Issue (1980), pp. 244-245. Cf. Beazley 204734; New York Metropolitan Museum 06.11.52; Athenian Red-figure Cup C; ca.475; Painter Makron; Satyrs attacking Meanads; inscribed ‘the girl is beautiful’. Also, Beazley 207517; Berlin, Antikensammlung F2334; Athenian Red-figure Amphora, Neck; ca. 450; Oionokles Painter; A: Dionysos on a donkey inscribed ‘the boy is beautiful’; B: a Maenad inscribed ‘the girl is beautiful’. Dover notes such vases should not be interpreted as ‘commissioned’ pieces with subjects relating to specific individuals, cf. Dover, Greek Homosexuality, p. 118.


Dover, Greek Homosexuality, p. 204.

Dover, The Greeks and their Legacy, pp. 120-22.

Ar. Politics 1272a.24-25.

Athenians considered the behaviour instinctive. It is still puzzling to be faced with the proposition that homosexual love might have occupied at least half the emotional life of the average Classical Greek. ... [It] was the abuse or commercialisation of a homosexual relationship that was attacked by both the law and public opinion, while the overt relationship between a man and a youth, including sexual relations especially of a non-penetrative (intercrural) nature, could be admired or encouraged.

Marrou mused over the difficulties sociologists of the future would have in defining the place of adultery in the lives of twentieth-century Frenchmen. It now seems absurd to psycho-pathologise an anthropological universal that there is a minority percentage of any population whose sexual orientation is for the same sex and a general behavioural proclivity to situational homosexuality. Plato recognised it in the formation myth he put into the mouth of Aristophanes. Though disputed by Dover, Lear and Cantarella suggest the antiquity of pederasty is evidenced by mythic couples such as Zeus and Ganymede, Poseidon and Pelops, Apollo and Hyacinth with the tone of the coupling attested by the countless courtship scenes on clayware idealizing the relationship. Clayware depicts homosexual pairings of all types. In Archaic Thera, clayware certainly suggests this was the practice there. Moreover, it has been shown that clayware depicting pederastic practices did not 'disappear' until the middle of the fourth century BC. Increasingly the practice appears to have involved intercrural intercourse, with the practice of courting boys during the hunt dropping off at the end of the fifth century. Lear and Cantarella point to a growing idealization of the practice where nobility and sexual restraint is juxtaposed to ugliness and excess. From another perspective this changing complexion of pederasty was really a re-ritualization: could it have been because young men were being educated in a different manner to their fathers, and that they were able to consider the pros and cons of any relationship rather than accepting under the auspices of archaic tact?

All of the above brings the argument to this point: why cannot religious sexual acts encapsulate both ritual and pleasure; is that not what happens symbolically in a Christian church when the groom kisses the bride? The Thera inscriptions do not have to document 'flagitious' initiation; as Dover notes, 'ritual can be enjoyed.' As pederasty was a natural feature of Hellenic society it is logical that it extended into religious behaviour either celebrating the god's favour or in the guise of submitting to the god. It would have been

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426 Eurip. Frag., 840 'nature forces me'; Aristoph. Clouds 1080, 'desire is a natural urge'; Lysias Pro Simon 3.4, 'in my attitude toward the youth ... you know all men are liable to desire.'

427 Boardman, 'Review of Greek Homosexuality' by K.J. Dover', pp. 244-245. This attitude is likely to have been one of long standing: Homer [Od. 14.297, 15.449] does not appear to approve of Phoenicians trading in boys through stealth but recommends marriage to Nausicaa [Od. 6.180-181] as a good thing.


429 Pl. Symposium 189d.


431 Cf. Beazley 4230; Thera (Santorin), Archeological Museum XXXX4230; Athenian black-figure Band Cup, Thera, Sellada ca.550: an erotic scene between man and boy; Dover, Greek Homosexuality, CE34 [in G.M.A. Richter, Koraì: Archaic Greek Maidens, London (1968), Pl VIIIc]; an archaic Theran Plate dated 620BC shows two adult women courting with one touching the chin of the other.


433 Lear, Cantarella, ibid., pp. 190-192.

especially predictable on Thera where there was a long history of religious ritualism. In assessing the Theran architecture and art at Akrotiri, Nanno Marinatos concluded that 'all subjects revolve around festivals, rituals and nature scenes [and] the formulae were dictated by the religious ideology of the Minoans'.

The site of the inscriptions is adjacent to a temple of Apollo Karneios on the terrace track (dromos) where dancing and racing ceremonies occurred during the ritualistic ceremonies of the nine day Karneia which marked the attainment of warrior status, in effect, a celebration of maleness. At the temple of Apollo Karneios youths and (slightly) older men (Karneatans) likely celebrated the Karneia in which grape runners (σταφυλιδρόμοι) excitedly chased fruit gatherers: σταφυλοδρόμοι τινες των Καρνεατών, παρομώντες τους ἐπὶ τρύγη [Hesychius Lexicon 1673]. This interpretation depends on accepting παρομώντες as παρομέω = incitement, rather than παρομέω = to lie beside. Brongersma creates a scenario that probably interprets παρομώντες as παρομέω:

On a rock beside Thera’s only well, an inscription has been discovered which reads, ‘Aglotoles, son of Enipantidos and Lakarto, was victor in the first staphylodromes’. This shows that Thera, a colony of Sparta, had adopted the Spartan ritual of the Staphylodromos to close its gymnopaideia. The gymnopaideia took place once a year, after the wine harvest in September, in honour of Apollo, protector of all that is good and beautiful. At Sparta it was the one occasion at which foreign visitors were admitted, and they came in multitudes to see the naked boys perform their dance. At the end, on a full moon night, a young boy naked but for a garland of raisins (‘staphulis’), sprinted away. He was allowed a head start, but then a group of older boys (ephebes) came after him in a foot race (‘dromos’). If they managed to overtake the boy, this was seen as a happy omen for the city. The first ephebe to catch up with him and bring him down possessed him on the spot.

The writer can find no clear ancient reference to such a scenario, however it does resemble art on clayware depicting normal Dionysian and other cult practices where similar garlanded figures are chased (and sometimes caught) by well-endowed satyrs carrying grape-clustered branches. Likewise it is reminiscent of Ephorus’ description [Strabo, Geography 10.4.21] of the celebratory nature of Cretan pederastic courting rituals which involved various chasings and hunts and which recognised an institutionalised relationship between the older and younger man in which the younger carried into adulthood distinctive clothing that conferred honour upon him; somewhat like the kufi of an El-Hadji or a veteran with service medals.

Of all the scholarship referenced above, Powell, von Gärtringen and Brongersma are the only ones who attest that they have been to the site on Thera: ‘I wonder whether Marrou or Dover ever were there. Examining the site … on the top of the promontory at an elevation of over 1100 feet … and considering the setting as a whole, it seemed to me quite unlikely that this place - at the time when everything was intact - would have been chosen for engraving obscene or insulting graffiti.’

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438 For example Beazley 1700; Oxford Ashmolean Museum, 1957.32; Black-figure Chous, no date assigned (Archaic); a procession of bearded men and beardless youths carrying bunches of grapes on poles. Their genitalia prominent.
Throughout Greece stone inscriptions were regarded as the authoritative reference; remembrances of religious and cultural ritual. Throughout Hellas monuments were mnemonic aids for events, ceremonies, enacted laws, etc. and remained so in Athens ‘even after a central archive had been established at the end of the fifth century’. ‘Frivolous’ did not get written down; especially in archaic Dorian Greece where the tradition was that citizens did not even get their names inscribed on their graves unless they had succumbed to battle or to childbirth. It was a very different world to Aristophanes’ Athens or Pompeii’s backstreets.

The writer infers from the quality and detail of the drawings of the rock formations with inscriptions on Thera that they were done in situ.

440 Rosalind Thomas, Literacy and Orality in Ancient Greece, p. 86; cf. 62.
APPENDIX 6

ATTIC BLACK- AND RED-Figure INSCRIPTIONS BY POTTER

6.1 BLACK-Figure PAINTERS: KLEITIAS, EXEKIAS, LYDOS, NEARCHOS, TLESON,

The records total figure denotes the number of pieces recorded in the Beazley Archive: http://www.beazley.ox.ac.uk/databases. However, between one database categorisation and another in the database, the vagaries of the system drop one or two, or add one or two pieces.

The list of pieces presented here will not add up to the total because all fragments without inscriptions have been eliminated as there is no way of knowing if they are part of a piece with inscriptions on it or not.

The lists are merely to give an indication of each potter's inscriptions at a glance.

KLEITIAS 580-550BC [41 records total]

For example

(1) Inscribed pieces attributed to Kleitias or his pottery:
Beazley 300000 (François Vase); Florence, Museo Archeologico Etrusco: 4209; Black-figure Krater, Volute; inscribed KLITIASMEGRAPHSEN: ERGOTIMOSMEPOIDESEN (2), TROON, RHODIA, KALLIOPE, URANIA, MELPOMENE, KLEIO [KLEO], EUTERPE, THALEIA, STESICHORE, ERALE, POLYMNIOS, TROPHOS, EPIBOIA, PROKRITOS, LYSIDIKE, HERNIPO, ASTERIA, ANTIKOS, DAMASISTRATE, HEUXISTRATE, KORONIS, EURYSTHENES, MENESTHOS, DAIDOCHOS, HIPODEAMIA, PHAIDIMOS, HARPYLEAS, ARISTANDROS, LABROS, ANTANDROS, THORAX, EUTYMACHOS, MELANION, ATALATE, METHENOS, ORMENOS, ANTAIOS, KORAX, AKASTOS, SIMON, PAUSELEON, TOXAMIS, EBOLOS, EGERTE, MRPSAS, ASMETOS, KYNORTES, KIMERION named (121 inscriptions).
Beazley 7383; Basel, H. Cahn, HC1418; Black-figure Krater frag.; inscribed OLYTEUS (named artwork Odysseus).
Beazley 16091; Madrid, Museo Arqueologico Nacional, XXXX16091; Black-figure Amphora frag.; inscribed ATHENAIA ret.)
Beazley 25344; Vathy, Museum, K962, K1223, K3272, K951; Black-figure Amphora frags.; inscribed HEPHAISTOS (?).
Beazley 300725; Moscow, Pushkin State Museum of Fine Arts, 2986; Black-figure Krater frag.; inscribed OLUTIEUS, PERIEUS.
Beazley 300726; Athens, National Museum, Acropolis Coll., 1.597A-E; Black-figure fragments; inscribed ATH?/?[NAIA], [ZEU]S[?], HERMES, H?/?[ORAI][?], MOI[RAI].
Beazley 300727; Athens, National Museum, Acropolis Coll., 1.597F-H; Black-figure fragments; inscribed I[PHI][MEDEIA][?], SKULEIEI, [TEL][EPULEIA.
Beazley 300728; Athens, National Museum, Acropolis Coll., 1.598; Black-figure fragment; inscribed EURUJ/STHENES.
Beazley 300730; Delphi, Archaeological Museum, XXXX300730; Black-figure fragment; inscribed [ERGO]TIMOS EP[POIESEN].
Beazley 300731; Athens, National Museum, 15164; Black-figure Hydria frags.; inscribed ALTHAIA, KUMATHOTHEA (named).
Beazley 300733; Athens Agora Museum, P12450; Black-figure fragment; inscribed [...]N vacat.
Beazley 300735; New York, Metropolitan Museum, 31.11.4; Black-figure Stand; inscribed KLEITIAS[ERGA]PHSEN, ERGOTIMOS EPOIDESEN.
Beazley 300736; Berlin, Antikensammlung, 4604; Black-figure Cup; inscribed ERGOTTIMOS MEP[POIESEN], [KLEITIAS MEGRAPHSEN.
Beazley 300737; London, British Museum, 88.6.1.427; Black-figure Cup frags.; inscribed [ER]GOTIMOS EP[POIESEN], [KLE[ITI]AS EGRAPHSEN.
Beazley 300738; London, British Museum, 88.6.1.237; Black-figure Cup frags.; inscribed [KLI]T[IAS EGRAPHSEN.
Beazley 300741; Athens, National Museum, Acropolis Coll., 1.602; Black-figure frags.; inscribed THE? [...] (retr.).
Beazley 300742; London, British Museum, B601.17; Black-figure frag.; inscribed APHRO[DITE] (retr.).

Beazley 300744; London, British Museum B601.10; Black-figure Cup frags.; inscribed [.KUL][IKA, [KALON EIM][I][P]O? ? ER[I][ON].

Beazley 300745; London, British Museum, 1948.8-15.5; Black-figure Cup frags.; inscriptions "between palmettes".

Beazley 306526; Athens, Agora Museum, AP3491; Black-figure frag.; inscribed [O]RANIA.

(2) Intact pieces without inscription:
Beazley 300747; Vatican City, Museo Gregoriano Etrusco Vaticano, 318; Black-figure Cup.

EXEKIAS 575-525BC [116 records total]

For example

(1) Inscribed pieces attributed to Exekias or his pottery:
Beazley 6426; Toledo, Museum of Art 1980.1022; Black-figure Amphora; inscribed EXSEKIASEPOIESE, STESIAKALOS, ANCHIPPOS, KAL[L]IPHORAS, PYRRICHOS named.

Beazley 8492; Taranto, Museo Archeologico Nazionale: XXXX8492; Black-figure Amphora frags.; inscribed [...]ETHEKE TAI BASILIDI.

Beazley 310309; Paris, Musee du Louvre F53; Black-figure Amphora; inscribed ECHSEKIASEPOISE, STESIAKALOS ANCHIROS, SEMOS, PYROKEME, KALIPHONE, KALIPHORA.


Beazley 310395; Vatican City, Museo Vatican City, Museo Gregoriano Etrusco Vaticano: 16757, Museo Gregoriano Etrusco Vaticano: 344; Black-figure Amphora A; inscribed ECHSEKIASEPOISEN [ECHSEKIASE], GRAPHSEKAPIOIESME, ONETORIDES KALOS, ACHIL[EO]S, TES[S]ARA, TRIA, AIANTOS, OVE?, ORIDES K? ALOS, POLUDEUKES, LEDA, KASTOR, TYNDAREOS.

Beazley 10060; Malibu, The J. Paul Getty Museum, 78.AE.305; Black-figure Amphora frag.; inscribed AKAMAS.

Beazley 17705; Switzerland, Private XXXX177705; Black-figure Cup Little Master; inscribed signature by Exekias.

Beazley 275633; Brauron, Archaeological Museum, XXXX275633; Black-figure Pyxis; inscribed STESAGORA[S].


Beazley 310396; Munich, Antikensammlungen, KM3179; Black-figure Cup; inscribed AMASOS, MENELAOS, [AX]ILEOS, A2NITLOXOS, EUPHORS.

Beazley 310399; London, British Museum, 1836.2.24.127; Black-figure Amphora Neck; inscribed EXEKIAS EPOIES, EXSEKIAS EPOISE.


Beazley 310402; Rome, Mus. Naz. Etrusco di Villa Giulia, 50599; Black-figure Dinos frag.; inscribed EXSEKIAS MEPOIIESE, EAPI?NETOS MEDOKEN CHAROPOI.

Beazley 310403; Munich, Antikensammlungen, KM3179; Black-figure Cup; inscribed EXSEKIAS EPOIESE.

Beazley 310404; Athens, National Museum, CC848-51; Black-figure plaque frags.; inscribed [X]ARITA[IOS]?

Beazley 310405; Prague, Private XXXX310405; ABV (Oxford, 1956) 146.1; Black-figure frag.; inscribed EXSEKIAS...

Beazley 310406; Paris, Musee du Louvre, F54; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip; inscribed EXSEKIAS MEPOIESE[N], EU., EXSEKIAS MEPOIES[N], EU.

Beazley 310408; Civitavecchia, Museo Civico, XXXX310408; CAVI Preliminary Edition (1998), 3191; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip frags.; inscribed EXSEKIAS EPOIES, EXSEKI[...]..

Beazley 310409; Athens, National Museum, 1104; inscribed EXSEKIAS EPOIESEN, E A XSEKIAS EPOIESEN, ENEINOIOIEN.
Beazley 310415; Reggio Calabria, Museo Nazionale,4001; Black-figure Amphora frag.; inscribed TRIPTOLEMOS?, ATHENAS, H[ERAKLES or KLEOS], PLOUTODÔ^TAS.

Beazley 310417; Athens, National Museum, Acropolis Coll., 1.926; Black-figure Panathenaic Amphora frags.; inscribed T? ON[...].

Beazley 310420; Barcelona, Museo Arqueologico, 4485; Black-figure Amphora frag.; inscribed KALOSONETORIDES.

Beazley 310422; London, British Museum, B164; Black-figure amphora; inscribed [ARG]OS, HERMES, HERAS.

Beazley 350458; Unknown, Markopoulo, XXXX350458, Paralipomena, Beazley (Oxford, 1971), 61; Black-figure Pyxis; inscribed KALOS STRESAGORA.

Beazley 350462; Boston, Museum of Fine Arts, 63.952; Black-figure Panathenaic Amphora; inscribed HELENE, [P]OLODEUKES, AISXINES, KASTOR, SIMOIS, KASON^KA^LOS, EURULOXOS, DIONUSOS.

Beazley 350493; Berlin, Antikensammlung, F1823; Black-figure Plaque frags.; inscribed PHALIOS, MYLIOS, SIME named.

Beazley 352393; Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania, 3497; Black-figure Amphora; inscribed ESKALOS, ATHENAS, HERAKLES, IOLEOS, DIONUSOS.

Beazley 350009; Lost, F1820D, AntikBer, Kunze, M. et al., Die Antikensammlung im Pergamonmuseum und in Charlottenburg, Staatliche Museen zu Berlin (Berlin, 1992), 266, NO.143; Black-figure Plaque frags.; inscribed KALIPHORAS, SEMOS named, [...]ITHO, XARIS, AR, EUZ (painted and scratched letters).

Beazley 350447; Karlsruhe, Badisches Landesmuseum, 65.45; Black-figure Panathenaic Amphora; inscribed TON ATHENETHEN ATHLON.

(2) Inscribed with nonsense letters:
Beazley 5172; Champaign-Urbana, Univ. of Ill., Krannert Art Museum, 70.9.3; Black-figure Amphora; imitation letters placed where names would be expected, GINSN, [.]NGSN, KSN[K]G[S]NE, [K]SK[G]S, GSGS, KSKG.

Beazley 310390; London, British Museum, 1849.5-18.10; Black-figure Amphora; inscribed A[OIHSN, AMASIS, nonsense letters.

Beazley 310392; Orvieto, Museo Civico, Coll. Faina, 78; Black-figure Amphora.

Beazley 310393; Orvieto, Museo Civico, Coll. Faina, 77; Black-figure Amphora.

Beazley 310394; Paris, Musee du Louvre, F206; Black-figure Amphora.

Beazley 310395; New York, Metropolitan Museum, 17.230.14; Black-figure Amphora.

Beazley 310396; Boston, Museum of Fine Arts, 89.273; Black-figure Amphora.

Beazley 310397; Berlin, Antikensammlung, F1718; Black-figure Amphora.

Beazley 310398; Munich, Antikensammlungen, J1295; Black-figure Amphora.

Beazley 310399; London, British Museum, 1849.5-18.10; Black-figure Amphora; inscribed A? OIHSN, AMASIS, nonsense letters.

Beazley 310390; London, British Museum, 1849.5-18.10; Black-figure Amphora; inscribed A? OIHSN, AMASIS, nonsense letters.

Beazley 310426; Bologna, Museo Civico Archeologico, 37; Black-figure Amphora; inscribed "at least seven letters".

(3) Intact pieces without inscription:
Beazley 7249; London, Market, Sotheby’s, XXXX7249; Black-figure Oinochoe.

Beazley 310385; New York, Metropolitan Museum, 17.230.14; Black-figure Amphora.

Beazley 310386; Boston, Museum of Fine Arts, 89.273; Black-figure Amphora.

Beazley 310387; Berlin, Antikensammlung, F1718; Black-figure Amphora.

Beazley 310388; Munich, Antikensammlungen, J1295; Black-figure Amphora.

Beazley 310391; Orvieto, Museo Civico, Coll. Faina, 78; Black-figure Amphora.

Beazley 310392; Orvieto, Museo Civico, Coll. Faina, 77; Black-figure Amphora.

Beazley 310393; Orvieto, Museo Civico, Coll. Faina, 2745; Black-figure Amphora.

Beazley 310394; Paris, Musee du Louvre, F206; Black-figure Amphora.

Beazley 310400; Boulogne, Musee Communale, 558; Black-figure, Amphora.

Beazley 310410; Heidelberg, Ruprecht-Karls-Universitat, S178; Black-figure Amphora.

Beazley 310411; Tarquinia, Museo Nazionale Tarquiniense, 623; Black-figure Amphora.

Beazley 310412; Zurich, Market, XXXX310412; Black-figure Amphora.

Beazley 310414; Zurich, Prof. Mikro Ros, XXXX310414; Beazley Paralipomena (Oxford, 1971), 61; Black-figure Amphora.

Beazley 310418; Athens, National Museum, XXXX310418; Black-figure Krater.

Beazley 310421; Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania, 4841; Black-figure Amphora.

Beazley 310423; Naples, Museo Archeologico Nazionale, STG38; Black-figure Amphora.

Beazley 310424; Cambridge (MA), Harvard Univ., Arthur M. Sackler Mus., 1960.312; Black-figure Amphora.

Beazley 310425; Rome, Mus. Naz. Etrusco di Villa Giulia, 8340; Black-figure Amphora.

Beazley 310427; New York, Metropolitan Museum, GR547; Black-figure Amphora.

Beazley 350452; Oxford, Ashmolean Museum, 1960.1291; Black-figure Amphora.

Beazley 350456; Budapest, Hungarian Museum of Fine Arts, 50.189; Black-figure Amphora.

Beazley 350457; Unknown, XXXX350457; Paralipomena, Beazley (Oxford, 1971), 61; Black-figure Amphora.

Beazley 350460; Altenburg, Staaltisches Lindenau-Museum, 214; Black-figure Amphora.

Beazley 350461; Paris, Musee du Louvre, CP11298A; Black-figure Krater.

Beazley 9019204; Bochum, Ruhr Universitat, Kunstsammlungen, S1089; Black-figure Amphora.
LYDOS 575-525 BC [394 records total]

For example:

(1) Inscribed pieces attributed to Lydos or his pottery:
Beazley 310147; Athens, National Museum, Acropolis Coll., 1.607; Black-figure Dinos (Gigantomachy), inscribed …SEN HOLYDOS E[G]RAPHS[EN], plus a Gigantomachy, all named.
Beazley 310167; Paris, Musee du Louvre, F29; Black-figure Amphora B, inscribed HOLYDOS EGRSEN and Heracles named.
Beazley 785; Bolligen R. Blatter, XXXX0785; Black-figure Cup Little Master Band frag.; artwork ascribed to Lydos, inscribed EPOIESN NEANDROS plus partial letters.
Beazley 46026; New York, Metropolitan Museum, XXXX46026; Black-figure Krater Column frag.; inscription naming MOLPAIOS, PHILOPOS[,.,.] OUKALEGON, ERMOTHALES, DRATA[.,..][,]PISIOS.
Beazley 10151; Malibu, The J. Paul Getty Museum, 86.AE.157; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip; inscribed E[PI][TESEPO]JESEN (ascribed to Lydos).

(2) Inscribed with nonsense letters:
Beazley 252; Basel, Antikenmuseum und Sammlung Ludwig, BS424; Black-figure Amphora B; Satyrs and Maenads, nonsense inscriptions.
Beazley 4562; Private Collection unknown, XXXX4562; Mitteilungen des Deutschen Archäologischen Instituts Athenische Abteilung, 115 (2000), PL.1.2; Black-figure Pyx and Lid; numerous nonsense inscriptions some imitation inscriptions.

(3) Intact pieces without inscriptions:
Beazley 68; Tocra, Museum and Store Room, XXXX0068; Hydria; Sphinx and lions (attributed by Boardman).
Beazley 219; Taranto, Museo Archeologico Nazionale, 52155; Black-figure Cup; Heracles and sea monster, horseman, youths.
Beazley 306540; Herakleion, Giamalakis, XXXX306540; Black-figure Cup Siana; Dionysos, Ariadne between satyrs and maenads.
Beazley 24446; Athens, Ephorate, A8935; Lexicon Iconographicum Mythologiae Classicae, Supplementum I, PL. 197; judgement of Paris with Hermes, Athena, Hera, Aphrodite and draped men.
Beazley 46154; Ancona Museo Archeologico Nazionale, XXXX46154; Black-figure Hydria; Warriors.

Beazley 3271; Hannover, Kestner Museum, 1967.11; Black-figure Amphora.  
Beazley 3836; Salonica, Archaeological Museum, XXXX3836; Black-figure Krater.  
Beazley 3866; Unknown, XXXX3866; Archaiologika Analekta ex Athenon, 10 (1977), 280; Black-figure Likythos.  
Beazley 3967; Salonica, Archaeological Museum, 2972; Black-figure Krater.  
Beazley 4795; Denmark, Private, XXXX4795; Black-figure Amphora.  
Beazley 5601; Tours, Musee des Beaux-Arts, 863.2.65; Black-figure Amphora.  
Beazley 6237; New York, Market, Sotheby's, XXXX6237; Charles Ede Sale Catalogue, Pottery from Athens II (1974), No. 3.  
Beazley 6916; Basel, Antikenmuseum und Sammlung Ludwig, BS408; Black-figure Hydria.
NEARCHOS 575-525BC [14 records total]

For example
(1) Inscribed pieces attributed to Nearchos or his pottery:
Beazley 316; Berne, Archaologisches Seminar, XXXX0316, Museum Helveticum, 36 (1979), 176, FIG.2 (I); Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip; inscribed NE[A]RCHOS MEPOIESEN EU (2), ATLAS H ODE, MELAPHER EN[S], [HER]AKLES.
Beazley 300767; Athens, National Museum, 15155; Black-figure Kantharos frags.; inscribed CH[.. AXIL[..]US], NARCHOS MEIGRAPHSEN KA?[I EPOIESEN], CHAITOS, EU[THO]I[A]S, P[..] P[..] [...S, HEPHAI][STOS.
Beazley 300769; Athens, National Museum, 15156; Black-figure Kantharos frags.; inscribed NEARCHOS [...] H [ERMES, KE?] [...], [LU]CHORGOS.
Beazley 300770; New York, Metropolitan Museum, 26.49; Black-figure Aryballos; inscribed DOPHIOS I CHAIREI, TERPEKHALOS, PHSOLAS, HAOI LEI BRE, NEARCHOS EPOIESEN ME, PERSEIEUS, UE/SETI, HODI, HERMES, RIO, TH[..], AUAS, DRO. KAL, XOS. ARUS. POPU. THEN, AKI, THOI, BAUS, PU. OA.
Beazley 300771; Athens, National Museum, Acropolis Coll., XXXX300771; Black-figure Plaque frag.; inscribed [NE]ARCHOS M[...].
Beazley 300772; Athens, National Museum, Acropolis Coll., 1.614; Black-figure Kantharos frags.; inscribed T[..] [HERA]KLES.
Beazley 300773; Civitavecchia, Museo Civico, XXXX00773; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip; inscribed NEARCHOS EPOIESEN EU, [NEARCHOS EP]OIESEN[N EU].
Beazley 300774; Rome, Museo Naz. Etrusco di Villa Giulia, XXXX300774; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip frag.; inscribed NEARCHOS[...].
Beazley 300775; New York, Metropolitan Museum, 61.11.2; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip; inscribed NEARCHOS MEPOIESEN, NEARCHOS[...].
Beazley 9017710; Rome, Mus. Naz. Etrusco di Villa Giulia, XXXX00774; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip frag.; inscribed NEARCHOS[...].

(2) Inscribed with nonsense letters: none recorded
(3) Intact pieces without inscriptions:
Beazley 300768; Athens, National Museum, Acropolis Coll., AP67, Beazley, *Attic Black-Figure Vase-Painters* (Oxford, 1956), 82, 2, 0, N.
Beazley 23730; Florence, Museo Archeologico Etrusco, 98903, *Lexicon Iconographicum Mythologiae Classicae, SUPPLEMENTUM I, PL.12, ACHILLEUS ADD.43* (PARTS OF A), 0, 0, N; Athenian Black-figure Krater Column; (Talocchini, compared to Nearchos).

**TLESON PAINTER & POTTER, SON OF NEARCHOS 575-500BC [approximately 200 records]**

For example

(1) Inscribed pieces attributed to Tleson or his pottery:
Beazley 427; Hamburg, Museum fur Kunst und Gewerbe, 1967.34; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip frag.; inscribed CHAIRE K[AI ...], plus TLESON signature "between palmettes".
Beazley 3397; California, Hanita and Aaron Dechter, 9, Addž, Beazley Addenda, 2nd ed. (Oxford, 1989), 402; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip, inscribed TLESON HO NEARCHO EPOIESEN.
Beazley 15012; Rome, Mus. Naz. Etrusco di Villa Giulia, 64221; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip; inscribed CHAIREKAIRIEIITEDE
Beazley 28547; Basel, Market, H.A.C., Kunstwerke der Antike, XXXX28547; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip; inscribed CHAIRE KAIRIEI TENDE.
Beazley 28857, Malibu (CA), The J. Paul Getty Museum, 76.AE.90; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip; inscribed [TLESON][HO]NEARCHO EPOIESEN
Beazley 31935; Munich, Antikensammlungen, J38; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip; inscribed CHAIRE CHAIRIEIEU
Beazley 301171; New York (NY), Callimanopoulous, XXXX301171; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip; inscribed TLESONHONEARCHO EPOIESEN.
Beazley 301172; Boston (MA), Museum of fine Arts, 03.851; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip frags.; inscribed TLESONHONEARCHO EPOIESEN.
Beazley 301173; Florence, Museo Archeologico Etrusco, XXXX301173; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip frag.; inscribed TLESONHONEARCHO EPOIESEN.
Beazley 301174, Paris, Musee du Louvre, F86; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip; inscribed TLESONHONEARCHO EPOIESEN.
Beazley 301175; Karlsruhe, Badisches Landesmuseum, 65.43; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip; inscribed TLESONHONEARCHO EPOIESEN, "typical Tleson Painter’s backhand, but not with the short-hasta’d epsilons; the third epsilon is repainted."
Beazley 301176; New York (NY), Metropolitan Museum, 27.122.30; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip; inscribed TLESONHONEARCHO EPOIESEN "between palmettes on A & B".
Beazley 301178; London, Market, Christie’s XXXX301178; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip; inscribed TLESONHONEARCHO EPOIESEN.
Beazley 301179; Berlin, Antikensammlung, F1760; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip; inscribed TLESONHONEARCHO EPOIESEN, A. & B.
Beazley 301180; Berlin, Antikensammlung, F1759; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip; inscribed TLESONHONEARCHO EPOIESEN, A. & B.
Beazley 301181; New York (NY), Metropolitan Museum, 56.171.34; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip; inscribed TLESONHONEARCHO EPOIESEN.
Beazley 301182; Munich, Antikensammlungen, J33; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip; inscribed TLESONHONEARCHO EPOIESEN, A. & B.
Beazley 301186; Orvieto, Museo Civico, XXXX301186, TLESONHONEARCHO EPOIESEN, A & B.
Beazley 301187; Nicosia, Cyprus Museum, C438; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip; inscribed CHAIRE KAI [P]EI EU, side B similar.
Beazley 301188; Warsaw, National Museum, 142446; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip; inscribed TLESONHONEARCHO EPOIESEN, A. & B.
Beazley 301194; Brussels, van Branteghem: 18; Maplewood (NJ), Joseph V. Noble: XXXX301194; Tampa (FL), Museum of Art: 86.50; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip; inscribed CHAIRE KAIRIEIEU.
Beazley 301203; London, British Museum, B421, Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip; inscribed TLESONHONEARCHO EPOIESEN, A. & B.

442 In the Beazley Archive Tleson the painter is accorded 146 pieces and Tleson the potter 110 pieces, however there is an overlap of around fifty pieces appearing in both lists.
Beazley 301204; Paris, Seillere, XXXX301204; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip; inscribed TLESONHONEARCHOEPOIESEN, A. & B.

Beazley 301205; London, British Museum, B410; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip; inscribed TLESONHONEARCHOEPOIESEN, A. & B. (Erotic, Satyr)

Beazley 301206; Rome, Market, XXXX301206; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip; Lost; inscribed on A with signature.

Beazley 301207; Bonn, Akademisches Kunstmuseum, 53; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip; inscribed TLESONHONEARCHOEPOIESEN, A. & B.

Beazley 301208; Boston (MA), Museum of Fine Arts, 92.2655; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip; inscribed TLESONHONEARCHOEPOIESEN. "Letter forms a bit unusual for the Tleson Painter … first epsilon and the last-but-one omicron are smeared."

Beazley 301209; Brussels, Musees Royaux, R385B; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip; inscribed TLESONHONEARCHOEPOIESEN, A. & B.

Beazley 301210; Brussels, Musees Royaux, R385C, Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip; inscribed TLESONHONEARCHOEPOIESEN, A. & B., "in the hand of the Tleson painter."

Beazley 301211; Dresden, Staatl. Kunsthalle, Albertinum, ZV2714; Black-figure cup Little Master Lip; inscribed TLESONHONEARCHOEPOIESEN, A. & B.

Beazley 301212; Florence, Museo Archeologico Etrusco, XXXX301212; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip; inscribed TLESONHONEARCHOEPOIESEN, A. & B.

Beazley 301213; Heidelberg, Ruprecht-Karls-Universitat, S29; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip frag.; inscribed TLESONH[...]NEARCHOEPOIESEN.

Beazley 301214; Heidelberg, Ruprecht-Karls-Universitat, S30; black-figure Cup Little Master Lip frag.; inscribed TLESO[N]/b/[b]ONEARCHOEPOIESEN/[/b], [X]IREKAIPIEIEU]//[/b].

Beazley 301217; Leipzig, Antikenmuseum d. Universitat Leipzig, T52; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip; inscribed TLESONHONEARCHOEPOIESEN, A. & B.

Beazley 301218; London, British Museum, B411; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip; inscribed TLESONHONEARCHOEPOIESEN, A. & B.

Beazley 301219; Munich, Antikensammlungen, 2127; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip; inscribed TLESONHONEARCHOEPOIESE, TLESONEARCHOEPOIESE[.]SNE; "the lettering is cramped … sloppier … signature on B. is miswritten The hand is typical of the Tleson painter."

Beazley 301220; Munich, Antikensammlungen, 2126; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip; inscribed TLESONHONEARCHOEPOIESEN; "the writing is very distinctive, especially sigma and nu.

Beazley 301221; Naples, Museo Archeologico Nazionale, H2528; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip; inscribed TLESONHONE[A]RCOE(P)[O][E][E][N]; "manya lettes are incomplete."

Beazley 301222; Naples, Museo Archeologico Nazionale, STG271; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip; inscribed TLESONKONEARCHOEPOIESEN; "the inscription on B is distinctly less careful than that on A. Irregular epsilons, once oversize. ... KO for HO miswritten."

Beazley 301223; Orvieto, Museo Civico, XXXX301223; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip; inscribed TLESONHONEARCHOEPOIESEN, A & B.

Beazley 301225; Taranto, Museo Archeologico Nazionale, 4440; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip; inscribed TLESONHONEARCHOEPOIESEN, A. & B.

Beazley 301226; Vatican City, Museo Gregoriano Etrusco Vaticano, 322; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip; inscribed TLESONHONEARCHOEPOIESEN, A. & B.

Beazley 301227; Rome, Mus. Naz. Etrusco di Villa Giulia, 50654; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip; inscribed TLESONHONEARCHOEPOIESEN, A. & B, undecorated lip.

Beazley 301228; Boston (MA), Museum of Fine Arts, 62.615; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip; inscribed TLESONH[ARCHOEPOIES]EN, TLESO[NHONEARCHOEPOIESEN], TLESO[NHONEARCHOEPOIESEN].

Beazley 301354; Boston (MA), Museum of Fine Arts, 98.920; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip; inscribed TLESONHONEARCHOEPOIESEN, A. & B.

Beazley 302323; London, British Museum, B416; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip; inscribed KAIKEKAIPIEIEU, KAIKE[K][AI][P]IEIEU. "B is sloppier than A.

Beazley 302406; Braunschweig, Herzog Anton Ulrich Museum, 495; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip frag.; inscribed TLESO[N…]
Beazley 302407; Rome, Private, XXXX302407; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip frags.; inscribed [TLESO][HNONEAR][CHOEPOIESEN].

Beazley 302408; Kavala, Museum, XXXX302408; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip frag.; inscribed [TLESONHONEAR][CHOEPOIESE][N].

Beazley 302409; Florence, Museo Archeologico Etrusco, XXXX302407; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip frag.; inscribed TLESONH[ONEAR][CHOEPOIESE][N].

Beazley 302410; Izmir, Archaeological Museum, 49A; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip frag.; inscribed [TLESONH[ONEAR][CHOEPOIESE][N]].

Beazley 302411; Athens, Agora Museum, P13349; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip frags.; inscribed [TLESONHONEAR][CHOEPOIESE][EN].

Beazley 302412; Florence, Museo Archeologico Etrusco, XXXX302412; Black-figure Cup Little Master frags. (11); all inscribed with signatures.

Beazley 302413; Rome, Hartwig, XXXX302413; Black-figure Cup Little Master frag.; inscribed [TLE[SONHO][...], [...][SEN].

Beazley 302414; Leipzig, Kunstgewerbemuseum, XXXX32414; Black-figure Cup Little Master frag.; inscribed TLESONH[ONEARCHO][POIESEN].

Beazley 302415; Sydney, University, Nicholson Museum, 56.22; Black-figure Cup Little Master frag.; inscribed [TLESONHO][NEARCHO][POIESEN].

Beazley 302416; Siena, Museo Archeologico, 38447; Black-figure Cup Little Master frag.; inscribed [TLESONH[ONEARCHO][POIESEN]. “For two other Tleson signatures omitting the father’s name, see Heidelberg 81/10 and 91/1.”

Beazley 302417; Siena, Museo Archeologico, 38446; Black-figure Cup Little Master frag.; inscribed [TLESONHO][NEARCHO][POIESE][N].

Beazley 302418; Erlangen, Friedrich-Alexander-Universitat, I837; Black-figure Cup Little Master frag.; inscribed [TLESONHO][NEARCHO][POIESE][N].

Beazley 302419; Rome, Mus. Naz. Etrusco di Villa Giulia, XXXX302419; Black-figure Cup Little Master frag.; inscribed [TLESONHO][NEARCHO][POIESE][N].

Beazley 302420; Oxford, Ashmolean Museum, 1953.11; Black-figure Cup Little Master frag.; inscribed TLESONH[ONEARCHO][POIESE][N].

Beazley 302421; Oxford, Ashmolean Museum, 1953.12; Black-figure Cup Little Master frag.; inscribed [TLE][SONHO][NEARCHO][POIESE][N].

Beazley 302422; St. Petersburg, State Hermitage Museum, XXXX302422; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip frag.; inscribed "signature of Tleson.”

Beazley 302423; Florence, Museo Archeologico Etrusco, XXXX302423; Black-figure Cup Little Master Band frag.; inscribed TLESONHO[NEARCHO][POIESE][N].

Beazley 302424; Gottingen, Georg-August-Universitat, 66; Black-figure Cup Little Master Band frag.; inscribed TLESONHO[NEARCHO][POIESE][N].

Beazley 302425; Rome, Hartwig, XXXX302425; Black-figure Cup Little Master Band; inscribed TLESONHO[NEARCHO][POIESE][N].

Beazley 302426; Leipzig, Antikenmuseum d Universitat Leipzig, T422, Black-figure Cup frag.; inscribed [T][LESON [...]

Beazley 302427; Unknown, XXXX302427; CAVI 7279; Lost; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip frag.; inscribed "signature of Tleson.”

Beazley 302428; London, British Museum B420; Black-figure Cup; inscribed T L[E]SO[N H]O NEARCHO EPOIESE, NIKAPHRODITE.

Beazley 302912; Munich, Antikensammlungen, 2150; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip; inscribed TLESONHO[NEARCHO][POIESE][N], NIKA APHRODITE.

Beazley 302410; Munich, Antikensammlungen, J32; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip; inscribed TLESONHO[NEARCHO][POIESE][N], NIKA APHRODITE.

Beazley 303011; New York (NY), Callimanopoulos, XXXX303011; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip; inscribed TLESONHO[NEARCHO][POIESE][N], NIKA APHRODITE.

Beazley 303018; Cambridge, Fitzwilliam Museum, GR47.1864A; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip; inscribed TLESONHO[NEARCHO][POIESE][N], NIKA APHRODITE.

Beazley 303038; Naples, Museo Archeologico Nazionale, 81136; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip; inscribed TLESONHO[NEARCHO][POIESE][N], NIKA APHRODITE.

Beazley 303078; Munich, Antikensammlungen, J32; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip; inscribed TLESONHO[NEARCHO][POIESE][N], NIKA APHRODITE.

Beazley 303084; Copenhagen, National Museum 105; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip; inscribed TLESONHO[NEARCHO][POIESE][N], NIKA APHRODITE.

Beazley 303210; New York (NY), Metropolitan Museum, 18.74.2; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip; inscribed CHAIRES[I][PI][EI]E[I], CHAIRES[I][PI][EI]E[I].

Beazley 305475; Vatican City, Museo Gregoriano Etrusco Vaticano, G60; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip; inscribed TLESONHO[NEARCHO][POIESE][N], NIKA APHRODITE.
Beazley 305495; Leipzig, Antikenmuseum d. Universitat Leipzig; XXXX305495; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip frags.; inscribed TLESON HO NEARCHO EPOIESEN (iota omitted on one side).

Beazley 350515; New York (NY), Metropolitan Museum, 55.11.13; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip; inscribed TLE[O]N HO NEARCHO EPOIESEN.

Beazley 350516; Ascona, Galleria Casa Serodine, XXXX350516; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip; inscribed TLESON HO NEARCHO EPOIESEN.

Beazley 350721; Cincinnati (OH), Art Museum, 1979.2; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip; inscribed TLESON HO NEARCHO EPOIESEN.

Beazley 350722; Private, collection unknown, XXXX350722; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip; inscribed [TL]ESON HO NEARCHO EPOIESEN.

Beazley 350723; Basel, Antikenmuseum und Sammlung Ludwig, BS405; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip; inscribed TLESON HO NEARCHO EPOIESEN.

Beazley 350724; Geneva, Market XXXX350724; Beazley Paralipomena (Oxford, 1971) 75; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip; inscribed SU CHAIRE KAI PIEI EU TOI.

Beazley 350725; Philadelphia (PA), Market XXXX350725; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip frags.; inscribed TLESON HO NEARCHO EPO.

Beazley 350726; Riehen, Private, XXXX350726; Beazley Paralipomena (Oxford, 1971) 75; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip; inscribed CHAIRE KAI PIEI EU.

Beazley 350728; London, British Museum, B415; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip; inscribed CHAIRE KAI PIEI EU.

Beazley 350729; London, British Museum, 1854.5-19.2; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip; inscribed CHAIRE KAI PIEI EU.

Beazley 350732; Toledo (OH), Museum of Art, 58.70; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip; inscribed TLESON HO NEARCHO EPOIESEN.

Beazley 1006087; Munich, Antikensammlungen, 9414; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip frags.; inscribed CHAIRE [AI P]IEI EU, [CHAIRE KAI] PIEI EU.

Beazley 19616; Unknown, Excavation, XXXX19616, BCH, Bulletin de Correspondance Hellenique, 118 (1994) 800, FIG.125; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip frag.; inscribed [CHAI]RE KAI PIEI EU, CHAIRE KAI PIEI.

Beazley 19880; New York (NY), Market, Sotheby's, XXXX19880; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip; inscribed TLESON HO NEARCHO EPOIESEN.

Beazley 200565; Naples, Museo Archeologico Nazionale, M1149; Red-figure Cup frag.; inscribed TLESON HO NUP N [R]OP[E]OIESE[N], TLESONNUM[L][L] EOEPOIESEN; Attic alphabet and miswritten letters.

Beazley 350734; Toledo (OH), Museum of Art, 1958.70; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip; inscribed "Tleson potter by signature."
Beazley 350736; Paris, Market, XXXX350736, *Paralipomena* (Oxford, 1971), 76; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip; inscribed "Tleson potter by signature."

Beazley 9016914; Private, Collection unknown, XXXX350722, Swiss Private; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip; inscribed TLESON HO NEARCHO EPOIESEN.

Beazley 9017701; Basel, Market, Munzen und Medaillen, A.G., Basel, sale catalogue, LAGERLISTE 500 (1987) 47.428 (A); Black-figure Cup Little master lip; inscribed TLESON HO NEARCHO EPOIESEN.

Beazley 9017869; Basel, Market, Munzen und Medaillen A.G., CAVI 2114; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip; inscribed TLESON HO NEARCHO EPOIESEN, KALOS SELINO; "a feminine name, so probably a kale-name with kale omitted."

Beazley 9017933; Rome, Marchesa Isabella Guglielmi, CAVI 3193, Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip; inscribed "Tleson potter by signature."

(2) Inscribed with nonsense letters:
Beazley 6871; Zurich, Market, Galerie am Neumarkt, XXXX6871; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip; nonsense inscriptions between palmettes on sides A & B.2.

Beazley 44980; Moscow, Pushkin State Museum of fine Arts, 72; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip, nonsense inscription "a row of 12 imitation letters and blobs"; "five letters of the same kind."

Beazley 350737; New York (NY), Market, XXXX3507237; *Paralipomena* (Oxford, 1971) 76; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip; inscribed with dots that possibly represent inscriptions.

Beazley 355; Karlsruhe, Badisches Landesmuseum, 67.90; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip; inscribed U[U][U][.] [U][A][U][O][V][.] [U][U], E[P][N][.] [S][.] [O][U][C][H][L][S][NS]. The paintings are (A) a potter at a wheel with a boy seated turning the wheel; (B) a potter with a finished cup on the wheel and a youth standing with him.

(3) Intact pieces without inscriptions:
Beazley 6943, Zurich, Market, Arete, Galerie fur Antike Kunst, Liste 10, 6-7; XXXX6943; Black-figure Cup Little Master Band.

Beazley 8388, St. Petersbourg, State Hermitage Museum, 2616; Black-figure Cup Little Master Band.

Beazley 10136, Malibu (CA), The J. Paul Getty Museum, S80.AE.60, Black-figure Cup Little Master Band.

Beazley 13740; Rome, Musei Capitolini, 295; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip.

Beazley 16049; Bremen, Zimmermann, XXXX16049; Black-figure Cup Little Master Band.

Beazley 16096; Unknown, Excavation, XXXX16096; Madrider Mitteilungen: 26 (1985) PL.8B.

Beazley 17071, New York (NY), Market, Royal Athena, XXXX17071; Black-figure Cup Little Master Band.

Beazley 24285; New York (NY), Market, Christie's, XXXX24285; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip.

Beazley 301191; Wurzburg, Universitat, Martin von wagner Mus.: 409; black-figure Cup Little Master Lip.

Beazley 301192; Compiegne, Musee Vivenel: 1091; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip.

Beazley 301195; Paris, Cabinet des Medailles, 317; Black-figure Cup, Little Master Band; sirens between palmettes.

Beazley 301196; Manchester, City Art Gallery & Museum, 111H51; Black-figure Cup Little Master Band.

Beazley 301197; Munich, Loeb, SL462, SammlungLoeb, Black-figure Cup Little Master Band.

Beazley 301199; Moscow, State Historical Museum, III1B367; Black-figure Cup Little Master Band.

Beazley 301200; Wilanow, Stanislaw Kostka Potocki, 5303; Black-figure Cup Little Master Band.

Beazley 301201; New York (NY), Metropolitan Museum, 1898.8.16; Black-figure Cup Little Master Band.

Beazley 301202; Athens, National Museum, 502; Black-figure Pyx.

Beazley 350517; Oxford, Ashmolean Museum, 1964.621; Black-figure Cup Little Master Band.

Beazley 350518; Tocra, Museum and Store Room 1056; Black-figure Cup Little Master Band.

Beazley 350730; Jerusalem, Israel Museum, 91.71.309; Black-figure Cup Little Master Band.

Beazley 1006086; Munich, Antikensammlungen, J166, M1094; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip.
6.2 RED-FIGURE PAINTERS: PSIAX, EUPHRONIOS, ANDOKIDES, DIKAIOS, EUTHYMIDES, PHINITIAS, SMIKROS, HISCHYLOS

PSIAX 525-475 BC [102 records total]
For example

(1) Inscribed pieces attributed to Psiax or his pottery:
Beazley 200032; Athens, National Museum, Acropolis Coll., 2.452; Red-figure Skyphos frag.; inscribed […]EP[O]IESEN.
Beazley 13622; Basel, Market, Munzen und Medaillen A.G., XXXX13622; Black-figure Amphora neck; inscribed KALOS HI[KE]TES and Heracles and Apollo named.
Beazley 14877; Compiegne, Musee Vivenel, 1106; Red-figure Cup; inscribed KALE OPOS PIESTHE (disputed).
Beazley 18411; Basel, H. Cahn, HC1432; Black-figure Amphora; inscribed ANDOKIDESEPOIESEN.
Beazley 200021; Munich, Antikensammlungen, 2302; Red-figure Amphora; inscribed KALOS, HIPPOKRATES, Iolaos, Heracles and Hermes named.
Beazley 200022; Madrid, Museo Arqueologico Nacional, 11008; Red-figure Amphora; inscribed ANDOKIDESEPOIESEN.
Beazley 200023; Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania, 5399; Red-figure Amphora A; inscribed PSIAX, MENONEPOIESEN, Apollo, Leto and Artemis named plus names of two horses SKONTHON, PI[..IP] O().
Beazley 200024; Karlsruhe, Badisches Landesmuseum, B120; Red-figure Alabastron; inscribed PSIAX EGRAPHSEN, HILINOSEPOIESEN.
Beazley 200025; Odessa, Museum of Western and Eastern Art, 26602; Red-figure Alabastron; inscribed PSIAXEGRAPHSEN, HILINOSEPOIESEN.
Beazley 200027; Cleveland, Museum of Art, 76.89; Red-figure Cup; inscribed ZOILOS (not dipinto, but engraved under foot).
Beazley 200034; London, British Museum, 1900.11.1; Black-figure alabastron; inscribed SMIKRONKALOS, KALOSKARYSTIOS, MORYLOS.
Beazley 200037; London, Victoria and Albert Museum, 275.64; Red-figure Mastoid; (possibly Psiax); inscribed BRACHASKALOS.
Beazley 320351; Copenhagen, National Museum, 112; Black-figure Amphora neck; Inscribed warrior AMPHIARAOS or KAL(L)IPHORA.
Beazley 320354; Berlin, lost, F1897, BerlinVerluste, Staatliche Museen zu Berlin, Antikensammlung, Dokumentation der Verluste, V.1, Skulpturen, Vasen, Elfenbein und Knochen, Goldschmuck, Gemmen und Kameen (Berlin, 2005), 119, F1897 (NOT ILL.), Berlin 1897; Black-figure Hydria; inscribed SIMON, SIKON, EU[THOS].
Beazley 320356; Wurzburg, Universitat, Martin von Wagner Mus., L319; Black-figure Hydria; inscribed ARION, PIA? ENPLOS.
Beazley 320358; St. Petersburg, State Hermitage Museum, 1429; Black-figure Alabastron; inscribed AISCHIS, KALOS.
Beazley 320370; Athens, National Museum, Acropolis Coll., 1.1633; Black-figure Cup Little Master frags.; possibly inscribed […]A[N ETHEKEN […]].
Beazley 320371; Athens, Agora Museum, P5002; Black-figure Lekythos frags.; inscribed […]S EN.
Beazley 200024; Karlsruhe, Badisches Landesmuseum B120; Red-figure Alabastron; inscribed HILINOSEPOIESEN.
Beazley 200025; Odessa, Museum of Western and Eastern Art 26602; Red-figure Alabastron; inscribed HILINOSEPOIE. Beazley 44587; Adria, Museo Archeologico Nazionale 22916; Black-figure Amphora, neck fragment; inscribed names Heracles and Apollo.

Beazley 320356; Wurzburg, Universitat, Martin von Wagner Mus. L319; Black-figure Kydria; inscribed PIAP ENPLOS, AGRETOS, XOLARGOS, SXANTHOS.

(2) Inscribed with nonsense letters:
Beazley 8076; Florence, Museo Archeologico Etrusco, 3858; Black-figure Amphora, neck fragment; inscribed names Heracles and Apollo. Lettering recalls Leagros group.

Beazley 340531; Rome, Mus. Naz. Etrusco di Villa Giulia, 64217; Black-figure Amphora; nonsense inscriptions with many letters seeming to name figures; CAVI suggests them similar to others by the Painter of Berlin 1686.

(3) Whole pieces without inscriptions:
Beazley 4523; Malibu, The J. Paul Getty Museum, 90.AE.122; Black-figure Mastos.

Beazley 4524; Basel, Market, Palladion, XXXX4524; Black-figure Mastos.

Beazley 4525; New York, Metropolitan Museum, 1975.11.6; Black-figure Mastos.

Beazley 8252; Tessin, Private, XXXX8252, (Lexicon Iconographicum Mythologiae Classicae, VII, PL.218); Red-figure Hydria.

Beazley 9934; Copenhagen, Thorvaldsen Museum, 10; Black-figure Oinochoe.

Beazley 41072; Havana, Museo Nacional de Bellas Artes, 225; Black-figure Kantharos.

Beazley 200026; Lost, XXXX0.26, ARV, Beazley, J.D., Attic Red-Figure Vase-Painters, 2nd edition (Oxford, 1963), 7.6, 0, N; Red-figure Aryballos.

Beazley 340532; Philadelphia, Market, XXXX340532; Black-figure Amphora.

Beazley 340533; Vatican City, Museo Gregoriano Etrusco Vaticano, 346; Black-figure Amphora.

Beazley 340534; New York, Market, Christie's, XXXX340534; Black-figure Amphora.

Beazley 340535; New York, Market, Christie's, XXXX340535; Black-figure Amphora.

EUPHRONIOS 550-500BC [75 records total]

For example

(1) Inscribed pieces attributed to Euphronios or his pottery:
Beazley 187; New York, Metropolitan Museum, 1972.11.10; Red-figure Krater; inscribed EUPHRONIOS EGRAPHSEN, EUXITHEOS EPOIESEN, LEAGROS KALOS, LAODAMAS, HUPNOS, HERMES, THANATOS, SARPEDON, HIPPOLUTOS, HUPEROXOS, HIPP(A)SOS, MEG? ON, AKASTOS, AXSIPPOS named.

Euphronios was the pupil of Psiax.
Beazley 6203; Munich, Antikensammlungen, 8953; Red-figure Cup; inscribed EUPHRONIOS EGRAPHSEN, TELESIAS KALOS.

Beazley 7043; Private, Collection unknown, XXXX7043, cf. Robertson, C.M., The art of vase-painting in classical Athens (Cambridge, 1992), 22, FIG.15-16; Red-figure Cup; inscribed EUPHRONIOS EGRAPHSEN, HUP(ON)OS, SA(R)PEDON, (TH)ANATOS, AKAMAS named.

Beazley 7501; New York, Shelby White & Leon Levy Collection, XXXX7501, Greek Vases in the J. Paul Getty Museum 6 (2000), 181, FIG.9; Red-figure Krater, frags.; inscribed EUPHRONIOS EGRAPHSEN, ATELENA, AUKOS, ARÉS, APHRODITE, (AN)TIAS, named.

Beazley 7503; Malibu, The J. Paul Getty Museum, 77.AE.86; Red-figure Krater frags.; inscribed ATHENA, (PER)SEUS named.

Beazley 7507; Malibu, The J. Paul Getty Museum, 79.AE.17, PHOTO, PHOTOGRAPH(S) IN THE BEAZLEY ARCHIVE, 4, Malibu 79.AE.19.+(1); Red-figure Cup frags.; inscribed EUPHRONIOS EPOIESEN, (TE)LA(MO)N.

Beazley 16551; Malibu, The J. Paul Getty Museum, 86.AE.311; Red-figure Cup frag.; inscribed (EUPHRONI)OS EPOIESEN.

Beazley 28790; Malibu, The J. Paul Getty Museum, 83.AE.429; Red-figure Cup frags.; inscribed EUPHRONIOS EPOIESEN, (TE)LA(MO)N.

Beazley 30693; Thasos, Archaeological Museum, 80.51.21; Red-figure Cup frags.; inscribed (X)AXRULIO(N) EPOI[...].

Beazley 43240; New York, Metropolitan Museum, 1989.382.1; Red-figure Cup frags.; inscribed PHORBAS, (X)AXRULIO(N) EPOIESEN, (POL)UDEU(KES), (K)ASTOR.

Beazley 200063; Berlin, Antikensammlung, F2180; Red-figure Krater; inscribed LEAGROS KALOS, HO PAIS, ANTIAS, KUKNOS, ARES, APHRODITE, (AN)TIAS named.

Beazley 200064; Milan, Civico Museo Archeologico, A1810; Red-figure Krater frag.; inscribed EUPHRONIOS EPOIESEN, LEAGROS KALOS, POLUKLES, HU(L)AS, KEPHISODOROS, M?(E)LAS KA(L)OS.

Beazley 200065; Paris, Musee du Louvre, CP748; Red-figure Krater; inscribed EUPHRONIOS EGRAPHSEN, HERAKLES, A(N)TAIOS, LEAGROS KALOS, POLUKLES, HU(L)AS, KEPHISODOROS, M?(E)LAS KA(L)OS.

Beazley 200066; Malibu, The J. Paul Getty Museum, 77.AE.86; Red-figure Krater frags.; inscribed EUPHRONIOS EPOIESEN, LEAGROS KALOS, POLUKLES, HU(L)AS, KEPHISODOROS, M?(E)LAS KA(L)OS.

Beazley 200067; Paris, Musee du Louvre, G33; Red-figure Krater frags.; inscribed EURION EPOIESEN, LEAGROS KALOS, POLUKLES, HU(L)AS, KEPHISODOROS, M?(E)LAS KA(L)OS.

Beazley 200068; Paris, Musee du Louvre, CP11071; Red-figure Amphora neck; inscribed ANTIAS KALOS, PAIS, MAMEKAPOTEI.

Beazley 200073; Rome, Mus. Naz. Etrusco di Villa Giulia, XXXX0.73; Red-figure Pelike; inscribed LEAGROS KALOS.

Beazley 200074; Chicago, Univ. of Chicago, D.&A. Smart Gall., 1967.115.1; Red-figure Pelike; inscribed LEAGROS KALOS.

Beazley 200075; Dresden, Staatl. Kunstsammlungen, Albertinum, 295; Red-figure Hydra; inscribed LEAGROS KALOS, ANTIAS KALOS, SM(IKU)THOS.

Beazley 200077; Boston, Museum of Fine Arts, 10.221; Red-figure Psikter; inscribed GALEVE (retr.), PENTHEUS named.

Beazley 200078; St. Petersburg, State Hermitage Museum, 125; Red-figure Psikter; inscribed EUPHRONIOS EGRAPHSEN, LEAGRE KALOS, AGAPE, PALAISTO, SMIKRA, SEKLINE named.

Beazley 200079; Heidelberg, Ruprecht-Karls-Universitat, 51; Red-figure frags.; inscribed ANTIAS.

Beazley 200080; Munich, Antikensammlungen, J337; Red-figure; inscribed EUPHRONIOS EGRAPHSEN, CHACHRYLIONEPOIESEN, LEAGROS KALOS, EURYTION, IOLEOS, ATHENAIA, HERAK?LES, (GER)OJUNES, (H)O PAIS KAL0?S?

Beazley 200081; Athens, National Museum, 15214; Red-figure Cup frags.; inscribed EUPHRONIOS EGRAPHSEN, THETIS, LEAGROS KALOS, H(ERA), HEPHAISTOS, LE(TO).

Beazley 200082; Tarquinia, Museo Nazionale Tarquiniense, RC2978; Red-figure Cup frag.; inscribed TOXARIS.
ANDOKIDES 525-475 BC [49 records total]444
For example
(1) Inscribed pieces attributed to Andokides or his pottery:
Beazley 200001; Berlin, Antikensammlung, F2159; Red-figure Amphora; inscribed ANDOKIDESEPOESEN.
Beazley 200002; Paris, Musée du Louvre, G1; Red-figure Amphora; inscribed ANDOKIDESEPOESEN.
Beazley 200013; Paris, Musée du Louvre, F203; Red-figure Amphora; inscribed ANDOKIDESEPOESEN.
Beazley 200014; Palermo, Mus. Arch. Regionale, 1448; Red-figure Cup; inscribed (ANDOKIDES) E(P)O(…..)
Beazley 200022; Madrid, Museo Arqueologico Nacional, 11008; Red-figure Amphora; inscribed ANDOKIDESEPOESEN.

444 Andokides was the pupil of Exekias; a bi-lingual painter in that he produced both Black- and Red-figure clayware.
Beazley 200617; Rome, Mus. Naz. Etrusco di Villa Giulia, XXXX0.617; Red-figure Krater; inscribed (ANDOKIDES EPOE) + KIDESEPOE, EPIKTE(TOS E)GRASPHEN (for egraphsen).

Beazley 275000; New York, Metropolitan Museum, 63.11.6; Red-figure; inscribed ANDOKIDES EPOE.

Beazley 302216; New York, Metropolitan Museum, 1999.30AB; Black-figure Amphora; inscribed ANDOKIDES EPOIESE.

Beazley 302217; London, British Museum, 1980.10-29.1; Black-figure Amphora, inscribed ANDOKIDES EPOIESE.

Beazley 200005; Orvieto, Museo Civico, Coll. Faina, 64; Red-figure Amphora A; inscribed [LE][A(G)]ROS KA[LOS] (retr.) "the gamma was omitted because of its similarity to the preceding alpha.

Beazley 200020; Athens, National Museum, XXXX0.20; Red-figure Mastos; inscribed [...]CHS[..], [...]ESE[..], [...]S, "reversed three-stroke sigma.

2) Nonsense letters:
Beazley 200004; Basel, Antikenmuseum und Sammlung Ludwig, BS491; Red-figure Amphora A; on the top of lid a gamma reversed.

3) Intact pieces not inscribed:
Beazley 302263; Paris, Musee du Louvre, F295; Black-figure Hydria.
Beazley 5189; Madison (Wi), Elvehjem Museum of Art, 1985.97; Black-figure Cup.
Beazley 8255; Essen, Folkwang Museum, A169; Black-figure Cup.
Beazley 302228; Paris, Musee du Louvre, F294; Black-figure Hydria.
Beazley 302231; Munich, Antikensammlungen, 2080; Black-figure Cup.
Beazley 302232; Cambridge, Fitzwilliam Museum, 37.12; Black-figure Cup.
Beazley 200009; Munich, Antikensammlungen 2301; Red-figure Amphora.

Beazley 396; Oxford, Ashmolean Museum, 1974.344; Black-figure Cup A.
Beazley 9613; Toronto, Market, Artworld, XXXX9613; Black-figure Amphora Neck; Amazonomachy.

Beazley 11824; Oxford, Ashmolean Museum, 1925.14; Black-figure Amphora.

Beazley 200007; Boston (MA), Museum of Fine Arts, 01.8037; Red-figure Amphora A.
Beazley 200008; London, British Museum, B193; Red-figure Amphora A.

Beazley 200009; Munich, Antikensammlungen, 2301; Red-figure Amphora A.

Beazley 200010; Bologna, Museo Civico Archeologico, 151; Red-figure Amphora A.

Beazley 200012; Boston (MA), Museum of Fine Arts, 99.538; Red-figure Amphora A.

Beazley 275001; Budapest, Hungarian Museum of Fine Arts, 51.28; Red-figure Cup A.
Beazley 301323; Boston (MA), Museum of Fine Arts, 01.80.52; Black-figure Amphora Neck.

DIKAIOS 550-500BC [17 records total]445

For example

(1) Inscribed pieces attributed to Dikaios or his pottery:
Beazley 200166; London, British Museum, E254; Red-figure Amphora A; inscribed [.]OPAOISAOGI, TOP[...].OIO, EOIS, TONEI, EOPOI, IOPI, TOTE N OPOENAI, IOPO[G]M, POE[...][I].E[...], ONMAOPAE N IPO, EOPOPAERIO ("certainly not complete at end"), CHOPAOP.

Beazley 200174; Vienna, University, 631B; Red-figure Amphora frags.; inscribed (APO)ILLON (retr.).

Beazley 200190; Paris, Cabinet des Medailles, 387; Red-figure Krater frag.; inscribed LUSII(L).A.

Beazley 200191; London, British Museum, E767; Red-figure Psykter; inscribed KUDIAS, CHAIRE, CHAIRE, KARTA, DIKAIOS, (...)CHARCHON.

Andokides was the pupil of Exekias; a bi-lingual painter in that he produced both Black- and Red-figure clayware.

445 Andokides was the pupil of Exekias; a bi-lingual painter in that he produced both Black- and Red-figure clayware.
Beazley 200192; Brussels, Musees Royaux, R351; Red-figure Hydria; inscribed EGI(L)A, POLULA(OS), KLEOKRATE(S), SEK?LINE.
Beazley 303016; Bologna, Museo Civico Archeologico, 288; Black-figure Amphora; inscribed (PHA(O)N, APHRO(D)ITE.

(2) Inscribed with nonsense letters:
Beazley 200175; London, British Museum, E255; Red-figure; inscribed ATHENAIA, PALOS, DECHIOI, AP(?OL)OLON, ARTEMIS, (then nonsense) KAI GECHGOGK, CHLE(SI, C.HECHGIOCHECHOGE CHLEIOPICHO.
Beazley 200166; London, British Museum, E254; Red-figure Amphora; inscribed (..)O? POISAOGI, TOP (..) OI, O, EOIS, IOP, TOTE OPOENAI, IOPO(G)M, POE(…)I? (..)E(…), ONMAOFAE IPO, EOPO? PAERII, KOPAO.
Beazley 200193; Paris, Musee du Louvre, G51; Red-figure Hydria; inscribed LSP CHSCHS, CHLCHHP.
Beazley 200195; Basel, Antikenmuseum und Sammlung Ludwig, BS437; Red-figure Hydria; inscribed LOKRE, EGONO(., plus letters.
Beazley 200196; New York, Metropolitan Museum, 21.88.2; Red-figure Hydria (recalls Pioneer group); inscribed POIPIOI, LPOIS, PIOP, CHUPU, OPGO(P), SPIS(O), OISTLO.

(3) Whole pieces uninscribed:
Beazley 303017; Agrigento, Museo Archeologico Regionale, C1954; Black-figure Amphora.

EUTHYMIDES 525-475BC [40 records total]

For example
(1) Inscribed pieces attributed to Euthymides or his pottery:
Beazley 200124; Haslemere, Haslemere Educational Museum, 03,5; Red-figure Cup, inscribed EUT(UMIDES) EGRA(PHSEN.
Beazley 200125; Athens, National Museum, Acropolis Coll., 2,211; Red-figure Cup frags.; inscribed KALOS LEAGROS, DEUS, PHOR(PHURION), APOLLO ON, EURALO(S), (EU)RUBOTOS?, HEPH(AISTOS), EKSOR.
Beazley 200128; Athens, Agora Museum, P4683; Red-figure Stand frags.; inscribed (HO DEIN(A) EPOIES(E)IN (EUTUMIDES EGRA)PHSEN? H O) POL(L)IO, KA(LOS).
Beazley 200129; Adria, Museo Archeologico Nazionale, 22139; Red-figure Plate; inscribed EUTHUMIDES EGRAPHE.
Beazley 200140; Turin, Museo di Antichita, 4123; Red-figure Psykter, inscribed EUTHUMIDES EGRAPHESEN HOPOLIO, EU GE, NAIXI, THESEUS, KL(UT)IOS.
Beazley 200141; Bonn, Akademisches Kunstmuseum, 70; Red-figure Hydria; inscribed MEGAKLES KALOS, SMIKUTHOS, EU(HUMIDES E) GEPH.
Beazley 200145; Aidone, Museo Archeologico, 58,2382; Red-figure Krater; inscribed ANDROMACHE, HERAK(L)ES, KOSIA(S) CHARA, XAI(RE), (S)OSIA(S), (...).IOS.
Beazley 200149; Warsaw, National Museum, 142332; Red-figure Amphora neck; inscribed ATHENION, EXE, D(U)N, OION, OPHON, BRIKON.
Beazley 200156; Paris, Musee du Louvre, G44; Red-figure Amphora; inscribed DA(M)AS, XAI(RE), SOTIS, XARX(N), XAI(RET)I(., (..)AS.
Beazley 200157; Munich, Antikensammlungen, J410; Red-figure Amphora; inscribed HERES, PERITHOUS, HELENE, THESEUS, KL(UT)IOS.
Beazley 200161; Munich, Antikensammlungen, J378; Red-figure Amphora; inscribed E(G)E KALOS, SMIKUTHOS, EU(HUMIDES E) GEPH.
Beazley 200165; Munich, Antikensammlungen, J374; Red-figure Amphora; inscribed H(OPOLI)O E(G)E KALOS, SMIKUTHOS, EU(HUMIDES E) GEPH.
Beazley 200196; New York, Metropolitan Museum, 21.88.2; Red-figure Cup frag.; inscribed (EU)THUMIDES EGRAPHESEN, (A)POL(L)IO(N)OS, HILUTHA.
Beazley 275011; Athens, National Museum, Acropolis Coll., 2.231; Red-figure Cup frags.; inscribed (…)OS, [KAL]OS?.

Beazley 9988; Private collection unknown, XXXX9988, Metropolitan Museum Journal, Vol. 26 (1991), 65, FIGS.24-25; Red-figure Oinochoe, inscribed EUTHYMEDES EPOIESEN, 'Paris, Hermes, Hera, Aphrodite, Athena, Iris and Eris(?), Alexandros, retr. Aphrodite, retr. Peitho is also inscribed. ... The word separation is peculiar, but the signature is considered genuine, although I have been doubtful (but see Cohen).'

(2) Inscribed with nonsense letters:
Beazley 200137; Vatican City, Museo Gregoriano Etrusco Vaticano, 17752; Red-figure Hydria; inscribed XXEI, EXUK, KTOTLE, (...) LJT, KXUO, PI.
Beazley 200144; Paris, Musee du Louvre, G31; Red-figure Pelike; inscribed (LEAG(?))ROS, "the other inscriptions seem meaningless." [Beazley, ARV(2)].
Beazley 16321; Malibu, The J. Paul Getty Museum, 84.AE.63; Red-figure Amphora; inscribed PHAUL(L)OS?(...)N, IO, IO, KOTELO, ECHOPEI, CHOISI (mixture of sense and nonsense).

(3) Whole pieces not inscribed:
Beazley 200120; Lost, XXXX0.120, Beazley, Attic Red-Figure Vase-Painters, 2nd ed. (Oxford, 1963), 29.1, Red-figure Hydria.

PHINITIAS 525-475BC [29 records total]

For example
(1) Inscribed pieces attributed to Phinitias or his pottery:
Beazley 16042; Germany, Private 101, Gunther, G., et. al., Mythen und menschen, Griechische Vasenkunst aus einer deutschen Privatsammlung (Mainz, 1997), 67, 69, No. 19 (I, A); inscribed E[R][A][T]OSTHELES KALOS.
Beazley 200116; Paris, Musee du Louvre, G42; Red-figure Amphora A; inscribed SOSIAS, DEMOSTRATE, CHAIRE, KAIRE, A[P]OLLON, LETOUS, [ARTE][M]IDO[S], SOTINOS, SOSTRATOS [KA]LOS (or AIDOS, making LETOUS AIDOS the title of the picture), CHARES.
Beazley 200117; Tarquinia, Museo Nazionale Tarquiniese, RC6843; Red-figure Amphora; inscribed PHINITIAS EGRAPHSEN, (D)IO(N)USOS, SIMADES, KIS(S)INE, HERAK(L)ES, (A)POL(L)ON.
Beazley 200118; Paris, Musee du Louvre, CP10784; Red-figure Pelike frag.; inscribed EGRAPHSEN PHINITIAS, PHLEBODOKOS, KISSINE named.
Beazley 200122; St. Petersburg, State Hermitage Museum, 1843; Red-figure Krater, Calyx frags.; inscribed THESEUS, KALOS, PAT(R)O KLOS, DIOMEDE(S).
Beazley 200123; Thasos, Archaeological Museum, XXXX0.123; Red-figure Krater frag., inscribed, MEM(N)ON.
Beazley 200130; London, British Museum, E159; Red-figure Hydria; inscribed PHI(N)TIAS EGRAPHSEN, MEGAKLES KALOS.

Beazley 200134; Boston, Museum of Fine Arts, 01.8019; Red-figure Psykter; inscribed SIMON, EOPPOKI, PHILON (A), ETBEAXROI, PTOIODOROS, [SO?]TRATOS, [E(U)]KRATATES, ELIOAS, EUDEMOS, SOS(T)RATOS, EPILOUK(O), XSEONOPH(ON), PHAUL(L)OS, SI.
Beazley 200135; Munich, Antikensammlungen, 2590; Red-figure Cup; inscribed PHINTIAS EG(R)APHSEN, DEIN(IA)DES (E)POIESEN, HE(R)AKLĒS, ALKŌUNEUS, HE(R)MES, APOLLON.

Beazley 200139; Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University, B4; Red-figure Cup; inscribed PHINTIAS EGRAPHSEN, CHAIRIAS KALOS.

Beazley 200142; Athens, National Museum, Acropolis Coll., 2.766; Red-figure Loutrophoros; inscribed OLYMPIO(DOROS) KA(LOS).

Beazley 200143; Athens, National Museum, Acropolis Coll., 2.636; Red-figure Cup; inscribed PHINTIAS EGRAPHSEN, DEIN(IA)DES (E)POIESEN, HE(R)AKLĒS, ALKŌUNEUS, HE(R)MES, APOLLON.

Beazley 200147; Eleusis, Archaeological Museum, XXXX0.147; Red-figure Arybalos frag.; inscribed FIN^TIA^S EPOI^ES^EN, EPOI (written upside down).

Beazley 200146; Athens, National Museum, 1628; Red-figure Cup; inscribed FIN^TIA^S EPOI^ES^EN, EPOI (written upside down).

Beazley 200119; Rome, Mus. Naz. Etrusco di Villa Giulia, XXXX0.119; Red-figure Krater frags.; inscribed KAPENISANI, EXUPKI.

Beazley 200126; Munich, Antikensammlungen, 2421; Red-figure Hydria; inscribed KALOI, (S)OI(..) TEN(DI), EUTHUMI(D)EI, SO(DPS THND\DB, EUTHUM\DBD\PHA KAL\D2(50), EUTUMIDES, TLEMP? O(L)EMOS, SMIKUTHOS, IL, LH (perhaps nonsense).

Beazley 200127; Munich, Antikensammlungen, J50; Red-figure Hydria; inscribed (.).ON XOSSI, KALOS, PO(?). (.).S, (KL)LOS((?).) GO(NO((?) (?).) LO(.,) (.).S?ONOS, XN, IH, LHLH (part nonsense).

Beazley 200115; Munich, Antikensammlungen, 2590; Red-figure Amphora neck frag.; inscribed PHEIDIADES KALOS.

Beazley 13369; Malibu, The J. Paul Getty Museum, 83.AE.285; Red-figure Psykter; inscribed PENTE XOI(DIA(?)), KALA, TRIA, TOI, (.).UTOS?, (.).OS KALOS, (.).AS.

Beazley 30685; Malibu, The J. Paul Getty Museum, 82.AE.53; Red-figure Psykter; inscribed ANDRISKOS, ANBROSIOS, E(U)MACH(O)S, ANTIAS KALOS, E(U)ALKIDES KALOS.

Beazley 200141; Berlin, Antikensammlung, 1966.19; Red-figure Amphora neck; inscribed SMIKROS EGRAPHSEN, STUSIP(?P)OS KALOS, TERPAULOS, NETĒNARENE(T)ENETO.
(2) Inscribed with nonsense letters:
Beazley 200106; Paris, Musee du Louvre, CP709; Red-figure Pelike; inscribed PSI, IOCHI, NISI, Å.

(3) Whole pieces not inscribed:
Beazley 200105; St. Petersburg, State Hermitage Museum, B1574; Red-figure Pelike.

HISCHYLOS 525-475 BC [27 records total]
For example
(1) Inscribed pieces attributed to Hischylos or his pottery:
Beazley 1385; Paris, Musee du Louvre, CP10889; Red-figure Cup A frags.; inscribed [K]ALO[S], HO PAI[S].
Beazley 200246; Cambridge, Fitzwilliam Museum, GR14.1937; Red-figure Cup; inscribed HISCHULOS [.] EPOIESEN.
Beazley 200264; Rome, Private, XXXX0.264, Red-figure Cup; inscribed HISCHYLOSEPOIESEN.
Beazley 200265; Berlin, Antikensammlung, F2100; Red-figure Cup frag.; inscribed [HI]5CHY[L]0SPEOIE[SEN].
Beazley 200304; Florence, Museo Archeologica Etrusco, 12B106; Red-figure Cup frags.; inscribed HISCHYLOS [EP]OIESEN.
Beazley 200307; Orvieto, Museo Civico, 2581; Red-figure Cup; inscribed HISCH YLOS, EPOIE[SEN], EPIKTETOS, EGRA^SPHE^N (for EGRAPHSEN).
Beazley 200308; Florence, Museo Archeologico Etrusco, 3B1; Red-figure Cup frags.; inscribed H[IS]CHY[LO]S EPIKTETOS.
Beazley 200309; London, British Museum, E3; Red-figure Cup; inscribed HISCHYLOS EPOIESEN, EPIKTETOS, EGRASPHEN (for EGRAPHSEN).
Beazley 200310; St. Petersburg, State Hermitage Museum, 645; Red-figure Cup; inscribed HISCHYLO[ ]$ EP^OIESEN, EGRASPHEN EPIKTETOS ("the inscription is clearly planned.
Beazley 200311; Rome, Museo Torlonia, 158; Red-figure Cup; inscribed [HISCHYLO]S EPOIESEN.
Beazley 200378; London, British Museum, E6; Red-figure Cup; inscribed HISCHYLOS (retr.) EPOIESEN, PHEIDIP[P]EOS EGRAPHE.
Beazley 200634; Magnoncourt, Musee, 34, ARV 2nd ed. (Oxford, 1963), 79.1; Red-figure Cup; inscribed EPIKTETOS EGRASPHEN, HISCHYLOS EPOIESEN.
Beazley 201514; Rome, Private XXXX0.1514, ARV 2nd ed. (Oxford, 1963), 162.14, 1630; Red-figure Cup; inscribed HISCHYLOSEPOIESEN.
Beazley 201515; Munich, antikensammlungen, J1160; Red-figure Cup; inscribed HISCHYLOS EPOIE[SEN].
Beazley 201516; Athens, National Museum, Acropolis Coll., 2.76; Red-figure Cup frag.; inscribed […]OL[.][], […]JOU[.][].
Beazley 275075; Geneva, Market, XXXX275075, ARV 2nd ed. (Oxford, 1963), 1630.1BIS; inscribed HISCHYLOSEPOIESEN.
Beazley 301106; Cambridge, Fitzwilliam Museum, GR38.1864; Black-figure Cup; inscribed HISCHYLOS EPOIESEN, SAKONIDES EGR[APHSEN] ("the signatures are in very tiny BG letters on opposite sides. … this is the only signature of Hischylos where iota is omitted in EPOIESEN. … Both signatures are by one hand - that of Sakonides?").
Beazley 310583; Civitavecchia, Museo Civico, 1524; Black-figure Cup Little Master Band; inscribed HISCHYLOS EPOIESEN, HISCH[Y]LOS E EPOIESEN.
Beazley 310584; New York (NY), Metropolitan Museum, 29.131.6; Black-figure Cup Little Master Lip; inscribed HISCHYLOS EPOIESEN.
Beazley 350491; Kassel, Staattliche Museen Kassel, Antikensammlung, T698; Black-figure Krater; inscribed HISCHYLOS EPOIESEN (Beazley claims signature is modern (false).

(2) Inscribed with nonsense letters:
Beazley 306560; Heidelberg, Ruprecht-karls-Universitat, S36; Black-figure Skyphos; "nonsense inscriptions".

(3) Whole pieces not inscribed: nil
DK. 82.B.11 - GORGIOY ELEHNS EGKWMION


(1) Order in a city comes from right behaviour, in a body it comes from beauty, in a mind from wisdom, in an action from merit, in a speech it comes from truth: and the opposites of these are disorder. And a man, and a woman, and a speech, and a task, and a city, and an action worthy of praise must be honoured with praise, while disgrace must be placed on the unworthy. For it is an equal fault and ignorance to blame the praiseworthy or to praise the disgraced.

(2) τοῦ δ’ αὐτοῦ ἄνδρος λέξαι τε τὸ δέον ὀρθὸς καὶ ἐλέγξαι *** τοὺς μεμφομένους Ἕλενην, γυναῖκα περὶ ἢς ὀμόφωνος καὶ ὀμοφύσιος γέγονεν ἢ τε τῶν ποιητῶν [10] ἀκουσάντων πίστις ἢ τε τοῦ ὀνόματος φήμη, ὡς τῶν συμφορῶν μίμη γέγονεν. ἐγὼ δ’ θεωρῶ λογισμὸν τινα τωὶ λόγῳ δους τὴν μὲν κακῶς ἀκούσαν παύσαι τῆς αἰτίας, τοὺς δὲ μεμφομένους φευγομένους ἐπιδείξας τάληθες [ἡ] παύσαι τῆς ἀμαθίας.

(2) The same man must speak correctly and [therefore] to speak against *** those blaming Helen, a woman about whom the poets with one voice and one mind assuredly profess, and also the legend of her name has become an epitaph synonymous with disaster. I wish to give some consideration to the story, and to lift the charge from this shamed woman, and to show the truth that those who blame her are lying, and to put an end to the ignorance.

(3) ὅτι μὲν οὖν φύει καὶ γένει τὰ πρώτα τῶν πρώτων ἄνδρων καὶ γυναικῶν ἢ γυνὴ περὶ ἢς ὅθε ὁ λόγος, οὐκ οὔδηποτε οὐδὲ ἀλήθεια. [5] δῆλον γὰρ ὥς μητρός μὲν Λήδας, πατρός δὲ τοῦ μὲν γενομένου θεοῦ, λεγομένου δὲ θητοῦ, Τυνδάρεως καὶ Δίος, ὡς οὐ μὲν δία τὸ εἶναι ἔδοξεν, ὦ δὲ διὰ τὸ φανεὶ ἡλέχθη, καὶ ἢν οὗ μὲν ἄνδρων κρατίστος ὥς οὗ παντῶν τύραννος.

(3) That the woman this speech is about is, by birth and by nature, the first among the foremost men and women is not unclear. For it is clear that her mother was Leda while her father, though he was said to be mortal was a god. Tyndareus and Zeus: the former one seemed to be so because he actually was, while the latter was said to be so because it was said. And while the former was the master of men, the latter was ruler of all. 447


(4) From these origins she received her god-like beauty, of which she was conscious and did not conceal. And let me add, she aroused the greatest sexual desire in a great many men.


447 In another text (Buchheim frag. 26) Gorgias warns that reality does not automatically make itself apparent: Being without seeming is unobvious, seeming with being is weak [p. 31].
And what is more, to [this] one body a great many bodies of men gathered, greatly hoping for great things. Some were, of course, of great wealth; others of proud ancient lineage; some possessed vigorous personal strength whilst others had learned wisdom. And they were all under the grip of desire; competitive, seeking honour, unassailable.448

(5) ὅστις μὲν οὖν καὶ ἐὰν ὁ ὀρθὸς, ὥσπερ ἀπέπλησε τὸν ἔρωτα τῆς Ελένης λαβών, οὐ λέγει· τὸ γὰρ τοῖς έἰδοσιν ὁ ἰσαία λέγει τίποτι μὲν ἔχει, τέρψει δὲ οὐ φέρει. Τὸν χρόνον δὲ τῷ λόγῳ τὸν τότε νῦν ὑπέρβας ἔπι τὴν ἀρχήν τού μέλλοντος λόγου προσβήσουμει, καὶ προθειούμε τάς αἰτίας, δι’ ἀς εἰκός ἤ γενέσθαι τὸν τῆς [20] Ἀπόλλωνος ἡμῖν στόλον.

(5) Now who it was and how and why the lover of Helen took her, I shall not recount. Because telling what they know to those knowing, wins belief but brings no pleasure. I shall pass over this period in the story and intend to proceed now to beginning of the part of the speech that argues the reasons which brought about Helen’s journey to Troy.

(6) ή γὰρ Τύχης θεολύμακη καὶ θεῶν θεολύμακη καὶ Ἀγάπης ψυφίσμασιν ἐπράξειν ἀ ἐπράξειν, ἡ βίαι ἀραπαθεία, ἡ λόγος πεισθεία, < ἡ ἐρωτή ἀλούσα >. ἐπί μὲν οὖν διὰ τὸ πρῶτον, ἀξίος αἰτίασθαι ὧν αἰτίωμεν· θεοῦ γὰρ προθυμίαν ἀνθρωπινήν προμηθείαν ἀδύνατον (290) κωλύειν. πέψκει γαρ οὐ τὸ κρείσσον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἴσους κωλυεῖαν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἴσους ὑπὸ τοῦ κρείσσονος ἀρχεῖαν καὶ ἀγέθαι, καὶ τὸ μὲν κρείσσον ἤγεθαι, τὸ δὲ ἴσους ἐπεσθαί, θεοῦ δὲ ἀνθρώπου κρείσσον καὶ βίαι καὶ σοφίαι καὶ τοῖς ἀλλοῖς, ἐπί οὖν [5] τῇ Τύχης καὶ τῶν θεῶν τὴν αἰτίαν ἀναθετεύον, [ί] τὴν Ἀπόλλωνη ἡς δυσκλείας ἀπολυεῖν.

(6) Either she did what she did either by the wishes of Fate and the will of the gods and the decrees of Necessity; or she was raped by force or persuaded by words < or captured by sexual desire >. So, if through the first, those responsible deserve to be made responsible; because human foresight is powerless to prevent the will of god. For it is against nature that the stronger be hindered by the weaker, but for the weaker to be ruled and led by the stronger and for the stronger to lead and the weaker to follow. A god is stronger than a person in force and wisdom and everything else. Therefore if the cause must be with Fate or a god, Helen must be released from shame.

(7) εἰ δὲ βίαι ἡμπάσθη καὶ ἄνόμως ἔμπουλθη καὶ ἀδίκως ὑφισθηθη, δῆλον ὅτι ὁ <μὲν> ἀρπάκας ὡς ὑφισθησα ἡδίκησαν, ἢ ἀραπασθεία ὡς ὑφισθεία ἐδοτύχησεν. ἀξίος οὖν ὁ μὲν ἐπιχειρήσας βαρβαρός [10] βαρβαρόν ἐπιχειρήμα καὶ λόγοι καὶ νομιζεὶ καὶ ἔργοι δύνατοι μὲν αἰτίας, νόμιμες ὑπὸ ἀτίμως, ἐργεῖ οὐ διαμείναν· ἡ δὲ βιασθεία καὶ τῆς πατρίδος στρατηγεία καὶ τῶν φιλῶν ὀρφανιδεία πώς οὖν ἀν εἰκότως ἐλεηθήη μᾶλλον ἢ κακολογηθήη; ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἔφορας δεῖξα, ἢ δὲ ἐπαθή· δικαίοι οὖν τὴν μὲν σικτήσαι, τὸν δὲ μισήσαι.

(7) However, if she was carried off by force, restrained unlawfully and unjustly raped, it is clear that the rapist committed a crime, whilst she was the unfortunate one who was raped. Therefore, the barbarian attacker deserves a barbarous attack to be made on him with words, and with society’s rules, and to be held accountable in action and speech; to be socially disgraced and actively punished. And she, who was abducted and robbed of her country and separated from her friends, how can it not be reasonable to show her great pity rather than to speak against her? Indeed he committed the crime and she was the victim. It is therefore just to pity her and hate him.449

448 The Greek for 'brought together' has a specialised, hostile sense. ... Where power or capacity - dynamis - is really to be found, and how it works, will develop into the master-theme of the Encomium. [p. 32]

449 Employment of the optative mood of the verb here is perfectly in order, since what we are contemplating is the hypothesis that Paris raped Helen, and thus our reaction is itself hypothetical. But there is an ambiguity in the words which follow, 'thus it is just to feel sorry for her, but to hate him': the phrasing does not reveal whether this conclusion remains within the scope of the preceding optative, and so is properly hypothetical as well, or has shifted to the indicative, which is used for what is actually (supposed to be) the case. And of course it is notoriously easy for an imagination to be manipulated (notice the metaphor) into
(8) If it was a story that persuaded and misled her mind, it is not difficult to argue a defense and to acquit her of the responsibility in the following way. Speech is a great force, which, by the smallest and least observable substance executes the most god-like works. For it is able to stop fear and take away grief and produce delight and to delight in compassion. And I have the power to demonstrate that this is so.

(9) deι δε και δοξή δείξαι τοις ἀκούσαι: τὴν ποίησιν ἀπασαν καὶ νομίζω καὶ όνομάζω λόγον ἠχοντα μέτρον ἢς τοὺς ἀκοῦσας εἰσῆλθε καὶ φρίκη περίφοβος καὶ ἔλεος πολύδακρυς

experiencing feelings indistinguishable from those aroused by the corresponding real situations: ... So if Gorgias is playing on ambiguity of phrasing here, he is deliberately encouraging us to indulge in feelings which exceed what logos in the sense of reason should permit. ... The opposition 'he acted, she suffered' invokes a second fundamental polarity, that between action and passion, to set beside that of 'force/persuasion'; when the latter subsequently comes under pressure, the rôle of sufferer will enlarge to threaten us as well.

Wardy considers No. 8 to be the 'heart' of Gorgias' argument which overturns the normal presumption that allowing oneself to succumb to 'verbal seduction' is wrong. Gorgias turns the tables: The process is begun by simply juxtaposing 'persuasion' and 'deception' as if persuasion too by its very nature 'takes in' its victims, and by introducing the concept of the psyche into the argument, a tactic with the most far-reaching consequences. But, we object, even if everyone persuaded is 'taken in', does that mean that persuasion necessarily and of itself victimises those who succumb to it? One of Gorgias' most telling fragments suggests otherwise. On [Buchheim frag. 23] the subject of Athenian tragedy ... tragedy through its myths and feelings [pathē] furnishes a deception ... [but] the one who deceives is more just than the one who does not, and the one who is deceived is wiser than the one who is not. For the one who deceives is more just, because he has done what he promised, and the one who is deceived is wiser, for what is not insensible is easily captured by the pleasure of logoi. ... What he is saying is that tragedy, to have its characteristic effect, must generate a theatrical illusion in order to captivate the audience both intellectually and emotionally: members of the audience must react as if what happens on stage were indeed happening, if they are to enjoy the tragic experience. ... Thus the tragic spectacle demands a sort of collusion in pretence, which provides Gorgias with the opportunity for more, audacious paradoxologia: we should conceive of the theatrical experience as a sort of contractual deception, relying on cooperation between the deceptive tragedian and the receptively deceived audience. ... one should avoid leaping to the conclusion that this very special phenomenon of deceptive connivance regularly occurs outside the theatre, for that would have the curious consequence that in the case which immediately concerns us, Paris justly seduced Helen and Helen was wisely seduced. ... [36] Nevertheless, it does not follow that the doctrine of tragic deception has no bearing on the workings of persuasion in general. [37] ... Might [the Encomium] not be a piece of fiction? If it is, recognition of its fictitious character will be seriously impeded by Gorgias' commitment in #2 to truth-telling, since realising that a denial of pretence is actually a sort of second-order pretence demands quite a sophisticated response from the reader or auditor. So were the Encomium a fiction, we supposed 'knowers' - would turn out to have been pleasurably and deceitfully persuaded of Helen's innocence; but then we could hardly take exception to her falling prey to the words of Paris, since we ourselves have been seduced by Gorgias. Perhaps, in the last analysis, we who are persuaded are all more or less willing victims of persuasion; at the very least, the degree to which we cooperate in deception might remain permanently obscure. [37] ... I]n 8 Gorgias blurs the distinction between word and deed (ergon) and the manoeuvre is important for his purposes. ... Thus the chief significance of the mention of physical symptoms in 9 might be to strengthen the impression that logos makes things happen, as we can directly corroborate by monitoring the palpable effects of poetry on ourselves and others. [pp.34-37, 40]
Now then, it is necessary to demonstrate to the audience the nature of opinion through the use of opinion. I define all poetry as speech with metre. Poetry enters the heads of those who hear it and they shudder in great fear, cry for pity and yearn with sad longing. Through the effects of the words, the mind experiences unfamiliar perceptions of the good fortune and bad luck of other peoples’ deeds and lives. But come, let me put this in another way. / take another position.

Gorgias depicts opinion as a slippery and unsteady fortune. For, by uniting with the mind’s opinion, the power of the mantra makes up the deceived psyche. Two techniques of wizardry and magic have been discovered: faults of the mind and misled opinion.

Many men have persuaded and still do persuade many people about many things with deceitful fallacious argument. But if everyone had a recollection of everything in the past, a notion of the present and a foreknowledge of the future, it would not be like this for speech. However, as men are unable to recollect times past, nor observe the present, nor prophesise, it is an easy thing to do. So that most people on most things equip themselves with opinion to advise their thinking. But opinion, being slippery and unsteady, surrounds those who submit to it with slippery and unsteady fortunes.

[Text corrupted] This is surprising easy, or that knowledge of the future, it would not be like this for speech. However, as men are unable to recollect times past, nor observe the present, nor prophesise, it is an easy thing to do. So that most people on most things equip themselves with opinion to advise their thinking. But opinion, being slippery and unsteady, surrounds those who submit to it with slippery and unsteady fortunes.

Now that we have read (or heard) No. 10, perhaps the phrase ‘coming together with the opinion of the psyche’ will lead us to realise that Gorgias himself is operating on us as, if not just as, incantation works on those the sorcerer wants to bewitch. [p.41]

Is Gorgias assuming the prognostication is surprisingly easy, or that knowledge of the present (if not the past) is surprisingly difficult? ... Gorgias depicts opinion as a pis aller [a temporary solution] ... The contention that opinion is an unreliable adviser might seem to offer at least the pretence of an epistemological theory in the making. But, crucially, logos is not put at the service of memory, insight and foreknowledge in order to bolster feeble opinion, as the philosophically minded might anticipate. Instead, logos uses opinion to attack the deceived psyche. Such a position is sustainable only because Gorgias has so addeptly highlighted the instrumental aspect of logos. [p. 42]
Dies brieflich,
do not have, it has power within itself.

Such is persuasion; and whilst I persuade I compel one of intelligence with knowledge he heedless young woman singing a Bridal song, going as if carried away by a savage power.

For what was responsible for captivating Helen

Furthermore, if by compulsion she yielded as a persuaded, turns out to be nothing compulsory.

Therefore what captivated Helen comes from having heard just as if being carried away by force. For the mind had put before it a false premise / false pretense by compulsion, the power ... 

So what caused Helen to be captivated was listening to charmed speech just as those marching are carried away / transported. For persuasion was no longer able to advise the mind.

Therefore what captivated Helen comes from having heard just as if being carried away by force. For the mind had put before it a false premise / false pretense by compulsion, the power ...

Therefore what captivated Helen comes from having heard just as if being carried away by force. For the mind had put before it a false premise / false pretense by compulsion, the power ...
tis ou' ait'ia kolhiei kai twn 'Elfhnin <p>tpi tis ton logou dw<namwos elthein &omicron;wos an
suvaiouvouno 'wster e i dia <theta>-tirion biai i&lt;eta&gt;ptosei, to gar tis piteusos ezei onediou'
So what was responsible for having held Helen under the power of speech to go would be
like consenting just as if through a spell carried away by force. The blame goes to
persuasion; and what is more, do not blame compulsion whilst ...

(12) Resumes: [Diel - line 15]: logos yar psuchh' o pei'as, h' epeisen, h'agkasa kai pi gesba
tois legymewn kai suvaivseis tois poioumenois. mei ou' on pei'sas ou' anagkasas adikei, h'
de peisvheisa w' anagkaseiseis twi logwai mati ou akouei kakw.'

(13) That persuasion can become part of speech and strike the mind in any way it wishes,
can be learned firstly from the explanations of the meteorologists, who, disposing of one
point of view and creating the opposite viewpoint, can make the unbelievable and obscure
appear to the eyes of opinion; secondly, from the forceful competitive debates in which one
speech written with skill but not delivered with truth, delights and persuades a great
appearance to the eyes of opinion; secondly, from the forceful competitive debates in which one
point of view and creating the opposite v

(14) The power of speech over the disposition of the mind is the self-same as that of drugs
over the disposition of the physical body. For just as the medicine draws out different fluids
from the body and some put an end to sickness while others to life, so is the way of words,
some produce pain, some delight, some frighten, others bring courage to the audience,
while others drug and beguile the mind by some evil persuasion.

Gorgias' use of anankazein correlates to Parmenides' ananke (Necessity). Wardy calls No.
12 'the crisis' of the piece because Gorgias 'explicitly denies the difference between force
and persuasion, indeed actually identifies them, to complete his defense of Helen and
praise of logos. ... because 'logos' is grammatically masculine, 'psyche' grammatically
feminine, an immediate transition can be made from the asymmetric relation between logos
and soul to that between Paris and Helen; the 'he' and 'she' in the last sentence refer
indifferently to logos/Paris, soul/Helen. ... All the very forms of which 'logos'/Paris are
subject are active, while all the forms of which 'psyche'/Helen are subject are passive ... the
deliberate feminisation of the psyche plays on the Greek cultural assumption that the
female as such is a passive object shaped at will by a dominating, masculine force. Thus,
perhaps, every male citizen who yields to rhetorical logos is comparable to a man who
suffers the physical violence of another, and whose masculinity is thereby humiliated: the
successful orator performs psychic rape. [Wardy pp. 42-43] This is definitely a kairos
moment.
judgement

active and passive processes, perception, memory, imagination and, most important, judgement. [p. 164]

So, even if she was persuaded by speech she was not a wrongdoer but, as I have said, unlucky; which brings me to the fourth cause in the fourth part of my discussion. For if it was desire which caused all this, it is not difficult to demolish the genesis of her alleged guilt. Because what we perceive does not have the physical properties we visualise but whatever each has in actuality; and through perception the mind is molded in this manner.

Now to begin with, whenever a warlike enemy lines up, in the flesh, in hoplite arms of bronze and iron, [***] their line a defensive wall of spears, the sight agitates the eyes and confuses the mind, so that often men flee in panic, anxious as if the danger was [already] actually happening. The strong habit of custom is abandoned through fear of what is seen, which causes the abandonment of what is judged by custom to be honourable and to the good that comes from victory.

Even in this day and age some who have witnessed a terror have lost hold of their senses; thus fear stifles and expels thought. Many men have been exposed to fruitless suffering, terrible diseases and to incurable manias, because the sight engraves in the thought processes the image of the things seen. And what is more, many of the unpleasant ones stay there and, so remaining, become synonymous with spoken words. 

(15) So, even if she was persuaded by speech she was not a wrongdoer but, as I have said, unlucky; which brings me to the fourth cause in the fourth part of my discussion. For if it was desire which caused all this, it is not difficult to demolish the genesis of her alleged guilt. Because what we perceive does not have the physical properties we visualise but whatever each has in actuality; and through perception the mind is molded in this manner.

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(18) It is true that whenever the painters successfully fashion a bodily form and imitate out of many colours and materials, they please the sight; and the making of statues and the
working of icons provides for a sweet spectacle for the eyes. Therefore the sight is naturally inclined to be distressed by some things while it yearns for other things. And a great desire and longing is produced in a great many people for a great many dealings and material things.

(19) εἰ ὁ ὄφει τοῦ Ἀλεξάνδρου σώματι τὸ τῆς Ἐλένης ὁμοὶα ἠθένη προθυμίαν καὶ ἀμίλλαν ἔρωτος τῇ ψυχῇ παρέδωκε, τῇ θαυμαστών; ὡς εἰ μὲν θεός <ὡς ἔχει> θεὸν θείαν δύναμιν, πῶς ἂν ὁ ἴσσων εἴη τούτου ἀπώσασθαι καὶ [10] ἀμύνασθαι δυνατός; εἰ δὲ εἰσίν ἀνθρώπινον νόσημα καὶ ψυχῆς ἁγνόμη, σὺν ὡς ἀσωμῖτα μεμπτέων ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἀτύχημα νοομάτον· ἠλθὲ γὰρ, ὡς ἤλθε, τυχῆς ἀγρεύμασιν, σὺ γνώμης βουλεύμασιν, καὶ ἔρωτος ἀνάγκαις, ὡς τέχνης παρασκευάσι.

(19) Thus, if Helen's eye was eager for Alexander's outward appearance and her mind surrendered to the conflicts of sexual desire, is there any wonder? Because if a god is exercising divine power, how can she, the weaker, have power to reject and fend him off? But if it is a human disorder and a mental error, it should not be blamed as a crime but acknowledged as a misfortune; because she came to it by the tricks of Fate, not by the mind's volition; and by the force of desire, not by intrigues of skill.

(20) πῶς οὖν χρὴ δίκαιον ἠγέρσασθαι τὸν τῆς Ἐλένης μῶμον, ἡτίς [15] εἰτ' ἔρασθεία εἶτε λόγῳ πείσθεία εἶτε βίαι ἀργασθεία ἐπὶ ὑπὸ θείας ἀνάγκης ἀνάγκασθεία ἐπραξεν ἁ ἐπραξε, πάντως διαφέρει τὴν αἰτίαν;

(20) So how is it necessary to consider as just the disgrace of Helen, who, either by passionate desire or by persuasive argument or abducted by force, or compelled by divine might, could she, what she did, and so absolutely escapes responsibility.

(21) αὐθείλοι τῷ λόγῳ δισκλεισιν γυναικός, ἔνεμεινα τῷ νόμωι ὃν ἠθέμιν ἐν ἂρχῃ τοῦ λόγου· ἐπειράθην καταλυσαι μεῖων ἄδικα στὸν καὶ δοξῆς ἀμαθίαν, ἐβουλήθην γραφῆν τοῖς λόγοις Ἐλένης μὲν ἐγκώμιοι, [20] ἐμὸν δὲ παίγνιον.

(21) With this argument I have removed the ill-repute of a woman, fulfilled the assignment which is established in the beginning of the speech. I have tried to expunge the injustice of blame and ignorant opinion and wanted to write the speech as an encomium to Helen, and for my own amusement.455

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455 Too many pedestrian critics take refuge from Gorgias by understanding this sting in the tail as a simple disclaimer: it is all just a harmless joke. But when we recall how On What is Not dislocated philosophy by obstinately hovering between 'serious' and 'playful' intentions, we can recognise that the Encomium's joke is on us. When we ourselves are made to pity Helen and execrate Paris, are persuaded (perhaps) that persuasion is manipulation, enjoy the deception with which Gorgias amuses us even as we discern it, we feel in our own souls the seduction of rhetoric. [pp. 50-51] Wardy's essay is itself a subtle mirror of the Encomium where he subjects the reader to his own dazzling form of 'psychic rape'.
# APPENDIX 8
## ANCIENT REFERENCES WITH ENGLISH TRANSLATIONS

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It may be argued that, if I do what is just and temperate, I am just and temperate already, exactly as, if I spell words or play music correctly, I must already be literate or musical. This I take to be a false analogy, even in the arts. It is possible to spell a word right by accident or because somebody tips you the answer. But you will be a scholar only if your spelling is done as a scholar does it, that is thanks to the scholarship in your own mind. … The doer must be in a certain frame of mind when he does them. Three conditions are involved. (1) The agent must act in full consciousness of what he is doing. (2) He must 'will' his action, and will it for its own sake. (3) The act must proceed from a fixed and unchangeable disposition. [trans. Thomson]

EURIPIDES: [speaking of Aeschylus] Look at the way he cheated his audience: brought up on Phrynichos, they were pretty stupid anyway. The play would begin with a seated figure, all muffled up - Niobe, for example, or Achilles: face veiled, very dramatic, not a word uttered. … Then the Chorus would rattle off a string of odes - four of them, one after the other: still not a syllable from the muffled figure.

DIONYSUS: I must say I rather enjoyed the old silent days. Better than all this talk we get nowadays.
8.II.3:  
Χορός – μακάριός γ’ ἀνήρ ἔχων ἔμειναι ἡμιδικωμένην.
πάρο δέ πολλοῖσιν μαθεῖν.
όδε γάρ εὔ φρονεῖν δοκήσας
πάλιν αἰσθεῖν οἴκαδ’ σοι,
ἐπ’ ἁγαθῷ μὲν τοῖς πολίταισι,
ἐπ’ ἁγαθῷ δὲ τοῦ ἕαυτου
ἐξυγγέει τε καὶ φίλοισι,
διὰ τὸ συντότος εἶναι.

Αριστοφάνης ὁ Πτολύτων – ἄγιος ἡ χαῖραν Ἀισχύλε χώρει,
καὶ σῶζει πόλιν τὴν ἡμετέραν
γνώμης ἁγάθοις καὶ παιδευοσ
τοὺς ἄνοιχτος: πολλοὶ δ’ εἰσίν.

CHORUS:  
Blest is the man
with keen intelligence -
we learn this truth in many ways
Once he’s shown his own good sense
he goes back home again.
He brings our citizens good things
as well as family and friends,
with his perceptive mind.

χαρέων οὖν μὴ Σωκράτει
παρακαθίημου λαλείν,
ἀποβαλόντα μουσικὴν
τὰ τε μέγιστα παραλιπόντα
τῆς τραγωδικῆς τέχνης.
τὸ δ’ ἐπὶ σεμνοίσιν λόγοισι
καὶ σκαριφημοιοῖς λήπον,
διατριβὴν ἄρχον ποιεῖσθαι,
παραφρονοῦντος ἀνδρός.

PLUTO: Farewell, Aeschylus, go,
Save our city with your good judgement
and teach those fools -
And they are many
[trans. after Ian Johnston]

8.II.4:  
eἰδέναι δὲ ὅτι ὁ σοι μόνον ὑμνὸς θεοῦ καὶ ἐγκώμια τοῖς ἁγαθοῖς ποιήσως
παραδεκτέως εἰς πόλιν εἰ δὲ τὴν ἡμιδικὴν Μοῦσαν παραδέξη ἐν μέλειν ἡ
ἐπέσει, ἣδονή σοι καὶ λύπη ἐν τῇ πόλει βασιλεύσετον ἀντὶ νόμου τε καὶ τοῦ
κοινῆς ἂν δοξαστῶς εἶναι βελτίστου λόγου.

[Plato Republic 10.607a]

[Τ]he only poetry that should be allowed in a state is hymns to the gods and
paecans in praise of good men; once you go beyond that and admit the sweet
lyric or epic muse, pleasure and pain become your rulers instead of law and
the rational principles commonly accepted as best. [trans. Lee]

οὐ μέντοι πο τὸ γε μέγιστον κατηγορήκαμεν αὐτῆς. τὸ γάρ καὶ τοὺς ἐπιείκεις
ἰκανοῖς εἰναι λοξάσθαι, ἐκτός πάνυ τινῶν ὀλίγων, πάνδεινον ποι.
[Plato Republic 10.605c]

The gravest charge against poetry still remains. It has a terrible power to
corrupt even the best characters, with very few exceptions. [trans. Lee]

οἱ γὰρ ποι μὲν ἄλλος ἄλλος ὀμήρου ἕλεος τῶν
τραγῳδοποιοῦν αἰσθηθέντας τινὰ τῶν ἠρώων ἐν πένθει δότα καὶ μακρὰν ῥήσιν
ἀποτείνεσθα ἐν τοῖς ὀδηρίς ἔκαστος τε καὶ κατοπτομένος, αἰσθῇuers’ ὅτι
χαιρεῖμν τε καὶ ἐνδόνως ἡμᾶς αὐτὸς ἐπόμεθα συμπάσχειν καὶ
σπουδάζομεν ἐπιστεύμεν ὡς ἱγαθῶν ποιητήν, ὡς ἃν ἡμᾶς ὅτι καλίστα ἄλλω
διάβα.
[Plato Republic 10.605c-d]

When we hear Homer or one of the tragic poets representing the sufferings of
a hero and making him bewail them at length, perhaps with all the sounds
and signs of tragic grief, you know how even the best of us enjoy it and let
ourselves be carried away by our feelings; and we are full of praises for the
merits of the poet who can most powerfully affect us in this way. [trans. Lee]
8.II.5:

ATHENA: Hear the constitution of your court. From this day forward this judicial council shall for Aegeus' race hear every trial of homicide ...

Here, day and night, shall Awe, and Fear, Awe's brother, check my citizens from all misdoing, while they keep my laws unchanged ...

From your polity do not wholly banish fear. For what man living, freed from fear, will still be just? Hold fast such upright fear of the law's sanctity, and you will have a bulwark of your city's strength ...

I establish this tribunal, untouched by greed, worthy of reverence, quick to anger, awake on behalf of those who sleep, a guardian of the land ...

Fair trial, fair judgement, ended in an even vote, which brings to you neither dishonour nor defeat. Evidence which issued clear as day from Zeus himself, brought by the god who bade Orestes strike the blow could not but save him from all harmful consequence ...

[trans. Vellacott]

8.II.6:

ATHENIAN: ‘I suppose literary compositions and written speeches by many other authors are current in our cities, besides those of the legislator?’

CLEINIAS: ‘Of course they are.’

ATHENIAN: ‘To whose writings ought we apply ourselves? Are we to read the poets and others who have recorded in prose or verse compositions their advice about how on e should live one’s life, to the neglect of the compositions of the legislators? Or isn’t it precisely the latter that deserve our closest attention?’

CLEINIAS: ‘Yes it certainly is’ [trans. Saunders]

8.II.7:

EPIDAIOS καθαρίζειν μάθησιν, ἄλλων αὐτοῖς ποιητῶν ἄγαθῶν ποίημα διδάσκωμεν μελοποιού, εἰς τα καθαρίσματα ἐντεύκνετο, καὶ τοῖς ρυθμοῖς τε καὶ τοῖς ἀρμονίαις ἀναγκάζωμαι οἰκείοις ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν παιδῶν, ἵνα ἡμερῶτεροι τε ὅσιοι, καὶ ἐυμυθότεροι καὶ εὐφωμοστότεροι γιγαντόμενοι χρησμοί ὅσιοι εἰς τὸ λέγειν τε καὶ πράττειν πάς γὰρ ὁ βίος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εὐρυμεῖα τε καὶ εὐφωμοστίας δεῖται.

[Plato Protagoras 326a-b]
When they have learned to play the lyre, they teach them the works of good poets of another sort, namely the lyrical, which they accompany on the lyre, familiarizing the minds of the children with the rhythms and melodies. By this means they become more civilised, more balanced, and better adjusted in themselves and so more capable in whatever they say or do; for rhythm and harmonious adjustment are essential to the whole of human life. [trans. Guthrie]

8.II.8: ότι μάλιστα καταδύεται εἰς τὸ ἑντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς ὁ τε ῥυθμός καὶ ἀρμονία, καὶ ἔρωμενεται ἀπεται αὐτῆς φέροντα τὴν εὐσχημοσύνην, καὶ ποιεῖ εὐσχήμων, εὰν τις ὀρθῶς τραφῇ, εἰ δὲ μη, τούναντιον. [Plato, Republic 3.401d-e]

Rhythm and harmony penetrate deeply into the mind and take a most powerful hold on it, and, if education is good, bring and impart grace and beauty, if it is bad, the reverse. [trans. Lee]

οὐκοῦν ὅταν μὲν τὶς μουσικὴ παρέχῃ καταλεῖν καὶ καταχεῖ τῆς ψυχῆς διὰ τῶν ὀτῶν ὀσπρὶ διὰ χώμης ἀς νυνῆ ἤμεις ἔλεγομεν τὰς γλυκεῖς τε καὶ μαλακὰς καὶ θρησκείας ἀρμονίας, καὶ μιαρίζων τε καὶ γεγανωμένος ὑπὸ τῆς ὁμοίας διαστήμης τοῦ βίου ὀλον, οὕτος τὸ μὲν πρῶτον, εἰ τι θυμοειδὲς εἴχεν, ὀσπρὶ οἴδρου ἐμαλάξει καὶ χρήσιμον ἐξ ἀχρέσιον καὶ σκληροῦ ἔποιησεν: ὅταν δὲ ἐπέχων μὴ ἀνά ἄλλα κηλῆ, τὸ δὲ μετα τοῦτο ἦδη τίκει καὶ λείβει, ἦδαν ἀν ἐκτίζε τὸν θυμὸν καὶ ἐκτείμη ὄσπρὶ νεύρα ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ ποιήσῃ "μαλακόν αἰχμητήν.

[Plato, Republic 3.411a-b]

So when a man surrenders to the sound of music and lets its sweet, soft, mournful strains ... be funnelled into his soul through his ears, and gives up all his time to the glamorous moanings of song, the effect at first on his energy and initiative of mind, if he has any, is to soften it as iron is softened in a furnace, and made workable instead of hard and unworkable: but if he persists and does not break the enchantment, the next stage is that it melts and runs, till the spirit has quite run out of him and his mental sinews (if I may so put it) are cut, and he has become what Homer calls 'a feeble fighter'. [trans. Lee]

τὶ δὲ ἂν ὃν γυμναστικὴ πολλὰ ποιητικὴ ἀπηττήτα εἰς μᾶλλα, μουσικὴς δὲ καὶ φιλοσοφίας μὴ ἀπτήτησι; οὐ πρῶτον μὲν εἰ ἱσχῶν τὸ σώμα φρονήματος τε καὶ θυμοῦ εἵματισται καὶ ἀνδρεύτηρος γίγνεται αὐτοῦ ἀυτοῦ; ... τὶ δὲ ἐπίτιθαι ἀλλὰ μηδὲν πράττει μήδε κοινωνία Μουσῆς μηδαμή; οὐκ εἰ τι καὶ εἶν αὐτοῦ φιλοσοφεῖ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ὅτε οὐκ ἀληθής γενομένος οὐδένος οὔτε ὑπήρηται, οὔτε λόγου μετίροισιν οὔτε τῆς ἀλλῆς μουσικῆς, αἰσθητῶς τε καὶ κοφὸν καὶ τυφλὸν γίγνεται, οὔτε οὐκ ἐγειρόμενοι οὐδὲ τρεφόμενοι οὐδὲ διακαθαιρομένοι τῶν σαθησίων αὐτοῦ; ... μισολόγος δὲ ὁμοίοι τοιοῦτος γίγνεται καὶ ἀμοιβὰς, καὶ πείθοι μὲν δία λόγων οὐδὲν ἔτι χρῆται. [Plato, Rep. 3.411c-d]

On the other hand, if a man toils hard at gymnastics and eats right lustily and holds no truck with music and philosophy, does he not at first get very fit and full of pride and high spirit and become more brave and bold than he was? ... He does indeed. But what if he does nothing but this and has no contact with the Muse in any way, is not the result that even if there was some principle of the love of knowledge in his soul, since it tastes of no instruction nor of any inquiry and does not participate in any discussion or any other form of culture, it becomes feeble, deaf, and blind, because it is not aroused or fed nor are its perceptions purified and quickened? ... And so such a man, I take it, becomes a misologist and stranger to the Muses. He no longer makes any use of persuasion by speech ...[trans. Shorey]
Αθηναίοι — έστησε άττα και σχήματα, καί τι ἦν ἔδωκας ὠδής εὑχαί πρὸς θεούς, ὃνομα δὲ ὤμοι ἐπεκαλούντο· καὶ τούτω δὴ τὸ ἐναντίον ἦν ὁδής ἔτερον ἔδωκας — θρήνους δὲ τὶς ἀν αὐτοὺς μάλιστα ἐκάλεσαν — καὶ παιινόες ἔτερον, καὶ ἄλλο ... διθυράμβος λεγόμενος. νόμοις τε αὐτῷ τοῦτο τούμωμα ἐκάλουν, ὡδήν ὡς τινὰ ἔτεραν ἐπέλεγον δὲ κιθαροδικῶς. τούτων δὲ διατεταγμένων καὶ ἄλλων τιμῶν, ὥς ἔζησε ἄλλο εἰς ἄλλο καταχρῆσθαι μέλους ἔδωκας· τὸ δὲ κῦρος τούτων γνωρι λόγοι τε καὶ ἀμα γνώντα δικάσαι, ἐξιομός τε αὐ τὸν μὴ πειθομενον, ὦ σύριγξ ἦν οὔδε τινας ἰμούου μοι βομ πλήθους, καθώπερ τὰ νῦν, οὔδε αὐτὸ ἐπείνας ἀποδιδοντες, ἀλλὰ τοῖς μὲν γεγονόσι περι παιδευσι παδομένων ἄκου ἦν αὐτοῖς μετὰ σιγῆς δία τέλους, ποιος δὲ καὶ παιδαγωγοίς καὶ τὸ πλείστω ὀχλο λόγους κοσμούσι η νοητήσις ἐγίγνετο. ταύτ' ὤν οὕτω τεταγμένως ἥθελεν ἀρχεθαι τῶν πολιτῶν τὸ πλῆθος, καὶ μὴ τολμάν κρίνειν διὰ θορύβους μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα, πρόοντοι τοῦ χρόνου, ἀρχινύτες μὲν τῆς ἰμοῦος παρανομίας ποιηται ἐγίγνουτο φιεῖ μὲν ποιητικοί, ἄγνωμοις δὲ περὶ τὸ δικαίον τῆς Μούσης καὶ τὸ νόμον, βακχευοντες καὶ μᾶλλον τοῦ δέντονος κατεχομενοι υπ' ἱδονης, κερανυντες δὲ θρήνους τε ὑμοίς καὶ παιινας διθυράμβοις, καὶ συλλακτικα δὴ ταῖς κιθαροδικαις μιμομενοι, καὶ παντα εἰς παντα συνάγοντες, μουσίκησ ἀκοντες υπ' ἀνοίξια καταφεύγουσιν ὡς ὅρθωται μὲν οὐκ ἔχουσι υπὸ ἱδονινοῦ μουσικῆς, ἱδονη δὲ τῇ τοῦ χαίροντος, εἰτε βελτίων εἰτε χειρών ἄν εἰπ τις, κρίνοιτο ὁρθοτατα. τοιαύτα δὴ ποιοντες ποιηματα, λόγους τε επιλέγουντες τοιούτους, τοις πολλοῖς ἐνθεομοια παρανομίαν εἰς τὴν μουσικὴν καὶ τολμάν ὡς ἱκανοῖς οὐσίν κρίνειν·[Plato Laws 3.700b-e]

ATHENIAN: One class of song was that of prayers to the gods, which bore the name of 'hymns'; contrasted with this was another class, best called 'dirges'; 'paeans' formed another; and yet another was the 'dithyramb' … 'Nomes' also were so called as being a distinct class of song; and these were further described as 'citharoedic nomes'. So these and other kinds being classified and fixed, it was forbidden to set one kind of words to a different class of tune. [700c] The authority whose duty it was to know these regulations, and, when known, to apply them in its judgments and to penalise the disobedient, was not a pipe nor, as now, the mob's unmusical shoutings, nor yet the clappings which mark applause: in place of this, it was a rule made by those in control of education that they themselves should listen throughout in silence, while the children and their ushers and the general crowd were kept in order by the discipline of the rod. [700d] In the matter of music the populace willingly submitted to orderly control and abstained from outrageously judging by clamor; but later on, with the progress of time, there arose as leaders of unmusical illegality poets who, though by nature poetical, were ignorant of what was just and lawful in music; and they, being frenzied and unduly possessed by a spirit of pleasure, mixed dirges with hymns and paeans with dithyrambs, and imitated flute-tunes with harp-tunes, and blended every kind of music with every other; [700e] and thus, through their folly, they unwittingly bore false witness against music, as a thing without any standard of correctness, of which the best criterion is the pleasure of the auditor, be he a good man or a bad. By compositions of such a character, set to similar words, they bred in the populace a spirit of lawlessness in regard to music, and the effrontery of supposing themselves capable of passing judgment on it. [trans. Shorey]

8.11.9: ei τι ποτ' έχοι λόγον εἰπένι ἢ πρὸς ἱδονή ποιητική καὶ ἢ μύμπας, ὃς χρή αὐτὴν εἶναι ἐν πόλει εὑρομομενήν; ... δοιμὲν δὲ γε ποτ' ἀν καὶ τοῖς προστάταις αὐτῆς, ὥσι μὴ ποιητικοί, φιλοποιηται δὲ, ἀνευ μέτρου λόγον ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς εἰπένι, ὡς ὃ μόνον ἤδεια ἀλλ' καὶ ὁμέλημα πρὸς τὰς πολιτεῖας καὶ τὸν βίον τοῦ ἀνθρώπινου ἔστιν·[Plato Republic 10.607c-d]
It is only fair then that poetry should return, if she can make her defence in
lyric or other metre. ... And we should give her defenders, men who aren't
poets themselves but who love poetry, a chance of defending her in prose
and proving that she doesn't only give pleasure but brings lasting benefit to
human life and human society. [trans. Desmond Lee]

This is similar to a passage in the *Phaedrus*:

> Σωκράτης — τούτο μὲν ἀρα παντὶ δὴλον, ὅτι οὐκ ἀισχρὸν αὐτὸ γε τὸ
> γράφειν λόγους. ... ἀλλ’ ἐκείνο οὖσι αἰσχρὸν ἤδη, τὸ μὲν καλὸς λέγειν τε καὶ
> γράφειν ἀλλ’ αἰσχρὸς τε καὶ κακὸς. ... 
> τις τούτων τού καλῶς τε καὶ μὴ γράφειν; δεόμεθα τι, ... Λυσίαν τε περὶ
> τούτων ἐξέτασαν καὶ ἄλλον ὁστὶς ποιοτέ τι γεγραφέν ἢ γράφει, εἴτε πολιτικὸν
> συγγρώμαμα εἴτε ἱδιωτικὸν, ἐν μέτρῳ ὡς ποιητὴς ἢ ἄνευ μέτρου ὡς
> ἱδιῶτης; [Plato *Phaedrus* 258d]

Socrates: Then that is clear to all, that writing speeches is not in itself a
disgrace. ... But the disgrace, I fancy, consists in speaking or writing not well,
but disgracefully and badly. ... What is the method of writing well or badly?
Do we want to question Lysias about this, and anyone else who even has
written or will write anything, whether a public or private document, in
verse or in prose [ἄνευ μέτρου - without metre], be he poet or ordinary man?[
trans. Fowler]

8.II.11:

> Ἀθηναῖος — πρὸς δὲ ἡ μαθήματα ἄλλα ποιητῶν κείμενα ἐν γράμμασι, τοὺς
> μὲν μετὰ μέτρων, τοὺς δ’ ἄνευ ρυθμῶν τιμήτων, ἃ δὲ συγγράμματα κατὰ
> λόγου εἰρήμενα μόνον, τιτμεμένα ρυθμῷ τε καὶ ἀρμονίᾳ, ὑφελέρα γράμμαθ’
> ἤμιν ίσων παρὰ τίνων τῶν πολλῶν τοιούτων ἀνθρώπων καταλείμμενα·
> [Plato *Laws* 7.810b-c]

(Athenian) Regarding the study of written works which the authors have not
set to music. Although some of these works are in metre, others lack any
rhythmical pattern at all - they are writings that simply reproduce ordinary
speech, unadorned by rhythm and music. Some of the many authors of such
works [the ones in metre] have left us writings that constitute a danger.
[trans. Saunders]

> ἐρῶ δ’ στόμαι γὰρ πολλάκις μυρίοις ἕναντία λέγειν οὐδομὸς εὔπορον.
> [Plato *Laws* 7.810d]

I'll tell you: the idea of contradicting many thousands of voices. that's always
difficult' [trans. Saunders]

> λέγω μὴν ὅτι ποιηταὶ τε ἢμιν εἰσὶν τινὲς ἐπὶ ἕξαμέτρων πάμπολλοι καὶ
> τριμέτρων καὶ πάντων δ’ τῶν λεγομένων μέτρων, ... ἐν τῶι φασὶ δεῖν οἱ
> πολλάκις μυρίοι τῶς ὄρθως παὶδευμένους τῶν νέων τρέφειν καὶ διακορέας
> ποιεῖν, πολυήκους τ’ ἐν ταῖς ἀναγνώσεις ποιουμαν τοις καὶ πολυμαθέας, ὅλους
> ποιητὰς ἐκμαθήνουσαν·
> [Plato *Laws* 7.810e-811a]

I say that we have a great many poets who compose in hexameters and
trimeters and all the standard metres; ... Over and over again it's claimed
that in order to educate young people properly we have to cram their heads
full of this stuff; we have to organise recitations of it so that they never stop
listening to it and acquire a vast repertoire, getting whole poets off by heart.
[trans. Saunders]

> οἱ δὲ ἐκ πάντων κεφάλαια ἐκλέξαντες καὶ τινὰς ὀλίγας ῥήσεις εἰς ταύτων
> συναγαγόντες, ἐκμαθήνουσιν φασὶ δεῖν εἰς μὴνε τιθεμένους, εἰ μέλλει τις
Another school of thought excerpts the outstanding work of all the poets and compiles a treasury of complete passages, claiming that if the wide knowledge of a fully informed person is to produce a sound and sensible citizen, these extracts must be committed to memory and learnt by rote. … Each of these authors has produced a lot of fine work, and a lot of rubbish too - but if that's so, I maintain that learning so much of it puts the young at risk. [trans. Saunders]

This discussion of ours … a discussion in which I think I sense the inspiration of heaven - well, it's come to look, to my eyes, just like a literary composition. … my 'collected works' … because of all the addresses I have ever learned or listened to, whether in verse or in this kind of free prose style [floods of words] I've been using, it's these that have impressed me as being the most eminently acceptable and the most entirely appropriate for the ears of the younger generation. … tell the teachers to teach the children … prose writings or the verse of poets, or … unwritten compositions in simple prose that show a family resemblance to our discussion today … have them committed to writing. … compel teachers to learn this material and speak well of it … [and] not employ … any teachers who disapprove of it. [trans. Saunders]

8.II.12:

CHORUS: Most, loyal of sons, you have your victory, what fancied sights torment you so?

ORESTES: To me these living horrors are not imaginary; They are there - avenging hounds incensed by a mother's blood.

CHORUS: That blood is still a fresh pollution on your hands. That's why your mind's distracted. What more natural?' [trans. after Vellacott]
The women who cure Corybantic conditions have learnt this treatment from experience … the cure consists of movement, to the rhythms of dance and song … just as surely as the music of the pipes bewitches the frenzied Bacchic reveller. … The revellers by being set to dance to the music of the pipes, are restored to mental health after their derangement, with the assistance of the gods to whom they sacrifice … [trans. Saunders]

Poetry is the work of a gifted man or one in a state of madness. 
trans. Fyfe

In tragedy one needs to create a sense of awe … the non-rational [is] the greatest source of awe [trans. Fyfe]

Among the modes [of music] the Phrygian has exactly the same effect as the pipes among instruments: both are orgiastic and emotional [pαθητικα], for all Bacchic frenzy and all similar agitation are associated with the pipes more than with other instruments, and such conduct finds its appropriate expression in tunes composed in the Phrygian mode more than in those composed in other modes. (This is shown by poetry: the dithyramb, for example, is universally regarded as Phrygian. Experts in this field point to numerous examples, notably that of Philoxenus [436 - 380BC] who tried to compose The Mysians in the Dorian mode, but could not do so: the very nature of his material forced him back into the Phrygian.) [trans. Saunders]
Now in the theatre there are two types of audience, the one consisting of educated free men, the other of common persons, drawn from the mechanics, hired workers and such-like. For the relaxation of this latter class also competitions and spectacles must be provided. But as their souls have become distorted, removed from the condition of nature, so also some modes are deviations from the norm, and some melodies have high pitch and irregular colouring. Each group finds pleasure in that which is akin to its nature. Therefore permission must be given to competitors before this class of audience to use the type of music that appeals to it. [trans. Saunders]

8.II.16:

8.II.17:

At this time of distress people naturally recalled old oracles, and among them was a verse which the old men claimed had been delivered in the past. … There had been a controversy as to whether the word in the ancient verse was ‘dearth’ rather than ‘death’; but in the present state of affairs the view that the word was ‘death’ naturally prevailed; it was a case of people adapting their memories to suit their sufferings. Certainly I think that if there is ever another war with the Dorians after this one, and if a dearth results from it, then in all probability people will quote another version. [trans. Rex Warner]

8.II.17:

When ancient sins have given rise to severe maladies and troubles which have afflicted the members of certain families, madness has appeared among them and by breaking forth into prophecy has brought relief by the appropriate … prayer and worship. [trans. Fowler]
The third type is possession by the Muses. When this seizes upon a gentle and virgin soul it rouses it to inspired expression in lyric and other sorts of poetry ... But if a man comes to the door of poetry untouched by the madness of the Muses, believing that technique alone will make him a good poet, he and his sane compositions never reach perfection, but are utterly eclipsed by the performances of the inspired madman. [trans. Fowler]

The words of the oak in the holy place of Zeus at Dodona they say were the first prophetic utterances. The people of that time, not being so wise as you young folks, were content in their simplicity to hear an oak or a rock, provided only it spoke the truth; but to you, perhaps, it makes a difference who the speaker is and where he comes from, for you do not consider only whether his words are true or not. [trans. Fowler]

The mass of people ought to be sovereign, rather than the best but few ... For it is possible that the many, no one of whom taken singly is a sound man, may yet, taken all together, be better than the few, not individually but collectively. [trans. Saunders]

Their judgement was based more on wishful thinking than on a sound calculation of probabilities; for the usual thing among men is that when they want something they will, without any reflection, leave that to hope, while they will employ the full force of reason in rejecting what they find unpalatable. [trans. Warner]

Through a process of wishful thinking they first believed that the accusations were untrue ... [then] they became frightened and decided to take action. [trans. Warner]
... in their angry mood [they] decided to put to death not only those now in their hands but also the entire adult male population ... the bitterness of their feelings was considerably increased ... [and they made] orders to put the Mytilenians to death immediately. Next, day, however, there was a sudden change of feeling and they began to reflect that their plan was cruel and monstrous ... and [the authorities] themselves saw clearly that most of the citizens were wanting someone to give them a chance of reconsidering the matter. [trans. Warner]

Kléon – δημοκρατίαν ὃτι ἀδύνατόν ἦσιν ἐτέρων ἀρχεῖν, μάλιστα δ' ἐν τῇ νυν υμετέρα περὶ Μυτιληναίων μεταμελείας. [Thuc. 3.37.1]

CLEON: A democracy is incapable of governing others, and I am all the more convinced of this when I see how you are now changing your minds about the Mytilenians. [trans. Warner]

8.II.20: τούτων ἐγώ ἢδιον μὲν ἂν ἠλοχὸν ύμῖν ἔτερα ἐπιστήλλειν, οὐ μὲντοι χρησιμώτερα γέ, εἰ δὲ ασφάλεις εἰσδότας τὰ ἐνθάδε βουλεύσασθαι, καὶ ἢμα τὰς φυσῖς ἐπιστάμενος ύμῶν, βουλομένων μὲν τὰ ἥδιστα ἀκούειν, οἰτιμωμένων δὲ ύστερον, ἢν τι ύμῖν ἀπ' ἄυτῶν μὴ ὑμίοιν ἐκβῇ. [Thuc. 7.14.4]

I might certainly have sent you a different account from this, and one that would have given you more pleasure, but I could not have told you anything more useful, if what you require is to have a clear idea of the position here before you reach your decisions. Besides, I know the Athenian character from experience: you like to be told pleasant news, but if things do not turn out in the way you have been led to expect, then you blame your informants afterwards. [trans. Warner]

8.II.21: τοιαῦτα ο Περικλῆς λέγων ἐπειράτο τοὺς Ἀθηναίους τῆς τε ἐς αὐτῶν ὀργῆς παραλείψειν καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν παρόντων δεινῶν ἀπάγειν τὴν γνώμην. [Thuc. 2.65.1]

In this way Pericles attempted to stop the Athenians from being angry with him and to guide their thoughts in a direction away from their immediate sufferings. [trans. Warner]

8.II.22: ἡδονᾶς τε καὶ λύπας ἐν παισὶ μάλιστα ἂν τις ἐὕριοι καὶ γυναιξὶ καὶ οἰκέταις καὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων λεγομένων ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς τε καὶ φαύλοις. ... τὰς δὲ γε ἀπάλας τε καὶ μετρίας, οἱ δὲ μετὰ νου τε καὶ δόξης ὀρθῆς λογίσμῳ ἀγονται, ἐν ὀλίγοις τε ἐπιτευχθεῖ καὶ τοῖς βέλτιστα μὲν φύσιν, βέλτιστα δὲ παιδευθεῖσιν. [Plato Republic 4.431c-d]

The greatest number and variety of desires and pleasures and pains is generally to be found in children and women and slaves, and in the less respectable majority of so-called free men. ... While the simple and moderate desires, guided by reason and right judgement and reflection, are to be found in a minority who have the best natural gifts and best education. [trans. Lee]

ως οἴτινες πρὸς τὰς ξυμφορὰς γνώμη μὲν ἤκιστα λυπῶται, ἔργῳ δὲ μάλιστα ἀντέχουσιν, οὕτωι καὶ πόλεωι καὶ ἱδιωτῶν κράτιστοι εἶσιν. [Thuc. 2.64.6]
To face calamity with a mind as unclouded as may be, and quickly to react against it - this, in a city and in an individual, is real strength. [trans. Warner]

8.III.1: 
τούτο μὲν σφι πέμψασι έξ Νυμφίαν πρός τοὺς πρότεινοι κατεστησαν, τοὺς δὲ ὑπολογίζοντα τινὰ λοιμὸς ὑπολαβόν ἀπήρικτο τούτο δὲ ἐν τῇ πόλι τοῦ αὐτοῦ τοῦτον χρόνον, ὕπατον πρὸ τῆς ναυμαχίας, πασί γράφματα διδασκόμενοι εἰνέπεσε ἡ στέγη, ὡσπερ ἀπ' ἕκατον καὶ εἰκάζει σαιδῶν ἐς μοῦνος ἀπέφυγε. [Herodotus 6.27.2]

The Chians had sent a choir of a hundred young men to Delphi: ninety-eight of them caught the plague and died, and only two returned. ... at about the same time ... the roof of a school fell in on some children who were learning their letters, and of a hundred and twenty children only one escaped. [trans. de Sélincourt]

8.III.2: 
νόμον ἔθηκεν ... ἵνα δῖνεται ἐκείνης τῆς πόλεως μὴ θηταὶ τὰ ὄπλα μηδὲ μεθ᾽ εὖτερον, ἀτίμον εἶναι καὶ τῆς πόλεως μὴ μετέχειν. [Aristotle Athenaios Politea 8.5]

A specific law ... laying down that anyone who did not choose one side or the other in such a dispute should lose his citizen rights. [trans. de Sélincourt]

8.III.3: 
ταῦτ᾽ οὖν ἐγνωρίσαθε ἡμῖν πάντα τὰ ψηφίσματα, καὶ αὐτὰ καὶ εἰ ποῦ τι ἀντίγραφον ἦν, καὶ πίστιν ἄλλης ἡμῶν ὀμοίως δώσαι εἰς ἀκροπόλει καὶ μοι ἀναγνώσθη τὸ ψηφίσμα τὸ Πατροκλείδου, καθ᾽ ὅ ταύτα ἐγένετο. [Andocides On the Mysteries 1.76]

You enacted, then, that both the originals and all extant copies of these several decrees should be cancelled, and your differences ended by an exchange of pledges on the Acropolis. Kindly read the decree of Patrocleides whereby this was effected. [trans. Maidment]

ἀναγνώσται δὲ ἵς ἅμα αὐτῷ ἐπὶ γὰρ καὶ νῦν ἐγγέγραπται ἐν τῷ Βουλευτήριῳ. [Andocides On the Return 2.23]

The herald shall read it to you, as it is lying even now among the records in the Council-chamber. [trans. Maidment]

8.III.4: 
Ἀθηναῖος - γράμματα μὲν ποιοὶ καὶ ἐν γράμμασιν λόγοι καὶ ἄλλων εἰδὲ πολλῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεις γεγραμμένοι, γράμματα δὲ καὶ τὰ τού νομοθέτου καὶ λόγοι [Plato Laws 858c]

[Athenian: We have in our States not only the writings and written speeches of many people, but also the decrees and laws of the lawgiver. [trans. Burly];

Ἀθηναῖος - ἄλλα οἰκονόματε μᾶλλον ὅμορφα τε καὶ τυρταῖοι καὶ τοῖς άλλοις ποιηταις περὶ βίου τε καὶ ἐπιπεδευμάτων κακῶς θεοῦτα γράφομεν, Λυκούργω γὰρ ἤτοι καὶ Ζώλαν καὶ ὅσοι δὲ νομοθέται γεγραμμένοι γράμματα ἐγράφωσι; ἥ το γε ὅρθον, πάντων δὲ γραμματῶν τῶν ἐν τοῖς πόλεις τα περὶ τοὺς νομούς γεγραμμένα φαίνεσθαι διαπεπτόμενα μακρὰ κάλλιστα τὸ καὶ ἄριστα. [Plato Laws 858e]

[Athenian: Well then, is it more disgraceful on the part of Homer and Tyrtaeus and the rest of the poets to lay down in their writings bad rules about life and its pursuits, and less disgraceful on the part of Lycurgus and Solon and all the legislators who have written? Or rather, is it not right that,
of all the writings which exist in States, those which concern laws should be seen, when unrolled, to be by far the fairest and best. [trans. Bury]

8.III.5:

Also the King-archon introduces the letting of domains, having made a list of them on whitened tablets. These also are let for ten years, and the rent is paid in the ninth presidency; hence in that presidency a very large revenue comes in. [trans. Rackham]

8.III.6:

There are ten Receivers elected by lot, one from each tribe; these take over the tablets and wipe off the sums paid in the presence of the Council in the Council-chamber, and give the tablets back again to the official clerk. [trans. Rackham]

8.III.7:

What’s to be inscribed on the side of the Treaty-stone?

8.III.8:

It is signed by Lysilla, the clerk at the suggestion of Sostrate.

That is what I declare publicly; as to certain points, which I wish to keep undisclosed, I propose to record them on the secretary’s minutes. [trans. Leiper]
As for the audience, You are mistaken
If you think subtle points will not be taken
Such fears are vain, I vow;
They've all got textbooks now -
However high your brow, they won't be shaken.
No talking down to these: that's all outdated!
For native wit alone they're highly rated;
It's real tough stuff they need;
They don't want chicken-feed -
They're educated!
[trans. David Barrett]

Now the people who do these things [tuition in letters, music and physical training] more than anyone else are just the people who can do them more than anyone else - and the people who can do the most are simply the people with the most money. So it's their sons who start going off to school at the earliest age and who are the last to finish with teachers. [trans. Beresford]

[Writing] is a receipt for recollection, not for memory. ... And as for wisdom, your pupils will have the reputation for it without proper instruction, and in consequence be thought very knowledgeable when they are for the most part quite ignorant. ... to suppose that one can transmit or acquire clear and certain knowledge of an art through the medium of writing, or that written words can do more than remind the reader of what he already knows on any given subject ... writing involves a similar disadvantage to painting. The productions of painting look like living beings, but if you ask them a question they maintain a solemn silence. The same holds true of written words; you might suppose that they understand what they are saying, but if you ask them what they mean by anything they simply return the same answer over and over again.
[trans. Hamilton]
Besides, once a thing is committed to writing it circulates equally among those who understand the subject and those who have no business with it. A writing cannot distinguish between suitable and unsuitable readers. [trans. Hamilton]

Knowledge and understanding ... reside not in sounds or in physical shapes but in souls [the intellect]. [trans. Hamilton]

When one sees a written composition, whether it be on law by a legislator or on any other subject, one can be sure, if the writer is a serious man, that his book does not represent his most serious thoughts; they remain stored up in the noblest region of his personality. If he is really serious in what he has set down in writing 'then surely' not the gods but men 'have robbed him of his wits'. [trans. Hamilton]

I am told that since then he [Dionysios] has written a book about what he learnt at that time, putting it together as if it were a treatise of his own, quite different from what I taught him; but of this I know nothing. I know that some others have also written on the same topics, but such men are ignorant
even of themselves. But this much at any rate I can affirm about any present or future writers who pretend to knowledge of the matters with which I concern myself, whether they claim to have been taught by me or by a third party or to have discovered the truth for themselves; in my judgement it is impossible that they should have any understanding of the subject. No treatise by me concerning it exists or ever will exist. It is not something that can be put into words like other branches of learning; only after long partnership in a common life devoted to this very thing does truth flash upon the soul like a flame kindled by a leaping spark, and once it is born there it nourishes itself thereafter. Yet this too I know, that if there were to be any oral or written teaching on this matter it would best come from me. [trans. Hamilton]

"Εἰ δὲ μοι ἐφαίνετο γραπτή᾽ ἵκανὸς εἶναι πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς καὶ ῥητά, τί τοιοῦ καλλίου ἐπεράκτ᾽ ἂν ἦμιν εἰν τῷ βίῳ ἢ τοὺς τε αὐθρώποις μέγα ὄφελος γράψαι καὶ τὴν φυσιν εἰς φός παῖσι προαγαγεῖν; ἀλλ᾽ οὔτε αὐθρώποις ἡγούμαι τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν περὶ αὐτῶν λεγομενὴν ἄγαθον. [Plato, Letter VII 341d-e]

If I thought that any adequate spoken or written account could be given to the world at large, what more glorious life-work could I have undertaken than to put into writing what would be of great benefit to mankind and to bring the nature of reality to light for all to see? But I do not think that the attempt to put these matters into words would be to men's advantage. [trans. Hamilton]

8.III.12: 'Εστι μὲν οὖν τὰ ἐν τῇ φωνῇ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ παθημάτων σύμβολα, καὶ τὰ γραφόμενα τῶν ἐν τῇ φωνῇ. καὶ ὡσπερ οὐδὲ γράφωμα παῖσι τα αὐτὰ, οδὲ φωναὶ αἱ αὐταί· ὥν μεντι ταῦτα σημεία πρῶτας, ταῦτα παῖσι παθηματα τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ ὡν ταῦτα ὁμοιώματα, πρᾶγματα ἤδη ταύτα. [Aristotle, On Interpretation 1.4-9:16a]

Words spoken are symbols or signs of affections or impressions of the soul [psyche]; written words are the signs of words spoken. As writing, so also is speech not the same for all races of men. But the mental affections themselves of which these words are primarily signs, are the same for the whole of mankind, as are also the objects of which those affections are representations or likenesses, images, copies. [trans. Cook]

456 Cf. Diog. Laert.[8.15] who states that ‘down to the time of Philolaus it was not possible to acquire knowledge of any Pythagorean doctrine, and Philolaus alone brought out those three celebrated books which Plato sent a hundred minas to purchase. Not less than six hundred persons went to his evening lectures; and those who were privileged to see him wrote to their friends congratulating themselves on a great piece of good fortune. … And the rest of the Pythagoreans used to say that not all his doctrines were for all men to hear.’

457 Cf. Liddell and Scott [1996 LJS, p. 1676]: ‘a symbolon [σύμβολον] … one half of an astragalos … xenoii … to a contract broken in two, each keeping half as proof of the contractual relationship’. Cff. Roy Harris, Rethinking Writing, p. 23-26: ‘Aristotle’s use of the term is both striking and profound. … For the two disjoint parts of the symbolon have no value at all individually, Each is significant only as a counterpart of the other. … [the] relationship is not representational. … With the two halves of the symbolon there is no question of one representing the other or being a substitute for the other. They are not identical, nor equivalent. … The whole point is that they are both different and unique. … Written signs are symbola of vocal sounds, and vocal sounds in turn are symbola of affections of the soul. [pp. 23 - 24]’ Vocal sounds are symbols of affections of the soul, but letters are not. [p. 25] In the same passage in De Interpretatione Aristotle distinguishes between a symbolon and a semeion. The latter is speech as a sign of what is happening in the speakers soul (psyche) [mind] … understanding the semeion presupposes acquaintance with the symbolon. Aristotle also distinguishes between what we write (graphomena) and the letters (grammata) we use for that purpose [p. 26].
8.III.13:

And we can’t recognise reflections of the letters in water or in a mirror till we know the letters themselves. The same skill and training are needed to recognise both. [trans. Lee]

8.IV.1:

They tell me that you have acquired all the words of Homer.

8.IV.2:

SOCRATES: At least then you have heard from one or another, and from Homer; for you have heard the Odyssey and the Iliad.

ALCIDIADES: No doubt about it, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Pisistratus’s son Hipparchus, of Philaidae, who was the eldest and wisest of Pisistratus’s sons, and who, among the many goodly proofs of wisdom that he showed, first brought the poems of Homer into this country of ours, and compelled the rhapsodes at the Panathenaea to recite them in relay, one man following on another, as [228c] they still do now. He dispatched a fifty-oared galley for Anacreon of Teos, and brought him into our city. Simonides of Ceos he always had about him, prevailing on him by plenteous fees and gifts. All this he did from a wish to educate the citizens, in order that he might have subjects of the highest excellence; for he thought it not right to grudge wisdom to any, so noble and good was he. And when his people in the city had been educated and were admiring him for his wisdom, [228d] he proceeded next, with the design of educating those of the countryside, to set up figures of Hermes for them along the roads in the midst of the city and every district town; and then, after selecting from his own
wise lore, both learnt from others and discovered for himself, the things that he considered the wisest, he threw these into elegiac form and inscribed them on the figures as verses of his own and testimonies of his wisdom, so that in the first place [228e] his people should not admire those wise Delphic legends of 'Know thyself' and 'Nothing overmuch' and the other sayings of the sort, but should rather regard as wise the utterances of Hipparchus; and that in the second place, through passing up and down and reading his words and acquiring a taste for his wisdom, they might resort hither from the country for the completion of their education. [trans. Lamb] 458

8.IV.3:

... την Ὀμήρου ποιήσιν ... τῶν προγόνων ἡμῶν ἐντιμῶν αὐτῶν ποίησαι τὴν τεχνὴν ἐν τῷ τῆς μουσικῆς ἄθλῳ καὶ τῇ παίδευσι τῶν νεωτέρων, ἵνα πολλὰς ἀκούσας τῶν ἐπῶν εκμαθᾶσαι τὴν ἐχθρὰν τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν πρὸς αὐτῶς ... [Isocrates Panegyricus 159]

Our ancestors determined to give [Homer's] art a place of honor in our musical contests and in the education of our youth, in order that we, hearing his verses over and over again, may learn by heart the enmity which stands from of old between us and them ... [trans. Norlin]

8.IV.4:

Ἡδη τῶν ἐνενῆκοντα ἑτῶν, ἐγώ δὲ πη μᾶλιστα δεκέτης. ἢ δὲ Κουρεώτις ἡμῖν οὐσα ἐτύγχανεν Ἀπατουρίων. τὸ δὴ τῆς ἔρτης σύνθετο ἐκάστοτε καὶ τότε συνείδη τοῖς παισίν ἔδεα γὰρ ἡμῖν οἱ πατέρες ἔθεσαν ραφωδίας: πολλῶν μὲν οὖν δὴ καὶ πολλὰ ἔλεξηπαι ποιήματα, ἀτι δὲ νέα κατ' ἐκείνον τὸν χρόνον ἄντα τὰ Σόλωνος πολλοί τῶν παίδων ἔσαιμεν. εἶπεν οὖν τὶς τῶν φατέρων, εἶπε δὲ δοκοῦν αὐτῷ τότε ἀτι καὶ χαρίν τινὰ τῷ Κριτίᾳ φέρον, δοκεῖν οἱ τὰ τι.

[Plato, Timaeus 21b-c]

Critias was at the time, so he said, nearly ninety, and I was about ten. It was Children's Day in the festival of Apatouria, and there were the customary ceremonies for the boys, including prizes given by the fathers for reciting. There were recitations of many poems by different authors, but many of the competitors chose Solon's poems, which were in those days quite a novelty. And one of the clansmen ... said that he thought that Solon was not only the wisest of men but also the most outspoken of poets. [trans. Lee] 459

8.IV.5:

πέμψας γάρ κωλὴν ἔριφον σκέλος ἦραν πίον ταύρου λαρινοῦ, τίμιον ἀνδρὶ λαχεῖν τοῦ κλέος Ἐλλάδα πάσαν ἀφίζεται, οὐδ' ἀπολῆξει, ἐστ' ἀν αὐιδάου ἐγεος Ἐλλαδίκον.

[Xenophanes Frag. B.6 (West)]

You, sending the thigh of a kid, got a fat leg of beef in return.
A precious thing to fall into your lap.
A prize whose popularity will spread throughout Hellas, as long as the family of Greek singers lives. [trans. Leiper]

458 Cf. Aristotle [Ath. Pol. 18.1] who also states it was Hipparchus who brought Anacreon, Simonides and others to Athens. The physical evidence that these herms existed is in P.A. Hansen, Carmina Epig Graeca Saeculorum VIII-V A. Chr. N., Texte und Kommentare 12, Berlin, 1983, no. 304.

459 The dramatic date of Timaeus is 425, making the incident around 525BC. In Homer, Telemachus also remarks on the popularity of the newest song [Od. 1.351-53].
8.IV.6:

χαίρε, τόδε μὲν κατὰ Φοινίσσων ἵμπολὰν
μέλος ὑπὲρ πολλὰς ἄλος πέμπεται:
τὸ Καστόρειον δ’ ἐν Αἰολίδεσσι χορδαῖς ἰκών
ἀθησον χαῖριν ἐπτακτύπου
φορμιγγοίς ἀυτόμενοι. [Pindar Pythian 2.68]

Good-bye. This song / I am sending, like a Phoenician merchant, over the grey
sea. / And on the Kastoreion's Aeolian mood, so please you, / Look: turn to it,
if ever / You liked my seven-stringed harp. [trans. Bowra]

8.IV.7:

καὶ τοὺς θησαυροὺς τῶν πάλαι σοφῶν ἀνδρῶν, ὃς ἐκεῖνοι κατέλιπον ἐν
βιβλίοις γράφαντες, ἀνελίττων κοινὴ σὺν τοῖς φίλοις διέρχομαι, καὶ ἀν τι
ὀρῶμεν ἀγαθὸν ἐκλέγομεν καὶ μέγα νομίζομεν κέρδος
[Xenophon Memorabilia 1.6.14]

And the treasures that the wise men of old have left us in their writings I open
and explore with my friends. If we come on any good thing, we pick it, and we
set much store on being useful to one another. [trans. Tredennick]

8.IV.8:

staking, πρῶτον Μουσῶν χορὸν ἐξ Ἑλικῶν ἤλθεν εἰς ἔμοι ἢτορ
ἐπευχομαι εἰκέναι καὶ δήσεις, ἢι νέον ἐν δήλοις ἐμοῖς ἐπί γονᾶσαι θῆκος, [Battle
of the Frogs and Mice 1-3]

Here I begin: and first I pray the choir of the Muses to come down from
Helicon into my heart to aid the lay which I have newly written in tablets upon
my knee.'[trans. White]

8.V.1:

dαιμονίη Δίδυν μοι Ὄλυμπος ἄγγελος ἔλθεν λύσασθαι φίλον ύιόν ἱόντι ἐπί
νησὶ Λάκταιος, δωρὰ δ’ Ἀχιλλῆι φερεμέν τα κε θυμόν ἰηῆ. ... ύιὸν δ’ αὐτὸς γαρ
τις μ’ ἄκουσα θεοῦ καὶ ἑοδήκαρον ἀντῆν, εἴμι, καὶ οὐχ ἀλίου ἐπος ἐσσωτείναι.
[Il. 24.194-199; 23.223-224]

Princess, word from Olympian Zeus has come to me to go down to the ships of
the Achaeans and ransom our dead son. ...With my own ears I heard the voice,
I saw the god before me. Go I shall and no more words. [trans. Fitzgerald]

8.V.2:

μηκέτι ύιὸν μ’ ἐρεθίζει, γέρον ... μὴ σε, γέρον, οὐδ’ αὐτόν εἰνι κλασίςειν ἔσσω καὶ
ἰκέτην περ ἱόντα, Δίως δ’ ἀλίτωμα ἐφέτεισης.
[Il. 24. 569-570]

Do not vex me, sir ... no more or under my own roof, suppliant though you
are, I may not spare you, sir, but trample on the express command of Zeus!
[trans. Fitzgerald.]

8.V.3:

Τηλέμαχος’, ἥ μάλα δὴ σε διδάσκουσιν θεοί αὐτοῖ
ὑψαγορητ’ ἔμεναι καὶ βαρσάλως ἀγορεύειν.
μη σε γ’ ἐν ὕμφαλῳ θάκη βασιλῆς Κρονίων
ποιησειν, ὁ τοι γενεῇ πατρῶϊ ἔστιν.
[Od. 1.383-385]

Telemachos, no doubt the gods themselves are teaching you this high and
mighty manner. Zeus forbid you should be king in Ithaca, though you are
eligible as your father's son. [trans. Lattimore]
8.V.4:
καὶ κεν ἐμὸν κατὰ θυμὸν ἀμύμονα μεμπρίξας φράσομαι, ἂ κεν νωὶ δυνηοίμεθ' ἀντιφέρεσθαι μούνῳ ἀνευθ ἄλλων, ἂ καὶ διζησιμεθ' ἄλλος.
[Od. 235-239]
I must put all my mind to it, to see if we two by ourselves can take them on or if we should look round for help. [trans. Lattimore]

8.V.5:
καὶ φράσαι ἂ κεν νωίν Ἀθηναίδα σὺν Δίι πατρί ἀρκέσαι, ἂ τιν' ἄλλον ἀμύντωρα μεμπρίξω.
[Od. 260-261]
Suppose Athena’s arms are over us, and Zeus her father’s, must I rack my brains for more? [trans. Lattimore]

Telemachus answers:
ἐρθλὼ τοι τούτων γ’ ἐπαμώμωρε, τοὺς ἁγορευεῖς, ὃς περ ἐν νεφέσσι καθιμέω· ὡ τε καὶ ἄλλοις ἀνδράσι τε κρατέουσι καὶ ἀθανάτοις θεοῖς.
[Od. 263-265]
Those two are great defenders, no one doubts it, but throned in the serene clouds overhead; other affairs of men and the deathless gods they have to rule over. [trans. Lattimore]

8.V.6:
ἡ δ’ ἄρ’ ἐπ’ ὀφρύσι νέεσε· νόησε δὲ διὸς ᾠδυσσεύς,
[Od. 16.164]
… signing to him with her brows, a sign he recognised. [trans. Lattimore]

8.V.7:
καὶ γὰρ τίς θ’ ἐνα φῶτα κατακτεῖνας ἐνι δήμῳ· ὃ μὴ πολλοὶ ἐωσιν ἀσσοστήρες ὀπίσσω ἠμεῖς δ’ ἔρμα πόλιος ἀπέκταμεν, οἱ μὲν’ ἀριστοὶ κούρνων εἰν Ἰθάκη τά δε σε φράζονθαι ἄνωγα.
[Od. 23.118-122]
Whoever kills one citizen [even if he has few to avenge him] … Well, we cut down the flower of Ithaca, the mainstay of the town. Consider that. [trans. Lattimore]
8.V.8:

What is more we allow the mind plenty of rest from labour; in that we carry out assemblies and sacrifices throughout the year.

[trans. Leiper]

8.V.9:

What is more we allow the mind plenty of rest from labour; in that we carry out assemblies and sacrifices throughout the year.

[trans. Leiper]

8.V.10:

Chryses, as Agamemnon’s emissary
I bring your child to you, and for Apollo a hecatomb in the Danaans’ name.
We trust in this way to appease your lord
who sent down pain and sorrow on the Argives
[trans. Fitzgerald]

8.V.11:

All the soldiers murmured their assent: ‘Behave well to the priest. And take the ransom!’
But Agamemnon would not. It went against his desire, and brutally he ordered the man away.
[trans. Fitzgerald]
8.V.12:

And you, Hieron. Having the wit to know what sayings are sharp and true, have learned the old proverb: 'With every blessing God gives a pair of curses.' This is what fools cannot bear with decency; but good men can, and turn the fair part outwards.

[trans. Bowra]

8.V.13:

Do not have evil friends or clash with good men ... Unquestionably a restrained tongue is a man's greatest treasure. His greatest refinement, one which has limits ...

[trans. Leiper]

8.V.14:

... bribe swallwers, those who choose to judge in this way. Childish! They do not even know how much more the half is than the whole, nor what great profit there is in mallow and asphodel.

[trans. Leiper]

8.V.15:

I will be little when little is my circumstance. And great when it is great. What doom now or to come, attends me. But that I shall set my heart, and serve it after my measure. If God should give me the luxury of wealth, I think surely I should know Thenceforth the heights of fame. Of Nestor and the Lykian Sarpedon, those household names, the loud lines speak, which craftsmen built with skill. And thence we know them. Greatness in noble songs endures through time; but to win this, few find easy.

[trans. Bowra]
8.V.16: No one taught me: deep in my mind a god shaped all the various ways of life in song. And I am fit to make verse in your company as in the god's. [trans. Lattimore]

8.V.17: Once the Muses, meeting Thamyris, The Thracian on his way from Oechalia - from visiting Eurytus, the Oechalian - ended his singing. Pride made him say he could outsing the very Muses, daughters of Zeus who bears the storm-cloud for a shield. For this affront they blinded him, bereft him of his god-given song, and stilled his harping. [trans. Fitzgerald]

8.V.18: I seal my words of wisdom with our name, Kurnos; no man can steal them now, nor try To slip his trash in with my excellence, And every man will say, 'This is a song That great Theognis, the Megarian, sang' [trans. Wender]

καιρὸν ἐς θείες, πολλῶν πείρατα συνταξάσαις ἐν ὑφασκ, μεῖν ἐπεται μάμος ἄνθρωπων. ἀπὸ γὰρ κόροις ἀμβλυνεῖ αἰῶνες ταχείας ἐλπίδας. ἀστῶν δὲ ἀκοῖ κρύφων ὑμῶν βαρύνει μάλιστ' ἐπιπλοίον ἐπὶ ἀλληρεῖας ἄλλ' ὄμως, κρέσσων γὰρ οἰκτιρμοῦ φθόνος, πολλοὶ μάρτυρες ἄμφοτέροις πιστοί. εὐαυθεία δὲ ἐν ὅργα παρόμοιον,

460 Cf. Μοῦσ' ἄρ', ἀοίδων ἀνήκειν ἀείδεμεναι κλέα άνδρῶν (the Muse arouses the singer to sing) [Od. 8.73]; ἦσ' γε Μοῦσα ἐκεί ἐδίδαξε, Διός παῖς, ἦσ' γε ἁπόλλων (you were taught by the Muse or Zeus or Apollo) [Od. 8.488]. Cf. Minchin, op. cit., pp. 163-164 with references and scholarship on the poet's ability to 'synthesise' the 'causal chains' of storylines that are held in normal memory banks and his perception of such ability. She cites Segal's [Singers: Heroes, and Gods in the 'Odyssey', Ithaca, N.J., Cornell University Press, 1994, pp. 138-139] suggestion that the poetic performance is similar to the warriors who are inspired with a will for battle. Conversely she notes the poet sometimes recalls his audience from the story-telling world to reflect on the performance whilst himself not interrupting his performance; cf. pp. 167-168.
Pindar Pythian I.81-85 & 89

Say enough and no more,
And spin in a slender twine
The threads of many tales
And men shall carp less at your heels.
Tedious Too-much dulls the quick edge of hope:
And words in a city weigh on men's hidden pride
Worst, when you say good things of another.
Yet, to be envied is better than pitied!
... Many are the witnesses and true
Of your good and evil. [trans. Bowra]

8.V.19:

[Friend], Don't be a fool! It isn't like you to
desert the field the way some coward
would! Come, halt, command the troops
back to their seats. You don't yet know
what Agamemnon means. He means to
test us, and something punitive comes
next. Not everyone could hear what he
proposed just now in council. Heaven
forbid he cripple, in his rate, the army he
commands. There's passion in kings; they
hold power from Zeus, they are dear to
Zeus! [trans. Fitzgerald]

8.V.20:

... he swung upon him with his staff and
told him,
[friend], Fool, go back, sit down, listen to
better men ...
weak sister, counting for nothing in battle
or in council! Shall we all wield the power
of kings? We can not, and many masters are
no good at all.

Let there be one commander, one authority,
holding his royal staff and precedence from
Zeus ...
[trans. Fitzgerald]

[661] ὃν τινα μὲν βασιλῆα καὶ ἠξιόχον ἄνδρα κισχίη τὸν δ’ ἀγανοῖς ἐπέέσσιν ἐρητύσασκε παραστάς - [2.189 – Whoever he met who was a leader or office-holder he would approach with gentle calming words to restrain]. Homer uses the same words [ἀγανοῖς ἐπέέσσιν ἐρητύσασκε] as Athena had instructed: σοὶ δ’ ἀγανοῖς ἐπέέσσιν ἐρήτε τε φῶτα ἐκαστον [2.180].
8.V.21:

Ατρείδη τέο δ᾽ αὐτ᾽ ἐπιμέμφεται ἴδῃ χατίζεις; πλεία τοι τοῦ χαλκοῦ κλησία, πολλαὶ δὲ γυναίκες εἶναι εἰς κλησία ἐξαιρεῖται, ἵς τοι Ἀχαιοὶ πρωτιστέο δίδομεν ἐν ἄπολεθρὼν ἐλωμεν. ἦτε καὶ χρυσοῦ ἐπίθευσι, ὥς κε τις οὐδεὶς Τρώων ἱπποδάμων ἔξηλιον ύιὸς ἄποινα, ὥς κεν εὐγα δήσας ἀγάγω ἵς ἄλλος Ἀχαιῶν, ἵς γυναίκα νῆπι, ἵνα μισεῖν ἐν φιλότητι, ἧν τ᾽ αὐτὸς ἀπονόσφι κατισχεῖ; οὐ μὲν ἔοικεν ἀρχὸν ἑωτά κακῶν ἑπιβασκεμένων υἱὰς Ἀχαιῶν. ὦ πέπονες κάκ᾽ ἐλέγχει Ἀχαιίδες οὐκέτ᾽ Ἀχαιοὶ οἰκαὶ περὶ σὺν ηυσι νεώμεθα, τόνδε δ᾽ ἐῶμεν αὐτοῦ ἐνι Τροίη γέρα πεσσεμέν, ὅφρα ἰδητοῖ ἦν τ᾽ οἱ χήμες προσαμπούνει ἤ καὶ οὐκ᾽ ὥς καὶ καίν Ἀχιλῆς ἐν μέγ᾽ ἁμείνονα φῶτα ἠτύπουσι: ἐλῶν γὰρ ἔχει γέρας αὐτὸς ἀποῦρος, ἄλλα μάλ᾽ οὐκ Ἀχιλῆς χόλος φρεαίν, ἄλλα μεθύμουν

8.V.22:

Ἀγαμεμνόνοι! Ποιο ἐμμέμφεσθαι; Ποῖοι οἴον μετήρηται, ἵς χαχεῖ, μηδ᾽ ἐθέλ᾽ οἰοὺς ἐρίζεμεν οἰωβάλειν ullam γὰρ ἐγὼ σει φημὶ χερεῖτέρον βροτοῦ ἄλλον εἴμεναι, ὅσοι οὐ Ατρείδης ὑπὸ λίων ἠλθοῦν. τῷ οὐκ ἄν βασιλεῖς ἀνά στοῖ ἱχῶν ἄγορεύοις, καὶ φίλοι οἰνείδα τε προφέροις, νόστοι τε φιλάσσοις.

οὐδὲ τί πω πάφα ἱδέμος ἵνα ἔσται τάδε ἔργα, ἤ εὖ ἧς κακῶς νοτίσσαμεν υἱὰς Ἀχαίων. τῷ υἱῶν Ατρείδης Ἀγαμέμνονι ποιμενὶ λαὸν ἢσαι οὐειδίζωμ, ὅτι οἱ μάλα πολλὰ διδοῦσιν ἤσαι Δαναοῦς: σὺ δὲ κερωτεύμι ἄγορεύεις.

ἄλλ᾽ ἐκ τοῖς ἑρέω, τὸ δὲ καὶ τετελεσμένον ἔσται: εἰ κ᾽ εὔτε σ᾽ ἀφαίρεντα κιχηρομεῖν ὡς νῦ περ ὀδέ, μικρότερον ὑποζήν ὑποζήν ῥέγει, μηδ׳ ἦν Τηλέμαχοι πατὴρ κεκλημένως οἶνον, ἤ μὴ ἐγὼ σε λαβὼν ἀπὸ μεν φίλα ἐγίστα δύσα, χαίλιον τ᾽ ἤδε χίτεμα, τα τ᾽ οἰδὼ αμφικαλύπτει, αὐτὸν δὲ κλαίοντα θοὺς ἐπὶ νήματο ἀφίσων πεπληγῶν ἀγορίθθεν ἀεικάσαι πληγῶσιν.

[II. 2.225-241]

8.V.22:

Θερσὶν ἀκριτόμουθε, λιγύς περ ἑών ἄγορεύτης, ἵς χαχεῖ, μηδ᾽ ἐθέλ᾽ οἰοὺς ἐρίζεμεν οἰωβάλειν ullam γὰρ ἐγὼ σει φημὶ χερεῖτέρον βροτοῦ ἄλλον εἴμεναι, ὅσοι οὐ Ατρείδης ὑπὸ λίων ἠλθοῦν. τῷ οὐκ ἄν βασιλεῖς ἀνά στοῖ ἱχῶν ἄγορεύοις, καὶ φίλοι οἰνείδα τε προφέροις, νόστοι τε φιλάσσοις.

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ἄλλ᾽ ἐκ τοῖς ἑρέω, τὸ δὲ καὶ τετελεσμένον ἔσται: εἰ κ᾽ εὔτε σ᾽ ἀφαίρεντα κιχηρομεῖν ὡς νῦ περ ὀδέ, μικρότερον ὑποζήν ὑποζήν ῥέγει, μηδ᾽ ἦν Τηλέμαχοι πατὴρ κεκλημένως οἶνον, ἤ μὴ ἐγὼ σε λαβὼν ἀπὸ μεν φίλα ἐγίστα δύσα, χαίλιον τ᾽ ἤδε χίτεμα, τα τ᾽ οἰδὼ αμφικαλύπτει, αὐτὸν δὲ κλαίοντα θοὺς ἐπὶ νήματο ἀφίσων πεπληγῶν ἀγορίθθεν ἀεικάσαι πληγῶσιν.

[II. 2.245-263]

Agamemnon! What have you got to groan about? What more can you gape after? Bronze fills all your huts, and the hottest girls – we hand them over to you, you first, when any stronghold falls. Or is it gold you lack? A Trojan father will bring you gold in ransom for his boy, though I – or some foot soldier like myself - roped the prisoner in. Or a new woman to lie with, couple with, keep stowed away for private use - is that your heart’s desire?

You send us back to bloody war for that? Comrades! Are you women of Achaea? I say we pull away for home, and leave him here on the beach to lay his captive girls! Let him find out if we troops are dispensable when he loses us! Contempt is all he shows when he loses us! Contempt is all he shows for a man twice his quality, by keeping Achilles’ woman that he snatched away.

[trans. Fitzgerald]

[At his side, abruptly, Odysseus halted, glaring, and grimly said: ‘You spellbinder! You sack of wind! Be still! Will you stand up to officers alone? Of All who came here to beleaguer Troy I say there is no soldier worse than you. Better not raise your voice to your commanders, or rail at them, after you lie awake with nothing on your mind but shipping home.

We have no notion, none, how this campaign may yet turn out. Who knows if we sail homeward in victory or defeat? Yet you bleat on, defaming the Lord Marshall Agamemmon because our Danaan veterans award him plentiful gifts of war. You sicken me!

Here is my promise, and it will be kept: if once again I hear your whining voice, I hope Odysseus’ head may be knocked loose from his own shoulders, hope I may no longer be called the father of Telemachus, if I do not take hold of you and strip you - yes, even of the shirt that hides your scut! From this assembly ground I’ll drive you howling and whip you like a dog into the ships - away from this assembly with deadly blows! [Fitzgerald trans.]
8.V.23:

The soldiers, for all their irritation, fell to laughing at the man’s disarray. You might have heard one fellow, glancing at his neighbour, say: ‘Oh, what a clout! A thousand times Odysseus has done good work, thinking out ways to fight or showing how you do it: this time, though, he’s done the best deed of the war, making that poisonous clown capsize. By god, a long, long time will pass before our hero cares to call down his chief again!’

[trans. Fitzgerald]

8.V.24:

But here is what I say: my oath upon it by this great staff: look: leaf or shoot it cannot flower, peeled of bark and leaves; instead, Achaean officers in council take it in hand by turns, when they observe by the will of Zeus due order in debate: let this be what I swear by them: I swear a day will come when every Achaean soldier will groan to have Achilles back. That day you shall no more prevail on me than this dry wood shall flourish—driven though you are, and though a thousand men perish before the killer, Hector. You will eat your heart out, raging with remorse for this dishonour done by you to the bravest of Achaeans.

[trans. Fitzgerald]
In ancient times, ... the king offered all the sacrifices, and those which were holiest and which none might name his wife performed, as was natural, she being queen. [75] But when Theseus settled the people in one city and established the democracy, and the city became populous, the people none the less continued to elect the king as before, choosing him from among those most distinguished by valor; and they established a law that his wife should be of Athenian birth, and that he should marry a virgin who had never known another man, to the end that after the custom of our fathers the sacred rites that none may name may be celebrated o n t h e c i t y ' s b e h a l f , a n d t h a t t h e a p p r o v e d sacrifices may be made to the gods as piety demands, without omission or innovation. [76] This law they wrote on a pillar of stone, and set it up in the sanctuary of Dionysus by the altar in Limnae (and this pillar even now stands, showing the inscription in Attic characters, nearly effaced). Thus the people testified to their own piety toward the god, and left it as a deposit for future generations, showing what type of woman we demand that she shall be who is to be given in marriage to the god, and is to perform the sacrifices. For this reason they set it up in the most ancient and most sacred sanctuary of Dionysus in Limnae, in order that few only might have knowledge of the inscription; for once only in each year is the sanctuary opened, on the twelfth day of the month Anthesterion. [trans. DeWitt; my italics]

8.V.26:

Φαλής ἑταῖρε Βακχίου
ζυγκωμε νυκτοπεπτλάνητε
μοιχέ παιδεράστα,
ἐκτός ἂν ἐστει προσεύμενον ἐς
τὸν δήμον ἠδόν ἐσμενος,
σπουδάς ποιησάμενος ἐμαυτῷ,
πραγμάτων τε καὶ μαχών
καὶ Λαμάχων ἀπαλλαγέας,
πολλα γὰρ ἐν θ' ἠδίου, ὦ Φαλής Φαλής,
κλέπτουσαν εὐρωθα οἰρικὴν υληφόρον
τὴν Στρυμόδωρον Θεραττὰν ἐκ τοῦ Φελλέως
μέσαν λαβόντο ἀραυντα καταβαλόντα
καταγχαρτίς ὦ
Φαλής Φαλής.

[Aristophanes Archarnians 264-276]
Oh, Phales, companion of the orgies of Bacchus, night reveller, god of adultery, friend of young men, these past six years I have not been able to invoke you. With what joy I return to my farmstead, thanks to the truce I have concluded, freed from cares, from fighting and from Lamachuses! How much sweeter, oh Phales, oh, Phales, is it to surprise Thratta, the pretty woodmaid, Strymodorus’ slave, stealing wood from Mount Phellenus, to catch her under the arms, to throw her on the ground and possess her, Oh, Phales, Phales! [trans. Hall]

8.V.27:

dε μιν Λυκίνην δε, πόρεν δ’ ώ γε σήματα λυγρά
γράψας εν πινακι πτυκτωθ’ θυμοθόρα πολλά, [Iliad 6.169]

He sent him to Lycia, and gave him destructive symbols, many deadly signs scratched in a folded tablet. [trans. Leiper]

tαύτ’ οὐ πίναξεν ἐστιν ἐγγεγραμμένα
οὐδ’ ἐν πτυχαίς βιβλίων κατεσφυγμένα,
σαφῆ δ’ ἀκουείς εξ ἐλευθεροτομούμενον
γλώσσης. [Aeschylus Suppliant 946-949]

Not on tablets is this inscribed, nor has it been sealed in folds of books: you hear the truth from free-spoken lips. [trans. Vellacott]

8.V.28:

τόν ὁ Ολυμπιονίκαν ἀνάγωντε μοι
Ἀρχεστράτου παῖδα, ποθὶ φρενὸς
ἐμὸς γέγραπται: ἀλλ’, γαρ σύτω μέλος
οἱ ἐπιλέβοντοι ἐπιλεβάθ’. [Pindar Olympian 10.1-4]

Read me [make me know] the name of the Olympic victor, the son of Archestratus, where it has been written in my mind. For I owed him a sweet song, and I have forgotten. [trans. Bowra].

αἰώνιοι γυναῖκι τῶν ἐπὶ δελτουμένας.
[Aeschylus Suppliants 179]

I charge you, record my injunctions on the tablets of your minds and guard them. [trans. Vellacott]

tοιαυτ’ ἀκούον ἐν φρεσίν γράφου’. [Aeschylus Choephoroi 450]

Hear my tale and inscribe it on your heart. [trans. Vellacott]

καὶ μὴν ἀριθμῶν, ἔσοχον σοφισμάτων,
ἐξίπριον οὕτωις, γραμμάτων τε συμβέβαιν,
μημὴν ἀπάντων, μουσουμήτορ ἐργάνην.
[Aeschylus Prometheus Bound 459-461]

Rituals associated with Phales appear on many cups; for example: the Pan painter (Beazley 206285; Berlin, Antikensammlung 3206; Athenian Red-figure; ca.475) depicts a naked woman carrying a giant phallus on one side and a draped youth performing ritual before a Herm. There is no reason to identify her as a hetaira rather than a citizen wife. Also a Cup fragment attributed to the Chairias Group (Beazley 201621; Berlin, Lost F2275; Red-figure; ca. 500) shows a naked woman with a vessel of phalloi. Likewise, (Beazley 9017718, Rome, Villa Guilia 50404; Red-figure Cup; ca. 475) the two women on the tondo, one naked, the other dancing clothed and both wearing ritual headwraps seen on other clayware depicting phallos ritual. Both of these cups are ‘kale’ cups.
And numbers, too, chiepest of sciences, I invented for them, and the combining of letters, creative mother of the Muses' arts, with which to hold all things in memory. [trans. Vellacott]

μὴ ἐγγράψον σὺ μνήμοσιν δέλτοις φρενῶν. [Aeschylus Prom. Unbound 789-790]

May you engrave it on the recording tablets of your mind. [trans. Vellacott]

8.V.29:

πάρ πρὶν χρῆ τοιοῦτα λέγειν χειμώνος ἐν ὁρή ἐν κλίνῃ μαλακῆ κατακείμενον, ἐμπλεόν οὖν, πινόντα γλυκῶν οίνου, ὑποτρώγοντ' ἐρεβίνθους· τίς πόθεν εἰς ἄνδρών, πόσα τοι ἐστί, φέροις; πηλίκος ἢ θ', ὁ Μήδος ἄφικε τοις πορευόμενοις; [Athenaeus 2.54e: Xenophanes DK.22]

This is what the fireside conversation should be in the winter
When a man reclines on a soft couch, well-fed
Drinking sweet wine and munching chickpeas [and answering]
Such things as, 'Who are you and where do you come from?
How old are you? What age were you when the Mede came? [trans. Gulik]

8.V.30:

ψυχρών δ' ἔστιν ύδωρ καὶ γλυκῷ καὶ καθαρῷ· πάρκειται δ' ἄρτοι ξανθοί γεφρέθ' τε τραπέζα
τυρόν καὶ μέλιτος πίνοις ἄχθυννεν· βεβιώνει δ' ἄνθεαις αὖ τὸ μέσον πάντῃ
πεποκαστό, μολιθ' δ' ἄμφις ἔχει δῶματα καὶ θαλή.

χρῆ δ' πρῶτον μὲν θεὸν ὑμνεῖν εὐφρονον ἄνδρας
εὐφήμους μόθοι καὶ καθαροῖς λόγοις· σπείραντας δ' καὶ εὐερεμούνοις
τὰ δίκαια δύνασθαι πρῆσαι—ταῦτα γάρ ὡς ἐστὶ
προχειροτέρωτοι—
οὐχ ὤρθος πίνειν ὑπόθεν κεν ἔχων ἀφίκοιο
οἰκαί ἀνὴρ προτόλου μὴ πάνω γαρ κρατεῖος.
ἄνδρών δ' ἀινεῖν τούτον ὡς ἐσθλὰ
πιὸν ἀναφαίνει,

καὶ δὴ τοῖς ὑμνημοσύνης καὶ τοῖς ἀμφ' ἄρετης,
οὕτι μάχας διεπον Τιττάνων ὡτ' Ἱγαντέων
οὐδὲ ταῦτα αἰνεῖν ποτέρων,
η σταίρας σφαδανός, τοῖς ὦν
χρίστον ἐνεστι·
θεῶν δ' προμῆθειάν αἰὲν ἔχειν ἁγαθόν.
[Athenaeus 11.462: DK.1]

Now the floor is scrubbed clean, our hands are washed
and cups are dry. A boy loops garlands in our hair. Another passes round a phial of redolent balsam. The mixing bowl is bubbling with good cheer, and more fragrant wine
stands potent in the earthen jars.
Incense floats a holy perfume through the room.
Water is cold, crystal, sweet.

Golden bread is set near on a princely table loaded down with cheese and rich honey.
The altar in the center is submerged in flowers and the house vibrates with fun and singing.

Gracious men should first sing praises to god with proper stories and pure words.
After the libation when we pray for strength to act with rectitude (our first concern),
there is no sin in drinking all one can and still get home without a servant - unless too old.

We commend the man who shows
good memory after drink; who seeks virtue and not to harangue us with the ancient myths of noisy wars of Titans, Giants, Centaurs. These things are worth nothing.
The good lies in our reverence for the gods.

[trans. Barnstone, 345]
8.V.31:

καὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ μοι τὸ περὶ ποιήματος διαλέγεσθαι ὡμοίωτατόν εἶναι τοῖς
συμποσίοις τοῖς τῶν φανῶν καὶ ἁγοραῖοις ἀνθρώπων, καὶ γὰρ οὕτω, διὰ τὸ
μὴ δύνασθαι ἀλλήλοις δι’ ἑαυτῶν συνεῖναι ἐν τῷ πότῳ μηδὲ διὰ τῆς ἑαυτῶν
φωνῆς καὶ τῶν λόγων τῶν ἑαυτῶν ὑπὸ ἀπαίσιας, τιμίας ποιοῦσι τὸς
αὐλητρίδας, πολλοῦ μισθοῦμεν ἀλλοτρίαν φωνὴν τὴν τῶν αὐλῶν, καὶ διὰ
tῆς ἑκείνων φωνῆς ἀλλήλοις συνεῖναι ὅπου δὲ καλοὶ κάγχαθοι συμπόται καὶ
πεπαιδευμένοι εἰσίν, οὐκ ἂν ἰδοὺς οὕτ᾽ αὐλητρίδας οὕτ᾽ ὀρχηστρίδας οὕτε
ψαλτρίας, ἀλλὰ οὕτωσις οὕτως ἰκανοὶ ὤντες συνεῖναι ἄνευ τῶν λήρων τε
καὶ παιδίων τούτων διὰ τῆς ἑαυτῶν φωνῆς, λέγοντας τε καὶ ἀκούοντας ἐν
μέρει ἑαυτῶν κοσμίως, καὶ πάνω πολὺν ὁνόματα πίωσιν. [Plato Protagoras 347c-e]

[It seems to me that arguing about poetry is comparable to the wine-parties of
common market-folk. These people, owing to their inability to carry on a
familiar conversation over their wine by means of their own voices and
discussions—such is their lack of education—put a premium on flute-girls by
hiring the extraneous voice of the flute at a high price, and carry on their
intercourse by means of its utterance. But where the party consists of
thorough gentlemen who have had a proper education, you will see neither
flute-girls nor dancing-girls nor harp-girls, but only the company contenting
themselves with their own conversation, and none of these fooleries and
frolics—each speaking and listening decently in his turn, even though they
may drink a great deal of wine. [trans. Lamb]

8.V.32:

καὶ ὁ Ἐρμογένης, ἢ σὺν βουλεθείς, ἔφη, ὥσπερ Νικόστρατος ὁ ὑποκριτής
tetrameter πρὸς τὸν αὐλὸν κατέλεγεν, οὕτω καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ αὐλῶν ὑμῖ
διαλέγομαι;
καὶ ὁ Σακράτης, πρὸς τῶν θεῶν, ἔφη, Ἐρμογένες, οὕτω ποίει. ὀίμαι γάρ,
ὡσπερ ἡ ὁδὴ ἡδίων πρὸς τὸν αὐλόν, οὕτω καὶ τοὺς σους λόγους ἡδυναθαὶ
ἂν τί ὑπὸ τῶν φθογγῶν, ἀλλὰς τε καὶ εἱ μορφαξοὶ, ὥσπερ ἡ αὐλητρίς, καὶ
σὺ πρὸς τὰ λεγόμενα.
[Xenophon Symposium 6.3-4]

Hermogenes retorted, 'Is it your wish that I should converse with you to the
accompaniment of a flute, the way the actor Nicostratus used to recite
tetramer verses?' 'In Heaven’s name, do so, Hermogenes,' urged Socrates.
'For I believe that precisely as a song is more agreeable when accompanied on
the flute, so your discourse would be embellished somewhat by the music,
especially if you were to gesticulate and pose, like the flute-girl, to point your
words. [trans. Marchant]

8.V.33:

dεχομεν τήν προσποιμομένην
τὴν ἀπ’ ἐμοὶ ποιήσαν, ἐγώ δʼ ἐπιδέξαμενί ψῆμω
οὐ πρῶτοι, Ἡρωτών ἐγκεκρασάς ἱστίας.
καὶ σὺ λαβὼν τὸς δόμον αἰσθᾶς αντροπώθητι,
συμπτίσας κοσμῶς καὶ τὸ σὸν εὐθήμενος.
[Dionysius Chalcus Frag. 1]

Accept this poem from me that I offer as a toast, and that I send from left to
right, first to you, mixing in the graces of the Graces. And when you have
taken this gift, reply to me with a toast of songs, bringing adornment to the
symposium and playing your part well. [trans. M. L. West]
8.VI.1: 

Theaétetoς — δοκεῖ οὖν μοι ὡς ἐπιστάμενός τι αἰσθάνεσθαι τούτῳ ὁ ἐπίσταται, καὶ ὡς γε νυνί φαίνεται, οὐκ ἀλλά τί ἔστιν ἐπίστημή ἡ αἰσθήσις. ...

[Plato Theaetetus 151e-152b]

THEAETETUS: I think that someone knows something when he perceives it; my current impression is that knowledge and perception are the same … it's what Protagoras used to say … 'man is the measure of all things - of things that are, that they are; of things that are not, that they are not. … let's follow in his footsteps - Isn't it possible that, when the same wind is blowing, one of us might feel chilly, while the other doesn't. [trans. Waterfield]

Protagoras said with his doctrine that man is the measure of all things.

ἐτι εἰ ἀληθεῖς οἱ ἀντιφάσεις ἂν κατὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πάσαι, δὴλον ὡς ἀπαντα ἔσται ἐν. ἔσται γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ τριήρης καὶ τοῖχος καὶ ἀνθρώπος, ἐτι κατὰ παντὸς ἡ καταφθαίρῃ ἡ ἀπόφησι εὑρικεται, καθάπερ ἀνάγκη τοῖς τοῖς Πρωταγόροις λέγουσι λόγου, εἰ γὰρ τὸ δοκεῖ μὴ εἶναι τριήρης ὁ ἀνθρώπος, δὴλον ὡς οὐκ ἐστὶ τριήρης· ὡστε καὶ ἔστιν, εἴπερ ἡ ἀντιφάσεις ἀληθεία.

[Aristotle, Metaphysics 1007b 18-23]

Again, if all contradictory predications of the same subject at the same time are true, clearly all things will be one. For if it is equally possible either to affirm or deny anything of anything, the same thing will be a trireme and a wall and a man; which is what necessarily follows for those who hold the theory of Protagoras. For if anyone thinks that a man is not a trireme, he is clearly not a trireme; and so he also is a trireme if the contradictory statement is true. [trans. Tredennick]

παραπλήσιον δὲ τοῖς εἰρήμενοις ἔστι καὶ τὸ λεξίμων ὑπὸ τοῦ Πρωταγόρου καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος ἐφί παντοὶ εἶναι χρημάτων μέτρων ἀνθρώπων, οὐδὲν ἔτερον λέγων ἢ τὸ δοκοῦν ἐκάστω τοῦτο καὶ εἶναι παγιώς· [Aristotle, Metaphysics 1062b]

Very similar to the views which we have just mentioned is the dictum of Protagoras; for he said that man is the measure of all things, by which he meant simply that each individual's impressions are positively true. [trans. Tredennick]

Also:

Σωκράτης — καὶ ἐγὼ κρίτης κατὰ τὸν Πρωταγόρον τῶν τε ὄντων ἐμοὶ ὡς ἔστι, καὶ τῶν μὴ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν. [Plato Theaetetus 160c]

SOCRATES: As Protagoras says, I am the judge of the things that are for me, that they are, and of the things that are not, that they are not. [trans. Waterfield]

Σωκράτης — φαντασία ὁρα καὶ αἰσθήσεις ταύτων … οἷς γὰρ αἰσθάνεται ἐκάστος, τοιαῦτα ἐκάστῳ καὶ κινδυνεύει εἶναι. … αἰσθήσεις ὁρα τοῦ ὄντος αἰε ἔστι καὶ ὀφειδές ὡς ἐπιστήμη οὐσία. [Plato Theaetetus 152c]

SOCRATES: So appearance is the same as being perceived … as each person perceived events to be, so they also are for each person. … Perception, therefore, is always of something that is, and it is infallible, which suggests that it is knowledge. [trans. Waterfield]
8.VI.2:

'And Timon said of him: 'Protagoras, that gregarious expert at quarrelling.

[kai τὸν Ἀντισθένειον λόγον τὸν πειρόμενον ἀποδεικνύειν ώς οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτιλέγειν, οὗτος πρῶτος διείλεται, καθὰ φησὶ Πλάτων ἐν Εὐθύμῳ.

[Diogenes Laertius 9.53]

Again we learn from Plato in the Euthydemus [286c] he was the first to use in discussion the argument of Antisthenes which strives to prove that contradiction is impossible. [trans. Hicks]

[kai πρῶτος κατέδειξε τὰς πρὸς τὰς θέσεις ἐπιχειρήσεις, ὡς φησίν Ἀρτεμιδώρῳς ὁ διαλεκτικὸς ἐν τῷ Πρὸς Χρύσιππον. [Diogenes Laertius 9.53]

... and the first to point out how to attack and refute any proposition laid down: so said Artemidorus the dialectician in his treatise In Reply to Chrysippus. [trans. Hicks]

The force of language: πρῶτος μέρη χρόνου διώρισε καὶ καίρου δύναμιν ἐξῆθεν [Diogenes Laertius 9.52]

He was first to distinguish the tenses of verbs, to emphasise the importance of seizing the right moment. [trans.Hicks]

Ἀγοναλὸς ἔριτρικὸς μίασμα: λόγων ἀλήθειαν ἐποίησατο καὶ σοφίσματα τοῖς πραγματολογούσι προσήγαγε [Diogenes Laertius 9.52]

to institute contests in debating and to teach rival pleaders the tricks of their trade. [trans. Hicks]

Ἐλενχὸς διαλεκτικὸς: οὗτος καὶ τὸ Σωκρατικὸν εἶδος τῶν λόγων πρῶτος ἐκίνησε. [Diogenes Laertius 9.53]

He too first introduced the method of discussion which is called Socratic. [trans. Hicks]

Use of metaphor: τὴν διάνοιαν ἀφείς πρὸς τοῦν ομιλείν διελέχθη [Diogenes Laertius 9.52]

... in his dialectic he neglected the meaning in favour of verbal quibbling. [trans. Hicks]

Προϊστάμενος ἐλενχοῦσα: τὸν λόγον πρῶτος εἰς τέταρτα, εὐχωλήν, ἐρωτήσιν, ἀπόκρισιν, ἐντολήν [Diogenes Laertius 9.53]

He was the first to mark off the parts of discourse into four, namely wish, question, answer, command [trans. Hicks] (corresponding approximately to the optative, indicative and imperative).

8.VI.3:

εἰ γὰρ δὴ ἐκάστῳ ἀλήθεια ἦσται ὁ ἄν δὲ ἀναθέσεως δοξάζῃ, καὶ μήτε τὸ ἄλλον πάθος ἄλλος βέλτιον διακρίνει, μήτε τὴν δοξήν κυριεύειν ἦσται ἐπισκέψασθαι ἐπρὸς τὴν ἔτερον ὀρθὴν ὑποθέτησιν, ἀλλ’ ὁ πολλάκις ἐφημεῖ, αὐτὸς τὰ αὐτῶν ἐκάστοτε χῦνος δοξάσει, ταῦτα δὲ πάντα ὀρθά καὶ ἀληθῆ, τί δὴ ποτὲ, ὡς ἔταιρε, Πρωταγόρας μὲν σοφὸς, ὡστε καὶ ἄλλων διδάσκαλος ἀξιοῦσθαι δικαίως μετὰ μεγάλων μυθῶν, ἡμεῖς δὲ ὀμοθέστεροι τε καὶ
If no one else is a better judge of another person’s experiences, in the sense of deciding authoritatively which are true and which false; if, in other words, as we have repeatedly said, each person alone makes up his mind about his own impressions, and all of them are correct and true; if all this is so, my friend, how on earth are we to distinguish Protagoras, whose cleverness was such that he thought he was justified in teaching others for vast fees, and ourselves, who are less gifted and had to go and be his students? I mean, each of us is the measure of his own cleverness or - aren’t we bound to think that Protagoras said this to startle? [trans. Hamilton]

8.VI.4:

Σωκράτης – εκ δε δη φοράς τε και κινήσεως και κράσεως πρὸς ἄλληλα γίγνεται πάντα ά δη φαμεν εἶναι, οὐκ ὀρθῶς προσαγορεύσουσι‘… καὶ περὶ τούτου παντες ἐξῆς οἱ σοφοὶ πλὴν Παρμενίδου συμφερόθηκαν, Πρωταγόρας τε καὶ Ἡράκλειτος καὶ Εμπεδοκλῆς, [Plato Theaetetus 152e]

SOCRATES: Everything which we describe as ‘being’ is actually in the process of being generated as a result of movement and change and mutual mixture… The whole succession of past sages (with the exception of Parmenides) can be seen to agree on this point - I’m thinking of Protagoras, Heraclitus and Empedocles. [trans. Waterfield]

Σωκράτης – ἡ πολὺ μάλλον ὅτι οὐδὲ σοι αὐτῶ ταῦτά διὰ τὸ μηδέποτε ὀμοίως αὐτῶν σεαυτά ἔχεις; [Plato Theaetetus 154a]

SOCRATES: Not even you yourself perceive things in the same way because you never remain in a similar state? [trans. Waterfield]

And:

SOCRATES: We must move closer, as our speech in defence of Protagoras told us to; [166c-168b] we must investigate this ‘reality in motion’ and test it thoroughly, to see whether it is sound or flawed. But there’s a major controversy raging about this issue, in which quite a few people have been involved.

THEAETETUS: It certainly is a major controversy, and one which is rapidly increasing in Ionia, because the Heracliteans are setting a cracking pace for the adherents of this theory. … [179c-d]

8.VI.5:

τῶν γὰρ ἐνυποκομένων ἀπάντων τὰ μὲν παρ’ ἑτέρων ληφθέντα πρότερον πεποιημένα κατὰ μέρος ἐπιδεδοκεν ὑπὸ τῶν παραλαμβόντων ύστερον· τὰ δ’ ἐξ ὑπαρχῆς ἐνυποκομένα μικρὰν τὸ πρῶτον ἐπίδοσιν λαμβάνειν εἰσθῇ, χρησιμωτέραν μὲντοι πολλῷ τῆς ύστερον ἐκ τούτων αὐξήσεως. μέγιστον γὰρ ἰδιὸς ἀρχὴ παντος, ὡσπερ λέγεται: διὸ καὶ χαλεπωτάτον ὡσα ναρ κρατίστοσ τῇ δυναμεῖ, τοσοῦτοι μικρῶτατον ὅτι τῶ μεγεθεί χαλεπωτάτοτα ἐστὶν οοθθῆναι. ταὐτῆς δ’ ἑνυπημένης βασίν τὸ προστιθέναι καὶ συναύξει τὸ λοιπὸν ἐστὶν: ὡσπερ καὶ περὶ τοὺς ῥητορικοὺς λόγους συμβέβηκε, σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας πάσας τέχνας, οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐφόντες παντελῶς ἐπὶ μικρὸν τὶ προϊόγαγον οἱ δὲ νῦν εὐδοκίμουσι’ παραλαμβόντες ταρά πολλῶν ὁνὶν ἐκ διαδοχῆς κατὰ μέρος προσαγοράσουσιν ὡτὸς νηύκεικαι, Τιτιάς μὲν μετὰ τοὺς πρώτους, Θρασύμαχος δὲ μετὰ Τιτιάν, Θεόδωρος δὲ μετὰ τούτων, καὶ πολλοὶ πολλὰ συνενηχόσας μέρι’ διόσπερ οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν ἔχειν τὶ πληθὺς τὴν τέχνην. … καὶ περὶ μὲν τῶν ῥητορικών ὑπόχε πολλά καὶ μικρὰ ἀλ λά τα λεγόμενα, περὶ δὲ

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463 Elsewhere Plato states that Protagoras was respected [Protagoras 316-17] and esteemed even after death [Meno 91e].
In the case of all discoveries the results of previous labours that have been handed down from others have been advanced bit by bit by those who have taken them on, whereas the original discoveries generally make advance that is small at first though much more useful than the development which later springs out of them. For it may be that in everything, as the saying is, ‘the first start is the main part’: and for this reason also it is the most difficult; for in proportion as it is most potent in its influence, so it is smallest in its compass and therefore most difficult to see: whereas when this is once discovered, it is easier to add and develop the remainder in connexion with it. This is in fact what has happened in regard to rhetorical speeches and to practically all the other arts: for those who discovered the beginnings of them advanced them in all only a little way, whereas the celebrities of to-day are the heirs (so to speak) of a long succession of men who have advanced them bit by bit, and so have developed them to their present form, Tisias coming next after the first founders, then Thrasymachus after Tisias, and Theodorus next to him, while several people have made their several contributions to it: and therefore it is not to be wondered at that the art has attained considerable dimensions. … Moreover, on the subject of Rhetoric there exists much that has been said long ago, whereas on the subject of reasoning we had nothing else of an earlier date to speak of at all, but were kept at work for a long time in experimental researches. [trans. Pickard-Cambridge]

8.VI.6

… εἰπέν μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ παραστικὰ περὶ τοῦ παρατυχόντος ἐπισκόπου, καὶ ταχεῖα χρησάθω τῶν ἐνδυμάτων καὶ τῶν ὄνομάτων υπορίᾳ, καὶ τῷ καίρῳ τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις τῶν ἀνθρώπων οὐστόχως ἀκολουθήσω καὶ τὸν προσήκοντα λόγον εἰπέν, οὕτε φύσεως ἀπάσης οὕτε παῖδευσά τῆς τυχόσεως ἑστίν. [Alcidamas, Against the Sophists 3]

… To speak extemporaneously, and appropriately to the occasion, to be quick with arguments, and not to be at a loss for a word, to meet the situation successfully, and to fulfill the eager anticipation of the audience and to say what is fitting to be said, such ability is rare, and is the result of no ordinary training. [trans. Van Hook]

8.VI.7

ΓΟΡΓΙΑΣ: ὁποιοὶς ἐπιθυμεῖ τὸ ἀργοῦν καὶ χειράκων καὶ ἑπιτραπέτους καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας πάντως καὶ τῆς δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῆς τῆς ἀληθείας οὐκ ἐπιθυμεῖ τὸν πόλεμον χρησάθων καὶ τῷ τοῦ σωτῆρος τὸν πολέμον τῆς ἀληθείας. [Plato Gorgias 456c-d]

GORGIAS: It should be used as with any other competitive skill. Just because a man has acquired such skills in boxing or all-in wrestling or armed combat that he can best anyone, friend or foe, that is no reason why he should employ it against all men indiscriminately and strike and wound and kill his friends. [Hamilton, Emlyn-Jones]
…So it is not the teachers who are wicked, nor is the art either guilty or wicked on this account, but rather, to my thinking, those who do not use it properly. Now the same argument applies also to rhetoric: for the orator is able, indeed, to speak against every one and on every question in such a way as to win over the votes of the multitude, practically in any matter he may choose to take up: [457b] but he is no whit the more entitled to deprive the doctors of their credit, just because he could do so, or other professionals of theirs; he must use his rhetoric fairly, as in the case of athletic exercise. And, in my opinion, if a man becomes a rhetorician and then uses this power and this art unfairly, we ought not to hate his teacher and cast him out of our cities.

[trans. Lamb]

8.VI.8:

...We should praise the teachers, but execute the pupils who pervert the teaching … Again, suppose the case of men who, having mastered the art of war, did not use their skill against the enemy, but rose up and slew many of their fellow-citizens; or suppose the case of men who, having been trained to perfection in the art of boxing or of the pancration, kept away from the games and fell foul of the passers-by; would anyone withhold praise from their instructors instead of putting to death those who turned their lessons to an evil use? [trans. Norlin]

8.VI.9:

He was the most concerned to know the extent of any of his associates’ special knowledge, and the most enthusiastic to teach, so far as he was competent, the subjects which a really good man should know; and where he himself was not well qualified he put them in touch with experts. [trans. Tredennick]

8.VI.10:

[Diogenes Laertius 1.61]
Be cautious of every man, see if
He is holding hidden hostility in his heart,
His face beaming bright as he addresses you
While his ambiguous language
Speaks out from deep dark thoughts. [trans. Leiper]

8.VI.11:

'It is not my mouth nor my mind. ... A woman who sits in a house and is a fool is a trouble. But a clever woman—that I loathe! May there never be in my house a woman with more intelligence than befits a woman!

For Aphrodite engenders more mischief in the clever. The woman without ability is kept from indiscretion by the slenderness of her wit. [trans. Kovács]

8.VI.12:

STREPSIADES: I want to know about interest - how not to pay it.
SOCRATES: All right; cover up, give your brain a little more play, and reflect on the matter. Make sure you draw the correct distinctions.

STREPSIADES: Yow! It's those bugs again!
SOCRATES: Now don't wriggle. And if an idea gets you into any difficulty, let go of it, withdraw for a bit, and then get your brain to work again shifting it around and weighing it up. ...
STREPSIADES: Suppose I bought a Thessalian slave, a witch, and got her to draw down the moon one night, and then put it in a box like they do mirrors and kept a close watch on it.
SOCRATES: What good would that do you?
STREPSIADES: Well, if the moon never rises, I never pay any interest.
[trans. Sommerstein]

Χορός – ὁ θεόμενοι κατερώ πρὸς ὕμας ἐλευθέρως τάλθη ἦ τὸν Διὸνυσον τὸν ἐκδρέψαντα με. ὡσ νικήσαμι τ' ἐγὼ καὶ νομίζοιμην σοφός, ἦ μας ἤμοιμενος εἶναι θετάς δεξίος καὶ ταύτην σοφώτατ' ἐχειν τῶν ἐμῶν κομμαδίων, πρῶτους ἥξιωσ· ἀναγεγέυα ὕμαι, ἣ παρέσχε μοι ἔργον πλείστον· εἰτ ἀνεχώρουν ὑπ' ἀνδρῶν φορτικῶν ἡττηθείς οὐκ ἄξιος ὡν·
[Aristophanes Clouds 519-526]

CHORUS LEADER: I swear by Dionysus, my protector in my youth, Athenians, that I'll tell you now the frank and simple truth. So may I lose my wits and may I finish last again, if I don't think my audience consists of clever men. I thought that I had never written any play so witty as this; that's why I let it first be tasted by this city. A lot of sweat went into it; and yet this play retreated by vulgar works of vulgar men unworthily defeated.
[trans. Sommerstein]

Στρεψίαδης – εὖ γ'. ὥς κακοδαίμονες, τί κάθησθ' ἀβέλτεροι, ἡμετέρα κέρδη τῶν σοφῶν ὄντες, λίθοι, ἀριθμοῖ, πρὸβαταί ἄλλοις, ἀμφορῆς νενημένοι;
[Aristophanes Clouds 1201-1204]

STREPSIADES: Why are you poor blighters out there just sitting like stones, not even laughing? Ah, they're just fodder for us clever ones - we can treat them like sheep. [trans. Sommerstein]

8.VI.13:

ἐκαστὸς τῶν μισθαρμοῦντων ἰδιωτῶν, ὡς δὲ ὦτοι σοφιστάς καλοῦσι καὶ ἀντιτέχνου ἡγοῦνται, μὴ ἄλλα παιδεύειν ἢ ταύτα τὰ τῶν πολλῶν δόγματα, ἣ δοξάζουσιν ὅταν ἀθροισθόσι, καὶ σοφίαν ταύτην καλεῖν;
[Plato Republic 6.493a]

All those individuals who make their living by teaching, and whom the public call 'Sophists' and envy for their skill, in fact teach nothing but the conventional views held and expressed by the mass of the people when they meet; and this they call a science [sophia]. [trans. Lee]

8.VI.14:

εἰ ἀληθῆς ἡ Ἀλήθεια Πρωταγόρου ἄλλα μὴ παίζουσα ἐκ τοῦ ἀδύτου τῆς βιβλίου ἔθεγξετ; [Plato Theaetetus 162a.]

If The Truth of Protagoras is true, and he was not hiding behind the written word to make oracular predictions he did not really mean. [trans. Leiper]
8.VI.15:

Then it must be clear to everybody that there is nothing inherently disgraceful in speech-writing. ... The disgrace comes, I take it, when one speaks and writes disgracefully and badly instead of well. [trans. Hamilton]

8.VI.16:

Have you also come across the writings of our wisest men, which say just the same: like must always be friend to like? These are, of course, the men who discuss and write about nature and the universe. [trans. Watt]

8.VI.17:

To select from these elements those which should be employed for each subject, to join them together, to arrange them properly, and also, not to miss what the occasion demands but appropriately adorn the whole speech with appropriate arguments and to deliver it in rhythmic and melodious words. [trans. Norlin]

8.VI.18:

It may, perhaps, be alleged that it is illogical for one to condemn written discourse who himself employs it in the present written essay, and to disparage a pursuit through the employment of which he is preparing to win fame among the Greeks. [trans. Van Hook]

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Gagarin ['Probability and Persuasion: Plato and Early Greek Rhetoric' p. 62] considers this list implies 'an important thesis of classical rhetoric' which was only categorised later.
To write after long premeditation, and to revise at leisure, comparing the writings of previous Sophists, and from many sources to assemble thoughts on the same subject, and to imitate felicities cleverly spoken, to revise privately some matters on the advice of laymen and to alter and expunge other parts as a result of repeated and careful excogitation, verily, this is an easy matter even for the untutored. [trans. Van Hook]

In the first place, one may condemn the written word because it may be readily assailed, and because it may be easily and readily practised by any one of ordinary ability. [trans. Van Hook, my italics]

To learn written speeches is, in my opinion, difficult, and the memorising likewise is laborious, and to forget the set speech in the trial of a case is disgraceful. Every one would agree that it is harder to learn and commit to memory details than main heads and similarly many points than few. In extemporaneous speech the mind must be concerned only with reference to the main topics, which are elaborated as the speaker proceeds. But, where the speech is previously written, there is need to learn and carefully to commit to memory, not merely the main topics, but words and syllables. [trans. Van Hook]
The training given by the paid teachers of contentious argument resembled the system of Gorgias. For some of them gave their pupils to learn by heart speeches which were either rhetorical or consisted of questions and answers, in which both sides thought that the rival arguments were for the most part included. Hence the teaching which they gave to their pupils was rapid but unsystematic; for they conceived that they could train their pupils by imparting to them not an art but the results of an art. [trans. Forster]

Come with a new book, a new pen, and new tablets, if you have a mind. [trans. Hicks]

Those who use these properly nearly always carry off the prizes in dramatic contests, and as at the present day actors have greater influence on the stage than the poets, it is the same in political contests, owing to the corruptness of our forms of government. [trans. Ross]

Hippias of Elis, seated high on a chair in the doorway opposite; and sitting around him on benches were Eryximachus, son of Acumenus, Phaedrus of Myrrhinous, Andron son of Androtion and a number of strangers,—fellow-citizens of Hippias and some others. They seemed to be asking him a series of astronomical questions on nature and the heavenly bodies, while he, seated in his chair, was distinguishing and expounding to each in turn the subjects of their questions. [trans. Lamb]

Though not one solely aimed at eristic truth if Hippias was 'passing out judgements'.

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That persuasion can become part of speech and strike the psyche in any way it wishes, can be learned firstly from the explanations of the meteorologists, who, disposing of one point of view and creating the opposite viewpoint, can make the unbelievable and obscure appear to the eyes of opinion; secondly, from the forceful competitive debates in which one speech written with skill but not delivered with truth, delights and persuades the populace; thirdly from the disputational philosophical debates in which quick thinking demonstrates how the proof of an opinion can be made changeable. [trans. Leiper]

I pride myself more on other matters; I believe that writing should be practised as an ancillary pursuit. I am, therefore, of the opinion that those who devote their lives to writing are woefully deficient in rhetoric and philosophy; these men, with far more justice, may be called poets rather than Sophists. [trans. Van Hook]

But the truth is that these men care for naught save enriching themselves at the expense of the youth. It is their 'philosophy' applied to eristic disputations that effectively produces this result; for these rhetoricians, who care nothing at all for either private or public affairs, take most pleasure in those discourses which are of no practical service in any particular. [trans. Norlin]

And as the poets, although their utterances were devoid of sense, appeared to have gained their reputation through their style, it was a poetical style that first came into being, as that of Gorgias. Even now the majority of the uneducated think that such persons express themselves most beautifully, whereas this is not the case, for the style of prose [έτέρα λόγου] is not the same as that of poetry. And the result proves it; for even the writers of tragedies do not employ it in the same manner, but as they have changed from the tetrametric to the iambic metre, because the latter, of all other metres, most nearly resembles prose, they have in like manner discarded all such words as differ from those of ordinary conversation, with which the
early poets used to adorn their writings, and which even now are employed by the writers of hexameters. [trans. Freese]

8.VI.28:

Similarly, just as those who are loosed after long confinement in bonds are unable to walk normally, but still must proceed in the same fashion and manner as when previously inhibited, so, the practice of writing, by making sluggish the mental processes, and by giving the opposite sort of training in speaking, produces an unready and fettered speaker, deficient in all extemporaneous fluency. [trans. Van Hook]

8.VI.29:

PHAEDRUS: Do you suppose that I, who am a mere ordinary man, can tell from memory, in a way that is worthy of Lysias, what he, the cleverest writer of our day, composed at his leisure and took a long time for?

SOCRATES: ... [W]hen listening to Lysias, he [Phaedrus] did not hear once only, but often urged him [Lysias] to repeat; and he gladly obeyed. Yet even that was not enough for Phaedrus, but at last he borrowed the book and read what he especially wished, and doing this he sat from early morning. Then, when he grew tired, he went for a walk, with the speech, as I believe, by the Dog, learned by heart, unless it was very long. ...

PHAEDRUS: Really, Socrates, I have not at all learned the words by heart; but I will repeat the general sense of the whole, ... giving [the chief points] in summary, one after the other, beginning with the first.

SOCRATES: ... I suspect you have the actual discourse [holding before me discourses in books] And if that is the case, believe this of me, that I am very fond of you, but when Lysias is here I have not the slightest intention of lending you my ears to practise on. Come now, show it.

PHAEDRUS: Stop. You have robbed me of the hope I had of practising on you. [trans. Fowler]
The truth is that speeches which have been laboriously worked out with elaborate diction (compositions more akin to poetry than prose) are deficient in spontaneity and truth, and, since they give the impression of a mechanical artificiality and labored insincerity, they inspire an audience with distrust and ill-will. [trans. Van Hook]

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... those who write for the lawcourts seek to avoid this pedantic precision, and imitate the style of extempore speakers; and they make the most favourable impression when their speeches least resemble written discourses. ...

And the greatest proof is this, that those who write for the lawcourts seek to avoid this pedantic precision, and imitate the style of extempore speakers; and they make the most favourable impression when their speeches least resemble written discourses. Now, since speech-writers seem most convincing when they imitate extemporaneous speakers, should we not especially esteem that kind of training which shall readily give us ability in this form of speaking?

[trans. Van Hook]
I think that for this reason also we must hold written speeches in disesteem, that they involve their composers in inconsistency; for it is inherently impossible to employ written speeches on all occasions. And so, when a speaker in part speaks extemporaneously, and in part uses a set form, he inevitably involves himself in culpable inconsistency, and his speech appears in a measure histrionic and rhapsode, and in a measure mean and trivial in comparison with the artistic finish of the others. [trans. Van Hook]

Furthermore, I am now essaying the written word because of the display orations which are delivered to the crowd. My customary listeners I bid test me by that usual standard whenever I am able to speak opportunely and felicitously on any subject proposed. To those, however, who only now at last have come to hear me (never once having heard me previously) I am attempting to give an example of my written discourse. The latter are accustomed to hear the set speeches of the rhetors and, if I spoke extemporaneously, they might fail to estimate my ability at its real worth. [trans. Van Hook]

8.VII.2:

[Those who have compiled our earlier technical manuals on deliberative speaking] ... chiefly devote their attention to matters outside the subject; for the arousing of prejudice, compassion, anger, and similar emotions has no connexion with the matter in hand, but is directed only to the dicast. ... It is wrong to warp the dicast's feelings, to arouse him to anger, jealousy, or compassion. [trans. Freese]

Cf. Robert Wardy [The Birth of Rhetoric: Gorgias, Plato and Their Successors, London, Routledge, 1996, p. 114] states: One might be tempted to conclude that here Aristotle, by sternly and unqualifiedly forbidding the orator to touch the emotions of his audience, also unqualifiedly abjures Gorgianic rhetoric in favour of Platonic philosophy. ... The temptation should be resisted: one of the crowning virtues of Aristotelian philosophy of mind is precisely that it permits us to drive a wedge between the concept of emotional appeal and that of emotional manipulation.
It was a poetical style that first came into being, as that of Gorgias. Even now the majority of the uneducated think that such persons express themselves most beautifully. [trans. Freese]

8.VII.3:
καὶ με θεὰ πρόφρων ὑπεδέξατο, χεῖρα δὲ χειρὶ
dεξιτερῆν ἔλεν, ὥδε δ’ ἐπὸς φάτο καὶ με προσμύδα·
ὡς κούρ’ ἄθανατοις συνάνοορος ἦν ὅρος,
ἳπποι ταῖς σε φέρουσιν ικάνων ἡμέτερον δῶ,
χαῖρ’, ἐπεὶ οὕτι σε μοίρα κακὴ προὔπεμπε νεόσθαι
την’ ὅδον ἥ γαρ ἄτ’ ἀνθρώπων ἐκτὸς πάτου ἐστίν,
όλλα θέμες τε δική τε. [Parmenides DK.28.B1]
And the goddess received me kindly, and took my right hand in hers, and thus she spoke and addressed me: ‘Young man, companion of immortal charioteers, who comest by the help of the steeds which bring thee to our dwelling; welcome! since no evil fate has despatched thee on thy journey by this road (for truly it is far from the path trodden by mankind); no, it is divine command and Right. [trans. Freeman]

8.VII.4:
χρεώ δὲ σε πάντα πυθέσθαι
ἡμὲν Ἀληθείας εὐκυκλέος ἄτρεμες ἤτορ,
ἡδε βροτῶν δόξας, ταῖς οὐκ ἐνὶ πάσι ἄληθίς.
ἀλλ’ ἔμπης καὶ ταύτα μαθήσαι, ὥς τὰ δοκοῦντα
χρὴν δοκίμασι εἶναι διὰ παντὸς πάντας περιώντα.
[Parmenides DK.28.B1]
Thou shalt inquire into everything; both the motionless heart of well-rounded Truth, and also the opinions of mortals, in which there is no true reliability. But nevertheless thou shalt learn these things (opinions) also - how one should go through all the things-that-seem, without exception, and test them. [trans. Freeman]

(This is flux theory - or rather anti-flux theory - and therefore a time theory which can then relate to kairos in that one can reach relative truth rather than immutable truth. The concept of kairos is discussed in VII.3.)

...τά’ ἐγώ φράζεσθαι ἄνωγα.
πρῶτης γάρ σ’ ἀφ’ ὅδοί ταύτης διζήσιος εἴργω,
αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ ἀπό τής, ἢν δὴ βροτοὶ εἰδότες οὐδὲν
... This I command you to consider; for from the latter way of search first of all I debar you. But next I debar you from that way along which wander mortals knowing nothing, two-headed [i.e., in two minds]. [trans. Freeman.]

8.VII.5:
Come, I will tell you - and you must accept my word when you have heard it. [trans. Freeman]

Observe nevertheless how things absent are securely present to the mind; [trans. Freeman]
... You must debar your thought from this way of search, not let ordinary experience in its variety force you along this way, (namely, that of allowing) the eye, sightless as it is, and the ear, full of sound, and the tongue, to rule; but (you must) judge by means of the Reason (Logos) the much-contested proof which is expounded by me. [trans. Freeman]

tόν σοι ἐγώ διάκοσιον ἐικότα πάντα φατίζω, ὡς οὐ μὴ ποτὲ τις σε βροτῶν γνώμη παρελάσσῃ.
[Parmenides DK.28.B8.]

This world-order I describe to you throughout as it appears with all its phenomena, in order that no intellect of mortal men may outstrip you. [or, reading gnώμη (Stein): 'in order that no mortal may outstrip you in intelligence'. [trans. Freeman]

8.VII.6:
Σίβυλλα δὲ μανωμένῳ στόματι καθ’ Ἦρακλειτον ἀγέλαστα καὶ οὐκαλλώπιστα καὶ ἀμύριστα φθεγγομένη χιλίων ἑτῶν ἔξεκείται τῇ φαώ διὰ τοῦ θεοῦ.
[Heracleitus quoted in Plutarch The Pythia, DK 22 B92]

The Sibyl with frenzied mouth, according to Heraclitus, uttering words that are without laughter, without adornment, and without incense reaches over a thousand years with her voice through the god. [trans. Freeman]

8.VII.7:
ὁ τόπος εἶναι, ὡσεὶ ἄνα πολλάκις νυμφαληπτός προϊόντος τοῦ λόγου γένομαι, μὴ θυμάσθως τὰ νῦν γὰρ οὐκετί πόρρω διθυράμβους φθέγγωμαι.
[Plato Phaedrus 238d]

The place seems filled with a divine presence; so do not be surprised if I often seem to be in a frenzy as my discourse progresses, for I am already almost uttering dithyrambs. [trans. Fowler]

8.VII.8:
Θέσσαλος—παντάπασι μὲν οὐκ. καὶ γὰρ, ὁ Σώκρατες, περὶ τοῦτων τῶν Ἡρακλείτειων ἢ, ὅσπερ σὺ λέγεις, Ὠμηρεῖοι καὶ ἔτι παλαιότεροι, αὐτοῖς μὲν τοῖς περὶ τὴν Ἐφεσον, οὓς προσποιοῦνται ἐμπειροί, οὐδὲν μᾶλλον οἷον τε διαλεχθήσεται καὶ τοῖς σύστρωσιν ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ κατὰ τὰ συγγράμματα φεροῦνται, τὸ δ’ ἐπιμείναι ἐπὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἐρωτῆματι καὶ ἱσχύως ἐν μέρει ἀποκρίνασθαι καὶ ἐμερισθεὶς ἦτον αὐτοῖς ἐν οὗ ἡ μῆνιν μᾶλλον δὲ ὑπερβάλλει τὸ οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸ μή μικρὸν ἐνείη τοῖς ἄνθρακεσ ἱσχύοις. ἀλλ’ ἄν τινα τι ἐρή, ὡσπερ ἐκ φορέτρας ῥηματικὰι αἰνιγματοθῆκα ἀνασπῶντες ἀποτοξεύοισι, κἂν τούτου ξίζης λόγου λαβέιν τι εἰρήκην, ἐτέρω πεπληρής καίνως μετανωμασμένοι. περαιεῖς δὲ οὕσεστο πατέρων πρὸς οὐδένα αὐτῶν οὐδὲ γε ἐκεῖνοι αὐτοὶ πρὸς ἄλλοσ, ἀλλ’ εἰ πάνω φυλάττουσι τὸ μήνιν βεβαιὸν ἐὰν εἶναι μῆτ’ ἐν λόγῳ μῆτ’ ἐν ταῖς αὐτῶν ψυχαῖς, ἱγουμενοί, ὡς έμοι δοκεῖ, αὐτὸ στασιμὸν εἶναι τούτῳ δὲ πάνω πολεμοῦσιν, καὶ καθ’ ὁσον δυνάται πανταχόθεν εξβάλλουσιν.
Σφακράτης—…. τοὺς ἄνδρας μαχομένους ἔωρακας, ἐφημερεύουσι δὲ οὐ συγγέγονοι’ οὐ γὰρ σοι ἐταιροί εἰσιν.
Θέσσαλος—ποιος μαθηταί, ὁ δ’ αἰσθητός; οὐδὲ γίγνεται τῶν τοιούτων ἔτερος ἐτέρῳ μαθητῆς, ἀλλ’ αὐτοῖς ἀναφέρονται ὁπόθεν ἀν τύχη ἔκαστος αὐτῶν
Theodorus: 'One can no more have a rational conversation with those very Ephesians who claim to be the pundits than one can with lunatics. I mean, they are certainly faithful to their texts - they are literally in motion! Their ability to stay put for a discussion or a question, or to keep still and ask and answer questions in due order, is worse than useless - though even that's an exaggeration: there's not the tiniest amount of tranquility in these people. Suppose you ask a question: they draw enigmatic phrases, as it were out of a quiver, and let fly. Suppose you ask for an explanation of these phrases: you just get hit with another weird metaphor. You'll never get anything conclusive out of any of them - but then, they themselves don't from one another either! They take a great deal of care not to allow any certainty to enter their speech or their minds. I suppose they think that certainty is fixed; and fixedness is the arch-enemy, whose utter banishment is the object of their efforts.

Socrates: ... when they are on the warpath, not at peace; after all, you're not of their circle. [Theodoros is 'quasi-Protagorean'] ...

Theodorus: Pupils? What pupils? People like that don't become pupils of one another. They spring up automatically here, there and wherever inspiration strikes; and they don't recognise one another's claims to knowledge. [trans. Fowler]

8.VII.9:

καθόλου δὲ φησὶ καὶ τραγῳδίας αὐτὸν γράψαι καὶ πολιτικοῦ ... Φησὶ δὲ Σάτυρος ἐν τοῖς Βίοις ὅτι καὶ ἰστρός ἢν καὶ ῥήτωρ ἀριστὸς.

[Diogenes Laertius 8.58]

In general terms he [Aristotle] says he wrote both tragedies and political discourses ... Satyrus in his Lives says that he was also a physician and an excellent orator. [trans. Hicks]

8.VII.10:

tαυνίαις τε περίστετος στέφεσιν τε θαλείως, ... τοσὶν ἂν ἵκωμι εἰς ἁστεα τηλεθύοντα, ἀνδραῖοι ἢ γυναιξί, σεβίζομαι: οἱ δὲ ἄμι ἐπονται μυτίοι ἔξεροντε, ὅπῃ πρὸς κέρδος ἀταρπος, οἱ μὲν μαντοσεμνοὶ κεχρημένοι, οἱ δ' ἐπὶ νουσῶν παντοίων ἐπιθύμοντο κλειεῖν εὐκέκα βαξίν, δὴ τὸν δὲ χαλεπὸν πεπαρμένοι <αμφ' ὀδύνησιν>.

[Empedocles, DK31.B.112]

When I come to them in their flourishing towns, to men and women, I am honoured; and they follow me in thousands, to enquire where is the path of advantage, some desiring oracles, while others ask to hear a word of healing for their manifold diseases, since they have long been pierced with cruel pains. [trans. K. Freeman]
8.VII.11:

It is equally absurd for anyone to think, like Empedocles, that he had made an intelligible statement when he says that the sea is the sweat of the earth. Such a statement is perhaps satisfactory in poetry, for metaphor is a poetic device, but it does not advance our knowledge of nature. [trans. Lee]

8.VII.12:

The third [rule] consists in avoiding ambiguous terms, unless you deliberately intend the opposite, like those who, having nothing to say, yet pretend to say something; such people accomplish this by the use of verse, after the manner of Empedocles. For the long circumlocution takes in the hearers, who find themselves affected like the majority of those who listen to the soothsayers. For when the latter utter their ambiguities, they also assent. [trans. Freese]

8.VII.13:

Commonly approved sentences (éndoxa) are those which are accepted by all or most men or the most enlightened men and of these by all or most men or the most famous or the most distinguished ones. [trans. E.S. Forster]

8.VII.14:

The probable is a premise which is based on an opinion; for whatever usually happens in a certain way or does not happen in this way, what is usually this way or is not this way - that is the probable. [trans. Forster]

The probable is that which generally happens ... which is concerned with things that include the possibility of there being otherwise. [trans. Freese]
It is also evident from what has been said that it is not the poet’s function to relate actual events, but the kinds of things that might occur and are possible in terms of probability or necessity. The difference between the historian and the poet is not that between using verse or prose. ... No the difference is this: that the one relates actual events, the other the kinds of things that might occur. Consequently, poetry is more philosophical and more elevated than history, since poetry relates more of the universal, while history relates particulars. [trans. Kassel]

8.VII.15:

It is evident that the poet’s task is not to relate actual events, but to relate the kinds of things that might occur, in terms of probability or necessity. The difference between the historian and the poet is not that between using verse or prose. No, the difference is this: that the one relates actual events, the other the kinds of things that might occur. Consequently, poetry is more philosophical and more elevated than history, since poetry relates more of the universal, while history relates particulars. [trans. Kassel]

People attach the verbal idea of ‘poetry’ to the name of the metre, and call some ‘elegiac poets’, others ‘epic poets’. This is not to classify them as poets because of mimesis, but because of the metre they share: hence, if writers express something medical or scientific in metre, people still usually apply these terms. But Homer and Empedocles have nothing in common except their metre, so one should call the former a poet, the other a natural scientist. [trans. Kassel]

8.VII.16:

That which employs unfamiliar words is dignified and outside the common usage. By ‘unfamiliar’ I mean a rare word, a metaphor, a lengthening, and anything beyond the ordinary use. But if a poet writes entirely in such words, the result will be either a riddle or jargon; if made up of metaphors, a riddle and if of rare words, jargon. The essence of a riddle consists in describing a fact by an impossible combination of words. By merely combining the ordinary names of things this cannot be done, but it is made possible by combining metaphors. For instance, ‘I saw a man weld bronze upon a man with fire’, and so on. A medley of rare words is jargon. We need then a sort of mixture of the two. For the one kind will save the diction from being prosaic and commonplace, the rare word, for example, and the metaphor and the ‘ornament’, whereas the ordinary words give clarity. [trans. Kassel]

8.VII.17:

ei δὲ βίαι ἕρπασθε καὶ ἀνόμως ἐβιάσθη καὶ ἄδικος ὑβρίσθη, δήλων ὅτι ὁ μὲν ἀρπάσας ὡς ὑβρίσας ἤδικαιν, ἢ δὲ ἀρπασθεὶς ὡς ὑβρισθεὶς ἐδυστυχεῖν. ἀξίων οὖν ὁ μὲν ἐπιχειρησας βαρβαρος βαρβαρον ἐπιχειρημα καὶ λόγωι καὶ νόμωι καὶ ἐργαὶ λόγωι μὲν αἰτίας, νόμωι δὲ ἀτίμωι, ἐργαὶ δὲ ζημίας τυχεῖν.

[Gorgias, Encomium to Helen 7]
However, if she was carried off by force, restrained unlawfully and unjustly raped, it is clear that the rapist committed a crime, whilst she was the unfortunate one who was raped. Therefore, the barbarian attacker deserves a barbarous attack to be made on him with words, and with society’s rules, and to be held accountable in action and speech; to be socially disgraced and actively punished. [Gorgias, Encomium to Helen 7, trans. Leiper]

ei δὲ λόγος ὁ πείσας καὶ τὴν ψυχήν ἀπατήσας, οὐδὲ πρὸς τοῦτο χαλέπιν ἀπολογησάσθαι καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν ἀπολύσασθαι ὁδὲ. λόγος δυνάστης μέγας ἑστιν, ὡς αἰκροτάτων σώματι καὶ ἀφανεσάτω θειότατα ἔργα ἀποτελεί·
[Gorgias, Encomium to Helen 8]

If it was a story that persuaded and misled her mind, it is not difficult to argue a defence and to acquit her of the responsibility in the following way. Speech is a great force; which, by the smallest and least observable substance executes the most god-like works. [trans. Leiper]

tίς οὖν αἰτία καλλεὶ καὶ τὴν Ἐλένην ὑμοιός ἠλθεν ὑμοίως ὅποις οὐκέν οὖσαν ὠμός εἰς βιαστήριον βία ἠμπάσθη, το γὰρ τῆς πείθους ἔζην ὁ δὲ νοῦς καί τοίς ἀναγκηκὸς ὁ ἑδόθη ἐξέβαλέν ὅ, τινι δὲ δύσαμιν τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει. λόγος γὰρ ψυχὴν ὁ πείσας, ἢν ἔπεισας, ἰσαμάθεια καὶ πιθανάν τοῖς λεγομένοις καὶ συναινεῖσθαι τοῖς ποιημένοις. ὁ μὲν οὖν πείσας ὡς ἀναγκάςσας ἀδικεῖ, ἢ δὲ πείθεια ὡς ἀναγκασθείσα τῶν λόγων μάτιν ἀκουει κακῶς.
[Gorgias, Encomium to Helen 12: text corrupted - Diel version]

Therefore would not the cause that captivated Helen be similar to the lament-songs of a young woman as if they were the means of carrying her off? For the mind is held by the power of persuasion and what’s more even if the knowledge is held through force, it has its own power. For speech was the persuader of the mind, it was persuaded and forced to believe in things said and to agree to the things that were done. Therefore he who persuades as enforcer did wrong whilst she who was persuaded as one forced by speech is wrongly ill-reputed. [trans. Leiper]

8.VI.18:
τὸν σοι ἕγώ διάκοσμον ἑοικότα πάντα φατίζω,
ὡς οὐ μὴ ποτὲ τίς σε βροτῶν γνώμη παρελάσῃ.
[Parmenides DK28.B.8]

This world-order I describe to you throughout as it appears with all its phenomena, in order that no intellect of mortal men may outstrip you. [or, reading γνώμη (Stein): 'in order that no mortal may outstrip you in intelligence'. [trans. K. Freeman]

8.VI.19:

アルバム μὴν οἱ γραφεῖς ὅταν ἐκ πολλῶν χρωμάτων καὶ σωμάτων ἐν σώμα καὶ σχῆμα τελεῖος ἀπεργασώστω, τέρτοτιμ τὴν ὁφιν ἢ δὲ τῶν αὐθηναίτων ποιησις καὶ ἡ τῶν ἀγαλμάτων ἔργασια θέων ἠδειν παρασχετο τοῖς ὁμομοιός. ὡς τὰ μὲν λυπεῖ τα δὲ πολλοί πέρικε τὴν ὁφιν. πολλὰ δὲ πολλοὺς πολλῶν ἔρωτα καὶ πόθον ἐνεργαζέται πραγμάτων καὶ σωμάτων. [Gorgias, Encomium to Helen 18]

It is true that whenever the painters successfully fashion a bodily form and imitate out of many colours and materials, they please the sight; and the making of statues and the working of icons provides for a sweet spectacle for the eyes. Therefore the sight is naturally inclined to be distressed by some things while it yearns for other things. And a great desire and longing is
produced in a great many people for a great many dealings and material things. [trans. Leiper]

Order in a city comes from right behaviour, in a body it comes from beauty, in a mind from wisdom, in an action from merit, in a speech it comes from truth: and the opposites of these are disorder. And the man, and woman, and speech, and task, and city, and action worthy of praise must be honoured with praise, while disgrace must be placed on the guilty. For it is an equal fault and ignorance to blame the praiseworthy or to praise the disgraced. [trans. Leiper]

Because telling what they know to those knowing,⁴⁶⁷ wins belief but brings no pleasure. [trans. Leiper]

That persuasion can become part of speech and strike the mind in any way it wishes, can be learned firstly from the explanations of the meteorologists, who, disposing of one point of view and creating the opposite viewpoint, can make the unbelievable and obscure appear to the eyes of opinion; secondly, from the forceful competitive debates in which one speech written with skill but not delivered with truth, delights and persuades a great crowd; thirdly from the disputational philosophical debates in which quick thinking demonstrates how the proof of an opinion can be made changeable. [trans. Leiper]

For just as the medicine draws out different fluids from the body and some put an end to sickness while others to life [trans. Leiper]

What we perceive does not have the physical properties we visualise but whatever each has in actuality; and through perception the mind is molded in this manner. [trans. Leiper]

⁴⁶⁷ Wardy [op. cit., p. 32] notes, 'conviction [πίστις] was the word used in two for the misguided faith people have in poets.'
8.VII.21:

SOCRATES: dokei di’ moi tōrētēōn autois einai en áppasai tais hilikaiais, ei philakikoi eis toutou tou dōymatos kai mīte gopteúomoi mīte biazoimoi ekbállosoun epiboulvounmenoi doxa an toutan poiein dein a tis polei bêtistha.

GLAUCON: eph, legeis tin ekbolh; Socr: eno sou, eph, erow. fainetai moi doxa eixeiva eti diavoias h ekousias h akousias [Plato Republic 412e-413c]

SOCRATES: I think, then, we shall have to observe them at every period of life, to see if they are conservators and guardians of this conviction in their minds and never by sorcery nor by force can be brought to expel from their souls unawares this conviction that they must do what is best for the state.

GLAUCON: What do you mean by the 'expelling'? (he said).

SOCRATES: I will tell you - it seems to me that the exit of a belief from the mind is either voluntary or involuntary. [trans. Lee]

I remember, Socrates, having heard someone make the distinction [between true opinion and knowledge] but I had forgotten it. He said that knowledge was true opinion accompanied by reason, but that unreasoning true opinion was outside of the sphere of knowledge; and matters of which there is not a rational explanation are unknowable, yes that is what he called them, and those of which there is are knowable. [trans. Fowler]

8.VII.22:

dio kai a’i tîchnai suneiástasan, hi te râfowðia kai hi ùspokrkitikai kai allai ge. epithe d’oi poihtai légonutes eînai dia tis léxin èdikous parissadíai tis dôzan, dia touto poihtikí prwth èpene to lezis, ouen h Gorgiou. kai vna eit’ oi polloi twn apaiðètewn twn toioioutos ouíto ài dialexeúthai kalísta. touto d’ ouk estin, all’ étéra losous kai poîseus lezis estin. déloi de to sumbasin’ oude gar oi tais traukódiqais poiouthes eiti crswai òn auton ròspou, all’ wstep kai ek twn tetramètron eis to iambhein metêbhsan dia to toî logos touto twn métron òròsostan einai twn allon, oust kai twn oônomatôn afeikaios ósa para tîn diálektôn estin, ouí oî prôwton ekósmous, kai eit’ vna oî tà èzametera poiouthes. [Aristot. Rhetoric 3.1.9-10]

Thus the arts of the rhapsodists, actors, and others, were fashioned. And as the poets, although their utterances were devoid of sense, appeared to have gained their reputation through their style, it was a poetical style that first came into being, as that of Gorgias. Even now the majority of the uneducated think that such persons express themselves most beautifully, whereas this is not the case, for the style of prose is not the same as that of poetry. And the result proves it; for even the writers of tragedies do not even employ it in the same manner, but as they have changed from the tetrametric to the iambic metre, because the latter, of all other metres, most nearly resembles prose, they have in like manner discarded all such words as differ from those of ordinary conversation, with which the early poets used to adorn their writings, and which even now are employed by the writers of hexameters. [trans. Freese]
8.VII.23:

It is reasonable to remind you in a summing up of what has been said, if you were lesser jurors, but it is unthinkable that [you] the foremost of the Greeks would not put your minds to concentrate nor to forget what has been said. [trans. Leiper]

8.VII.24:

Through words, inspired mantras [incantations] are able to induce pleasure and remove distress. For, by uniting with the mind’s opinion, the power of the mantra makes up your mind for you and persuades and changes it by wizardry. Two techniques of wizardry and magic have been discovered: faults of the mind and misled opinion. [K. Leiper]

8.VII.25:

In the next place, the moment for action has not yet gone by, and so made it now futile to bring up this question; for then, and only then, should we cease to speak, when the conditions have come to an end and there is no longer any need to deliberate about them, or when we see that the discussion of them is so complete that there is left to others no room to improve upon what has been said. [trans. Saunders, my italics]

For the deeds of the past are, indeed, an inheritance common to us all; but the ability to make proper use of them at the appropriate time, to conceive the right sentiments about them in each instance, and to set them forth in finished phrase, is the peculiar gift of the wise. [trans. Saunders, my italics]

8.VII.26:

Wherefore, when the right moment comes, one must say, 'And give me your attention, for it concerns you as much as myself'. [trans. Freese]
8.VII.27:

Because telling what they know to those knowing wins belief but brings no pleasure. [trans. K. Leiper]

8.VII.28:

[They were] the easy victims of newfangled arguments, unwilling to follow received conclusions; slaves to every new paradox, despisers of the commonplace; the first wish of every man being that he could speak himself, the next to rival those who can speak by seeming to be quite up with their ideas by applauding every hit almost before it is made, and by being as quick in catching an argument as you are slow in foreseeing its consequences; asking, if I may so say, for something different from the conditions under which we live, and yet comprehending inadequately those very conditions; very slaves to the pleasure of the ear. [trans. Dent]

8.VII.29:

(1) Two-fold arguments concerning the good and the bad are put forward in Greece by those who philosophise. Some say that the good is one thing and the bad another, but others say that they are the same, a thing might be good for some persons but bad for others, or at one time good and at another time bad for the same person. (2) I myself side with those who hold the latter opinion. [trans. Sprague]
if things do not unfold as stated, then the argument is false. ... (5) It is clear that a single argument is false when it contains present falsehood and true when it contains present truths. Just as a man is the same person when a child, when he is a youth and an adult and an old man. [trans. Leiper]

8.VII.30:

(1) *<tō autō*> ἀνδρὸς καὶ τάς αὐτὰς τέχνας νομίζω κατὰ βραχὺ τε δύνασθαι διαλέγεσθαι, καὶ *<tāν*> ἀλήθειαν τῶν πραγμάτων ἐπισταθαι, καὶ δικαίων ἐπισταθαι ὀρθῶς, καὶ διαμορφεῖν ὅσον τ᾽ ἦμεν, καὶ λόγων τέχνας ἐπισταθαι, καὶ περὶ φύσις τῶν ἀπάντων ὡς τε ἔξει καὶ ὡς ἔγένετο, διδάσκεν. (2) καὶ πρῶτον μὲν ὁ περὶ φύσις τῶν ἀπάντων εἰδῶς, πῶς οὐ δυνασθαι περὶ πάντων ὀρθῶς καὶ *<tāν πολὺν διδάσκεν> prássean; (3) ἐτὶ δὲ ὁ τάς τέχνας τῶν λόγων εἰδῶς ἐπισταθαι καὶ περὶ πάντων ὀρθῶς λέγειν. (4) δὲ γὰρ τὸν μέλλοντα ὀρθῶς λέγειν, περὶ ὅλων ἐπισταθαι, περὶ τούτων λέγειν. πάντ᾽ ὅν [γὰρ] ἐπισταθαι. (5) πάντων μὲν γὰρ τῶν λόγων τῶν τέχνας ἐπισταθαι, τοὶ δὲ λόγοι πάντες περὶ πάντων τῶν ἔκοντων ἔντιτι. (6) δὲ δὲ ἐπισταθαι τῶν μέλλοντα ὀρθῶς λέγειν, περὶ ὅλων καὶ λέγη, *<tā πράγματα*> καὶ τά μὲν ἄγαθα ὀρθῶς διδάσκεν τὴν πολὺν πράσεαν, τὰ δὲ κακὰ τῶν καλείν. (7) εἰδῶς δὲ τούτα εἰδήσει καὶ τὰ ἄτερα τούτων πάντα γὰρ ἐπισταθαί ἐστὶ γὰρ τούτων πάντων τίμα, <o> δὲ ποτὶ τούτων τὰ δέοντα πράξει, αἱ χρῆ. ... (12) ὃς γὰρ *<μᾶν*> τὸν ἀλήθειαν τῶν πραγμάτων ἐπισταθαι, εὐπετῆς ὁ λόγος, ότι πάντα ἐπισταθαι: (13) ὃς δὲ *<καὶ κατὰ> βραχὺ <διαλέγεσθαι δύναται, αἱ κα> δεὶ νῦν ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρίνεσθαι, περὶ πάντων ῥόκων δεὶ νῦν πάντ᾽ ἐπισταθαι. [Dissoi Logoi 8.1-12, DK.90]

(1) It belongs to the same man and the same art to be able to converse in the brief style and understand the truth about affairs; to pass correct judgement; to be a public speaker; to understand the art of rhetoric; and to teach concerning the nature and origin of the universe. (2) First, the man who understands the nature of the universe will be able to give correct teaching and advise the community best on everything. (3) Second, he who understands rhetoric will know how to speak correctly on everything; (4) For if anyone is to speak well, he must speak on what he knows; therefore he will know about everything. (5) He knows the arts of all kinds of speech, and these cover all existing things. (6) Further, he who wishes to speak correctly must understand the matters on which he speaks, and must correctly instruct the community to do what is good, and prevent them from doing what is bad. (7) Knowing the correct course, he will also know the opposite; for the latter belongs to the same section of the whole, and he will always do the proper thing in regard to the same necessity if he is called upon. ... (12) Further, whoever knows the truth about affairs knows everything. (13) And so he can converse briefly, and if necessary give answers to questions, on everything; therefore he must know everything. [trans. Freeman]

8.VII.31:

(3) οὐ γὰρ ἢδυ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἄλλων τιμὰν αὐτοὶ γὰρ στερισκευάται τίμιος ἤγονται, χειρῳδεύετε δὲ ὑπὸ τῆς ἀνάγκης αὐτῆς καὶ κατὰ συμφόρου ἐπταχθεῖτε ἐπαινεῖται καὶ ἀκουτες ὑμῶς γίγνονται. ... (7) καὶ τέχνη μὲν ἄν τις τίνι κατὰ λόγους πυθόμενος καὶ μαθῶν ὡς χείρων τοῦ διδάκτου κηρύσσην καὶ ἐν γένιστε ἐν ὁλίγων χρόνοις, ἀρετῆς δὲ ἤτης ἐξ ἐργῶν πολλῶν αὐτοτική, ταύτην δὲ ὅλω τὸ ὑπὸ ἀρξαίμενον ὑμᾶς ὀλιγοχρωμάς ἐπὶ τέλος ἀγαγεῖν ... [Anonymus lamblichii, DK.89.2.p.96.1.3-7]

[Men] in the end can be forced by the compulsion of facts to praise even against their will. ... Rhetoric can be mastered in a short time from a teacher, but the virtue built up of many acts cannot be brought to its goal if begun late or briefly practised. ... [trans. Freeman]
8.VIII.1

All men, to a degree, can scrutinise a logos or defend himself or bring an accusation. Now, while most people accomplish this without any plan, others from a practised skill. [trans. Leiper]

8.VIII.2:

Protagoras draws them with his spellbinding voice, like Orpheus, and wherever the voice leads, they follow, under his spell … there were one or two Athenians in the 'chorus' as well. [trans. Beresford]

8.VIII.3:

I am surprised at the sophists, as they are called, because, though most of them profess to lead the young to virtue they lead them to the very opposite. … Neither do their contributions to literature tend to make men good: but they have written many books on frivolous subjects, books that offer the young empty pleasures, but put no virtue into them. To read them in the hope of learning something from them is mere waste of time, and they keep one from useful occupations and teach what is bad. Therefore their grave faults incur my graver censure.

As for the style of their writings, I complain that the language is far-fetched, and there is no trace in them of wholesome maxims by which the young might be trained to virtue. I am no professor, but I know that the best thing is to be taught what is good by one's own nature, and the next best thing is to get it from those who really know something good instead of being taught by masters of the art of deception. I daresay that I do not express myself in the language of a sophist; in fact, that is not my object: my object is rather to give utterance to wholesome thoughts that will meet the needs of readers well educated in virtue. For words will not educate, but maxims will, if well found.

Many others besides myself blame the sophists of our generation - philosophers I will not call them - because the wisdom they profess consists of words and not of thoughts. [trans. Marchant]
sofistikous poie allosofos kai agathois: ou gar dokein auta boiomyai mallou h einai xermima, iana anexelekteta h eis ae.
[Xenophon On Hunting 13.6]

I am well aware that someone, perhaps one of this set,\textsuperscript{468} will say that what is well and methodically thought is not well and methodically written - for hasty and false censure will come easily to them. But my aim in writing has been to produce sound work that will make men not wiseacres but wise and good. For I wish my work not to seem useful, but to be so, that it may stand for all time unrefuted. [trans. Marchant]


The sophists talk to deceive and write for their own gain, and do no good to anyone. For there is not, and there never was, a wise man among them; every one of them is content to be called a sophist, which is a term of reproach among sensible men. So my advice is: avoid the behests of the sophists, and despise not the conclusions of the philosophers; for the sophists hunt the rich and young, but philosophers are friends to all alike: but as for men's fortunes, they neither honour nor despise them. [trans. Marchant]

8.VIII.4:

Euripides — toioata mentougyo frowein toutosin eisapagmen, logismon intheis tis teknhe kai skpwn, ouste hde nevain apanta kai dieidnei ta ta alla kai tas oikias oikein ameion h pro tou kanaskopein, ’poos tout’ exe; pou mou todi; tis tot’ elabe;’ ... 

Aischylus — eite au laiian epitideusai kai staumalian edidaxos, ... kai touj Parafoj anepiean antagoreuein tois arxousin. kaitoi tote y iunik elgez, oum htpistai alloi h maazan kaloesai kai rupnapai eitein.

[Xenophon On Hunting 13.6]

EURIPIDES: 'What I did was to teach the audience to use its brains, introduce a bit of logic into the drama. The public have learnt from me how to think, how to run their own households, to ask, 'Why is this so! What do you mean by that?' ... [to Aischylus] 'And you think that the right and proper way to teach them is to speak of Lycaebettes and the heights of Parnasses, instead of like an ordinary person?'

AISCHYLOS (to Euripides): 'And then look how you have encouraged people to babble and prate. ... now even the sailors argue with their officers - why, in my day the only words they knew were 'slops' and 'yo-heave-ho'. [trans. after David Barrett]

\textsuperscript{468} One of this set = a sophist; however Bowersock [E. C. Marchant, G. W. Bowersock, Xenophon in Seven Volumes, London, Heinemann, 1925] states that 'the text of what follows is open to suspicion'.

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Whenever he taught anything whatsoever, he bade the learner assess the value of the knowledge, and accepted the amount so fixed. [trans. Tredennick]

Overall none of those known as sophists will be found to have accumulated much money, but some lived in poor, others in moderate circumstances. The man who in our recollection secured most was Gorgias. Now he spent his time in Thessaly when the Thessalians were the most prosperous people in Greece; he lived a long life and devoted himself to the making of money; he had no fixed domicile in any city and paid nothing for public needs nor any tax; he was not married and he had no children … yet all the same he left at his death only a thousand staters [say, 20,000 drachmas]. [trans. Norlin]

A man has to be careful when he visits powerful cities as a foreigner, and induces their most promising young men to forsake the company of others, relatives or acquaintances, older or younger, and consort with him on the grounds that his conversation will improve them. Such conduct arouses no small resentment and various forms of hostility and intrigue. [trans. Guthrie]

PROTAGORAS: The fact is, other sophists abuse the young. They take young men who have specifically avoided skilled professions and thrust them, against their will, right back into mere skills by teaching them mathematics, and astronomy, and geometry, and music. (as he spoke he shot a glance at Hippias). [trans. Beresford]
8.VIII.9:

SOCRATES: Listen to his slack pronunciation - the drawl, the open mouth - did you hear? It's not going to be easy to teach him to win cases and make good debating points that don't actually mean anything. And yet, for 6,000 drachmas, Hyperbolos did manage to learn it. [trans. Sommerstein]

8.VIII.10:

How quick and abrupt were the changes of fortune which came to the rich who suddenly died and to those who had previously been penniless but now inherited their wealth, people now began openly to venture on acts of self-indulgence which before then they used to keep dark. Thus they resolved to spend their money quickly and to spend it on pleasure, since money and life alike seemed equally ephemeral. As for what is called honour, no one showed himself willing to abide by its laws. [trans. Warner]

8.VIII.11:

[Protagoras said], 'If he applies to me [a man] will learn that learning consists of good judgement in his own affairs, showing best how to order his own home; and how to become most capable of dealing with public affairs, both in speech and in action. This learning consists of good judgement of [a man’s] own affairs, showing how best to order his own home; and how to become most capable of dealing with public affairs both in speech and in action.' [Socrates said] 'I wonder whether I follow what you are saying; for you appear to be speaking of the civic science (politeke techne) and undertaking to make men good citizens.' [Protagoras] replied, 'That is exactly the purport of what I profess, Socrates'. [trans. Lamb]

8.VIII.12:

Among the ancients it was the greatest and the most illustrious orators who brought to the city most of her blessings. [trans. Norlin]

100 drachmas = 1 mina.
For who among you does not know that most of those who have sat under the sophists have not been duped nor affected as these men claim, but that some of them have been turned out competent champions and others able teachers; while those who have preferred to live in private have become more gracious in their social intercourse than before, and keener judges and more prudent counsellors than the great majority? How then is it possible to scorn a discipline which is able to make of those who have taken advantage of it men of that kind? [trans. Norlin]

No, it is evident that these students cross the sea and pay out money and go to all manner of trouble because they think that they themselves will be the better for it and that the teachers here are much more intelligent than those in their own countries. This ought to fill all Athenians with pride and make them appreciate at their worth those who have given to the city this reputation. [trans. Norlin]

8.VIII.13:
[Plato Phaedrus 227d]
SOCRATES: Ah the excellent [Lysias] ... for truly his discourse would be witty and of general utility [public service/social benefit]. [trans. Fowler]

8.VIII.14:
[Thuc. 2.65.9-11]
In what was nominally a democracy, power [in the time of Pericles] was really in the hands of the first citizen. But his successors, who were more on a level with each other and each of whom aimed at occupying the first place, adopted methods of demagogy which resulted in their losing control over the actual conduct of affairs. ... Because they were so busy with their own personal intrigues for securing the leadership of the people ... and by quarrelling among themselves [they] began to bring confusion into the policy of the state. [trans. Warner]