WHERE IS THE WISE MAN?

GRAECO-ROMAN EDUCATION AS A BACKGROUND TO THE DIVISIONS IN 1 CORINTHIANS 1–4

ADAM GRAHAM WHITE
BTh (Hnrs)

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ABSTRACT

This thesis investigates the divisions in the Corinthian church that Paul names in 1 Corinthians 1:12: “Each of you says, ‘I follow Paul,’ or ‘I follow Apollos,’ or ‘I follow Cephas,’ or ‘I follow Christ.’” The investigation seeks to locate them in the milieu of first-century Graeco-Roman education. By consulting relevant literary and epigraphic evidence, I will develop a picture of ancient education both throughout the Empire generally and in Roman Corinth specifically. This will serve as a backdrop to the situation in the Christian community, wherein some of the elite, educated members have preferred Apollos to Paul as a teacher since Apollos more closely resembles other teachers of higher studies.

As we will see in the literature review, there have been numerous studies that have pursued this line of argument, each attempting to locate the problems in a specific school or branch of study. However, this thesis will argue that it is against the values inculcated through “higher education” in general that the teachers are being compared. By starting with this broader category, one that much better reflects the very eclectic nature of Graeco-Roman education, a sustained reading of the entire section of 1 Corinthians 1–4 is made possible.
I certify that the work in this thesis entitled “Where is the Wise Man? Graeco-Roman Education as a Background to the Divisions is 1 Corinthians 1–4” has not previously been submitted for a degree nor has it been submitted as part of the requirements for a degree to any other university or institution other than Macquarie University.

I also certify that the thesis is an original piece of research and it has been written by me. Any help and assistance that I have received in my research work and the preparation of the thesis itself have been appropriately acknowledged. In addition, I certify that all information sources and literature used are indicated in the thesis.
This thesis had its genesis during a weekend stay at the beach house of Dr. Bruce Winter. Bruce very kindly offered to be an associate supervisor early on in my candidature and it was through our discussions over several days in Queensland, Australia that my research idea was developed. Several months later, I accompanied Bruce and his students on a trip to Corinth and Ephesus and their surrounding cities; here, ideas for the thesis were further discussed and developed. I am thus indebted to Bruce for the early development of this thesis.

My greatest acknowledgement, however, goes to my primary supervisor, Dr. Chris Forbes. Despite his heavy teaching load over the three years of my research, he always made time to meet and chat with me about ideas that I was considering. Chris’ knowledge of ancient philosophers and his own research in 1 Corinthians proved to be a continual comfort as he was able to guide me confidently through areas that I had never been before. Moreover, his careful and critical reading of the final thesis has been invaluable to the finished product. Needless to say, I am indebted to the time and encouragement that Chris has contributed both to my research and to myself as a scholar.

In addition, I would like to acknowledge my associate supervisor, Professor Larry Welborn. Larry joined the faculty at Macquarie University on a half-yearly basis around the time I began my candidature and very kindly agreed to assist me in my research. Larry’s expertise in 1 and 2 Corinthians are second to none. His work *Paul, the Fool of Christ*, in addition to his recent work *An End to Enmity*, have been a source of great inspiration to not only my Christian faith, but particularly to my research. For this reason, they are frequently cited throughout this thesis. Moreover, the numerous discussions I was able to have with him, in addition to the chapters that he read of my work, were both informative and encouraging.

Along the way, several members of the Ancient History Department at Macquarie also assisted me. Dr. Don Barker very kindly read drafts of several chapters and was able to offer helpful insights into the work. Professor Alanna Nobbs read a later draft of the first half of the thesis and noted further areas that I could improve the work. My friend and colleague, Brad Bitner, introduced me to, and gave me a crash course in, epigraphy. This became invaluable at points of my argument. Please note, however, that any failings on my part as an epigraphist are mine as a student and certainly do not reflect shortcomings of my teacher. In particular, I would like to thank Professor Paul McKechnie who read through the entire thesis and gave
exceptionally critical feedback. The entire thesis was, for the most part, re-written as a result of this, and what is now offered is largely thanks to his (sometimes brutal) comments.

Additionally, I wish to thank the Ancient History Department at Macquarie as well as the Society for the Study of Early Christianity for generous grants that enabled me to travel to Corinth in 2010 and to attend the 2012 International SBL Conference in Amsterdam. The research experience at Corinth as well as the opportunity to present some of my research in Amsterdam was both timely and helpful to the development of the thesis.

Most importantly, however, I wish to acknowledge the person who made this all possible, my wife Rachel. Her willingness to postpone starting a family and continue working while I studied for the last eight years is the only reason this could have happened. Moreover, her struggle to work shift work up to nearly full-term pregnancy in my final year of study is something that I could never fully repay. This thesis is dedicated to her.

Lastly, the leitmotif of this thesis is echoed in the name of my first child who was born in the final year of my candidature: σοφία.
ABBREVIATIONS


AB  Anchor Bible  
ABSA  *Annual of the British School at Athens*  
AGJU  Arbeiten zur Geschichte des antiken Judentums und des Urchristentums  
AGRL  Aspects of Greek and Roman Life  
AJP  *American Journal of Philology*  
ANTC  Abingdon New Testament Commentaries  
AP  *Ancient Philosophy*  
Apeiron  *Apeiron: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science*  
ATLA  *American Theological Library Association Proceedings*  
AW  *Ancient World*  

BA  *Biblical Archaeologist*  
BECNT  Baker Exegetical Commentary on the New Testament  
BibInt  *Biblical Interpretation*  
BICS  Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies  
BNTC  Black’s New Testament Commentaries  
BTB  *Biblical Theology Bulletin*  

CA  *Classical Antiquity*  
CBC  Cambridge Bible Commentary  
CBET  Contributions to Biblical Exegesis and Theology  
CBQ  *Catholic Biblical Quarterly*  
CBR  *Currents in Biblical Research*
CJ  Classical Journal
CL  Collection Latomus
CLET  Continuum Library of Educational Thought
Corinth  Corinth
CP  Classical Philology
CQ  Classical Quarterly
CR  Classical Review
CSCA  California Studies in Classical Antiquity
CW  Classical World

DMAHA  Dutch Monographs on Ancient History and Archaeology

ECL  Early Christianity and its Literature
ESV  English Standard Version
EvQ  Evangelical Quarterly

FT  First Things

GCRW  Greek Culture in the Roman World
GR  Greece and Rome
GRBS  Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies

HBS  Herders Biblische Studien
HEQ  History of Education Quarterly
Hermes  Hermes
Hesperia  Hesperia: Journal of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens

Historia  Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte
HSCP  Harvard Studies in Classical Philology
HTR  Harvard Theological Review
HTS  Harvard Theological Studies

ICC  International Critical Commentary
IJJE  International Journal of Ethics
Int  Interpretation

JAAR  Journal of the American Academy of Religion
JAE  Journal of Aesthetic Education
JBL  Journal of Biblical Literature
JBR  Journal of Bible and Religion
JCE  Journal of Christian Education
JETS  Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society
JR  Journal of Religion
JRASup  Journal of Roman Archaeology: Supplementary Series
JRH  Journal of Religious History
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<td>JRS</td>
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<td>JSNT</td>
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<td>JSNTSup</td>
<td>Journal for the Study of the New Testament: Supplement Series</td>
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<td>JTS</td>
<td>Journal of Theological Studies</td>
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<td>KEK</td>
<td>Kritisch-exegetischer Kommentar über das Neue Testament (Meyer)</td>
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<td>LC</td>
<td>Libraries &amp; Culture</td>
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<td>LCL</td>
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<td>LCBI</td>
<td>Literary Currents in Biblical Interpretation</td>
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<td>LNTS</td>
<td>Library of New Testament Studies</td>
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<td>MSJ</td>
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<td>NCB</td>
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<td>RBL</td>
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<td>ResQ</td>
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

In 1 Corinthians 1–4, Paul is dealing with divisions (σχίσματα, 1:10) in the Christian community at Corinth that have arisen from a preference over favourite teachers.¹ This division is described in Paul’s statement in 1 Corinthians 1:12: “Each of you says, ‘I follow Paul,’ or ‘I follow Apollos,’ or ‘I follow Cephas,’ or ‘I follow Christ.’”² This verse has been the subject of extensive discussion amongst Corinthian scholars; thus, for the sake of brevity, I will simply restate some of these conclusions as they pertain to the thesis.³

Johannes Munck argued that the “bickering” at Corinth was not over false doctrine, but rather, came as a result of the various members comparing the Christian message to the wisdom of the Greeks. Ever since this influential study, scholars generally agree that the divisions at Corinth are best explained in the social and cultural milieu of Roman Corinth.⁴ In seeking to locate the social causes of the division, Welborn argued persuasively that the form of these Corinthian slogans (“I follow Paul,” “but I follow Apollos”) reflects the principle at work in the creation of ancient political parties.⁵ Just like the common political factions in the ancient world, the Corinthian parties have arisen and been delineated in a power struggle between the wealthy members of the Christian community (who are the prime movers of the factions). In this scenario, “the bondage of the poor to the rich is the breeding ground of faction. Poverty creates dependence, a relationship that ambitious aristocrats readily exploit in their struggle for power.”⁶ Bruce Winter has further argued that following the conventions of the sophists with their own students, the various Christian groups in Corinth have considered

² Ἐκαστός ὑπὸν λέγει, Ἐγώ μὲν εἰμὶ Παύλου, Ἐγώ δὲ Ἀπόλλωνος, Ἐγώ δὲ Κηφᾶ, Ἐγώ δὲ Χριστοῦ.
³ The two most pertinent questions are: what was the cause of the division? And second, were there in fact four, three, or two parties? For the most recent summary of this discussion, see J. Brian Tucker, You Belong to Christ: Paul and the Formation of Social Identity in 1 Corinthians 1-4 (Eugene, Ore.: Pickwick, 2010), 14–31. For similar summaries, see Anthony C. Thiselton, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, (NIGTC; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000), 123–133; Andrew D. Clarke, Secular and Christian Leadership in Corinth: A Socio-Historical and Exegetical Study of 1 Corinthians 1-6, (PBMS; Eugene, Ore.: Wipf & Stock, 2006), 89–107; Mark T. Finney, “Honor, Rhetoric and Factionalism in the Ancient World: 1 Corinthians 1-4 in Its Social Context,” BTB 40, no. 1 (2010): 27–31.
⁶ Ibid., 99. Margaret M. Mitchell (Paul and the Rhetoric of Reconciliation [Louisville, Ky: Westminster John Knox, 1991], 82–86) also sees the connection between the Corinthian “slogans” and ancient politics, though she is critical of some of Welborn’s conclusions.
themselves exclusively committed to one of the “itinerant” teachers who visited Corinth.\(^7\)

Winter makes the point that the focus of 1 Corinthians 3:4 and 4:6 is on Paul and Apollos, arguing that “The allegiance of members of the church is now in effect divided between the former teachers, himself and Apollos. The church’s request ‘concerning Apollos’ and his return to minister to the congregation (1 Cor 16:12b), and the obvious relief and subsequent assertiveness on the part of some in the church because Paul’s promised return had not eventuated would support this (1 Cor 4:18).”\(^8\) This is an important point for the present thesis. Whether or not there was a “Cephas party” or a “Christ party” is impossible to determine with any certainty;\(^9\) even if we take the reference to Peter in 1 Cor 9:6 as evidence of his visiting Corinth at some stage, we are still left with the problem that neither of these parties is referred to again in 1 Cor 1–4. Moreover, the fact that only Paul and Apollos are mentioned in further discussion of the party disputes (1 Cor 3:4, 21) would lead us to assume that, while there may very well have been four genuine factions within the church, the main issue in 1 Cor 1–4 is between the followers of Paul and Apollos. I thus follow the conclusion of Welborn who argues that Paul’s parody of the party slogans in 3:4 only mentions Paul and Apollos, additionally, only these two are mentioned in the proceeding analogies, which would lead to the conclusion that the apology of 1:18–3:4 was written with a view to the Apollos party.\(^10\)

It will thus be argued in this thesis that 1 Corinthians 1–4 deals primarily with two opposing factions: one loyal to their teacher Paul and the other to their teacher Apollos. More specifically, it will be argued that a number of problematic opinions have arisen amongst the members of the Apollos faction which have led them to favour their teacher over Paul. These include: misconceptions over the wisdom (σοφία) and content of the Christian message (1:18–25); confusion over the particular status of the “chosen ones” (1:26–31); false expectations over the rhetorical style of the Christian teacher, and, within that, disdain at Paul’s refusal to employ contemporary oratorical methods (i.e., “wise speech,” σοφία λόγου).

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\(^8\) Ibid., 177; similarly, Bruce W. Winter, *After Paul Left Corinth: The Influence of Secular Ethics and Social Change* (Grand Rapids: Erdmans, 2001), 31–43.


\(^10\) L. L. Welborn, *An End to Enmity: Paul and the “Wrongdoer” of Second Corinthians* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2011), 372. Similarly, Stephen M. Pogoloff (Logos and Sophia: the Rhetorical Situation of 1 Corinthians, [SBLDS 134; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1992], 180) states that “In 3:4–9 and 4:6, Paul emphasises that whatever the status of the other slogans, the ones connected to Paul and Apollos are central to the exigencies.”
in his own preaching (2:1–5); and finally, a false understanding of what determined the quality and character of the “mature ones” (τέλειοι/πνευματικοί) in Christ (2:6–16).

The sheer complexity of these issues has given rise to a variety of scholarly interpretations over the years, all seeking to locate the problems in a particular social or theological context. It is the argument of this thesis, however, that at the heart of the problem in Corinth is a partisan evaluation of Paul by the educated, elite leader(s) of the Apollos group, who have evaluated Paul according to the values found in the schools of oratory and philosophy, or, more generally, Graeco-Roman παιδεία. In response to these misconceptions, Paul, in 1 Corinthians 3–4, employs a series of six metaphors in order to explicate what exactly his role should look like: that is, a mother (3:1–4), a farmer (3:5–9), a wise master builder (3:10–15), a household steward (οἴκονόμος, 4:1–5), and finally, a father brandishing a rod (4:14–17).

1.1 The Problem of Terminology

An initial objection to this proposal might be the absence of the term παιδεία in 1 Cor 1–4.

To be sure, “παιδεία” only appears six times in the NT corpus: four times in Hebrews 12:5–11 as reference to the discipline of the Lord, and twice elsewhere in Ephesians 6:4 and 2 Timothy 3:16 as reference to the upbringing of children and Christian instruction respectively. However, despite this absence, other terms, which are inclusive of education or rational activity, frequently appear in 1 Cor 1–4. For example, λόγος and γνώσις (1:5), νοῦς and γνώμη (1:10), σοφία and σοφός (passim.), τέλειος (2:6), διδακτός (2:13), ἀνακρίνειν (2:13, 14; 4:3, 4), λογιζομαι (4:1), and παιδαγωγός (4:15) appear throughout this section. It will also be argued that there are numerous other metaphors which find their

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significance in education. In fact, the frequency and variety of this language leaves little doubt that behind the divisions in Corinth is a problem that is informed by education.\textsuperscript{12}

1.1.1 Κατάρτισις

In 1 Corinthians 1:10, Paul says, “I implore you brothers and sisters, in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, that all of you speak the same language and that there may not be divisions (σχίσματα) among you; but rather that you be restored and made complete (κατηρτισμένοι) in the same mind (νοῦς) and in the same judgement (γνώμη).”\textsuperscript{13} Paul believes that the solution to the church’s division is for them to be restored (καταρτίζειν). This term has two main nuances: first, it can mean to put in order or restore; second, it can mean to prepare, make, create, or outfit.\textsuperscript{14} Mitchell has argued that in this verse, the term has a strong political overtone; the divisions (σχίσματα) resemble those found in political or social contexts and these factions need to be restored/mended (καταρτίζειν) to unity.\textsuperscript{15} This is certainly one of the nuances being implied. But καταρτίζειν also implies a process, one of preparation or outfitting for a purpose.

For example, καταρτίζειν is used frequently to refer to the fitting out of a fleet or a ship in preparation for a voyage.\textsuperscript{17} In 1 Thessalonians 3:10, Paul desires to return to the church after being separated from them so that he can supply (καταρτίζειν) what is lacking in their faith. Similarly, the author of Hebrews prays that God himself will equip them (καταρτίζειν) with everything good for doing His will (13:21). This sense of “outfitting” or “equipping” also had a place in the context of education. In Luke 6:40, Jesus reminds his


\textsuperscript{13} Translation mine.

\textsuperscript{14} BDAG, 526.


\textsuperscript{16} In 2 Cor 13, Paul seems to be dealing with a continuation of these divisions. He twice makes the same appeal to the church: in 13:9, he prays that they be fully restored (τὴν ἵμαρτον κατάρτιον); again, in 13:11, he encourages them, among other things, to strive for full restoration (καταρτίζειν).

\textsuperscript{17} “Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio, who had been appointed by the Roman people a few days before to command the fleet, after giving the ship captains orders that as soon as they had fitted out (καταρτίζειν) the fleet they should sail to the Straits” (Polybius, \textit{Hist.} 1.21.4; similarly, 1.46.6; 2.9.9; Diodorus Siculus, \textit{Lib.} 11.68.2; 13.38.6; et al).
disciples that a student (μαθητής) is not above their teacher (διδάσκαλος), but a student that is fully trained (καταρτιζείν) is like their teacher. Plutarch says of Alexander’s education that

Philip saw that his son’s nature was unyielding and that he resisted compulsion, but was easily led by reasoning into the path of duty, he himself tried to persuade rather than to command him; and because he would not wholly entrust the direction and training (κατάρτισις) of the boy to the ordinary teachers of poetry and the formal studies, feeling that it was a matter of too great importance. (Plutarch, Alex. 7.1)

Again, in Galatians 6:1, Paul tells the church that if anyone is caught in sin, the ones who live by the Spirit (i.e., the “mature ones,” οἱ πνευματικοὶ) are to restore (καταρτίζειν) that person.

In other words, Paul tells the Corinthians that the way to resolve these divisions is through a process of restoration (κατάρτισις) into the same thinking and judgments. This process would obviously involve education and training in the things of God. As Barrett observes, “Disunity is fundamentally a matter of mind and opinion [sic], that is, of doctrine, and it is here that restoration and reconciliation must take place.” Similarly, Ambrosiaster says that “He (Paul) wants them to perfectly united in the teaching which he had given them. He challenges them to think this way and defend his teaching (italics added).”

1.1.2 “Christian Παίδεια” as a NT concept

That such a clash of values could occur between the apostle Paul and his Corinthian converts who live in a flourishing Greek metropolis should come as no surprise. Nor should it surprise us that Paul would be familiar with values and terminology found in Greek education, particularly given his extensive travel and interaction in major cities. Ross Saunders has shown that Paul’s writings betray a deep understanding of the people among whom he worked and to whom he wrote. He says

I have no doubt that Paul would have spent many hours listening to the chattering in the agora and the taverna, as well as reading public inscriptions, in order to understand the mentality of the people to whom he was presenting Christ as a relevant saviour. Further, since the majority of Paul’s converts were Greeks rather than Jews, he would have come up against the full force

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18 See section 7.5.1–2 for discussion of the term πνευματικός.
20 Gerald Bray, ed., 1-2 Corinthians, Ancient Christian Commentary on Scripture 7 (Downers Grove, Ill.: IVP, 1999), 9.
of the Greek *paideia* in which they had been educated as he discussed his Christian *paideia* with them.\textsuperscript{21}

Saunders examines a second-century B.C.E. inscription from the agora in Ephesus (I. Eph. 202), in which Attalus II of Pergamum praises a certain “Aristo—,” whom he has deemed worthy of educating his nephew, the future Attalus III. The inscription deals with the education (παιδεία) of the boy, and in his thesis, Saunders notes the similarity in vocabulary between the inscription and much of Paul’s writing. From this, he delineates three important ideals, each with their associated vocabulary, which underly the inscription. The first ideal he notes is “tradition.” He argues that “While the Hellenistic world valued tradition, and the culture and ethos that resulted from it, Paul and the early Christians valued only those traditions and values that could be traced back to Christ.”\textsuperscript{22} The second ideal he notes is “discipline.” Under this heading, he discusses NT usages of the term παιδεία, particularly where it refers to education (i.e., Eph 6:4; 2 Tim 3:16). He suggests that “In the Pauline corpus *paideia* is not used for education as understood at that time in the classical sense, but education in the Lord, that is, training in the Christian life, with the scriptures providing the curriculum.”\textsuperscript{23} The third and final ideal he notes is “worthiness” (i.e., the standards by which a person’s actions or attitudes are judged). He notes that, although the language in the inscription is the same as that used by Paul, “in the inscription they will be those standards generally approved by secular authority and/or the community, while for Paul they will be the standards set by God.”\textsuperscript{24} Saunders’ conclusion is important. He states that “These ideals of *paideia* are not ignored by Paul: they are recognised and transformed into kingdom *paideia.*” He says

> Christian *paideia* is aimed … at helping the transformed soul to mature, thus resulting in a way of life that is approved by God. Classical educators believed that transformation of human nature could be brought about by strictly applied *paideia*. Thus, while the resultant human behaviour may be similar and the ideals bear some outward resemblance, the means of achieving them are different … With the majority of his converts firmly educated in the ideals of Greek *paideia*—ideals often different from the ideals of the kingdom of God—it is no wonder that Paul has to spend so much time and energy in virtually re-educating them. He does this not by attacking Greek *paideia*, nor by setting up an alternative education system, but by referring all human ideals and conduct to the nature of God and the example of Jesus.\textsuperscript{25}

\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., 178.
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{24} Ibid., 181.
\textsuperscript{25} Ibid., 182.
In other words, although we do not see the term παιδεία anywhere in 1 Cor 1–4, what we do see, it will be argued, is a clash of values between the content of a “Christian παιδεία” (i.e., the foolish message of the cross) and Graeco-Roman education.26

It will therefore be argued in this thesis that the Christian community, in many respects, resembled a type of school that taught a Christian παιδεία. This is not to suggest that Paul ever explicitly presented the church and the message of the gospel in such a way, but rather, that many aspects of the Christian community resembled the schools of the first century. This, it will be argued, has led some members to falsely impose secular values onto their understanding of its wisdom and its teachers. As a result, some of the Corinthians have argued that Paul is inferior by comparison to Apollos.

1.1.3 Other Issues of Terminology

This brings us to the next issue of terminology. At points in this thesis, the term “education” will be employed to translate the Greek παιδεία. However, παιδεία was not simply the transmission of knowledge.27 Rather, education was the process of moulding a young child into an elite, cultured citizen. This παιδεία was a holistic process. In fact, the primary and secondary stages were commonly referred to as ἐγκυκλικὴ παιδεία, or “cyclical/complete education.” This would involve a variety of disciplines, including: grammar, rhetoric, logic, arithmetic, geometry, music, and astronomy, in addition to physical exercise, gymnastics, dance, and other forms of training.28 Put another way, παιδεία was not “education,” so much as it was “enculturation.” It was concerned with the intellectual, physical, ethical, and social formation of a young man (and occasional woman).29 In this sense, although I will at times

26 This will be discussed at length in the literature review. A further objection might be raised that Jewish Christians would not have received a Greek education. Robert S. Dutch (The Educated Elite in 1 Corinthians: Education and Community Conflict in Graeco-Roman Context, [JSNTSup 271; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2005], 147–164) has shown at length that Jews, particularly of the Diaspora, would have received a gymnasium education. For similar discussion, see Philip S. Alexander, “Hellenism and Hellenization as Problematic Historiographical Categories,” in Paul Beyond the Judaism/Hellenism Divide, ed. by Troels Engberg-Pedersen (Louisville, Ky: Westminster John Knox, 2001), 71–74.

27 See especially the discussion throughout chapter 3.

28 Cf. Quintilian, Inst. 1.10. For fuller treatment of this term, see Teresa Jean Morgan, Literate Education in the Hellenistic and Roman Worlds (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 33–39. For discussion of the various subjects, see Donald Lemen Clark, Rhetoric in Greco-Roman Education (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1977), 12; Morgan, Literate Education in the Hellenistic and Roman Worlds, 33. Although, the arrangement and variation of these differed according to the particular teacher’s agenda and/or the students situation; thus, ἐγκυκλικὴ παιδεία was not a universal curriculum as much as it was an ideal (50–52).

29 Although it has been shown that the occasional young girl was educated, overall, education was restricted to boys, especially at the higher levels. For this reason, references to students will generally be limited to masculine terminology; cf. Morgan, Literate Education in the Hellenistic and Roman Worlds, 48. For discussion of education for young girls, see Beryl Rawson, Children and Childhood in Roman Italy (Oxford:
employ the English term “education,” παιδεία is probably better understood with the German term “Bildung.”

Additionally, a note must be made on the term “teacher.” At times, it will be used to refer to those responsible for training students, but a more appropriate option would be “instructor.” As we will see, throughout the educational process (one that essentially spanned from birth to early adulthood), a pupil would encounter a vast array of instructors. Even in the earliest years, there was no single person responsible for imparting the elements of speaking, reading, writing, and counting. These elements were acquired informally from various members of the household (such as nurses and both male and female carers).³⁰ A young son would first and foremost look to their father as their main teacher.³¹ Beyond this, a son in the early stages of education would most commonly encounter a primary teacher (διδάσκαλος)³² or tutor (παιδονόμος),³³ and if his parents’ means allowed, a pedagogue (παιδαγωγός).³⁴ Beyond this elementary training, male children who reached the secondary stage of παιδεία would be introduced to a variety of subjects under a multitude of instructors. In the gymnasium for instance (where education typically took place), they would encounter the gymnasiarch (γυμνασίαρχος) who was the general overseer of the whole complex and could often be an instructor.³⁵ They might also meet the superintendent of the wrestling school (παλαιστροφύλαξ), or the trainer of gymnastics (γυμναστής or παιδότριβης).³⁶ Additionally, a pupil would study music with the μουσικός or κιθαρίστης³⁷ as well as literary training with the teacher of poetry and grammar (γραμματικός).³⁸ At the highest “tertiary” stages, the male child would study with the orator or philosopher.³⁹ Παιδεία then,
was a process of holistic development, whereby a student would progress through various stages of training under a multitude of instructors, whose task it was to shape the young man into an elite citizen.

1.2 Framing the Investigation

In an article provocatively sub-titled “Did Paul Seek to Transform Graeco-Roman Society?” Peter Marshall sets out the following challenge:

I am concerned that, in our efforts to place Paul in his world, we are resorting too easily to parallelism without showing the contrast. Better results may be forthcoming if we could first show the extent to which technical ideals from the various philosophical schools had become commonplaces of popular morality or were in circulation among the educated Greeks, Romans and Jews through schooling and conversation. We must look for Paul’s own contribution, to define the differences between him and his contemporaries, in both degree and kind, and explain his reasons.  

My thesis will, in part, attempt to take up this challenge. Paul is being measured according to the standards of popular orators and philosophers, and while there are clear similarities (as we will see later), the divisions have occurred because Paul differed in so many ways from some of the Corinthians’ expectations. As Marshall states

It is most significant that Paul contrasts his own power to traditional Greek rhetoric. It helps us see in concrete terms what Paul means by ‘preaching Christ and him crucified’ in ‘weakness, fear and much trembling’. He presents himself as the very antithesis of accepted norms of cultivation … the practice of rhetoric, Greek education, and the value system on which they were founded, were incongruent with the gospel which he preached and the way he himself experienced it.

1.2.1 Methodology and Thesis Summary

In approaching the task, this thesis will employ a social-historical method similar to that used in studies such as Bruce Winter’s Philo and Paul Among the Sophists, Andrew Clarke’s

Ambiguity of Youth and the Absence of Adolescence in Greco-Roman Society, (DMAHA 8; Amsterdam: Gieben, 1991), 81–83. For other discussion of ancient schools, see Stanley F. Bonner, “The Street-Teacher: An Educational Scene in Horace,” AJP 93, no. 4 (1972): 509–528; Cribiore, Gymnastics of the Mind: Greek Education in Hellenistic and Roman Egypt, 15–44.


41 Ibid., 165.
Secular and Christian Leadership in Corinth, John Chow’s Patronage and Power, and others. These studies draw on Graeco-Roman literary and archaeological sources to construct a picture of the customs and practices that would have influenced the behaviour of some in the church. In the same way, this thesis will examine a variety of ancient literary and epigraphic sources in addition to relevant secondary sources that pertain to παιδεία, with a view to developing a picture of ancient education. This picture will be one that displays the cultural importance of education, not only within the schools of orators and philosophers, but also in the wider culture. From this, it will be argued that it is a background of παιδεία that has informed much of the Corinthians’ attitudes and expectations in 1 Cor 1–4. The few educated members of the Christian community are measuring their teachers in terms familiar to them from both their own upbringing and the surrounding cultural mores. This falling back on “secular” customs and values, Winter argues, is at the root of many of the issues in the church:

In 1 Corinthians, Paul was responding to problems which were created by the influence of secular ethics or social conventions on this nascent Christian community. They may have crept into the church imperceptibly and grown with the passage of time. Some were already there just below the surface (e.g., 3:1). Others were a rapid reaction to a problem which arose unexpectedly and were resolved almost unthinkingly on the basis of the legal or cultural mores of this Roman colony. Tucker has recently made a similar observation. He argues that “Roman imperial ideology is Paul’s primary interlocutor … (his) main concern was the formation of the Christ-movement around the Mediterranean basin. The principal hindrance to communal stability was the pretentious Roman Empire, as expressed through provincial governors and local collaborators (i.e., the educated elite).” Tucker states further, “Some in Corinth were continuing to identify primarily with key aspects of their Roman social identity rather than their ‘in Christ’ identity and this confusion over identity positions contributed to the problems within the community.”

In evaluating their instructors according to these worldly criteria, Paul’s teaching methods and general ministry style have been judged inferior next to the abilities of Apollos, which more closely resembles the methods familiar to the Corinthians. According to Luke’s description in Acts 18:24–28, Apollos is a Jew from the city of Alexandria, one of the

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42 For discussion and brief history of this approach to Corinthian studies, see Edward Adams and David G. Horrell, eds., Christianity at Corinth: the Quest for the Pauline Church (Louisville, Ky: Westminster John Knox, 2004), 26–34.
43 Winter, After Paul Left Corinth, 4.
44 Tucker, You Belong to Christ, 13.
45 Ibid., 35.
education capitals of the first century. Luke refers to him as an ἀνήρ λόγιος, that is, a man of excellent speech and education. He was skilled in handling the scriptures (δυνατός ἐν ταῖς γραφῖς), instructed in the ways of the Lord, spoke with great passion (ζέων τῷ πνεύματι ἐλάλει), and taught accurately (ἐδιδασκευὸν ἀκριβῶς) about the things of Jesus. Finally, Luke says that when Apollos was in Corinth, he would vehemently refute his Jewish opponents in public debate, showing from the scriptures that Jesus was the Messiah. According to this description, Apollos would easily rank amongst the contemporary philosophers and orators (i.e., the instructors of higher παιδεία) who often had esteemed public profiles and great reputations. Because of this, in the eyes of his followers, Apollos, in contrast to Paul, was seen as a man of superior wisdom and eloquence. Moreover, under the (unintended) influence of Apollos’ personal style and example, his followers have come to misunderstand the Paul’s ministry and the content of his preaching. The resulting arrogance and disdain towards Paul’s ministry has jeopardised his role as an apostle to the Christian community (1 Cor 1:18–2:16). In response, Paul employs metaphors that derive their cultural significance from ancient education to remind them of what a Christian teacher and apostle is meant to look like. These metaphors, however, are infused with new meaning and values that sharply contrast with the existing social order. His point is to show the Corinthians that, in Christ, the categories they are using to evaluate their teachers are no longer relevant. The foolishness of the cross turns the wisdom of the world on its head, and in this new order, teachers and apostles look and act radically different.

1.2.2 Chapter Summaries

For us to fully grasp the significance of the situation, careful attention must be paid, not only to what characteristics were expected of ancient teachers, but also what skills and values the most successful teachers exemplified. This includes an examination of the values and ideals inculcated through παιδεία, which will be the focus of chapter 3. There it will be shown that

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47 Cf. Winter, Philo and Paul among the Sophists, 178; L. L. Welborn, Paul, the Fool of Christ: a Study of 1 Corinthians 1-4 in the Comic-Philosophic Tradition, (JSNTSup 293; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2005), 107; Pogoloff, Logos and Sophia, 181.

48 Winter (Philo and Paul among the Sophists, 178) has shown that the three terms: ἀνήρ λόγιος, δυνατός ἐν τοῖς γραφῖς, and ἐπιδεικνύμενι all have rhetorical connotations, indicating the rhetorical skills of Apollos.
παιδεία was often listed in inscriptions amongst the main virtues by which a person was honoured (i.e., ἀρετή, σωφροσύνη, and καλοκαγαθία). As a mark of culture, παιδεία set its possessor apart from the many who did not have the necessary means to receive an education (primarily, time and money). It will also be shown that education was the principal characteristic that determined a person’s fitness to engage in public service and civic leadership. Overall, it will be shown that παιδεία was part of a worldview that was characterised by virtues and beliefs in conflict with the humble message of the cross.

Chapter 4 will look at two very important questions in NT scholarship that underscore this thesis. The first question is: were there any wealthy, educated Corinthian Christians? Here I will follow the “New Consensus,” suggesting that there were indeed a small handful of wealthy members who themselves had received an education. The second question is: what level of education, if any, did Paul have? Again, I follow numerous scholars, suggesting that Paul has, at the very least, a level of education that enabled him to engage the social elite and walk in their educated circles. It will be argued, however, that in Apollos they saw something far better attuned to what they expected in a learned person and much more in conformity with what they knew of παιδεία. For this reason, competition and comparison were inevitable.

These conclusions will set the foundation for a two-part exegesis in which I will expound 1 Corinthians 1:18–4:21. In the first part of the exegesis (chapters 5–7), I will investigate 1 Corinthians 1:18–2:16, focussing on Paul’s defence of his ministry style and preaching content, as well as his correction of the arrogance of the “mature” believers. In the second section (chapters 8–11), I will investigate 1 Corinthians 3:1–4:21, paying particular attention to the metaphors employed by Paul to redescribe his role and function as an apostle to the Corinthians. Methodologically, each chapter will begin by detailing a relevant aspect of Graeco-Roman παιδεία; this backdrop will then be used to give clarity to the particular issues being discussed in the passage. To begin with, however, we must first briefly examine the history of scholarship.


50 There appears to be a dual function to the section of 1 Cor 1:10–4:21: on the one hand, Paul is offering a defence of his authority as the apostle to the Corinthians in the face of comparisons with Apollos; cf. Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, “Rhetorical Situation and Historical Reconstruction in 1 Corinthians,” NTS 33 (1987): 397. On the other hand, Paul makes it clear that his purpose in writing is to admonish them (4:14); cf. John T. Fitzgerald, Cracks in an Earthen Vessel: an Examination of the Catalogues of Hardships in the Corinthian Correspondence, (SBLDS 99; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988), 117.
PART 1: SETTING THE SCENE
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

The difficulty with reviewing the scholarly literature on 1 Corinthians is the sheer volume of work that has been produced over the last two centuries, making an adequate review almost an insurmountable task. In fact, the extent and variety of interpretations through this long history has given rise to two recent publications on the matter. The first is a 2004 volume titled *Christianity at Corinth: the Quest for the Pauline Church*, edited by Horrell and Adams, which provides sample sections of the most influential works as well as a brief history of the trends in Corinthian scholarship. The second, and most recent, is a 2010 article by Oh-Young Kwon titled “A Critical Review of Recent Scholarship on the Pauline Opposition and the Nature of its Wisdom (σοφία) in 1 Corinthians 1–4.” These two works provide an excellent overview of the different scholarly suggestions as to the background of the Corinthian divisions and the many other issues going on in the church. I will thus limit the present review to the more recent work on the idea of παιδεία, specifically, rhetoric and philosophy, as a possible background to the problems in Corinth.

2.1 Ground Breakers: Munck and Judge

In 1952, Johannes Munck, in his *The Church without Factions*, challenged the long-standing thesis of Baur (i.e., that behind the various parties mentioned in 1 Cor 1:12, was a conflict between a Pauline “Gentile” and a Petrine “Jewish” Christianity), demonstrating that it was not a Judaizing group behind the problem. He argued instead that in 1 Cor 1–4, Paul was not arguing against false doctrine, but rather “the Corinthians regarded the Christian message as wisdom like that of the Greeks, the Christian leaders as teachers of wisdom, themselves as wise, and all this something to boast about.” He states that

The *milieu* to which we are introduced in 1 Cor 1–4 reflects processes that we know from literature and the upper classes. It is a question here, not simply of philosophy, but of a mixture of philosophy and sophistry, typical of that age … It is a question of something that is

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1 Adams and Horrell, *Christianity at Corinth*.
philosophy or wisdom by name, but Christian life by content, as the Corinthians experience it in the firm consciousness of being rich, free, and equal to anything … That new, overflowing life is wisdom, and they have received it from a teacher of wisdom; and in their childish vainglory each boasts of having had the best and most eminent teacher of wisdom. And because they know only the popular philosophy and the professional orator or sophist, who understood how to captivate a Greek audience by his learning and eloquence, the outward form is conclusive for them.4

This thesis was an early statement of the view that behind the situation in 1 Cor 1–4 were Hellenistic and Graeco-Roman values, the influence of which would resonate in scholarship for generations to come.5

There is no doubt that Munck’s work was a major turning point in the discussions of Paul and his Corinthian detractors. However, arguably the most prominent scholar on this topic is E. A. Judge. Between 1960 and 1961, Judge produced a two-part article titled “The Early Christians as a Scholastic Community.” Here, he suggested that the activities of the Christian groups could be classified in three ways: first, their cultic activities, second, their function as agencies of welfare, and third, their activities as a scholastic community.6 At the heart of Judge’s thesis was the suggestion that the NT churches “were founded and to some extent carried on under the auspices of visiting professional preachers, which makes them parallel in some respects to the philosophical movements of the day.”7 This led him to posit the quite provocative suggestion that the class to which Paul belonged was the sophists. Judge was quick to caution, however, that “This is not to say that he modelled himself on any of them, nor that he would have approved of this categorisation … they were all travellers, relying upon the hospitality of their admirers, all expert talkers and persuaders, all dedicated to their mission and intolerant to criticism.”8 He concludes the article by saying that

The object of (Paul’s) missions underlines the intellectual character of Paul’s activity. He is always anxious about the transmission of the logos and the acquisition of true gnosis … The Christian faith, therefore, as Paul expounds it, belongs to the doctrines of the philosophical schools rather than with the esoteric rituals of the mystery religions. Another feature that marks Paul’s teaching as philosophical rather than religious is its concentration upon ethics.9

This work was continued a few years later in a 1966 article titled “The Conflict of Educational Aims in the New Testament.” In this article he suggested that the early church

4 Ibid., 153.
8 Ibid., 540.
9 Ibid., 551.
presented a new way of life that supervened the existing educational systems (Greek and Jewish), but in defining this new way, “analogies and technical terms drawn from education are quite commonly used. Many of the officials mentioned in connection with the churches exercise what we might call educational roles.”10 He argued that “What we are observing is a matter of adult education, or indeed, as the apostles might have put it, a kind of higher education ‘in Christ,’ which is the complete development of man.”11 Judge suggested that the apostles were not concerned with an educational system as such; rather, they were dedicated to “the preparation of man for his proper end.” This “new man [sic] in Christ” was characterised by three consistent features: the notion of the spiritual man (one who possessed the Spirit of God); of the complete or adult man (growth towards a full personal development “in Christ”); and of the loving man (since man is to grow to completeness in Christ, the manifestation of love will be the necessary sign of growth).12 This work was further developed in a 1983 paper titled “The Reaction against Classical Education in the New Testament.” In this, Judge focussed on the conflict between Paul and those who espoused the reigning values of higher education. He argued that Paul “deliberately refrained from the formal techniques of persuasion because he rejected the moral position one must adopt to employ them, and that he was driven into a confrontation with those in the churches who did use them by the fact that his own followers were disturbed by his irregularity. They would have liked him to have done it properly too.”13 He states further that “In asserting a new source and method of knowing about the ultimate realities of the world, and about how one should live in it, Paul is occupying the territory that belonged to higher education. He is promoting a new kind of community education for adults. This involved him in a confrontation with his own churches because they wanted him to adopt the status in life that was appropriate to a tertiary teacher.”14 Judge’s conclusion is important, as it forms a point of departure for the present thesis

The value-system upon which Greek education had been built up is deliberately overthrown. Paul was not apparently concerned with the threat which classical literary studies represented to children at primary and secondary levels. But he reacted powerfully against the perversion of human relations which he saw inculcated by the ideals of higher education. It was a perversion because it enshrined the beautiful and the strong in a position of social power. In his own case he deliberately tore down the structure of privilege with which his followers wished to enshrine him.15

11 Ibid.
12 Ibid., 703–704.
14 Ibid., 12.
15 Ibid., 14.
The cumulative picture that emerges from these works is one where the early Christian community is being perceived, and indeed structured, as an educational institution. The problems in 1 Corinthians 1–4, however, have arisen over the extent to which these similarities are appropriate. Though not without their critics, Munck and Judge demonstrated very clearly that the opposition which Paul faced in Corinth could be best explained against the backdrop of Graeco-Roman culture, and, more specifically, ancient education.16

2.2 Arguments for Oratory

This has given rise to a multitude of discussions, all seeking to locate the problems at Corinth in the oratorical or philosophical milieu. In terms of rhetoric, two studies have been highly influential. The first is Stephen Pogoloff’s 1990 dissertation Logos and Sophia: the Rhetorical Situation of 1 Corinthians, in which he argued that the divisions in Corinth came as a result of a competition for status mediated through the use of popular rhetoric. By far the most important aspect of this study is its detailed treatment of the phrase οὐκ ἐν σοφίᾳ λόγου.

After consideration of various alternative renderings, he concludes that “σοφία λόγου would mean clever or skilled or educated or rhetorically sophisticated speech.”17 He rightly points out that σοφία tends to describe educated or cultured characteristics of persons of high social standing.18 “How one spoke was closely related to issues of social status that included education, power, wealth, birth, social relations, and tensions between urban/rural and Roman/Greek identity.”19 The “wise” speaker in this case, was one who employed language in a manner that suited him to an upper class station. This leads Pogoloff to suggest that “Paul is responding not to division itself, but to the values which lie behind them [sic]. Those ‘of Paul’ have perceived him as possessing the status indicator of eloquence, while those ‘of Apollos’ perceive Apollos superior in this regard.”20 These divisions are based on social status, whereby the different groups are claiming, or reacting to other claims, that they have the wiser teacher; one whose cultured eloquence indicates and confers status.21

17 Pogoloff, Logos and Sophia, 110.
18 Ibid., 113.
19 Ibid., 127. This is further supported by the suggestion that the term ὑπεροχή in 1 Cor 2:1 includes not only rhetoric, but the superior social status of those who master it (132).
20 Ibid., 119.
21 Ibid., 197.
The value of Pogoloff’s study is that, like Munck’s thesis, it locates the Corinthian situation in the rhetorical milieu of the first century, particularly in regard to the rhetorical schools. However, its usefulness in explaining the overall situation of 1 Cor 1–4 is limited due to its narrow focus on rhetoric at the expense of philosophy. Pogoloff rightly notes that “Rhetoric influenced the entire culture through education, literature, values, and uniformity across time and space.” Moreover, in discussing the tension between philosophers and orators in this period, he notes that rhetors like Cicero and Quintilian claimed to be the true philosophers, incorporating philosophy into the content of their oratory. This leads him to suggest that rhetoric is the primary reference of σοφία λόγου; a cultured rhetor is one who can speak on any topic. There is no doubt that a major issue in the Corinthian church is rhetorical style, particularly in 1 Cor 1:17 and 2:1–5, thus, we would certainly concede Pogoloff’s assertion here. However, in the broader context of these passages (chs. 1–4), much of Paul’s language is best explained in the context of philosophy (as we will see in chapter 5). Hence, Pogoloff’s conclusions become limited in their explanatory ability. Part of the problem for his study is his use of primary sources. Pogoloff rightly draws on orators such as Cicero, Quintilian, the Elder Seneca, and others; but what is most surprising is the absolute absence of Seneca the Younger. As we will see later, the devoted Stoic Seneca, apart from being Paul’s immediate contemporary, is considered by Quintilian himself to be one of the most influential orators of his generation. Additionally, Pogoloff dismisses out of hand the evidence of sophists, seeing the movement as being too late for it to have any impact on the

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22 On this point, he gives relatively brief mention of the schools of declamation and the general popularity of declaimers in the first century (175–176). What is surprising, however, is the brevity of his engagement with such an important feature of first-century oratory. He also helpfully suggests that when Paul states “We speak not in words taught by human wisdom,” the most natural teacher would be the rhetorical schools (140).

23 Pogoloff, Logos and Sophia, 52.

24 Ibid., 61–62. What is surprising about this chapter, one that looks at the dialect between philosophers and orators in regard to the use of oratory, is the absence of engagement with philosophers. Only Epictetus is given a passing mention (62) with reference to a single dismissive comment he makes about the use of oratory. One might ask though, why is there no discussion of Philo in such a chapter? Philo’s frequent calls (as we will see below) for philosophers to become proficient in oratory in order to challenge the sophists would be, one would think, very important in such a discussion.

25 Ibid., 68.

26 The absence of Seneca is most telling when Pogoloff discusses the term σοφία and wise speech. He notes that “Another place we find the conjunction of wise speech and social status is popular Stoicism” (115). This leads to a discussion of the Stoic σοφός; however, in describing this man, he draws on discussion by Cicero, an orator living 100 years before Paul, and Plutarch, a late first-century critic of Stoicism. In such a discussion, why not draw on Paul’s immediate contemporary, a gifted Stoic orator, and one who frequently discusses the idea of the σοφός? The wise man, in Pogoloff’s view, thus becomes little more than an eloquent speaker with some philosophical knowledge. The limitations of this view become most apparent when he discusses the σοφός of 1 Cor 1:20. He suggests that this reference is a “generic term for a person, whether Greek or Jew, who claims to be humanly wise” (158). Later, however, he argues that “The Corinthians implicitly, if not explicitly, had regarded (Paul) as a persuasive rhetor, i.e., a σοφός” (178). As we will see later, the term σοφός in the context of 1 Cor 1–4 makes much better sense understood as a reference to the Stoic wise man as described by Seneca.
situation at Corinth. But despite these weaknesses, Pogoloff’s work certainly did a lot to move the discussion forward.

2.2.1 Bruce Winter

The second, and perhaps one of the most influential treatments of the issue of oratory in 1 Corinthians, is Bruce Winter’s *Philo and Paul among the Sophists: Alexandrian and Corinthian Responses to a Julio-Claudian Movement*. In this, Winter builds on the tentative conclusions of Munck that sophistry was an influential factor in the problems at Corinth. However, Winter notes two weaknesses in Munck’s thesis: first, his singular reliance on Philostratus (and conversely, a lack of engagement with first-century sources); second, the publication of his work coming prior to the ground-breaking research of G. W. Bowersock in 1969. By drawing on a broader range of sources such as Epictetus, Dio, and Plutarch, Winter is able to demonstrate that sophistry was in fact an issue in mid-first century Corinth, and, moreover, that it was also a factor in the church. This is most clearly seen in 1 Cor 2:1–5, where Winter shows that Paul’s explanation of his early preaching is best understood as an anti-sophistic ploy, a direct counter styling to the entries practised by the popular orators. The incorporation of sophistry (i.e., professionally trained orators), into the discussion gives far more scope to understanding the Corinthian situation. For example, in 1 Cor 1:4–9, the inferiority felt by some in the church is explained as a comparison between those with no education and those who are highly trained in oratory. The status terms found in 1:26–28 and 4:8–10 are also able to be located into the broader philosophical debate, particularly between sophists and “true” philosophers such as Philo. Additionally, the debates over Paul and Apollos are also given a more precise setting as resembling the debates between students of particular orators. Winter’s work has been pivotal in Corinthian scholarship as it opens up new lines of evidence to us and causes us to look deeper into the popular values and the overall educational milieu of the time. In conjunction with studies like Pogoloff’s, it gives a firm setting for the problems in Corinth as being heavily informed by the popular oratory of

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31 Ibid., 192–199.
the first century. But, one might ask, what about the schools of philosophy? Possibly the core issue at Corinth was the definition of wisdom (σοφία). Are we to imagine that the Corinthian misunderstanding over this term was in no way informed by the philosophers who had been discussing and debating this term for centuries? It seems highly unlikely.

2.3 Arguments for Philosophy

In recent times, scholars have argued that type of σοφία being sought in the Corinthian community (and indeed, many of the other issues) has its understanding in the philosophical ideas commonly found in the culture. We have already noted the insights of E. A. Judge, who suggests that “the Christian faith, as Paul expounds it, belongs with the doctrines of the philosophical schools rather than with the esoteric rituals of the mystery religions.”

Conzelmann goes as far as to suggest that the early church could well be seen as “an intentionally organised Pauline school operation,” or, in short “eine Schule des Paulus.” There is little doubt that Paul’s preaching and pastoral activities would have loosely resembled the educational institutions of the day. Harrison, for example, looks at the role of

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35 Judge, “The Early Christians as a Scholastic Community,” 551.

the ancient gymnasium, and more specifically, the role of the gymasiarch, in shaping young men into civic leaders as paradigmatic of Paul’s own pastoral leadership. He cites an example from an inscrptional portrait of the gymasiarch, noting the way that he pastorally cares for and personally develops the epheboi and neoi. Harrison suggests that there was a “comprehensive pastoral care that the young boys experienced under the gymasiarchs;” more specifically, “the convergence of word and deed in personal transformation, as well as the centrality of unity.” These are motifs, he suggests, that Paul would readily agree with.

Regarding the philosophical schools as a possible comparison to the ἐκκλησία, Malherbe suggested long ago that “The points of similarity between Paul and his philosophic competitors may be stressed to the point that he is viewed as a type of Hellenistic philosopher.” He draws attention to Paul’s tent making, pointing out that “Some philosophers, too, were active in workshops, and took the opportunity to demonstrate their teaching by their practice.” Malherbe is, however, quick to point out that “While some of the philosophers looked to the practice as an ideal, few actually followed it.” He also notes the similar practice shared by Paul and the philosophers of calling their disciples to imitate them. However, he is again quick to point out the difference that “Paul did not demand that his converts look to him as a paradigm of what one might accomplish through one’s own effort, as the philosophers did.”

Similarly, Loveday Alexander notes that for the Christians to function, they needed a place to meet, the question however, was where? According to her, Paul’s first point of call is the synagogue, but as was often the case, after a certain time this was no longer a viable option. At this point, Alexander suggests that Paul would move his operations to a house, which, she suggests, had its precedent in the activities of the

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39 Ibid., 88. Similarly, Loveday Alexander, “‘Foolishness to the Greeks:’ Jews and Christians in the Public Life of the Empire,” in Philosophy and Power in the Graeco-Roman World: Essays in Honour of Miriam Griffin, ed. by Gillian Clark and Tessa Rajak (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 239. Ronald F. Hock (“The Workshop as a Social Setting for Paul’s Missionary Preaching,” CBQ 41 [1979]: 438–450) argues that Paul’s tent making would have resembled the Cynic philosophers. He notes that the only philosophers we find in workshops are Cynics, and despite the fact that philosophers generally despised manual labour, for some circles of Cynics, working in a trade was seen as an ideal. This, Hock suggests, became a possible paradigm for Paul; that is, working to support his ministry (The Social Context of Paul’s Ministry [Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1995], 37–42). However, Hock argues that Paul deemed this work as slavish and demeaning given his (arguably) elite status (“Paul’s Tentmaking and the Problem of His Social Class,” JBL 97, no. 4 [1978]: 555–564). Against this thesis, however, Todd Still suggests that Paul’s view of work was ambiguous at best (“Did Paul Loathe Manual Labour? Revisiting the Work of Ronald F. Hock on the Apostle’s Tentmaking and Social Class,” JBL 125, no. 4 [2006]: 781–795). For other discussion and comparison of Paul’s initial preaching and work as an artisan, see Jerome Murphy-O’Connor, St. Paul’s Corinth: Texts and Archaeology (Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical Press, 2002), 192–198.
40 Malherbe, “Paul: Hellenistic Philosopher or Christian Pastor?,” 89.
philosophers. These, she notes, would often use their own houses or those of patrons to conduct their activities.41

2.3.1 Stanley Stowers

This idea of the house churches being understood as philosophical schools is given extensive treatment by Stanley Stowers in his “Social Status, Public Speaking and Private Teaching: the Circumstances of Paul’s Preaching Activity,” where he rejects the earlier assertions of scholars like Judge (that Paul’s preaching activity resembles something like the sophists), arguing that scenes like those from the Areopagus are in fact atypical in Acts.42 He suggests instead that the centre of activity for which we have evidence from his letters is the private home. “The private home was a center of intellectual activity and the customary place for many types of speakers and teachers to do their work. Occasional lectures, declamations and readings of various sorts of philosophical, rhetorical and literary works often took place in homes.”43 The patron or owner of a private home, he argues, would provide not just a meeting place, but also an audience and social legitimation. Moreover, private homes seem to be the most popular places for philosophers and sophists to hold their classes.44 He concludes that “The private home provided him with a platform where an audience could be obtained and taught without the problems of presenting oneself to be judged by the criteria of public speaking.”45 Stowers continues this discussion in a recently republished article titled “Does Pauline Christianity Resemble a Hellenistic Philosophy?”46 Here he responds to the comparison between the early Christian community and voluntary associations,47 arguing

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42 Ibid., 60–61. He argues that the reputation, wealth, and high social position would have precluded Paul from being considered a rhetor or a sophist (74).

43 Ibid., 65.

44 Ibid., 66.

45 Ibid., 81.


47 Discussion of voluntary associations lays beyond the purview of this paper; for various treatments, see Richard S. Ascough, “The Thessalonian Christian Community as a Professional Voluntary Association,” *JBL* 119, no. 2 (2000): 311–328; Richard S. Ascough, “A Question of Death: Paul’s Community-Building Language
instead that there are more similarities with philosophical schools. From the outset of his argument, he rightly notes that “similarity is not sameness. I do not think that Pauline Christianity was a philosophy, and differences are as important as similarities.” He notes seven points of similarity between the early Christian practices and schools of philosophy: first, “The Hellenistic philosophies conceived of themselves as distinct and mutually exclusive haireseis, choices, or sects.” Like the various philosophical sects, Paul constructs life in Christ as a distinct and mutually exclusive choice with a unitary good. Second, Hellenistic philosophies were para doxa, that is, contrary to conventional thinking; likewise, Pauline Christianity claimed to oppose itself to traditional thinking on moral matters and regarding religious disbelief and practice. Third, “The change to the new life might be described as a conversion in the sense of a dramatic orientation to the self.” Fourth, this choice made possible and required a “new technology of the self.” Fifth, the Hellenistic philosophies developed the idea of the wise man. Sixth, “Encompassing the previous five characteristics, the central practices of the Hellenistic schools and of Pauline Christianity were intellectual practices and practices that made reference to the mind.” On this point he rightly states that “whatever else they were, Jesus and Paul were teachers.” Seventh, “The goals and practices of the Hellenistic philosophies and Paul’s ‘Christianity’ might give rise to nontraditional and radical social reform.” His conclusion restates his initial point that “Even though Christianity did not derive from philosophy in any way, but from Judaism, it shared the structural features that made it philosophy-like.”


49 Ibid.
50 Ibid., 230–231.
51 Ibid., 231.
52 Ibid., 232.
53 Ibid., 233.
54 Ibid., 234.
55 Ibid., 235. However, Stowers notes three caveats to these similarities: first, “Pauline Christianity was not a neat package, fully integrated and consistent.” Second, Hellenistic philosophers tend to associate as friends. In Pauline Christianity, however, one finds the language of fictive kinship. Third, “Specific rituals play an intrinsic role in Pauline Christianity that they do not for the Hellenistic philosophies, except possibly for Epicureans” (241–242).
2.3.2 Thomas Schmeller

Certainly there were similarities in practice, but as it has been shown, there were also similarities in content. In his *Schulen im Neuen Testament?* Thomas Schmeller has argued that “The philosophy of the NT period was not simply concerned with progress in knowledge, it understood itself as “life skills;” (that is) as instruction towards a right life, in both an ethical and religious sense. Its interest was not simply persuasion, but conversion, not only instruction and exercise, but also soul-guidance and meditation.”

He goes on to suggest that, for Paul, the Christian message is not simply a matter of faith and obedience; there is also a process which involves the reasoning of the readers, a process that has immediate parallels in philosophical schools. In regard to the problems in 1 Cor 1:18–2:16, he suggests that the various factions were acting like competing philosophical schools, in that they were exalting the various teachers according to each one’s style and treating them like heads of different schools. This behavior could be traced back to the elite members and found acceptance among the majority. They asserted that Christianity, just like philosophy, had different expressions of “wisdom;” in other words, a religiously underpinned Lebenskunst, combined with a certain intellectual demand. This wisdom, Schmeller suggests, one could and should only approach with the help of different teachers and one’s own effort.

But similar to Pogoloff’s study, the narrow focus on philosophy alone becomes problematic, particularly when dealing with 1 Cor 2:1–5. Like Pogoloff, Schmeller notes the rivalry between orators and philosophers, pointing out, however, that even philosophers had need of at least protreptic skills in order to recruit students for a school. He suggests that “When Paul dismisses an expected propaganda from his mission, alongside sophistry could also be meant philosophy. Should the variant reading ἐν πειθοὶ σοφίας be original, a reference here to philosophy would be nearer.” This seems too difficult to accept. As we will see, Paul’s language in these verses makes far better sense when read as reference to a rejection of rhetorical style;
and, conversely, as Winter has shown, the Corinthians’ desire for teachers who resemble popular orators. Nevertheless, the work of Schmeller and Stowers leaves little doubt that part of the situation in 1 Cor 1–4 is being influenced by the schools of philosophy. This has led several scholars to attempt to locate the issue in a particular school.

2.3.3 F. Gerald Downing

In “Cynics and Christians,” F. Gerald Downing suggests a background in Cynic thought; he argues that for some early Christians, “the ethical approach of first-century Cynicism afforded a very important model for the selection of preaching and teaching from the available ‘stock.’” He lists several points of similarity between the two: to begin with, in the gospels, John the Baptist and Jesus are presented as haranguing and rebuking groups and individuals. This, he argues, was the normal Cynic style. Whereas “sophists tickled your ears, more academic philosophers confused you with technicalities; Cynics told you off, challenged you to change your life-style.” Again, he suggests, “Whatever else baptism was taken to be, it was a powerful symbolic action. It was from Cynics that a town crowd would expect such public ‘performative’ visual aids.” Further, he notes that “the only temptation story as such that I can find is one Dio makes up, about each one of us being tempted by a spirit of greed, a spirit of ambition, and a spirit of lust. What Jesus is shown here refusing (Luke 4:1–13) a Cynic, too, would try to resist.” Downing argues further that first-century Cynics mostly sound religious, theistic. Thus, “An insistence on allegiance to one’s ‘God’ first and foremost would confirm rather than disturb a first-century listener’s conviction that these followers of Jesus of Nazareth were some kind of Cynic fanatics.” Moreover, “owning little, giving away (or even destroying) what you might own comes high on the Cynic list of priorities.” Finally, he argues, “That the ‘rules for the road’ of the first-century Cynics resemble those of the synoptic Christians is quite widely acknowledged. Such a call involves a break with family and possessions. There is no permission in either Cynicism or this Christianity for half-measures.” However, Downing’s suggestions are incidental at best, as is shown in his conclusion.

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63 Ibid., 586.
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid., 586.
66 Ibid., 587.
67 Ibid., 588.
I am not trying to suggest that the early Christians took many if any actual excerpts from the ethical teaching of the wandering Cynics, to ascribe to Jesus. Much of the Jesus material looks very specifically Palestinian, rather than 'cosmopolitan.' Yet it does seem clear that these early Christians did choose to select from the traditions of Jesus available to them, elements that tallied extensively with contemporary Cynic concerns, pressing similar conclusions, often with very similar illustrations and arguments. At least they must have been content to happen on the coincidences; and they can hardly have been left unaware of them.68

2.3.4 Graham Tomlin

Alternatively, in “Christians and Epicureans in 1 Corinthians,” Graham Tomlin sees Epicurean influence in the various practices and beliefs of the Corinthian church. He suggests that some within the church had adopted many of their principles and attempted to import them uncritically into the church. For example, the denial of the resurrection on the part of some can be traced back to the idea in Epicureanism that resurrection of the body is nonsensical.69 Furthermore, Epicurean teaching on sexuality was conflicting. They taught, on the one hand, that sex can be morally neutral; on the other hand, there is a tradition of sexual asceticism.70 He further cites the fact that Epicureans were seen as atheistic as a possible reason why some on the church had no aversions to eating in idols temples.71 Finally, and most tenuously, he suggests that the high value Epicureans placed on friendship and retirement from public life is a possible cause of the issues over communion. The sense of superiority felt by the elite in relation to the Eucharist could be a result of their seeing the meal along the same lines as a funerary meal to remember the dead founder of the sect.72

Again, these connections are tenuous at best, and Tomlin’s hesitation should be noted.

This is not to say that Epicurean influence explains everything within the church. It is likely that a number of other currents are at work, for example from the mystery religions or from Jewish Christian sources. This is only to be expected in the cultural melting-pot of a city such as

68 Ibid., 590. In favour of a cynic background, see also F. Gerald Downing, “Paul’s Drive for Deviants,” NTS 49, no. 3 (2003): 360–371; F. Gerald Downing, “A Cynic Preparation for Paul’s Gospel for Jew and Greek, Slave and Free, Male and Female,” NTS 42, no. 3 (1996): 454–462; Abraham J. Malherbe, “‘Gentle as a Nurse’: The Cynic Background to I Thess II,” NovT 12, no. 2 (1970): 203–217; David E. Fredrickson, “No Noose is Good News: Leadership as a Theological Problem in the Corinthian Correspondence,” WW 16, no. 4 (1996): 420–426. Although conceding some similarities, Stowers (“Social Status, Public Speaking and Private Teaching,” 80) argues that Paul’s preaching did not resemble that of the Cynic philosophers. He says that “it is very difficult to conceive of Paul teaching the gospel through such methods or to think of him forcing himself on strangers.” He points out that “Even if Paul somehow looked like a Cynic, his purpose was different. The hit-and-run tactics of the Cynic do not fit. Paul sought not to challenge individuals to give up vice, but preached in order to form a community.”

70 Ibid., 64. It seems highly unlikely, however, that in such a small group of believers, both sides of an alternative belief system are represented. It is also unlikely that both of these are simultaneously causing conflict.
71 Ibid., 68.
72 Ibid., 66.
Corinth. It is important not to underestimate the effect of religious syncretism and the degree of overlap between different philosophical schools. It is also true that Epicureans themselves could hold allegiance to other religious movements, such as the mysteries. All of this created an atmosphere of great fluidity of movement, where people could move from one association into another, and where different influences were at play all the time on a small, young, cosmopolitan group such as the Christian church.

While some of these suggestions have merit, if a case is to be made for a particular school, the most consistent correlation between the Corinthians’ thought and Graeco-Roman philosophy seems to be found in Stoicism.

2.3.5 John Fitzgerald

In his 1984 dissertation titled *Cracks in an Earthen Vessel: an Examination of the Catalogues of Hardships in the Corinthian Correspondence*, John Fitzgerald looked at the various suffering catalogues found in 1 and 2 Corinthians against the backdrop of the ideal sage, suggesting that the lists Paul employs resemble the *peristasis* catalogues found in philosophical literature. Although primarily focussed on 2 Corinthians, his study also looks at 1 Cor 4, noting firstly the educational language being employed in 4:6. He argues that the background for the very enigmatic expression “do not go beyond what is written” is to be found in the early stages of a child’s education, where they are first learning to write and trace letters. But by far the most valuable and far-reaching contribution Fitzgerald’s research made to the present discussion is his treatment of the *synkrisis* found in 1 Cor 4:7–13. He demonstrates convincingly that in these verses, Paul makes use of the various traditions about the *sophos*, particularly amongst the Stoics. On the one hand, Paul depicts the Corinthians in terms used to describe the Stoic sage; here they are characterised as rich, kings, wise, and illustrious. On the other hand, the apostles are depicted in the most derogatory terms. This description, Fitzgerald argues, “is not unrelated to the way in which the true sage is depicted

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73 Ibid., 70.
74 Fitzgerald, *Cracks in an Earthen Vessel*, 122–127. This suggestion is important for the present thesis and will be taken up in greater detail below.
75 Ibid., 133–144. Again, Fitzgerald’s work will form an important part of the discussion below; particularly in regard to the terms Paul uses to describe the Corinthians’ perceived status as “wealthy kings.”
76 Ibid., 144. Though to be sure, this was not the first time such a connection was made; Weiss (*Der erste Korintherbrief*, 106–107) noted the Stoic connection to this language many years before; similarly, James Moffatt, *The First Epistle of Paul to the Corinthians*, (MNTE; London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1945), 48–49; Barrett, *The First Epistle to Corinthians*, 109. But, whereas these and other authors only allude to a possible cultural connection, Fitzgerald’s research convincingly grounds the language into a plausible Stoic background. However, the present thesis differs slightly from Fitzgerald’s in that, while Fitzgerald argues that Paul uses these as ironical terms to describe the Corinthians’ inflated self-opinions (cf. pp. 144, 148), it will be argued here, that these were terms some of the Corinthians were using to describe themselves.
in the philosophical traditions … the philosopher was in point of fact often poor and ridiculed.” The importance of this study is that it situates the problems and attitudes in Corinth firmly in an educational/philosophical milieu. Though it is difficult to imagine that Paul would ever present himself as an ideal Stoic sage,78 that he would draw from such examples to describe his role as an apostle of Christ is very plausible.

2.3.6 Terence Paige

In “Stoicism, Ἐλευθερία, and Community at Corinth,” Terence Paige makes the same argument as Fitzgerald in regard to these terms.79 However, he argues further that the “Stoicizing-Christian Corinthians see themselves as wise ones who share all with God and have true insight (γνώσεις) into the universe. They know that an idol—that is, an image—is ‘nothing’ in the cosmos, and that only God exists (1 Cor 8:4; 10:19).”80 Moreover, the disregard in Corinth for the community dimension of their new existence “would likely be fostered by a Stoicizing influence, which would in fact exalt the individual σοφός at the expense of the community.”81 Finally, the discussion of freedom in 1 Cor 9 would be well at home in discussions of the Stoic wise man, who prides himself on his freedom from irrational passions, freedom to choose or reject those things which are in his power, and freedom to live according to nature and to pursue virtue.82

2.3.7 Tim Brookins

Similarly, Tim Brookins has recently argued in “The Wise Corinthians: Their Stoic Education and Outlook,” that the sort of “wisdom” that is driving many of the assertions in 1 Corinthians

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77 Fitzgerald, Cracks in an Earthen Vessel, 145. Fitzgerald argues that the purpose of this catalogue is to specify the ways in which God exhibits Paul. Furthermore, “Its more general functions of exemplification and admonition also coincide with the functions of peristasis catalogues in other authors.” Moreover, the situations in which Paul and other philosophers use them are identical (147).

78 To be sure, Fitzgerald never explicitly states that Paul wants the Corinthians to view him as an ideal sophos, yet his conclusion would possibly suggest it: “Paul’s use of sophos-imagery and peristasis catalogues clearly shows that he is familiar with the traditions about the sage and the means used to depict him. In the Corinthian correspondence he adopts and adapts these traditions for his own purposes and uses them in the ways that have been indicated” (207).

79 Terence Paige, “Stoicism, Ἐλευθερία and Community at Corinth,” in Christianity at Corinth: the Quest for the Pauline Church, ed. by Edward Adams and David G. Horrell (Louisville, Ky: Westminster John Knox, 2004), 211.

80 Ibid., 214.

81 Ibid., 215.

82 Ibid., 217.
has its foundation in Stoicism. He notes from the outset that there “is no a priori reason why all of this language should be rooted in one philosophical system. But if the evidence points that way, there remains no good reason why we should postulate multiple systems.”

In this paper, he cites an inscription which commemorates “Lucius Peticius Propas of Corinth, a Stoic philosopher,” arguing that “Since the inscription dates between A.D. 50 and 100, Lucius’ later life must have coincided precisely with the events related in the Corinthian letters. This Lucius may easily have been a source of Stoicism for the wealthier Corinthians, whether through lectures at the gymnasium or otherwise.”

This becomes the foundation of Brookins’ argument, that is, that Stoic philosophy is at the heart of the Corinthian idea of wisdom. He suggests firstly that “In Greek philosophical discourse, the ‘wise man’ was considered the embodiment of virtue and, thus, the ideal that all people should imitate. Although each major philosophical school of the Hellenistic period had its own conception of the wise man, the idea was most prominent in the Stoics.” Furthermore, he suggests that “The Stoic wise man was said to be ‘perfect’ in judgement because of his unerring use of reason. That is, the wise man was perfect in knowledge, and right knowledge, or right use of reason, led to perfect virtue.”

From this, Brookins suggests that “It seems to be in this connection that the wise Corinthians were calling themselves ‘perfect’ over against the ‘immature’. In fact, several texts indicate that they thought they had arrived at perfect wisdom.”

Again he argues that “Stoic freedom was, in a manner of speaking, the ‘right to live as you wish,’” suggesting that “The Corinthian assertion ‘all things are lawful for me’ finds its closest parallel in a related Stoic formula.”

This becomes the reason for the Corinthians lax attitude in regards to both food and sex. Although lengthy, his conclusion paints a very plausible scenario for the situation in Corinth:

In all this I do not suggest that the wise Corinthians were professional philosophers or uncompromising Stoics. They were also Pauline Christians—if Pauline Christians who had in part misunderstood the Pauline message. John Barclay has argued that the Corinthian church, unlike some other Pauline churches, had friendly relations with outsiders. Given their full integration into their Greco-Roman environment, ‘there was no reason why they could not accept a kind of theological pluralism, which distinguished their views without discounting all others’. In line with Barclay, I propose that the sub-elite/liminal elite contingent of the Corinthian church had received a gymnasium education and, having acquired a moderately technical knowledge of Stoic doctrine there, allowed this to inform their understanding of Paul’s eschatological message. The result was not pure philosophy, but a unique amalgam of Stoic

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84 Ibid., 59.
85 Ibid., 60.
86 Albert V. Garcilazo (The Corinthian Dissenters and the Stoics [New York: Peter Lang, 2007], 32–36) also sees the Stoic wise man as being behind the Corinthians’ preoccupation with wisdom.
88 Ibid., 67; similarly, Garcilazo, The Corinthian Dissenters and the Stoics, 36–45.
philosophy and Christian theology—though without the loss of the content of either. On the one hand, they thought of themselves as ontologically advanced in the manner of the Stoic wise man. Yet on the other hand, their perspective was not wholly philosophical. To the extent that they were enthusiastic about ‘gifts’ (χαρίσματα) and ‘spiritual things’ (πνευμάτικα), they were not philosophers but rather Pauline Christians—though perhaps not yet very good ones. They could claim the ‘perfection’ of the Stoic wise man, even while the Stoics rarely acknowledged the existence of such people, because their understanding of Pauline theology had allowed it. And we find no exact parallel between πνευματικος and ψυκος in ancient literature because this distinction was unique. If the wise Corinthians were Stoic in outlook, they were also ‘spiritual’, in a way that no Stoic ever was. 89

2.3.8 A More General Approach: Robert Dutch

The cumulative weight of these and other similar studies makes a solid case for seeing ancient education as a backdrop to the situation found in 1 Corinthians 1–4. The difficulty is the inadequacy of any one particular rhetorical or philosophical setting to thoroughly explain the overall problem. Clearly there is influence from the schools of oratory and the values found within the rhetorical milieu of the first century; but there are also issues that can only be understood in the worldview of the philosophical schools. Perhaps then, the way forward is to look beyond the particular schools to παιδεία itself. This was the proposal of Robert Dutch in his 1998 dissertation The Educated Elite in 1 Corinthians: Education and Community Conflict in Graeco-Roman Context. 90

Dutch’s study examines the “educated elite” in 1 Corinthians against an ancient education model. He focuses on the omission of the Greek gymnasium from education models employed for interpreting Paul’s letter, highlighting the various routes by which a resident of

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90 Dutch, The Educated Elite in 1 Corinthians.
Corinth, and a Corinthian Christian, may have received a gymnasium education. He rightly argues that such a model “yields a more nuanced interpretation of the educated elite among the Corinthian Christians than previous models have accomplished.” In applying his model to the Corinthian letter, he notes the language of maturity and nursing imagery in 1 Cor 3:1–4, particularly the metaphorical language of milk and solid food. He cites Plutarch, Epictetus, Philo, and Quintilian who also use similar language to describe the various stages of a student’s progress. He then turns to the agricultural imagery of 3:5–9, noting a similar usage of metaphors in Philo and Plutarch. In the ancient world, education was often seen as a process of cultivation, not unlike a farmer’s task. These two sections of his thesis are some of the few that draw primarily on ancient sources to support his case, adding significant weight to his argument. Following this, there is extensive discussion of Paul’s reference to the rod in 4:21. After surveying the various interpretations of this metaphor, he concludes that it is to be understood in the context of education, similar to the discipline administered by the father and the teacher.

Dutch’s insights into these passages are helpful, as is his extensive treatment of the Corinthian gymnasium, which incorporates personal correspondence with the archaeologist James Wiseman. Thus, it forms part of the discussion in the present thesis. However, what is troubling about the development of his educational model is the brevity and nature of sources by which it is done. Dutch states in the outset of the thesis that the model he is developing “is intentionally an ancient education model. By this I attempt to avoid reading, explicitly or implicitly, a modern Western educational system, or philosophy, into the first-century eastern Mediterranean world.” This is correct, such anachronisms must at all costs be avoided. But then he states that “My ancient education model is not a model proposed by an ancient author, such as is set forth in Plato’s Republic … the model I construct is designed to describe an education system used in antiquity. In this I follow the modern social-scientific methodology of constructing models that are appropriate for the NT world.” Then in the brief section where this model is developed, Dutch draws on the recent works of Yun Lee Too, Raffaella...

91 Ibid., 3–5.
92 Ibid., 6.
93 Ibid., 248–254.
94 Ibid., 255–261.
95 Ibid., 261–287. Less convincing is his argument that the grammateus of 1:20 is reference to a type of “secretary” or “clerk” of ephelic education (278–299). As L. L. Welborn (“Review of Robert Dutch, The Educated Elite in 1 Corinthians: Education and Community Conflict in Graeco-Roman Context,” CBQ 68, no. 3 [2006]: 539) points out in his review of Dutch’s work, this “ignores Paul’s careful balance between Jewish and Greek responses to the gospel.” Moreover, Dutch’s treatment of students and writing in 4:6 is simply a restatement and defence of Fitzgerald’s argument (287–295).
97 Ibid., 4. Italics his.
98 Ibid.
Cribiore, and Teresa Morgan.99 It would seem, however, that if one were attempting to develop an ancient education model, it would be necessary to engage primary sources that deal with ancient education. These ancient texts can be helpfully supplemented by secondary sources (e.g., Too, Morgan, Cribiore, which themselves draw on this ancient material), but not replaced by them.

Furthermore, incorporating Plato into a study of first-century παιδεία is crucial. As this thesis will demonstrate, beginning in the very early years of the Empire, there is a deliberate revival of these classical values in both Roman and Greek education. Additionally, there is the simple fact that many of the core values of Greek education remained largely unchanged, even under the Romans. Moreover, although Dutch devotes chapter four to the discussion of family and its role in educating the child, making the point that education was a status determinant, these conclusions are not applied to the most important aspect of the Corinthian problem: Paul’s relationship to the Corinthians and his reminder that he is their father (1 Cor 4:15).100

In other words, although Dutch has made some important observations in regard to a few of the passages in 1 Cor 1–4, much more work is still to be done. What we are dealing with in this section is clearly a clash of values between Paul and some members of the church, and to properly understand these values requires significant engagement with the primary sources that inculcate them. Moreover, to really grasp the significance of Paul’s educational metaphors in 1 Cor 3–4, the investigation must begin in 1 Cor 1–2 (chapters that Dutch overlooks), the very place where these problematic values are being addressed. It is to this task that we now turn.

99 Ibid., 86–90.
100 As Welborn (“Review of Dutch,” 539) has noted, “that Dutch’s conclusions are not more detailed and far-reaching may result from his dependence on the secondary scholarship.” For additional review, see Edward Adams, “Review of Robert Dutch, The Educated Elite in 1 Corinthians: Education and Community Conflict in Graeco-Roman Context,” JSTT 29, no. 2 (2006): 238–241.
I am suggesting in this thesis that at the heart of the conflict in Corinth is a clash of values. That is to say, on the one hand, some of the Corinthians have allowed their understanding of the Christian faith to be influenced by values inculcated through their education and upbringing (i.e., their παιδεία), while on the other hand, Paul is attempting to remind them that the values found in the message of Christ are at odds with these in significant ways. Subsequent chapters will unpack this in detail, but before this can be done, we must first consider the cultural importance and public perception of both Graeco-Roman παιδεία and those who received it.

In this chapter, we will explore the various ways in which the term παιδεία was understood; taking into consideration both epigraphical and literary evidence, it will be shown that, in every way, παιδεία was a process of enculturation. To do this, we will (1) consider the basic term παιδεία in light of its usage in literary texts and honorary inscriptions. Following this, we will (2) look briefly at the gymnasium and the gymnasiarch, showing that these physical representations of education were also given the same public esteem as the παιδεία they represented. In the next section, we will (3) explore the major educational theorists. Beginning with Plato (ca. 424 B.C.E.–348 B.C.E.) and extending up until Quintilian (ca. 35 C.E.–100 C.E.) and Ps-Plutarch (ca. 45 C.E.–120 C.E.), we will see that from classical times to the early Empire, the function of education was to mould and shape a young man into an elite citizen, one who would participate in civic life and one who was characterised by the ethics and values inherent in the broader culture (values which further chapters will explore in depth).

To be sure, this is not a new observation. Werner Jaeger (Archaic Greece, The Mind of Athens, trans. Gilbert Highet, vol. 1, Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture [Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1946], xvi–xvii) noted long ago in regard to Greek παιδεία that “It was not the sum of several abstract ideas; it was Greek history itself, in all its concrete reality. But the facts of Greek history would long ago have sunk into oblivion if the Greeks had not moulded them into a permanent form—the expression of the highest will, of their resistance to change and destiny … it was the creation of a higher type of man. They believed that education embodied the purpose of all human effort. It was, they held, the ultimate justification for the existence of both the individual and the community. At the summit of their development, that was how they interpreted their nature and task.” He suggests that the Greeks were the first to recognise that education means deliberately moulding human character in accordance with an ideal; this type of education, he suggests, deserves the name of “culture.” In ancient thought, the educated person was one whose soul had progressed “towards excellence and the condition proper to humanity;” at the same time, the uneducated person was less rational, less refined, and less humane. The value of education as a symbol of culture and civilisation was so great that some people advertised their education in their epitaphs and others in monumental inscriptions. See Edward Jay Watts, City and School in Late Antique Athens and Alexandria (California: University of California Press, 2006), 5–6.
3.1 Παιδεία: Culture and Ethics

Παιδεία typically denoted the process of ancient education. It was the means by which a child was trained and developed to be a cultured citizen. Because παιδεία was a process of citizen development, it was also understood in terms of “culture.”² It was both the way of education and cultivation that must be undertaken and also the goal which is to be attained.³ Plato says that “a sound nurture (τροφή) and education (παιδεία) if kept up creates good natures in the state, and sound natures in turn receiving an education (παιδεία) of this sort develop into better men than their predecessors” (Resp. 424A).⁴ In Antiphon’s (ca. 480 B.C.E.–411 B.C.E.) Tetralogy 2, a youth is being prosecuted for accidental homicide after throwing a javelin and killing a boy who ran into the weapon’s path. In the boy’s defence, his father says, “I thought that, by educating my son in those subjects which especially benefit the state, both the state and I would be rewarded” (Tetr. 3.2.3).⁵ Aeschines (ca. 389 B.C.E.–314 B.C.E.), in his Against Timarchus, notes that the laws concerning education and training (such as opening and closing times of schools, at what age children should start to attend school, and the provision of public officials and slave attendants who will ensure the safety of the pupil) proved that the lawgiver believed that it was the boy who has been well brought up that would be a useful citizen when he became a man.⁶

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² The implications (of παιδεία) are not just men educated.” See Graham Anderson, The Second Sophistic (London: Routledge, 1993), 8. Aristotle (Eth. Eud. 1.1214B) says, “Everybody able to live according to his own purposive choice should set before him some object for noble living to aim at—either honour or else glory or wealth or culture (παιδεία)—on which he will keep his eyes fixed in all his conduct.” He goes on to point out that it is a mark of much folly not to have one’s life regulated with regard to some end; cf. Isocrates, Demon, 33. In fact, it could be easily said that to be “uneducated” was the equivalent of being “uncultured.” The goal of education was to teach the citizen how to behave and how he to expect others to behave towards them. See J osiah Ober, “The Debate Over Civic Education in Classical Athens,” in Education in Greek and Roman Antiquity, ed. by Yun Lee Too (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 175. Regarding the compulsory nature of education in classical and Hellenistic times, Peter Schmitter (“Compulsory Schooling at Athens and Rome: A Contribution to the History of Hellenistic Education,” AJP 96, no. 3 [1975]: 289) argues that it is uncertain whether or not it was in fact compulsory, but given that its various disciplines were considered skills necessary for living, it would have been strongly encouraged.


⁴ It also had the connotation of “upbringing.” See Bertram, “παιδέω, παιδεία, κτλ.,” 596. In his For Polystratus (20.11), Lysias is defending his father, who has been accused of association with a certain Phrynichus in regards to particular charges, to which Lysias responds by saying, “There was kinship with Phrynichus, but their accusation was a lie. Nor, indeed, was he a friend of his by upbringing (παιδεία).” Similarly, Euripides (Iph. Taur. 205) tells the story of Iphigenia, who reflects on her childhood, saying, “From the beginning my fate was unhappy, from that first night of my mother’s marriage; from the beginning the Fates attendant on my birth directed a hard upbringing (παιδεία) for me.”

⁵ For this translation, see Stephen G. Miller, Arete: Ancient Writers, Papyri, and Inscriptions on the History and Ideals of Greek Athletics and Games (Chicago: Ares, 1979), 72.

⁶ Aeschines, Tim. 1.11.
Παϊδεία was also something for which a person could be esteemed. In a eulogy for Leosthenes and his comrades who had fallen in the Lamian war, Hyperides (ca. 390 B.C.E.–322 B.C.E.), in considering what specifically to praise them for, asks, “Am I then to touch upon their education (παϊδεία), and, as other speakers often do, remind you how as children they were reared and trained in strict self-discipline?” (6.8) This, however, seems too obvious a thing to commend since, “none of us, I think, is unaware that our aim in training children is to convert them into valiant men; and that men who have proved of exceptional courage in war were well brought up in childhood needs no stressing” (6.8). In all, education was the process by which honourable character was produced. Isocrates (436 B.C.E.–338 B.C.E.), in his speech To Demonicus, sets out to counsel Demonicus on the objects to which he should aspire and from what actions he should abstain. He begins by saying, “I deem it fitting that those who strive for distinction and are ambitious for education should emulate the good and not the bad” (Demon. 2). Pointing to Demonicus’ own father as his first example, he says, “You will have from your own house a noble illustration of what I am telling you;” going on to list his many virtues, he concludes by encouraging him to strive to emulate his father’s virtue, “for it were a shame, when painters represent the beautiful among animals, for children not to imitate the noble among their ancestors” (Demon. 9–11). Following this, he then sets out for Demonicus various maxims, since he believes it is the nature of the soul to be developed by moral precepts. While space does not permit a comprehensive list of the many maxims he provides, two are of significance to the present task. In the first he says, “Consider culture (παϊδεία) to be a good so far superior to the lack of culture” (Ἀπαϊδευσία, Demon. 33). This is informative in its use of παϊδεία to refer to general acculturation. In the second he says

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<td>7</td>
<td>Isocrates, Demon. 5. For discussion of the legal nature of παϊδεία, see Yun Lee Too, “Legal Instruction in Classical Athens,” in Education in Greek and Roman Antiquity, ed. by Yun Lee Too (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 122.</td>
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<td>Isocrates, Demon. 12.</td>
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lessons they have taught.⁹ “For just as we see the bee settling on all the flowers, and sipping the best from each, so also those who aspire to culture (παιδεία) ought not to leave anything untasted, but should gather useful knowledge from every source” (Demon. 52).¹⁰ We can see then, that Παιδεία denoted much more than education; it was, rather, the process of civic enculturation.

3.1.1 Παιδεία amongst the Virtues in Inscriptions

We can see then, that a person who was educated was also considered cultured. So it is not surprising that παιδεία is often listed amongst their virtues, often in combination with σοφία, ἀρετή, σωφροσύνη, and καλοκάγαθία.¹¹

3.1.1.1 Inscriptions from the Peloponnese

Looking first in the Peloponnese, we see several statue bases honouring people on account of their παιδεία. The first is from Calamae (Roman Period), erected by decree of the polis of Lacedaemonia and funded by his parents and brother, honours a Lacedaemonian by the name of Junius, the son of Chariteles, who has settled in Calamae; he is honoured on account of the piety of his ancestors and also his σωφροσύνη as well as his παιδεία.¹² Another statue base from Olympia (late 1st–early 2nd century C.E.), erected by the boulē and demos and funded by his mother Iulia Hapla, honours Publius Memmius Philodamos on account of his ἀρετή, σωφροσύνη, and παιδεία.¹³ Again, a statue base (ca. 140 C.E.) set up near the theatre in Sparta, funded by P. Ulpius Pyrrhus, a leading figure in Sparta, honours the “remarkable” (άξιολογώτατος) Tiberius Claudius Montanus, who was a citizen of both Trapezous and Sparta, on account of his παιδεία and σωφροσύνη.¹⁴ Still in Sparta, another statue base,

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⁹ Isocrates, Demon. 51.
¹⁰ Plutarch (Rect. rat. aud. 41F–42B) uses this same analogy in philosophical education, suggesting that students, when listening to lectures, should concentrate on taking from them the fruits of the lecture, drawing only what is useful and profitable.
¹¹ As we will see throughout this thesis, ethical terms such as ἀρετή, σωφροσύνη, and καλοκάγαθία had strong connections to παιδεία.
¹² IG V,1 1369. For discussion of his family, see Alfred S. Bradford, A Prosopography of Lacedaemonians from the Death of Alexander the Great (Munich: Beck, 1977), 451.
¹³ Iv0 470.
¹⁴ IG V,1 504. For discussion of Tiberius, see Bradford, A Prosopography of Lacedaemonians from the Death of Alexander the Great, 284. Publius Ulpius Pyrrhus held the position of high priest of Augustus, was a president of the joint administration (πρέσβεως συναρχίας), and was honoured as agoranomos for life; for his own inscription, see IG V,1 503.
erected by the *polis* and funded by his children, honours Nymphodotos Xenophon on account of his propriety and his *παιδεία*.*\(^{15}\)

### 3.1.1.2 Inscriptions from Elsewhere

This same practice also took place in other cities. A statue base from Aphrodisias (1st century B.C.E. or C.E.), set up by the *boulē, demos, gerousia* and the young men (*νεόι*) and funded by his family, posthumously honours a youth named Lykidas Zenon “with the finest honours,” who “lived in” (*ζήσαντα ἑν* *παιδεία*, with elegance and virtue.\(^{16}\) Again in Aphrodisias, an honorary inscription for a city benefactor named Artemon Andronos (1st century B.C.E. or C.E.), praises him for living honourably and temperately (*ζήσαντα καλῶς καὶ σωφρόνως*) as well as honouring his ἀρετή, καλοκάγαθία, φιλομαθία, and *παιδεία*. For his many great benefactions, he was awarded the gold crown.\(^{17}\) An inscription from Ephesus (2nd century C.E.), erected under the supervision of his friend L(ucius) Gerellanus Rufus Salvianus, honours Cn(aeus) Pompeius Quartinus, who had served as the *grammateus* of the *demos*, on account of his ἀρετή, favours (*ἐνυνοία*), and the reputation (*δόξα*) of his *παιδεία*.\(^{18}\)

Reference to the honorand’s *παιδεία* amongst their virtues leaves little doubt that it was something highly esteemed and an important characteristic to possess. In fact, Kleijwegt has suggested that the function of mentioning *παιδεία* in inscriptions is to show that “the person belonged to a particularly prominent group in society. Like benefactions are used to emphasise the superiority of one group over another, so education is stressed to distinguish a person from the mass of illiterate ‘boors.’”\(^{19}\)

### 3.1.1.3 Σοφία in Inscriptions

The term *σοφία* was used in similar ways. An honorary inscription erected by Tauromenion in Rome (ca. 2nd century C.E.), honours Iallia Bassias on account of ἀρετή, σωφροσύνη, and

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\(^{15}\) IG V,1 466. These four statue bases are representative of what Anthony Spawforth (“Families at Roman Sparta and Epidaurus: Some Prosopographical Notes,” *ABSA* 80 [1985]: 192) notes, was an increasing trend amongst the elite (particularly in Sparta) whereby public statues were funded by the family of the honorand.

\(^{16}\) Aphrodisias, 503.

\(^{17}\) Aphrodisias, 241.

\(^{18}\) Ephesos, 1489. A fragment of a herm from Athens, possibly an honorary epigram, has the phrase “δόξα παιδείας πέρι” (SEG 30:181). For similar examples, see IG V,1 525, 563, 607. For a similar type of inscription and discussion, see G. H. R. Horsley, ed., *New Documents Illustrating Early Christianity*, vol. 4 (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1987), 32.

\(^{19}\) Kleijwegt, *Ancient Youth*, 86.
In a fragmentary inscription from Athens, we see the phrase “on account of σωφροσύνη, ἀρετή and σοφία.”20 Another fragmentary epigraph from Sikelia honours an unnamed person for their ἀρετή and σοφία.21 In other words, σοφία, like παιδεία, was itself a noteworthy characteristic and something to esteem in honorary inscriptions. Moreover, the public accessibility and general consumption of an inscriptions’ content would suggest that these were commonly known and esteemed values.22 However, four inscriptions in particular are insightful for our purposes.

3.1.1.4 Four Key Inscriptions

The first is a set of inscriptions found outside the library of Celsus in Ephesus (ca. 135 C.E.). Funded by Gaius Julius Aquila, the library was built in honour of his father, the Roman Senator Tiberius Julius Celsus Polemaeanus. Decorating the façade of the building are four inscriptions: σοφία, ἀρετή, ἔννοια, and ἐπιστήμη; and above each of these is a statue personifying the particular term.24 The significance of this is two-fold. First, while we would expect to see terms like “intellect,” “understanding,” and “wisdom” (ἔννοια, ἐπιστήμη, and σοφία) in the context of παιδεία, it is noteworthy that, given our discussion above, we also see ἀρετή. Second, above each of these inscriptions is a sculptured image of the particular term. Yun Lee Too has shown that ancient libraries were frequently decorated with this kind of physical art “to the extent that libraries resembled art galleries.”25 She notes that one of the common features of the ancient library was statues of authors that were placed there as a means of bringing the author’s presence into the room, in a way that would speak to the reader and form continuity between past and present.26 These kinds of statues served many functions, one of the most important being to act as an incentive for the viewer to become like

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20 IG XIV 1091; similarly, see IG II2 4251.
21 IG II2 13086.
22 SEG 52:904; similarly, see IG XIV 1295.
23 For discussion of general consumption of honorific inscriptions by the broader population, see James R. Harrison, Paul’s Language of Grace in its Graeco-Roman Context, (WUNT 172; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003), 27–28.
24 For archaeological details of the library of Celsus, see Homer F. Pfeiffer, “The Roman Library at Timgad,” MAAR 9 (1931): 157–165; for similary discussion, see T. Keith Dix, “Pliny’s Library at Comum,” LC 31, no. 1 (1996): 85–102. I would like to thank Bruce Winter for drawing my attention to this while on a trip to Ephesus.
25 Yun Lee Too, The Idea of the Library in the Ancient World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 191. The Roman library, in particular, was designed to be an impressive place for passers-by and for users.
26 Ibid., 200. Statues of the donor could also be found as a way of honouring the library’s benefactor, or in the case of the library of Celsus, his father. This seems to be part of the function of these inscriptions, as we see with the terms ἀρετή, ἐπιστήμη, and σοφία the genitive Κέλσου (“of Celsus”), and with ἔννοια, the genitive Φιλιπποῦ.
the represented subject; that is, “viewing an image of a wise and moral man [or, in our case, the characteristics themselves] is a protreptic, a call, to wisdom and virtue.”27 We might imagine then, a passer-by in Ephesus seeing these images in the context of literature and learning, and making the logical connection between intellect, wisdom, and virtue; or for those who might venture inside to use the library’s resources, the reminder that learning is equated with, and produces character.

Our second inscription is a lengthy decree from Aphrodisias (ca. 127 C.E.) inscribed on a marble block that honours the poet Gaius Julius Longianos with the following:

[The Council and people? of Halicarnassus honoured C. Julius Longianos since he had benefited them ...] and by the rest of his visit, and he also honoured and adorned us, and gave demonstrations of poems of every kind, by which he both delighted the older and improved the younger, and, pleased at all this, the People instructed that the appropriate honours be voted to him; it has been resolved that Gaius Julius Longianos function as a citizen among us without payment, being both a good man, and the best poet of our times, and be honoured with the other grants of citizenship and honours, the greatest that the laws permit, and with bronze statues which are to be put up both in the most notable places of the city and in the precinct of the Muses and in the gymnasion of the ephebes next to the ancient Herodotus; it has also been voted that there should be public presentation of his books in the libraries in our city, so that the young men may be educated in these also, in the same way as in the writings of the ancients; and, so that our goodwill and enthusiasm for their citizen should become clear to the People of our kinsfolk, the Aphrodisians, it has been resolved that a copy of this decree should be sent, by the hand of Julius himself, to the Aphrodisians, signed with the public seal, from which they too will learn both the way in which we regularly behave towards all educated men (πεπαιδευμένοι), and the honours with which we have honoured (Longianus) as someone quite outstanding. (Roueché, PPAphr 88)28

Here we see the great fame that could be achieved by and the potential honours given to literary men. Longianos is honoured as one who delighted the old with his literary displays and was also an educator to the young. As a result, he is given citizenship in Aphrodisias and bronze statues to be erected in the most prominent locations, including the gymnasion. More significantly perhaps, his works are to be presented publicly in the library so that they can be taught to the young men, presumably alongside Homer and the like. Such honours, it is said, will also serve to demonstrate how the city of Aphrodisias treats all educated men; that is, with the highest honours the law permits.

Our third inscription is similar. An imperial period statue base from Iasos honours Aulus Mussius Aper with the following:

27 Ibid., 203.
The people (honour) Aulus Mussius Aper (for his) noble birth and foremost reputation and loftiness of heritage, on account of both (his) superior excellence of ethos (τὴν τῶν ἴθῶν αμείμπτων ἀρετήν) and (his) most artful and incomparable genius in rhetoric and poetry and the rest of all wisdom (τὴν ἐν ῥητορικὴν καὶ τῇ λοιπῇ πάσῃ σοφίᾳ ποικιλωτάτην καὶ ἀσύκριτων μεγαλοφυείαν). (Iasos 240)

Here again we see honours given to an educated man, who is obviously an orator and a poet, on account of his ἀρετή and σοφία.

Our fourth inscription is a statue base found in Olympia. Decreed by the boulē of Elis and dating to the mid–late first century C.E., it is dedicated to a certain Lucius Peticius Propas of Corinth, who is apparently a Stoic Philosopher (φιλόσοφον Στωικὸν Κορίνθιον); funded by his mother Occia Prisca, it honours him on account of his παιδεία and σοφία.29 Unfortunately, nothing more is known of this man, however, it is of significance that in mid-first century Corinth such men were being produced, and moreover, that the same men were being honoured in surrounding cities.

What we see from these four inscriptions are the honours that could be received by those who embodied and demonstrated παιδεία—in addition to the wealth and status typical of honorands. This would no doubt be engrained in the worldview of both high and low status people, including the Corinthian Christians.

3.1.2 Παιδεία as a Virtue in Literary Sources

Turning to the literary evidence, we can see the same connections between education and virtue. Seneca says that “If a man has brought his reason to perfection, he is praiseworthy and has reached the end suited to his nature. This perfect reason is called virtue, and is likewise that which is honourable” (Ep. 76.6–10).30 Furthermore, he says that the happy life is completely dependent on our attainment of perfect reason.31 Ps.-Plutarch says, “The beginning, the middle, and end in all these matters is good education and proper training; and it is this, I say, which leads on and helps towards moral excellence (ἀρετή) and towards happiness (εὐδαιμονία, Lib. ed. 5C–D). In regard to παιδεία, Ps.-Plutarch says explicitly that

29 Ivo 453. For discussion of the inscription and possible connections to the church, see Brookins, “The Wise Corinthians.” We will discuss this further in section 5.2.

30 Similarly, 37.3–4; 124.9–12.

31 Seneca, Ep. 92.2; similarly, Epictetus, Diatr. 1.1.1–8. For discussion of this idea in Seneca, see Brad Inwood, Reading Seneca: Stoic Philosophy at Rome (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 249–270.

32 I follow the majority of scholars who see On the Education of Children as pseudonymous; hence all references to this work will be with: Ps.-Plutarch. For discussion, see Whitmarsh, Greek Literature and the Roman Empire, 49; Robert Lamberton, Plutarch (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), 45; Edmund Berry, “The De Liberis Educandis of Pseudo-Plutarch,” HSCP 63 (1958): 387–399.
education (παιδεία) is the source and root of all goodness (καλοκαγαθία). The Cynic Ps.-Crates says, “If you want your sons to be good men and not bad, send them, not to the country, but to a philosopher’s school, where we too went to learn the fine things of life. For virtue (ἀρετή) is something acquired by practice and does not spontaneously enter the soul as evil does” (Epistle 12, 3–8). Similarly, education, according to Diogenes Laertius (ca. 3rd century C.E.), is a “controlling grace” (σωφροσύνη) to the young. Epictetus (55 C.E.–135 C.E.) says that his purpose in educating is “to make of you a perfect work, secure against restraint, compulsion, and hindrance, free, prosperous, happy, looking to God in everything small and great” (Diatr. 2.19.29). Dio Chrysostom (ca. 40 C.E.–120 C.E.), in speaking of the Trojans, says that because luxury and insolence came amongst them, they thought they had no need of culture (παιδεία) and sobriety (σωφροσύνη); as a result, they became by far the most unfortunate of all men.

3.1.2.1 Education and the Divine

The result of education was, at least for some thinkers, that it assimilated a person, at a metaphorical level, with the divine. Seneca, as a Stoic, thinks that philosophy makes (or can make), a man as joyful and calm as the gods. He says, “For that is exactly what philosophy promises to me, that I shall be made equal to God. For this I have been summoned, for this purpose have I come. Philosophy, keep your promise!” (Ep. 48.11) The wise man, according to Seneca, is joyful, happy and calm, unshaken; he lives on a plane with the gods. Dio sees the characteristics of an educated person in similar terms to the divine.

Virtually everyone praises and refers to as ‘divine’ and ‘august’ such things as valour (άνδρεία) and righteousness (δικαιοσύνη) and wisdom (φρόνησις) and, in short, every virtue (ἀρετή) …

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33 Plutarch, Lib. ed. 4C.
34 Diogenes Laertius, Lives, 6.2.68.
35 Ἀποτελέσαι ὑμᾶς ἀκαλύπτως, ἀναναγκάσως, ἀπαραπόδιστως, ἠλευθέρως, ἐνεργεύοντας, εὐδαιμονεύοντας, εἰς τὸν θεὸν ἄφοροντος ἐν παντί καὶ μικρῷ καὶ μεγάλῳ.
36 Dio, Or. 33.22. The connection of παιδεία with other ethical terms is found in an interesting example; Theophrastus is said to have written a book on education that went under the synonymous titles Of Education or Of the Virtues or Of Temperance (περὶ παιδείας ἢ περὶ αρετῶν ἢ περὶ σωφροσύνης, Diogenes Laertius, Lives, 5.2.50).
37 cf. Plutarch, Lib. ed. 5C–D. The idea of linking outstanding political virtue with divinity goes back at least as far as Aristotle (Pol. 1284A), who said, “If there is any one man so greatly distinguished in outstanding virtue (ἀρετή), or more than one but not enough to be able to make up a complete state, so that the virtue of all the rest and their political ability is not comparable with that of the men mentioned, if they are several, or if one, with his alone, it is no longer proper to count these exceptional men a part of the state; for they will be treated unjustly if deemed worthy of equal status, being so widely unequal in virtue and in their political ability: since such a man will naturally be as a god among men.”
anyone believed to be, or to have been, characterized by such virtues, or nearly so, they admire and celebrate in song … all are ready to obey and to serve, no matter what orders he may give, and they are ready to appoint as their king and ruler and to make the guardian of their possessions any man whom they suppose to be really prudent (σοφος) and righteous (δικαιος) and wise (φρονιμως) and, in a word, a good man (ανηρ ογισθος). (Or 69.1)

In syllogistic fashion, Diogenes Laertius suggests that the wise man shares all things with the gods. “All things belong to the gods. The gods are friends (φιλοι) to the wise (σοφοι), and friends share all property in common; therefore all things are the property of the wise” (Lives, 6.72). Quintilian makes the clear assertion that the perfect orator is “a man sent by heaven to be the blessing of mankind, one to whom all history can find no parallel, uniquely perfect in every detail and utterly noble alike in thought and speech” (Inst. 12.1.25).³⁹ Ps.-Crates tells his students to practice being in need of only a few things, for this is the closest thing to God.⁴⁰

Even in popular culture, proverbs like “all things come to the wise,” or gnomic sayings like “wisdom (φρονησις) is the greatest good always,” were very common.⁴¹ In fact, one of the most prominent of all virtues in stories and sayings is wisdom or intelligence.⁴²

3.1.3 A Case Study from the Peloponnese

Titus Statilius Lamprias, who died at the age of 18 in ca. 40-50 C.E., was a member of a wealthy and well-known family in Epidaurus.⁴³ Both of his parents, T. Statilius Timocrates and Statilia Timosthenis, as well as his paternal grandfather, T. Statilius Lamprias, are mentioned in various honorific inscriptions as public office holders and benefactors.⁴⁴ The untimely death of Lamprias came as a significant blow to not only the parents (as he was their only son), but also the surrounding cities of the Peloponnese. His death is attested to in two conciliatory decrees from Sparta and Athens, both inscribed on statue bases. In the Spartan

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³⁹ Quintilian, Inst. 12.1.25.
⁴⁰ Crates, Epistle, 11.1–2.
⁴¹ “All things come to the wise,” cited in Teresa Jean Morgan, Popular Morality in the Early Roman Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 43. “Wisdom (φρονησις) is the greatest good always,” cited in Ibid., 102.
⁴² Morgan, Popular Morality in the Early Roman Empire, 168. In the same conclusion she also makes a very interesting observation regarding wisdom; she notes that “the aims of wisdom, as sayings and stories describe them, are highly unusual and quite different from those of most other virtues. Far from being a social or problem solving virtue, wisdom in our texts is an embattled and lonely quality, typically individualistic and self-interested, rarely acting on behalf of others. Wisdom establishes another cognitive dissonance at the heart of popular morality. Because it regularly puts individual goodness above the good of the community, it is constantly in danger of creating as much danger as it avoids or solves.”
⁴³ For full discussion of his family, see Spawforth, “Families at Roman Sparta and Epidaurus,” 248–258.
⁴⁴ Cf. father: IG IV² 1,80-81; 1,665; 1,670; mother: Peek, 1972, 32, no. 51; IG IV² 1,604; grandfather: IG IV² 1,665; 1,674; 1,672.
decree, he is praised for his \( \pi \alpha \iota \delta \varepsilon \iota \alpha \), \( \sigma \omega \phi \rho \omicron \omicron \upsilon \eta \), \( \delta \varepsilon \varsigma \omicron \tau \tau \varsigma \), and \( \varsigma \nu \nu \varepsilon \varsigma \varsigma \);\textsuperscript{45} this decree also provides for a bronze statue to be erected in the Spartan gymnasium and two portraits in the agoras of Sparta and Epidaurus.\textsuperscript{46} The Athenian decree, the initiative for which came from his relative and member of the Areopagus, Timosthenes son of Callistomachus, provides for a statue on the Acropolis and in the \textit{telesterion} at Eleusis.\textsuperscript{47} Additionally, he is honoured with several statues, one of which is dedicated by the people and the council of Corinth on account of his \( \dot{\alpha} \rho \varepsilon \tau \tau \iota \iota \).\textsuperscript{48} In fact, Spawforth has estimated that Lamprias had at least 11 statues or portraits in 4 different localities: Athens, Sparta, Epidaurus, and Eleusis.\textsuperscript{49} Lamprias then, is illustrative of the value placed on \( \pi \alpha \iota \delta \varepsilon \iota \alpha \) as a virtue in the Graeco-Roman world. We would assume that he had not quite completed his education, or, if he had, it was very recently; but he certainly had not yet lived long enough to begin to establish his public career and reputation. Yet throughout some of the major cities of the Peloponnese, including Corinth, he is honoured simply on account of his culture (\( \pi \alpha \iota \delta \varepsilon \iota \alpha \)), intellect (\( \varsigma \nu \nu \varepsilon \varsigma \varsigma \)), and character (\( \sigma \omega \phi \rho \omicron \omicron \upsilon \eta \), \( \delta \varepsilon \varsigma \omicron \tau \tau \varsigma \), and \( \dot{\alpha} \rho \varepsilon \tau \tau \iota \iota \)), and this, moreover, in prominent locations, including the Athenian acropolis, the Spartan and Epidaurian agora, and Spartan gymnasium.

3.1.4 Summary

In summary, \( \pi \alpha \iota \delta \varepsilon \iota \alpha \), like other virtues, was something to be honoured and those who possessed it were assumed to be people of virtue and good character (i.e., people worthy of praise). Moreover, because education was understood as the means of developing \( \sigma \phi \omicron \iota \alpha \) and \( \dot{\alpha} \rho \varepsilon \tau \tau \iota \iota \), only the educated person was seen to be capable of holding a public office (i.e., positions of authority) since only they were truly cultured.\textsuperscript{50} But \( \pi \alpha \iota \delta \varepsilon \iota \alpha \) was not simply the means to the end of leadership positions, whereby honours are achieved for public service; as we have seen, a person could receive honours simply for their possession of or their display of skills in \( \pi \alpha \iota \delta \varepsilon \iota \alpha \). In other words, \( \pi \alpha \iota \delta \varepsilon \iota \alpha \) was the foundation of elite civic life and the distinguishing characteristic between those who were honoured and the rest. This meant that one of the most important features of any Greek city was the “schoolhouse,” that is, the gymnasium.

\textsuperscript{45} Cf. Peek, Asklepieion, 36; he has re-edited the original translation of IG IV\textsuperscript{2} 1,86 to include \( \pi \alpha \iota \delta \varepsilon \iota \alpha \).
\textsuperscript{46} Cf. IG IV\textsuperscript{2} 1,86; as Peek, Asklepieion, 36 does not contain this final section of the inscription.
\textsuperscript{47} IG IV\textsuperscript{2} 1,83.
\textsuperscript{48} IG IV\textsuperscript{2} 1,676; similarly, see IG IV\textsuperscript{2} 1,677; 1,679; 1,681.
\textsuperscript{49} Spawforth, “Families at Roman Sparta and Epidaurus,” 252–253.
\textsuperscript{50} This will be discussed further in chapter 7.
3.2 The Gymnasium of Virtue

In almost every Hellenistic city there was at least one gymnasium, and attached to this, a *palaestra*. These were the centres of Greek education and athletic training; moreover, they were where elite youth were developed into citizens. Corinth was no exception in that it had a large gymnasium that has been dated (at the earliest) to the mid-first century C.E. The importance of the Corinthian gymnasium as a public location is noted by Vanderpool, who says that “throughout the history of Roman Corinth the favoured locations for public display of private citizens were the South Stoa and Central Shops, including the Bema, and the Lechaeum Road; also of importance were areas such as the Gymnasium and the Theatre.”

The gymnasium complex, including the *palaestra* and the gymnasium itself, was something like an ancient “school-house,” a place where body and mind were trained. Within the *palaestra* there was usually a library as well as an *exedra*, a space dedicated specifically to lectures and literary training. This *exedra* was where the *ephebes* would listen to lectures from various orators, grammarians, or philosophers.

A gymnasium would typically be staffed with athletic trainers, but could also have permanent literary and musical teaching staff attached to it. Funding of these teachers was considered to be an important benefaction. The cultural importance of the *palaestra* is most clearly demonstrated through numerous depictions of its activities in Greek vase-paintings. Many of these portray the daily running of the facility, with images of young men clearing rocks from the track or turning up the ground with a pick; others show boys oiling and scraping themselves, and others still, with boys simply conversing with one another or with

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51 It is not within the purview of this thesis to discuss the athletic and military side of gymnasium education; for discussion of this in regards to Paul’s athletic imagery in 1 Corinthians 9:24–27, see Dutch, The Educated Elite in 1 Corinthians, 219–248; Edgar Krentz, “Paul, Games, and the Military,” in Paul in the Greco-Roman World, ed. by J. Paul Sampley (Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press, 2003), 344–383.


53 Catherine de Grazia Vanderpool, “Roman Portraiture: The Many Faces of Corinth,” Corinth 20 (2003): 372. Dutch (The Educated Elite in 1 Corinthians, 130–138) has discussed at length the archaeological evidence for the Corinthian gymnasium; he notes from personal correspondence to Wiseman a large *exedra* within the grounds.

54 Cf. Miller, Ancient Greek Athletics, 176–179.

55 Cf. König, Athletics and Literature in the Roman Empire, 50.

56 Two decrees give honour to certain men who have put up funding to hire gymnasium staff. The first is from Miletus (second century B.C.E.) and honours Eudemus son of Thallion, who, in order to “perpetuate for all time the memory of his own love of glory,” gave to the education of free children ten talents of silver. In order to “make manifest the favourable disposition of the people and the love of glory” displayed by Eudemus, a copy of the decree was set up in the *palaestra* and the temple sanctuary of Apollo Delphinus (Austin, The Hellenistic World from Alexander to the Roman Conquest, 257–259). The second is from Teos (second century B.C.E.) and honours Polythrus son of Onesimus, who, wishing to establish a most fair memorial of his own love of glory, donated 34,000 drachmas so that all the free children might be educated (Ibid., 260).
their teachers and trainers. The fact that even such day-to-day activities are so prominently displayed in the general culture testifies to the importance these activities (i.e., education) had in the view of the citizens.

The gymnasion complex was also the place to find travelling teachers. These might be visiting a city and might be invited to offer lectures in the gymnasium to students or could use the facilities to hold public talks. Others still, as in the case of Ps.-Diogenes, might simply visit the gymnasium just to see what is happening. In a letter to a friend, he recounts a time when he was in Miletus and saw in the young man’s gymnasium a young lad who was not playing ball properly. He proceeded to rebuke the superintendent of the wrestling school (παλαιστροφύλαξ) for allowing this to happen. After this, he removed his cloak and oiled himself and then stood in the palaestra. It was not long before a young man, who was “following the local custom,” came to challenge him in a wrestling match. In other words, the gymnasium complex was one of the most important features of any city; König notes that

The gymnasium is represented as an institution of great public importance, mimicking the structures of civic life, but also in many ways as a self-enclosed institution, with its own distinctive rules and rituals, preparing young men for the military disciplines of the outside world, but also providing them with an independent arena in which to exercise those disciplines.

Its athletic facilities, combined with, among other things, its spaciousness to hold public feasts in its grounds, as well as its hosting public lectures, meant that it possessed a versatility that could serve various educational and recreational purposes.

Amongst the variety of citizens who took advantage of the gymnasium, one of the most well known is the group of young men called the ephebes. Originally set up as a two-year training program for all Greek boys to receive military training and to act as border patrol around the city, the ephebeia had, by the imperial period, become an exclusive form of

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58 Ibid., plate 31–41.
59 Cf. König, Athletics and Literature in the Roman Empire, 49.
60 Diogenes, Epistle 35, 1–31. This challenge by the student is possibly indicative of an assumption that a philosopher, by virtue of his education, was also a capable athlete. Certainly though, we see in this example both the athletic nature of the palaestra in connection with the freedom of travelling teachers to come and go in the gymnasium at will.
61 König, Athletics and Literature in the Roman Empire, 53.
athletic, military, and literary, citizen training for elite young men on the verge of manhood. By way of recognition, every year’s group was recorded in an inscription. These publicly displayed lists of each year’s class brought to the *ephebeia* a certain level of prestige; added to this prestige, was the fact that it had come to be expected that the *ephebeia* prepared the young men to play a leading role in the local community. As Kleijwegt notes, “the *ephebeia* was an aristocratic institution deploying activities which introduced the ephebes into the world of citizens (=adults).”

In short, the gymnasium was, in some ways, the symbol of παιδεία; its facilities, staff, and members were all part of the formation of elite citizens, which meant that at its head needed to be a person who clearly embodied these values; this was the *gymnasiarch*.

### 3.2.1 The Gymnasiarch as an Ethical Exemplum

In charge of the gymnasium complex, its staff and students, and the daily running of the institution was the annually elected *gymnasiarch*. Given the importance of παιδεία and the gymnasium in regard to citizen development, it comes as no surprise that holding the gymnasiarchy was viewed as one of the most important benefactions an individual could perform. The *gymnasiarch* had a financially burdensome role. The most well known responsibility was the provision of oil for the athletes. But additionally, they could also fund the salary of teachers, the prizes for contests, or provide necessary equipment for the complex. They could even combine this role with that of the *agonothete*, which would involve holding banquets for large numbers during festival periods and providing prizes for games. He or she also had the responsibility for the morals and the behaviour of those who attended the gymnasium. A second-century B.C.E. inscription from Borea offers insight into

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64 König, *Athletics and Literature in the Roman Empire*, 59.

65 Kleijwegt, *Ancient Youth*, 101. Nigel M. Kennell (“Citizen Training Systems in the Roman Peloponnese,” in *Society, Economy, and Culture under the Roman Empire: Continuity and Innovation*, ed. by A. D. Rizakis and C. L. Lepenioti, vol. 3, *Roman Peloponnese* [Athens: Research Institute for Greek and Roman Antiquity, 2010], 215) has brought together significant inscriptive evidence for the *ephebeia* in the Peloponnese, particularly in Messene and Sparta; however, apart from Epictetus’ generic reference, no evidence has yet been found for a citizen training system in Corinth. Kennell notes, however, “Corinth’s well-known lack of inscriptions and the ubiquity of ephebates throughout the Greek world should however caution us against excluding the possibility of a citizen training system there during the Roman period.”


68 König, *Athletics and Literature in the Roman Empire*, 68.
According to this, the *gymnasiarch* was responsible for appointing any leaders within the gymnasium and anyone failing to obey them was to be flogged or fined. They were also to prevent the youngsters from interacting with the older boys. Moreover, they must see to it that the following types of people must not use the facilities: slaves, freedmen (or sons of these), anyone who has not been to the wrestling school, a pederast, one who practices a vulgar trade, one who is drunk, or mad. Failure in this would result in a 1,000 drachma fine. If anyone insulted the *gymnasiarch*, they were to be fined 50 drachmas, or if they struck them, 100 drachmas.

### 3.2.1.1 Gymnasiarchs in Inscriptions

In other words, the *gymnasiarch*’s role was one of significant benefaction, and at the same time, one of great moral and ethical responsibility. They were leading public figures and were intimately connected to ποιδεία; for this reason, they received great honour for their services to the city. This can be seen clearly in the hundreds of inscriptions that honour *gymnasiarchs* on account of, predominately, their ἀρετή. A statue base from Sparta (1st–2nd C.E.), erected by the *synarchia* on behalf of the city and funded by Gaius Julius Laco, honours Tiberius Claudius Harmonicus, who served as a *gymnasiarch*, on account of his ἀρετή and his μεγαλοψυχία. Another Spartan statue base set up in front of the theatre by the city (ca. 128/9 C.E.), honours Gaius Julius Lyssipus, who served well as a *gymnasiarch* during the second visit of the emperor Hadrian, on account of his ἀρετή and εὐνοία. Again in Sparta, though dating a little beyond our period (ca. 190 C.E.), two statue bases honour the same man, Marcus Aurelius Chrysogonus Soteridas, for his munificence (λαμπρότης) while serving as

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70 According to this inscription, every *gymnasiarch* was to swear an oath to uphold the laws of the gymnasium and discharge their duties in accordance with the same. A similar oath is seen in a Macedonian inscription; cf. Harrison, “Paul and the Gymnasiarchs: Two Approaches to Pastoral Formation in Antiquity,” 151. Aeschines (*Tim.* 1.12) notes that it was the duty of the teachers to open the schoolrooms not earlier than sunrise and close them before sunset. Furthermore, “No person who is older than the boys shall be permitted to enter the room while they are there, unless he be a son of the teacher, a brother, or a daughter’s husband. If any one enter in violation of this prohibition, he shall be punished with death.” Moreover, the *gymnasiarchs* were, under no conditions, to allow any one who has reached the age of manhood to enter the contests of Hermes together with the boys. Aeschines warns that “A *gymnasiarch* who does permit this and fails to keep such a person out of the gymnasium, shall be liable to the penalties prescribed for the seduction of free-born youth.”

71 The connection between the gymnasiarch and ἀρετή would likely also have to do with the athletic connotation in the term. Miller (*Ancient Greek Athletics*, 238) notes that “the word is so frequently used in the context of athletics or to describe athletes that it sometimes seems that this excellence or virtue—as the word is so frequently translated—carries strictly athletic connotations.”


73 IG V,1 486; similarly, IG V,1 555a (late 2nd–early 3rd century C.E.).
gymnasiarch. In Epidaurus, an honorary inscription found on an altar honours Titus Statilius Timocrates, the nephew of T. Statilius Lamprias (see above 3.1.3), on account of his ἀρετή and εὐνοία. Still in Epidaurus, a stone (ca. 32/33 C.E.), found in an exedra, honours a four-year-old named Gnaeus Cornelius Pulcher, who, it claims, held office as both agoranomo and gymnasiarch during the feast of the Asclapeia and Apolloneia games, on account of his ἀρετή and εὐνοία. An undated inscription from Athens honours Lucius Flavius Flammis, who served as commander of the hoplites, gymnasiarch, and priest of Zeus and Athena, on account of his ἀρετή and δικαιοσύνη. Beyond these few examples we see many more gymnasiarchs who are honoured with a variety of terms including καλοκάγαθία, μεγαλοψυχία, and φιλοτιμία.

3.2.2 Summary

In summary, παιδεία was a mark of honour; it was what separated the elite from the rest, and was in itself a virtue. Moreover, the physical representations of παιδεία (i.e., the gymnasium and its staff and members) were also esteemed with the same honour. But παιδεία was not just a characteristic one possessed, it was also the process by which citizens were formed, it was their “schooling.” However, this was not simply a process of informing the mind; rather, it was a process of physical, intellectual, and spiritual transformation. It is this aspect of the term that we will now consider.

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74 The first is set up by his children Sophrosyna and Soteridas and honours him on account of his ἀρετή (IG V, 1 560). The second statue was set up by his son-in-law, M. Aurelius Chrysogonus son of Dion, and acknowledges his σωφροσύνη (IG V, 1 651). Similarly, an early second-century statue base from Olympia honours Tiberius Claudius Artemas, who served as gymnasiarch, on account of his virtue (IvO 940). For similar formulations, see IG VII 1825; SEG 35:598; IG II² 3593; SEG 35:598; Samsaris, Bas-Strymon 37; IG II² 1072; IG IV², 1 642 honours a woman named Isiona who served as gymnasiarch on account of her ἀρετή and εὐεργεσία.
75 Peek, Neue Inschriften, 87.
76 IG IV² 1 653. Doubtless this was a purely honorific title, probably set up by his father, C. Cornelius Nikatos. This sort of thing was not uncommon; Kleijwegt (Ancient Youth, 247) argues that “young sons (and daughters) of elite families were expected to arrive on the political scene at an early age. In a complimentary fashion, it formed part of the ideology of the benefactor to begin a political career as early as possible. Consequently, children and adolescents were presented in public language as successors to their parents and as equivalent to adults.”
77 IG II² 3544. Again, Flavius Leosthenes Alcibiadus, who was both commander of the hoplites and gymnasiarch, is honoured on account of his ἀρετή (IG II² 3591).
78 E.g., ID 1923, 1929.
79 E.g., Roesch, IThesp 355; Polemon 1 (1929) 126,423.
80 E.g., SEG 23:112.
3.3 παιδεία and Educational Theory: Classical Theorists

Since so much importance was placed on παιδεία and its outcomes, works of educational theory were produced at many points throughout antiquity. One of the earliest extant treatments we have, Plato’s Republic, stands out as a benchmark of the ancient world.

3.3.1 Plato

In the Republic, Plato outlines the requirements for his concept of the ideal state, and within this, the requirements for the education of its ruling class, that is, the “guardians.”

According to him, an appropriate type of education is the key to establishing and maintaining a healthy society. Although theoretical in nature, the Republic is most beneficial for our present study, as it highlights the ideals that παιδεία was perceived to both possess and produce. He begins with the education of the guardians (φύλακες) of the state. This responsibility, he says, is the greatest of all, and “requires more leisure (σχολή) than any other business and the greatest science and training” (Resp. 374D–E).

Such a person must be of high spirit, with the further quality of being a lover of wisdom (φιλόσοφος) and a lover of learning (φιλομαθής). In regard to παιδεία, he recommends, “that which long time has discovered,” namely, gymnastics for the body and for the soul, music, and the objective being to “insensibly guide them to likeness, to friendship, to harmony with beautiful reason” (Resp. 401D).

As a part of training in music, the child was introduced to fables. This served a number of purposes: first, it was a means of teaching about the nature of the gods, being careful to

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82 Cf. Robin Barrow, Plato, (CLET; New York: Continuum, 2008), 38.

83 This was obviously an exclusive education; as Barrow (Ibid., 62) notes, “only the male children of prosperous and aristocratic families will have had something recognisable as a formal education.” Similarly, see George F. Hourani, “The Education of the Third Class in Plato’s Republic,” The Classical Quarterly 43, no. 1/2 (1949): 58–60.

84 Plato, Resp. 375B, E; 376C.

85 Plato, Resp. 376E; Plato (Resp. 401D) explains that “Education in music is most sovereign, because more than anything else rhythm and harmony find their way to the inmost soul and take strongest hold upon it, bringing with them and imparting grace, if one is rightly trained.” Furthermore, “Omissions and the failure of beauty in things badly made or grown would be most quickly perceived by one who was properly educated in music, and so, feeling distaste rightly, he would praise beautiful things and take delight in them and receive them into his soul to foster its growth and become himself beautiful and good” (Resp. 401E). For recent discussion of Plato’s use of music in παιδεία, see Sophie Bourgault, “Music and Pedagogy in the Platonic City,” JAE 46, no. 1 (2012): 59–72.
only tell the good examples of them; second, it provided human examples for the child to imitate; and third, it shaped their soul. To this end, the stories needed to be accurate about how to live and what is conducive to happiness. For this reason, only stories on the “accepted list” were to be permitted to nurses and mothers to tell to the children. Even if the truth could be found allegorically, this was unacceptable because a young person is not able to distinguish what is and what is not allegory. He insists that “We should do our utmost that the first stories that they hear should be so composed as to bring the fairest lessons of virtue to their ears” (Resp. 378E). The overall aim of this early training, Plato argues, is that by receiving it, they “should be convinced and receive our laws like a dye as it were, so that their belief and faith might be fast-coloured both about the things that are to be feared and all other things because of the fitness of their nature and nurture” (Resp. 430A).

For Plato, however, the education of the rulers was pivotal to all education. He was less concerned with the education of the ordinary citizen than with the problem of how to train political technicians; that is, “experts in political affairs who could act as advisors to kings or as leaders of the people.” Therefore, from amongst the best of the guardians were taken the rulers of the city. These needed to be intelligent and capable, careful of the interests of the state; such men as who “appear most inclined through the entire course of their lives to be zealous to do what they think for the interest of the state, and who would be least likely to consent to do the opposite” (Resp. 412C–E). These, according to Plato, were the philosophers. Plato insists that it is philosophers who need to become kings or “those whom we now call our kings and rulers take to the pursuit of philosophy seriously and

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86 He argues that “the true quality of God we must always surely attribute to him whether we compose in epic, melic, or tragic verse.” “We must.” “And is not God of course good in reality?” (Resp. 379A)
87 He argues that “If they imitate, they should from childhood up imitate what is appropriate to them—men, that is, who are brave, sober, pious, free and all things of that kind; but things unbecoming the free man they should neither do nor be clever at imitating, nor yet any other shameful thing, lest from the imitation they imbibe the reality” (Resp. 395C–D).
88 Plato, Resp. 377C.
89 Kamtekar, “Plato on Education and Art,” 348.
91 Andrea Nightingale (“Education in Plato’s Republic and Aristotle’s Politics,” in Education in Greek and Roman Antiquity, ed. by Yun Lee Too [Leiden: Brill, 2001], 139) summarises Plato’s educational theory with the following: “the first stage is designed to produce virtues such as courage, endurance, temperance, piety and self-control, thus rendering the students free from the compulsions and enticements of the irrational parts of the soul … the emphasis in the early educational programme is on practical and political virtue; the goal is to produce good habits and a good character. Although the youths must learn to recognise good men and good actions, they achieve this not by perfecting their intellectual capacities by rather by studying and absorbing good models. In short, they are not taught to develop their own ideas but rather to absorb and enact a specific ideology.”
94 Plato, Resp. 412C–E.
adequately” (Resp. 473D).95 Having identified these, Plato says, “We must exercise them in many studies, watching them to see whether their nature is capable of enduring the greatest and most difficult studies or whether it will faint and flinch as men flinch in the trials and contests of the body” (Resp. 503E–504A). This would lead the philosopher towards the greatest goal: understanding the nature of the good.96

This higher study consisted of several fields, including: arithmetic,97 plane and solid geometry,98 astronomy, and then harmony; followed by the highest form of study, namely, dialectic.99 Of this last discipline he says, “When anyone by dialectics attempts through discourse of reason and apart from all perceptions of sense to find his way to the very essence of each thing and does not desist till he apprehends by thought itself the nature of the good in itself, he arrives at the limit of the intelligible, as the other in our parable, came to the goal of the visible” (Resp. 532A–B).100

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95 The philosopher, he suggests, is “the one who feels no distaste in sampling every study, and who attacks his task of learning gladly and cannot get enough of it, him we shall justly pronounce the lover of wisdom, the philosopher” (Resp. 475C). He says further that “The true lover of knowledge must, from childhood up, be most of all a striver after truth in every form” (Resp. 485D). He is also to be “temperate and by no means greedy for wealth” (Resp. 484E); nor can he be “a forgetful soul, for a competent lover of wisdom, requires a good memory.” Finally, in addition to these requirements, “We look for a mind endowed with measure and grace, whose native disposition will make it easily guided” (Resp. 486D). In other words, “Only by becoming individuals of principle and reason and, thereby, wisdom, which is what Plato means by a philosopher, as contrasted with sophists, can they become fit to lead.” See Barrow, Plato, 43.

96 It is in this context that he introduces the well known analogy of the cave, wherein the philosopher is like a prisoner who is freed from the cave and comes to understand that the shadows on the wall do not make up reality at all, as he can perceive the true form of reality rather than the mere shadows seen by the prisoners. The journey out of the cave into the reality is achieved through higher studies. Plato refers to it as “a conversion and turning about of the soul from a day whose light is darkness to the veritable day; that ascension to reality we will affirm to be true philosophy” (Resp. 521C). For discussion, see Jennifer Gurley, “Platonic Paideia,” Ph&Lit 23, no. 2 (1999): 351–377. In other words, behind Plato’s epistemological thesis was the message that παιδεία was a process of turning the mind in the right direction; it was about “the mastery of abstract thoughts and concentration on a certain set of moral and humanistic concepts.” See Barrow, Plato, 45.

97 Resp. 525B. This was important for a soldier, who must learn to marshal his troops; and for a philosopher, “because he must rise out of the region of generation and lay hold on essence or he can never become a true reckoner.”

98 Resp. 526D–E. In the conduct of war, this was needed in “dealing with encampments and the occupation of strong places and the bringing of troops into column and line and all the other formations of an army in actual battle and on the march.” For the philosopher, it helped to facilitate the apprehension of the idea of good, in that it “forced the soul to turn its vision round to the region where dwells the most blessed part of reality, which it is imperative that it should behold.”

99 It is noted by scholars that at no point does Plato actually offer a description of dialectic (Rorty, “Plato’s Counsel on Education,” 170). However, Nicholas D. Smith (“Images, Education, and Paradox in Plato’s ‘Republic,’ ” Apeiron 32, no. 4 [1999]: 125–141) has suggested that the paradoxes found within the Republic, are intentional “summoners” to be used within the practice of dialectic.

100 For discussion of these subjects and their value in forming the ruler, see Rorty, “Plato’s Counsel on Education.” She argues that “These studies combine theory and practice; they are simultaneously abstract and applied; they are intended to form the character and habits of a rational soul. They are selected and structured to enable rulers to instantiate and construct a well-formed polis as a harmonious whole composed of properly proportioned interdependent parts, guided by the Good as a Unity—that harmonizes—distinct parts” (169).
Like the Republic, Aristotle’s Politics explores the requirements of the ideal city.\(^{101}\) He says that “The proper thing is for the state, while being a multitude, to be made a partnership and a unity by means of education” (παίδεια, Pol. 2.1263B). Moreover, he says, “Since every household is part of a state, and these relationships are part of the household, and the excellence of the part must have regard to that of the whole, it is necessary that the education both of the children and of the women should be carried on with a regard to the form of the constitution” (Pol. 1.1260B).\(^{102}\) For Aristotle, the opportunity to rule afforded by the necessary training was a pursuit for the leisured elite; he says that

The slave’s sciences then are all the various branches of domestic work; the master’s science is the science of employing slaves—for the master’s function consists not in acquiring slaves but in employing them … Therefore all people rich enough to be able to avoid personal trouble have a steward who takes this office, while they themselves engage in politics or philosophy. (Pol. 1.1255B)

The ideal ruler, he argues, must possess intellectual virtue in completeness,\(^{103}\) moreover, “a good ruler is virtuous and wise (φρόνιμος), and a citizen taking part in politics must be wise” (Pol. 2.1277A).\(^{104}\) In regard to producing this character he says

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\(^{101}\) For discussion regarding the composition and structure of this work, see C. J. Rowe, “Aims and Methods in Aristotle’s Politics,” CQ 27, no. 1 (1977): 159–172. For discussion of its relationship with Nicomachean Ethics, see Stephen Salkever, “Teaching the Questions: Aristotle’s Philosophical Pedagogy in the ‘Nicomachean Ethics’ and the ‘Politics’,” RP 69, no. 2 (2007): 192–214. For comparison of Aristotle’s work with Plato’s Republic, see Richard Stalley, “Education and the State,” in A Companion to Aristotle, ed. by Georgios Anagnostopoulos (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 566. He says there is a “sense” in which Aristotle’s account is more idealistic than Plato’s. He goes on to say that “it does not mean that these Books have no practical implications. I shall argue that, particularly because of their concern with education, they have a direct relevance to real life.”

\(^{102}\) Aristotle’s educational theory, however, differs from Plato’s, in that “the education outlined in the Politics is designed to produce rulers and not philosophers, (however) the ‘liberal’ education and activities of this elite group are defined in terms very similar to those used for the contemplated activities of philosophers.” See Nightingale, “Education in Plato’s Republic and Aristotle’s Politics,” 154. On this point, Carnes Lord (“Politics and Philosophy in Aristotle’s ‘Politics’,” Hermes 106, no. 2 [1978]: 338) argues that “the best regime of the Politics is not a regime ruled by philosophers. It is meant to be a regime that is capable of realization within the limits of the humanly possible, if under the best of circumstances. Its rulers are leisured gentlemen or aristocrats—a type of man or a political class that Aristotle thought might have opportunities as well as the inclination to establish such a regime.”

\(^{103}\) Aristotle, Pol. 2.1260A.

\(^{104}\) Aristotle, Pol. 2.1277A. However on this point we should note that Aristotle sees a difference between the goodness of a ruler (δόλος) and a citizen (πολιτικός); he argues that “we praise the ability to rule and to be ruled, and it is doubtless held that the goodness of a citizen consists in ability both to rule and to be ruled well. If then we lay it down that the goodness of the good man (or ruler) is displayed in ruling, whereas that of the citizen is shown in both capacities, the two capacities cannot be equally laudable. Since, therefore, both views are sometimes accepted, and it is thought that the ruler and the subject do not have to learn the same arts but that the citizen must know both arts and share in both capacities …” Unfortunately, at this point the original text breaks off; it is possible that this led to discussion of the different requirements of training, however we cannot know. For helpful discussion of what is a complex idea, see Robert Develin, “The Good Man and the Good Citizen in Aristotle’s ‘Politics’,” Phronesis 18, no. 1 (1973): 71–79.
There are admittedly three things by which men are made good and virtuous, and these three things are nature, habit, and reason. For to start with, one must be born with the nature of a human being and not of some other animal; and secondly, one must be born of a certain quality of body and of soul. Now the other animals live chiefly by nature, though some in small degrees are guided by habits too; but man lives by reason also, for he alone of animals possesses reason; so that in him these three things must be in harmony with one another; for men often act contrary to their acquired habits and to their nature because of their reason, if they are convinced that some other course of action is preferable. (Pol. 7.1332A–B)

Like Plato, this education began at childhood. The upbringing he says, “Should involve enough movement to avoid bodily inactivity … but even the games must not be unfit for freemen, nor laborious, nor undisciplined.” Moreover, “All such amusements (including tales) should prepare the way for their later pursuits; hence most children’s games should be imitations of the serious occupations of later life.” He says that “Tutors (παιδονόμοι) must supervise the children’s pastimes, and in particular must see that they associate as little as possible with slaves” (Pol. 7.1336A).

For Aristotle, there were five customary subjects of education, reading and writing, gymnastics, music, and drawing. “Reading and writing and drawing” he says, are “taught as being useful for the purposes of life and very serviceable, and gymnastics as contributing to manly courage” (Pol. 8.1337B). Education, according to Aristotle, prepared a child for a life that included participation both in public affairs and activities that were valuable simply because they involved exercise of the rational powers.

In summary, we can see that for Plato the ideal city was ruled by the philosophers, and for Aristotle, while not necessarily philosophers, at least educated men. But, as we will see, throughout every period, ancient educators were torn between two rival forms of training, between which they never managed to make up their minds. The one we have been examining is philosophical education. The other form of education was in rhetoric, and one of its earliest protagonists was Isocrates.

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105 In regard to music, he is in doubt as to what objective one should participate in it, “whether for amusement and relaxation, as one indulges in sleep and deep drinking … or whether we ought rather to think that music tends in some degree to virtue; or that it contributes something intellectual entertainment and culture,” Pol. 8.1339A. After some consideration of these points, he concludes that “It is plain that music has the power of producing a certain effect on the moral character of the soul, and if it has the power to do this, it is clear that the young must be directed to music and must be educated in it” (Pol. 8.1340B).


107 Marrou, A History Of Education In Antiquity, 61.

108 For the sake of brevity in such a broad overview, I have intentionally passed over discussion of sophistry in this period in spite of its obvious influence in the development of educational theory in Classical Greece (e.g., both Plato and Isocrates in their own writings are at pains to distance themselves from these professional educators). For discussion of this movement, see in particular Isocrates’ Against the Sophists.
In his Antidosis, Isocrates is compelled to give a defence of the nature and content of his teaching practices throughout his lifetime. Written towards the end of his life, it forms a general summary of his methods and a general synopsis of the school he ran for many decades.\(^{109}\) Set in what is presumably a fictitious court scene, the Antidosis offers a detailed insight into the very real practices of Plato’s immediate contemporary and rival.\(^{110}\)

According to Isocrates, to produce a good orator requires natural ability, practical experience, and formal training.\(^{111}\) Much like Plato, he sees two main branches of study: physical training for the body, that is, gymnastics, and for the mind, philosophy.\(^{112}\) These he sees as “twin arts—parallel and complementary—by which their masters prepare the mind to become more intelligent and the body to become more serviceable, not separating sharply the two kinds of education, but using similar methods of instruction, exercise, and other forms of discipline” (Antid. 181).\(^{113}\) He says further that “When they take their pupils in hand, the physical trainers (\(\pi\alpha\iota\delta\sigma\tau\rho\iota\beta\alpha\iota\)) instruct their followers in the postures which have been devised for bodily contests, while the teachers of philosophy impart all the forms of discourse in which the mind expresses itself” (Antid. 183). This raises an important issue for our purposes. We can see in this the idea that there was no one master through the process of \(\pi\alpha\iota\delta\epsilon\iota\alpha\). Isocrates is explicit about this when he says

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Aristophanes’ Clouds, and in the secondary literature, Marrou, A History Of Education In Antiquity, 46-60. More pertinent to this thesis is the influence of the Second Sophistic, which will be dealt with in subsequent chapters.\(^{109}\)

\(^{109}\) For discussion of his rhetorical training, see Terry Papillion, “Isocrates’ techne and Rhetorical Pedagogy,” RSQ 25 (1995): 149–163. In the absence of a detailed description of the day to day method of teaching in the Antidosis, Edward J. Power (“Class Size and Pedagogy in Isocrates’ School,” HEQ 6, no. 4 [1966]: 22–32) has offered a speculative picture based on allusions throughout the work.


\(^{111}\) Isocrates, Soph. 14–17; Antid. 187.

\(^{112}\) Isocrates is nowhere clear as to what exactly he means by philosophy. Jaeger (Paideia, 3:144), however, suggests that “Man is a being composed of soul and body. Both his soul and his body need care. That is why bygone generations created a dual system, gymnastics and intellectual education. Here Isocrates does not call the latter music, as was customary, but philosophy, ‘the love of wisdom’—for, as a Greek, he naturally understood the relation of poetry and the other ‘musical’ arts to the formation of the spirit.”

\(^{113}\) However, unlike Plato, he sees less value in the study of arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy and the like, saying, “For I believe that the teachers who are skilled in disputation and those who are occupied with astronomy and geometry and studies of that sort do not injure but, on the contrary, benefit their pupils, not so much as they profess, but more than others give them credit for” (Antid. 261). These studies he refers to as “a gymnastic of the mind and a preparation for philosophy” (Antid. 266). For discussion of the various subjects that his curriculum consisted of, see R. Johnson, “A Note on the Number of Isocrates’ Pupils,” AJP 78, no. 3 (1957): 297–300. For discussion of his classes, see Power, “Class Size and Pedagogy in Isocrates’ School”; Johnson, “A Note on the Number of Isocrates’ Pupils.”
Watching over them and training them in this manner, both the teachers of gymnastic and the teachers of discourse are able to advance their pupils to a point where they are better men and where they are stronger in their thinking or in the use of their bodies. However, neither class of teachers is in possession of a science by which they can make capable athletes or capable orators out of whomsoever they please. They can contribute in some degree to these results, but these powers are never found in their perfection save in those who excel by virtue both of talent and of training. (*Antid. 185*)

In this process, according to Isocrates, both the master (*διδάσκαλος*) and pupil (*μαθήτης*) each has his place. “No one but the pupil can furnish the necessary capacity; no one but the master, the ability to impart knowledge while both have a part in the exercises of practical application: for the master must painstakingly direct his pupil, and the latter must rigidly follow the master’s instructions” (*Antid. 188*).

But for Isocrates, the priority was to train the political orator.\(^{114}\) Unlike Plato, he deemed the most appropriate training for the ruler to be in rhetoric.\(^{115}\) He says, “I hold that people can become better and worthier if they conceive an ambition to speak well, if they become possessed of the desire to be able to persuade their hearers, and, finally, if they set their hearts on seizing their advantage” (*Antid. 275*).\(^{116}\) He argues this by saying that in the first place, “When anyone elects to speak or write discourses which are worthy of praise and honour, it is not conceivable that he will support causes which are unjust or petty or devoted to private quarrels.” In the second place he says, “He will select from all the actions of men which bear upon his subject those examples which are the most illustrious and the most edifying; and, habituating himself to contemplate and appraise such examples, he will feel their influence not only in the preparation of a given discourse but in all the actions of his life.” Furthermore, he says, “The man who wishes to persuade people will not be negligent as to the matter of character; no, on the contrary, he will apply himself above all to establish a most honourable name among his fellow-citizens” (*Antid. 266–288*).

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\(^{115}\) However, it should be noted that Plato was not against the teaching and practice of rhetoric, as is demonstrated through the *Phaedrus* and *Gorgias*; for comparison of both men’s attitudes towards the use and practice of rhetoric, see William L. Benoit, “Isocrates and Plato on Rhetoric and Rhetorical Education,” *RSQ* 21, no. 1 (1991): 60–71.

3.3.4 Summary

Several observations can be drawn from this study so far. First, we see that early educational theory, particularly for Plato and Aristotle, was only conceived within the context of (implicit or explicit) social and political theory. Second, we see that from the earliest years of the child’s life, and through a lengthy process of various interdependent disciplines studied under a variety of masters, ranging from music and gymnastics, to geometry and astronomy, and finally, in philosophy or oratory, a young man was being transformed into an upright and virtuous citizen, suitable to participate in civic life. Third, this process involved significant care and input from parents from an early age; furthermore, it involved imitation of carefully selected people, both living and historical, men who best embodied the values of the culture. Finally, we see that education went far beyond informing the mind; rather, it was seen as a holistic method of intellectual training, physical development, and soul transformation; the goal of all of this being the production of the ideal human. This was the case certainly in classical Greece, but as we will see, these various aspects remained central to παιδεία up to and beyond the period of our study.

3.4 Educational Theory in the Early Empire

When we turn to the period of the early Empire, two features stand out. Within Graeco-Roman παιδεία, both Greek and Roman authors shared essentially identical values with classical education. Particularly noticeable are the similarities in the works of Ps.-Plutarch’s On the Education of Children and Quintilian’s The Orator’s Education, which would suggest not only a common set of ideas across the empire, but also a borrowing of ideas from other authors. Second, as we will see below, there is an intentional revival in the late Republic–

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117 So well accepted were these activities as a part of a child’s upbringing and education, that many fourth-century B.C.E. vases depict them. Numerous examples show children in school settings, usually with a master, learning to read and write, learning maths or drama, or, most commonly, learning music. Interestingly, a number of these vases contain images combining boys reading and writing with other boys learning music (usually the lyre). This would suggest that literature was presumed to be inseparable with music as a part of παιδεία. See Beck, Album of Greek Education, plate 8–23; esp. images 68, 76, 79, 80.

118 For reasons of brevity I will skip over the developments of παιδεία throughout the Hellenistic period as it is beyond the limited space of this thesis. For discussion of this development, see in particular the introductory chapters of Morgan, Literate Education in the Hellenistic and Roman Worlds, 1–49; similarly, see Anthony Corbeil, “Education in the Roman Republic: Creating Traditions,” in Education in Greek and Roman Antiquity, ed. Yun Lee Too (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 261–287; J. J. Eyre, “Roman Education in the Late Republic and Early Empire,” GR 10, no. 1 (1963): 47–59.

119 Quintilian (Inst. 1.pr.1) says at the outset of his work, that because there was a difficulty in choosing between the many and often contradictory opinions on education, he had been encouraged to write his Institutions. W. H. S. Jones (“Quintilian, Plutarch, and the Early Humanists,” CR 21, no. 2 [1907]: 33–43) offers
early Empire of classical Greek language and values as a means of identifying the educated elite.

3.4.1 Ps.-Plutarch and Quintilian

In a similar vein to Plato, Ps.-Plutarch sees the origins of a person’s virtue in their parents. He encourages fathers of notable offspring to abstain from random cohabitation with women; that is, women such as courtesans and concubines. He argues that “Those who are not well-born, whether on the father’s or the mother’s side, have an indelible disgrace in their low birth, which accompanies them throughout their lives, and offers to anyone desiring to use it a ready subject of reproach and insult” (Lib. ed. 1B). In regards to the stories that a child is to be read, Ps.-Plutarch borrows directly from Plato, saying, “That remarkable man (Plato), quite properly advises nurses, even in telling stories to children, not to choose at random, lest haply their minds be filled at the outset with foolishness and corruption” (Lib. ed. 3E–F).

He argues that when fathers have badly brought up and badly educated their sons and they are enrolled in the ranks of men, they “disdain the sane and orderly life, and throw themselves headlong into disorderly and slavish pleasures.” Some of them, he says, among other things, “take up with flatterers and parasites, abominable men of obscure origin, corrupters and spoilers of youth, and others buy the freedom of courtesans and prostitutes, proud and sumptuous in expense,” and so forth. But if these men, he suggests, “had become conversant with the higher education (φιλοσοφία), they perhaps would not have allowed themselves to be dominated by such practices” (Lib. ed. 5B–C). When it came to producing the best young men, like Aristotle, Ps.-Plutarch sees the need for a concurrence of three things in order to produce perfectly right action: nature, reason, and habit (Φύσις, λόγος, ἕθος). He says that

The first beginnings come from nature, advancement from learning, the practical use from continued repetition, and the culmination from all combined; but so far as any one of these is wanting, the moral excellence (αρετή) must, to this extent, be crippled. For nature without

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a very helpful table of passages which refer to the same ideas in Quintilian and Ps.-Plutarch. Berry (“The De Liberis Educandis of Pseudo-Plutarch,” 387–388) suggests that the similarities between Ps.-Plutarch, Quintilian, and Tacitus’ Dialogus would indicate a common source.

However, Ps.-Plutarch’s ideal is far removed from Plato’s elaborate eugenics program; cf. Plato, Resp. 457–460.

Similarly, see Rect. rat. aud. 37C–F.

Cf. Plato, Resp. 377E.

Similarly, Lib. ed. 12C.
learning is a blind thing, and learning without nature is an imperfect thing, and practice without both is an ineffective thing. (Lib. ed. 2B)

Like Ps.-Plutarch, Quintilian says that “A father should conceive the highest hopes of his son from the moment of his birth. If he does so, he will be more careful about the groundwork of his education” (Inst. 1.1.1). Moreover, his reading must be manly, combining dignity and charm; he must learn not merely what is eloquent, but what is morally excellent. Quintilian urges that even the first lines which the child is set to copy should not express thoughts of no significance, but convey some sound moral lesson, since the impression made upon his unformed mind would contribute to the formation of his character.

When the child was at an age to be put under the charge of attendants (παιδαγωγοί), Ps.-Plutarch warns that the father is not to entrust one’s children inadvertently to slaves taken in war or to barbarians or to those who are unstable. Likewise, teachers (διδάσκαλοι) needed to be sought for the children who were free from scandal in their lives, who were unimpeachable in their manners, and in experience the very best that could be found. He argues that “To receive a proper education (παιδεία) is the source and root of all goodness (κολοκύγια). As husbandmen place stakes beside the young plants, so do competent teachers with all care set their precepts and exhortations beside the young, in order that their characters may grow to be upright” (Lib. ed. 4B).

In short, just as in classical times, education began at the earliest stages of childhood. Παιδεία was always understood as the process whereby naturally endowed abilities were fostered and developed. To this end, parents were responsible for the early development of the child, particularly in regard to setting role models (both in literature and in real life) before the children. The first and most important role model was the father. Furthermore, it was the duty of the parents to seek out the best pedagogues and teachers right throughout their

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124 Similarly, Philo (Abr. 53) says, “Teaching cannot be consummated without nature or practice, nor is nature capable of reaching its zenith without learning and practising, nor practice either unless the foundation of nature and teaching has first been laid.” According to Philo, these three elements are symbolised in the lives of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob (Mut. 12; Sacr. 5; Congr. 35). See also Samuel Sandmel, “Philo’s Environment and Philo’s Exegetis,” JBR 22, no. 4 (1954): 251–252. Similarly, Quintilian (Inst. 1.12.26; similarly 2.19.1–3) says, “Without natural gifts technical rules are useless. Consequently the student who is devoid of talent will derive no more profit from this work than barren soil from a treatise on agriculture.” Cicero argues in much the same fashion as Quintilian (De Or. 1.113–115).

125 Quintilian, Inst. 1.8.2, 4, 8.

126 Quintilian, Inst. 1.1.35.

127 Plutarch, Lib. ed. 4A; similarly, Quintilian, Inst. 1.1.8.

128 He uses a similar agricultural analogy elsewhere: “A piece of land is good by nature, but without care it grows waste, and the better it is by nature, so much the more is it spoiled by neglect if it be not worked. Another piece is forbidding and rougher than land should be, but, if it be tilled, straightway it produces noble crops. What trees if they are neglected do not grow crooked and prove unfruitful? Yet if they receive right culture (παιδαγωγία), they become fruitful, and bring their fruit to maturity” (Lib. ed. 2B). See section 9.3 for discussion.

129 See section 11.1–2 for discussion.
training, teachers who best embodied the ideals of the family. However, these ideas will be explored in much greater depth in subsequent chapters.

3.4.2 Ἐγκύκλιος Παιδεία

We saw in our classical writers an educational “curriculum” that incorporated primarily music and gymnastics; the study of these disciplines was understood as a way of preparing the pupil for higher studies. This was still very much the case in the first century, the difference now being, that it had become a much more widely recognised and standardised process known as ἔγκυκλιος παιδεία, or the Latin orbis doctrinae. This “circular” or “complete” education generally consisted of music, gymnastics, astronomy, arithmetic, and thorough training in grammar under the grammarian. This process was distinct from the study of rhetoric and philosophy, and was seen as a way of preparing the student for these higher disciplines. Of particular interest to our present investigation is the unanimity with which it was understood. In spite of the distance between the authors, both in time and geography, they all seem to agree on its general make up, both in content and purpose. Accounts of this process are found throughout our authors.

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130 I use the term “curriculum” hesitantly, as it is a rather inadequate way of defining what was really an undefined process. This term would suggest a set system that every student would be taken through at roughly the same age; but from the evidence of our sources, it was far more flexible in terms of its content.

131 For discussion of this process, see Morgan, Literate Education in the Hellenistic and Roman Worlds, 33–39. She notes that “Most of the elements of what became enkyklios paideia existed in some form in classical Greece. It is their regularization that is new and important in the Hellenistic and Roman world” (38).

132 It is generally accepted by historians that ancient education consisted of a three-tier system: a primary education (i.e., elementary letters and counting), a grammatical education, and finally, rhetoric or philosophy. See e.g., Cribiore, Gymnastics of the Mind: Greek Education in Hellenistic and Roman Egypt, 16. Furthermore, it is argued there was a clear distinction between these levels, irrespective of status; cf. Ronald F. Hock, “Paul and Greco-Roman Education,” in Paul in the Greco-Roman World: a Handbook, ed. by J. Paul Sampley (Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press, 2003), 198–227; Eyre, “Roman Education in the Late Republic and Early Empire”; Marrou, A History Of Education In Antiquity, 265–266; William Barclay, Educational Ideals in the Ancient World (Michigan: Collins, 1959), 173–191. This strict, three-tier idea has been challenged, however, with some scholars arguing for a two-track system instead. That is, on the one hand, a basic, lower-status form of training (ludus litterarius) that served the basic needs of slaves and the lower class freeborn. On the other hand, there was a more refined liberal arts track that served the elite and upper classes (scholae liberalis). In this system, the grammarian was responsible for the elementary stages of the upper class children; cf. Alan D. Booth, “The Appearance of the ‘Schola Grammatici,’” Hermes 106, no. 1 (1978): 117–125; Cribiore, Gymnastics of the Mind: Greek Education in Hellenistic and Roman Egypt, 37; Robert A. Kaster, “Notes on ‘Primary’ and ‘Secondary’ Schools in Late Antiquity,” TAPA 113 (1983): 323–346. However, this is an ambiguous issue and beyond the purview of this thesis. For discussion of more vocational and other lower status training, as well as literacy at the lower levels, see Edward E. Best, “The Literate Roman Soldier,” CJ 62, no. 3 (1966): 122–127; S. L. Mohler, “Slave Education in the Roman Empire,” TAPA 71 (1940): 262–280; Alan K. Bowman, “Literacy in the Roman Empire: Mass and Mode,” in Literacy in the Roman world, ed. by Mary Beard, (JRASup 3; Rhode Island: Journal of Roman Archaeology, 1991), 119–131.

133 Naturally there would be some variation from city to city, or even teacher to teacher, but as Morgan (Literate Education in the Hellenistic and Roman Worlds, 51) notes, “all the surviving versions of enkyklios...
For Philo, ἔγκυκλιος παιδεία included music, which taught what is harmonious in the way of rhythm; geometry, which sowed the seeds of equality and just proportion in the soul; rhetoric, which equipped a person to be a true master of words and thoughts; and dialectic (the twin sister of rhetoric), which separated true from false arguments, refuted the plausibilities of sophistry, and cured the great disease of the soul, deceit. Quintilian goes into far more detail as to what aspects of ἔγκυκλιος παιδεία are important for the future orator. He discusses first music (which included dancing), which he says had two modes of expression: in the voice and in the body. Next came Geometry, which was useful since it exercised the mind, sharpened the wits and generated quickness of perception. Students of oratory could also gain value from studying with the comic actors, for from these they could learn the art of delivery and gesture. He also suggests gymnastics, in order that the arms will extend in the proper manner, the hands free from all inelegance, the attitude becoming, the movements of the feet appropriate, and the motions of the head and eyes in keeping with the poise of the body. Similar lists are also found in Ps-Plutarch, Seneca, and Cicero.

paideia can be regarded as variations on a theme whose dominant and most remarkable characteristic is still its high degree of uniformity across the Hellenistic and Roman worlds.”

134 Philo, Congr. 15–18. For Philo, the prize of education (παιδεία) is virtue (ὀρέτη), and as such, a person must be unflagging in self discipline if they desire to attain it; cf. (Congr. 23–28).

135 It was absolutely necessary for the orator to be acquainted with all these methods of expression which are concerned first, with gesture; second, with the arrangement of words; and third, with the inflexions of the voice, of which a great variety are required in pleading (Inst. 1.10.22–25). He tells the story of Gaius Gracchus, the leading orator of his age, who, when declaiming would have a musician behind him with a pitchpipe in order to aid him in keeping the right pitch in his voice (Inst. 1.10.27–28).

136 It was also useful in oratory since order is a necessary element in geometry and eloquence alike (Inst. 1.10.34–35).

137 Moreover, they could ensure that their utterance is distinct, and that each letter is properly pronounced. Furthermore, they could ensure the orator faces the crowd and their posture and facial expression is correct, and finally, that they know how to deliver a narrative correctly (Inst. 1.11.1–12). Cicero (De Or. 1.156) also sees the same value in training with actors.

138 Quintilian, Inst. 1.11.15–16. Quintilian’s orator was “perfect down to the last detail” (Inst. 1.10.4).

139 Ps.-Plutarch (Lib. ed. 7C) says that “The free-born child should not be allowed to go without some knowledge, both through hearing and observation, of every branch also of what is called ἔγκυκλιος παιδεία” (παιδεία is synonymous with παιδεία), however, these should only be learned incidentally, “just to get a taste of them.” However, Ps.-Plutarch gives no details as to what subjects of study this consisted of exactly. It did include “exercise of the body,” under the παιδιστριβησ. In similar fashion to Plato, he says that “It is for the contests of war that boys must be practised, by exercising themselves in throwing the javelin, shooting with the bow, and in hunting. For the goods of the vanquished” in battle “are prizes offered to the victors” (Lib. ed. 8C).

140 Seneca gives almost an identical list to Philo; it included grammar, music, geometry, and astronomy. Of interest, however, is what he also excludes; that is, he says that he debars from liberal studies sculpture and painting, as well as wrestling (Ep. 88. 3–17). No doubt suggesting that, in some circles, these were considered part of education.

141 Cicero (De Or. 1.20) says that “No man can be an orator complete in all points of merit, who has not attained a knowledge of all important subjects and arts;” for oratory, he suggests, derives its beauty and fullness from such knowledge. Speaking through Crassus, he suggests that the orator who desires to speak at trials, public assemblies and the senate house, or even just to speak eloquently, cannot do so skilfully without extensive handling of all public business, mastery of ordinances, customs and general laws, and without knowledge of human nature and character (De Or. 1.48). Moreover, he says, the orator must be well versed in political and moral science (De Or. 1.58–68). He suggests that when all of these attributes are assembled in perfection, no
We can see here the carry-over from classical times, in that training involved a broad range of theoretical, artistic, and physical disciplines by which the ideal citizen was produced. This person was in every way virtuous and eloquent, and, above all, ideally suited to participate in public life. Rawson says that

This curriculum had breadth, but with a functional and practical emphasis. This emphasis was not intended to lead to a narrow range of subjects or skills. It was what we would call ‘applied’ rather than theoretical, although there was a theoretical underpinning. It aimed at public activity and performance rather than internalised cultural development. The process might be called *educatio*, or *institutio*, but it aimed at *humanitas*.

But εὐκλείσ ς παιδεία was only a preparatory stage for the higher studies of philosophy and rhetoric, and regarding these two options, as in previous times, there was argument over which was the most useful course of study: philosophy or rhetoric.

### 3.4.3 Philosophy in the Empire

Arguing from the side of philosophy, Philo (20 B.C.E.–50 C.E.) uses the story of Abraham, Hagar, and Sarah allegorically to describe the grammatical and philosophical stages of education. He suggests that Hagar represents the preliminary stages of education, whereas Sarah represents virtue; and the mind which desires to attain knowledge (*ἐπιστήμη*) is Abraham. According to Philo, the higher study (philosophy) is in fact the study of ἀρετή itself, and this level of study is represented by Sarah. Sarah’s offspring included wisdom, justice, and piety, but the impregnation of virtue was only possible by going through Hagar (grammatical training). In other words, it is impossible to attain virtue unless one has been through the preliminary levels of study (in the same way, he argues, it was impossible for Abraham to conceive with Sarah until he had conceived with Hagar). He says, “For we are incapable of receiving the impregnation of virtue unless we have first mated with her handmaiden, and the handmaiden of wisdom is the culture gained by the primary learning of

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other craftsman in their respective vocation can win the same approval as when they are assembled in an orator (*De Or*. 1.128). Cicero and Quintilian (and indeed, all Roman instructors of oratory) envisaged the dual role of the orator as politician and lawyer; this meant, in addition to the study of orators and poets, the study of the 12 tables of Roman law. Cicero suggests that the orator must have a “complete history of the past; and a store of precedents must be retained in the memory, nor may knowledge of statute law and our national law in general be omitted.” Moreover, he says, “It is from knowledge that oratory must derive its beauty and fullness, and unless there is such knowledge, well-grasped and comprehended by the speaker, there must be something empty and almost childish in the utterance” (*De Or*. 1.20).

142 Rawson, *Children and Childhood in Roman Italy*, 173.
143 Philo, *Congr*. 23.
the school course” (*Congr.* 9). But once the mind had attached itself to virtue, perceiving its genuine, unalloyed, and very divine beauty, it (the mind) becomes the shepherd of sheep, being the charioteer and pilot of the irrational faculties that exist in the soul.145

Seneca argues similarly. Writing to Lucilius, he says that “‘Liberal studies’ are so called because they are studies worthy of a freeborn gentleman. But there is only one really liberal study: that which gives a man his liberty.” This, he argues, is the study of wisdom, which he says is lofty, brave, and great-souled.146 Like Philo, he sees the value of the primary studies (ἐγκύκλιος παίδεια) simply in preparing the soul for the reception of virtue. “The liberal arts,” he says, “do not conduct the soul all the way to virtue, but merely set it going in that direction” (*Ep.* 88.20). He says further that “Wisdom is the perfect good of the human mind; philosophy is the love of wisdom, and the endeavour to attain it. The latter strives toward the goal which the former has already reached” (*Ep.* 89.4). Thus, for Philo and Seneca, general education contributed to a proper comprehension of philosophy; and philosophy aided in the acquisition of wisdom, which for these men, was the goal of life. “What, you ask, is the fullest span of life? It is living until you possess wisdom. He who has attained wisdom has reached, not the furthermore, but the most important goal” (*Ep.* 93.8).147 In other words, for these authors, only the philosopher was suitable to participate in civic life. Ps.-Plutarch summarises their case well when he says

For as regards the care of the body men have discovered two sciences, the medical and the gymnastic, of which the one implants health, the other sturdiness, in the body; but for the illnesses and affections of the mind philosophy alone is the remedy. For through philosophy and in company with philosophy it is possible to attain knowledge of what is honourable and what is shameful, what is just and what is unjust, what, in brief, is to be chosen and what to be avoided, how a man must bear himself in his relations with the gods, with his parents, with his elders, with the laws, with strangers, with those in authority, with friends, with women, with children, with servants; that one ought to reverence the gods, to honour one’s parents, to respect ones elders, to be obedient to the laws, to yield to those in authority, to love one’s friends, to be chaste with women, to be affectionate with children, and not to be overbearing with slaves; and, most important of all, not to be over joyful at success or overmuch distressed at misfortune, nor to be dissolute in pleasures, nor impulsive and brutish in temper. These things I regard as pre-eminent among all the advantages which accrue from philosophy. For to have a generous heart in prosperity shows a man, to excite no envy withal shows a disciplined nature; to rule pleasure by reason marks the wise man, and not every man can master his passion. But I regard as perfect (τέλειος), so far as men can be, those who are able to combine and mingle political capacity with philosophy; and I am inclined to think that these are secure in the possession of two things which are of the greatest good: a life useful to the world in their public position, and the calm and untroubled life in their pursuit of philosophy. (*Lib. ed.* 7D–8A)

146 Seneca, *Ep.* 88.1–2; “Hoc est sapientiae, sublime, forte, magnanimum.”
147 Philo (*Congr.* 89) warns against being “ensnared by the love lures of the handmaids” (the lower studies); reminding the reader that “just as the school subjects contribute to the acquirement of philosophy, so does philosophy to the getting of wisdom. For philosophy is the practice or study of wisdom, and wisdom is the knowledge of things divine and human and their causes.”
3.4.4 Oratory in the Empire

On the other side of the debate, however, like Isocrates, Quintilian holds that the ideal ruler is none other than the orator. Quintilian is quite critical of the philosophers of his own day. He says, “I am ready to admit that many of the old philosophers inculcated the most excellent principles and practised what they preached. But in our own day the name of philosopher has too often been the mask for the worst vices.” Though not specific in his accusation, he accuses them of trying to “disguise the depravity of their characters by the assumption of a stern and austere mien accompanied by the wearing of a garb differing from that of their fellow men” (Inst. 1.pr.15). He argues that “No philosopher has ever been a frequent speaker in the courts, or won renown in public assemblies, or taken a prominent part in the government of the state” (Inst. 12.2.7). But in spite of this criticism, Quintilian still desired that his orator should be “a ‘wise man’ (sapiens) in the Roman sense, that is, one who reveals himself as a true statesman, not in the discussions of the study, but in the actual practice and experience of life” (12.2.7). In his view, leadership should be the role of the orator. He argues that, although “the principles of upright and honourable living should, as some have held, be regarded as the peculiar concern of philosophy,” the “man who can guide a state by his counsels, give it a firm basis by his legislation and purge its vices by his decisions as a judge, is assuredly no other than the orator of our quest” (Inst. 1.pr.10).

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148 George A. Kennedy (“An Estimate of Quintilian,” AJP 83, no. 2 [1962]: 136) notes that a great deal of Quintilian’s influence derives from Cicero, but ultimately it is from Isocrates and the Greek sophists; similarly, Kingsley Price, Education and Philosophical Thought (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1962), 82. Certainly Quintilian’s comments regarding Isocrates’ teaching and eloquence would indicate his high level of respect; cf. (Inst. 2.8.11).

149 Kennedy (“An Estimate of Quintilian,” 135) also suggests that this opposition to the philosophers stemmed from his sympathy to the Flavians, and in particular Vespasian who drove the philosophers out of Rome.

150 Although, Quintilian did have a place for the teachings of philosophy (as indeed, most philosophers had a place for the teaching of oratory); in fact he believes that “Those who have discoursed on the nature of virtue must be read through and through, that the life of the orator may be wedded to the knowledge of things human and divine.” However, in his view, such subjects would appear much greater and fairer if those who taught them were also those who could give them the most eloquent expression; cf. (Inst. 12.2.8). In fact, he goes as far as to say, “Let our ideal orator then, be such as to have a genuine title to the name of philosopher” (Inst. 1.pr.18). In his view, orators “frequently handle those themes which philosophy claims for its own.” He asks rhetorically, “Who, short of being an utter villain, does not speak of justice, equity and virtue? Who does not make some inquiry into the causes of natural phenomena? (But) it is surely the orator who will have the greatest mastery of all such departments of knowledge and the greatest power to express it in words” (Inst. 1.pr.16–17). He cautions, however, that though there is value in the teachings of philosophical schools, “there is no need for an orator to swear allegiance to any one philosophic code” (Inst. 12.2.26) Though it has been suggested by some that Quintilian’s vir bonus is a Platonist; cf. Alan Brinton, “Quintilian, Plato, and the ‘Vir Bonus’,” PR 16, no. 3 (1983): 167–184; Michael Winterbottom, “Quintilian and the Vir Bonus,” JRS 54 (1964): 90–97; and by others that he is a Stoic; Arthur E. Walzer, “Quintilian’s ‘Vir Bonus’ and the Stoic Wise Man,” RSQ 33, no. 4 (2003): 25–41. See section 7.1.2 for further discussion.
3.4.5 Summary

Once again, we see the same ideas and values carrying down from classical authors into our present period. \( \Pi \alpha \delta \varepsilon \iota \alpha \) was the process of producing elite citizens, be they an orator or a philosopher, and between the two sides there was a constant tension as to which was the most useful discipline.\(^{151}\) However, there is a unique feature of education beginning in the early Empire, one that intimately connected it with the classical period; that is, an intentional revival of these classical authors as a way of identifying elite from non-elite and separating Greeks from Romans. It is to this issue that we will now turn.

3.5 Graeco-Roman \( \Pi \alpha \delta \varepsilon \iota \alpha \) and the Revival of Classical Times

I have suggested in this chapter that, since the earliest times, \( \Pi \alpha \delta \varepsilon \iota \alpha \) served a primary function of enculturation. This is certainly the case in the early Empire, but what is of particular interest in this period, is the way in which education created elite identity through an intentional recalling of classical times. Across the many forms of Graeco-Roman \( \Pi \alpha \delta \varepsilon \iota \alpha \), one feature remained constant: the attempt to root all forms of status and identity in the prestigious past.\(^{152}\) This meant that to possess \( \Pi \alpha \delta \varepsilon \iota \alpha \) was to be familiar with a set of canonical texts, mostly from the fifth and fourth centuries, and to be able to write and declaim in the Attic dialect in which they were written.\(^{153}\)

3.5.1 Atticism

Attic Greek became the shared language of the educated elites; it was the common cultural store that bound them together and excluded the lower class.\(^{154}\) The Attic style was a deliberate shift within these elite circles away from the common Koine, which they felt now

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\(^{151}\) This tension remained unresolved; but as we will see in chapter 7, the difference was a matter of degree; that is, the person who trained in philosophy was still trained in rhetoric and vice versa. In other words, the final product of \( \Pi \alpha \delta \varepsilon \iota \alpha \) was a person thoroughly gifted in both speech and knowledge.

\(^{152}\) Whitmarsh, Greek Literature and the Roman Empire, 6.


become unsuitable for literary creation. In other words, it distinguished this group from the broad masses as those who had command of the best Greek. In particular, it demonstrated the possession of wealth and leisure required to attain such a skill. Thus it became in some ways the epitome of Greek παιδεία, since it was an extension of the already spoken language, yet still outside the grasp of the majority. In summarising this period, Preston states:

Paideia can be understood as both the formal education of the elite and the wider culture shared by the Greek local elites. This common culture has been taken to include expertise in public speaking; knowledge, and therefore deployment, of a shared stock of historical paradigms and literary texts; an ability to use a highly artificial, ‘Atticizing’ dialect of Greek; and a common aristocratic ethos. Wealth provided the means for acquisition and display of paideia; paideia differentiated the elite from the uneducated and uncultured masses and was one means of legitimising elite political authority.

Παιδεία, and in particular, expertise in Atticism, was a means by which the elite could separate themselves from the lower status; but at the same time, it also served to distinguish elite Greeks from Romans. Joy Connolly says, “Greek writers of the Empire view themselves as natural heirs of the fifth- and fourth-century traditions—and consequently, their conception of education is closely interlocked with the classical discursive structures of rhetoric and politics.” She goes on to show that rhetoric still had a fixed place in the imperial Greek παιδεία that prepared students for political life, but with the consolidation of the Empire brought with it a growing trend towards classicism in arts and letters, the most extreme manifestation being in the push towards the “pure” Attic standard. This, she argues, came as a result of the changes in Greek political experience beginning in the first century C.E. and

155 However, the difference between someone trained in Koine and another in Attic was not the same as between an uneducated and an educated person, rather it demonstrated different degrees along an educated continuum. See Simon Swain, Hellenism and Empire: Language, Classicism, and Power in the Greek World AD 50-250 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 20. Epictetus, whose works are written in Koine, is accused of being “nothing at all, his language was full of solecisms and barbarisms” (Epictetus, Diatr. 3.9.14).
157 But this desire for perfection of style could easily get out of hand, as Plutarch (Rect. rat. aud. 42D; similarly, Virt. prof. 79D) notes, “He who at the very outset does not stick to the subject matter, but insists that the style shall be pure Attic and severely plain, is like the man who is unwilling to swallow an antidote for a poison unless the cup be of the finest Attic ware, or unwilling to put on an overcoat in winter unless the wool be from Attic sheep, but must needs sit still and inactive, with a delicate thin jacket of Lysias’ s language cast over him. Indeed, this sort of unhealthiness has produced much barrenness of mind and of good sense, much foolery and bibble-babble in the schools, since younger men do not keep in view the life, the actions, and the public conduct of a man who follows philosophy, but rate as matters for commendation points of style and phrasing, and a fine delivery, while as for what is being delivered, whether it be useful or useless, whether essential or empty and superfluous, they neither understand nor wish to inquire.”
159 Joy Connolly, “Problems of the Past in Imperial Greek Education,” in Education in Greek and Roman Antiquity, ed. by Yun Lee Too (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 341.
160 Ibid., 344.
lead to “conscious attempts to recall the past through linguistic and literary archaising, in order to simultaneously enhance the Greek cultural pride and to exclude Romans from participation in the practices of Greek heritage.”  

In other words, for Greeks in the Roman Empire, “cultural” activity—and in particular writing ‘literature’—was a fundamental means of constructing a Greek identity discrete from Rome. Since Greek identity could not be grounded in the real political world, it instead found its place in the cultural domain, and did so as loudly as possible. However, in as much as παιδεία in this period served as a means of distinguishing elite Greeks, it also served as an intermediary between Greece and Rome.

3.5.2 Atticism and Hellenisation

Since the fifth century B.C.E., παιδεία played a centrally constitutive role in defining what it was to be Greek. But as Whitmarsh has demonstrated, with Greece’s conquest by Rome, παιδεία took on a new layer of complexity, in that it played a fundamental role in Rome’s own narrative of self-definition.

On the one hand, in terms of cultural definition, Rome used the advent of Greek paideia as a narrative stage in Roman history, marking the transition from origins to civilisation … On the other hand, in terms of competitive ambition within the Roman hierarchy, the possession of Greek education … could be used as a counter in the game of elite self-positioning … Rome invented the equation of Hellenism exclusively with ‘culture’: in this Roman market-place, Greek learning was a commodity that could be bought and sold, displayed or excoriated for its decadence.

In this setting, “‘Greekness’ was constituted by an aggregation of civilised and intellectual virtues … the most important of these being paideia; in this respect then, every citizen had the

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161 Ibid., 346.
162 Whitmarsh, Greek Literature and the Roman Empire, 20.
163 Swain, Hellenism and Empire, 89. Although, caution should be exercised here. Whitmarsh (Greek Literature and the Roman Empire, 18) rightly notes that “Greek pepaideumenoi were amongst the most empowered of provincials. Almost all of the authors discussed in this book are known to have been Roman citizens (and none are known not to have been), some (notably Plutarch, Arrian, and Philostratus) figures of some considerable influence at Rome. Greeks of the highest socio-economic ranks were, during this period, increasingly implicated in structures of Roman power: ever larger numbers of elite Greeks acted as intermediaries between their cities and Rome. Preston (“Roman Questions, Greek Answers: Plutarch and the Construction of Identity,” 91) offers a helpful way through this seeming paradox when she says, “Elite acquisition of Roman citizenship, and then of imperial office, as well as a community of interests shared with oligarchic elites throughout the Empire, suggests, almost paradoxically, that the Greek elite were in many ways the most Romanised of the population in the East. Yet, as the most educated and culturally proficient, and in their claim to cultural authority as guardians of classical heritage, they could also be seen as the most Greek. The Greek elite, then, had to make sense both of a real loss of autonomy and of the tensions involved in pursuing local and imperial office, in being both Roman and Greek.”
164 Whitmarsh, Greek Literature and the Roman Empire, 9.
165 Ibid., 14–15.
capacity to be a Hellene.” Whitmarsh suggests that “the notion of Greekness was not by now coterminous with ethnicity; it was a socially constructed style, one strand in a skein of valorized concepts (civilisation, intelligence, manliness) which could not be disentangled meaningfully.” We see this in the example of Favorinus (ca. 80 C.E.–160 C.E.), a sophist from Gaul, of whom Philostratus says that “though he was a Gaul, he led the life of a Hellene.” Favorinus had made such an impression on the Corinthians that they had a bronze statue set up to honour him; this he felt to be warranted, since, as a Gaul, he had thoroughly adopted the Greek culture in language, thought, manners and dress, “and that too with such mastery and manifest success as no one among the Romans of early days or the Greeks of his own time had achieved … aiming,” he says, “to achieve one thing at the cost of all else, namely, not only to seem Greek but to be Greek too.”

3.5.3 Atticism and Augustus’ “Moral Revolution”

Atticism then, not only created a mechanism by which Greek elites could be more clearly defined, it also served the same function for Roman elites. For them, the Attic style of oratory provided a convenient model by which to define the Roman man. Spawforth has recently discussed the “moral revolution” of Augustus in the early part of the Empire. The chief concerns of this restoration were addressing the perceived moral decline of the late Republic and reasserting traditional gender roles. As a major feature of this gender focus was the value of Atticism as fitting for Roman men:

For Romans the genus Atticum in oratory, whether Latin or Greek, came to define subjectively a manner of speaking which could be claimed to conform to Roman standards of excellence and moral propriety. Athens provided a canon of Greek orators with specific stylistic traits which Romans sought to imitate, whether speaking in Latin or Greek, because they were perceived as embodying ‘Roman’ qualities. Since educated Romans saw Athens as the cradle of civilisation, the idea(l) of Athens provided them with a metaphorical point of reference: in a linguistic context, Athens symbolised purity … For a variety of reasons therefore, Roman admiration for the genus Atticum long outlived the Augustan age.

166 Ibid., 21.
168 Philostratus, Vit. soph. 489.
169 Dio, Or. 37.25.
170 Anthony Spawforth, Greece and the Augustan Cultural Revolution, (GCRW; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 264. The continued admiration amongst Roman orators of the Attic style is clearly seen in Quintilian. In contrast to the Asiatic style, he describes it as “concise and healthy … remarkable for the absence of all superfluity.” He suggests that the difference in styles is attributable to the character both of the orators and the audiences whom they addressed: “The Athenians, with their polish and refinement, refused to tolerate emptiness and redundancy, while the Asiatics, being naturally given to bombast and ostentation, were puffed up with a passion for a more vainglorious style of eloquence” (Inst. 12.10.16–17). Moreover, he states
This conscious revival of classical Athens by both Greeks and Romans was naturally reflected in the materials set for students to read. Theon’s *Progymnasmata*, dated to the first century C.E., was a set of literary exercises designed to train the student of oratory in literary and rhetorical composition.\(^\text{171}\) It was effectively a “bridge” between the second and third levels of education as well as an entrée, at level three, to declamation.\(^\text{172}\) In the gathering texts for the various exercises, Theon states that “first of all, the teacher should collect good examples of each exercise from ancient prose work and assign them to the young to be learned by heart.”\(^\text{173}\) By ancient, he is referring to the classical writings of the fifth and fourth centuries B.C.; the works he lists include Plato’s *Republic*, *Symposium*, and *Phaedo*, Xenophon’s *Memorabilia*, various speeches of Demosthenes and Isocrates, and others.\(^\text{174}\) These exercises were crucial for laying a foundation for elite discourse and would also have helped to inculcate certain modes of thinking about language and about the relation of the individual to those texts.\(^\text{175}\) Moreover, these preliminary exercises equipped speakers with a store of techniques of presentation and argumentation and a set of common narratives, personae, and values to appeal to.\(^\text{176}\)

\(\Pi\sigma\iota\delta\iota\alpha\) then, from classical times through to our period, was unchanging in that it was always seen as a means of (elite) citizen training. However, by the first century, the possession of \(\Pi\sigma\iota\delta\iota\alpha\) had become a distinctive mark of the elite and cultured. This person was characterised by a proficiency in both classical texts and Attic Greek language.

**Conclusion**

To summarise our discussion, education, at every point, served as a tool for maintaining the social order by placing people in appropriate niches in society.\(^\text{177}\) It usually occurred in the context of political theory, its function being to produce people suited to bring about or

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\(^\text{171}\) Though it is generally dated to the first century, there is suggestion that it was a later composition; for discussion, see Malcolm Heath, “Theon and the History of the Progymnasmata,” *GRBS* 43 (2002): 129–160.


\(^\text{174}\) Ibid., 9–11.


\(^\text{176}\) Ibid.

\(^\text{177}\) Cribiore, *Gymnastics of the Mind: Greek Education in Hellenistic and Roman Egypt*, 9; Whitmarsh, *Greek Literature and the Roman Empire*, 94; König, “Education,” 396.
maintain whatever political organisation the author proposed for a particular state. It furnished students with an adult identity, a status of mature, active, decision-making subjects. Overall, it was training for life; a process of enculturation that moulded a young man into an elite citizen, and a means by which he could define himself from the rest, namely, cognitive superiority through literary education. But in the early Empire, we see a deliberate revival of classical authors and values as well as the language in which they were written. This was true for both Roman and Greek education, where we see virtually identical values being shared amongst their authors. In other words, what we find in our period can truly be described as “Graeco-Roman παιδεία.”

This understanding of first-century παιδεία will frame the rest of this investigation. It was a characteristic by which a person was honoured. It was a mark of culture that set its possessor apart from the common masses who could simply not afford to be educated. It was what determined a person’s fitness to engage in public service and was what prepared a person for civic leadership. Overall, it was part of a humanistic worldview, characterised by a set of virtues and beliefs at odds with the humble message of the cross. It was in many ways the antithesis of the Christian message; it was the “wisdom” that saw as “foolish” a crucified messiah. Moreover, as this thesis will demonstrate, it was the possession of παιδεία by some members of the Christian community at Corinth that was causing problems. This then, begs the question: was it possible for a Corinthian Christian to have received παιδεία?

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179 Whitmarsh, Greek Literature and the Roman Empire, 94.

180 Plutarch, An. virt. doc. 439C–D.

181 Morgan, Literate Education in the Hellenistic and Roman Worlds, 270.
CHAPTER 4: PRELIMINARY ISSUES

I am suggesting in this thesis that at the heart of the conflict in Corinth is a clash of values informed by Graeco-Roman παιδεία. The most obvious objection to this proposal, however, is whether or not anyone in the Christian community was financially capable of receiving such an education, since this was the exclusive domain of the elite. In this chapter I will seek to demonstrate that it was indeed possible for at least a small few (bearing in mind that many of the problems in the Corinth seem to stem from only a few prominent members) in the Christian community to have had sufficient means to be educated. Moreover, it will be suggested that it was one of the major features of παιδεία, namely competition, which was at work in the divisions.

The chapter itself will proceed in two independent but complimentary sections. In the first section, we will look at the evidence for wealth and social advancement in first-century Corinth. From this it will be suggested that it is indeed plausible to see in the Christian community a few wealthy, prominent citizens. In the second section, we will look at Paul’s own education, suggesting that at the heart of the conflict over himself and Apollos is not an absolute lack of παιδεία on Paul’s part; rather it is a perceived inferiority in comparison to Apollos.

4.1 Social Status and Wealth in the First Century

Though it is generally understood that the first-century world consisted of very strictly defined ranks and a vast chasm between the elite and non-elite, some studies have shown that there was in fact the possibility for lower status citizens to move up the social ladder. In such a setting, an upwardly mobile person, even though of low rank, could, through various connections or business opportunities, attain a high level of wealth and status. Moreover, their sons, by attaining an education, could eventually be considered among the elite. After all, the prerequisite for an education was wealth, not birth.

Weaver argues that “A considerable degree of flexibility in the working of the system of stratification was permitted, and was indeed inescapable, if the basic structure was not to be

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strained and break down in social discontent and revolution.”² He notes the status dissonance within the Empire, particularly within the Familia Caesaris, whereby slaves, by virtue of their responsibility and access to the emperor, could potentially have greater status than the plebs and even equestrians.³ Moreover, having become freedmen, they could also attain important positions in the bureaucracy through the skills they acquired in the emperor’s service and even rank among the elite propertied classes.⁴ These studies are helpful in that they allow for the possibility of a slightly less rigid social structure, but what happened in Caesar’s house may have had relatively little bearing in a province like Achaia so far from the capital. We must therefore look to other indications of similar flexibility within the broader empire.

4.1.1 A Picture of Corinth

Cities like Corinth followed a typical tripartite structure: the citizen body, the city council (who were the elite decurions), and the annually elected magistrates.⁵ Little needs to be said about this structure here, only to note that, as in the wider culture, there was a large gap between the few ruling elite and the rest of the population. But a study by Purcell has attempted to fill in this vast gap of ruling elite and non-elite. He has shown that below the orders of equestrian and decurion, was a lower status group of apparitores. These were the scribes, messengers, lictors, and heralds who served the magistrates and together formed a collective body known as the decuria.⁶ This group in fact considered themselves an order in their own right.⁷ Purcell calls the apparitorial world one “of social climbers” and notes from the evidence we have that it consisted largely of freedmen.⁸ An apparitorial position earned its holder an income, but more importantly, it brought them into the world of the elite, where, through useful contacts, an even more profitable future could be made.⁹ And indeed this was

³ Ibid., 5; Meeks, The First Urban Christians, 72–73. Gerd Theissen (“The Social Structure of Pauline Communities: Some Critical Remarks on J.J. Meggitt, Paul, Poverty and Survival,” JSNT 84 [2001]: 68) suggests that “The early Christian groups might have comprised rich and educated as well as poor and uneducated people, but all had a deficit inasmuch as they all belonged to a deviant minority.”
⁷ Ibid., 134.
⁸ Ibid., 136–137.
⁹ Ibid., 138.
at times the case, with examples of many eventually reaching equestrian rank and others achieving spectacular wealth and social success. He concludes that “The apparitorial position provided an excellent entrée into the world of patronage which characterised Roman public life. It constituted, like certain other social institutions of the Roman world, a licensed mechanism for social mobility.”

In other words, a citizen with some means in a city like Corinth would have had at least potential access to these positions, thus opening up to them the higher levels of the city council. But Corinth, at least in its earlier years, provided other opportunities to move up the ladder.

Spawforth has noted several interesting features of the Roman colony. First, due to its original colonists including of a large percentage of freedmen, the colony provided opportunities for freedmen and their families to rise to high status and hold important magisterial positions. In fact, Spawforth argues that “It is fair to surmise that colonial Corinth’s reputation for being ‘freedman-friendly’ continued to attract freedmen in the years after the foundation.” An example of this success is an early Corinthian resident and prominent benefactor, Cn. Babbius Philinus. Philinus, according to West, was probably a freedman and throughout his career had been a pontifex and duovir. Spawforth has also

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10 Ibid., 150; Wiseman, New Men in the Roman Senate, 139 B.C.-A.D. 14, 73.
12 Ibid., 171. Garnsey and Saller (The Roman Empire, 116) have argued that the presence of this “order” demonstrates a sizable heterogeneous group of men that can be distinguished from both the elite orders and the humble masses. The apparitores, he suggests, are but a small part of this group. At the same time though, their presence also serves to reinforce the dichotomy, since their rank derived from their position as an appendage to the ruling elite.
13 For recent discussion of the economic development of the Peloponnese during the early imperial period, see A. D. Rizakis, “Peloponnesian Cities under Roman Rule: the New Political Geography and its Economic and Social Repercussions,” in Society, Economy, and Culture under the Roman Empire: Continuity and Innovation, ed. by A. D. Rizakis and CL. E. Lepenioti, vol. 3, Roman Peloponnes (Athens: Research Institute for Greek and Roman Antiquity, 2010), 1–18.
14 Anthony Spawforth, “Roman Corinth: the Formation of a Colonial Elite,” in Roman Onomastics in the Greek East: Social and Political Aspects, ed. by A. D. Rizakis, Meletenata 21 (Athens: Research Centre for Greek and Roman Antiquity, 1996), 169. In Caesar’s colonies, exceptions were made so that the early founders, who were mostly freedmen, were able to hold magistracies; however this was a unique feature of Caesar’s colonies that was revoked under the Augustan regime. See Donald W. Engels, Roman Corinth: an Alternative Model for the Classical City (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 67. To be sure, these positions were also available to the veteran settlers as well, that is, the ex-soldiers of Caesar’s armies. L. J. F. Keppie (Colonisation and Veteran Settlement in Italy, 47-14 B.C. [London: British School at Rome, 1983], 105) suggests that “The prospect of enhanced social status was one of the most sought after consequences of land settlement, and a powerful incentive to loyalty.” He notes that veterans with allotments of close to 100 iugera (i.e., centurions and tribunes), by virtue of the capital value of their land, would be brought close to, if not within, the required property value of decurions.
suggested that Babbius was probably one of the original colonists.\textsuperscript{17} His descendants were also men of high standing. His son, Babbius Magnus, and grandson Babbius Maximus both held important positions in Delphi.\textsuperscript{18}

A second feature that Spawforth notes is the commercial attractions of the city, which attracted both Roman and Greek negotiatores. These he suggests were often wealthy enough upon arrival in the city to establish themselves and their dependants as leading families and hold the highest magistracies, including duovir, duovir quinquennalis and Isthmian agonothete. Others, he suggests, would be moneylenders attracted by the prospect of making profitable (what Spawforth calls) “pump-priming” loans.\textsuperscript{19}

A final feature he notes is the sudden influx under the Claudian and Neronian reigns of office-holding Greeks from neighbouring cities, once again, holding the highest posts including two who were Isthmian agonothetes. This sudden influx, Spawforth suggests, is possibly due to the increased status of Corinth as the provincial capital and the increased opportunity for exposure to the governor.\textsuperscript{20}

In addition to the agonothetes, it has also been shown that, during the early part of the first century, there was a sub-elite group known as the Augustales active in Corinth. This was group was comprised mostly of freedmen, and formed a second ordo beneath the decurions. Their wealth placed them above the plebs but they lacked the legal status to enter the ordo decurionum.\textsuperscript{21} The evidence of their activity, it has been argued, “provides an index of the colony’s wealth, which must have extended beyond the members of the ordo decurionum.”\textsuperscript{22}

\textsuperscript{17} Spawforth, “Roman Corinth: the Formation of a Colonial Elite,” 169. For an overview of his career, see Engels, \textit{Roman Corinth}, 68–69.


\textsuperscript{19} Spawforth, “Roman Corinth: the Formation of a Colonial Elite,” 171–172. This potential for financial affluence is possibly reflected in Dirk Jongkind’s (“Corinth in the First Century AD: The Search for Another Class,” \textit{TynBul} 52, no. 1 [2001]: 148) study of housing in Corinth. He suggests that the diversity of types and sizes of houses would indicate varying degrees of wealth; that is, a society that cannot be simply divided into elite and very poor non-elite (contra Meggitt), but rather a slightly more diversified community that included a “middle class” that could possess some kind of luxury.


\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., 88. P. D. Scotton (“Imperial Cult and Imperial Recognition,” in \textit{Roman Colonies in the First Century of Their Foundations}, ed. by Rebecca J. Sweetman [Oxford: Oxbow Books, 2011], 80) has recently noted that in the late Augustan period, there was also an extensive building program as a result of both imperial
Building on the work of Spawforth, James Walters looks at the original foundation of Corinth as a Roman colony and the subsequent degree of Romanisation in the following years. He suggests, like Spawforth, that even from an early stage in the colony’s history there would have been a significant Greek population with many coming to the city from surrounding regions. He further suggests that the increase of Greek office holders is evidence of both Greek elites becoming Roman, and, at the same time, Corinth becoming more Greek. This increasing presence of local Greek elites in the *ordo decurionum* was significant. Walters notes that it was the city decurions who managed the public cults and *collegia*; it was their job to select, organise and arrange the finance of civic cults. “But,” he argues, “the civic identity of Roman Corinth was changing rapidly during the first century C.E., and these changes resulted in a growing ambiguity in the population’s civic religious identity, producing decurions and magistrates who were less likely to police private religious associations in the city.” This meant that in Corinth, individuals and groups would have had more freedom to define their own religious identities; the result being a climate where groups like the Christians could assemble in their households without the same level of hostility or suspicion of other cities. Walters concludes that

Paradoxically, the lack of conflict with outsiders resulted in more internal conflicts, because potential converts faced fewer of the social pressures that would have deterred persons of status from converting. Corinth—and the Corinthian Christian community—permitted persons of varying social strata, varying levels of commitment, and varying sorts of allegiances to identify in some measure with the church. Conflict was inevitable.

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24 Ibid., 409. Jesper Madsen (“The Romanization of the Greek elite in Achaia, Asia and Bithynia: Greek Resistance or Regional Discrepancies?” [n.d.]: 27, http://www.pontos.dk/publications/papers-presented-ormally/oral-files/Mad_romanisationelite.pdf [accessed May 4, 2011]) suggests that “What was important to members of the Greek elite was the possibility of becoming part of the ruling elite and thereby gaining political influence. To become part of the imperial elite and obtain the important personal privileges was essential and provided the best possible conditions for their personal status and that of their cities of origin.”

25 Walters, “Civic Identity in Roman Corinth and Its Impact on Early Christianity,” 409. In regard to the religious and political life of the Peloponnesian cities, Rizakis (“Peloponnesian Cities under Roman Rule: the New Political Geography and its Economic and Social Repercussions,” 13) says that “The Romans did intervene in their religious sphere and left the cities free to organise their own traditional religious life.”


27 Ibid., 416.

28 Ibid.
The picture of Corinth (in its early years) is that of a city which presented possibly rare opportunities for social mobility, especially for freedmen. In fact, the numerous studies present us with an image of a city with a sizable population consisting of an elite, freedman base, landholders, labourers, itinerant merchants, and a share of urban destitution. It also drew to itself wealthy business people and families seeking to capitalise on Corinth’s exceptional trade opportunities. Furthermore, its status as the provincial capital and esteemed status in the region would make it the logical place to be for those with ambitions for Roman offices. All in all, Corinth provided possibly the best opportunities for its citizens, and those from neighbouring cities, to gain wealth and status. It could be reasonably argued then, that obtaining an education would be an important pursuit for the citizens who could afford it. In this setting, it would be easy to imagine a wealthy Corinthian freedman who had capitalised on the financial opportunities of the early city setting up his own sons with the necessary capital for success (i.e., παιδεία and free born status), which in fact seems to be the case with Babbius, discussed above.

A herm, which was discovered in the gymnasium complex in Corinth, lists several athletic officials and victors. One of the xystarchs named is Gnaeus Babbius Italicus, who, as Wiseman suggests, was also probably the son of Philinus. The fact that he is listed amongst the important associates of the gymnasium may well suggest that Italicus had received an education there; though this is impossible to say for sure, it is certainly likely if he has become a benefactor for the complex. If this is correct, then we have at least one example of a freedman gaining enough wealth to give his son the necessary means for social advancement, that is, an education. Though speculative, it is very likely that there were several, if not many, examples like this of the early colonists making it big and subsequently giving their sons the means to further climb the ladder. If my argument is correct, then it would not be too much of a leap to suggest that by the mid-first century, there would have been any number of educated sons of these men. This is made more plausible, as the rest of this thesis will demonstrate, when we consider the general educational climate in the city. What remains to be asked is this:

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30 This was certainly not unheard of. We see in the life of Horace (*Sat.* 1.6.70–80) an example of a freedman father establishing a son’s career by giving him an education. Speaking to his patron Maecenas, he tells him that he was the son of a poor farmer who took him to Rome to be educated in the schools where knights and senators sent their boys.

could some of the Christians have come from these newly wealthy and educated circles? It is to this question we will now turn.

4.2 Were There Any Educated Corinthian Christians?

I have already suggested that the prerequisite for an education is wealth. Whether or not the educated elite who were causing issues for Paul were decurions or held municipal offices is beside the point; what is of concern is, did they or their families have the necessary means to afford an education?

4.2.1 A Response to Friesen’s “Poverty Scale”

I take as my starting point in this thesis the opinion that there were at least a few members in the Corinthian Christian community wealthy enough to gain an education, and possibly even be men of significant resources and power. However, since such an abundance of discussion over the social status of the early Christians already exists, any further engagement of the issue would be somewhat superfluous. I therefore refer the reader to the many discussions found throughout NT scholarship on the issue.32 However, I do wish to briefly discuss one of the major arguments against the “new consensus.” Steven J. Friesen is highly critical of this position, arguing, “Paul’s congregations were probably composed mostly of individuals living near, at, or below subsistence level. Leadership within the congregations seems to have come mostly from the families of those living near subsistence level and those with moderate

surplus resources.” Friesen’s picture of a Christian community made up almost exclusively of impoverished people is derived from his general conception of the Roman economy. This is a world where, in his words:

Almost everyone lives near the level of subsistence, but there is a very small wealthy elite that controls commerce and politics. In between the masses and the elite there is no economic middle class, because a preindustrial society has so few economic mechanisms for gaining significant wealth. Some people do, however, manage to achieve moderate surplus income for various reasons, and these people occupy the large gap between the elite and the masses. I have emphasised the last sentence, because even in such an extreme assessment, Friesen still allows the possibility for some level of wealth in the “middle.” In fact, Friesen admits that “some of the resident leaders in the Pauline churches had moderate disposable income, and hence were somewhat above average in status as well.”

To demonstrate the overall levels of wealth, Friesen gives the following “Poverty Scale” (PS) as a categorical breakdown of the various socio-economic stations of the population. The percentiles given here are from a subsequent table where he measures the actual percentage of people in each category based on a city of 10,000 people or more:

- **PS 1 Imperial Elite**: imperial dynasty, Roman senatorial families, some retainers, local royalty, some freedpersons (0.04%)*
- **PS 2 Regional or Provincial Elite**: equestrian families, provincial officials, some retainers, some decurial families, some freedpersons, some retired military officers (1%)*
- **PS 3 Municipal Elite**: most decurial families, wealthy men and women who do not hold office, some freedpersons, some retainers, some veterans, some merchants (1.76%)*
- **PS 4 Moderate**: some merchants, some traders, some freedpersons, some artisans

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34 Ibid., 364; emphasis mine.
35 Ibid., 368.
Surplus Resources (especially those who employ others), military veterans (7%)

PS 5 Near
Subsistence Level
many merchants and traders, regular wage earners, artisans, large shop owners, freedpersons, some farm families (22%)

PS 6 At Subsistence Level
small farm families, labourers (skilled and unskilled), artisans (especially those employed by others), wage earners, most merchants and traders, small shop/tavern owners (40%)*

PS 7 Below Subsistence Level
some farm families, unattached widows, orphans, beggars, disabled persons, unskilled day labourers, prisoner (28%)*

* Indicates figures that Friesen admits are speculative.\(^{38}\)

He then notes ten individuals and eight groups for which we have some indication of economic situations; however, the only clear references to people above the poverty level are individuals.\(^ {39}\) These few, he suggests, had moderate disposable income and he lists them accordingly:

Chloe: PS 4
Gaius: PS 4
Erastus: PS 4–5
Philemon: PS 4–5
Phoebe: PS 4–5
Aquila: PS 4–5
Prisca: PS 4–5

From this model, he makes the following conclusions about the Pauline churches:

\(^{38}\) Regarding PS4–5, Friesen (“Poverty in Pauline Studies: Beyond the So-Called New Consensus,” 367) admits that “Unfortunately, it is currently impossible to measure this middle-income group (PS4) given the current state of our knowledge. The task of measurement is made even more complicated by the fact that we know little about the number of people who were near, but safely above, the subsistence level (PS5). These two categories together must have made up around 29% of the population, based on simple subtraction of the other groups from the urban population that are better established, but it is impossible to go beyond this point with any precision. It is possible to speculate that PS4 was much smaller than PS5 because of the endemic character of poverty in the Roman Empire, because of structural impediments in the economy, and because of the large amounts of wealth required to move up the poverty scale.”

1. Paul’s letters provide no evidence for any assembly participation from members of the superwealthy elite (PS 1–3).
2. Of the individuals about whom we have economic information, at least one or two and a maximum of seven can be classified as having moderate surplus resources.
3. Most of the people in Paul’s congregations—including Paul himself—lived near the level of subsistence, either above it or below.

There are several concerns with this model, however, that would cast doubt over his effectiveness in describing the Corinthian situation. First, by Friesen’s own admission, the percentages he offers here are speculative; moreover, the categories, though perhaps helpful, are still ambiguous. For example, PS 4 and 5 fill in what would be the “middle,” that is, the large gap between ultra “rich” and ultra “poor.” While it would be correct to assume that the people who filled these categories were a smaller sector of the population, there is no way of being certain how many there were exactly. In fact, a recent article by Bruce Longenecker has demonstrated some significant weaknesses in Friesen’s methodology. He shows that a more suitable figure for PS 4 should be around 17%, and PS 5 around 25%. This revision broadens the “middle” sector somewhat, and in his view, is necessitated by, amongst other things, the evidence of groups such as apparitores (discussed above) and Augustales.

Moreover, in my own view, these artificial distinctions suggested by Friesen would vary from city to city, thus blurring the lines between them. For example, what would be considered sufficient resources to categorise one as “moderate surplus” (PS 4) in one city, might only be considered enough to categorise the same person as “near subsistence level” (PS 5) in another. Or again, the difficulty for a person to penetrate the category above might be easier in one city to the next. This would be particularly true in Corinth where there appear to be more opportunities to make wealth and thus climb higher on the poverty scale. Furthermore, the presence of freedmen in every category shows that these levels are not defined by birth or

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40 Though he says that Phoebe and Erastus present possible exceptions, “from what we know of the general economy, however, the odds are greatly against this” (Ibid., 368).
42 I am not suggesting a “middle class,” merely a group of people who would not have the means to be considered “elite,” but at the same time, more than would warrant the term “distribute.” See Martin’s cautionary remarks regarding the term “middle class” in Martin, “Review Essay: Justin J. Meggitt, Paul, Poverty and Survival,” 53–54. See also, Meeks, The First Urban Christians, 53.
44 For his full argument, see Longenecker, Remember the Poor, 317–332; Bruce W. Longenecker, “Exposing the Economic Middle: A Revised Economy Scale for the Study of Early Urban Christianity,” JSNT 31, no. 3 (2009): 243–278.
45 A recent series of studies on Roman colonies has challenged the extent and validity of Romanisation; against the idea of colonies being a “mini-Rome,” it is suggested that “it is now becoming clear that no two colonies are alike, and a blueprint for such a Roman foundation can hardly be defined with any precision.” See Rebecca J. Sweetman, ed., Roman Colonies in the First Century of Their Foundations (Oxford: Oxbow Books, 2011), 1–2.
education; rather, as Friesen notes, they represent simply various levels of disposable income. In other words, according to Friesen’s model there is a fluid “middle level” of wealth that is filled by anyone with disposable income; the only scaling factor seems to be the amount of disposable income; a measure which would be impossible for us to determine.\textsuperscript{46} Second, Friesen’s placement of the “better off” church members seems arbitrary at best. He correctly categorises them as having disposable income, but the suggestion that it was only “moderate” seems to be an \textit{a priori} judgement, moreover, it is not very clearly defined. Looking at his first two examples (Chloe and Gaius), he has categorised them as PS4; while it may be the case that they do fall into this category, there is nothing to suggest that this is actually the case; in fact the evidence we have would probably place them higher. We know that Chloe was able to supply the provisions for members of her household to travel to Ephesus in order to report to Paul on the state of the church (1 Cor 1:11).\textsuperscript{47} We also know that Stephanas had a household (1 Cor 16:15–17),\textsuperscript{48} as did Gaius (1 Cor 1:11; Rom 16:23), whose house could apparently accommodate the whole congregation. But this is all we know. However, if house ownership were an indicator of wealth, as Filson noted many years ago, then there is nothing to suggest that they should only be rated as PS4, and in fact the evidence would suggest that at least Gaius should rate higher.\textsuperscript{49} Moreover, Crispus (who is not mentioned in Friesen’s list), as the former ἀρχισυνάγωγος must have been a man of significant means to fulfil that role.\textsuperscript{50} In addition, as the proliferation of studies has demonstrated, it is very likely that Erastus, who Kent suggests was a freedman who became extremely successful, would have filled the official role of aedile, placing him well above the station of PS4–5 as Friesen has here suggested.\textsuperscript{51}

\textsuperscript{46} Theissen (“The Social Structure of Pauline Communities: Some Critical Remarks on J.J. Meggitt, Paul, Poverty and Survival,” 72) argues against the idea of a homogenous mass struggling for survival, he suggests that “The social homogeneity of so many people is extremely unlikely in sociological terms. Such a huge mass must have been socially structured. And there is indeed evidence for significant socio-economic differences within them.”

\textsuperscript{47} Welborn (\textit{An End to Enmity}, 234) considers her to be a person of some financial means.

\textsuperscript{48} Meeks (\textit{The First Urban Christians}, 57) sees him as high status, but perhaps not as high as Crispus or Gaius; similarly, Theissen, “The Social Structure of Pauline Communities: Some Critical Remarks on J.J. Meggitt, Paul, Poverty and Survival,” 82.

\textsuperscript{49} Floyd V. Filson, “The Significance of the Early House Churches,” \textit{JBL}, 58, no. 2 (1939): 110. See a similar discussion by Martin (“Review Essay: Justin J. Meggitt, Paul, Poverty and Survival,” 55–56, 62) who argues that various indicators of wealth would had to have created a distinction amongst the poor. Welborn (\textit{An End to Enmity}, 247) has treated the wealth and influence of Gaius extensively, concluding that he would have been a person of high social class.


\textsuperscript{51} So much has been said regarding the identification of Erastus the Aedile from the Corinthian pavement (Kent, \textit{The Inscriptions}, 1926–1950, vol. 8, no. 232) with Erastus ὁ Ὀἰκονόμος τῆς Πόλεως of Rom 16:23, that further discussion here would seem redundant; therefore, I will only mention some of the main studies and
Third, Friesen’s list only includes those members we know of from Paul’s letters, but there were obviously many others in the church. Indeed, it would seem that the ones causing the problems for Paul in 1 Cor 1–4 remain unnamed. These moreover, as I will suggest, appear to be educated, thus assuming a higher level of surplus resources. This would then place them somewhere between PS 4–3, or possibly even PS2. Admittedly, only a small percentage of any city would rate amongst the PS 4–2, but in 1 Cor 1–4, we are probably only dealing with one or two people who are causing the problems.

various viewpoints. Against the suggestion that they are the same person, Justin J. Meggitt (“The Social Status of Erastus [Rom 16:23],” NovT 38, no. 3 [1996]: 223) argues that “It is improbable that the Erastus of Rom 16:23 is identifiable with the figure mentioned in the Corinthian inscription. We can conclude therefore that, despite the current fashion to the contrary, Erastus’ socio-economic situation was most likely indistinguishable from that of his fellow believers.” Henry J. Cadbury (“Erastus of Corinth,” JBL 50, no. 2 [1931]: 58) also denied the connection between the Erasti, suggesting that οἰκονόμος is more likely equivalent to the position of arcarius. This would have been a position held by a slave or someone of servile origin, though he may often have been wealthy; Cadbury argues from this that it would be improbable if not impossible for any man’s cursus honorum to contain both arcarius and aedilis. Friesen argues similarly. See Steven J. Friesen, “The Wrong Erastus: Ideology, Archaeology and Exegesis,” in Corinth in Context, ed. by James C. Walters, Daniel N. Schowalter, and Steven J. Friesen (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 246.

The most recent and thorough treatment in favour of the connection is in Welborn’s An End to Enmity, where he looks at the various scholarship on the issue as well as considering the epigraphic evidence (260–282). Bruce W. Winter (Seek the Welfare of the City: Christians as Benefactors and Citizens [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994], 195) suggests that Paul’s mention of him was a way of providing an example to the wealthier Christians of how they themselves should act as city benefactors. Oscar Brooneer (“Corinth: Center of St. Paul’s Missionary Work in Greece,” BD 14, no. 4 [1951]: 78–96) also sees them as one and the same person. Clarke (Secular and Christian Leadership in Corinth, 56) is more hesitant to associate the two, but he does not rule it out as a possibility. “Regardless of any direct connection, there is the firm probability that in the Erastus of Rom 16:23, there is a figure who was one of the established people of Corinth, and was in a position to offer hospitality to the whole church of Corinth.” For similar discussion, see Andrew D. Clarke, “Another Corinthian Erastus Inscription,” TynBul 42, no. 1 (1991): 146–151. David G. Horrell (Social Ethics of the Corinthian Correspondence: Interests and Ideology from 1 Corinthians to 1 Clement, [SNTW; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2000], 97) concurs with this position. Equally uncertain is David W. J. Gill (“Erastus the Aedile,” TynBul 40 [1989]: 300) but, “at the very least it is clear that Paul is here reminding the Christians to take an active role in the running of the city, just like Erastus the oikonomos.” Theissen (The Social Setting of Pauline Christianity, 83) sees them as the same, although he argues that οἰκονόμος is the equivalent to a quaestor, a position held by him at the time of Paul’s writing and only later did he become aedile. Meeks (The First Urban Christians, 58) seems to agree with Theissen’s conclusion, as does John K. Chow (Patronage and Power: A Study of Social Networks in Corinth, [JSNTSup 75; Sheffield: JSOT, 1992], 92–93). John K. Goodrich (“Erastus, Quaestor of Corinth: The Administrative Rank of Ο Οικονόμος Τῆς Πόλεως [Rom 16.23] in an Achaean Colony,” NTS 56, no. 1 [2010]: 90–115) has recently weighed in on this argument, citing an inscription from Patras, an Achaean colony 80 miles from Corinth, which indicates that οἰκονόμος is in fact the Greek equivalent to the Latin quaestor; he concludes that the Erastus of Rom 16:23 would also be a quaestor since as Achaean colonies, they would have the same municipal structure. Alexander Weiss (“Keine Quästoren in Korinth: Zu Goodrichs (und Theißens) These Über Das Amt Des Erastos [Röm 16.23],” NTS 56, no. 4 [2010]: 578–579) rejects this however, pointing out that Corinth, as a Caesarean colony, would have a two-tier structure (aedile, duovir), as opposed to Patras, an Augustan colony, which would have a three-tier structure (quaestor, aedile, duovir). For response, see John K. Goodrich, “Erastus of Corinth (Romans 16.23): Responding to Recent Proposals on His Rank, Status, and Faith,” NTS 57, no. 4 (2011): 583–593. This overview only touches on the complexity of the discussion, however it serves to suggest that Erastus the οἰκονόμος was very likely a member of the Corinthian church with moderate to significant wealth and is thus presented here as a good indication that some of the church members were people of means.

However, as we will see in section 10.2.1, Paul’s main detractor may in fact be Gaius. Nevertheless, it has been argued convincingly that the troubling behaviour of certain unnamed members of the congregation is indicative of wealthy citizens, see e.g., Gill, “In Search of the Social Elite in the Corinthian Church”; Winter, After Paul Left Corinth; Winter, Seek the Welfare of the City; Clarke, Secular and Christian Leadership in Corinth; Chow, Patronage and Power.
Finally, the explanatory value of this model appears to add little to earlier descriptions of ancient society. Martin, writing several years before Friesen, argues

Almost all New Testament scholars admit that although we have evidence that some early Christians enjoyed a high status relative to manual laborers, artisans, the destitute—the majority of the inhabitants of the Roman Empire—probably none of them could be called members of the highest class of the Empire. The official ruling class of the Roman Empire was a minute fraction of the population, made up of members of the highest Roman ordines ('orders')—senators, equestrians, and decurions—along with local aristocracies in the provinces. Below them were the humiliores, an economically wide-ranging category that included people who controlled considerable amounts of money (for example, many merchants) and both freedmen and freed, all of whom depended upon the labor of others for their livelihood. Below that were the ‘poor’: artisans, construction workers, and owners of small business establishments like bars, baths, and brothels. And further down still were the destitute poor: unskilled laborers, those who made do with the occasional day job, and the unemployed.  

Martin suggests that the more affluent of members of Paul’s churches fell into the middle area between true elite and poor. They would have had households that included freed persons and slaves and would have made their living from the surplus labour value of their dependents. The division in Corinth, he suggests, is between those who controlled their economic destiny and those who did not.

4.2.2 Assumptions about the Corinthian Christians

It seems that whichever way we look at it there was some kind of “middle” sector somewhere between the two extremes of wealth. Moreover, in Corinth, this group was probably larger than in many other cities. The fact that the percentage of people in this medium to high wealth range was only small does not imply a priori that no Christians could possibly be among these people; in fact, looking at prosopographical evidence, quite the opposite seems true. Even if none of these Christians were from the formal rank of decurions or equestrians (though this is still possible), they could still come from the relatively well to do; they could have possessed the marks of the elite including, among others, wealth and παιδεία. If this were the case, then in the eyes of the many low status Christians (given the public honour παιδεία received), it would have put them in a place of superiority. I take as a starting point then, the view that there were a few educated, elite Corinthians in the Christian community; it

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will then be the contention of this thesis, that it was these who were causing the problems for Paul. This leads into our next issue: what was Paul’s education, if any?

4.3 Was Paul Educated?

There has been a spate of scholarly discussion in regard to Paul’s level of education. Although some have proposed that Paul was all but uneducated, many scholars agree that he almost certainly attained at least a grammatical level of training. Schmeller states that “It is no longer disputed these days, that Paul had received a middle education [grammatical], which also included rhetoric and philosophy.” Along these lines, Blass and Debrunner have argued that

Paul exhibits a good, sometimes even elegant, style of vulgar Greek. However, almost nothing of proper classical education appears in (Paul) … yet many a good classical form or construction and many a word from the cultured literary language, indicate that Paul and Luke and the author of Hebrews must have some kind grammatical and rhetorical education.

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55 Against the notion that Paul was educated, one of the earliest and most influential voices was Adolf Deissmann. He cited Paul’s lack of literary Greek and the fact that he made no apparent attempt to write according to accepted Greek standards as clear proof that Paul stood below the educated upper class (Adolf Deissmann, Paul: a Study in Social and Religious History, trans. William E. Wilson [Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1972], 50). For critique of Deissmann, see Winter, Philo and Paul among the Sophists, 248–249. Mary E. Andrews (“Paul, Philo, and the Intellectuals,” JBL 53, no. 2 [1934]: 150–166) compares the writing of Paul to Philo, and argues that Paul makes no mention of an experience with the mode of education among Gentiles, unlike Philo’s frequent quotations and references to Greek poets betray evidence of his broad culture. Moreover, Paul’s scorn of philosophy and absence of allegorical method is in clear contrast to Philo. Again, Philo is constantly indebted to philosophers, particularly Plato, whereas Paul has no such debt; she argues that if Paul belonged to first-century intellectuals, then such references should be there. Similarly, Günther Bornkamm, Paul (Harper, 1971), 9. This kind of reasoning, however, is flawed. The most obvious criticism weighing against it is that Paul is simply not doing what Philo does. Paul makes very clear that he presents Christ and Him alone (1 Cor 2:2); the absence of Greek philosophical content in no way assumes a lack of awareness, only a lack of usage. In fact, given Paul’s determination to preach only Christ, any other content would be simply inappropriate. For other discussion of Paul’s lack of education, see e.g., Morton S. Enslin, “Paul and Gamaliel,” JR 7, no. 4 (1927): 360–375. For similar arguments, see Osvaldo Padilla, “Hellenistic Paideia and Luke’s Education: A Critique of Recent Approaches,” NTS 55, no. 4 (2009): 416–437. For arguments to the contrary, see esp. Hock, “Paul and Greco-Roman Education.”

56 “Demgegenüber wird heute nicht mehr bestritten, daß Paulus eine mittlere Bildung erhalten hat, die auch Rhetorik und Philosophie umfaßte” (Schmeller, Schulen im Neuen Testament? 102).

Similarly, Kennedy remarks that “He (Paul) is certainly thoroughly at home in the Greek idiom of his time and in the conventions of the Greek epistle, and when addressing Greeks he is able to make reference to classical literature.”

Assuming, therefore, that Paul received a grammatical education, it would also be assumed that he was at least familiar with contemporary rhetorical conventions. This point is confirmed in light of Paul’s obvious rhetorical proficiency. Schmeller notes that after twenty years of scholarly study on the issue of Paul’s rhetoric, though there is no unity on individual conclusions, “die starke und gekonnte rhetorische Prägung der Paulusbriefe wird allgemein anerkannt.”

What is not certain, however, is whether or not Paul continued on from the grammatical level to receive a full rhetorical education. Moreover, if he had done so, where did it take place (Tarsus or Jerusalem)?

Forbes concludes that “What we have seen of Paul’s rhetoric suggests a mastery and an assurance unlikely to have been gained without long practice, and possibly long study as well.” He goes on to suggest that “Any decent amateur rhetor could follow text-book rules, but it would take more than mere competence to weave them into an eloquent and compelling whole.” Furthermore, he suggests that “If my assumption about Paul’s education is correct, then we must assume that his education reached at least beyond the level of the grammatici, and into rhetorical school.” In a recent article, Forbes nuances this position slightly, suggesting that

Paul is not, in Greco-Roman terms, an anēr logios. It seems very unlikely that his formal education extended to the upper levels. Paul was, however, a highly experienced speaker, and, from what we can tell, in his own time and place, a persuasive one. He may or may not have had formal rhetorical training, but he certainly knew from observation and experience which styles of argument would, and would not, hold the attention of his “target audience.”

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60 Schmeller, *Schulen im Neuen Testament?* 100.
61 Paul’s place of education is another subject of debate, the conclusions of which are not pertinent here; for discussion, see e.g., Enslin, “Paul and Gamaliel”; Judge, “Paul’s Boasting in Relation to Contemporary Professional Practice,” 60–62; Hengel, *The Pre-Christian Paul*, 18–39.
63 Ibid., 24.
According to Forbes, Paul reached a grammatical stage of education, but more likely learnt rhetoric incidentally as he travelled for many years among the Hellenistic cities. This is what Kennedy argues, suggesting that “Even if he had not studied in a Greek school, there were many handbooks of rhetoric in common circulation which could have been seen.” Kennedy argues further that by sheer virtue of the popularity and pervasiveness of oratory in every facet of society, it would be impossible to avoid exposure to it. Moreover, “in addressing a Greek audience … Paul could not expect to be persuasive unless there was some overlap between the content and the form of what he said and the expectations of his audience.”

This line of reasoning leaves us on tenable grounds and makes very good sense of the evidence. However, it does not completely rule out the possibility of a full rhetorical education. Hock argues that “(Paul’s) letters, given their length, complexity, and power, clearly point to an author who received sustained training and composition in rhetoric, and it was only during the tertiary curriculum that such instruction was given.” Witherington deals at length with the issue of Paul’s education, arguing that “by the time Paul was being educated, rhetoric had become the primary discipline of Roman higher education. There is thus an a priori likelihood that Saul dedicated a considerable portion of his educational years to learning rhetoric.”

4.3.1 A Portrait of Paul

It seems that Paul was indeed a product of some level of \( \pi \alpha \iota \delta \iota \iota \alpha \). His skills in writing good rhetorical letters demonstrate that, although he perhaps did not receive a full blown rhetorical education, he certainly received grammatical training with elements of rhetorical convention.
This rudimentary rhetorical training would have then been further developed through cultural observation and preaching experience in synagogues and house churches. Moreover, as this thesis will show, Paul’s education is demonstrated in that he was able to engage his Corinthian detractors at their own educated level, taking their language and infusing it with new meaning in his response to their accusations. But it was this rudimentary level of training that has caused him problems in Corinth.

I suggest that when Paul first ministered in Corinth, it would have been apparent to all that he possessed some of the marks of παίδευσις; this would have allowed him to engage in the circles occupied by higher-status men like Gaius. But in the competitive environment of the Corinthian ekklēsia, particularly among those with pretensions to education and status, his decision not to display his rhetorical proficiency was a risky strategy. It is this final point, I suggest, that forms the crux of the issue in Corinth.

4.4 A Proposed Scenario

Παίδευσις was largely characterised by competition. In the absence of examinations as a way of measuring a pupil’s abilities as we have today, the ancient student was set apart by their performance in competition with their peers. Unlike examinations, competitions would rank, rather than qualify participants. This created a tense scenario for both the student and teacher:

The pupil would have had a degree of freedom in what he learned, but a corresponding degree of anxiety: he could never be sure that what he learned would impress the cultural group to which he aspired. The lower his social status, the less access he would be likely to have to information about what the culture-group valued and the more likely he might be to play it safe … Teachers can be assumed to have felt some of the same effects of competition. The absence of curriculum would give teachers freedom but also a heavy responsibility: they would have to judge what authors and exercises would best serve their pupils. If they judged rightly, we can expect them to have acquired proportionately high status and more pupils … a competitive educational system gives society, or the already-acculturated group, a high degree of control over criteria for entry into that group.

The competition between teachers was reflected in the self-advertisment of one teacher by way of comparison to other teachers. In fact, self-advertisment was a prime characteristic of

69 The same is true of teachers.
70 Morgan, Literate Education in the Hellenistic and Roman Worlds, 81.
71 Ibid., 83.
popular teachers. This competitive attitude was as endemic in education as it was in the wider culture. Quintilian talks about what used to happen when he was at school. The teacher, he recalls, would get the boys to speak in the order of their ability; this way the boy who had made most progress in his studies had the privilege of declaiming first. The performances on these occasions were then criticised. He recalls that to win commendation was a tremendous honour, but the prize most eagerly coveted was to be the leader of the class. Added to this was the hierarchy that presented. Every level achieved by the pupil of afforded them the opportunity to look down on their inferiors, yet still looking up at their superiors.

4.4.1 Competition and Paul’s Detractors

, as with the culture at large, was highly agonistic. This, I suggest, is what is informing the Corinthians’ attitude towards their teachers. is being criticised, not for his absolute lack of education, but rather his perceived inferiority by comparison to . It might also be speculated that there was a comparison being made in respect to the type of education that and had received. It has already been noted that was educated in Alexandria. If this was an education similar to Philo’s, then more closely resembled a product of Graeco-Roman (as opposed to , who, despite his familiarity with Greek culture, is a product of Jewish education), giving him greater appeal among the Greeks or Hellenised Jews in the Christian community.

What seems to be taking place in is that a small circle of the educated elite who originally embraced has now favored instead. In other words, within a small inner circle marked by the possession of , a circle that both and could engage, the cultural value of competitiveness has taken precedence. In this battle, one in which and are unwitting participants, is clearly superior by virtue of his higher attainments. is obviously aware of this competitive element in

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73 Quintilian, Inst. 1.2.23–26.
74 Cf. Morgan, Literate Education in the Hellenistic and Roman Worlds, 84.
75 Pogoloff makes a similar argument, Pogoloff, Logos and Sophia, 187–189.
76 AsWelborn (Paul, the Fool of Christ, 107–108) has argued: “The expression ἀνέρ λόγιος describes a person … designates a ‘learned man’ generally, one who had studied philosophy and literature. The additional characterization of as διστατὸς ἐν γραφής probably refers to his ability to expound the deeper, allegorical meaning of religious texts through the application of a philosophical framework. Perhaps we should picture to ourselves as a man like , with similar education and abilities, though not of so lofty a class … such a ‘man of culture’ might well have engendered among his admirers comparisons derogatory of.”
παίδευς; in fact, he even states that in his own education, he outstripped his classmates in eminence (Gal 1:14). But this is something that he now has no desire to engage in.\textsuperscript{77}

I suggest, then, that in Paul’s initial ministry at Corinth, the Christian community found in their leader a man with apparent marks of παίδευς. As the problem develops, even his enemies confess that he was a skilful writer who could construct strong rhetorical letters (2 Cor 10:10) by virtue of his, at least, grammatical level of training. What he lacked, so it seemed, was polished skills in speaking. For the Corinthians who first received Paul, this was sufficient in the early days of the church, but with the entry of Apollos, Paul was cast into the background, because now, finally, they found what they were really looking for. Rhetorically speaking, though they had Isocrates, what they really wanted was Demosthenes.

**Conclusion**

It has been argued in this chapter that present in the Corinthian Christian community are a small handful of wealthy members who themselves have most likely received a full elite education. This education, with all of its cultural baggage, has informed their opinion of Paul’s ministry. During his initial stay, they possibly saw in him a certain level of sophistication that indicated some form of education. At the very least, he was able to engage them at their level and walk in their educated circles. But in Apollos they saw something far superior and, as we will see throughout this thesis, something much more in conformity with what they knew of παίδευς. Competition and comparison was inevitable and Paul clearly came out the loser.

\textsuperscript{77}This argument is supported by the work of Judge (“The Conflict of Educational Aims in the New Testament,” 700), who, in comparing Paul to a sophist, suggests that “Paul found himself ranked as a minor celebrity in this field.” However, he goes on to argue that Paul did not have a full classical training, and when he found himself in competition with professionals who did, it was his poor performance that brought him under ridicule from these men. Forbes (“Comparison, Self-Praise and Irony: Paul’s Boasting and the Conventions of Hellenistic Rhetoric,” 24) argues similarly, saying that “His opponents did not disdain to compare themselves with Paul … (Which) means that they were willing to grant that there were grounds for comparison, though that condescension may have been strictly limited.”
PART 2: PAUL’S DEFENCE OF HIS STYLE

1 CORINTHIANS 1-2
We saw in the first chapter that \(\pi\alpha\delta\varepsilon\iota\alpha\) was understood in terms of “culture” and was in and of itself a virtue. In honorary inscriptions, \(\pi\alpha\delta\varepsilon\iota\alpha\) was often found alongside \(\alpha\rho\varepsilon\tau\eta\), \(\sigma\omega\phi\rho\sigma\omicron\upsilon\eta\), \(\kappa\alpha\lambda\omicron\kappa\alpha\gamma\alpha\theta\iota\alpha\), and \(\sigma\omicron\phi\iota\alpha\) as characteristics of eminent men who were held up as the embodiment of elite culture. We also saw there that education sought to develop and mould ideal citizens, men who themselves possessed the highest virtues and character. These ideas will be further explored in the present chapter.

Here it will be argued that some of the elite members of the Christian community have brought to their understanding of the “wisdom of God” ethical categories taught (particularly) in philosophical schools and embodied in the \(\sigma\omicron\phi\omicron\omicron\). According to their self-evaluation, they have attained lofty heights in Christ, far superior to Paul, who is, by contrast with Apollos, inadequate. According to Paul, however, the “wisdom” they are boasting about is nothing more than the wisdom of the world, which, according to him, is foolishness to God and incompatible with the message of the cross. In dealing with this arrogance, Paul draws a sharp distinction between himself and these members, characterising his life and ministry in shameful terms in order to demonstrate that his own life and ministry more closely resembles the characteristics that God is seeking. Moreover, he draws attention to the fact that the true embodiment of God’s wisdom is not a human teacher, but is in fact, Christ.

In the following chapter we will discuss (1) the well-known figure of the \(\sigma\omicron\phi\omicron\omicron\) and the values he embodied. This person was especially synonymous with the (particularly Stoic) philosophical schools. It will then be demonstrated from both literary and epigraphical evidence that (2) philosophers were particularly honoured in Corinth, and from this evidence, it will be conjectured that there was a preference towards Stoicism. Finally, it will be argued that (3) Paul and Apollos are being compared to this figure of the (Stoic?) \(\sigma\omicron\phi\omicron\omicron\).
5.1 The Wise Man

One of the intended outcomes of παιδεία (particularly in the philosophical schools) was the attainment of ευδαιμονία. This happiness was achieved through the pursuit of wisdom (σοφία, φρόνησις) and the wise man (ὁ σοφός), who embodied wisdom, was characterised by ethical qualities. The perfection of the rational faculty was held to bring with it the perfection of the whole person. In other words, the wise man was one who embodied theoretical and practical knowledge; he was, particularly amongst the Stoics, the ideal human.

5.1.1 Παιδεία and the Wise Man

In the Tabula of Cebes (ca. first century C.E.), the unnamed protagonist is taken on a journey towards “true education (παιδεία).” As he goes along, the path becomes a very narrow ascent with a deep precipice on each side. At the top of a hill is a towering boulder with sheer drops all around. This boulder blocks the path, but standing on top of it are two sisters, Self-control and Perseverance. These are stretching out their hands to help the traveller up onto the boulder so that he can continue on his way. Beyond this is a meadow, in the middle of which is an enclosure with a gate; inside this enclosure is the dwelling place of the happy, wherein all the virtues and happiness (ευδαιμονία) spend their time. Standing at the gate are three women: in the middle is education (παιδεία) and either side of her, are her daughters: Truth and Persuasion. Their task is to bestow on the traveller the gift of knowledge (ἐπιστήμη), defined as courage and fearlessness. This gift is given for the purpose of healing the traveller from pretentiousness, desire, incontinence, passion, and avarice. Having healed the traveller,
they then lead him inside to the virtues. According to Trapp, this parable is illustrative of one of the central ethical truths of all the imperial-period sects: that human perfection was a conceivable idea. This is similarly illustrated in another story.

In his work *Hermotimus*, Lucian (ca. 125 C.E.–180 C.E.) puts a student of Stoicism through what is essentially an inquisition as to his motives and expectations in studying philosophy. The dialogue begins with Hermotimus hurrying to attend the day’s lecture, at which point Lycinus stops him to inquire as to what he is doing. As their conversation unfolds, Lycinus comments on the time that Hermotimus has spent so far on his education (some twenty years) and inquires about his progress towards virtue and goal of reaching ἐυδαίμονία. He asks, “Have you not sweated and travelled enough?” “No,” Hermotimus replies, “I couldn’t be other than perfectly happy if I were at the top. At this moment I am still beginning” (*Hermot.* 2). Hermotimus explains that in his journey to the top of the mountain, he is still in the foothills; however, the journey has lately become slippery and rough and he needs a hand to help. Somewhat surprised at this, Lycinus replies, “your teacher can do that: he can let down his own teaching from the top like Zeus’s golden rope in Homer, and clearly pull and lift you up to himself and Virtue. He made the climb long ago” (*Hermot.* 3). His teacher, however, has determined that he is still years from this goal; but Hermotimus is confident, because “all who endure to the end arrive at the top, and from then on are happy having a wonderful time for the rest of their life, from their heights seeing the rest of mankind as ants.”

In response to such a pretentious claim, Lycinus states

Goodness Hermotimus! How small you make us, not even as big as pygmies! Utter groundlings crawling over the earth’s surface. It’s not surprising—your mind is already away up above; and we, the whole trashy lot of us ground-crawlers, will pray to you along with the gods, when you get above the clouds and reach the heights to which you have been hastening for so long. (*Hermot.* 6)

Both of our stories demonstrate that at the heart of παιδεία was the pursuit of σοφία, εὐδαιμονία, and ἀρετή. Moreover, παιδεία is presented as a tough, rigorous pursuit of wisdom, with the final goal of becoming a wise man. This brought with it a sense of pride and achievement, and ultimately, a feeling of superiority over the rest. Additionally, we see

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9 Cebes, *Tab.* 19.5.
10 Trapp, *Philosophy in the Roman Empire*, 28. Commenting on the *Tabula of Cebes*, Trapp argues that "Philosophia was founded on a conviction that perfection, in the individual human subject and in a lived life was, if not ever easy to attain, at least an entirely conceivable ideal. At the heart of each of its competing brands stood the vision of human fulfilment, of the right kind of life to live and (above all) the right kind of person to be."
12 Cynic-influenced thinkers, such as Lucian and the author of the Tabula, rejected mainstream “egkyklios paideia,” but not *paideia* itself. They proposed a different form of education, but still education.
the importance placed on the teacher, or the σοφός, not only to help the student reach their goal, but also to lead and demonstrate a life of virtue. In other words, to be a σοφός was the goal and the σοφός was also instructor of παιδεία. In what follows, we will look at various descriptions of the wise man, highlighting the great honour given to him in both literature and general culture.

5.1.2 The Orator as the Wise Man

As the end goal of παιδεία, both orators and philosophers had their own definitions of what characterised the person who embodied wisdom. For the orators, the wise man was primarily characterised by his rhetorical eloquence, which was generally synonymous with virtue. This was especially true for Quintilian, whose sole aim was the education of the perfect orator.

The orator, Quintilian believes, is a good citizen, and the true wise man (sapiens) who has devoted his life to the management of the state (from which philosophers have completely withdrawn). In training such a man, he says, “The first essential is that he should be a good man (vir bonus), and consequently we demand of him not merely the possession of exceptional gifts of speech, but of all the excellences of character as well” (Inst. 1.pr.9). He repeats this sentiment throughout his work, saying, “I do not merely assert that the ideal orator should be a good man, but I affirm that no man can be an orator unless he is a good man” (Inst. 12.1.3). For Quintilian, virtue meant both excellent character and eloquence of speech, or in his terms, “a good man, skilled in speaking.” According to him, such virtue can

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13 Lycinus asks Hermotimus, “How can you know that up there there is a happiness and the like worth enduring everything to attain? You yourself have not been up there I suppose?” Hermotimus replies, “I believe what my teacher says. He is already right at the top and knows very well” (Hermot. 7). The promise this teacher holds out to Hermotimus is that at the end he will receive wisdom, courage, beauty itself, justice itself, and the certainty of knowing everything as it really is. Trapp (Philosophy in the Roman Empire, pp. 22–23) argues that in the early Empire, philosophers wanted to be acknowledged and valued as educators. They wished to be acknowledged as leaders of their communities, but without occupying any formal position of civic authority. Moreover, they wished also to be accepted as leaders of humanity as a whole. He notes the various metaphors used by philosophers to describe their relationship to their fellow men: a guide to a band of travellers, a general to an army, a steersman to a ship’s company, a herdsman to a flock, a chorus-leader to a choir, or that of a doctor to a patient.

14 Quintilian, Inst. 11.1.35.

15 Similarly Inst. 2.15.33; for discussion regarding the vir bonus, see Winterbottom, “Quintilian and the Vir Bonus”; Brinton, “Quintilian, Plato, and the ‘Vir Bonus’”; Walzer, “Quintilian’s ‘Vir Bonus’ and the Stoic Wise Man”; Morgan, “A Good Man Skilled in Politics: Quintilian’s Political Theory.”

16 He says, moreover, “no man can speak well who is not good himself” (Inst. 2.15.1, 33). George A. Kennedy (The Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World: 300 B.C.-A.D. 300 [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972], 509) notes that the emphasis on the boys moral character over against his political character and intellectual leadership is a reflection of a teacher working under an autocratic government.
only be perfected through παίδεια. The end goal Quintilian saw for all of this training was, “no hack-advocate, no hireling pleader … a man sent by heaven to be the blessing of mankind, one to whom all history can find no parallel, uniquely perfect in every detail and utterly noble alike in thought and speech” (Inst. 12.1.25). He encourages his readers to resolve to follow what is right, and to strive with all their hearts and devote all their efforts to the pursuit of virtue and eloquence; “and perchance it may be granted to us to attain to the perfection that we seek” (Inst. 12.1.31). Thus, the end goal of rhetoric, according to Quintilian, is to speak well. This kind of rhetoric, he says, “which befits a good man and is in a word the only true rhetoric, will be a virtue” (Inst. 2.20.4).

For the orators, virtue was clearly inseparable from eloquence; Antonius says in De Oratore that an orator cannot even earn his distinctive title without being eloquent. For this reason, eloquence was also the means to public recognition and promotion. Pliny (61 C.E.–ca. 112 C.E.), a student of Quintilian, while acting as an assessor at a gathering, heard two young pleaders speaking, who he described as a remarkable pair. He thought them likely to prove an ornament not only to their age, but also to literature itself. The reason he gives for such confidence is that both combined exceptional honesty with strength of character; moreover, their appearance was pleasant, their accent pure, their voices fully developed, and they both had excellent memories and discretion to match their ability. He concludes by asking, “What could be happier for our country than for two such distinguished young men to make their name and reputation in eloquence?” (Ep. 6.11.1, 3) Similarly, Aper tells the story of two men who achieved greatness, not by their vast wealth, but through their eloquence. Both, he tells us, came from mean and humble backgrounds, but according to Aper, (now) “shine as

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17 Quintilian, Inst. 12.2.1. “Since then the orator is a good man, and such goodness cannot be conceived as existing apart from virtue, virtue, despite the fact that it is in part derived from certain natural impulses, will require to be perfected by instruction. The orator must above all things devote his attention to the formation of moral character and must acquire a complete knowledge of all that is just and honourable. For without this knowledge no one can be either a good man or skilled in speaking.” Morgan (“A Good Man Skilled in Politics: Quintilian’s Political Theory,” 248) argues that “Quintilian’s project is to show that the orator can be neither good nor skilled without education … the good man, in his analysis, is the product of education acting on nature.”

18 Since the orator, he believes, cannot succeed in their work (particularly in the area of panegyrics) if they themselves cannot distinguish between what is honourable and the reverse. He asks, “How can he urge a policy, unless he has a clear perception of what is expedient? How can he plead in the law-courts, if he is ignorant of the nature of justice? Again, does not oratory call for courage, since it is often directed against the threats of popular turbulence and frequently runs into peril through incurring the hatred of the great, while sometimes, the orator may have to speak in the midst of a crowd of armed soldiers? Consequently, if oratory be a virtue, perfection is beyond its grasp” (Quintilian, Inst. 2.20.8). Kennedy (The Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World, 504) notes the difficulty of this argument, saying that “The argument tends to prove that the orator must have the virtues and that his speech will often exhibit these virtues. Those mentioned are prudence, justice and fortitude, but the traditional fourth virtue of temperance is certainly needed too, to judge from other passages. The argument does not prove that rhetoric, or the art of oratory, is itself a virtue, and it is not logically rigorous.”

19 Cicero, De Or. 2.38. For discussion on Cicero and Quintilian’s style, see Cecil Wooten, “Cicero and Quintilian on the Style of Demosthenes,” Rhetorica 15, no. 2 (1997): 177–192.

20 See also his praise for a young man after a reading (Ep. 5.17).
conspicuous examples of the practical advantage of oratorical power.” Moreover, one of them, Aper reports, had an exterior that made him an object of derision, “but now they are powerful men in Rome and leaders at the bar who take a leading place in the emperor’s circle of friends” (Tacitus, Dial. 8.3). In other words, according to the orators, there was a general belief that the wisdom and virtue resulting from παιδεία was marked by eloquence. But when it came to discussion of the wise man, it was the philosophers who had the most to say.

5.1.3 Philosophy and the Wise Man

In the first century, Stoicism was by far the most influential philosophical school; it stands to reason then, that Stoic ideal of the wise man was a particularly influential one in this period. In fact, two of the most substantial (extant) bodies of work dealing with the wise man come from the pens of Stoics.

5.1.3.1 The Wise Man According to Seneca

According to Seneca, the quality of being wise can fall to the lot of the good man alone. As a typical Stoic ideal, the sapiens feels his troubles, but overcomes them; he desires friends, neighbours, and associates, but is self-sufficient in that he can do without them. In fact, any desires he might have for friends are only for the purpose of practising friendship, in order that his noble qualities may not lie dormant. Furthermore, he makes use of evils in order to develop virtue; this could be in the midst of wealth or poverty, in his own country or exile, as a commander or as common soldier, in sound health or enfeebled. Whatever fortune he finds, he will accomplish from it something that is noteworthy. For the sapiens, mere living is not a good, but living well. He always reflects concerning the quality, and not the quantity, of his

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21 Again, Dio (Or. 44.10), in addressing his hometown, says, “I observe that it is not from the pursuit of eloquence (λόγος) alone, but also from the pursuit of wisdom (φιλοσοφία) that men of character and distinction are being produced here in Prusa.”
23. The closest contemporary alternative to this discussion would be Plutarch’s How a Man May Become Aware of His Progress in Virtue.
24 Seneca, Ep. 117.9.
26 Seneca, Ep. 9.8.
life. And as soon as there are many events in his life that give him trouble and disturb his peace of mind, he sets himself free (i.e., by suicide). According to Seneca, the wise man is joyful, happy, calm, and unshaken; he lives on a plane with the gods. Overall, the sapiens embodies the cardinal virtues:

If we had the privilege of looking into a good man's soul, oh what a fair, holy, magnificent, gracious, and shining face should we behold—radiant on the side with justice (iustitia) and fortitude (fortitudo), on another with temperance (temperantia) and wisdom (prudentia)! And, besides these, thriftiness, moderation, endurance, refinement, affability, and—though hard to believe—love of one’s fellow-men, that Good which is so rare in man, all these would be shedding their own glory over that soul. There, too, forethought combined with elegance and, resulting from these, a most excellent greatness of soul (the noblest of all these virtues)—indeed what charm, O ye heavens, what authority and dignity would they contribute! (Ep. 115.3)

Such an eminent figure takes on almost a divine status. “If one might behold such a face, more exalted and more radiant than the mortal eye is wont to behold, would not one pause as if struck dumb by a visitation from above, and utter a silent prayer … Then, led on by the encouraging kindliness of his expression, should we not bow down and worship?” (Ep. 115.4)

Thus, according to Seneca, the fullest span of life is living until you possess wisdom.

5.1.3.2 The Wise Man According to Epictetus

Like Seneca, Epictetus dedicates much of his teaching to the formation of the good and excellent man (ἀνήρ καλός καὶ ἀγαθός). According to him, this is a person who

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28 Seneca, Ep. 70.4.
29 Seneca, Ep. 109.1. Similarly, “The sapiens is completely endowed with every good and has attained perfection.” This moreover, is the reason for wanting to be wise, since “the sapiens is never deprived of joy.” This joy, he says, “springs only from the knowledge that you possess the virtues. None but the brave, the just, the self-restrained, can rejoice” (Ep. 59.14).
30 For a fuller discussion of education and the divine, see section 3.1.2.1.
31 Again, “You must grant that the wise man has an element of godliness, heavenliness, grandeur” (Ep. 87.19).
33 The term σοφός is hardly used in his Discourses, rather the synonymous term φρόνιμος appears in its stead. For discussion of these terms, see A. A. Long, Epictetus: A Stoic and Socratic Guide to Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 37. The sage, according to Epictetus, represents a prescriptive ideal that epitomizes the telos as the one who makes the perfect rational use of their prohairesis. See William O. Stephens, Stoic Ethics: Epictetus and Happiness as Freedom (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2007), 113.
ultimately lives according to his προσήρεσις or “moral purpose.”

The idea of προσήρεσις was central to Epictetus’ Stoic system. According to him, education meant learning how to apply the natural preconceptions to particular cases, each to the other, in conformity with nature; furthermore, it meant making the distinction that some things are under our control while others are not under our control. Under our control are προσήρεσις and all the acts of προσήρεσις. Progress in virtue, then, meant withdrawing from external things, and turning one’s attention to the question of one’s own προσήρεσις, cultivating and perfecting it so as to make it finally harmonious with nature, elevated, free, unhindered, untrammelled, faithful, and honourable. According to Epictetus, everything that lies within the sphere of the προσήρεσις was free and unhindered. Therefore, to regard one’s own good and advantage as residing in those things which are free from hindrance and under one’s control, was to be free, serene, happy, unharmed, high-minded, reverent, and giving thanks for all things to God. It meant under no circumstances finding fault with anything that has happened, nor blaming anything. To live in conformity with προσήρεσις was to live in conformity to god.

For Epictetus, only the educated person was properly equipped to handle life. He suggests that every faculty acquired by the uneducated and the weak (ωςθενής) is dangerous for them since it is prone to make them conceited and puffed up over it. In his view, “The rational and the irrational are different for different persons. It is for this reason especially that we need education, so as to learn how, in conformity with nature, to adapt to specific instances our preconceived idea of what is rational and what is irrational” (Diatr. 1.2.5). For Epictetus, the goal of education was to apply the general notions of the rational and the irrational to particular cases in harmony with nature. According to him, to be truly educated resulted in tranquillity, fearlessness and freedom. “For on these matters we should not trust the multitude, who say, ‘Only the free can be educated,’ but rather the philosophers, who say,

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35 Epictetus, *Diatr.* 1.22.9–11; similarly, see 3.8.1–7, 3.12.4–5.

36 Epictetus, *Diatr.* 1.4.18–20. The invincible man (ὁ ἀντίττητος) is one whom nothing that is outside the sphere of his προσήρεσις can dismay (*Diatr.* 1.18.21). “The subject-matter with which the good and excellent man has to deal is his own governing principle;” that is, “the function of the good and excellent man “is to deal with his impressions in accordance with nature” (*Diatr.* 3.3.1). According to Epictetus, he is to remain in a state of harmony with nature, attending only to his own business, to the end that it also may be in harmony with nature, “for this is the object which the good and excellent man has ever before him” (*Diatr.* 4.5.5–7).

37 Epictetus, *Diatr.* 4.7.8; similarly, see 1.29.1–3, 2.16.2, 3.10.18–20, 3.19.1–3.

38 Epictetus, *Diatr.* 4.12.12. “I have one whom I must please, to whom I must submit, whom I must obey, that is, God, and after Him, myself. God has commended me to myself, and He has subjected to me alone my προσήρεσις, giving me standards for the correct use of it.”

39 Epictetus, *Diatr.* 1.8.8.

‘Only the educated are free’” (Diatr. 2.1.22–24). Only a life lived within the realm of προσιρέσιος was any life at all. “In a word,” he says, “remember this—that if you are going to honour anything at all outside the sphere of the προσιρέσιος, you have destroyed your προσιρέσιος” (Diatr. 4.4.23).

5.1.4 Summary

The pursuit of wisdom, demonstrated through an ethical life that embodied the particular doctrines and values of the school, was at the heart of first-century philosophy. This made the ideal of the σοφός, in whatever form he took, a well-known figure and, in the opinions of most, a quasi-divine object of worship. However, since it is well attested that Stoicism was the dominant philosophical system in our period, the Stoic ideal of the wise man would be the most well known.

5.2 Corinth and the Wise Man

Before moving to the Pauline passage, the question should be asked: do we see evidence of philosophers or wise men in Corinth to whom some in the Christian community could be comparing their teachers? Some scattered literary and epigraphical clues seem to indicate such a possibility.

5.2.1 Literary Evidence

The Isthmian Games, like other Festivals and games held through Greece, would typically attract philosophers, orators, and the like, not only as competitors, but also as “salesmen” offering their particular wares. This was certainly the case in Corinth as we see in Dio’s account of his visit to the Games while still in exile. He recalls that

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41 Similarly, see 2.22.20–22; 3.12.4–5. He says that the good and excellent man “does nothing for the sake of appearances, but only for the sake of having acted right” (Diatr. 3.24.50). Again, “he centres his attention on this and this only, how he may fill his place in an orderly fashion, and with due obedience to God” (Diatr. 3.24.95). He asks, “‘How may I follow the gods in everything, and how may I be acceptable to the divine administration, and how may I become free?’ Since he is free for whom all things happen according to his προσιρέσιος, and whom none can restrain” (Diatr. 1.12.6–8).

42 For discussion of this, particularly in classical times, see Håkan Tell, “Sages at the Games: Intellectual Displays and Dissemination of Wisdom in Ancient Greece,” CA 26, no. 2 (2007): 249–275; N. J. Richardson,
One could hear crowds of wretched sophists around Poseidon’s temple shouting and reviling one another, and their disciples, as they were called, fighting with one another, many writers reading aloud their stupid works, many poets reciting their poems while others applauded them, many jugglers showing their tricks, many fortune-tellers interpreting fortunes, lawyers innumerable perverting judgment, and peddlers not a few peddling whatever they happened to have. (Dio, Or. 8.9)\(^{43}\)

He goes on to say that many passers-by stopped to listen to what he had to say, however none of these listeners were Corinthians; the reason, he suggests, is because they could hear him every day in Corinth.\(^{44}\) Such was their familiarity with the philosopher and his obvious reputation in the city.

The ability of major Panhellenic festivals to attract such illustrious men is further illustrated by Plutarch, who tells the story of his own visit to Corinth during the games. He recalls how the president, Sospes, who hosted many banquets for all the citizens, once entertained in his own home his closest friends, all men of learning (\(\varphi\iota\lambda\omicron\omicron\gamma\omicron\omicron\))\(^{45}\), one of these guests being Herodes Atticus.\(^{45}\) A small number of inscriptions found in the city also demonstrate the presence and activity of philosophers in Corinth.

5.2.2 Epigraphical Evidence

An extremely fragmentary second-century inscription found in the agora and set up by the \(b\omega\lambda\epsilon\) honours Marcus Valerius Taurinus, son of Marcus, who is described as a philosopher and a good orator, on account of his fine character.\(^{46}\) In this inscription, we see someone who is honoured as both an orator and a philosopher, who, like those seen in section 3.1.1., is honoured solely on account of \(\pi\alpha\iota\delta\epsilon\iota\alpha\). Two other inscriptions honour philosophers in Corinth, and significantly, both are Stoics. The first we have already seen in section 3.1.1.4. A

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\(^{44}\)A similar situation is portrayed in Diogenes, *Epistles*, 38.5–9.

\(^{45}\)Dio, *Or*. 8.10.

\(^{45}\)Plutarch, *Quaest. conv.* 723A. Like Dio in our first example, Herodes seems to be a familiar part of the Corinthian milieu, not only due to his generous benefactions, which include the *odeum*, but also his reputation. Despite not being a citizen, a statue was set up in Corinth by Herodes himself, honouring his wife Regilla on account of her \(\sigma\omega\phi\rho\sigma\rho\epsilon\omicron\eta\nu\eta\). In regard to Herodes, it says that he was “pre-eminent above others, who had attained the peak of every kind of excellence, Herodes famous among Hellenes and furthermore a son (of Greece) greater than them all, the flower of Achaia.” See Kent, *The Inscriptions, 1926-1950*, vol. 128. For discussion of his career, see Harry C. Rutledge, “Herodes the Great: Citizen of the World,” *CJ* 56, no. 3 (1960): 97–109. Winter, *Philo and Paul among the Sophists*, 135 notes that “No other extant Corinthian inscriptions of the first half or middle of the second century surpass the superlatives heaped upon Herodes.”

\(^{46}\)Kent, *The Inscriptions, 1926-1950*, vol. 8, no. 268. \(\Phi\iota\lambda\omicron\omicron\sigma\iota\ [\rho\iota\tau\omicron] [\sigma\alpha \acute{\alpha} \gamma\alpha\theta\omicron\nu] \imath [\pi\omicron\lambda\iota\varsigma \acute{\alpha} \rho\epsilon\tau\iota\varsigma \acute{\epsilon} \nu\epsilon\kappa\epsilon\nu\varsigma] \psi\iota\eta\phi\iota\sigma\iota\mu\alpha\omicron\iota\tau\iota\varsigma \acute{\beta}\omicron\sigma\omicron\lambda\iota\varsigma].\)
mid-first century inscription from Olympia honours Lucius Peticius Propas, the Corinthian Stoic Philosopher, on account of his παιδεία and σοφία.47 The second inscription, dating to the mid-second century and found in the south Basilica, has been identified as honouring none other than T. Flavius Arrianus of Nicomedia, student of Epictetus, later governor of Cappadocia and historian of Alexander, who had moved to Athens.48 The inscription was erected by two Corinthian brothers, L. Gellius Menander and his brother L. Gellius Justus Filius, who we know from other statues they erected in Corinth, including one dedicated to Antoninus Pius.49 But possibly the most noteworthy reference in relation to the family is found in the opening line of Arrian’s work: “Arrian to Lucius Gellius, greeting.”50 This Gellius, to whom the discourses are dedicated, has been identified as L. Gellius Justus, the father of these two brothers.51 Epictetus’ connection to Corinth is well known. In his discourse titled Of Personal Adornment, a student of rhetoric from Corinth visits Epictetus, and in their discussion, he ultimately criticises the student for being far too effeminate in his attire.52 Doubtless then, Epictetus’ reputation was known in Corinth; but it is interesting to see here the continued relationship between the city and one of his star pupils, Arrian. What relationship Arrian had with Gellius is uncertain, but it was clearly an important one given that he dedicates his famous work to the man; moreover, the fact that Gellius’ sons honour Arrian in Corinth also testifies to his reputation in the city.

We have here then, three inscriptions associated with Corinth that give honour to philosophers (in the case of Arrian, possibly an honorary title). This is obviously not many, but given that in the entire Peloponnesian, a total of only six inscriptions appear with the term φιλόσοφος, this scant number becomes more significant. Moreover, of these additional three inscriptions, only one is honorary, and this on account of civic benefaction. A large, late second-century statue base from Troizen honours Marcus Aurelius Olympiodorus the philosopher, who acted as the λογιστής (Greek equivalent of the Latin curator civitatis) for

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47 IvO 453.
48 The original reconstruction found in Kent leaves the honorand unidentified. See Kent, The Inscriptions, 1926-1950, vol. 8, no. 124. However, a few years after the publication of Kent’s volume, Bowersock re-examined the inscription, determining from his title as “philosopher” and the fact that he is honoured as a governor of Cappadocia under Hadrian, we can only be dealing with the famous historian from Nicomedia and pupil of Epictetus. See Glen W. Bowersock, “A New Inscription of Arrian,” GRBS 8, no. 4 (1967): 279–280. Hence, Rizakis, Zoubaki, and Kantirea (Roman Personal Names in Their Social Context, 1:314) have reconstructed the first lines as “[Ἀρριανὸς Αρριανοῦ Ἀθηναῖος | [φιλόσοφος ὑπατικόν].
49 CIL III.1,7269. See also Kent, The Inscriptions, 1926-1950, vol. 8, no. 223.
50 Epictetus, Diatr. 1.intro.
52 Epictetus, Diatr. 3.1.
Taking this evidence together, Corinth appears to be the only city that honours people as philosophers on account of their character and education alone. Furthermore, of the six philosophers listed here in connection with Corinth (i.e., Dio, Plutarch, Marcus Valerius, Lucius Peticius, Epictetus, and Arrian), three are Stoic. It is merely conjecture to suggest a preference in Corinth towards Stoicism. Moreover, it is not pertinent to this thesis, but taken with the popularity of the school in the first century (as we saw above), and the Corinthians’ language (which we will examine below), the suggestion is not entirely without merit.

5.2.3 Summary

Central to παιδεία then, was an anthropocentric worldview in which human achievement and moral perfection were the highest attainments. This was represented in the σοφος, who was the living embodiment of σοφία. Moreover, in Graeco-Roman thought, σοφία (and by implication, the σοφος) was marked by ἀρετή, σωφροσύνη, and καλοκαγαθία, amongst other values. As a result, anyone successfully scaling the mountain called Παιδεία and attaining the lofty heights of wisdom was seen by others, and indeed by themselves, as an object of reverence. Furthermore, the small number of clues that we have from Corinth would seem to suggest that philosophers were particularly honoured in the city.

This, I suggest, is what is behind the situation in 1 Corinthians 1:18–31. Certain members of the Christian community have deemed themselves to have attained some sort of lofty wisdom, which is based on the παιδεία of the surrounding community, but according to Paul, is nothing more than “the wisdom of the world.” Moreover, these elite few have measured themselves and their teachers according to a set of ethical ideals that resemble something seen in the σοφος of the philosophical schools. In the resultant dispute, Paul wants to redefine their understanding of wisdom in line with a Christocentric definition, as found in the message of the crucified messiah.

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53 IG IV 796. The other two examples come from catalogues of gerontes; Iulius Philokratidas Hippodamus and his son of the same name are mentioned in separate lists with the title “philosopher” (IG V,1 116, 116a).

54 In regard to the term σοφός, its usage in inscriptions is infrequent and scattered in both time and location (it does not seem to appear at all in the first century). It is sometimes used with the definite article to mean “expert.” This is how it appears in the one example found in Corinth: a (probably) third century inscription in honour of a prominent Corinthian citizen (in Kent’s view, more likely an emperor) has the phrase “τὸν σοφὸν...” at which point the inscription breaks off. See Kent, The Inscriptions, 1926-1950, vol. 8, no. 118. Most likely it would follow a construction similar to the following: IosPE I 2482 (τὸν σοφὸν ἐν Μούσαις); IK Kibyria 364 (τὸν σοφὸν ἐν θήρασι). In other cases, it is used as a simple adjective: e.g., IG V,1 1469 (γραμματείς Σοφός); IG X,2 1512 (ῥητωρ σοφός); IG XIX,1 837 (ἀρητήρα σοφόν); IG XII,2 443 (ὁ πάντα σοφὸς); TAM IV,1 211 (ψηφιώ σοφός).
5.3 A Clash of Ethics (1 Cor 1:18–31; 4:8–13)

First Corinthians 1:18–31 and 4:8–13 concerns, primarily, the juxtaposition of the terms σοφία/μωρία and their various cognates. Paul is defining “wisdom” with the very ambiguous qualifier “of the world” (ἡ σοφία τοῦ κόσμου) and “foolishness” as “the message of the cross” (ὁ λόγος ὁ τοῦ σταυροῦ). It was suggested above that Stoicism was possibly the popular philosophical school in Corinth. If this is the case, it is likely that any elite, educated Corinthian living there had some understanding of Stoic thought, and prior to becoming a Christian, may well have been endeavouring to live out this sort of life.55 It seems reasonable then to suggest that the language we find in 1 Cor 1:18–31 and 4:8–13 referring to the Corinthians’ self-perception has been shaped by an encounter with (most likely) Stoic philosophy.56 That is, some elite members of the Christian community have measured themselves and their teachers according to these values, and as a result, are elevating themselves and their achievements to what Paul perceives as dangerous heights. This attitude appears to have led them to reject Paul as an inferior teacher, particularly in comparison to Apollos. This is what Paul is reacting against.57 Paul’s concern is not to present the Christian message as a competing system; rather, he wants to remove any thoughts that the wisdom of God can be achieved in the same way as the wisdom of the world, next to which he juxtaposes the “foolish message of the cross.”58

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55 Cf. Paige, “Stoicism, ἐλευθερία and Community at Corinth,” 210. Furthermore, as the studies in the Literature Review showed, this Stoic understanding has been brought into their Christian experience and problems have occurred when the two have been combined.

56 However, it must be noted that it is not Paul who is being influenced by Stoic thought, rather, it is the Corinthians who are trying to fuse Stoic ideals with Christian doctrine and practice. Contra Deming, “Paul and Indifferent Things”; Lee, Paul, the Stoics, and the Body of Christ. The fact that some of his terminology seems so at home in Stoicism is because he is most likely writing to people who use such language, think in a Stoic manner, or are impressed with Stoic ideas. Cf. Paige, “Stoicism, ἐλευθερία and Community at Corinth,” 209.

57 Judge, “The Reaction Against Classical Education in the New Testament,” 14. “The value system upon which Greek education had been built up is deliberately overturned. Paul was not apparently concerned with the threat which classical literary studies represented to children at primary and secondary levels. But he reacted powerfully against the perversion of human relations, which he saw inculcated by the ideals of higher education. It was a perversion because it enshrined the beautiful and the strong in positions of social power.”

58 Scholarly discussion concerning the message of the cross and its foolishness in the Graeco-Roman world abounds, as does the discussion on the terms found in these sections, rendering further discussion here almost superfluous. See e.g., Peter L. Berger, “Worldly Wisdom, Christian Foolishness,” FT Aug/Sep (1990): 16–22; Mark T. Finney, “Christ Crucified and the Inversion of Roman Imperial Ideology in 1 Corinthians,” BTB 35, no. 1 (2005): 20–33; Donald E. Green, “The Folly of the Cross,” MSJ 15, no. 1 (2004): 59–69; David A. deSilva, “‘Let the One Who Claims Honor Establish That Claim in the Lord’: Honor Discourse in the Corinthian Correspondence,” BTB 28, no. 2 (1998): 61–74. For discussion of the various terms, see Welborn, Paul, the Fool of Christ; he has also discussed this issue in his earlier article L. L. Welborn, “Paul’s Appropriation of the...
In 1 Corinthians 1:20–28, Paul offers three rhetorical triads which he hopes will put some of these arrogant members and their views back in line.

5.3.1 Triad 1 (1 Cor 1:20)

The first triad is found in 1:20, where Paul asks rhetorically “Where is the one who is wise? Where is the scribe? Where is the debater of this age?” These three figures (the σοφὸς, γραμματεύς, and συζητητὴς) have been defined as the three main types of tertiary scholar in the Graeco-Roman world; that is, the rationalistic philosopher (that we have met already in this chapter), the Jewish legal expert, and the rhetorician respectively. Paul’s point here, according to Welborn, is to show that “the truly wise person cannot be found, (because) God has annihilated the basis of learned culture, so that one can no longer claim to be what the name of σοφὸς suggests.” In other words, Paul wants to remind the Corinthians that the teachers in the Christian community are not to be found amongst the world’s σοφοί; in fact, a closer inspection will reveal that such men are virtually nowhere to be seen.

5.3.2 Triad 2 (1 Cor 1:26)

The second triad is found in 1 Cor 1:26, where, Paul reminds them of their calling, pointing out that “not many of you were wise according to worldly standards, not many were powerful, not many were of noble birth.” These three terms (σοφὸς, δυνατός, and εὐγενὴς) were all used to describe the members of the upper class, those who are distinguished by education, wealth, and birth. For example, Ps-Plutarch lists the various attributes that are honoured by the society.
Good birth (ἐυγένειον) is a fine thing, but it is an advantage which must be credited to one's ancestors. Wealth (πλουσίος) is held in esteem, but it is a chattel of fortune. Repute is imposing, but unstable. Beauty is highly prized, but short-lived. Health is a valued possession, but inconstant. Strength (φύσις) is much admired, but it falls an easy prey to disease and old age. But learning (παιδεία), of all things in this world, is alone immortal and divine. (Lib. ed. 5C–D)

Again he says, “some people will not even listen to the Stoics, when they call the wise man at the same time rich (πλουσίος), handsome, well-born (εὐγένειος), and a king” (Adul. amic. 58E). Similarly, Dio notes that those known as “noble” and “well-born” (εὐγενής) were given these titles on account of being well-born in respect to virtue; moreover, the descendants of families of ancient wealth and high repute were called “well-born” by a certain class. In the Progymnasmata, Theon teaches that in the composing of encomium, external goods that are to be praised are good birth (both from a good city and family), education, friendship, reputation, official position, wealth, good children and a good death. Ethical virtues include prudence, temperance, courage, justice, piety, generosity, magnanimity and the like.

Similar language is used in 1 Corinthians 4:8, where Paul parodies the claims of the Corinthian opponents, saying “Already you have all you want! Already you have become rich! Without us you have become kings!” These sort of lofty claims were common amongst the educated elite such as sophists. Philo says of them:

Those who take care of themselves (the Sophists) are men of mark (ἐυδοξοί) and wealth (πλουσίοι), holding leading positions, praised on all hands, recipients of honours, portly, healthy, stout and vigorous; revelling in luxurious and riotous living, strangers to labour, conversant with pleasures which carry the sweets of life to the all-welcoming soul by every channel and sense. (Philo, Det. 34)
Paul says (ironically) that they have already begun to reign as kings (ἐβασιλεύσατε), which was a normal reference to the σοφός, particularly among the Stoics.\(^{65}\) Philo says that “We pronounce wisdom to be kingship, for we pronounce the wise man to be king” (Migr. 197). Again, he says that “The kingdom of the Sage comes by the gift of God, and the virtuous man who receives it brings no harm to anyone, but the acquisition and enjoyment of good things to all his subjects, to whom he is the herald of peace and order” (Abr. 261).\(^{66}\) Horace (65 B.C.E.–8 B.C.E.) makes reference to the Stoic philosopher when he says, “the wise man is less than Jove alone. He is rich, free, honoured, beautiful, nay a king of kings!” (Ep. 1.1.106)\(^{67}\) In fact, Lucian’s *Hermotimus* demonstrates how widely held this view was, when he says that “A lot of people said that the Stoics were manly and understood everything and that the man who went this way was the only king, the only rich man, the only wise man, and everything rolled into one” (Hermot. 16).

The Stoic σοφός imagery continues in 1 Cor 4:10—Paul again, no doubt parodying their own claims—says, “We are fools for Christ, but you are wise (φρόνιμοι) in Christ. We are weak, but you are strong (σωφρόνεσθε). You are held in honour (ἐνδοξοί), but we in disrepute.” First, they are φρόνιμοι, a term drawn from the sage’s possession of φρόνησις,\(^{68}\) which was the chief cardinal virtue.\(^{69}\) The Stoic correlation of kingship and φρόνησις is most clearly seen in Plutarch’s report:

> Some think that the Stoics are jesting when they hear that in their sect the wise man (σοφός) is termed not only prudent (φρόνιμος) and just and brave, but also an orator, a poet, a general, a rich man (πλουσίος) and a king (βασιλεύς); and then they count themselves worthy of all these titles, and if they fail to get them, are vexed. (Tranq. an. 472A)

This comment by Plutarch may even indicate where some of the Corinthians’ attitude stems from. Second, the Corinthians are ἑνδοξοι, a term used to describe the kings and the rich and appropriated by Stoics to describe the σοφος.\(^{70}\) Finally, the Corinthians are ενδοξοι, another term associated with kings and the rich, and thus used to depict the sage.\(^{71}\)


\(^{66}\) Similarly, *Mut.* 152; *Sohr.* 56; *Post.* 128. Although Philo was a Platonist, Gill (“The School in the Roman Period,” 55) notes that “Philo’s theses also come close to Stoicism; but even when he does not, he adopts a highly Stoic conceptual vocabulary, so that his texts are widely used as sources for Stoic terminology.”

\(^{67}\) Similarly, *Sat.* 1.3.124; *Cicero*, *Parad.* 6.42; *Diogenes Laertius*, *Lives*, 7.122; *Epictetus*, *Diatr.* 3.22.49, 63, 79.

\(^{68}\) Fitzgerald, *Cracks in an Earthen Vessel*, 137; similarly, Schnabel, *Der erste Brief des Paulus an die Korinther*, 246.

\(^{69}\) Wilckens and Fohrer, “σοφία, σοφός, κτλ.,” 474.


\(^{71}\) Ibid., 139–140. The Stoic influence in these terms is well attested in scholarship. Terence Paige (“Stoicism, ἐλευθερία and Community at Corinth,” 211) notes that “The use of these terms could have arisen from a misplaced, Stoic-like ideal of themselves as wise. For according to the Stoa, only the wise man is truly
In other words, some in the Christian community believe that they, like the σοφοί of the Stoic philosophical schools, have begun to reign as kings in life (4:8); moreover, they are (in Christ) wise strong and esteemed (φρόνιμοι, ἴσχυροί, ἐνδοξοί 4:10). This attitude no doubt stems from their being, in worldly terms, educated, wealthy, and well born (σοφοί, δυνατοί, εὐγενεῖς 1:26). But as Paul now points out in the third triad, these are the very characteristics of those things God intends to shame.

5.3.3 Triad 3 (1 Cor 1:27–28)

The third triad is found in 1 Cor 1:27–28. Like the second, it focuses both on their calling and also on explaining God’s purpose in their election. The centrality of this passage and its importance in Paul’s thinking is indicated by its clearly intentional composition. The text contains three identical structures that create a paradox of low/high status with God and His purposes as the immediate centre:

Διὰ τὰ μωρὰ τοῦ κόσμου ἐξελέξατο ὁ θεός, ἵνα κατασχῦνῃ τοὺς σοφοὺς,
Καὶ τὰ ἄθετα τοῦ κόσμου ἐξελέξατο ὁ θεός, ἵνα κατασχῦνῃ τὰ ἴσχυρα,
Καὶ τὰ ἄρετα τοῦ κόσμου
Καὶ τὰ ἐξουθενημένα ἐξελέξατο ὁ θεός,
Τὰ μὴ ὄντα, ἵνα τὰ ὄντα καταργήσῃ

But he foolish things of the world God chose, in order to shame the wise
And the weak things of the world God chose, in order to shame the strong
And the lowborn things
And the despised things God chose,
The things that are not, in order to nullify the things that are

The rhetorical structure is unmistakable, as is its use of synonymous terms from the previous triad. The point in Paul’s mind is clearly to separate the wisdom of God from the wisdom of the world and to remind the Corinthians that although some of them are educated and possess πρεσβεία, these characteristics are not indicative of possession of God’s wisdom. This is demonstrated by the fact that the majority of members stand in contrast to the educated elite; that is, while the elite are “wise,” “strong,” and “noble,” the chosen ones are “foolish,” “weak,” and “low-born.”

happy, truly wealthy, truly fit to govern as king, truly free. This is because he shares the world with the gods, and is enriched with the wisdom if the divine λόγος which governs nature.”

72 Cf. Thiselton, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, 183.
73 Weiss notes the same structure, Weiss, Der erste Korintherbrief, 36.
74 Δυνατοὶ cf. Τὰ ἄθετα/τὰ ἴσχυρα; εὐγενεῖς cf. Τὰ ἄγενη/Τὰ ἐξουθενημένα/Τὰ μὴ ὄντα/τὰ ὄντα. For discussion, see Theissen, The Social Setting of Pauline Christianity, 71; Conzelmann, First Corinthians, 50. Similarly, τοῦ κόσμου cf. κατὰ σάρκα in Schnabel, Der erste Brief des Paulus an die Korinther, 142.
This idea of an uneducated person being foolish and weak was common. Quintilian says that no one can concede intelligence to someone unless he is a good man. Since, then, “a bad man is necessarily a fool … the fool (stultus, some manuscripts: malus) will most assuredly never become an orator” (Inst. 12.1.4). In addition to the fools, Paul says that God also chose the weak things (τὰ ὅσθενη) of the world. The term in classical Greek was typically non-ethical and had a broad range of usages, referring to physical, social or even metaphysical weakness; it was also a frequently used antonym to δύναμις and ἰσχύς. Epictetus suggests that every faculty acquired by the uneducated and the weak (ὁσθενής) is dangerous for them since it is prone to make them conceited and puffed up over it. This third triad then, in taking up the language of the previous one, re-emphasises the fact that the foolish and weak things of the world that God has chosen, stand in stark contrast to the “wise, with their ‘this age,’ merely human point of view.”

5.3.4 Summary

In summary, the constellation of value terms found in these passages leaves little doubt that behind the Corinthian idea of σοφία is a comparison to an elite, educated ideal in the culture (exemplified but not limited to the Stoic σοφός) by elite, educated members of the church. In response, Paul juxtaposes these few elite members with the many lower status people in the church. The implication is clear: God neither chooses people, nor defines wisdom according to the world’s standards; in fact, the very presence of a lower status majority demonstrates, if anything, a radical shift in the values that God looks for in his “pupils.” This being the case, it would stand to reason that he would look for the same values in his teachers.

5.4 Paul, Christ, and a New Kind of “Wise Man”

Some of the Corinthians, then, have measured themselves according to the well known figure of the Stoic (?) σοφός, and in doing so, they have elevated themselves to a superior place in

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75 Similarly, Inst. 12.10.52. Welborn (Paul, the Fool of Christ, 32–33) has shown that the term “foolishness” (μωρία) that Paul uses here, was used amongst the philosophers to denote a lack of reason or self-understanding, the absurdity of an unexamined life; the foolish one, according to them, was the “lower class buffoon.” He states that “the ‘foolishness’ of this social type consisted in a weakness or efficiency of intellect, coupled with a physical grotesqueness.”

76 David Alan Black, Paul, Apostle of Weakness: Astheneia and its Cognates in the Pauline Literature (New York: Peter Lang, 1984), 13. See also for Paul’s use of the term in 1 Cor 1–4.

77 Epictetus, Diatr. 1.8.8.

78 Fee, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, 83.
the church, and have also deemed themselves to be superior to Paul. In response, Paul, in 1 Corinthians 4:9, contrasts himself and his ministry to their perceived achievements.\(^{79}\) He says that “we have become a spectacle (θεατρον) to the world, to angels, and to men.”\(^{80}\) Again, in 1 Cor 4:10 he says that the apostles are foolish (μωρός) and weak (σκέπτερις), language that has come to, and will continue to describe his rhetorical presence.\(^{81}\) Furthermore, he refers to himself and the apostles as dishonoured (ατιμος).\(^{82}\) Finally, he says in 1 Cor 4:11–13 that he and the other apostles are hungry, thirsty, naked, beaten, and homeless. His struggles also include laboring, revulsion, persecution, defamation, and falling into the general category of offscourings of the world and refuse of all things.\(^{83}\) In other words, Paul tells the Christian community that what characterises his ministry is the very thing God is looking for and calling; in every way, he is a μωρός.\(^{84}\) This is no doubt antithetical to anything found in παιδεία, and would certainly present a point of difficulty for elite Corinthians who are seeking in their teacher a σοφός.\(^{85}\) But Paul’s concern goes beyond contrasting his ministry to

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\(^{80}\) For discussion of this metaphor, see V. Henry T. Nguyen, “God’s Execution of His Condemned Apostles. Paul’s Imagery of the Roman Arena in 1 Cor 4.9,” \textit{ZNW} 99 (2008): 33–48; V. Henry T. Nguyen, “The Identification of Paul’s Spectacle of Death Metaphor in 1 Corinthians 4.9,” \textit{NTS} 53 (2007): 489–501. He suggests that it is to be understood as a reference to the arena wherein condemned criminals were executed. Alternatively, Welborn (\textit{Paul, the Fool of Christ}, 55) locates the metaphor in the context of the theatre, where the mimes and buffoons were sent on stage last. Finally, it has also been compared to the victory parade, or triumphal procession through Rome. See Fee, \textit{The First Epistle to the Corinthians}, 174–175; Raymond F. Collins, \textit{The Power of Images in Paul} (Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical Press, 2008), 124–125.

\(^{81}\) Cf. 1 Cor 2:3; 2 Cor 10:10. For discussion see Welborn, \textit{An End to Enmity}, 114–115.

\(^{82}\) The rhetorical synkrisis of this verse is synonymous with 1:27–28, reinforcing the contrast between the elite Corinthians and Paul. Cf. Schnabel, \textit{Der erste Brief des Paulus an die Korinther}, 249; Winter, \textit{Philo and Paul among the Sophists}, 199; Collins, \textit{First Corinthians}, 189; Conzelmann, \textit{First Corinthians}, 89.

\(^{83}\) These last two terms (περικαθαρισμα and περιψιμοι), it is argued, were the worst terms in of abuse in the Greek language. See Welborn, \textit{Paul, the Fool of Christ}, 80; Collins, \textit{The Power of Images in Paul}, 119–120. See Welborn for extensive treatment of each of the terms in this passage. The gravity of such self-humiliation is well noted by E. A. Judge (“St Paul and Classical Society,” in \textit{Social Distinctives of the Christians in the First Century: Pivotal Essays}, ed. by David M. Scholer [Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 2008], 97) who says “It is certain that no explanation can get to the heart of Paul’s relation to classical society that does not do full justice to his pursuit of radical self humiliation. This theme runs through all his work, in theology and ethics alike, and on his practical relations with both followers and rivals, and the way he talked about himself. It is moreover an attitude in violent reaction to much that was central to the classical way of life.”

\(^{84}\) However, this was most likely a term given to him by the Corinthians; in admitting that “we are fools for Christ,” Paul is no doubt assuming this title for himself. Cf. Welborn, \textit{An End to Enmity}, 415.

\(^{85}\) Eckhard Schnabel has argued that Paul’s description of suffering in vv. 11–13 should be understood against the background of the righteous sufferer of many of the Psalms. The sufferings in this catalogue, he suggests, are not analogous of Cynic/Stoic ideals of the imperturbability or self sufficiency of the sage; nor do they emphasise the apostle’s personal character formation or illustrate the irrelevance of external circumstances; Schnabel argues instead that “Der Leidenskatalog soll vielmehr die Entsprechung des apostolischen Lebens zu Tod und Auferweckung Jesu illustrieren und den korinthischen Christen ein Paradigma der Wege in Christus vor Augen stellen.” See Schnabel, \textit{Der erste Brief des Paulus an die Korinther}, 240. Fitzgerald’s suggestion that Paul’s use of this catalogue of suffering has in mind the suffering sage indeed has merit; in fact, given the
what the Corinthians are seeking; his primary concern is to point their focus back to the true embodiment of God’s wisdom, namely, Christ.

### 5.4.1 Christ as the Embodiment of Wisdom (1 Cor 1:24, 30)

Paul says in 1 Corinthians 1:24 that Christ is both God’s power (δύναμις) and God’s wisdom (σοφία). We have already seen the importance of these terms in reference to the σοφός.

Paul’s point then, is clear: what the Corinthians have been trying to find in their teachers can only be found in Christ. However, unlike the σοφοί who are (only) characterised by wisdom, Christ is in fact the embodiment of wisdom itself. He is the manifestation of God’s power and wisdom. This is further defined in 1 Cor 1:30 when Paul says, “because of Him [God] you are in Christ Jesus, who became to us wisdom from God, righteousness and sanctification and redemption.” Paul first reminds them that, above all else, it is on account of God’s saving work in Christ that they are members of His body. He says plainly that “you are all in Christ Jesus because of God!” a clear rejection of their current elitism and striving for wisdom by their own abilities. He then points out that “Christ was made wisdom on our behalf from God” (ὁ ἐγεννήθη σοφία ἡμῖν ἀπὸ τοῦ θεου). The aorist passive γίνομαι (“God made Christ to become”) primarily refers to Christ’s incarnation, but still has in mind His ongoing work as

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66 This statement would have in mind both Jewish and Greek members of the congregation, as Schnabel (Der erste Brief des Paulus an die Korinther, 133) notes: “Aber Paulus kommt es in V. 24 gerade nicht darauf an, den Juden zu zeigen, dass die von ihm verkündigte Botschaft von Jesus Christus ihren weisheitlichen Traditionen entspricht, noch will er den Griechen demonstrieren, dass seine Botschaft mit ihrer Weisheitsuche mithalten kann.”

67 As Conzelmann (First Corinthians, 48) notes: “It goes without saying that God is strong and wise, but the point is to make clear how he is so, namely, in revealing his power and wisdom ‘in Christ.’ We can say that Christ is God’s ‘nature.’”

68 Tucker, You Belong to Christ, 174. “The Corinthians’ reliance on any school of philosophy with regard to salvation will ultimately be displayed publicly as an unacceptable means of righteousness, holiness, or redemption.”

69 In particular it would have in mind the crucifixion as the ultimate display of God’s “wisdom” that confounds the wise of this world. Cf. David E. Garland, I Corinthians, (BECNT; Grand Rapids: Baker, 2003), 79; Walter Klaiber, Der erste Korintherbrief; (BNT; Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 2011), 34.
their saviour. In other words, Christ, in both his earthly ministry and his ongoing work in the believer’s life, has become the true embodiment of, and the means to, the wisdom and knowledge of God.⁹⁰ He is, figuratively speaking, the head of the “Christ school,” the one to whom we should look for inspiration, example, and salvation. The implication from the point of view of philosophical schools would not be lost on the church. Morgan argues that

It is increasingly understood that philosophers of the early Empire did not see themselves primarily as exponents of systems. They saw themselves in much more organic, biographical terms: as followers of an inspirational teacher (who might be dead or alive); as guardians of a tradition; as trying to live a certain kind of life … In the Graeco-Roman world, especially during the Hellenistic and Roman periods, what gives philosophical movements their cohesion and identity is less a disinterested common quest for the truth than a virtually religious commitment to the authority of a founder figure. Lives, more than doctrines, were what inspired seekers after wisdom.⁹¹

This, I suggest, is a possible backdrop to the situation in our passage. We have seen above the comments of Schmeller (cf. 2.3.2), who has suggested that the various factions were acting like competing philosophical schools in that they were exalting the various teachers according to each one’s style and treating them like heads of different schools.⁹² The Corinthian Christians were categorising their teachers as σοφοί. In response, they are told that the only person to whom such allegiance is owed is the head and founder of the church, namely, Christ.

This σοφία that Christ embodies, as with all philosophical systems, is further defined in ethical terms: δικαιοσύνη, ἀγίασμός, and ἀπολύτρωσις. The additional clarification not only explains what Paul understands by the wisdom of God, but also serves to distinguish God’s wisdom from the wisdom of the world.⁹³ Paul’s reference to δικαιοσύνη as an aspect of Christ’s σοφία is interesting, given that Paul typically avoids the ethical terms we have encountered above (i.e., καλοκάγαθία, ἀρετή, σωφροσύνη cf. 3.1.1), no doubt due to the

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⁹⁰ Cf. Robertson and Plummer, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the First Epistle of St Paul to the Corinthians, 27. “(He) became’ by His coming into the world and by what He accomplished for us. He showed the highest that God could show to man and opened the way to knowledge of God through reconciliation with Him.”

⁹¹ Morgan, Popular Morality in the Early Roman Empire, 274–275. She goes on to say that “Figures like Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and Diogenes were not just important thinkers: they were heroes. They were not merely expositors of specific doctrines or founders of discrete schools: they lived exemplary lives. They embodied their principles; they lived—and sometimes famously died—as they taught.” Although she is careful to point out that “this is not uncontroversial and reverence for founder figures should probably not be stressed at the expense of other aspects of philosophical life.”

⁹² Schmeller, Schulen im Neuen Testament? 122. Similarly, see Klaiber, Der erste Korintherbrief, 34.

⁹³ Hence I take the terms exexegetically, as Schnabel (Der erste Brief des Paulus an die Korinther, 145) has argued, “der zwischen Paulus und den Korinthern umstrittene Begriff der “Weisheit” bedarf der weiteren Klärung.” Similarly, Leon Morris, The First Epistle of Paul to the Corinthians, (TNTC; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1985), 55.
affiliation they had with human striving and achievement. Yet here he takes up one of the most prominent values in Graeco-Roman culture, something intimately connected to παιδεία, and attributes it to Christ as a manifestation of His wisdom. What is different however, is the passive way by which we attain it. What was formally a result of personal accomplishment, especially by the elite, is now a gift from God alone. In combination with ἁγιασμός and ἀπολύτρωσις, true wisdom, as it is embodied in Christ, is actually salvation, that is, a life set apart and transformed by God through Christ.

All of this work, God did on our behalf (ἡμῖν dative of advantage). Christ was made to be not only a living embodiment and example of God’s wisdom, but also the power through which we attain God’s wisdom. This last point is further reinforced in 1 Cor 1:31 by Paul’s reference to Jeremiah 9:23–24, reminding them that as a result of this calling and salvific work of God, all human boasting is rendered futile and any boasting should be in God.

94 Ἰακοβάθεια appears nowhere in the NT. Ἀρετή appears five times and only once in Paul (Phil 4:8); it is suggested that this minimal usage is not because the term was irreligious, but because it was far too anthropocentric and this-worldly in orientation. See Otto Bauernfeind, “Ἀρετή,” in TDNT 1:457-461, 1964, 460. Likewise, σωφρόσυνη only appears three times in the NT, two of these in the pastorals (1 Tim 2:9, 15) as a general reference to sobriety of women. Most notably, in the lists of Christian virtues (cf. 1 Thess 2:10; Tit 2:12) the term does not appear. See Ulrich Luck, “σωφρονή, σωφρονέω, κτλ.,” in TDNT 7:1097-1104, 1971, 1102. It would be reasonable to suggest that Paul’s avoidance of these terms would be intentional given their cultural baggage in regard to human achievement. This suggestion is given further support by Judge’s comments. He notes that although Paul shows no sign of finding primary or secondary education a source of problems, there are very clear indications that he had thrown himself into total confrontation with those who espoused the reigning values of higher education. See E. A. Judge, “The Reaction Against Classical Education in the New Testament,” JCE 77 (1983): 11.

95 This thought is repeated in 2 Cor 5:21 where Paul tells them that “God has made him to be sin for us, who knew no sin, that we might become δικαίοσύνη θεοῦ.”

96 The three terms form a rhetorical gradatio, where the final characteristic (redemption) is emphasised through an ascending series of terms. Cf. Collins, First Corinthians, 113. As Blomberg rightly notes, “In Him, believers receive true wisdom: the wisdom of the cross and all its benefits (v. 30)—right standing before God (righteousness), moral cleansing (holiness), and rescue from slavery to sin (redemption).” See Craig L Blomberg, 1 Corinthians, (NIVAC; Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1995), 54; similarly, Ciampa and Rosner, The First Letter to the Corinthians, 109. Thiselton (“Wisdom in the Jewish and Christian Scriptures: Wisdom in the New Testament,” Theology 114, no. 4 [2011]: 265–266) argues that this is the believers’ new status, in contrast folly, weakness or lack of status, the despised and the “nothings;” these now experience a reversal through the cross to become the “wise” in Christ.

97 Cf. Fee, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, 85 for this rendering.

98 On this point I follow Thielson, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, 191; similarly, Kistemaker, 1 Corinthians, 65; Witherington, Conflict and Community in Corinth, 117; contra, Fee, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, 85.

Conclusion

In summary, I suggest that it is, in part, against the figure of the σοφός and the values he embodied that Paul and Apollos are being compared. Moreover, it is against a philosophical worldview, one that praised human achievement and embodied a general wisdom that was counter to the message of the cross, that these elite Christians have measured their “achievements.” I have also made the suggestion that the particular philosophical system was most likely Stoicism. This suggestion is peripheral in the context of the overall thesis, but I offer it by way of contribution to the scholarly discussion reflected in the Literature Review. Although we can never be entirely certain, given the epigraphical and literary evidence that we have seen above, Stoicism appears to be a very plausible backdrop to the views of these detractors. What is certain, however, is that the wisdom sought by these Corinthians was one that divided the Christian community along lines of status, separating between high and low on the grounds of their perceived superiority. Moreover, it caused them to elevate themselves above Paul, who, in their eyes, was a μωρός. Paul responds by pointing out that, in Christ, true wisdom is in fact embodied. Moreover, his (Paul’s) life more closely resembles the example set by Christ. But this is only half the story. The Corinthian “wisdom” was not only marked by elite virtues and human accomplishment, it was also marked, more specifically, by eloquent speech (σοφία λόγου),\(^\text{100}\) it is to this issue that we will now turn.

CHAPTER 6: PAUL AND THE ORATORS

In the previous chapter it was argued that elite Corinthian Christians had measured their teachers as well as their own perceived achievements against the well-known figure of the ἁγιός and the virtues he embodied. But the wisdom sought by these elite Corinthians was not only marked by elite virtues and human accomplishment, it was also marked more specifically by eloquent speech (σοφία λόγου). In 1 Corinthians 2:1–5, Paul recounts his initial ministry in Corinth, telling them that his preaching style, which stood in stark contrast to that of orators, sophists, and philosophers, was a deliberate ploy on his part to avoid any association with the sort of teachers the Christian community was seeking.

In the following chapter it will be shown that (1) the first century was enamoured with the rhetorical practice known as declamation and that, moreover, the preference was towards the more “masculine” Attic style. It will then be suggested that (2) Atticism and a concern with manliness was a current issue in Corinth; at the very least, Corinth (by comparison to surrounding cities) was a city that gave great honour to orators. Finally, it will be demonstrated that (3) Paul’s description of his own preaching activities can be better understood against this broader cultural backdrop.

6.1 First-Century Oratory

The importance of oratory in the ancient world simply cannot be overstated.¹ This was certainly the case in the schools of rhetoric, but, as we will see in the next chapter, also in the schools of philosophy. Orators were the politicians, statesmen, and celebrities, their fame being well attested.² Rhetorical skill was also believed to be a mark of character. According to

¹ Morgan, *Literate Education in the Hellenistic and Roman Worlds*, 190. “The art of rhetoric is central to Greek and Roman education, as to Greek and Roman society as a whole. Throughout antiquity, rhetoric was used in every area of public and many areas of private life, for business and pleasure, by a wide range of social groups. It was studied endlessly, generating any number of philosophical investigations, speeches, handbooks and treatises, attacks and defences. It features in every account of Hellenistic and Roman education to survive, having been taught to wealthy young Greeks from the fifth century B.C.E. and radiating ever more widely through the Hellenistic and Roman periods and beyond.”

² “Why, where is there a profession whose fame and glory are to be compared with the distinction of the orator? Who is a more illustrious man at Rome, not only with the busy class, intent on public affairs, but even with people of leisure, and with the young? Whose name does the father din into his children’s ears before that of the orator? Whom, as he passes by, do the ignorant mob and the men with the tunic oftener speak of by name?
most elite writers in the first century, a person’s character and manliness was largely defined by their eloquence and style. In Suetonius’ (written ca. 100 C.E.—130 C.E.) biographies of the first-century emperors, a section is given to each one’s particular rhetorical style as a defining aspect of each their persona.\(^3\) Oratory permeated every facet of elite life, and while only a few would ever be trained in it, everyone would be exposed to it. Moreover, as we will see, everyone would have the opportunity to become a critic of it.

6.1.1 The Historical Development of Oratory

The use of rhetoric in ancient Greece came largely from two main needs. The first was the need of either prosecutors or defendants to represent themselves in civil or criminal cases. The second was the need for governing officials to address the *ekklēσia* or *boulē*.\(^4\) In this climate, the eloquent orator became a civic ideal, “the master artist of civic life, being in full control of language that served his art and personal claim.”\(^5\) In Hellenistic times, schools of grammar and rhetoric appeared in every important town and city, and in this new environment, the ability to speak Greek in the law court, or conduct business in Greek became important for many citizens. Moreover, it brought with it understanding of and acceptance into, the dominant culture. However, in the shift towards the autocratic world of the Hellenistic rulers, opportunities for the deliberative political oratory of the democracy were stymied. In its place came new forms of speech such as announcing policy to the city, arousing public opinion in favour of the ruler or giving ceremonial addresses in honour of the ruler or official.\(^6\)

In a similar way, the change from the Roman Republic to the Empire brought with it an evolution in the use of oratory. Under the Republic, oratory found its main value in the law courts and in the senate. Throughout this period, deliberative rhetoric was taught in the schools to those who in the future would urge particular matters, whether in the senate or...
public assembly and judicial oratory was taught with a view to appearances in the law courts. Of the two main branches of law, civil and criminal, the latter was the most appealing to the young orator as way of making a name for himself, especially in light of the many political scandals in the late Republic. Tacitus (ca 56 C.E.–120 C.E.) says that in these times, the speaker’s political wisdom was measured by his power of carrying conviction to the unstable populace. These, he says, were times of hereditary feuds between whole families, of schisms among the aristocracy and never-ending struggles between the senate and the commons. But although these many issues tore apart the commonwealth, he says that they provided “a sphere for the oratory of those days and heaped on it vast rewards. The more influence a man could wield by his powers of speech, the more readily did he attain to high office; the further did he, when in office, outstrip his colleagues in the race for precedence, the more did he gain favour with the great, authority with the senate and fame with the common people” (Dial. 36.4). However, by the Augustan age, deliberative rhetoric in the form of political oratory, or more specifically, the ability to speak freely, shrunk in proportion to the power of the emperor. In its place arose a new use of oratory, one that, whilst devoid of any real political force, captivated its audience with style and eloquence; the practice of declamation.

6.1.2 Declamation

While judicial oratory remained relatively unchanged, political oratory gave way to new kinds of persuasion in the verbal and visual arts. Since there was less real political use of oratory,
but eloquence was still prized, declamation developed as an alternative expression of eloquence. In what follows, we will briefly explore the widespread use, influence, and style of this practice.

6.1.2.1 Declamation and Παιδεία

In the early Empire, declamation became the main form of rhetorical training in the schools of oratory. Here the teacher would set a topic for the students to write a speech about. These topics were of two main kinds: the mock-deliberative suasoria and the mock-forensic controversia. The purpose of these exercises was to give students practice in public speaking, with teachers lecturing on rhetorical theory then giving students opportunities to compose and practise their own speeches. In teaching declamation, the teacher himself would often declaim on the topic and then get the students to follow in turn. Visitors could also come and watch these presentations, even taking the opportunity themselves to speak extempore. The overall purpose of declamation was to inculcate, through repetition, approved values in the young minds of the next generation of the elite. By becoming steeped in these values, beliefs, and stereotypes, the students acquired the reflexes needed to live as respectable men.

In declamation, the student also took on the speaking role of his father or other adult roles. In writing speeches and declaiming, a boy was taught gender and status roles and in doing so, was being shaped for his position at the top of the ladder, that is, as a vir bonus. In practice, he would speak like a patron or paterfamilias on behalf of his social subordinates.

his troops or a provincial governor to address his people, in all there were fewer opportunities to use deliberative rhetoric. Augustus developed a new technique of verbal and visual persuasion including coins, monuments and buildings which effectively co-opted the previous functions of traditional oratory.

Cf. Kennedy, The Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World, 304. Kennedy suggests that this shift in the use of oratory away from the senate was a reason for its perceived decline in eloquence in the Augustan age. Under the Republic, he claims, the education of an orator had as its main concern the future leader and spokesman in the senate; but now under the Empire this was no longer the case (450). While this was certainly a cause for the shift in function of oratory, it is difficult to say that this was a cause of the decline of eloquence; in fact some of our authors suggest that the state of eloquence had never been so good.


Clark, Rhetoric in Greco-Roman Education, 215–216.


Ibid., 164.
Additionally, he might speak for the freedman accused of ingratitude, the son accused of rape or patricide, the stepmother accused of poisoning, or the military hero accused of desertion. Overall, the practice of declamation allowed future leaders to master the complexities and contradictions of Roman ideology and Roman practice. Quintilian regarded it as the most useful of rhetorical exercises. The reason for this, he says, is that “it includes practically all the exercises of which we have been speaking and is in close touch with reality.” As a result, “it has acquired such a vogue that many think that it is the sole training necessary to the formation of an orator, since there is no excellence in a formal speech which is not also to be found in this type of rhetorical exercise” (Inst. 2.10.1–2). Declamation was seen as practice for the courts, thus it was encouraged that the subjects chosen should be as close to reality as possible. “For if declamation is not a preparation for the actual work of the courts, it can only be compared to the rant of an actor or the raving of a lunatic.” Moreover, “What can be more ludicrous than to work oneself into a passion and to attempt to excite the anger or grief of our hearers, unless we are preparing ourselves by such mimic combats for the actual strife and the pitched battles of the law-courts?” (Inst. 2.10.8)

6.1.2.2 Declamation as a Cultural Phenomena

But what began as a form of training for students of oratory soon developed into a popular form of entertainment for adults. By the mid-sixties B.C.E., schools of declamation were starting to attract adults from the Roman elite who sat in classes as auditors. Additionally, Roman orators also used declaiming as a way of staying limber for the stage or the forum. Because declamation was a performance, it could also take place in settings such as private homes. Moreover, it also became a means by which one could discuss political themes, themes that might otherwise not be safe to speak about; and as time went on, it became a

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20 W. Martin Bloomer, “Schooling in Persona: Imagination and Subordination in Roman Education,” CA 16, no. 1 (1997): 47. In addition to learning how to think categorically, the young man considered the various plots that could trouble the home or the city, the breaches of loyalty of social or familial order.


22 Spawforth, Greece and the Augustan Cultural Revolution, 73.

23 Pliny writes many letters regarding private readings in small gatherings, or being requested or requesting a review of a new book or piece of writing (cf. Ep. 2.9.1–4; 3.13, 15; 4.14, 20, 26, 27; 5.3, 12; 7.2, 12, 17, 20, 8.3, 12, 14, 16, 21; 9.31, 34). Although Kennedy argues that this practice should be distinguished from declamation (Kennedy, The Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World, 321.); and Fantham suggests that Pliny, as a statesman, was probably atypical in this practice (Fantham, “The Contexts and Occasions of Roman Public Rhetoric,” 124.), it is still indicative of a culture fascinated by eloquence and focussed on the perfection of the art of rhetoric.
public spectacle at various games and with travelling sophists.\textsuperscript{24} It was even practised by emperors. Augustus, it is said, took his teacher of declamation Apollodorus of Pergamon with him from Rome to Apollonia.\textsuperscript{25} Overall, declamation reflected the tastes of an age that appreciated style, technique, and artistic effects as virtues in themselves.\textsuperscript{26} This was so much so that Kennedy notes

Any fair estimate would judge the early Roman Empire as one of the most eloquent periods in human history. Rhetoric monopolised secondary education and in this period the crest was probably reached in the number of students trained in declamation and in the influence of rhetorical study on literary composition. The ideal orator continued to be an inspiration and a goal for thousands.\textsuperscript{27}

Moreover, deliberative oratory, once the mainstay of the senate and the forum in the form of political oratory, was now all but completely co-opted by the schools and rhetorical performers in the form of declamation.\textsuperscript{28} This was certainly true in Roman oratory and equally true in Greek.

6.1.2.3 Declamation and the Second Sophistic

Under the Empire, Greek civic life went on in a semi-autonomous manner and internal peace was conducive to stimulated intellectual life and opportunity for speech.\textsuperscript{29} Although political deliberation before the \textit{demos} on matters of the economy and external relations was largely a matter of form, political decision-making that mattered still occurred in the \textit{boulē}.\textsuperscript{30} In

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{24} Kennedy, \textit{The Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World}, 320–321.
\item \textsuperscript{25} Suetonius, \textit{Aug.}, 89.1.
\item \textsuperscript{26} Kennedy, \textit{The Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World}, 316.
\item \textsuperscript{27} Ibid., 428. This desire and aspiration towards eloquence and style was not new however, it in fact stemmed back to the earliest practices of rhetoric in Rome. Cicero gives a brief account of this history: “For as soon as our world-empire had been established, and an enduring peace had assured us leisure, there was hardly a youth, athirst for fame, who did not deem it his duty to strive with might and main after eloquence … Later, having heard the Greek orators, (they) gained acquaintance with their literature and called in Greek teachers, our people were fired with a really incredible enthusiasm for eloquence … In those days too, as at present, the prizes open to this study were supreme, in the way of popularity, wealth, and reputation alike. As for ability again—there are many things to show it—our fellow-countrymen have far excelled the men of every other race” (Cicero, \textit{De Or.}, 1.14–16).
\item \textsuperscript{28} In this tidal wave of cultural preference, not even Cicero himself was safe from attack. Aper admits that while Cicero was the first to give proper finish to oratorical style, he considered him to be “tedious in his introductions, lengthy in his narrations, careless about digressions; slow to rouse himself, and seldom warms to his subject, and only an idea here and there is brought to a fitting and a brilliant close.” Moreover Aper says, “there is nothing which you can pick out or quote, and the style is like a rough building, the wall of which indeed is strong and lasting, but not particularly polished and bright” (Tacitus, \textit{Dial.}, 22.3–4).
\item \textsuperscript{29} Kennedy, \textit{The Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World}, 553.
\item \textsuperscript{30} Connolly, “Problems of the Past in Imperial Greek Education,” 351. She also notes the continuing importance of public speaking in the Greek imperial city (341 n. 10). For discussion of the continuation of the
addition, although politicians were not as free to say what they wanted, public speech was still a primary method of ruling. However, in this new political milieu, declamation provided an avenue for orators to demonstrate their skills and compete for eminence and fame; this was most notable amongst the sophists.

The Second Sophistic was a phenomenon of professional orators, “virtuoso rhetors with a big public reputation.” Sophists were the celebrity declaimers, men whose lives were focussed on the perfection of their art and in particular, the recreation of Greece’s classical past. These were the elite teachers of declamation, but more than that, due to their often vast wealth, were also benefactors to their own and to their adopted cities; this became characteristic of the movement.

One of the most helpful mid-first century sources for not only the presence, but also the behaviour, popularity, and influence of sophistry is also one of its chief critics, Philo of Alexandria. Many of his philosophical discussions are polemics aimed at what he sees as “lovers of self,” eloquent yet morally bankrupt orators who deceive the masses through their empty sophistries. These “lovers of self” fight against the “lovers of virtue,” not ceasing in their attacks until they have completely destroyed their opponents. Philo cites in toto an argument the sophists present to defend their lifestyles:

Is not the body the soul’s house? Why, then, should we not take care of a house that it may not fall into ruins? Are not the eyes and the ears, and the band of the other senses bodyguards and

31 Swain, Hellenism and Empire, 90. Other occasions for public speech included welcoming dignitaries, funeral orations, speeches to honour the gods, and various competitions.
32 Glen W. Bowersock, Greek Sophists in the Roman Empire (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), 13; similarly, Glen W. Bowersock, “Philosophy in the Second Sophistic,” in Philosophy and Power in the Graeco-Roman World: Essays in Honour of Miriam Griffin, ed. by Gillian Clark and Tessa Rajak (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 160. The Second Sophistic is a topic surrounded by historical uncertainties, as there is no apparent starting point to the movement. Philostratus’ account leaves us in no doubt that it was a dominant force in the second century. Cf. Bowersock, Greek Sophists in the Roman Empire, 1–2. But, as Anderson (The Second Sophistic, 18) suggests, his selective usage of fifth century B.C.E. and late first century C.E. sophists would give the impression that “the last centuries B.C.E. spawned a tribe of mediocre declaimers who were unworthy of the title ‘sophists.’” In response to this suggestion, however, he says, “this is patently false, since the popularity of declamation in Rome, and the conflicts between austere Atticism and flamboyant Asianism in the first century B.C.E., testify to a lively and prestigious oratorical activity…” Whatever change took place in the aspect of the sophists came about early; one might be even tempted to argue that there was no real break in the history of ‘Sophistic’ at all.” For possible first-century references to sophists, see Seneca, Con. 1.2.22; Suetonius, Tib. 11.3; Pliny, Ep. 2.3.1–6 (cf. Philostratus, Vit. soph. 514).
33 Dio (Or. 8.33) describes them performers who could be “destroyed by popular opinion, their livers swelling and growing whenever they were praised and shrivelling again when they were censured.”
35 Bowersock, Greek Sophists in the Roman Empire, 26–27. For other discussion on the difference between rhetors and sophists, see Swain, Hellenism and Empire, 97–99.
courtiers, as it were, of the soul? Must we not, then, value friends and allies equally with ourselves? Did nature create pleasures and enjoyments, and all the delights which are spread over the whole of life for the dead, or for those who have never come into existence, and not rather for those who are alive? And what is to induce us to forego the acquisition of wealth and fame and honours and offices and all other things of that sort, things which secure for us a life of not merely safety, but happiness? (Philo, Det. 33)

Here we get a picture of ethically pragmatic orators who are more concerned with honours than virtue; he says further that “Those who take care of themselves [i.e., sophists] are men of mark and wealth, holding leading positions, praised on all hands, recipients of honours, portly, healthy, stout, and vigorous; revelling in luxurious and riotous living, strangers to labour, conversant with pleasures which carry the sweets of life to the all-welcoming soul by every channel and sense” (Philo, Det. 34). He says moreover, that “day after day the swarms of sophists to be found everywhere wears out the ears of any audience they happen to have with disquisitions on minutiae, unravelling phrases that are ambiguous and can bear two meanings” (Agr. 136). Along a similar line, the following is most scathing:

And so the multitude of those who are called Sophists, after winning the admiration city after city, and after drawing wellnigh the whole word to honour them for their hair-splitting and their clever inventiveness, have with all their might worn their life out, and brought it to premature old age, by the indulgence of their passions, differing not at all from neglected nobodies and the most worthless of mankind. Excellently, therefore, does the law-giver compare the race of sophists who live in this way to swine. Such men are at home in a mode of life not bright and luminous but thick and muddy and in all that is most ugly. (Agr. 143)

But in all of his criticism, Philo is still compelled to praise their eloquence; “There are the sophists who are exceedingly skilful in explaining their ideas, but very bad hands at forming intentions; for the mind of these sophists is destitute of all harmony and of all real learning; but their speeches, which are uttered by the organs of their voice, are full of music and beauty” (Migr. 72). He argues that it is in fact dangerous for the untrained in oratory to enter into battle with them; thus it is necessary for those who are wise to be both armed with wisdom in council and good deeds, as well in the arts of eloquence. Philo’s works are very illuminating; though obviously critical and at times disparaging, he still paints a picture of beautifully

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36 On another occasion he says, “Sophists are bound to find the powers within them at strife, words running counter to ideas and wishes to words, in absolute and utter discord. They make our ears ache with their demonstrations of the social character of righteousness, the advantageous nature of moderation, the nobility of self-control, the great benefits conferred by piety, the power of every kind of virtue to bring health and safety. On the other hand they dwell at great length on the unsociability of injustice, on the loss of health entailed by a virtuous life, and prove ad nauseam that irreligion makes you a pariah, and that serious harm is occasioned by all other forms of wickedness. And nevertheless they entertain all the sentiments quite at variance with the things, which they say. At the very moment when they are singing the praises of good sense and moderation and piety, they are found to be more than ever practising foolishness, licentiousness, injustice and impiety, to be confounding and overturning, you may well nigh say, every ordinance of God or man” (Philo, Det. 72–73).

37 Philo, Det. 35.
eloquent orators who not only win over audiences with their charm, but also attain many high honours through their wealth and popularity. Moreover, their influence is well attested to in the way in which Philo structures part of his curriculum with a view towards countering their power.

In summary, declamation was, by the first century, the most prominent manifestation of oratory. It was at the core of rhetorical training in the schools and was the most commonly practiced in the wider culture. This was the case for both Romans and Greeks. But when it came to actual style, as we saw in chapter 3 (cf. 3.5), there was amongst the elite a determined Atticism, which for both Romans and Greeks symbolised a man who was refined, cultured, and educated.

6.1.3 Atticism and Manliness

In the contest between Attic and Asianic style, Atticism won the day. This means that much of what we know of both comes from the point of view of the Atticists, and, as we will see, much of the material is highly polemical. Nevertheless, we can still gather from this a sense of the value placed on Attic style by its adherents and its perceived connection with one’s character.

The honour given to Atticism by some in the early Empire is no more clearly seen than in the comments of Velleius Paterculus (ca. 19 B.C.E.–31 C.E.)

A single city of Attica blossomed with more masterpieces of every kind of eloquence than all the rest of Greece together—to such a degree, in fact, that one would think that although the bodies of the Greek race were distributed among the other states, their intellects were confined within the walls of Athens alone. (Velleius Paterculus, 1.18.1)

This preference for Atticism was in direct contrast to the more “effeminate” Asianic style. The Asianic style was, especially amongst elite Romans, commonly affiliated with moral degeneracy. Dionysius of Halicarnassus (ca. 60 B.C.E.–after 7 B.C.E.), who, though Greek, was writing from Rome and wrote favorably about the Romans, says that after the death of Alexander, Attic oratory began to lose its spirit and gradually wither away; in its place came another rhetoric that was “intolerably shameless, histrionic, and ill-bred … deceiving the mob and exploiting its ignorance … It was altogether vulgar and disgusting, and finally made the

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Greek world resemble the houses of the profligate and the abandoned” (Ant. Or. 1.1). This “vulgar” style was clearly making its way into the Roman schools of oratory and in turn (some said) corrupting the youth. Petronius says that the teachers of this style were the ruin of true eloquence. Citing their empty tones, which stimulated absurd effects, the end result was that the substance of the students’ speech languished and died. “This flatulent and formless flow of words,” he says, “is a modern immigrant from Asia to Athens. Its breath fell upon the mind of ambitious youth like the influence of a baleful planet, and when the old tradition was once broken, eloquence halted and grew dumb” (Sat. 1–2).40

The disgust with which the Asianic style was viewed is most clear in Quintilian, who notes that the many faults of modern orators are tolerable “compared with the sing-song manner which is the chief problem in every cause and every school nowadays—and whether it is more useless than disgusting I do not know” (Inst. 11.3.57). His student Pliny says, “I am ashamed to describe the speeches of today, the mincing accents in which they are delivered, and the puerile applause they receive. That sort of sing-song needs only the clapping and cymbals and tambourines of Cybele to complete it” (Ep. 2.14.12). In fact, “Asianic” became a form of abuse. Quintilian recounts the attacks levelled against Cicero by his contemporaries: “(They) had the hardihood to attack him as bombastic, Asianic, redundant, repetitive, sometimes unsuccessful in his humour, and undisciplined, extravagant, and (heaven forbid!) almost effeminate in his compositions” (Inst. 12.10.12).41

We can see from this a clear (perceived) connection between style and character. Atticism was not only the preferred style amongst these elite writers; it was also a reflection of one’s manliness and character. This is no more apparent than in Lucian’s second century C.E. satire titled A Professor of Public Speaking. Here he writes to a young man who wants to become a public speaker. This student desires the fame, fortune, and popularity that will come along with eloquence, believing that it will make him “irresistible and invincible.”42

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40 Regarding these teachers, he says, “Unless they speak to the taste of their young masters they will be left alone in the colleges, as Cicero remarks. Like mock toadies cadging after the rich man’s dinners, they think first about what is calculated to please their audience. They will never gain their object unless they lay traps for the ear. A master of oratory is like a fisherman; he must put the particular bait on his hook which he knows will tempt the little fish, or he may sit waiting on his rock with no hope of a catch” (Sat. 3). For discussion of this passage, see Kennedy, A New History of Classical Rhetoric, 188–189.

41 Attic was generally described a sparer, less elaborate style, while Asianic was more showy, theatrical, and effeminate. See Catherine Connors, “Field and Forum: Culture and Agriculture in Roman Rhetoric,” in Roman Eloquence: Rhetoric in Society and Literature, ed. by William J. Dominik (London: Routledge, 1997), 85. Part of this association, it has been suggested, had to with the geography of Attica and Asia. On the one hand, Attic oratory was implicitly associated with the hard-bodied work of farming in Attica; on the other hand, Asiatic was associated with the soft sluggish body that the easy climate of Asia was thought to produce. For the Romans, in contrast to the servile, soft, and effeminate Asia, “European Greece [i.e., Attic], above all Athens and Sparta offered itself as an obvious symbol of an ‘ethical’ Hellenism more conforming to Roman values” (Spawforth, Greece and the Augustan Cultural Revolution, 18).

response to the student’s request, Lucian offers him a much easier path to eloquence. Instead of the usual rough, steep, and sweaty road, one that will cause him to turn back halfway out of weariness, he offers a short and pleasant path that is more like a leisurely stroll through a flowery field with perfect shade, in great comfort and luxury. In travelling this path, the student can acquire in an instant from Rhetoric every single blessing there is. Such blessings he has the student picture in his mind

Let her be sitting on a high place, very fair of face and form, holding in her right hand the Horn of Plenty, which runs over with all manner of fruits. Beside her imagine, pray, that you see Wealth standing, all golden and lovely. Let Fame, too, and Power stand by; and let Compliments, resembling tiny Cupids, swarm all about her on the wing in great numbers from every side. (Rhet. Praec. 6)

Lucian then instructs the student as to what will happen when he reaches the starting point of his journey towards Rhetoric. At first, “a vigorous man with hard muscles and a manly stride, who shows heavy tan on his body, and is bold-eyed and alert” will approach him. This is the guide on the rough road, who will talk a lot of nonsense, and will point out the footprint s of Demosthenes and of Plato and other great men as models to follow.

Great prints, I grant you, too great for men of nowadays, but for the most part dim and indistinct through lapse of time; and he will say that you will have good fortune and will contract a lawful marriage with Rhetoric if you follow these footsteps like a rope-dancer; but if you should make even a slight misstep, or set your foot out of them, or let your weight sway somewhat to one side, you will fall from the direct road that leads to the marriage. Then he will tell you to imitate those ancient worthies, and will set you fusty models for speeches, far from easy to copy, resembling sculptures in the early manner such as those of Hegesias and of Critius and Nesiotes. (Rhet. Praec. 9)

The worst part of this teacher is the exorbitant fees that he charges to teach oratory. Alternatively, the student could turn to the other road where he will find a “wholly clever and wholly handsome gentleman with a mincing gait, a thin neck, a languishing eye, and a honeyed voice; who distils perfume, scratches his head with the tip of his finger, and carefully dresses his hair, which is scanty now, but curly and raven black” (Rhet. Praec. 10). By putting himself in this teacher’s care, the student will at once, without effort, become an orator, “a king of the platform.” This teacher will address him while tossing back his hair, faintly smiling in a sweet and tender way, in the seductiveness of his tone, “since masculinity is boorish and not in keeping with a delicate and charming platform-hero” (Rhet. Praec. 12). This teacher will instruct the student on what to bring to his school

43 Lucian, Rhet. Praec. 3.  
44 Lucian, Rhet. Praec. 9.
Bring with you, as a principal thing, ignorance; secondly, recklessness, and thereto effrontery and shamelessness ... you need also a very loud singing voice, a shameless singing delivery, and a gait like mine ... Let your clothing be gaily-coloured, or else white, a fabric of Tarentine manufacture, so that your body will show through ... Have also many attendants and always a book in hand. (Rhet. Praec. 15)

The student must also arm himself with fifteen to twenty Attic words, in which he is carefully drilled, to have ready at the tip of his tongue in order to sprinkle them through his speeches. Moreover, “do not be ashamed to have the name effeminate ... this helps your rhetoric in many ways; it increases your shamelessness and effrontery. You observe that women are more talkative, and that in calling names they are extravagant and outstrip men. Well, if you imitate them you will excel your rivals even there” (Rhet. Praec. 23).

Though dating to the second century, this work gives a very detailed outline of the prevailing attitudes in oratory under the Empire that stemmed back the early parts of the first century. Lucian highlights a commonly held association between the perceived level of one’s manliness and character and one’s rhetorical style. On the one hand, there is the teacher of the Attic style, who is depicted as physically strong and sun-tanned, manly in stride and gait, one who embodies the hard work required to be an elite orator; a man’s man. On the other hand, there is the teacher of a more depraved, base style, one who is not only shameless and effeminate, but worst of all, proud of it.45

In other words, when it came to discussions of preferred style, there was a perceived correlation between one’s style and one’s manliness. Amy Richlin argues that “The ‘effeminate’ style was so called by Roman rhetoricians for multiple reasons: they related it to the putatively effeminate body of the speaker; they found it even in phrasing, syntax and use of rhetorical figures. Orators used imputations of effeminacy to attack each other’s style in a world in which men’s reputations were on the line while they vied with each other in public performance.”46 Rhetorical displays thus became an opportunity to demonstrate one’s education, character, and superiority over one’s rivals. This meant that an orator would need to develop and maintain an appropriate style and appearance, since this was the measure by

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45 Lucian does not make clear whether this is reference to the Asianic style, but given the similarity of description to what we have seen, it must be assumed.
46 Amy Richlin, “Gender and Rhetoric: Producing Manhood in the Schools,” in Roman Eloquence: Rhetoric in Society and Literature, ed. by William J. Dominik (London: Routledge, 1997), 99. Similarly, C. O. Brink (“Quintilian’s De Causis Corruptae Eloquentiae et Tacitus’ Dialogus de Oratoribus,” CQ 39, no. 2 [1989]: 478) notes, “The basic metaphor throughout is virility, Roman fighting strength, but the fight is forensic. So nature is thought to ordain; it seems laid down by natural law. Nature has given to the male sex strength, muscular force, etc. If you dispense with the fighting spirit of the exercise, nothing but faulty style remains, a smooth skin, as it were.”
which they were being judged. For this reason, the physical control of his voice, carriage, facial expression and gesture, and control of his emotions under competitive stress were all vital parts of his self-presentation and overall evaluation as a man. This connection between style, character, and manliness was central in oratory, particularly in discussions of the perceived decline in eloquence that was seen to be directly associated with the decline in morals.

6.1.4 The Decline of Eloquence

In the early years of the Empire, Seneca the elder (ca. 54 B.C.E.–39 C.E.) commends his sons for refusing to settle for the examples of their own day and desiring to learn from the orators of previous generations. He says that by this practice, they could judge just how sharply intellectual standards had fallen and how far eloquence had gone into decline. He believed that Roman oratory peaked in Cicero’s day. But since then, it had got steadily worse. The

47 See especially Pliny, Ep. 1.16.1–5 and 2.3.1–7 for the way orators were evaluated.
48 Maud Gleason, Making Men: Sophists and Self-Presentation in Ancient Rome (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), xxiv. The cultivation of masculinity would start from birth with nurses assigned to massage and swaddle the parts of the body that would accentuate the particular gender; it also meant specific training in gestures and body language to avoid signalling sexual availability or effeminacy (71–72). But this emphasis on manliness was not without aesthetic beauty. In describing the culture’s taste, Tacitus’ Aper says that the general audiences and the casual listeners who came to hear the orators had come to insist on a “flowery and ornamental style of speaking;” moreover, “the young men, still at the malleable stage of their education, who hang around our public speakers in order to improve themselves, are eager not only to hear but also to take home some striking and memorable utterance … it is by accommodating itself to the taste and judgment of hearers such as these that the orators of the present day have gained in grace and attractiveness” (Dial. 20.4–5). Even the more conservative Quintilian holds that of the styles available to the orator, the “flowery” is certainly the most preferable. This sort of style will “carry the judge away with its mighty torrent however much he resists; it will force him to go wherever it takes him. An orator like this will even raise the dead.” If then, it is necessary to choose just one style, “who would hesitate to prefer this one, which in any case is the most powerful and the best suited to the most important causes?” (Inst. 12.10.63)
49 Ibid., xxii.
50 This is the topic of debate in Tacitus’ Dialogus. In it, Messalla blames the rise of schools of declamation for the decline in standards. In the old days, the boy would go with his father to the orator who held the highest rank to be apprenticed. Here he would learn oratory under real conditions of the courts and forum. But nowadays, he goes to the “schools of the so called ‘professors of rhetoric.’” Here he learns mental exercises (suasoria and controversia) that have nothing to do with reality (Dial. 34.1–2; 35.2). He also blames the laziness of students, carelessness of parents, ignorance of teachers, and the decay of virtue (Dial. 27.2).
51 That Latin oratory peaked with Cicero and then declined was a widely held view amongst Roman orators. Velleius Paterculus (2.66.2–5) condemns Mark Antony for the “crime of beheading Cicero.” Quintilian (Inst. 12.10.13–14) is similarly condemnatory. Quintilian’s desire was to bring back the Ciceronian style (Inst. 12.10.12; similarly, Pliny, Ep. 1.5.8–13; Velleius Paterculus 1.17). For discussion, see Kennedy, A New History of Classical Rhetoric, 173. Kennedy notes in fact, that Quintilian represented a neo-Ciceronian movement, one that endeavoured “to recall students from a depraved style, weakened by every kind of error, to a severer standard of taste.” He argues that the resumption and development of Cicero’s thought was a deliberate act on Quintilian’s part in the face of this new style. See Kennedy, The Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World, 506; Kennedy, “An Estimate of Quintilian,” 134. In many eyes, Cicero was to Roman oratory as Demosthenes was to Greek. Cf. Tacitus, Dial. 25.3; 26.8.
reason he gives for this decline is the luxury of the day: “For nothing is so fatal to talent as luxury.” Moreover, the glorious art had become less prized and competitiveness transferred itself to “sordid businesses that bring great prestige and profit” (Con. 1.pr.6–7). In fact, he is scathing of the condition of the youth: “Look at our young men,” he says, “they are lazy, their intellects asleep; no one can stay awake to take pains over a single honest pursuit.” Furthermore, “sleep, torpor, and a perseverance in evil that is more shameful than either have seized hold of their minds. Libidinous delight in song and dance transfixed these effeminates. Braiding their hair, refining the voice till it is as caressing as a woman’s, competing in bodily softness with women, beautifying themselves with filthy fineries—this is the pattern our youths set themselves” (Con. 1.pr.8).

These sentiments are echoed in his son Seneca. In Epistle 114, he opens with the popular maxim “a man’s speech is just like his life” (Ep. 114.2).

Exactly as each individual man’s actions seem to speak, so people’s style of speaking often reproduces the general character of the time, if the morale of the public has relaxed and has given itself over to effeminacy. Wantonness in speech is proof of public luxury, if it is popular and fashionable, and not confined to one or two individual instances. A man’s ability cannot possibly be of one sort and his soul of another. If his soul be wholesome, well-ordered, serious, and restrained, his ability also is sound and sober. Conversely, when the one degenerates, the other is also contaminated. (Ep. 114.2–3)

He argues that “Just as an angry man will talk in an angry way, an excitable man in a flurried way, and an effeminate man in a style that is soft and unresisting” (Ep. 114.21). By contrast, however, “When the soul is sound and strong, the style too is vigorous, energetic, manly; but if the soul lose its balance, down comes all the rest in ruins” (Ep. 114.23). In finding the reason for this, he says that “the fault is due sometimes to the man, and sometimes to his epoch. When prosperity has spread luxury far and wide, men begin by paying closer attention to their personal appearance. Then they go crazy over furniture. Next, they devote attention to their houses. After that, they transfer their exquisite taste to the dinner-table” (Ep. 114.9). In another place he says, “people’s style of speaking often reproduces the general character of the time, the morale of the public has relaxed and has given itself over to effeminacy” (Ep.

52 Luxury was widely held amongst Romans as a symptom of effeminacy; it was believed to be a direct result of Greek influence on the Roman elite and the practice of Greek culture; for discussion, see Spawforth, *Greece and the Augustan Cultural Revolution*, 11.

53 For discussion, see Lewis A. Sussman, “The Elder Seneca’s Discussion of the Decline of Roman Eloquence,” *CSCA* 5 (1972): 195–210. Sussman also highlights the significance of Seneca’s comments regarding the lack of political oratory under the Empire (197).

54 See also Cicero, *Tusc. 5.47; Quintilian, Inst. 11.1.30.*
This decline has a direct bearing on the style of the orator and what the audiences prefer. Since performance was a means of displaying one’s power and manliness, audience participation was essential. They were judges of the relative success or failure of a performance, whether through praise or punishment by ridicule, and as Gleason notes, the educated audience relished being the ultimate arbiter of success.

Overall, Seneca argues that a soul which is uncontrolled, passionate, and effeminate, is a tyrant; it soon becomes prey to the uncontrolled emotions. Similarly, a major concern for Quintilian’s orator is the development of his voice in order that it does not dwindle to the “feeble shrillness” of eunuchs, women, and invalids. In regard to his performance, the orator, above all, needs to avoid effeminate movements. In regard to his dress, “as with all men of standing,” it needed to be distinguished and masculine.

6.1.5 Summary

Both Seneca and Lucian note that there are those who wear cloaks of outlandish colours, who wear transparent togas, and who never deign to do anything which will escape general notice. See Ep. 114.21; Rhet. Praec. 15.

Seneca, Ep. 114.10–12. “When the mind has acquired the habit of scorning the usual things of life, and regarding as mean that which was once customary, it begins to hunt for novelties in speech also; now it summons and displays obsolete and old-fashioned words; now it coins even unknown words or misshapes them; and now a bold and frequent metaphorical usage is made a special feature of style, according to the fashion which has just become prevalent … In short, whenever you notice that a degenerate style pleases the critics, you may be sure that character also has deviated from the right standard, just as luxurious banquets and elaborate dress are indications of disease in the state, similarly a lax style, if it be popular, shows that the mind (which is the source of the word) has lost its balance.”

Gleason, Making Men, 159. Otto Van Nijf (“Local Heroes: Athletics, Festivals and Elite Self-Fashioning in the Roman East,” in Being Greek under Rome: Cultural Identity, the Second Sophistic and the Development of Empire, ed. by Simon Goldhill [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001], 328–329) has also demonstrated that for some of the elite, another way to attain social status was through athletic competition in the various games. Athletic training was still closely tied to the gymnasium and παιδεία, thus to excel in it was indicative of the wealth and leisure needed to achieve success. He suggests two reasons for the preference towards athletics as a means of self-fashioning: first, athletics drew attention to the importance of the body in expressing cultural and social ideals; second, athletics was such an unmistakable marker of Geek culture. He argues that “Athletic contests offered young members of the local elite an opportunity to stake their claim to Greek identity. Although literary παιδεία was also on offer, many may have felt it easier to achieve social status, Greek identity and manhood through the training of their bodies, than through the arduous route of literary education.”

Erik Gunderson (Staging Masculinity: the Rhetoric of Performance in the Roman World [Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000], 7) suggests that vir (translated as an adult male), particularly in this case, would imply a real man or a “manly man.” It designates a position of authority and responsibility. Moreover, the bonus points to a person who is socially reliable or reputable; and when used of men, it indicates men of substance or social standing: a prominent, leading citizen. He says that “these handbooks that purport to aid one to speak well are thus handbooks to the elite male self.”
In summary, first century oratory was dominated by, in particular, Attic declamation. In this culture fixated with performance, one’s rhetorical style was seen as directly connected with one’s manliness and character. In the form of rhetorical training, for both Roman and Greek gentlemen, was a form of symbolic capital. It reflected the time and effort spent in receiving an education, thus eloquence was the essential precondition of its display. The performers who attracted the largest crowds valorised by making it appear to be the prize of a bruising competition for status dominance.

6.2 Oratory in Corinth

In 1 Corinthians 2:1–5, Paul gives an account of his preaching performance when he first came to Corinth. In doing so, he presents himself in quite negative terms, terms that would certainly bring ridicule in the culture we have just discussed. But can we see this preference towards Atticism and—at least in the eyes of the Atticists—its perceived connection to manliness in the activities of orators in Corinth during our period?

6.2.1 Corinth and Manliness

In regard to the discussion of manliness, several statues found in the Corinthian forum might suggest that this was a value during the first and second centuries. In the western half of the forum stood an early first century statue of the deified Augustus that was commissioned and funded by the Augustales. The base of the statue would have risen at least 2.2 metres above the original pavement and although the statue itself is missing, Laird estimates that it too would have stood between 2.5–3.0 metres high. Probably nude, it would have depicted the emperor in his deified state with the typical short hair as seen in other statues of Augustus found through the city; furthermore, it would have functioned “as a tangible expression of

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62 In fact, Quintilian (Inst. 12.5.5) states that the natural tools of an orator, voice, lungs, and good looks, are so important that they often give rise to a reputation for talent.
63 Gleason, Making Men, xxi. Pliny, no doubt influenced by his teacher Quintilian, talks about the practice in the courts of buying crowds in order to create an atmosphere of praise. He says that these “bravo-callers” or “dinner-clappers” are paid up to three denarii each to stand in the crowd and cheer and “acclaim the eloquence of the speaker.” He says that if you happen to be passing by the court and want to know about the speakers, there is no need to come to the bench pay attention to the proceedings; it is easy to guess—the man who raises the most cheers is the worst speaker (Ep. 2.14.8).
64 See section 4.1.1 for discussion of these.
66 Ibid.
consensus with the imperial system and a popular gathering place.”

The statue, she suggests, would have commanded the forum; moreover, standing at ca. 2.5 metres without the statue, it is the tallest surviving base built specifically for a statue of a Roman emperor in Roman Achaia. The base itself incorporated benches for passers by to sit and rest, thus providing a central meeting place in the forum. Laird comments that

Monuments of this sort and the inscriptions they bear not only sought to stimulate passers-by to remember the commemorated; they actively invited their audience to become participants in the work of the monument. Sitters posed around the base became a living sculptural tableau literally seated at the feet of the emperor. As vocal extensions of the inscription, they might call out to others passing by, encouraging them to approach.

We have already seen the significant concern amongst Roman elites in the early Empire with the declining masculinity of its men. This concern was a central feature of Augustus’ moral revolution, and as a part of his programme, he sought to associate himself with a traditional masculinity, particularly in regard to Roman oratory.

It would not be difficult to imagine then, that an oversized statue of Augustus, the largest in Achaia, in the centre of the forum, opposite the bema, would help to convey these values. Moreover, its erection by the city would suggest their partnership with this programme.

The suggestion that this statue functioned as a reinforcement of Roman gender values is strengthened when we consider a pair of columns from the northern side of the forum that originally stood not 20 metres from this statue and formed part of the two-storey high façade known as the Façade of the Captives. On each of these columns (now displayed in the Museum at Corinth) is depicted a man with long, curly hair, resembling something like the mocking descriptions of the authors above. In discussing these statues, Winter notes that “To portray these men wearing their hair thus was the way the Roman conquerors indicated that all the men in the façade were ‘weak’, i.e., captives of the mighty Roman army. It implies that they were ‘soft’ or ‘effeminate’.” The second-century dating of the façade would likely

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67 Ibid., 67.
68 Ibid., 93.
69 Ibid., 95.
70 Ibid., 112. For an illustrated reconstruction of the statue, see 94.
71 Spawforth, Greece and the Augustan Cultural Revolution, 10.
72 Laird (“The Emperor in a Roman Town: the Base of the Augustales in the Forum at Corinth,” 91) has pointed out that the Augustales base in the lower forum demonstrates an orientation connecting the Julian Basilica with Temple E, allowing a viewer in the shadow of the Augustales monument excellent sightlines towards both. “The base’s statue faced west, uniting the eastern Forum with its western half and forming a conceptual pivot between the honorific imperial dedications of the Julian Basilica, a line of small temples dedicated to deities important to the imperial family, and the cult activities of Temple E.”
73 Winter, After Paul Left Corinth, 132.
suggest an ongoing commitment to the Augustan programme, with the contrasting imagery depicting vividly the city’s allegiance when it came to its values.\textsuperscript{74}

Epictetus deals with this issue several decades after Paul’s time in Corinth, when a young student of rhetoric approaches him for advice. Noticing his smooth body he asks, “are you a man or a woman?” ‘A man,’ ‘very well then, adorn a man, not a woman. Woman is born smooth and dainty by nature, but if (a man) cuts it out (his hair) and plucks it out of himself, what shall we make of him? Where shall we exhibit him and what notice shall we post? I will show you, we say to the audience, ‘a man who wishes to be a woman rather than a man.’” He then asks him, “your paltry body doesn’t please you, eh? Make a clean sweep of the whole matter; eradicate your—what shall I call it?—the cause of your hairiness; make yourself a woman all over, so as not to deceive us, not half-man and half-woman” (\textit{Diatr.} 3.1.31).

\textbf{6.2.2 Corinth and Atticism}

In addition to the issue of masculinity, it has also been shown above that the Attic style was, according to many, the mark of elite orators, both Greek and Roman, in the first century. This was the conscious revival of classical Greek heritage, a heritage for which Rome had particularly admiration, as is seen in the following letter from Pliny to Valerius Maximus

Remember that you have been sent to the province of Achaia, to the pure and genuine Greece, where civilisation and literature and agriculture too, are believed to have originated … respect the gods their founders and the names they bear, respect their ancient glory and their very age, which in man commands our veneration, in cities our reverence … Pay regard to their antiquity, their heroic deeds, and the legends of their past. Do not detract from anyone’s antiquity, independence, or even pride, but always bear in mind that this is the land which provided us with justice and gave us laws, not after conquering us but at our request. (\textit{Ep.} 8.24.2–4)

Bruce Winter has shown in \textit{Philo and Paul among the Sophists} that sophists were an active part of Corinthian life through the late first-early second centuries.\textsuperscript{75} Though the evidence is relatively scant, Winter is able to build an insightful picture of not only the presence, but also

\textsuperscript{74} For dating and discussion of the façade, see Franklin P. Johnson, “Sculpture 1896-1923,” \textit{Corinth} 9, no. 1 (1931): 101–107; Richard Stillwell et al., “Architecture,” \textit{Corinth} 1, no. 2 (1941): 55–88. This same contrast also appears to be informing the discussion of hairstyles in the Corinthian church. In 1 Cor 11:14, Paul states that nature itself (\textit{φύσις}) teaches us that long hair on a man is disgraceful (\textit{ἀπαθεία}), for discussion, see especially David W. J. Gill, “The Importance of Roman Portraiture for Head-Coverings in 1 Corinthians 11:2-16,” \textit{TynBul} 41, no. 2 (1990): 257. The significance of such a claim would certainly not be lost in a Christian community seeking powerful, eloquent oratory.

the activity and attitude of sophists in Corinth. He concludes this investigation by suggesting that “there can be no doubt that sophists and their students were prominent in Corinth and played an important role in the life of the city … sophists were a major force in first-century Corinth.”\textsuperscript{76} The presence of the sophists in Corinth is also seen in Dio, who recalls from his travels an obviously noteworthy feature of the community. He describes his visit to the Isthmian Games and remembers hearing the “crowds of wretched sophists” around Poseidon’s temple shouting and reviling one another, as well as their disciples fighting with one another.\textsuperscript{77} In addition to Dio, his pupil Favorinus also visited the city on three occasions; on the second occasion a statue was set up for him in the library. We have seen the significance of having a statue placed in such an important location as a means of providing a model for imitation and inspiration. This is certainly the case here, as Favorinus remarks

You were so glad to see me that you did your best to get me to stay with you, but seeing that to be impossible, you did have a likeness made of me, and you took this and set it up in your Library, a front-row seat as it were, where you felt it would most effectively stimulate the youth to persevere in the same pursuits as myself. For you accorded me this honour, not as to one of the many who each year put in at Cenchreae as traders or pilgrims or envoys or passing travellers, but as to a cherished friend, who at last, after a long absence, puts in an appearance. (Or. 37.8)

In fact, it is the throwing down of this very statue that had led Favorinus to deliver an oration to the Corinthians in the first place.\textsuperscript{78}

6.2.3 Corinth and the Popularity of Oratory

Clearly then, Corinth was a city that attracted eminent orators. This fact is further demonstrated when we turn to epigraphic evidence, where we see a small handful of inscriptions containing the term ῥητωρ which seem to suggest that Corinth, by comparison to the surrounding cities, was the place to be for orators.\textsuperscript{79}

Our first example is a fragmentary pedestal found scattered in the South Basilica dating to the mid-second century. It was set up by the boule and the demos and honours an orator by the name of Publius Aelius Sospinus, on account of his upright character and general

\textsuperscript{76} Ibid., 140.
\textsuperscript{77} Dio, Or. 8.9.
\textsuperscript{79} Unfortunately these inscriptions are all dated to the second century. For this reason, some observations will be noted, but any application to the thesis will be tentative.
This inscription is particularly useful, as it honours a young man whose ancestry we can trace back two generations. We have already met his grandfather, Antonius Sospes, (cf. Kent, no. 170) who was a noted rhetorician and wealthy benefactor who held some of the highest political posts in the city including curator of the grain supply, agonothete three times and also duovir. He is also known to us from Plutarch, who, he records, was entertained by Sospes on his visit to Corinth during Sospes’ second presidency of the games. As we saw above (cf. 5.2.1), on this occasion Sospes hosted a special dinner for all of his “nearest and most learned friends,” one of these guests being none other than Herodes Atticus. Here we see not only a family of noted wealth and education, renowned for both their patronage and rhetorical abilities, but we also see a picture of an academic community of sorts that attracted some of the most famous orators.

Several other inscriptions help to build this picture of a scholastic community. We have already seen Marcus Valerius Taurinus, son of Marcus, who was a philosopher and a good orator, “on account of his fine character.” Fragments from a second century statue base, found in the agora, set up by the demos, honours Lucius Maecius Faustinus, who was a strategos, and a good orator; he is honoured for his κολοκύγιαθιον. Faustinus was also a member of the Panhellenion, a testament to his prominence in the city. Another second century statue base from the agora, erected by the boulē, honours Peducaeus Cesitianus, the Apollonian rhetor. Regarding this inscription, Kent and Saunders both draw attention to the honouring by Corinth of an Apollonian rhetor, suggesting Corinth’s continued affection for Apollonia, the famous centre of learning, which Corinth had originally founded in the first century B.C.E. Our final inscription is a second-century decree which honours a certain Poseidonius, who was a Helladarch, rhetor, and, according to Kent, a possible priest.

As with our philosophers in section 5.2, the evidence is quite scant; but, once again, its significance lies in proportion to the region. Looking at inscriptions found throughout the Peloponnese and dating to our period, five out of a total of nine are from Corinth. However,

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81 For his fame as an orator, see Plutarch, Quaest. conv. 739E.
82 Plutarch, Quaest. conv. 723A; for other discussion of the family and stemma, see Elias Kapetanopoulos, “Publius Aelius Sospis I,” Mnemosyne 22, no. 1 (1969): 80–82.
83 Who himself was honoured in Corinth with a statue. See Benjamin Dean Meritt, ed., Greek Inscriptions, 1896-1927, Corinth 8 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1931), no. 85.
84 Kent, The Inscriptions, 1926-1950, vol. 8, no. 268. Φιλοσοφό[ν] [ῥήτορος] [ο ἀγαθόν] ἦ [πόλις ἄρετης ἐνεκε[ν].
85 Ibid., vol. 8, no. 264.
of the additional four, one has connections back to Corinth. A statue base from Tegea, erected by the polis with the consent of the boulē, honours Marcus Appalenus Tiberius, who is given the title τοῦ ἀξιολογῶτατον ῥήτορα (remarkable orator). Spawforth has shown that this is either the son, or grandson, of the wealthy Corinthian Ti. Appalenus Anaxilaus, an official (hellanodikes) of the Isthmian games in the early second century.

We see then, that in Corinth, a proportionally higher number of orators and philosophers active in the city than in other cities in the region. One possible explanation for this is the practices of teachers in this period. A “school” was wherever students gathered to a certain grammarian, rhetor, or philosopher. This meant students would either travel to another city to learn from a particular teacher, or, as in the case of Pliny’s hometown of Comum, the wealthy members of the city would raise the funds to attract a good teacher to their city. In other words, there was a transient nature to teachers of παιδεία, and we would assume that the more affluent the city, the more likely it would be to attract teachers. This being the case, we would reasonably assume that Corinth was a popular city for the educated elite to come to, in order to build a reputation. This argument is further bolstered by the work of Ross Saunders, who has compiled a catalogue of ten inscriptions (including three of the above cited: Kent, 226, 264 and 269), along with others from Athens and Ephesus each containing the term ῥήτωρ. He notes that unlike Athens and Ephesus, Corinth is the only city of the three where all of the honours are initiated by the city council. He also notes that of the three cities, only Corinth gives honours simply because the honorands are rhetors. This, he suggests, would indicate a higher value placed on rhetors with the implication being that the art of oratory was very much valued in Corinth. In other words, Corinth’s wealth and political opportunity would provide ample incentive for not only young citizens to strive after παιδεία, but also for teachers to visit and potentially establish a school. Moreover, the apparent honour shown to philosophers and rhetors (as indicated by the inscriptions) would further increase the incentive to come.

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90 IG V,2 155. The second is a statue base found in Olympia containing just the following: “Κλαυδίου Ἀριστοκλέα ῥήτορα ὑπατίκου (i.e., orator and consul)” (IvO 462). This is possibly the sophist Aristocles from Pergamon mentioned by Philostratus (Vit. soph. 567). Another statue base from Olympia, set up by the demos and the boulē, honours the orator P. Aelius Crispinus Metroteimus, on account of his benefactions (IvO 463). The final one is a statue base from Methana that honours Dionysius the orator and Panhelleine (IG IV 858).
92 Pliny, Ep. 4.13.
93 We see this attitude reflected in Scopelian, whose own success was such that the citizens of Clazomenae begged him to open a school there; he declined, saying that “a nightingale does not sing in a cage.” He instead considered Smyrna “a grove in which he could practice his melodious voice,” since Smyrna was the most important city in Ionia. See Philostratus, Vit. soph. 516.
6.2.4 Summary

In summary, oratory was an integral part of the ancient world. By the first century it was not just to be seen in the public courts and the forum, but also in the theatres, lecture halls, schools and even the private residences of many wealthy people. The fact that not many people had the education or capabilities of an orator is beside the point. The sheer availability of oratory in its many forms would ensure that anyone who lived or ventured into a city would be exposed to it.\footnote{Dio’s \textit{Euboean Discourse} (Or. 7) tells the story of a Euboean hunter who had only been into the city twice, the first time as a child, the second to face the courts on various charges regarding his living in the region and not paying taxes. He recounts mostly about the exaggerated charges presented by the prosecutor of the case and the vacillation of the crowd as the different orators spoke.} Moreover, public taste and opinion went a long way in dictating the trends of orators. Oratory as a performance was designed to compel the audiences, thus, the orator had to meet the crowd’s expectations, which in Paul’s day were clearly coming to expect a beautiful display from a trained and talented speaker.

In regard to education, rhetorical training served to create a certain persona with specific values, conceptions, and skills, idealising these as the educated way. Rhetorical exercises were forms of role-play where the young man rehearsed his future roles as father, patron, and statesman among others.\footnote{Bloomer, “Schooling in Persona”; similarly, Marrou, \textit{A History Of Education In Antiquity}, 232–234.} This meant that a person’s “manhood” was defined largely by their eloquence and ability, and forged against the anvil of the rhetorical stage. Failure here essentially spelt failure in life.

Finally, it has been demonstrated that in first-century Corinth there was a definite love of oratory, especially by comparison to the surrounding cities. Though it is impossible to know for certain, various clues might suggest that the preference was towards the more “manly” Attic style. At the very least it could be suggested that the Corinthian community followed the current trends of popular oratory in critiquing Paul in similar terms as the Atticists critiqued the Asianists. This certainly seems to be the case in 1 Corinthians 2:1–5 where Paul’s performance is being judged by some of the Christians. The terms he uses to describe himself appear to directly contrast the preferences we have seen above.

\section*{6.3 Paul the Orator (1 Cor 2:1–5)}

In 1 Corinthians 2:1–5, Paul reminds the Corinthians of his original entry into Corinth.\footnote{Winter has argued that in this passage, Paul is reminding the church that his entry into Corinth was in direct contrast with established sophistic conventions. Further, that his choice of rhetorical terms and allusions} Here, he takes up the issue introduced in 1 Cor 1:17, which is the main point of the division. There
he tells them that God had sent him to preach, not in eloquent speech (οὐκ ἐν σοφίᾳ λόγου), in order that the cross would not be emptied of its power.⁹⁸

6.3.1 1 Corinthians 2:1

In 1 Corinthians 2:1, Paul reiterates this point introduced in 1:17, arguing that since God had sent him to preach in this manner, it was obvious that in coming to them, he would preach the mystery of God exactly this way and not in demonstrations of superior speech and wisdom (οὐ καθ ὑπεροχήν λόγου ἡ σοφίας). The term ὑπεροχή would have in mind not just a superiority of rhetorical style, but also the superior social status of those who mastered it.⁹⁹ In other words, Paul did not come like an elite sage, orator, or sophist, embodiments of παιδεία; rather, he came with a singular focus: to teach and demonstrate Christ crucified (1 Cor 2:2).¹⁰⁰ This meant that his method needed to reflect a humiliated, crucified messiah.¹⁰¹

6.3.2 1 Corinthians 2:3

In 1 Corinthians 2:3, Paul says to the Corinthians that in coming to them, he became amongst them (ἐγένομην πρὸς ὑμᾶς) one who spoke not in persuasive wisdom but rather presented himself in weakness, fear and much trembling.¹⁰² The exact meaning of the phrase ἐγένομην shows that his modus operandi was “a calculated anti-sophistic stance adopted to replace conviction derived from sophistic rhetorical wisdom with confidence in the power of God” (Winter, Philo and Paul among the Sophists, 155; similarly, Winter, “The Entry and Ethics of Orators and Paul [1 Thess. 2:1-12].” Following Winter are Mihaila, The Paul-Apollos Relationship and Paul’s Stance Toward Greco-Roman Rhetoric, 146–147; Ciampa and Rosner, The First Letter to the Corinthians, 112; Schnabel, Der erste Brief des Paulus an die Korinther, 149. Schmeller (Schulen im Neuen Testament? 114) argues that this was more likely a reaction against philosophers; he notes that it was also important for philosophers, upon arriving at a city, to give samples of their ability with persuasive rhetorical displays, particularly when it meant the establishing of a new school. In other words, Paul is intentionally distancing himself from the methods of some of the most prominent representatives of παιδεία in that culture. Again, A. Duane Litfin (St. Paul’s Theology of Proclamation: 1 Corinthians 1-4 and Greco-Roman Rhetoric, [SNTSMS 79; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994], 204) argues that the type of speech Paul is reacting against can be scarcely anything other than the teachings of the schools of the orators.

For discussion of the phrase, see Pogoloff, Logos and Sophia, 108–113. ¹⁰⁸
Ibid., 132. See also for discussion of the term. ¹⁰⁹
Moffatt (The First Epistle of Paul to the Corinthians, 24) notes that “to know nothing” was a phrase which for Greeks meant, “I was to have no philosophy.” ¹¹⁰
As Peter Marshall notes, “the rejection and humiliation of Jesus provides the intellectual and practical basis for the radical schēma of the apostle” (Marshall, Enmity in Corinth, 390; cf. Conzelmann, First Corinthians, 54). ¹¹¹
The three terms conforming with what was said in 1 Cor 1:27. See Jean Hering, The First Epistle of Saint Paul to the Corinthians, trans. A.W. Heathcote and P.J. Alcock (London: Epworth, 1962), 14. ¹¹²
πρὸς ὑμᾶς is uncertain.103 It is either rendered “I came to you,” or, alternatively, “I was with you.”104 Taking the middle voice γίνεσθαι (I became) in connection with the preposition πρὸς with the accusative would render the sense of: “I intentionally became this way while with you.”105 In this sense, Paul’s rhetorical manner was a conscious choice, one calculated to directly contrast himself with the popular orators of the culture.106 The rendering is further supported in light of two surrounding verses. In 1 Cor 1:30, Paul says “Christ was made wisdom on our behalf from God” (ὁς ἐγεννηθή σοφία ἢμιν ἀπὸ θεοῦ), using the passive γίνεσθαι. Also, in 1 Cor 3:18, Paul tells them to do the same; that is, if they want to become (γένηται σοφὸς) wise, they must first become (μορὸς γενέσθω) fools. In both cases, the middle form is used. In other words, Paul’s weak and inferior style of preaching was very intentional.107 Moreover, it was further a demonstration to the Christian community of the necessary rejection of the world’s wisdom.108 This also ties in with the intentional self-humiliation we have already seen in the previous chapter (section 5.3.2–3).

Paul further describes the characteristics of his preaching activity in Corinth. His entry was marked by weakness, fear, and much trembling (ἐν ἁσθενείᾳ καὶ ἐν φόβῳ καὶ ἐν τρόμῳ πολλῷ). This is also the accusation of his detractor in 2 Cor 10:10, where his rhetorical presence is described as weak and contemptible (ἡ δὲ παρουσία τοῦ σώματος ἁσθενῆς καὶ ὁ λόγος ἐξουθενημένος). The repetition of the term ἁσθενῆς to describe Paul’s oratorical style is important. As Welborn notes, “even if the term did not establish itself in the rhetorical tradition with the force of a technical term, it is nevertheless clear that a deficiency in rhetorical delivery is consistently portrayed as ‘weakness,’ with all of the attendant

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103 Some suggest it is simply unclear what Paul means. Cf. Horsley, 1 Corinthians, 54; Ciampa and Rosner, The First Letter to the Corinthians, 115.
104 “I came to you;” NIV, TNIV, NLT; “I was with you;” ESV, ASV, GNT, KJV.
105 Cf. Blass and Debrunner, Greek Grammar of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature, 124. The preposition with the accusative would also have the sense of “towards” (BDAG, 874). That is, “my actions towards you were in weakness.” Cf. Robertson and Plummer, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the First Epistle of St Paul to the Corinthians, 32. “These words are probably to be taken together, exactly as in 15:10; ‘I was with you.’ The sense of becoming in the verb, and of movement in the preposition, is attenuated. ‘My visit to you was in weakness,’ preserves both the shade of meaning and the force of the tense” (italics theirs).
106 Winter has argued that v. 1 “is constructed in such a way as to focus not on the fact of his physical arrival but on the stance he adopted when he arrived” (Winter, Philo and Paul among the Sophists, 156; similarly, Fee, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, 92). “I was with you,’ suggesting that he manifested ‘weakness’ in his ongoing relationship with them.”
107 This was not uncommon amongst orators. See e.g., Dio (Or. 35.1; 42.3), who openly and ironically downplays his own rhetorical ability; Socrates takes a similar position in his own defence (Plato, Apol. 17A–C). However Paul went much further by actually acting the fool. Cf. Welborn, Paul, the Fool of Christ, 91. Contra suggestions that Paul was intimidated and still affected by his “poor” effort in Athens. Cf. Robertson and Plummer, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the First Epistle of St Paul to the Corinthians, 31.
108 As Mark Douglas Given (Paul’s True Rhetoric: Ambiguity, Cunning, and Deception in Greece and Rome [Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press, 2001], 98) suggests, “perhaps he is emphasising that the way he appeared to them on that particular occasion, preaching a simple message in weakness, is not always the way he appears or will appear in the future.”
symptoms—confused head, stammering voice, trembling hands, etc.”\textsuperscript{109} We have already seen the importance of rhetorical style as a measure of one’s masculinity; it is not too difficult then, to imagine the contrast such a characterisation would present. In describing himself in these terms, Welborn has argued that Paul portrays himself as a well-known figure in the mime: the befuddled orator.\textsuperscript{110} He argues that “the figure of the foolish orator was so popular that actors specialised in the representation of this type.”\textsuperscript{111} In terracotta figures, he was portrayed as a low-class type with a bald head and stupid coarse features, mouth open, and hands lifted in gestures. In fact, because the figure of the foolish orator was so firmly established in popular consciousness, one was able to ridicule a politician, even the most powerful, by portraying him as an example of this comic type.\textsuperscript{112} The location of Paul’s terms in the context of the mime fits well with what has already been argued.

In the early stages of an orator’s education, Quintilian hesitantly suggests that the student study with the comic actor.\textsuperscript{113} Inasmuch as this trainer can add some value to the orator (i.e., in regard to enunciation, how to lend authority to advice, what stimulus to use in order to produce a surge of anger, and what change of tone is appropriate to an appeal to pity), far more caution is offered in putting the orator under his tutelage. “I do not want the boy we are educating for this purpose to have a weak or womanish voice or to quaver like an old man. Nor ought he to mimic the failings of drunkenness, be taught the cringing manner of a slave, or learn the emotions of love, greed, or fear” (Inst. 1.11.2). In fact, in rhetorical terms, other than effeminacy, a major source of anxiety about style was the danger of resembling an actor. The sexuality of actors was itself suspect; as a result, actors suffered diminished civil status as infames.\textsuperscript{114} This concern over the dubious character of actors certainly fits with Paul’s self-description as suggested by Welborn. In a city and culture deeply concerned with manliness in regard to oratorical style, Paul, by locating his own style in the context of a weak, cringing, effeminate actor would place himself as far from the Corinthians’ ideal as one could probably go.

\textsuperscript{109} Welborn, An End to Enmity, 117.
\textsuperscript{110} Welborn, Paul, the Fool of Christ, 92.
\textsuperscript{111} Ibid., 95.
\textsuperscript{112} Ibid. This, I believe, is the more likely background of Paul’s “fear and trepidation.” Savage has suggested, however, that Paul, in presenting the message of Christ, is also daily confronted by the awe-inspiring majesty of God. See Timothy B. Savage, Power Through Weakness: Paul’s Understanding of the Christian Ministry in 2 Corinthians, (SNTSMS 86; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 73; similarly, Black, Paul, Apostle of Weakness: Astheneia and its Cognates in the Pauline Literature, 101; Klaiber, Der erste Korintherbrief, 38. For a brief review of scholarly opinion of the terms, see Winter, Philo and Paul among the Sophists, 158.
\textsuperscript{113} By contrast, he is far less hesitant about the training of the gymnast (Inst. 1.11.15–19) and insistent of the involvement of the musician (Inst. 1.10.11).
\textsuperscript{114} Richlin, “Gender and Rhetoric: Producing Manhood in the Schools,” 99–100.
6.3.3 Summary

In summary, Paul is well aware of the Corinthians’—and indeed, the broader culture’s—love of (masculine) eloquence, and it is against this enamouring that he distances himself. Paul is not rejecting human communication in general, but rather the specific, studied art of persuasive speech that was practiced by orators and rhetoricians.\footnote{Timothy H. Lim, “‘Not in Persuasive Words of Wisdom, but in the Demonstration of the Spirit and Power’,” NovT 29, no. 2 (1987): 146. Similarly, Judge (“The Conflict of Educational Aims in the New Testament,” 702) argues that Paul “extensively and specifically rejects the art of persuasion as a prime test of human cultivation.” The reason, he suggests, is because Paul rejected the moral position one must adopt to employ it.} This, according to Paul, was how the wisdom of Christ is demonstrated, not only in “foolish” people, but also in “foolish” behaviour. This was all so that their faith might not rest on the wisdom of humans, but rather on the power of God. For Paul, the purpose of preaching the gospel was not just a rhetorical display; the goal of the gospel is salvation.\footnote{Furnish, “Prophets, Apostles and Preachers: A Study of the Biblical Concept of Preaching,” 55–56.}

Conclusion

It has been argued that in 1 Corinthians 1:18–2:5, the Corinthians have been seeking after, or claiming to possess, a wisdom that was marked, in particular, by eloquence and possibly by certain virtues. Such wisdom, we have seen, was the goal of παιδεία. Moreover, it was embodied in the philosophers, orators, and sophists, who were at the same time products of and stewards of παιδεία. Against this backdrop, Paul and Apollos are being compared, and according to—most likely—the followers of Apollos, Paul has being found wanting. In response, Paul reminds the Corinthians that the wisdom of the cross is foolish in the world’s eyes, and thus its preachers would logically appear foolish as well. This is exactly what Paul looked like in his initial ministry. His weak persona and poor rhetorical performance would have stood in stark contrast to the eloquent orators, but would have perfectly aligned him with the foolish message of the cross. Having then dealt with this, Paul must now explain the true nature of his wisdom.
We have seen in 1 Corinthians 1:18–2:5 that some of the Corinthians have deemed themselves to have attained a superior status, both in the community and over Paul. This perception has likely come about as a result of their education and through an understanding of the Christian message that resembles something like what Paul calls “the wisdom of the world.” This is a wisdom that is marked by both philosophical and rhetorical categories and values. On account of this superiority, they have labelled themselves “mature” (téλειοι).

In this chapter it will be shown that (1) both philosophical and rhetorical training had as their goals the shaping of leaders (i.e., “the rulers of this age”) and that within both disciplines there was an overlap; that is, philosophy incorporated oratory and vice versa. It will then be suggested that (2) because of the perceived superior status of the elite Corinthian Christians, they have labelled themselves “mature” (téλειοι) and are measuring themselves and their teachers next to the “rulers of the age.” Moreover, the weaker members have likely supported these claims to power due to the cultural understanding that a person who possesses παιδεία is worthy of such honour. Finally, it will be argued that (3) In 1 Cor 2:6–16 Paul is defining true maturity as something that is characterised by Spirit-possession. These πνευματικοί, it is suggested, are the (metaphorically speaking) students of Christian παιδεία and in Paul’s view, the true mature ones.¹

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¹ This is not a new suggestion; John B. Polhill (“The Wisdom of God and Factionalism,” RevExp 80 [1983]: 329) has noted already that the threat Paul is attacking is “the substitution of human wisdom, philosophy, and rhetoric for the divine plan of salvation in Christ.” According to him, “the basic question is the locus of salvation. Is it to be found in human wisdom and accomplishment, or does it rest with God alone?” Similarly, Mihaila (The Paul-Apelles Relationship and Paul’s Stance Toward Greco-Roman Rhetoric, 94) says, “a faithful reading of the term in context would recognise that sophia used in the negative sense refers to both rhetoric and philosophy; to both human eloquence and human efforts.” I take this section as a both Pauline and an original part of the letter; against the suggestions of interpolation, see e.g., William O. Walker, “1 Corinthians 2.6-16: a Non-Pauline Interpolation?,” JSNT 15, no. 47 (1992): 75–94; Martin Widmann, “1 Kor 2:6-16: Ein Einspruch gegen Paulus,” ZNW 70 (1979): 44–53. More likely, as Weiss (Der erste Korintherbrief, 52) has demonstrated, the section forms the center of an ομοίωμα chiasm between 1:18–31 and 3:1–17. “... So steht dies Stück mit seiner Anerkennung der pneumatischen Weisheit zwischen der prinzipiellen Ablehnung der σοφία (1:18–2:5) und der Bekämpfung des Parteitreibens (3:1–17).” For detailed discussion and rejection of interpolation proposals, see Welborn, Paul, the Fool of Christ, 183–190.
7.1 Leadership, Rhetoric, and the Usefulness of Philosophy

It was shown in chapter 3, that as far back as Plato and Isocrates, education was deemed to be a necessary prerequisite for the ruler. But at the same time, we also saw that there was a debate between philosophers and rhetors as to which was more important for the ruler, training in oratory or philosophy. These two aspects of παιδεία remained unchanged up to and beyond our period. Education in the early Empire was seen as crucial for any career in public office. Plutarch says, ‘‘don’t give a child a knife, says the proverb.’ I would say, ‘don’t give a child wealth, nor an uneducated man political power’’ (Frag. 131). Additionally, this training was always understood to include both philosophy and oratory, the only question being, which was more important.

7.1.1 Orators as Leaders

Tacitus’ Dialogue on Oratory tells the story of a debate primarily between Curiatius Maternus and Marcus Aper over the usefulness of oratory in general life. Maternus, a brilliant orator, has given himself to reading and studying poetry, much to the dismay of many of his friends and the general public. Aper, a leading light of the bar in Rome, goes to Maternus’ house in order to try and talk sense into him; in their discussion, he (Aper) outlines all the advantages of rhetorical training. Such a practice, he says, “can always bring aid to friends, succour to strangers, deliverance to the imperilled, while to malignant foes he (the orator) is an actual fear and terror, himself the while secure and entrenched” (Dial. 5.5).

Furthermore, there is the pleasure derived from the orator’s eloquence, its delights being enjoyed not just for a single moment, but also on every day and at every hour. For the orator there is no greater pleasure than his house being constantly full with crowds of the most important men; people both high and low, young and old, coming to him so that he can plead their case; or the large retinue of clients that accompany him to and from the courts; not to mention the great show

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2 Morgan, Literate Education in the Hellenistic and Roman Worlds, 243. “(Literacy and literate education) is presented as if it were the sole, or overwhelmingly the most important, arbiter of social and cultural success, status and power. The gap between the educated and uneducated, particularly the illiterate and the literate, is inflated until it appears as the difference between power, status and authority and the complete absence of those qualities … writers such as Quintilian, the Senecas, Plutarch and Philo are advertising themselves as little less than kingmakers: pivotal figures in the creation, stratification and production of society.”

3 For discussion of the history of this debate, see Wardman, Rome’s Debt to Greece, 120–125.

4 Similarly, Cicero, De Or. 1.34.

5 Tacitus, Dial. 6.2.
he makes in public, and the reverence paid to him. This pleasure is apparent to all, even to the uneducated.⁶

We can see this ideal being outworked in the education of the emperors. It is said of Augustus that from early youth he devoted himself with great diligence and application to the study of eloquence. As emperor, he never addressed the senate, the people, or the army, except in a premeditated speech, lest his memory should fail him. To prevent the loss of time memorising his speeches, it was his general practice to recite them. Even with his wife Livia, upon subjects of importance he wrote on his tablets all he wished to express, afraid that, if he spoke extempore, he might say more or less than was proper.⁷ Similarly, Nero, while instructed in almost all of the liberal arts, was diverted by his mother from the study of philosophy, saying it was unsuited to one destined to be an emperor.⁸ Nero in fact was so concerned with his eloquence, it is said that he never did anything without a voice-master standing by him to caution him against overstraining his vocal organs. Moreover, he used to apply a handkerchief to his mouth when he did. In fact, he would offer his friendship, or avow open enmity to many, depending on how lavish or sparing they were in giving him their applause.⁹

7.1.2 Oratory and the Need for Philosophy

But at the same time, among orators, there was also recognition of the value of philosophy. Speaking through Crassus, Cicero says, “There is to my mind no more excellent thing than the power, by means of oratory, to get a hold on assemblies of men, win their good will, direct their inclinations wherever the speaker wishes, or divert them from whatever he wishes” (De Or. 1.30).¹⁰ Scaevola argues, however, that the various schools of philosophy would have a lot to say in response to this statement. “This orator,” they would say, “has learned nothing

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⁶ Tacitus, Dial. 6.3–4.
⁷ Suetonius, Aug. 84.
⁸ Suet. Nero. 52. Which is an odd thing to report since his tutor Seneca was himself a renowned philosopher; although Morford has shown that philosophers were a part of the palace, though in a more visiting lecturer role. See Mark P. O. Morford, “The Training of Three Roman Emperors,” Ph 22, no. 1 (1968): 59. He also discusses the method by which Seneca would have taught.
⁹ Suetonius, Nero. 25.3. Above all things, he most eagerly coveted popularity, being the rival of every man who obtained the applause of the people for anything he did (Nero, 53).
¹⁰ “To come, however, at length to the highest achievements of eloquence, what other power could have been strong enough either to gather scattered humanity into one place, or to lead it out of its brutish existence in the wilderness up to our present condition of civilization as men and as citizens, or, after the establishment of social communities, to give shape to laws, tribunals, and civic rights? The wise control of the complete orator is that which chiefly upholds not only his own dignity, but the safety of countless individuals and of the entire State. Go forward therefore, my young friends, in your present course, and bend your energies to that study which engages you, that so it may be in your power to become a glory to yourselves, a source of service to your friends, and profitable members of the Republic” (De Or. 1.30–34).
concerning the good in life, or of the evil, nothing as to the emotions of the mind or of human conduct, nothing of the true theory of having, that they have made no research at all and are wholly without understanding respecting these things” (*De Or. 1.42*). Crassus responds by arguing that if an orator’s role is to speak before the Praetor, or at a trial, or in the public assembly, or the senate house, he cannot engage in such affairs without a mastery of ordinances, customs and general law, without knowledge of human nature and character. “For such a man,” he says, “can there be anything lacking that belongs to the knowledge of the highest matters?” “For,” he goes on, “excellence in speaking cannot be made manifest unless the speaker fully comprehends the matter he speaks about” (*De Or. 1.48*). He concludes that a speaker will not be able to achieve what he wants by his words unless he has gained profound insight into the characters of men and those motives whereby the soul is spurred on or turned back.\(^{11}\) In other words, there is certainly a place for philosophical understanding, in fact you cannot be an orator without it; but the most important thing for the greater society is the proficiency of a man’s oratory.

Quintilian follows Cicero on this, admitting that philosophical principles do belong to the art of oratory. In Book 12, he begins with the assumption that his newly formed orator, having been dismissed by his teachers, will proceed under his own power or seek greater assistance from the innermost shrine of philosophy.\(^{12}\) He argues that no one will be skilled in speaking who does not have a profound understanding of all the workings of nature, or has formed their character by precept and principle.\(^{13}\) He says that “Proceeding to moral philosophy or ethics, we may note that it at any rate is entirely suited to the orator. For vast is the variety of cases … and there is scarcely a single one which does not at some point or another involve the discussion of equity and virtue” (*Inst. 12.2.15*).\(^{14}\) Doubtless then, Quintilian saw value in philosophical training as a part of rhetorical training;\(^{15}\) however, as

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\(^{11}\) Cicero, *De Or*. 1.52.


\(^{13}\) Quintilian, *Inst*. 12.2.5.

\(^{14}\) According to Quintilian (*Inst. 12.2.31*) “no man will ever be the consummate orator of whom we are in quest unless he has both the knowledge and the courage to speak in accordance with the promptings of honour.”

\(^{15}\) In fact, it has been suggested that Quintilian’s objective in teaching was to unite Cicero’s conception of the ideal orator with the Stoic ideal of the wise man. In doing so, “Quintilian hoped to fill voids in each discipline. The Stoics were notoriously ineffective speakers and writers because they were untrained as orators. Orators, talented as they often were, typically made bad use of good gifts because they had ‘abandoned moral concerns.’ A conception of an orator as a Stoic Wise Man with training in Ciceronian eloquence would address the needs of both philosophy and rhetoric and reunite them both” (Walzer, “Quintilian’s ‘Vir Bonus’ and the Stoic Wise Man,” 38). This honour towards philosophers is clearly seen in Quintilian’s student, Pliny, who, in a letter to Attius, complains of the busyness caused by his many public duties; these, he says, prevent him spending time with the philosopher Euphrates, whom he admires for both his philosophical ability and rhetorical eloquence. He says that “I complain about these duties to Euphrates, who consoles me by saying that anyone who holds public office, presides at trials and expounds justice, thereby puts into practice what the philosopher only teaches” (*Ep.1.10.10*). Although Trapp (*Philosophy in the Roman Empire*, 251) notes that this stance was not a personal idiosyncrasy of Quintilian; “rhetoricians in general,” he argues, “and the oratorical performers and
with Cicero, the orator’s expectations are clear: he is educated to rule.\textsuperscript{16} He states that “The principles of upright and honourable living should, as some have held, be regarded as the peculiar concern of philosophy,” however, “the man who can guide a state by his counsels, give it a firm basis by his legislation and purge its vices by his decisions as a judge, is assuredly no other than the orator of our quest” (\textit{Inst.} 1.pr.10). In other words, for Cicero and Quintilian, the true leader is always an orator. This is the one who can truly be called “wise:” one who is perfect in morals, in knowledge and in capacity for speaking.\textsuperscript{17}

Orators then, since the time of Isocrates, were concerned with training public officials and rulers.\textsuperscript{18} In the Roman schools, the orator was the man who spoke to defend his friends, reunite the family, repair society and champion Roman values.\textsuperscript{19} According to Quintilian, it was on account of oratory that founders of cities induced their unsettled multitudes to form communities by the magic of their eloquence. Moreover, it was by the highest gifts of oratory that the great legislators constrained humanity to submit themselves to the yoke of law. Overall, the orator was able to defend his friends, to guide the senate by his counsels, and to lead peoples or armies to follow his bidding.\textsuperscript{20} But even the orator needed some training in philosophy; although it always played a subservient role to that of eloquence of speech. A similar thing can be seen amongst the philosophers.

\textbf{7.2 Leadership, Philosophy, and the Usefulness of Oratory}

In chapter 5 (cf. 5.1.3.2), we saw the extensive discussion of Epictetus in regard to the good and excellent man. This person was in every way a product of philosophical training.\textsuperscript{21} But this did not preclude the value of oratory. According to Epictetus, to neglect the faculty of speech would be ungrateful to God who gives us this gift. He argues that speech cannot be
neglected any more than eyes, or ears, or hands, or feet, or dress, or shoes. There is then, according to him, value in the faculty of eloquence, but it is not as great as the faculty of προοίμειος. 22 “For it is this which uses not only that faculty of eloquence but also all the other faculties both small and great … But to do away with the faculty of eloquence and to say that in all truth it is nothing is the act not merely of a man ungrateful to those who have given it, but also cowardly” (Diatr. 2.23.31). He says further, “Some people think that I am disparaging the study of rhetoric or that of general principles. Yet I am not disparaging this, but only the habit of dwelling unceasingly on these matters and setting one’s hopes in them” (Diatr. 2.23.46–47). For Epictetus then, only philosophical training could produce a good and excellent man and was thus the highest form of training; but there was still value in rhetoric. 23

For many of the philosophers then, there was significant value placed on rhetorical ability. This is demonstrated in some of our authors who were highly skilled in both.

7.2.1 Seneca the Younger

Seneca, the statesman and tutor to the emperor himself, argues that without philosophy, “the mind is sickly, and the body, though it may be very powerful, is strong only as that of a madman or a lunatic is strong” (Ep. 15.1). Moreover, he says that no one can live a happy life, or even a supportable life, without the study of wisdom. 24 But Seneca was also well known

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22 See section 5.1.3.1 for discussion of this term.
23 Epictetus, Diatr. 3.2.1. Similarly, Philo (Congr. 79–80) is adamant that only a philosophical education is capable of producing virtue and wise judgment (and in this regard, a public official and leader). However, rhetorical ability was necessary for the philosopher, since he had the difficult task of challenging the sophists. Discussing the balance between philosophy and oratory, he says that there are some who are wise, but unskilled in speaking; these he holds up as virtuous people but ineffective in debate (Migr. 72). In the contest against the sophists, these people would do best to avoid such battles; but those who are equipped in both, who are able to communicate like the sophists as well as being furnished with wise council, have the means to repel their enemies (Det. 35–36; similarly Det. 68; Migr. 73; Agr. 164–166). Thus for Philo, perfection (and indeed, the goal of training) is the ability to both form ideas and be able to communicate them correctly.
24 Seneca, Ep. 16.1; cf. 37.4. According to Seneca, a happy life is reached when wisdom is brought to completion. He encourages thus: “Turn to her with all your soul, sit at her feet, cherish her; a great distance will then begin to separate you from other men. You will be far ahead of all mortals, and even the gods will not be far ahead of you” (Ep. 53.10).
for his rhetorical proficiency. In fact, Seneca was a chief representative of what is termed the “post-classical style.”

Seneca’s skill as an orator can be seen in the critique of Quintilian, who was trying to restore the Ciceronian style. In his analysis of the characteristics of various well-known orators, he gives special attention to Seneca. The reason for this focus is because he was endeavouring to recall students from “a depraved style” that was weakened by every kind of error to a severer standard of taste. During Quintilian’s time as a teacher, Seneca appears to have been all the rage with students, being, as he saw it, “in the hands of every young man.” Therefore, Quintilian felt it necessary, not to ban his reading all together, but to prevent him being preferred to authors superior to himself (Seneca). “But,” Quintilian says, “the young men loved him rather than imitated him, and fell as far below him as he fell below the ancients … for he pleased them for his faults alone, and each individual sought to imitate such of those faults as lay within his capacity to reproduce: and then brought reproach on his master by boasting that he spoke in the genuine Senecan manner” (Inst. 10.1.126–127).

7.2.2 Plutarch

Plutarch’s activities as a teacher, philosopher, emissary, politician, and priest also idealise the educated philosopher-politician. For him, philosophical training is paramount for leaders; he says, “I regard as perfect, so far as men can be, those who are able to combine and mingle

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25 Seneca, Ep. 40.2. Two of his epistles (40 and 114) discuss the appropriate style of speech for the philosopher. In another place he says, “Our words should aim not to please, but to help. If, however, you can attain eloquence without painstaking, and if you either are naturally gifted or can gain eloquence at slight cost, make the most of it and apply it to the noblest uses. But let it be of such a kind that it displays facts rather than itself. It and the other arts are wholly concerned with cleverness; but our business here is the soul” (Ep. 75.6). See also his discussion on the natural tendency to blush while speaking and the means to bring it under control (Ep. 11.1–7) and his discussion on the training of the voice (Ep. 15.7).

26 William J. Dominik, “The Style is the Man: Seneca, Tacitus and Quintilian’s Canon,” in Roman Eloquence: Rhetoric in Society and Literature, ed. by William J. Dominik (London: Routledge, 1997), 66. Dominik describes this style in the following: “The post-classical style was both function and product of its age … this shift in aesthetic appears to have been not only a natural extension of the classical norm and an anxious reaction to the influences of the Augustan classical achievement, but also a response to the oppressive political environment and a reflection of changed social conditions, manners and literary taste. In place of Ciceronian correctness, harmony, proportion, fullness and rhythm, contemporary audiences developed a predilection for incongruity, discordance, disproportion and point. The post-classical style of expression was an index of the new attitudes produced by the changes social and political circumstances of the early Empire. To Seneca, Aper and other writers and orators this new style was a better way of reflecting upon contemporary society than the classical.”

27 Quintilian represented a neo-Ciceronian movement. Kennedy argues that the resumption and development of Cicero’s thought was a deliberate act on Quintilian’s part in the face of this new post-classical style. See Kennedy, The Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World, 506; Kennedy, “An Estimate of Quintilian,” 134. Cf. Dominik, “The Style is the Man: Seneca, Tacitus and Quintilian’s Canon,” 51.

28 Quintilian, Inst. 10.1.125.

29 Quintilian, Inst. 10.1.126.
political capacity with philosophy; and I am inclined to think that these are secure in the
possession of two things which are of the greatest good: a life useful to the world in their
public position, and the calm and untroubled life in their pursuit of philosophy.” He concludes
by saying, “one must try, then, as well as one can, both to take part in public life, and to lay
hold of philosophy so far as the opportunity is granted,” Lib. ed. 7F–8A. But this does not
preclude the necessity of oratory. He asks, “How is it possible that a private person of
ordinary costume and mien who wishes to lead a State may gain power and rule the multitude
unless he possesses persuasion and attractive speech?” (Praec. ger. rei. publ. 801E)

7.2.3 Dio Chrysostom

Like Plutarch, Dio Chrysostom’s life as a teacher, author, orator, philosopher, politician, and
emissary demonstrates the potential career that a philosophical education could offer.
According to him, philosophy was important for the ruler, but he still saw a pivotal role for
eloquence and rhetoric in education and leadership. In Oration 18, he holds out the highest
praise to a man of obvious wealth and authority who, late in his career, seeks training in
rhetoric. Dio says to him

And you, as it seems to me, are altogether wise in believing that a statesman needs experience
and training in public speaking and in eloquence. For it is true that this will prove of very great
help toward making him beloved and influential and esteemed instead of being looked down
upon. For when men are afraid, what does more to inspire them than the spoken word? And
when they wax insolent and uplifted in spirit, what more effectively brings them down and
chastens them? What has greater influence in keeping them from indulging their desires? Whose
admonitions do they endure more meekly than the man’s whose speech delights them? Time
and again, at any rate, there may be seen in our cities one group of men spending, handing out
largess, adorning their city with dedications, but the orators who support these measures getting
the applause, as though they and not the others had brought these things about. (Or. 18.2–3)

But at the same time, he is critical of the Roman practice of having orators as leaders. He
argues that training in any field is a means to an occupation suitable to the acquired skill;
hence, it seems irrational for orators to become leaders, given the nature of their training.

Is it by learning from your parents to play the lyre and to wrestle, to read and write, and by
teaching your sons these things that you think that your city will be inhabited by more

30 Similarly, 7C–D. C. J. Gianakaris (Plutarch [Woodbridge: Twayne, 1970], 121) notes that “Esoteric
theories designed to baffle the reader had no part in his (Plutarch’s) purpose. The engaged life, directed toward
the good, was his final aim when moralizing; the active life meant becoming involved in civic and religious
functions.”
31 For discussion of style, see Lib. ed. 6C, E; Rect. rat. aud. 41F–42B.
disciplined and better citizens? And yet if one were to bring together all the cithara players and
gymnastic masters and schoolmasters who have the best knowledge of their respective subjects,
and, if you should found a city with them or even a nation, just as you at one time colonized
Ionia, what sort of a city do you think it would be, and what the character of its citizens? Will
not a much more ridiculous society be made by these teachers of your children of whom
I speak—I mean the gymnastic masters, the cithara players, and the schoolmasters, including
the rhapsodists and the actors? When there is need of any deliberation concerning the welfare of
your city and you have come together in the Assembly, do some of you get up and play the
cithara, and certain other individuals wrestle, and yet others of you take something of Homer’s
or Hesiod’s and proceed to read it? For these are the things that you know better than the others,
and these are the things which you think will make you good men and enable you to conduct
your public affairs properly and your private concerns likewise. And now, these are the hopes
which inspire you when you direct your city and prepare your sons, working to qualify them to
handle both their own and the public’s interests if only they can play satisfactorily. (Or. 13.17, 19)

He then makes the point clear: “But if you really think that the orators are qualified to
deliberate and that their profession is competent to make men good, I am surprised that you
have not entrusted the deciding of questions of state to them instead of to your own selves;
and why, if you regard them as the best and most just of men, you have not allowed them to
manage your finances also?” (Or. 13.22) He believes that if a man strives earnestly to be good
and honourable, that is nothing but being a philosopher. 32 He says elsewhere that the person is
really a philosopher who devotes himself to no other task than learning how he will be able to
rule well, be it ruling himself, a household, the greatest state, or, in short, all humankind. 33
More explicitly he says, “The function of the real philosopher is nothing else than to rule over
human beings” (Or. 49.13).

Its practitioners then, from Plato to the early Empire, saw philosophy as requisite for
leadership. Philosophers also saw themselves as shepherds, steersmen, and unofficial
legislators of humanity; it was their firm conviction that philosophical discourse, and its
providers, belonged in the public space, and indeed were sorely needed there. 34 Even if not all
agreed with this, 35 authors such as Dio, Philo, Seneca, and Plutarch, who had active roles in

32 Dio, Or. 13.28.
33 Dio, Or. 49.3. This person will need no ruler other than reason and God, and will be competent to care
for and give heed to the rest of humankind.
34 Trapp, Philosophy in the Roman Empire, 215.
35 There was a marked divergence between positions fundamentally supportive of political participation
and those opposed. On the one hand, Epicureans, Sceptics and Cynics generally saw no intrinsic value in
political activity (Trapp, Philosophy in the Roman Empire, 216). Ps.-Crates says that the law compels a man not
to do wrong, but philosophy teaches him not to do wrong. Since, then, to do something under compulsion is
worse than doing it willingly, law is worse than philosophy. For this reason, he argues, “do philosophy and do
not take part in government” (Crates, Epistle 5, 1–7). Ps.-Socrates sees no connection between philosophy and
politics; he says that he met a certain Critobulus and encouraged him to pursue philosophy, but, “it seemed that
he has rather set his mind on politics.” Therefore, he argues, “he will choose an education that is suited for that”
(Socrates, Epistle 4). On the other hand, we saw earlier that Plato and Aristotle saw the necessity of having a
philosopher as a ruler. Stoics, too, saw importance the role of the philosopher in public life; Stoicism, it is argued,
fLOURISHED in some measure during this period because it encouraged participation in political activity (Morford,
The Roman Philosophers, 164). In fact, as Trapp (Philosophy in the Roman Empire, 220) notes, the great
public life, make it clear that philosophers could also be wealthy statesmen who held prominent public roles. But even the philosopher saw the need for training in rhetoric; however, this always took a subservient role to philosophy.

7.2.4 Summary

It seems that both oratory and philosophy had an important role to play in the formation of a public official and leader (though in reality, rhetoric was still the favourite amongst students). The orator saw a need for philosophy, and, with few exceptions, the philosopher also valued rhetoric. The difference appears to be only one of degree. Dio says that “many things in general and absolutely everything involving any work or activity will be found common to philosophers and orators” (Or. 22.1). In other words, παιδεία aimed at producing ideal leaders and public officials who were both philosophical and eloquent; these were the “the rulers of this present age.”

From its earliest origins, education was seen as the gateway to success and entry into the privileged class. Παιδεία served to mark off the elite as a whole from the lower orders. It gave them a shared medium of communication and recognition denied to their social inferiors. Additionally, it acted as a replication and a symbolic justification of the social order; that is, the cultivation required to be educated was viewed as the product of an innate majority of the surviving texts and authors (writing in general and in regard to public life) speak from a Stoic or a Platonic vantage point.

Moreover, although these individuals did not have a ubiquitous cultural influence during their own careers, the presence of philosophers in school reading lists would indicate a universal influence of philosophical ideas amongst the educated elite. Both Dio and Quintilian recommend the reading of the Socratics and Xenophon, Quintilian also recommends the early Stoics (Dio, Or. 18.13–14; Quintilian, Inst. 10.1.81–84).

“Rhetoric and philosophy had long contended over the question of which was a more suitable preparation for public life: on the whole the art of speaking effectively could always hold its own in what was properly an unequal debate because of its greater accessibility. It could also expect to be more entertaining; and unlike much of the serious philosophy, which might deliberately eschew the attractions of literary style, rhetoric could delight to flaunt it” (Anderson, The Second Sophistic, 9).

It was not always the case that philosophers valued rhetoric; in the Tabula of Cebes (13) many are lovers of false education (ψευδοπαιδεία) such as oratory, and have been deceived into thinking that this is true education (παιδεία).

Trapp, Philosophy in the Roman Empire, 236. “Rhetorical education directed attention to the external self, what others perceived of one visually and aurally, and to the self as a public performance. It treated the process of formation as something circumscribed; a relatively brief period of training, concentrating on a few key aspects of performance, requiring to be refreshed in the course of a career by similarly limited and occasional sustaining exercises. Philosophical self-formation, in obvious contrast, was inward, aiming indeed to have an impact on what is publically observable, but via what is inner and hidden, directly available only to the individual concerned. And it was comprehensive, both in its requirement that the whole of the morally relevant part of the soul be trained, and in the expectation that the exercise of monitoring and training would occupy a lifetime.”

This phrase will be dealt with below in 7.3.

Marrou, A History Of Education In Antiquity, xi.
superiority and thus the reason why it was right and proper that those actually at the top of the heap, in power, rank, and influence should indeed be there. It taught good behaviour and obedience, both to rules and to those who enforced them. At the same time, it gave people arrogance, confidence, a sense of superiority, and the capability to rule the uneducated. In fact, the uneducated person was deemed intellectually defective and was in need of being ruled. This meant thorough training in the various arts, but most importantly philosophy and rhetoric. The emphases on these two departments varied, and the debate as to the merits of each went as far back as Plato and Isocrates; but in the final analysis, all agreed that to be a virtuous man capable of public office and leadership, both wisdom and eloquence had to be present and refined.

7.3 The Rulers of this Present Age

In the previous chapters, it was shown that some of the Corinthians have measured themselves and the apostles by a standard that was marked by both (Stoic?) philosophical wisdom and rhetorical eloquence. The wisdom of these Corinthians is something generally found in παιδεία, both in the schools of the philosophers and the orators. Against this wisdom, Paul has been deemed inferior. Now in this section, Paul describes what the wisdom of Christ is, but most importantly, what it means to be truly mature.

7.3.1 1 Corinthians 2:6–8

In 1 Corinthians 2:6, Paul states: “Yet among the mature (ἐν τοῖς τελεῖοις) we do impart (λαλοῦμεν) wisdom, although it is not a wisdom of this age or of the rulers of this age, who are doomed to pass away.” Brookins argues that the term τελείος here, has its background in Stoicism; that is, the self-proclaimed “wise” Corinthians were calling themselves “perfect”

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42 Trapp, *Philosophy in the Roman Empire*, 244–245.
43 Cribiore, *Gymnastics of the Mind: Greek Education in Hellenistic and Roman Egypt*, 252.
44 Morgan, *Literate Education in the Hellenistic and Roman Worlds*, 258. Summarising Quintilian, Morgan (“A Good Man Skilled in Politics: Quintilian’s Political Theory,” 200) notes that in his view, “illiterates are described as dumb: they cannot speak, or if they do, their speech is described as ephemeral, accidental, ignorant, subjective, even a different language, meaningless to the educated… Quintilian identifies the uneducated variously as barbarians, peasants, slaves, children, and women.” However a semi-literate was still able to achieve reasonable success in business. See R. W. Daniel, “Liberal Education and Semiliteracy in Petronius.” *ZPE* 40 (1980): 153–159.
over against the “immature,” and this according to Stoic categories. Given our discussion so far, this suggestion makes good sense. As we have already seen in chapter 5, some of the Corinthians have understood the message of Christ and their own personal accomplishments according to (most likely) Stoic categories, and have labelled themselves τέλειοι. In response to these claims, Paul takes up their language saying, “we do speak a certain wisdom amongst the (as you call them) ‘mature,’ but our wisdom is one that cannot be understood by reference to this world’s wisdom.”

This wisdom that Paul speaks is not the wisdom of this age or of the rulers of this age; it is, rather, God’s wisdom, a mystery that was hidden but has now been revealed. In 1 Cor 2:6 and 8, Paul refers to οἱ ἄρχόντες τοῦ σιῶνως τοῦτου. Two issues surround this term. First, it can be translated as either “rulers of this age,” or, alternatively, “rulers of this world.”

The flexibility of σιῶν allows for either nuance, implying something like: “today’s leaders.” Second, scholars are undecided as to whether he is referring to spiritual rulers or earthly rulers. Given the argument so far in this thesis, I take the latter as the correct interpretation. We have already encountered the term τοῦ σιῶνως τοῦτου in 1 Cor 1:20, where Paul asks “Where is the rationalistic philosopher? Where is the legal expert? Where is the rhetorician (of this age)?” Paul goes on in the verse to say that God has made foolish the wisdom of the world (σοφία τοῦ κόσμου), that is, the wisdom of these three figures. He then says in 2:5 that his preaching style was intentional in order that their faith might not rest on human wisdom (σοφία ἀνθρώπων). In both of these passages, he refers to earthly teachers

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46 Brookins, “The Wise Corinthians,” 61–63. “This contention receives further support from the contrast between the ‘perfect’ and ‘immature’ person (2:6; 3:1–3), which seems to be analogous to the contrasts between the ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ person (chs. 8–10; cf. 1:25, 27; 10:22) and the ‘spiritual’ and ‘unspiritual’ person (2:13–15; ch. 12; 15:46–47). Indeed, this is an ‘ontological’ (spiritual-status) distinction more than it is a ‘historical’ (eschatological) one, and one that finds its explanation in Stoicism” (62).

47 Cf. Thiselton, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, 225. Fee also suggests that Paul is taking up Corinthian terminology (Fee, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, 102; similarly, Gerhard Delling, “τέλειος, τελέος, τελέω,” in TDNT 8: 49–87, 1972, 76). However Paul’s use of τέλειος elsewhere to describe mature Christians (e.g., 1 Cor 14:20; Phil 3:15) would indicate that it is also a term he uses to describe maturity, synonymous with πνευματικός (Ibid., 76). However, in this context, he wants to make a distinction between the two terms in order to redefine “maturity” according to his own categories. This will be discussed further in 8.3.1–2.

48 NASB; ESV; NIV; NKJV; et al. 49 KJV; ASV; CEV. 50 BDAG, 32. 51 Cf. CEB.

and wisdom. It seems reasonable then, to suggest that 1 Cor 2:6 has the same thing in mind.\textsuperscript{53} The wisdom he speaks is not the wisdom of this age taught by the contemporary philosophers and orators, nor is it the wisdom of those who embody it: the earthly rulers of this age. But who exactly are these earthly rulers?

The term ἀρχών refers to a ruler, prince, or emperor; but it can also refer to one who simply has administrative authority, such as a leader or official;\textsuperscript{54} that is, a person with authority. In this sense, 1 Cor 2:6 would certainly refer to the holders of high offices in the administration of the Empire and in command of the army, offices that were reserved for senators and knights.\textsuperscript{55} But given our discussion so far, where we have seen that orators and philosophers both trained future leaders, and were leaders themselves (i.e., to be educated naturally assumed authority), something broader is possibly being implied. On this point, Fee’s analysis is salient. He says that “the rulers here at least include those responsible for the crucifixion. But in this first instance [1 Cor 2:6] the term probably also intends the ‘leaders’ of this age in the broader sense, including the various “wise ones” of 1:20 and 26.”\textsuperscript{56} In other words, the “rulers of this age and world” are not only those who actually hold positions of power (i.e., the emperor, generals, etc.), but also the educated elites, who, by virtue of their social status, power, good birth, and general influence (cf. 1 Cor 1:26), wield a certain authority over those of lower status; that is, local office holders, wealthy patrons, and the like.\textsuperscript{57}

\subsection*{7.3.2 Summary}

In summary, not only have these elite Corinthians defined wisdom according to the standards of the age, they have also measured its leaders next to the rulers of the age. Moreover, their behaviour in the Christian community was characteristic of “secular” rather than of Christian society.\textsuperscript{58} Overall, as the “rulers of the age” themselves, they were bringing into the Christian community principles and practices normal to leaders in society (i.e., values inculcated

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{53} Schnabel, Der erste Brief des Paulus an die Korinther, 166.
\item \textsuperscript{54} BDAG, 140. Cf. Rom 13:3, where it is used to refer to people in government.
\item \textsuperscript{55} Welborn, Paul, the Fool of Christ, 126; similarly, Clarke, Secular and Christian Leadership in Corinth, 115.
\item \textsuperscript{56} Fee, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, 104; similarly, Klaiber, Der erste Korintherbrief, 43.
\item \textsuperscript{57} The connection in 1 Cor 2:6 then, between the human rulers and the wisdom of the age (“not a wisdom of this age or of the rulers of this age”) as virtually synonymous is appropriate. Since the rulers of the age were the products of παπάς, they were at the same time leaders of the world and the embodiment of the wisdom of the world.
\item \textsuperscript{58} Clarke, Secular and Christian Leadership in Corinth, 111.
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through παθέω (παθέω). In a culture driven by honour, it would have been easy for elite members to see in the church an opportunity for gaining honour. At the same time, it would be expected that the lower status members would be drawn into this practice, particularly if these leaders were also patrons and supporters of the church. The Corinthians Christians, in other words, were attempting to turn their community into a microcosm of the larger society, reflecting the values, norms, and structures of the wider world, with the educated elites assuming their natural positions as superior and the low status falling in line. In response, Paul says that the “wisdom of the world” upon which their behaviour is being justified has no place here. Rather, the wisdom of the Christian community, the wisdom of its leaders, and the wisdom the apostles preach, is one that is only understood by the “truly” mature. Who exactly these are exactly is his next concern.

7.4 Excursus: 1 Corinthians 2:9

Paul’s quote in 1 Corinthians 2:9 “what no eye has seen, nor ear heard, nor the heart of man imagined, what God has prepared for those who love him,” has caused many headaches in scholarship with regard to its origin. The common suggestion is that it is an OT citation since it contains the introductory καθὼς γιγάντια, with its most likely reference being a

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59 It has been shown that the civil litigation of 1 Cor 6:1–11 was being carried out by men of relatively high social standing who were entering into vexatious litigation in order to protect reputation and status. Cf. Winter, Seek the Welfare of the City, 105–118; Winter, After Paul Left Corinth, 58–71; Clarke, Secular and Christian Leadership in Corinth, 59–71. Again, it has been argued that the Corinthians’ “boasting” in the incestuous believer (5:1–13) was due to the fact that he was their patron and convention bound them to loyalty. Cf. Ibid., 73–88; Winter, After Paul Left Corinth, 44–57. Possibly the clearest example of elite values being imposed on the community is the divisions at the Lord’s Supper (11:17–34).

60 Particularly since communities of honour existed far below the aristocracy, such as religious cults, trade guilds and burial insurance clubs relying on better off members to underwrite expenses out of a pursuit of honour. Cf. J. E. Lendon, Empire of Honour: The Art of Government in the Roman World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 97. Lendon notes that, to the rhetorician especially, honour was patronage and convention bound loyalty. Cf. Ibid., 73–88; Winter, After Paul Left Corinth, 44–57. Possibly the clearest example of elite values being imposed on the community is the divisions at the Lord’s Supper (11:17–34).


possible allusion to Isaiah 64:3, 4 and/or 65:16, 17. The well-attested problem, however, is that it is clearly not a direct quote, in fact, neither of these passages is identical in any way.\textsuperscript{64} One solution offered by numerous scholars to explain this discrepancy is that Paul is simply alluding to these passages, creating some kind of loose paraphrase.\textsuperscript{65} Alternatively, Klaiber suggests the most likely origin is a maxim in oral tradition that is a loose formulation of these passages in Isaiah;\textsuperscript{66} Thiselton suggests that it is from a pastiche of OT sources, including Isaiah.\textsuperscript{67} Looking outside the OT, but still within Jewish literature, Origen suggested that it was in fact a reference to the Apocalypse of Elijah.\textsuperscript{68} Similarly, Horsley argues that “it probably comes from some unknown Jewish apocalyptic that had drawn heavily on prophetic motifs, particularly Isa 64:4, but so significant to Paul that he cites it as scripture.”\textsuperscript{69} However, Barrett brings us full circle, arguing against an apocalyptic source that “(the clause καθώς γέγραπται) almost certainly means that Paul believed that he was quoting the OT and we must conclude either that he was doing so from memory, and very inaccurately, or that he had a text, perhaps of Isaiah different from ours.”\textsuperscript{70} Robertson and Plummer suggest that “The Apostle unquestionably intends to quote Canonical Scripture. Either, then, he actually does so, or he unintentionally slips into a citation from another source.”\textsuperscript{71} In fact, so ambiguous is this citation, and so diverse is the scholarly opinion, that the only thing that appears certain in regards to its origin, is that there is simply no way of knowing where it came from.\textsuperscript{72}

Interestingly, however, Plutarch uses a similar phrase in \textit{How to Study Poetry}, in fact the Loeb translation is almost verbatim: “Thus no eye of man hath seen nor ear hath heard this, nor can it be comprehended by the mind (οὐτως οὕτ’ ἐπιδερκτά τάδ’ ἀνδράσιν οὕτ’ ἐπακουστά οὔτε νόω περιληπτά’).”\textsuperscript{73} Conzelmann argued years ago that the similarity


\textsuperscript{65} Moffatt, \textit{The First Epistle of Paul to the Corinthians}, 30–31; Witherington, \textit{Conflict and Community in Corinth}, 127; Margaret Thrall, \textit{I and II Corinthians}, (CBC; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), 27; Ciampa and Rosner, \textit{The First Letter to the Corinthians}, 127; Schnabel, \textit{Der erste Brief des Paulus an die Korinther}, 170.

\textsuperscript{66} Klaiber, \textit{Der erste Korintherbrief}, 43.

\textsuperscript{67} Thiselton, \textit{The First Epistle to the Corinthians}, 252.

\textsuperscript{68} Although this has recently been dismissed out of hand. See Verheyden, “Origen on the Origin of 1 Cor 2,9.”


\textsuperscript{70} Barrett, \textit{The First Epistle to Corinthians}, 73.

\textsuperscript{71} Robertson and Plummer, \textit{A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the First Epistle of St Paul to the Corinthians}, 41.

\textsuperscript{72} Weiss’ conclusion then is still salient, “über dir Herkunft des Zitats ist noch keine Gewißheit erzielt” (Weiss, \textit{Der erste Korintherbrief}, 58).

\textsuperscript{73} Plutarch, \textit{Adol. poet. aud.} 17E.
between these two passages is “of no consequence;”74 I disagree. Here Plutarch is citing the opening passage from Empedocles’ *On Nature*

For limited are the means of grasping (i.e., *the organs of sense-perception*) which are scattered throughout their limbs, and many are the miseries that press in and blunt the thoughts. And having looked at (only) a small part of existing during their lives, doomed to perish swiftly like smoke they are carried aloft and wafted away, believing only that upon which as individuals they chance to hit as they wander in all directions; but every man preens himself on having found the Whole: so little are *the things to be seen by men or to be heard, or to be comprehended by the mind! But you, since you have come here into retirement, shall learn—not more than mortal intellect can attain.75

Commenting on the poem, Wright says that “The sense seems to be that the whole is not perceptible or understandable to the average man. Men are usually mistaken in method, attitude, and aim, and easily distracted; they are also unable to go beyond their immediate experience, which they misinterpret and overrate.”76 The contrast Empedocles makes is between the person who knows and the many mortals who do not. This contrast is made again further on in 95(132)–96(133) where he says, “Happy the man who has gained the wealth of divine understanding, wretched he who cherishes an unenlightened opinion about the gods. It is not possible to bring (the divine) close within the reach of our eyes or to grasp him with the hands, by which the broadest path of persuasion for men leads to the mind.”77

In *How the Young Man Should Study Poetry*, Plutarch refers to this passage when he is speaking about the young men who are being introduced in their early years of their education to poetry.78 He begins the essay by warning the reader that poetry is not particularly concerned with truth, that the poet is very likely to introduce false ideas about the subject into the poem, or let their own emotion and opinion influence what they say about the subject.79 For this reason, the young man studying it must be supervised; moreover, he must have discernment, since the truth is exceedingly hard to track down. Thus he is saying that it is nearly impossible for the young person starting out in study to properly discern the real truth in poetry, but if he is aware of this, he will not give as much concern to trying.80 In both Empedocles and Plutarch, the idea of this phrase is one of perception and the beholder’s

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74 Conzelmann, *First Corinthians*, 63.
77 Ibid., 252.
78 *Adol. poet. aud.* 17E.
79 *Adol. poet. aud.* 16F.
80 For discussion of Plutarch’s essay, see Lamberton, *Plutarch*, 47; Whitmarsh, *Greek Literature and the Roman Empire*, 51–54.
ability to comprehend knowledge or truth. This certainly seems to fit our context, where the “wise ones” of this age have crucified the Lord due to their inability to comprehend the manifest wisdom of God.

But could Paul be making reference to Empedocles in 1 Cor 2:9? Such a suggestion will always be difficult to maintain in light of the introductory καθως γέγραπται. However, several factors seem to make the suggestion plausible.

First, as we have seen, this passage does not actually appear to cite the OT; nor is it the only time Paul does this. In 1 Cor 9:10 and 2 Cor 4:6, a citation is introduced with an introductory formula that does not correspond to either the Greek or Hebrew OT. In fact, Paul’s citation technique, overall, demonstrates a high degree of flexibility and alteration to the text(s) he is quoting. In examining the various citations and introductory formulae in Paul’s letters, Stanley has concluded that there is “no correlation between the way a citation is introduced and the degree to which it adheres to the biblical wording. ‘Formulaic’ expressions appear with both verbatim and highly adapted quotations.” In other words, the type of introductory formula used offers no clue as to Paul’s attitude toward the wording of a particular biblical citation. Most interesting in Stanley’s survey, however, is that in comparing Paul to other contemporary authors, he notes that, among Jewish writers, quotations from non-biblical sources (Homer and other Greek authors in Philo and Aristobulus) and verses whose origins remain entirely obscure (e.g., 1 Cor 2:9) also appear with similar introductory formulae. “Even an author’s own literary creations can be introduced by one of the standard introductory formulae (Jubilees).” This sort of flexibility at least leaves open the possibility of sources outside scripture.

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81 1 Cor 9:10: “Does he not certainly speak for our sake? It was written for our sake, because the plowman should plow in hope and the thresher thresh in hope of sharing in the crop.” 2 Cor 4:6: “For God, who said, ‘Let light shine out of darkness.’” For discussion of these as citations of unknown origin, see Christopher D. Stanley, *Paul and the Language of Scripture: Citation Techniques in the Pauline Epistles and Contemporary Literature*, (SNSTSM 74; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 196–197, 215–216. Paul has several ways of introducing a quotation; according to Stanley, καθως γέγραπται is the only fixed expression used by Paul for this purpose, but it only appears eighteen times (27%) out of sixty-six places where such formal introductions occur (253).

82 Stanley, “Paul and Homer: Greco-Roman Citation Practice in the First Century CE.”

83 Stanley, *Paul and the Language of Scripture: Citation Techniques in the Pauline Epistles and Contemporary Literature*, 254. Note his conclusion: “The percentage of modified texts of all types in the authors studied here ranges from 6% in the case of Plutarch’s Poetry essay, to 15% for Heraclitus, 24% for Strabo, 50% for the Sublime and 52% for the Letter to Apollonius. In Paul’s case, on the other hand, Koch’s examination found evidence of intentional modifications in fully 56% of his citations. This places Paul just above the upper limit of the other first-century authors studied here—quite a contrast to the usual dismissal of Greco-Roman authors as being ‘notoriously free with the text’” (78).

84 Ibid.

85 Ibid., 340.
Second, we know that Paul is not averse to quoting Greek poets, as is demonstrated in his Areopagus speech (Acts 17:28) as well as other citations of Greek authors.\(^\text{86}\)

Third, the multitude of citations of Empedocles in subsequent literature attests to his popularity and renown as a philosopher.\(^\text{87}\) Moreover, Plutarch’s witness here would indicate that this maxim was known within education.\(^\text{88}\) This would mean that Paul would have probably been familiar with him, either through his own education or in his travels through Greek cities. Fourth, there is a corresponding motif of the human mind’s ability to comprehend God/the gods in both Paul and Empedocles. Likewise, Plutarch’s use of it is similar to Paul’s in that they both speak of hidden truths within a message that must be discerned by the mature.

It is plausible then, that Paul has Empedocles in mind in 1 Cor 2:9. In the context of 1 Cor 2:6–10, Paul is discussing inability of some to understand the wisdom of God. He says that the rulers, the “wise ones” of the age, did not, which is why they crucified Jesus. The reason, Paul suggests, is that people are not able to comprehend the knowledge of all things, nor are able to make proper judgements about God. However, as Paul goes on to state in 2:10, God’s Spirit has revealed these things to His people.

### 7.5 God’s Wisdom and True Maturity (1 Cor 2:13–16)

Until this point, Paul has argued that the message of the cross is foolish to those who are perishing (1 Cor 1:18) and that his ministry style is indicative of this fact. Moreover, he has stated that the wisdom he speaks among the mature is nothing like the wisdom of the world they are used to and probably expecting. Now, in 1 Corinthians 2:13–16, he reveals the source of true wisdom and, with that, sets up a definition of the true mature ones.

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\(^{87}\) The two collections of fragments in both Inwood, (*The poem of Empedocles*, 81–208) and Wright, (*Empedocles*, 93–151) demonstrate the ubiquity with which Empedocles was known and used.

\(^{88}\) In *The Academica* (1.12.44), Cicero also makes reference to this passage in his discussion of the New Academy vis-à-vis the Old and their different views on how we comprehend knowledge.
7.5.1 A New Type of Maturity

In 1 Cor 2:13 he says that he spoke, not in human taught words of wisdom, but rather in words taught by the Spirit, explaining spiritual matters to spiritual people (πνευματικοί). True wisdom, according to Paul, is the wisdom that is disclosed by the Spirit of God; this is the wisdom taught by his appointed teachers to those who have received the Spirit and are thus able to receive it: ὁ πνευματικός. Those without the Spirit (οἱ ψυχικοί, 1 Cor 2:14), on the other hand, can not and will not receive it. Here he distinguishes the true mature ones. On the one hand, those without the Spirit are, by inference, human taught and worldly by nature, and cannot receive the things of God because these things are spiritually discerned. These ψυχικοί would include the “rulers of this age” that we have just met, people outside of Christ who pursue σοφία by the world’s means (i.e., σαιδεία). On the other hand, those who possess the Spirit (οἱ πνευματικοί, 1 Cor 2:15) are Spirit taught (2:13) and are, by inference, the true mature ones.

It is my contention that the church resembled an ancient school that taught a Christian σαιδεία. Figuratively speaking then, these πνευματικοί are the true embodiment of this Christian σαιδεία; students whose lives and behaviour are in contrast to the students of the philosophers and orators that we have already met.

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89 On the enigmatic phrase “πνευματικοίς πνευματικά συγκρίνοντες” I follow the ESV and HCSB in taking the plural dative πνευματικοίς as masculine, giving the rendering “spiritual people.” Cf. Robertson and Plummer, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the First Epistle of St Paul to the Corinthians, 47–48; Collins, First Corinthians, 135; Witherington, Conflict and Community in Corinth, 128; Ciampa and Rosner, The First Letter to the Corinthians, 134; Schnabel, Der erste Brief des Paulus an die Korinther, 176. Two factors commend this translation: first, it corresponds to Paul’s statement in 2:6 “σοφίαν δὲ αλλούμεν ἐν τοῖς τελείοις;” second, it fits with what Paul is about to discuss: the characteristics of a πνευματικος person. Discussion of this phrase is voluminous, however, and is beyond the parameters of this thesis.


93 As Judge (“The Conflict of Educational Aims in the New Testament,” 703–704) has already noted: “the apostles were not concerned with systems of education as such. But they were dedicated to the preparation of
7.5.2 The Πνευματικός as the product of Christian Παιδεία

In regard to the adjective πνευματικός, it is rarely used in non-Jewish Greek, but for Christians, it was a term of great importance as a means of definition. Barclay suggests that

It is clear that the adjective πνευματικός is not in origin an anthropological term but an eschatological term: it describes people not through analysis of their human constitution, but in relation to their new status as graced by the Spirit of God. Thus the term is self-consciously new—not in the sense that it was wholly unprecedented in the Greek language, but in the sense that Paul employs it to designate a reality not hitherto attested, because it describes a state of affairs believed to be wholly without precedent.

He argues that, as a designation in the early church, it would have served to distinguish between the “outsiders” (οἱ ψυχικοί) and the “insiders” (οἱ πνευματικοί). Moreover, the Spirit was understood as the source of eschatological life, the medium of knowledge, and the criterion of morality. I would add to this, that it was what defined the true believer, and, by inference, the mature student of Christ.

This new type of maturity has radically different out-workings to the worldly maturity. For instance, we saw in chapter 3 (cf. 3.1.1) that educated elites were marked by ὁρετή, σωφροσύνη, and καλοκαγαθία, in addition to the other cardinal virtues. The πνευματικός, however, is characterised by love, joy, peace, etc., (Gal 5:22–23). The πνευματικός also has a new ability to speak publicly and authoritatively. In 1 Cor 12:8, Paul says that amongst the endowments of the Spirit is the word of wisdom (λόγος σοφίας) and the word of knowledge (λόγος γνώσεως). Moreover, it is assumed that when they meet, all of them have a hymn, a word of instruction, or a revelation (1 Cor 14:26). The significance of this would not be lost on the Corinthians. Like the students of Graeco-Roman παιδεία, the students of Christian παιδεία are also marked by speech and knowledge; the difference, however, is that it is not exclusive to the educated or elite. Rather, these abilities are universally given to any and all who have received the Spirit (1 Cor 1:5). Additionally, the πνευματικός has authority to lead in the Christian community. We saw in the introduction (cf. 1.1.1) that in Galatians 6:1, Paul

man for his proper end, as they saw it.” This “new man in Christ” was characterised by three consistent features: first, the notion of the spiritual man, that is, one who possessed the Spirit of God. “The term (πνευματικός), or its equivalents, is used to set up an antithesis between those who believe in Christ and those who are ruled by the Hebrew law or pursue the wisdom of the Greeks.” Second, of the complete or adult man; that is, growth towards a full personal development “in Christ.” Third, of the loving man; since man is to grow to completeness in Christ, the manifestation of love will be the necessary sign of growth.

94 Barclay, Pauline Churches and Diaspora Jews, 209.  
95 Cf. Ibid., 213.  
96 Ibid., 213. But it was not esoteric; πνευματικός “is a term for believers, that is, people with the Spirit in their lives. To the believer, all of what God might reveal is potentially available through the Spirit” (Witherington, Conflict and Community in Corinth, 126).
tells the church that if anyone is caught in sin, the ones who live by the Spirit (οἱ πνευματικοί) are to restore (καταρτίζειν) that person. Here we find the mature believers, those who are walking by the Spirit, disciplining the immature who are not, irrespective of social status, wealth, or rank.97 Finally, only the πνευματικός is able to make correct judgements (ἀνακρίνειν 1 Cor 2:14–15) about the Spirit, the things of God, and indeed all things; we will return to this in chapter 10. In other words, like the students of παιδεία, the πνευματικός is characterised by a particular set of ethics, is able to speak with wisdom and knowledge, has the ability to lead and correct, and is able to make accurate judgements about all things. However, the values they hold and the content of their wisdom stands in contrast to that of the worldly students. And, as we will see, this new type of student requires a different kind of teacher; this will be the theme of the second part of the exegesis.

97 In this case, the new mature ones, it might be suggested, are the Christian equivalent of the “rulers of this age,” at least in their roles in the Christian community. But this is merely conjecture.
CONCLUSIONS FROM PART 2

In chapter 3 it was argued that first century παιδεία was a characteristic by which a person was honoured. It was a mark of culture that set its possessor apart from the common masses who did not have the means to receive an education. It was what determined a person’s fitness to engage in public life and was what prepared a person for civic leadership. It was then argued in chapter 4 that present in the Corinthian Christian community were a small handful of wealthy members who themselves had most likely received this kind of education. Moreover, it was this that was informing their opinion or critique of Paul’s ministry. During his initial stay, they may have seen in him a certain level of education which, at the very least, enabled him to engage them at their own level and walk in their educated circles. However, in Apollos they saw something far superior and something much more in conformity with what they knew of παιδεία. Competition and comparison was inevitable and the Apollos faction saw Paul as inferior.

In chapter 5 it was argued that ethical categories taught in philosophical schools and embodied in the (Stoic) σοφός, who was the epitome of human achievement, were influential in their (mis)understanding of the “wisdom of God.” They felt that they had attained lofty heights in Christ, far superior to Paul, who was, by contrast to Apollos, a μωρός. According to Paul, however, the “wisdom” they are boasting about was nothing more than the wisdom of the world, which, according to him, is foolishness to God and incompatible with the message of the cross. In dealing with this arrogance, Paul draws a sharp distinction between himself and these members, characterising his life and ministry in the worst possible terms in order to demonstrate how closely his own life resembles what God is seeking. Moreover, he draws attention to the fact that the true embodiment of God’s wisdom is not a human teacher, but is in fact Christ. This wisdom that some of the Corinthians were seeking was also characterised by eloquent speech.

In chapter 6 it was argued that Paul’s (perceived) weak persona and poor rhetorical ability would have stood in stark contrast to the eloquent orators to whom he was being compared, but would have perfectly aligned him with the foolish message of the cross. Finally, in chapter 7 it was argued that because of this perceived superior status, both in the community and over Paul, these elite Corinthian Christians had labelled themselves “mature” (τέλειοι). Moreover, the weaker members have likely supported these claims due to the
cultural understanding that a person who possesses παιδεία is worthy of such honour. In 1 Cor 2:6–16 Paul responds by outlining the nature of the wisdom that he preaches and defining true maturity as something that is characterised by Spirit-possession. These πνευματικοί, it was suggested, are the (metaphorically speaking) students of Christian παιδεία and in Paul’s view, the true mature ones.

In all of this discussion, there is a clear correlation between the Corinthians’ behaviour and Graeco-Roman παιδεία. Their values, behaviour, and attitudes all find their roots in education. In response, Paul offers as the antidote the message of the crucified Christ (i.e., Christian παιδεία). This is the informing message upon which he believes all Christian behaviour and values must be based. It is also the example by which its teachers are to live and work.1 But can more be inferred from what we have seen so far in regard to the situation? Probably nothing beyond speculation, but given what we have here, can a picture be drawn of the type of teacher to which Paul is being compared? It has been argued that the Corinthian wisdom was one that fused, most likely, Stoic values as embodied in well-known figure of the σοφός with eloquent rhetoric. In has been suggested that part of Quintilian’s program was to fuse Ciceronian oratory with the Stoic wise man.2 This would certainly fit with our context. But a more contemporary example can be suggested. Seneca the younger was a Stoic philosopher, but as we saw above (cf. 7.2.1), he was also a well-known orator who was a chief figure of a new type of “post-classical” oratory. If we take Quintilian’s testimony at face value, Seneca was “in the hands of every young man;” moreover, they loved him and each individual sought to imitate the “genuine Senecan manner.”3 Furthermore, Seneca was certainly a “ruler of this age,” being a senator, a statesman, and personal advisor and tutor to the emperor himself. Needless to say, he fits the categories that have been outlined above. But bringing this closer to our context, the Corinthian Christians would have also known his family, since it was his brother Gallio before whom Paul was tried (Acts 18:12–17) while he was in Corinth. Is it possible that Seneca is being held up as a model of comparison to Paul? It is interesting to speculate, but there is nothing to commend this as anything more than mere conjecture.

At the very least, we can see that the philosophy and oratory of the schools of παιδεία was central in the Corinthian understanding of wisdom. The Christian community, in many respects, resembled a type of school that taught a Christian παιδεία, which has caused those who have already been educated to try and impose worldly categories onto it. As a result, Paul

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2 See p. 145, n. 15.
has been deemed inferior by comparison to what they are used to, prompting him to remind them that God’s παιδεία and His students are antithetical to the world. Moreover, a new kind of παιδεία requires a new kind of teacher; this is the topic to which Paul now turns.
PART 3: PAUL’S ROLE AS AN APOSTLE AND TEACHER

1 CORINTHIANS 3–4
CHAPTER 8: THE CORINTHIANS’ IMMATURETY

It has been argued in this thesis that the Christian community, in many respects, resembled a type of school that taught a Christian παιδεία. This has led some members to falsely impose secular values onto their understanding of its wisdom and its teachers. As a result, some of the Corinthians have argued that Paul is inferior by comparison to Apollos. Having explained what a teacher of the gospel should look like and the sort of wisdom they should proclaim, Paul, in 1 Corinthians 3–4, turns his attention to these comparisons. Here, he argues for his view of what his and Apollos’ roles actually are and why ultimately the Corinthians need to return to him as their principal teacher. To do this, he presents himself and Apollos in a series of six metaphors, each drawing their significance from Graeco-Roman παιδεία.

In this chapter, we will (1) explore the use and purpose of metaphor, particularly as it pertains to Paul’s usage. It will then be shown that (2) παιδεία was understood as a process of development from immaturity to perfection that involved increasingly difficult exercises and training. Finally, it will be argued that (3) some of the Corinthians have perceived in themselves a maturity that surpasses Paul’s abilities as a teacher and as a result, have favoured Apollos as a teacher. Paul responds to this with the first of his metaphors: himself as their nursing mother.

8.1 The Use and Function of Metaphor

I have already stated in the introduction that in responding to his critics, Paul employs metaphors that take their cultural significance from ancient education to remind the Corinthians of what a Christian teacher and apostle is meant to look like. His use of this metaphorical language appears to be (consciously or unconsciously) in keeping with both Aristotle’s and Cicero’s theories on the use and function of metaphor.

According to Aristotle, metaphor is important in both poetry and prose, but more so in prose because, compared to poetry, prose has fewer resources to draw on. Metaphor, he says, gives perspicuity, pleasure, and a foreign air to what is being said. However, he also says that it cannot be learnt from anyone else. The ability to use metaphor, according to Aristotle, is an

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1 Aristotle, Rhet. 3.2.8.
innate skill, suggesting that those who read Paul’s letters would have sensed a particular endowment of this ability.\(^2\) According to Aristotle, metaphors should also be derived from what is beautiful in sound, signification, sight, or another sense.\(^3\) But at the same time, they should not be too obvious, so that, just as in philosophy, it needs sagacity to grasp the connection and meaning.\(^4\) This certainly appears to be the case in 1 Cor 4:6 where Paul needs to make clear the meaning of his metaphorical language.

According to the rhetorical theorists, there were numerous types of metaphor, four of which appear in 1 Cor 3–4. Aristotle suggests that proverbs were in fact also metaphors.\(^5\) We see this in Paul’s use of the proverb “do not go beyond what is written” in in 1 Cor 4:6 (see below 10.3 for discussion). Another type of metaphor that Aristotle suggests is approved hyperboles.\(^6\) In this case, Paul’s reference to the Corinthians having ten thousand pedagogues (4:15) would certainly constitute metaphor.\(^7\) However, the two most common types of imagery in ancient rhetoric were simile and general metaphor (or, perhaps we might say “metaphor proper”).\(^8\) Simile is something compared with something else that the speaker wishes to describe.\(^9\) According to Aristotle, “The simile also is a metaphor; for there is very little difference. When the poet says of Achilles, ‘he rushed on like a lion,’ it is a simile; if he says, ‘a lion, he rushed on,’ it is a metaphor; for because both are courageous, he transfers the sense and calls Achilles a lion” (Rhet. 3.4.1). However, a simile is less pleasing because it is longer. Moreover, a simile does not say that this is that, meaning the mind does not even examine this.\(^10\) We can see an example of this in 4:9: “For I think that God has exhibited us apostles as last of all, like men sentenced to death, because we have become a spectacle to the world, to angels, and to men.”

Metaphor, on the other hand, is one thing substituted for the other.\(^11\) According to Cicero, it is a short form of a simile, contracted into one word.\(^12\) He says that the use of a metaphor is pleasing because it is a single word that suggests both the thing and a picture of

\(^4\) Aristotle, *Rhet*. 3.11.5.
\(^6\) Aristotle, *Rhet*. 3.11.15. He gives the example of a man with a black eye of whom it could be said, “you would have thought he was a basket of mulberries!” The black eye is something purple and the great quantity constitute the hyperbole.
\(^7\) We might also suggest that some of his described sufferings in 4:11–13 may fall into this category: “we are in rags”, “we are homeless”, “we are the scum of the earth and the refuse of the world!”
\(^8\) The term “metaphor” in our authors is ambiguous, that is, it appears to be both a general category and a particular type. As a type, it is distinguished in contrast to simile. See Aristotle, *Rhet*. 3.10.1–6; Quintilian, *Inst*. 8.6.9.
the whole.\textsuperscript{13} In other words, it can serve to achieve brevity in that it can convey the whole meaning of the matter;\textsuperscript{14} it also has a direct appeal to the senses, particularly the sight.\textsuperscript{15} Of all the senses, sight is the most effective because the mind’s eye is carried more easily to the things that have been seen than the things have been heard of.\textsuperscript{16} As we will see, Paul skilfully employs these two aspects of metaphor (brevity and visual imagery) when he refers to himself as an “οἰκονόμος” and as a “father,” and also, when he threatens to brandish the “rod.” These three images were parts of everyday life and education and would be easily imagined by any of the Corinthians. At the same time, Paul’s use of each of these single word metaphors represented a much broader idea that he was addressing.

In addition to these, Paul uses metaphors of a breast-feeding mother and farmer, two metaphorical concepts that find a home in education.

8.1.2 Recent Studies of Metaphor

Mark Johnsen and George Lakoff have demonstrated that metaphor does not occur primarily in language but in thought and action.\textsuperscript{17} In other words, they are both cognitive and linguistic in that we understand the world with metaphors and do not just speak with them. They use the example of “Argument is war.” This metaphor is reflected in our everyday language by a variety of expressions: “your claim is indefensible,” “I demolished his argument,” “you disagree? Okay, shoot!” etc.\textsuperscript{18} They suggest that

The essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another (italics theirs). It is not that arguments are a subspecies of war. Arguments and wars are different kinds of things—verbal discourses and armed conflict—and the actions performed are different kinds of actions. But ARGUMENT is partially structured, understood, performed, and talked about in terms of WAR. The concept is metaphorically structured, the activity is metaphorically structured, and, consequently, the language is metaphorically structured.\textsuperscript{19}

\textsuperscript{13} Cicero, \textit{De Or.} 3.160.
\textsuperscript{14} Cicero, \textit{De Or.} 3.158.
\textsuperscript{15} Cicero, \textit{De Or.} 3.160.
\textsuperscript{16} Cicero, \textit{De Or.} 3.163.
\textsuperscript{17} George Lakoff and Mark Johnsen, \textit{Metaphors We Live By} (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2003), 3.
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., 4. They suggest alternatively: “Try to imagine a culture where arguments are not viewed in terms of war, where no one wins or loses, where there is no sense of attacking or defending, gaining or losing ground. Imagine a culture where an argument is viewed as a dance, the participants are seen as performers and the goal is to perform in a balanced and aesthetically pleasing way. In such a culture, people would view arguments differently, experience them differently, carry them out differently, and talk about them differently. But we would probably not view them as arguing at all: they would simply be doing something different” (4–5).
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., 5.
Lakoff and Johnsen’s conclusion is important for our present purposes: “We talk about arguments that way because we conceive of them that way—and we act according to the way we conceive of things.”

Zoltán Kövecses has built on these insights in his *Metaphor in Culture*, articulating eleven key characteristics of the current cognitive linguistic view of metaphor, seven of which are useful for our understanding of Paul’s use of metaphor.

Kövecses explains that: (1–2) “Metaphor consists of a source and a target domain such that the source is a more physical and the target is a more abstract kind of domain.” (3) “The choice of a particular source to go with a particular target is motivated by an experiential basis, that is, some embodied experience.” (4) “The relationship of the source and the target is such that a source domain may apply to several targets and a target may attach to several sources.” (5) “The particular pairings of source and target domains give rise to metaphorical linguistic expressions; linguistic expressions thus are derived from the connecting of two conceptual domains.” (6) “Source domains often map ideas onto the target beyond the basic correspondences. These additional mapping are called *entailments* or *inferences*.” (7) “Conceptual metaphors converge on, and often produce, cultural models that operate in

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20 Ibid.
22 Ibid., 4–5.
23 The following explanations summarise Ibid., 5–8. He gives the following examples: “Source domains: WARMTH, JOURNEY. Target domains: AFFECTION, LIFE, LOVE. Thus: AFFECTION IS WARMTH; LIFE IS A JOURNEY; LOVE IS A JOURNEY.”
24 He gives the following examples: “Affection correlates with bodily warmth; forces often act as causes; motion is a type of event.”
25 He gives the following examples: “The JOURNEY domain applies to both LIFE and LOVE, given the linguistic evidence in English.”
26 He gives the following examples: “‘Warm relationship’ (from AFFECTION IS WARMTH), ‘get around a problem’ (from DIFFICULTIES ARE OBSTACLES).”
27 He gives the following example: “If love is conceptualised as a journey and the vehicle corresponds to the relationship, then our knowledge about the vehicle can be used to understand love relationships. If the vehicle breaks down, we have three choices: (1) we get out and try to reach our destination by some other means; (2) we try to fix the vehicle; or (3) we stay in the vehicle and do nothing. Correspondingly, if a love relationship does not work, we can (1) leave the relationship; (2) try to make it work; or (3) stay in it (and suffer).”
thought. These are structures that are simultaneously cultural and cognitive in that they are culturally specific mental representations of aspects of the world.\(^{28}\)

### 8.1.3 Summary

In light of this study on metaphor, Paul appears to be quite adept at drawing on the rhetorical resources available to him.\(^{29}\) His decision to use a series of metaphors to describe his role as the apostle to the Corinthians was not only appropriate, but also necessary. As Aristotle says, the language of metaphor must not be far-fetched; rather, “we must give names to things that have none by deriving the metaphor from what is akin and of the same kind, so that, as soon as it is uttered, it is clearly seen to be akin …” (Rhet. 3.2.12).\(^{30}\) In other words, in describing his role as an apostle, Paul draws on common imagery from the source that most closely resembles this task: παιδεία;\(^{31}\) by doing so, his metaphors are not only linguistic, but also cognitive. To borrow from Lakoff and Johnsen, Paul talks about his apostleship this way in order for the Corinthians to conceive of it this way and therefore act accordingly. That is, in drawing from a source domain (παιδεία) that corresponds to his target domain (apostleship), he is able to tap into the experiential basis of the Corinthians. By connecting these two conceptual domains, he also avails himself of linguistic expressions which produce a cultural model that operates in the thought of the Corinthians. The metaphorical language also has the potential to produce entailments or inferences that dictate behavioural patterns (e.g., if Paul is metaphorically their spiritual father, then their behaviour should be informed by their cultural understanding of such a relationship).

### 8.2 Παιδεία and Development

It has been argued throughout this thesis that the learning process envisaged for the Christian community shared similar practices with Graeco-Roman παιδεία—albeit, with inverted

\(^{28}\) He gives the following example: “An integral part of our understanding of time is that it is an entity that moves. This is because our cultural model of time is based on (created by) the conceptual metaphor TIME IS A MOVING ENTITY.”


\(^{30}\) Cf. Cicero, De Or. 3.157.

\(^{31}\) Schmeller (Schulen im Neuen Testament? 130) rightly notes that at no point does Paul refer to himself as a teacher; however, he notes that “für Paulus jedenfalls ist klar, daß es – bei allem persönlichen Einsatz des Missionars – eigentlich Gott ist, der das Evangelium verkündet und die Menschen belehrt. Trotz dieses Vorbehaltes entspricht das Verhältnis des Paulus zu seinen Gemeinden in vielen dem, was wir aus Philosophenschulen kennen.”
values—so it stands to reason that Paul would use similar metaphorical imagery in describing his task, but once again, modifying Corinthian expectations. This is what he does throughout 1 Cor 3–4. But before describing his own role, he must first point out the immaturity of the Corinthians’ present behaviour and the reality (from his point of view) of their “progress.”

8.2.1 Παιδεία and Progress

As we saw in chapters 3 and 5, the process of education was considered to be a steep and difficult progression towards virtue and god-like perfection. This is demonstrated in the Tabula of Cebes, a parable about the progress and development a person must go through as they travel along the path of παιδεία. At the early stages of the journey, the protagonist is shown an enclosure outside of which stands a woman who appears to be altogether pure and neatly adorned. “This woman,” he is told, “most rash men call true education (παιδεία), but she is not. Rather she is false education (ψευδόπαιδεία)” (Tab. 12). The ones who dwell within this enclosure are lovers of false education, men who have been deceived into thinking that they are consorting with true education; these men are poets, orators, dialecticians, musicians, mathematicians, geometricians, and others. “In any case,” Heracles says, “those who are being saved arrive here first, whenever they wish to enter into true education” (Tab. 13). Every traveller, he says, must go through this place to arrive at the true path, which is described as a steep, narrow, rocky track that leads up a hill. Very few people pass this way, as it is a trackless waste, both rocky and rough. Moreover, it is a high hill with a very narrow ascent and deep precipices on either side.  

This image of education as a difficult path was not uncommon. We see a parallel idea echoed in Jesus’ words: “Enter by the narrow gate. For the gate is wide and the way is easy that leads to destruction, and those who enter by it are many. For the gate is narrow and the way is hard that leads to life, and those who find it are few” (Matt 7:13–14; cf. Luke 13:24).

The image itself illustrated, in part, a student’s gradual exposure to increasingly difficult lessons and literature. A student would begin with the elementary exercise of tracing letters;
this was followed by the formation of syllables and learning lists of words, followed by reading and copying of single line extracts from authors and poets. As the student progressed to the grammatical level, they would be introduced to more difficult forms of literature. Here they would read, recite, and explain different authors; they would also learn to compose such forms as fable, narrative, and chreia; all of this material was written and selected to impart moral lessons. At the higher level, where rhetoric was taught, students were taken through a progressive course called the pro gymnasmata, a curriculum featuring a series of set exercises of increasing difficulty, both literarily and in maturity of thought. Like every stage of παιδεία, it took the pupil along the path towards maturity, beginning with the basics and progressing to the more difficult. The purpose of these lessons (as with every aspect of παιδεία) was transformation of a student’s character and behaviour. Epictetus says, “to store away bread and wine in a pantry is one thing, and to eat it is another.” The reason, is because, “what is eaten is digested, distributed, becomes sinews, flesh, bones, blood, a good complexion, easy breathing. What is stored away you can readily take and show whenever you please, but you get no good from it except in so far as you are reputed to possess it” (Diatr. 2.9.18). In other words, the acquisition of knowledge was meant to change a person’s nature. Epictetus insists that on no occasion should a person call himself a philosopher, nor talk among laymen about their philosophic principles, but rather to do what follows from their principles.
This was a ubiquitous feature of ancient education. Like its Graeco-Roman counterpart, Jewish education progressed through more difficult studies; but rather than moving from the poets to rhetoric, students in Torah school would study the Hebrew Bible, and proceed from written Torah to oral Torah (the latter most likely being exclusively under a rabbi).\textsuperscript{43} The process involved the teacher reading Torah to the student in order for them to memorise it, but the goal was for the student to write it. This meant beginning with short passages written on boards, followed by texts written on scrolls, up to writing out entire books.\textsuperscript{44} For those who had the means, this process culminated with study under a Rabbi; depending on their fame, this could bring with it increased social status.\textsuperscript{45} Again, like its counterpart, Jewish education was character-forming; it intended to make its possessors better people and thereby able to fulfil God’s purposes for their lives.\textsuperscript{46} Its aim was the perfect application of the law.\textsuperscript{47} The relative success of this can be seen in the comments of Josephus:

\begin{quote}
But, should anyone of our nation be questioned the laws, he would repeat them all more readily than his own name. The result, then, of our thorough grounding in the laws from the first dawn of intelligence is that we have them, as it were, engraven on our souls. A transgressor is a rarity; evasion of punishment by excuses an impossibility. (\textit{C. Ap.} 2.178)\textsuperscript{48}
\end{quote}

We can see a parallel in the teaching of Jesus. He makes a comparison between the person who does not put his (Jesus’) teachings into practice and a building that has poor foundations.\textsuperscript{49} When trouble comes, this person, like the structure, is ultimately destroyed. In other words, the goal of all training and education was changing the student’s character and

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{43} Birger Gerhardsson, \textit{Memory and Manuscript: Oral Tradition and Written Transmission in Rabbinic Judaism and Early Christianity} (Lund, Denmark: C.W.K. Gleerup, 1961), 56–57. Gerhardsson notes that at the beginning of the Christian era there were two types of Torah school in Judaism. In the first, the student was given elementary instruction in the written Torah; in the other, a more advanced study in in written and oral (57). Cf. Catherine Hezser, \textit{Jewish Literacy in Roman Palestine}, (TSAJ 81; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2001), 68–69.
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{44} Gerhardsson, \textit{Memory and Manuscript}, 67. Like its Greek counterpart, the primary stage would consist of alphabet learning as well as certain set portions of Torah and prayers; beyond this, the content would vary depending on the teachers’ qualifications and expertise, parents’ wishes, and the child’s learning capacity. See Hezser, \textit{Jewish Literacy in Roman Palestine}, 74. It also involved the tracing of letters followed by learning syllables and progressing to entire sentences (84–86).
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{45} Hezser, \textit{Jewish Literacy in Roman Palestine}, 95. This would involve further study and discussion of Torah. It might also include some rhetorical training for the purposes of synagogue teaching, though nothing like its Graeco-Roman counterpart. See Hengel, \textit{The Pre-Christian Paul}, 58–59.
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{46} G. H. Blackburn, “The Aims of Education in Ancient Israel,” \textit{JCE} 9, no. 1 (1966): 55. Blackburn outlines four main features of Jewish education: it was first and foremost religious education; its focal point was the study of Torah; it was focussed on moral values and character development; it embraced the whole of life (54–55).
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{48} Similarly, Philo (\textit{Legat.} 210) states that “Holding that the laws are oracles vouchsafed by God and having been trained in this doctrine from their earliest years, they carry the likenesses of the commandments enshrined on their souls.”
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{49} Matt 7:26–27; Luke 6:49.
\end{quote}
moving them towards maturity and virtue. But not every student was willing to go through this.

8.2.2 Failure to Progress

In one of the earliest known examples of the progymnasmata (ca. first century C.E.), Theon complains about the students of his day rushing through their studies in order to become orators. In the old days, he says, rhetoricians, particularly those who became famous, would not consider coming to rhetoric before at least grasping philosophy to some extent and being filled with its greatness. Now however, students rush into public speaking without even getting the knowledge of general studies, and worst of all, “proceed to debate judicial and deliberative hypothesis without having practiced in the proper way.”\(^{50}\) We saw in chapter 6 (cf. 6.1.3) a similar critique by Lucian of the practice whereby students were taking the easiest path possible to become orators. Philo complains that some of those who attended lectures, though they were in attendance, had their minds elsewhere: some on marine and mercantile affairs, others on rents and agriculture, some on public honours and affairs of state. These ones, he complains, were present with their bodies only, more concerned with a career than being transformed through virtue.\(^{51}\) Again, he is also critical of students who receive knowledge and are made pregnant (with the potential of the knowledge), but since it is not accompanied by wisdom, they either miscarry, or become a quarrelling sophist. These kinds of people, with boastful speech, ascribe the birth to themselves.\(^{52}\)

According to Epictetus, some would resort to the philosophers merely because they wanted to pick up pieces of information in order to make a display at a banquet of their knowledge.\(^{53}\) Elsewhere he discusses the state of students who are unwilling, or, through lack of discernment, unable to acknowledge their own faults; these are students who are ignorant

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\(^{50}\) Kennedy, *Progymnasmata*, 3. Petronius (Sat. 4) has the same criticism towards parents who, he says, “consecrate even their young hopefuls, like everything else, to ambition. Then if they are in a hurry for the fulfilment of their vows, they drive the unripe schoolboy into the law courts, and thrust eloquence, the noblest of callings, upon children who are still struggling into the world.”

\(^{51}\) Philo, *Congr.* 65–66. Dio (Or. 24.1–2) tells a similar story: “The majority of men have not as a rule concerned themselves at all with the question of what kind of men they ought to be, nor of what is ideally man’s best good, to the attainment of which he should direct all his other activities; but, each in accordance with his taste, they have devoted themselves, some to horsemanship, some to military commands, some to athletic competitions, others to music, or farming, or expertise in oratory ... yet the good and prudent man, one who can answer the all-important question, ‘what man is he who is virtuous and intelligent?’ cannot be found among them all.”

\(^{52}\) Philo, *Congr.* 129–130.

of, or unwilling to admit, things of themselves that are disgraceful. He says of students such as this who sit in his class

You come to me with a solemn air, like a philosopher, and you take your seat and judge how I have explained some word, and how I have babbled whatever came into my head. You come full of envy, and humbled, because nothing is being sent to you from home; and you sit during the discussion thinking of nothing else than how you stand with your father or your brother. ‘What are they saying about me at home? At this moment they think that I am improving, and are saying, “He will return with all knowledge.” ’ I wish I could learn everything before I return: but much labour is necessary and no one sends me anything, and the baths at Nicopolis are dirty, and my lodgings are bad, and the school here is bad.’ (Diatr. 2.21.11–14)

Such people, he says, come to school wanting to be able to speak fluently of philosophic principles, but since they are not willing to come and lay aside their judgements in order to take up new ones, become merely idle babblers. For them, he says, school is ultimately of no value. 54

It comes as no surprise that youthful arrogance was also a problem. Pliny says in regard to many of the young men of his day, “few will yield to age or authority as being their superior; they are born with knowledge and understanding of everything; they show neither respect nor desire to imitate, and set their own standards” (Ep. 8.23.3). It was also not uncommon for students to deem their progress to have surpassed their instructors. Neilus, a student of rhetoric in Alexandria, writes to his father saying that he has been unable to find a reputable sophist to study under since the two he had hoped for were no longer in town. 55 All that is left, he says, are trash “in whose hands most pupils have taken the straight road to having their talent spoiled.” His friends are also in the same predicament, “for they too, have been searching till now for a more stylish teacher, since the tutor whose classes they used to attend has died.” They have offered Neilus an alternative, a teacher named Didymus, to which Neilus responds, “I for my part, since I would vow never to see Didymus even from afar, if I

54 He says in another place to a student who is sick and desires to return home, “I suppose you were free from sickness at home? Do you not ask whether you are doing anything here that would have a bearing on your moral purpose so that it might be improved? For if you are not accomplishing anything here, it is better that you never came in the first place” (Diatr. 3.5.2–3). Similarly, Plutarch (Virt. prof. 78F) says, “Some of these beginners, like birds, are led by their flightiness and ambition to alight on the resplendent heights of the Natural Sciences; while others go in for the disputations, knotty problems, and quibbles; but the majority enter a course in Logic and Argumentation, where they straightway stock themselves up for the practice of sophistry.” Seneca refers to “squatters,” people who regard the philosopher’s lecture room “merely as a sort of lounging-place for their leisure.” He says that “they do not set about to lay aside any faults there, or to receive a rule of life, by which they may test their characters; they merely wish to enjoy to the full the delights of the ear.” He says, moreover, that some arrive “even with notebooks, not to take down the matter, but only the words, that they may presently repeat them to others with as little profit to these as they themselves received when they heard them” (Ep. 108.3–7).

55 P.Oxy, 2190. I have used the translation of this letter found in John Rea, “A Student’s Letter to His Father: P. Oxy. XVIII 2190 Revised,” ZPE 99 (1993): 75–88. For other discussion of the letter, see Cribiore, Writing, Teachers, and Students in Graeco-Roman Egypt, 16; Elliott and Reasoner, Documents and Images for the Study of Paul, 23–25.
found teachers worthy of the name, am depressed by the very fact that this person, who used to be a teacher in the country, has made up his mind to enter into competition with the others.” He concludes that there is no good to be gained from a teacher, unless it is paying exorbitant fees to no purpose. Instead, he decides to depend on his own efforts, noting that he has Didymus if need be, and alternatively, he can listen to the rhetoricians declaiming; this, he figures, if it be the gods’ will, shall cause him to do well.56

8.2.3 Summary

From this we see several important aspects of education: first, it was understood as a process of development from immaturity to perfection; second, it involved increasingly difficult lessons that a student must progress through; third, its aim was to produce elite virtue, character, and behaviour. However, not every student was willing to change and in fact some became arrogant, feeling they had surpassed their teachers. These various aspects of education seem to be at work in Corinth, particularly in regard to the Corinthians’ own perceived progress and “maturity.”

8.3 Divisions and Childishness

I have been arguing throughout this thesis that in many ways, the church resembled an ancient school that taught Christian παιδεία. However, unlike the exclusively elite nature of Graeco-Roman παιδεία, for Paul, Christian παιδεία was available to anyone, irrespective of wealth, birth, and status (1 Cor 1:26–27). In Luke 11:52, Jesus expresses his concern that everyone has the opportunity to learn: “Woe to you lawyers, for you have taken away the key to knowledge (γνῶσις). You did not enter yourselves, and you have hindered those who were entering.” For Paul, there was always an underlying intellectual character to his ministry that was concerned with sharing the “key of γνῶσις” with everyone.57 In fact, it was this

56 Similarly, Philostratus (Vit. soph. 540) tells of a student named Varus who had been so spoiled by parasites (i.e., so-called friends who live on the student’s kindness and flatter him that he’s better than he really is) that he had convinced himself that he was the fairest of the fair, tallest of the tall, most expert of the youths in the wrestling grounds and not even the muses could strike up a prelude more sweetly than he when he sang. Moreover, he believed himself to be able to outstrip any sophist whenever he declaimed; so much so, that whenever people borrowed money from him, they would reckon attendance at his lectures a part of the interest. 57 We have already seen the comments of Judge: “The object of (Paul’s) missions underlines the intellectual character of Paul’s activity. He is always anxious about the transmission of the logos and the acquisition of true gnosis … The Christian faith, therefore, as Paul expounds it, belongs to the doctrines of the philosophical schools rather than with the esoteric rituals of the mystery religions. Another feature that marks
openness to all that brought early Christians under ridicule from Celsus in the late second century:

In private houses we see wool workers cobblers, laundry-workers, and the most illiterate and bucolic yokels, who would not dare say anything at all in front of their elders and more intelligent masters ... (children, they say) should leave father and their schoolmasters, and go along with the women and the little children who are their playfellows to the wool-dresser’s shop, or to the cobbler’s or the washwoman’s shop, that they may learn perfection. And by saying this, they persuade them. (Origen, Cels. 3.55)

Paul says to the Corinthians that all of them (irrespective of status) have been made rich in the same γνώσις and λόγος (1:5). The problem, however, is that some of the elite members have considered inspired speech (i.e., glossolalia, and to a lesser extent prophecy) to be a mark of elite status, thus defining a boundary between the elite and non-elite members of the community.

Moreover, according to our authors, it was not enough to simply attend a lecture; a student must also be changed by it. Paul sees (if only figuratively) the same goal for Christian παιδεία: transformation through a renewing of their minds and moulding lives that no longer conform to this world’s standards (Rom 12:1–2). But, like their non-Christian contemporaries, some of the Corinthians were not willing to undergo this transformation in the way Paul intended. In fact, for Paul, many of the situations in the Christian community at Corinth are indicative of an unchanged life and a failure to respond to the message.

Overall, παιδεία was seen as a difficult climb towards wisdom and maturity that only a few ever accomplished. The end result of this process was an elite citizen, one who was fit to lead their community and, as we have seen above, was an object of admiration and even

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Paul’s teaching as philosophical rather than religious is its concentration upon ethics” (Judge, “The Early Christians as a Scholastic Community,” 551).


59 Christopher Forbes, Prophecy and Inspired Speech: In Early Christianity and its Hellenistic Environment (Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 1997), 173–174. “The Corinthians learned of glossolalia, and learned to practise it from Paul himself ... But from the beginning the Corinthians learned of glossolalia as a habit of the great leaders of the Christian movement ... Glossolalia, and perhaps to a lesser extent prophecy (both practices related to direct communion with God, authoritative revelation and the great figures of the early days of both Christianity itself and their own congregational life), easily suggested themselves as the marks of a spiritual elite. They became, in the minds of the elitists, decisive evidence of the work of το πνευμα το άγιον in the truly mature Christian ... the self proclaimed πνευματικοι/τελιοι made glossolalia a mark of elite status.” Similarly, Garland, 1 Corinthians, 661–663.

60 Their continuation of former practices is most clearly seen with the incestuous believer (5:1–13), the practice of lawsuits (6:1–11), visiting prostitutes (6:12–20), and the divisions at communion (11:17–34). Paul’s response to these issues seems to reflect a teacher frustrated with students who do not seem to be learning: “Cleanse out the old leaven that you may be a new lump” (5:7); “And such were some of you. But you were washed, you were sanctified, you were justified...” (6:11); “Do you not know?” (6:15, 16, 19) “What! Do you not have houses to eat and drink in? Or do you despise the church of God and humiliate those who have nothing? What shall I say to you? Shall I commend you? No, I will not!” (11:22)
worship. For the few who made this difficult climb, the sense of superiority, and even the potential for hubris, was inevitable.

This appears to be the attitude that is at work in some of the Corinthians, who have deemed themselves to be τέλειοι (1 Cor 2:6) and have boasted about their progress in that they are full, rich, and reigning as kings (1 Cor 4:8). Worse still, they have considered their progress to exceed the abilities of Paul. In fact, on account of what they saw of him by contrast to Apollos, they have branded him with the most derogatory label of μωρός. Later on in the relationship, they even categorise him as ἰδιώτης τῷ λόγῳ (2 Cor 11:6); that is, uneducated or a layperson in rhetoric. Parallel to this accusation, they deem his personal presence as a speaker to be weak (ἁσκηνός, cf. 1 Cor 2:3) and his speech contemptible (2 Cor 10:10). Paul has effectively been characterised in terms of one who is uneducated. The stigma attached to such a criticism was significant, given that an uneducated person was typically considered one of three things: deprived, dangerously un-socialised, or intellectually defective. This is the concern that Paul must now address.

8.3.1 1 Corinthians 2:6, 13–15

In 1 Corinthians 2:6, Paul responds to the accusations of inferiority by pointing out that he does speak wisdom among the mature (ἐν τοῖς τελείοις), but not the wisdom of this age or its rulers. Here he states that he is in fact a teacher of wisdom, however, it is the wisdom of God that is only understood amongst God’s people (cf. 1 Cor 2:13). The wisdom Paul

61 Welborn, An End to Enmity, 415. “The label μωρός is so potently derogatory that it is unimaginable that the term originated with Paul himself, even if Paul proved capable of appropriating the term in a dialectical sense in the course of his argument (1 Cor 3:18; 4:10). We must conclude that the label μωρός was applied to Paul by certain members of the Christian community at Corinth to describe the impression that Paul made upon them.”

62 Following the BDAG rendering: “A person who is unskilled or inexperienced in some activity or field of knowledge, i.e., layperson, amateur” (468). As a reference to Paul’s rhetorical abilities, see Winter, Philo and Paul among the Sophists, 224–228; Margaret Thrall, 2 Corinthians 8-13, (ICC; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2000), 677–678; Ralph P. Martin, 2 Corinthians, (WBC 4; Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 1985), 342. In the early Empire, such an accusation carried particular force: Whitmarsh (Greek Literature and the Roman Empire, 5) states that “In Roman Greece, elite Greeks defined their superiority in terms of education … they were the pepaideumenoi, the ‘educated’ as opposed to both the idiōtai (i.e., the sub-elite) within the Greek culture and the barbaroi (‘barbarians’) without.”

63 Winter, Philo and Paul among the Sophists, 227. “The critique of Paul’s opponents in 10:10 and 11:6 is consistent with autobiographical details found in 1 Corinthians 2:3, namely that his visit to Corinth was marked with fear, trembling, and much weakness. He suffered from a presentation style which fell short of the quality expected of a public orator or sophist who aimed to persuade a first-century Corinthian audience. This attracted his opponents’ attention because it was an irreparable deficiency.” Cf. Welborn, An End to Enmity, 114–115.

64 Morgan, Literate Education in the Hellenistic and Roman Worlds, 257.

65 It is important to note at this point that this does not refer to some form of esoteric wisdom that Paul withheld from the Corinthians on his first visit that is only understandable by a “higher class” of Christians. Such a statement would only cause further confusion in a Christian community already dividing over this issue.
speaks is the unchanging foolish message of the cross that he preached from day one (cf. 1 Cor 15:1–11). This is made clear in 1 Cor 1:30 where Christ, it is said, was made wisdom for us. Moreover, it is the wisdom of the cross as it is applied to everyday life.

Several points have already been made in regard to these τέλειοι in previous chapters. I have already suggested that the elite Corinthians have appropriated this label to themselves in reference to their perceived status as Christians (cf. 7.3.1). There I argued that Paul is taking up their language saying, “we do speak a certain wisdom amongst the (as you call them) ‘mature,’ but our wisdom is one that cannot be understood by reference to this world’s wisdom.” I have also argued that the elite members have (wrongly) made these assumptions based on Stoic categories (cf. 5.3). Additionally, I have argued that, according to Paul, the truly mature ones are those who are in Christ, that is, the πνευματικοί (cf. 7.5.1–2). These are the students of Christian παιδεία, people who walk according the Spirit of God and who outwork the characteristics of the Spirit in their life. By switching terms in this passage, Paul is able redefine what it means to be mature; in other words, having a different term (πνευματικός) prevents any confusion with the current definitions of maturity in Corinth associated with the term τέλειος.

Like the life of the student of παιδεία, the life of the πνευματικός is one that is marked by constant transformation. But, unlike the students of Graeco-Roman παιδεία, this growth and transformation does not require deeper, more esoteric levels of teaching—the message of the cross is sufficient for all levels of growth—but rather a continual reliance on the power of the message (cf. Rom 1:16–17).

Contra Polhill, “The Wisdom of God and Factionalism,” 331; Conzelmann, First Corinthians, 60; Hering, The First Epistle of Saint Paul to the Corinthians, 15. Against this line of argument, Schnabel is correct to note that “Diese Interpretation ist letztlich gezwungen, die Verkündigung vom Kreuz, die Paulus in 1,18 als „Macht Gottes“ bezeichnet hatte, als „Milche“ (3,2) zu verstehen, die reifere Christen nicht mehr brauchen” (Schnabel, Der erste Brief des Paulus an die Korinther, 163; similarly, William F. Orr and James Arthur Walther, I Corinthians, [AB; New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976], 163).


67 Cf. Klaiber, Der erste Korintherbrief, 41.

68 Ciampa and Rosner, The First Letter to the Corinthians, 123.

69 See discussion above at 7.3.1, esp. fn. 47; see also 7.5.1–2 for my discussion of the origin of this term and Paul’s usage of it in this passage.

70 Grindheim, “Wisdom for the Perfect,” 708–709. “One becomes perfect in the same way as one becomes a Christian: by accepting the word of the cross in faith, which amounts to a reversal of the world’s values. To be spiritual, then, is to have apprehended the word of the cross in such a way that it has transformed the entire existence of the believer into its image—to a cruciform life, a life characterised by self-sacrificing love, and where power is manifest through weakness.”
In 1 Corinthians 3:1, Paul then takes up and builds on the idea introduced in 2:6. There, he states that “we do speak (λαλέω) wisdom among the τέλειοι;” but now in 3:1 he makes it clear that he was unable to speak (λαλέω) to them as πνευματικοί. Instead, he can only speak to them as σάρκινοι, mere infants in Christ.

In the previous comparison (2:13–15), Paul has distinguished between those in Christ and those outside with the contrasting terms οἱ πνευματικοί/οἱ ψυχικοί. But in order to distinguish the immature Christians from ones who are mature, he now employs the term οἱ σάρκινοι. In other words, there are those who are mature in Christ (οἱ πνευματικοί) and those who he is unwilling to call spiritual/mature in Christ (οἱ σάρκινοι). He points out in 3:3, that as long as there is jealousy and quarrelling in the Christian community over teachers, this is still the case; they are not πνευματικοί, but rather σάρκινοι. For Paul, the divisions in the Christian community are clear indications of this spiritual immaturity. 71 Truly πνευματικοί Christians, as indicated in Gal 5:25–26, are distinguished by humility and consideration for one another; hence, division and rivalry can only be equated with human, earthly failing. 72

Paul then further defines these σάρκινοι with the very pejorative term νήπιοι (childish). 73 For Paul, the term νήπιος means generally “unskilled” or “untutored;” that is, the opposite of having a mature understanding of the faith. 74 This is fitting in our context. Paul sees in these Corinthians behaviour that reflects beginners in the faith; infants still clinging to old habits and not ready to let go of immature ways. Having made it clear that their present behaviour is not a mark of truly mature Christians, Paul now turns to his own role as a teacher, and, most importantly, their ongoing need of him.

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71 As Winter (Philo and Paul among the Sophists, 175) argues, “the essence of the charge levelled against the Corinthians is that they behave in a secular fashion, that is, they measure their instructors by the same canon as do the secular Corinthians.”

72 Cf. Moffatt, The First Epistle of Paul to the Corinthians, 36–37; Mitchell, Paul and the Rhetoric of Reconciliation, 211.

73 Fee (The First Epistle to the Corinthians, 125) notes that Paul’s use of the term νήπιος (typically translated “mere infants”) should be taken in the pejorative sense. He suggests that when Paul makes reference to children in a positive way (such as in reference to the relationship his church has to him as an apostle, cf. 1 Cor 4:14), he employs the term τέκνοι; but in this case, the Corinthians have considered themselves adults, but in Paul’s mind, adults of the wrong kind, hence, “mere infants.”

74 J. Francis, “‘As Babes in Christ’ - Some Proposals Regarding 1 Corinthians 3.1-3,” JSNT 2, no. 7 (1980): 44.
8.4 Metaphor 1: Paul the Nursing Mother (1 Cor 3:2)

In 1 Corinthians 3:2, we find the first of six metaphors, where Paul presents himself as a nursing mother. In this metaphor, he rejects the Corinthians’ claims to maturity with the sobering accusation that not only are they not ready for solid food, they are still only capable of receiving milk. This type of imagery was frequently used in the context of παιδεία. Quintilian says that the young (or for that matter, any age) should strive with all their hearts and devote all their efforts to the pursuit of virtue, eloquence, and perfection. He sees the gradual levels of study as being much the same as a child who is gradually able to handle increasingly more solid food. “I have no objection to a little exuberance in the young learner. Nay, I would urge teachers too like nurses to be careful to provide softer food for still undeveloped minds and to suffer them to take their fill of the milk of the more attractive studies. For the time being the body may be somewhat plump, but maturer years will reduce it to a sparer habit” (Inst. 2.4.1).

Epictetus uses this analogy in the context of education, specifically in regards to the maturing of our judgements. He says that it is not the things themselves that disturb men, but their judgements about them. He insists that when we are hindered, or disturbed, or grieved, we should not blame anyone but ourselves, in other words, our own judgements. According to him, it is the part of an uneducated person “to blame others where he himself fares ill; to blame himself is the part of one whose education has begun; to blame neither another nor his own self is the part of one whose education is already complete” (Enc. 5). He encourages his listeners

Are you not willing, at this late date, like children, to be weaned and to partake of more solid food, and not to cry for mammies and nurses, old wives’ lamentations? ‘But if I leave, I shall cause those women sorrow?’ You cause them sorrow? Not at all, but it will be the same thing that causes sorrow to you yourself, bad judgement. What, then, can you do? Get rid of that

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75 On two other occasions, Paul places himself in a maternal role (cf. 1 Thess 2:7; Gal 4:19); he also uses imagery of giving birth (1 Thess 5:3; Rom 8:22). For helpful discussion of Paul’s maternal imagery, see Beverly Roberts Gaventa, *Our mother Saint Paul* (Louisville, Ky: Westminster John Knox, 2007). In regard to 1 Cor 3:2, she comments that Paul is “metaphorizing the metaphor.” “First, he metaphorizes the gospel as milk, then he ‘squares’ that image by metaphorizing himself as the mother whose body supplies the milk” (5). In regard to Paul’s usage of maternal imagery, she notes that “maternal imagery appears in contexts referring to the ongoing nature of the relationship between Paul and the congregations he founded; paternal imagery, by contrast, regularly refers to the initial stage of Christian preaching and conversion” (6).

76 Dutch also makes the connection between these references and 1 Cor 3:2 (Dutch, *The Educated Elite in 1 Corinthians*, 248–254; similarly, Schnabel, *Der erste Brief des Paulus an die Korinther*, 186; Weiss, *Der erste Korintherbrief*, 72; Conzelmann, *First Corinthians*, 71; Collins, *First Corinthians*, 143).


78 He argues that the passing years will “skim off much of the froth, reason will file away many excrescences, and something too will be removed by what I may perhaps call the wear and tear of life” (Inst. 2.4.7).
judgement, and, if they do well, they will themselves get rid of their judgement; otherwise, they will come to grief and have only themselves to thank for it. *(Diatr. 2.16.40)*

Philo uses a similar idea in discussing the progress a student takes from the study under the grammarian to the school of the philosopher. “Observe too that our body is not nourished in the earlier stages with solid and costly foods. The simple and milky foods of infancy come first. Just so you may consider that the school subjects and the lore which belongs to each of them stand ready to nourish the childhood of the soul, while the virtues are grown-up food, suited for those who are really men” *(Congr. 19).*

8.4.1 Appropriation of the Metaphor

In all of these examples, the metaphor takes its usage and meaning from ancient education. Here, it refers to a type of training and development that is dependent on increasingly deeper teaching. The use of this language elsewhere in the NT, particularly in Hebrews 5:12–14 (and to a lesser extent in 1 Pet 2:2), would also suggest a similar meaning here. The difficulty is that this is exactly the problem in Corinth. Paul is attempting to rebuke such striving for deeper wisdom through better teachers; for him to then claim that he himself is capable of this would just be a tit-for-tat game.

His intention throughout this passage is to reject all such behaviour: “As long as there are arguments and jealousies amongst you about which teacher has the better wisdom, you are behaving like mere infants, and as such, must be treated as mere infants.”

I suggest then, that in the metaphor of 1 Cor 3:2, Paul adopts familiar educational imagery, rich with cultural meaning, but modifies it for his own purposes. In this case, milk

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79 For discussion of this idea in Epictetus, see Long, *Epictetus*, 28.
80 On another occasion he says, “Seeing that for babes milk is food, but for grown men wheaten bread, there must also be soul-nourishment, such as is milk-like suited to the time of the childhood, in the shape of the preliminary stages of school-learning, and such as is adapted to grown men in the shape of instructions leading the way through wisdom and temperance and all virtue” *(Agr. 9).* See also *Prob. 160; Migr. 29; Somn. 2.10.*
81 Cf. Collins, *First Corinthians*, 143. “Philo and Epictetus, along with other ancient authors (e.g., Heb 5:12–13; 1 Pet 2:2), occasionally distinguished milk-drinking infants from meat eating adults. Philo contrasts infants who drink milk with adults who eat wheat bread. Like Philo, Paul distinguishes the mature from infants. Unlike Philo, Paul does not project two stages of Christian development. Rather, he confronts the Corinthians by reminding them of their need to be nurtured and of his own role in their nurturing.”
82 Fee (The First Epistle to the Corinthians, 125) suggests that in 1 Corinthians 3:2, Paul is simply continuing the argument of the entire passage, just with new imagery. By considering Paul’s teaching “milk”, they show that they are mere infants. Paul’s concern “is not that they ‘progress’ into deeper teaching from the rudimentary, but that they abandon their present ‘childish’ behaviour altogether so that they may appreciate the ‘milk’ for what it is, ‘solid food.’” He concludes that “As milk it is the good news of salvation; as solid food it is understanding that the entire Christian life is predicated on the same reality—and those who have the Spirit should understand the ‘mystery.’ Thus the baby Corinthians do not need a change in diet but a change in perspective.” Similarly, Barrett (The First Epistle to Corinthians, 81) argues that “it differs in form rather than content, as meat and milk are both food, though differently constituted.”
and solid food is not a matter of level of teaching or content, but rather the way he can address and relate to them as infants in the (metaphorical) process of Christian παιδεία. The point is that as long as they behave in such a way, they must be treated as children. In other words, all Christians have the potential to be mature and the same wisdom and content is necessary for all levels of growth. Real growth and maturity, however (i.e., development as a direct work by the Spirit), is demonstrated by their readiness to respond to teaching concerning the implications of the word of the cross for life together. That was something that these “wise” Corinthians were clearly failing to do.

In the immediate context, Paul points out that the divisions demonstrate a lack of spiritual transformation, which is the very goal of the πνευματικός. But in the broader context, Paul wants to draw attention to the fact that, regardless of what they think they need, or in fact actually need, it is from him that they need it. This is the important point. In all of these metaphors, the central concern is Paul’s role in the church, not the Corinthians’ (lack of) progress. Put another way, before Paul can even address their immaturity, he must first remind them why they need to listen to him at all, particularly given their fixation with Apollos.

Conclusion

Παιδεία was the process of developing citizens and rulers. Very few people had the necessary resources to even begin the journey to virtue, and even for those who did, there was still no guarantee that they would have the perseverance to scale its lofty heights. The journey was increasingly difficult and involved ever more challenging instruction. But for the few who made it, the sense of superiority was inevitable.

83 Contra, Robertson and Plummer, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the First Epistle of St Paul to the Corinthians, 52–53.
84 “The contrast between milk and solid food enhances Paul’s metaphorical description of the Corinthians as mere infants. Proclaiming themselves to be fully mature, they are really like infants who can only drink milk, incapable as they are of eating solid food” (Collins, The Power of Images in Paul, 116). Gaventa has also noted the importance of the introductory κόγχα in 1 Cor 3:1. She argues that this is a unique feature of Paul’s use of the imagery by comparison to the other examples noted above. While other writers only acknowledge the student’s need of milk, Paul actually places himself in the role of the mother who will provide it. “Attending to the use of the first person in 3:1–2 alters the way we read this passage. It is no longer about the single issue of what the Corinthians eat; it also concerns the one who feeds them. And the language is unequivocal: Paul is the nursing mother of the church” (45).
85 Cf. Ciampa and Rosner, The First Letter to the Corinthians, 124. Similarly, Francis (“‘As Babes in Christ’ - Some Proposals Regarding 1 Corinthians 3.1-3,” 56) argues that “Paul is not concerned that they have failed to progress in knowledge, indeed it would seem they have gone too far, but had failed to understand the gospel in relation to their life together in the church.”
86 Collins (First Corinthians, 143) rightly draws attention to the focus on Paul’s role in this metaphor.
It is this attitude of superiority that some of the Corinthian Christians have brought to their understanding of the gospel message and its teachers. In other words, their perceived “maturity” and advanced progression has led to a rejection of Paul’s “milk” in favour of Apollos’ heavier “solid food.” In this opening metaphor, Paul bluntly reminds them that this is a false perception, and, if anything, they need him as much now as when they first started. This brings Paul to his next task: to relativise his and Apollos’ roles in relation to God.
CHAPTER 9: PAUL’S ROLE AS A TEACHER

When it came to a child’s upbringing, the importance of the teacher’s role was second only to the parents. For this reason, only the best teachers would do. In choosing between Paul and Apollos as teachers, some of the Corinthians have apparently measured them according to “secular” categories.

In the following chapter, we will (1) explore the various aspects of an ancient teacher, including their social status and roles they were expected to fill. It will then be argued that (2) these same expectations were being put onto Paul and Apollos. Finally, it will be shown that (3) Paul addresses some of these misconceptions with two metaphors: himself and Apollos as farmers, and all teachers as builders.

9.1 Teachers in Antiquity

To study under the most eminent teacher conferred status on the pupil; but when it came to selecting a teacher, another aspect was desired. Teachers were considered to be surrogate parents; for this reason, they needed to embody the highest virtues, as it was their task to mould the boy’s character. In fact, such was the importance of the teacher’s role, that the relationship between them and the pupil could be one of great affection and loyalty.

9.1.1 Teachers and their social positions

Teachers could come from a variety of backgrounds. Primary teachers at the lower levels of study were very often poor and were commonly slaves;¹ however, those at the higher levels of philosophy and rhetoric (with a few exceptions) came from wealth and held prominent

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¹ These teachers of elementary studies were typically low status and to be called a school teacher or the son of a school teacher was a common insult. See Cribiore, Gymnastics of the Mind: Greek Education in Hellenistic and Roman Egypt, 59. For discussion of their circumstances, see e.g., Stanley F. Bonner, “The Street-Teacher: An Educational Scene in Horace,” The AJP 93, no. 4 (1972): 509–528.
positions in the community. We saw in chapters 5–7 that orators and sophists (who were often teachers) were very often wealthy and famous; moreover, the high value placed on rhetorical proficiency in public life meant that the best teachers would be in the highest demand.

Changes also took place during our period whereby the status of free-born teachers rose and the éclat of their discipline rose, until by Flavian times they were exempt from taxation. In fact, such value was placed on rhetorical training, that in the late first century, Vespasian established a chair of rhetoric with an annual salary in Rome, with Quintilian being its first holder. This prestige and high status seems to have also been the case for philosophers. Philosophers in the Empire were given increasing status and honour, both in social privileges and in inscriptions and statues. We see this illustrated in the epistles attributed to Ps.-Socrates, who is critical of a trend amongst philosophers to think it is the advantage of the wise man to acquire large amounts of money and to have powerful friends. Prominent figures such as Plutarch, Seneca, and Dio would certainly indicate the sort of heights a philosopher could attain. As Cribiore notes, “undoubtedly grammarians and rhetors [we might add to this philosophers] had claims to higher status than that of teachers of mere letters.” For this reason, the most important relationship a student could form was with their professor, particularly when the teacher was a well-known rhetorician or philosopher.

9.1.1.1 Suetonius’ History of Teachers

Suetonius’ history of Roman grammarians and rhetoricians is very insightful as to the various backgrounds and social positions of the more prominent of these teachers. Of the twenty-eight

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2 However, as Cribiore (Gymnastics of the Mind: Greek Education in Hellenistic and Roman Egypt, 61) points out, the inconsistencies in our sources makes it difficult to form a single, coherent picture of the economic situation of teachers.

3 Morgan (Literate Education in the Hellenistic and Roman Worlds, 88) rightly points out that teachers of rhetoric and philosophy pursued a much wider range of activities, including legal careers, politics, and all kinds of writings.


5 Suetonius (Vesp. 18) tells us that Vespasian was a great encourager of learning and the liberal arts, and it was he who first granted to the Latin and Greek professors of rhetoric the yearly stipend of a hundred thousand sesterces, the first recipient being Quintilian. However, it has been suggested that his intentions in patronising the arts was far more political. Having taken control of the Empire in dire straits, his intention was to raise up qualified administrators to aid in the long term task of restoring the economic and political situation on his hands. See M. St. A. Woodside, “Vespasian’s Patronage of Education and the Arts,” TAPA 73 (1942): 123–129.

6 Trapp, Philosophy in the Roman Empire, 246–247. See also my discussion above in 3.1.1.4 and 3.1.3.

7 Socrates, Epistle 8.

8 Cribiore, Gymnastics of the Mind: Greek Education in Hellenistic and Roman Egypt, 61.

9 Watts, City and School in Late Antique Athens and Alexandria, 11.
grammarians he lists, two are of equestrian rank; thirteen, it must be assumed are free born; and thirteen are freedmen. Of the five rhetoricians he lists, four are freeborn (one in fact being an aedile) and one is a freedman. The grammarian, Lucius Appuleius, was employed by a wealthy Roman knight named Eficius Calvinus for 400,000 sesterces to teach in Osca. Marcus Verrius Flaccus, a grammarian and a freedman, was employed by Augustus to teach his grandchildren and was moved into the palace with his entire class; he was paid 100,000 sesterces annually on the condition that he did not take on any more students. This indicates some of the potential even grammarians had for earning. Others in Suetonius’ list, however, were extremely poor, though still famous. Marcus Pompilius Andronicus, a grammarian and a devoted Epicurean, was not well received in Rome due to his devotion to this philosophy, thus he moved to Cumae where he was so poor he was forced to sell his works for 16,000 sesterces to a man who later published them himself. Lucius Orbilius Pupillus, another grammarian, came to Rome when he was fifty to teach, and, it is said, he gave instruction with greater renown than profit.

Others still, from very humble beginnings, went on to become extremely successful in their fields. Quintus Remmius Palaemon, a freedman, received his education by accompanying his master’s son to school. Having been set free, he rose to hold the leading rank amongst the grammarians in spite of being notorious for his vices; in fact so bad were they, that Tiberius and Claudius both declared that there was no-one less fitted to be trusted with a boy’s education. Yet still, he received 400,000 sesterces annually from his school and the same again from his properties. Amongst Suetonius’ rhetoricians we see similar rags to riches stories. Manius Otacilius Pitholaus is said to have been a slave who served as a doorkeeper in chains, but was set free because of his talent with letters and began to help his patron prepare his accusations. He then became a teacher of rhetoric, having as one of his

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10 Suetonius seems to make a point of highlighting their ranks, but for these ten, nothing is said (with the exception being Marcus Antonius Gnipho [Gramm. 7] who it is said was born to free parents but was disowned; similarly Gaius Melissus [21]); thus, I assume, these are free born.
11 Suetonius, Gramm. 3.
12 Suetonius, Gramm. 17.
13 For helpful discussion of the grammarian, see Christian Laes, Children in the Roman Empire: Outsiders Within (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 132–137. He suggests that although the average grammarian was from a family of respectable class, they were still treated with disdain by the elite. However, they typically owned some property and were exempt from certain municipal obligations, which enabled them to reach levels of wealth the majority could only dream of (133).
14 Suetonius, Gramm. 8.
15 Suetonius, Gramm. 9.
16 Suetonius, Gramm. 2.
students Gnaeus Pompeius, son of Pompey the Great; he was the first freedman to write history and wrote about Pompeius and his father.\textsuperscript{17}

We have seen throughout this thesis that teachers were charged with the duty of training elite boys into leading citizens. In the case of teachers of higher studies, they too often ranked among these circles, and being associated with the best of these would confer on the student higher status as a result. The prominence of orators and philosophers in Roman Corinth (see sections 5.2 and 6.2) would certainly have been a determining factor in the Corinthians’ status perception of their teachers. But a second feature of the teachers’ role is also important to note, that is, the relationship shared between master and pupil.

\textit{9.1.2 Teachers as Parents}

Throughout the period of a child’s education, they would study with various instructors ranging from the primary teacher (\textit{διδάσκαλος})\textsuperscript{18} through to the grammarian and up to the orator or philosopher. These instructors were seen to be far more than just masters who imparted knowledge and skills; they were considered to be surrogate parents charged with the duty of moral formation.\textsuperscript{19} Quintilian sees the teacher’s role as that of a mother bird who distributes the food that they have collected in their bills among their weak and helpless nestlings. Once they are fledged, they then teach their young to leave the nest and fly round about it, themselves leading the way.\textsuperscript{20} Quintilian insists that the teacher must be able to govern the behaviour of his pupils by the strictness of his discipline; to this end, “he should adopt a parental attitude to his pupils, and regard himself as the representative of those who have committed their children to his charge” (\textit{Inst.} 2.2.8).\textsuperscript{21} In fact, so caring was the teacher’s role that there were often strong bonds formed between a pupil and their first teacher that

\textsuperscript{17} Suetonius, \textit{De Rhet.} 3. Pliny also speaks of his own freedman Zosimus, who he says was renowned for his comedy, acting, eloquence, and musical ability (\textit{Ep.} 5.19.1–3).

\textsuperscript{18} For definitions of terms for the various types of teachers, see Morgan, \textit{Literate Education in the Hellenistic and Roman Worlds}, 17–18.


\textsuperscript{20} Quintilian, \textit{Inst.} 2.6.7.

\textsuperscript{21} Quintilian himself is given the title “supreme ruler over our unsteady youth” and “glory of the Roman toga” by Martial (\textit{Epi.} 2.90). If an instructor failed in their responsibility, it could result in severe punishment; Suetonius tells us that Augustus had found out that the tutor and other attendants of his son Gaius had somehow taken advantage of his sickness and death to commit acts of arrogance and greed in the province he governed; in response, he tied heavy weights about their necks, and had them thrown into a river (Suetonius, \textit{Aug.} 67.2).
would mature into long-lasting friendships. A letter from Seneca to Lucilius gives a wonderful example of the affection a teacher could feel for a student

I grow in spirit and leap for joy and shake off my years and my blood runs warm again, whenever I understand, from your actions and your letters, how far you have outdone yourself; for as to the ordinary man, you left him in the rear long ago. If the farmer is pleased when his tree develops so that it bears fruit, if the shepherd takes pleasure in the increase of his flocks, if every man regards his pupil as though he discerned in him his own early manhood, what, then, do you think are the feelings of those who have trained a mind and moulded a young idea, when they see it suddenly grown to maturity? I claim you for myself; you are my handiwork, when I saw your abilities, I laid my hand upon you, and I exhorted you, I applied the goad and did not permit you to march lazily, but roused you continually. And now I do the same; but by this time I am cheering on one who is in the race and so in turn cheers me on. (Ep. 34.1–2)

Since the role and the authority of the teacher was seen as an extension of the parents’ (particularly the father’s), the father was thus responsible to seek out the very best teacher possible for his son(s). This could involve sending their boys to live in cities like Athens or Alexandria in order to place their sons with such men.

9.1.3 Searching for Teachers

In seeking out these instructors, Quintilian insists that the parents’ first task is to enquire whether the teacher is of good character. Since boys were on the verge of manhood when transferred to the teacher of rhetoric, and continued with him even when they are young men, he says that the parents must spare no effort to ensure that the purity of the teacher’s character should preserve those of tender years from corruption, while its authority should keep the bolder spirits from breaking out into licence. The teacher, Quintilian points out, must also be


At times the task of selecting a teacher fell to the pedagogue if they were abroad with the child, as is seen in P.Oxy 930 and 3815; in this case, they would act on behalf of the father. But even upon finding the right teacher, it did not always work out as planned. In a letter from the second or third century C.E., a mother writes to her son Ptolemaeus, somewhat distressed, after finding out that his teacher has left him. She had been very confident in his abilities, and was assured that he would have her son’s best interests in mind, but for unexplained reasons (though likely it was for better employment opportunities) he left, leaving the son and his Pedagogue to seek out a new teacher (930).

John McK. Camp (“The Philosophical Schools of Roman Athens,” in The Greek Renaissance in the Roman Empire: Papers from the Tenth British Museum Classical Colloquium, ed. by Susan Walker, [BICS 55; London: Institute of Classical Studies, 1989], 50) notes that under the Empire, Athens flourished, and by the 2nd century “she was adorned with odeia, gymnasia, libraries, and lecture halls, buildings which accurately reflect Athens’ role as a cultural and educational centre of the Roman world.” For evidence of Alexandria, see P.Oxy. 2190.

Quintilian, Inst. 2.2.1–4.
free from vice and refuse to tolerate it; “strict but not austere, genial but not too familiar; his
discourse must continually turn on what is good and honourable, for the more he admonishes,
the less he will have to punish” (*Inst. 2.2.4*). He must also control his temper without shutting
his eyes to faults requiring correction; he must be ready to answer questions and to put them
unasked to those who sit silent. Furthermore, the teacher should also declaim daily himself,
that his class may take his utterances home with them.26 Likewise, Ps.-Plutarch outlines the
important characteristics that must be sought in the teacher. They must be free from scandal in
their lives, people who are unimpeachable in their manners, and in experience the very best
that may be found. “For to receive a proper education is the source and root of all goodness
(καλοκάγαθος). As husbandmen place stakes beside the young plants, so do competent
teachers with all care set their precepts and exhortations beside the young, in order that their
characters may grow to be upright” (*Lib. ed. 4B–C*). He goes on to paint a grim picture of
what happens when fathers fail to put their sons with the right teacher.27

Pliny is asked to find a teacher for his friend Corellia Hispulla’s son. Until this point,
the boy has been studying under teachers at home, where Pliny says he has had little
opportunity to go astray. But now he is to go further afield and it is of highest importance that
he sits under a good teacher; such a one, Pliny says, should be a Latin rhetorician with a good
reputation for school discipline, for modesty, and above all, for good morals. Moreover, they
needed to find him not only a teacher, but also a guardian who will keep him straight. To this
end, Pliny recommends his friend Julius Genitor, a man of serious character, quite free from
faults and eloquent. Pliny says that his son will hear from him nothing but what will benefit

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26 Quintilian, *Inst. 2.2.6–8*. “For however many models for imitation he may give them from the authors
they are reading, it will still be found that fuller nourishment is provided by the living voice, more especially
when it proceeds from the teacher himself.” Suetonius (*Gramm. 4*) recounts how his own master used to declaim
and engage in discussion on alternate days, sometimes instructing in the morning and removing his desk to
declain in the afternoon.

27 “Nowadays there are some fathers who deserve utter contempt, who, before examining those who are
going to teach, either because of ignorance, or sometimes because of inexperience, hand over their children to
untired and untrustworthy men … What is this?… Some yield to the flatteries of those who would please them,
and there are those who do it as a favour to insistent friends … Heaven help us! Does a man who bears the name
of father think more of gratifying those who ask favours than he thinks of the education of his children?… Many
fathers, however, go so far in their devotion to money as well as in animosity toward their children, that in order
to avoid paying a larger fee, they select as teachers for their children men who are not worth any wage at all …
Now I will tell what happens to these admirable fathers when they have badly brought up and badly educated
their sons. When their sons are enrolled in the ranks of men, and disdain the sane and orderly life, and throw
themselves headlong into disorderly and slavish pleasures, then, when it is of no use, the fathers regret that they
have been false to their duty in the education of their sons, being now distressed at their wrongdoing. For some
of them take up with flatterers and parasites, abominable men of obscure origin, corrupters and spoilers of youth,
and others buy the freedom of courtesans and prostitutes, proud and sumptuous in expense; still others give
themselves up to the pleasures of the table, while others come to wreck in dice and revels, and some finally take
to the wilder forms of evildoing, such as adultery and bacchanalian routs, ready to pay with life itself for a single
pleasure” (*Lib. Ed. 4C–5D*).
him, nor anything that would have been better left unknown. But most importantly, he will learn right principles of conduct before he studies eloquence.  

The bonds of affection that could form between a student and a teacher inevitably resulted in a sense of loyalty, particularly on the part of the student. The teacher, Quintilian says, should be the object of the boy’s affection and respect. Again he says that a pupil should love their master not less than their studies; moreover, they should regard them as the parents of their bodies and their minds. This is invaluable to study, for under this kind of influence it is a pleasure to listen to their teachers, believe what they say and long to be like them. Moreover, they would gladly come to school, not be angry when corrected, rejoice when praised, and above all, seek to win their master’s affection by the devotion with which they pursue their studies.

9.1.4 Summary

We have seen so far, that when it came to a child’s education, it was expected that the best teachers would be sought out, even if this meant sending them long distances to live. A small number of teachers of skills, which the elite valued especially highly, might become prominent figures. Rhetoricians (particularly the sophists) and philosophers were very often wealthy and famous; moreover, they often held public offices and important leadership roles in their communities. A teacher was not just a school educator; they could also act as emissaries, benefactors, statesmen, orators, and political figures. It was this eclectic social role that helped determine their popularity as teachers, the assumption being that the more successful the teacher, the more chance of success for the student. Moreover, teachers were expected to assume a parental role over their students. Quintilian sees them as mother birds.

28 Pliny, Ep. 3.3. Genitor’s character is later reflected in a letter addressed to him where he complains about a dinner filled with mimes and clowns and “male dancers;” Pliny writes to remind him that he needs to be tolerant of other people’s pleasures (Ep. 9.17). Again, Pliny writes to Genitor who has just lost a pupil through death; Genitor is greatly distressed at the loss and Pliny writes to comfort him, noting his (Genitor’s) readiness with kindly attentions and generous affections for anyone of whom he thought highly (Ep. 7.30). On another occasion he is asked to find a rhetorician for his friend’s nephew (Ep. 2.18).

29 This is no more apparent than among the students of the sophists as Winter has aptly demonstrated. See Winter, Philo and Paul among the Sophists, 172–178.

30 Quintilian, Inst. 2.2.8. “And it is scarcely possible to say how much more readily we imitate those whom we like.”

31 Quintilian, Inst. 2.9.1.

32 Although it is interesting to read a letter from Pliny, who talks about a man of praetorian rank and an eloquent pleader at the bar, who he says has fallen so low as to become a teacher of rhetoric instead of a prominent advocate (Ep. 4.11). However, the uniqueness of such an attitude towards a teacher of oratory in the literary sources should warn us against making Pliny’s statement ubiquitous.

33 Most notably are Quintilian, Seneca (see esp. Ep. 8.6), Plutarch, Dio Chrysostom, and the majority of sophists in Philostratus’ Lives.
nourishing their young and Ps-Plutarch as farmers disciplining their growth and development. On the part of the student, teachers were to be the object of their affection and respect, surrogate parents who they looked up to and emulated. This same attitude towards teachers can be seen in Corinth and at the centre of it all is Paul and Apollos.

9.2 Paul as a Teacher

In 1 Corinthians 3:1–4, Paul drew attention to the Corinthians’ present immature state as σάρκινοι. The reason he believes they are immature is that they are dividing over teachers. He says in 3:3–4 that as long as there is jealousy and quarrelling over Paul and Apollos—and, we might infer, seeking after deeper wisdom and measuring teachers by the standards of contemporary orators—they are acting as mere men. Instead, they were acting according to the world’s standards in that they were swearing allegiance to their particular teacher (“I follow Paul,” “I follow Apollos”). In the previous metaphor, Paul pointed out their need of him as a breast-feeding mother to provide the basics. The imagery is fitting in a culture which understands and expects teachers to adopt a parental role. But in order to deal with this inappropriate elevation of teachers, he now describes his role in relation to Apollos’.

9.3 Metaphor 2: Paul and Apollos as Farmers (1 Cor 3:5–9)

In order to illustrate his and Apollos’ roles in the church, Paul first draws on the popular educational metaphor of the farmer. We saw in section 3.4.1 Ps-Plutarch’s discussion of the three necessary elements to produce perfectly right action: nature, reason, and habit (φύσις, λόγος, ἐθική). The first beginnings are provided by nature, the advancement comes by learning and practical use from continual repetition. To illustrate this point, he says that “Just as in farming, first of all the soil must be good, secondly, the husbandman skilful, and thirdly, the seed sound, so, after the same manner, nature is like the soil, the teacher to the farmer, and

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34 κατά ἀνθρώπων περιπατεῖτε. According to Winter (After Paul Left Corinth, 40), “the concept of walking was used as a metaphor for ‘living’ or ‘acting’, and the phrase κατά ἀνθρώπων refers to the fact that they were operating in the same way as the rest of Corinthian society.”

35 Cf. Ibid., 40–43; Schnabel, Der erste Brief des Paulus an die Korinther, 188; Mitchell, Paul and the Rhetoric of Reconciliation, 81–82.

36 Dutch (The Educated Elite in 1 Corinthians, 258) also draws attention to these works, though he gives little connection with 1 Cor 2. For discussion of these metaphors in παιδεία, see Morgan, Literate Education in the Hellenistic and Roman Worlds, 267. She notes that, in the context of παιδεία, most of the agricultural images in which the pupil is the soil, for instance, come from descriptions of the early parts of enkyklos paideia.
the verbal counsels and precepts like the seed” (*Lib. ed.* 2B). When all of these qualities are properly met, the result is men who are celebrated, such as Pythagoras, Socrates, and Plato.

Philo uses similar imagery in his essay *On Husbandry*; here he contrasts the worker of the ground, who simply works for a wage, with the “husbandman,” who is willing to do whatever it takes, even at personal expense, to do the farm good. This person he calls the “soul-husbandman.” Such a person will pull up trees that are choking growth; and sow or plant nothing that has no produce, but all that is fitted for cultivation and fruit-bearing. Ultimately, the soul-husbandman will plant the seeds virtue: sound sense, courage, temperance, justice, and all virtue. Quintilian in fact combines two of the metaphors we have just seen, saying that “The hard work in the climb is at the bottom; the further you go the easier the gradient and the richer the soil. And if, by perseverance, you rise above even these gentler slopes, the fruits offer themselves without effort, and all things come forth unbidden—though unless they are harvested daily, they wither away” (*Inst.* 12.10.79).

Imagery of a teacher being like a farmer tilling ground or the content of teaching growing to bear fruit in a student’s life would seem to be an obvious metaphor in an agrarian society, as is demonstrated in its use by Jesus to describe the gospel and the kingdom of heaven (Matt 13:1–43; Mark 4:1–20, 26–34; Luke 8:1–15, 13:18–21; John 15:1–17). Again, we see the author of Hebrews, like Paul, combining farming imagery with a mother breast-feeding in the same context (Heb 5:12–14; 6:7–8).

37 Again, Plutarch says, “Farmers take more pleasure in looking at the heads of grain that are bent over and bowed toward the ground, but those that tower aloft owing to their lightness the farmers think are empty cheats; so among the young men who would study philosophy: those who are most empty and have no weight, have assurance and a pose and a gait, and a countenance filled with a haughtiness and disdain which spares nobody; but, as their heads begin to fill and to accumulate some fruitage from their lectures and reading, they lay aside their swagger and superficiality” (*Virt. prof.* 81B; similarly, *Lib. Ed.* 2E; *Vit. pud.* 529B).


39 Philo, *Agr.* 18. Similarly, *Spec.* 2.29. Watering is also used in the context of education with Philo. He says, “For he shows us Hagar filling a water skin and giving the child a drink. Hagar represents imperfect training, being handmaid of Sarah who represents perfect virtue … For when incomplete education having come to depths of knowledge, which is called a well, draws from it into the soul as into a vessel the doctrine and speculations of which it is in quest, and thinks fit to feed the child with that on which it has itself been fed … Rebecca is discovered watering her pupil not with gradual progress, like Hagar, but with perfection” (*Post.* 130–132).

40 Similarly, *Inst.* 1.3.4–5; 2.19.1–3; 10.3.2; Seneca, *Ep.* 34.1; Cicero, *Leg.* 1.46. Diogenes Laertius (*Lives*, 7.40) sees this as a uniquely Stoic doctrine: “Philosophy to a fertile field: Logic being the encircling fence, Ethics the crop, Physics the soil or the trees.”

41 “For though by this time you ought to be teachers, you need someone to teach you again the basic principles of the oracles of God. You need milk, not solid food, for everyone who lives on milk is unskilled in the word of righteousness, since he is a child. But solid food is for the mature, for those who have their powers of discernment trained by constant practice to distinguish good from evil” (5:12–14). “For land that has drunk the rain that often falls on it, and produces a crop useful to those for whose sake it is cultivated, receives a blessing from God. But if it bears thorns and thistles, it is worthless and near to being cursed, and its end is to be burned” (6:7–8).
9.3.1 Appropriation of the Metaphor

These agricultural metaphors described two important aspects of education: first, they demonstrate education making a fundamental and irreversible difference to the pupil, generating new patterns of behaviour by altering the content and direction of their thought. Second, “ploughing” not only draws out the potential of the pupil’s mind and feeds it with material; it also changes it qualitatively. This would certainly fit Paul’s usage here.

As with the previous example of the breast-feeding mother, Paul appears to intentionally adopt a metaphor that has its cultural significance in education. Similar to its “secular” usage, he sees the process of development in Christian παιδεία as a complete renewal of the mind and behaviour (cf. Rom 12:1–2). But in the context of 1 Cor 3:5–9, the metaphor serves a more important purpose. Here it redescribes the different roles of the Christian teachers in a way contrary to the Corinthians’ present understanding. Unlike the present status-evaluation of the teachers, Paul seemingly relativises their roles, pointing out that his task was that of one who sows the seeds; Apollos’ was that of one who waters; but ultimately, the most important figure is God, the one who brings the growth.

9.4 Metaphor 3: Paul the Master Builder (1 Cor 3:10–13)

By describing himself in terms of a mother, Paul demonstrates to the Corinthians their current state of immaturity, but more importantly, their ongoing need of his ministry. By then describing himself and Apollos as farmers, he relativises the two roles. On the one hand, though different, their tasks are equally important; on the other hand, both of their tasks and the Corinthians’ development is all completely dependent on God. Now in a third metaphor, Paul reminds the Corinthians of the fact that their very existence as a church is contingent on his initial work in Corinth. In 1 Corinthians 3:10–11, Paul describes his initial preaching activity as that of a wise master builder (ὁ σοφὸς ἀρχιτέκτων) who laid the foundation of

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42 Morgan, Literate Education in the Hellenistic and Roman Worlds, 256.
43 Ibid., 259.
44 Dale Martin refers to this as “status reversal strategy” (Martin, The Corinthian Body, 102). Similarly, Andrew D. Clarke (Serve the Community of the Church: Christians as Leaders and Ministers [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000], 216–217) notes, “Paul does not cite as legitimisation of his position of leadership his own secular status or credentials. Indeed, as part of this discussion, he adopts a number of techniques which expressly invert the significance of social status. Paul’s choice of agriculture, artisan and household imagery in 1 Corinthians 3–4 (specifically the low task of gardener, builder and servant) may well have been regarded as offensive to those within the Christian community who sought to base their own authority on such widely-held criteria as secular honour and status.”
the church, namely, the unique gospel of the crucified Christ. The trouble has occurred when subsequent teachers have continued his work. While Paul is obviously not opposed to the idea of someone else teaching in the church—indeed, in his absence others must—in 3:12–13 he gives an explicit warning to anyone who would do so: whatever you build with, be it gold, silver, precious stones, wood, hay or straw, it will all be proven in the day of judgement. This warning applies not just to Paul and Apollos, but also to any who are assuming places of authority in the congregation.

Finally, Paul has already demonstrated that the message of the cross as well as its teachers and recipients are foolish; from this, there is only one logical conclusion: if anyone wants to be wise, they must become a fool. There is just no place for boasting in human leaders (3:21).

Conclusion

In these first three metaphors, Paul has dealt with the situation in Corinth more generally. Despite his tough admonition, it was the Corinthians in general who were acting like children in their factional behaviour. Moreover, his role was only part of a bigger picture that involved Apollos, other teachers, and ultimately God. But at the heart of the issue in Corinth is an attitude towards Paul, specifically, in regard to his ministry style and perceived inferior wisdom. But there was another factor at work in their evaluation of him: his refusal of support while staying with them the first time he was there. In the final stages of his argument, he

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45 Cf. Collins, First Corinthians, 149. There is no immediate education analogy here, although a connection could be made to Jesus’ parable of the men who built on different foundations, one on the gospel and the other on (figuratively speaking) the wisdom of the world (Luke 6:46–49). Most likely however, the passage would be drawing on Paul’s Jewish roots as reference to the building of the tabernacle in the desert and the temple in Jerusalem. See David W. Kuck, Judgment and Community Conflict: Paul’s use of Apocalyptic Judgment Language in 1 Corinthians 3:5-4.5, (NovTSup 66; Leiden: Brill, 1992), 177. Alternatively, Jay Shanor (“Paul as Master Builder Construction Terms in First Corinthians,” NTS 34, no. 3 [1988]: 461–471) has suggested that Paul is drawing imagery from Graeco-Roman regulations concerning the construction of temples in general. The “Day of Judgment” also has its origins in the OT. See Robertson and Plummer, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the First Epistle of St Paul to the Corinthians, 63; Collins, First Corinthians, 158. Although, in regard to Paul’s warning about the day of judgment, it was the practice for teachers to be paid at the end of the school year; this could be a tough time for teachers, since it was not uncommon for parents to evaluate their children’s development and pay the teacher according to what they believed to be the child’s progress had been. This could even result in teachers not being paid. Cf. Cribiore, Gymnastics of the Mind: Greek Education in Hellenistic and Roman Egypt, 63–65. However, any suggestion that this is what is in mind in this passage is conjecture at best.

46 This imagery will be discussed at length in the final section.


48 Ποτε μηδείς κουμάσοθω ἐν ἀνθρώποις. The phrase ἐν ἀνθρώποις, usually translated “about/in humans” (ESV, KJV, NKJV, et al.), in this case would be a reference to the church leaders, hence the TNIV’s “no more boasting about human leaders.” For support of this translation, see Ciampa and Rosner, The First Letter to the Corinthians, 165.
deals with the Corinthians at a more personal level, beginning with, it seems, the head of the Apollos faction.
CHAPTER 10: PAUL AND THE INTELLECTUAL CLIENTS

We have seen so far that teachers had the important task of training a child towards virtue. They were understood as surrogate parents and it was expected that they themselves would be men of the highest qualities, embodiments of the wisdom they taught. Teachers of higher studies were also by necessity well educated and wealthy. They could act in various political and public capacities and were often found amongst the elite circles. Additionally, due to their intellectual credentials, they could be sought after by wealthy elites as friends. In such a relationship, various benefits would be exchanged, but what is important for our purposes, is the obligation this kind of relationship created for the “intellectual client.” This appears to be the backdrop for the situation in 1 Cor 4:1–7.

In this chapter, we will (1) explore the somewhat ambiguous relationship of a teacher who is in a client relationship with a patron. It will then be argued that (2) some of the Corinthians had invited Paul into such a relationship during his stay in Corinth. Finally, we will (3) examine the language that Paul uses in this passage, arguing that Paul, having refused the offer, has come under judgement from an individual in the church and the group associated with this person.

10.1 Teachers as Clients

So far we have seen that parents would seek out an orator or a philosopher with whom their boys would study. Typically, the instructor would hold lessons with a class of students in a rented room or hall, their own house, or in the gymnasium. But for other teachers, their circumstances were different. A tutor (be it a pedagogue, grammarian, rhetorician, or philosopher), could be employed by a family to train their son(s) and thus become a client to the father. Quintilian’s Institutes 1.2 is dedicated to the discussion of which is preferable, sending a boy to a school, or hiring a private tutor. He notes that there were many families who opted for the latter. These educators could also act as intellectual clients among their patron’s retinue. By the late Republic, the number of intellectuals travelling to Rome

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2 Quintilian, Inst. 1.2.2.
increased, many of these taking up residence in the homes of leading citizens. As a result, Romans became more active in literary composition. Private homes now provided space and facilities for intellectual discussion and creativity; moreover, large collections of books were being gathered together in private and public libraries. These kinds of intellectuals could act as advisors, tutors, librarians, or just general “resource persons” to have at a family’s dinner table; they could also be used to discuss particular issues, “or to provide the steel on which members of the family—especially the father—could sharpen their own minds.” Other intellectuals were encouraged to become advisors to rulers. Plutarch says that “The philosophers who associate with persons in private station make those individuals inoffensive, harmless, and gentle towards themselves, but he who removes evil from the character of a ruler, or directs his mind towards what is right, philosophises, as it were, in the public interest and corrects the general power by which all are governed” (Max princ. 778E–F). He argues that if the teachings of a philosopher take possession of a ruler and fill him with love of honour, through one, he is able to benefit many. He says further, “If the dignity that befits leadership and power are associated with a man of moderation and culture, the philosopher will not hold aloof from making him a friend and cherishing him” (Max princ. 778B).

Moreover, he argues that the “philosopher who abstains from public affairs will not avoid such men, yet one who is interested in public life will even go to them with open arms … he will be glad to converse and spend his leisure with them and eager to associate with them” (Max Princ. 778B).

10.1.1 The Ambiguity of These Relationships

These sorts of relationships were generally classified under the rubric of “friendship” (amicitia/φιλία). Seneca explains that unlike the many types of reciprocal relationship, the one shared with a teacher (praeceptor) is different in that the teacher becomes a friend (amicus). The reason, he says, is not that what they have sold is worth more than what was

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3 Rawson, *Children and Childhood in Roman Italy*, 153.
4 Ibid., 154; similarly, Hock, *The Social Context of Paul’s Ministry*, 53. Seneca tells the story of a man named Calvisius Sabinus who, he says, had “the bank account and the brains of a freedman.” This man, “paid incredible prices for slaves, one to know Homer by heart and another to know Hesiod; he also delegated a special slave to each of the nine lyric poets.” Having gathered this retinue, “he began to make life miserable for his guests; he would keep these fellows at the foot of his couch, and ask them from time to time for verses which he might repeat, and then frequently break down in the middle of a word” (Ep. 27.5–6).
5 Again he says, “Philosophers who associate with rulers make them more just, more moderate, and more eager to do good, so that it is very likely that they are also happier.” Further on he says, “when philosophical reason derived from philosophy has been established as the ruler’s coadjutor and guardian, it removes the hazardous element from his power, as a surgeon removes that which threatens a patient’s health and leaves that which is sound” (Max princ. 778F, 779F).
paid for it, but that they have contributed something personally. In this unique relationship where knowledge is transmitted, mind is fused with mind; when this happens, the teacher is paid the price for his service, but the price of his mind is still owed. He explains that

Suppose that (he) endured labour and weariness in teaching me; that, besides the ordinary sayings of teachers, there are things which he has transmitted and instilled into me; that by his encouragement he has aroused the best that was in me, at one time inspired me by his praise, at another warned me to put aside sloth; that, laying hand, so to speak, on my mental powers that then were hidden and inert, he drew them forth into the light; that, instead of doling out his knowledge grudgingly in order that there might be the longer need of his service, he was eager, if he could, to pour the whole of it into me—if I do not owe to such a man all the love that I give to those to whom I am bound by the most grateful ties, I am indeed ungrateful. (Ben. 6.16.6–7)

Unlike the relatively clearly defined patron-client relationship, amicitia was ambiguous, in that it could occur between two parties of equal social status, but at the same time, could encompass a relationship of social unequals. In the latter case, the inferior member in the relationship was still a person of means, hence it was more commonly seen as amicitia, yet in reality, was better understood in terms of patronage. In other words, despite the social inferior being a person of means, they were still in need of the benefits that the superior was able to confer, most notably, reputation.

10.1.2 Poets and Clients and Friends

Peter White has discussed this kind of relationship with regard to poets. He argues that, unlike other dependants, a poet gets to eat and revel with their patron, accompany him on trips, and generally enjoy his hospitality. Overall, they act and are treated as friends. Though far from

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6 Seneca, Ben. 6.16.4.
7 Seneca, Ben. 6.17.1.
9 Saller, Personal Patronage Under the Early Empire, 15. Saller points out that “the Romans applied the language of patronage to a range of relationships, with both humble dependants and their junior aristocratic colleagues labelled clientes: usage was more fluid than usually supposed, and the connotations of amicus, cliens and patronus were subtly and variously manipulated in different circumstances” (Richard P. Saller, “Patronage and Friendship in Early Imperial Rome: Drawing the Distinction,” in Patronage in Ancient Society, ed. by Andrew Wallace-Hadrill [Routledge, 1989], 63–88). In the case of social unequals, amicitia could be understood more euphemistically to cover up a relationship of factual dependence. See Verboven, The Economy of Friends, 51.
10 White notes that “It can probably be taken for granted that, to the eyes of the Romans, the two parties to a friendship would rarely have looked like equals” (13). Verboven (The Economy of Friends, 62) distinguishes between the benefits reciprocated in each relationship: “Although the same resources were exchanged in amicitia as in patron-client relationships, they took on a different guise. Thus amici were offered resources (opes) and help (adiumentum), whereas clientes were offered protection (praesidium) in exchange for gratia and deference.”
11 White, Promised Verse, 13.
equal to their great friends, they too are generally from the economic upper class, as indicated by their ability to receive an education.\textsuperscript{12} In sharing a similar background, they also hold similar values—the convergence of values being implicit in choosing worthy friends.\textsuperscript{13} White argues that “The emphasis on friendship serves to blunt the consciousness which each of the two parties has of belonging to a particular lineage, census-class, or order, and to refocus attention on particular pursuits and ideals which they share.”\textsuperscript{14} Poets in such relationships could expect to receive gifts of cash, estates, emoluments, and dowries.\textsuperscript{15} But even more substantial than these tangible gifts were the intangible: the glory they received by being associated with one of society’s luminaries and the exposure that such a relationship could bring, the latter being particularly important for neophytes.\textsuperscript{16} In return for this generosity, the poet was able to offer a benefit that only he could bestow: the gift of poetic immortality.\textsuperscript{17} Moreover, to be associated with a poet as an adult signified an ongoing commitment to the ideal of the liberal arts.\textsuperscript{18} Overall, to have a poet as a friend looked very attractive; it added class and sophistication to the patron’s retinue.\textsuperscript{19} Yet, despite the ability of a literary friend to reciprocate gifts, and the fact that it was a relationship between members of the socioeconomic upper class, it remained a friendship between two parties of unequal wealth and status.\textsuperscript{20} White summarises it in the following: “The relationship between poets and their prominent friends looked no different from a mass of other relationships in upper class society which presented subtly compounded elements of parity and inequality. All alike go by the name of friendship.”\textsuperscript{21} In other words, despite the intimacy that the two parties often shared, the literary friend was always in greater need of the other’s resources and reputation.

10.1.3 Lucian’s Salaried Posts

\textsuperscript{12} Poets were often from the upper ranks of society and did not need to earn incomes from their work; the advantage of affiliation with the upper class was association with men of influence. See Peter White, “Positions for Poets in Early Rome,” in \textit{Literary and Artistic Patronage in Ancient Rome}, ed. by Barbara K. Gold (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982), 52–53, 59.

\textsuperscript{13} White, \textit{Promised Verse}, 13–14.

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., 14; similarly, Fitzgerald, “Paul and Friendship,” 329.

\textsuperscript{15} White, \textit{Promised Verse}, 17.

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., 18. These are discussed at greater length in Peter White, “Amicitia and the Profession of Poetry in Early Imperial Rome,” \textit{JRS} 68 (1978): 90–92.

\textsuperscript{17} White, \textit{Promised Verse}, 21. Pliny had as one of these clients, the poet Martial. In a letter he writes to Cornelius Priscus in regard to Martial’s death, he tells him that in return for Martial’s friendship (\textit{amicitia}) and the verses he had written about Pliny, he had paid for Martial’s travel expenses once he had retired from Rome (\textit{Ep.} 3.21.1–3).

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., 24.

\textsuperscript{19} Cf. Ibid., 25.

\textsuperscript{20} Cf. Ibid., 34.

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., 29.
Lucian seems to exploit the ambiguity of this relationship in his *On Salaried Posts in Great Houses*. In this essay, he writes to his friend Timocles in order to warn him of the conditions of those who enter into such a friendship (φιλία). According to Lucian, it was not just philosophers who were pursuing this arrangement, but also grammarians, rhetoricians, musicians, and any who considered themselves to be fit to enter families and serve for hire as educators. These teachers had been enticed by the prospects of having the noblest Roman families for friends, eating expensive dinners, living in a fine establishment, travelling in luxury, no inconsiderable amount of pay for the friendship they enjoyed, and generally luxurious conditions. Moreover, they are “impelled by the mere name of associating with men of noble family and high social position,” believing that this will confer distinction and exalt them above the masses. The reality, says Lucian satirically, is something quite different. Lucian paints a grim, somewhat hyperbolic picture of a tutor living in destitution as a virtual slave of his master, fighting with his other clients for recognition. In the end, having garnered everything profitable and using up the golden years of his life, after reducing him to rags and tatters, the master looks around for a rubbish heap on which to unceremoniously cast him aside. Lucian vividly demonstrates the fluidity of this kind of relationship. Despite falling under the rubric of amicitia, the reality of the relationship could range from honour and affection to destitution and slavery. Ultimately, Lucian depicts a position of dependency on the part of the literary client.

10.1.4 Summary

It was not uncommon then, for philosophers, rhetors, and even grammarians to become tutors in a household or to become intellectual friends of wealthy patrons in return for a salary and/or gifts. Moreover, teachers were often sought out by the elites on account of the benefits they could confer on a patron. This aspect of ancient education, and Lucian’s essay in particular, form an important backdrop in understanding the situation that is described in 1 Cor 4:1–5.

10.2 Metaphor 4: Paul the Οἶκονόμος (1 Cor 4:1–7)

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23 Lucian, *Merc. cond*. 3. In a similar scenario, Ps-Socrates (Epistle 1) refuses an offer of extravagant promises and a great number of gifts offered in order to persuade him to abandon his life in Athens and stay with a person (most likely in order to become a client).
In the fourth metaphor, Paul describes his role as a servant (ὁικονόμος). Whilst obscure, this metaphor, I suggest, would have resonated with at least some of the Corinthians from a context of education. But to fully draw this out, some preliminary discussion needs to be done.

10.2.1 Further Backgrounds to the Divisions

It has been argued throughout this thesis that, at the heart of the Corinthian divisions over teachers, is an assumption that Paul is incapable of providing the deeper wisdom that some of the Christians feel they need. Paul’s message and ministry style are far too elementary for these “wise” Corinthians. But there is another important element at work in the formation of their opinion of Paul: an offer of friendship he refused while at Corinth (1 Cor 9:12–18; 2 Cor 11:7–15). Welborn has recently argued that this friendship was intended to be one between an intellectual and their social superior (i.e., social unequals). The person who made this offer, he suggests, was probably Gaius, one of the wealthy patrons of the Christian community (Rom 16:23). In this proposed relationship, “the evangelist obtained material benefits—hospitality, money, status—which he recompensed with spiritual gifts – knowledge, eloquence, admonition.” Paul’s decline of this offer, Welborn argues, may have initially caused consternation, in that it departed from the paradigm of Graeco-Roman friendship, but need not have caused enmity. The troubles in Corinth, he suggests, emerged after the arrival of Apollos, who, unlike Paul, did accept this support, leading to the initial confrontation in 1

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26 Cf. Marshall, *Enmity in Corinth*, 231–233. This offer, Marshall explains, would have placed Paul under the following conditions: first, while presuming to be disinterested, the recipient was under obligation to repay. Second, it was linked to the notion of honour and shame, granting the giver recognition from others and putting the recipient in a position where they must outdo the giver in order to save face. Finally, it sought to form alliances, secure power and act as security and protection against personal and political enemies (242–243). Conditions that Paul was obviously unable to accept.


30 Welborn (*An End to Enmity*, 400) suggests that “The immediate, practical consequence of Paul’s decision to continue working for a living must have been that Paul was unable to organise his life to fit the domestic routine of his would-be patron.”
Cor 9. For this reason, and because of Apollos’ rhetorical proficiency, which would appeal to an educated person such as Gaius, it is most likely that Gaius was foremost among the Corinthians who expressed their preference for Apollos over Paul. Gaius thus became Apollos’ patron while he was in Corinth and would have enjoyed Apollos expounding the Messiahsship of Jesus in accordance with the high canons of “eloquent wisdom.” Welborn suggests that “From the moment that Apollos entered the house of Gaius, comparisons with Paul would have been inevitable … the contrast between Apollos’ ‘eloquent wisdom’ and Paul’s unadorned preaching would have been manifest and unavoidable.”

This argument helps to round out our picture of the situation in Corinth. According to the elite, educated members of the church, Paul was deemed inferior on two fronts: first, he was clearly not a teacher like the orators these men had been used to (unlike Apollos); and second, he had not even followed the standard conventions of friendship surrounding intellectual clients (unlike Apollos). Worse, instead of taking advantage of the obvious fiscal and social benefits of patronage, he has chosen rather to undertake menial labour. All of these factors combined have brought Paul under severe judgement by members of the community, a situation which he attempts to deal with in 1 Corinthians 4:1–5.

10.2.2 Individual Evaluation (1 Cor 4:1, 7)

In 1 Corinthians 4:1–5 Paul appears to directly confront his detractors in Corinth, who, I suggest, are the members of the Apollos faction. In doing so, he gives his overall response to the doubts over his ability and authority. Throughout this small section, he appears to address three different, yet interdependent situations each marked with a different term: λογίζεσθαι, ἀνακρίνειν and κρίνειν. These three terms fall within a semantic field that is best understood as “judgement” or “evaluation.” Because of such similarity of meaning, scholars who deal with this passage have tended to categorise these terms together, almost synonymously, within the general situation of the Corinthians’ judgement of Paul’s apostleship and perceived

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31 The argument that Apollos accepted support is inferred from 1 Cor 9, where Paul is obliged to defend his right to work for a living. Evidently other evangelists had been to Corinth and received support, but only Apollos is known to have been there. See Ibid., 406.
32 He argues, “Unless we are to assume that Apollos’ patron remains entirely anonymous in the sources, it is difficult to imagine that anyone in Corinth could have been more receptive to Apollos, the ἀνὴρ λόγιτος, than Gaius” (Ibid., 408).
33 Ibid., 375. Elsewhere Welborn is explicit in citing Gaius as the ringleader of the Apollos faction (378).
34 Ibid., 408.
35 Ibid., 409. Stowers (“Social Status, Public Speaking and Private Teaching,” 73) argues similarly, pointing out the tendency of independent groups surrounding particular philosophers to become highly competitive.
abilities. In doing so, the various nuances are lost in translation, nuances that reveal more than just the differences in meaning, but also the differences in the situation in the church.

The first situation is found in 1 Corinthians 4:1. Here, Paul appears use the rhetorical device of periphrasis or “non-naming” when he says, “this is how a person [i.e., you] should regard us” (οὗτος ἤμισυ λογίζεσθω ἄνθρωπος). If Paul is specifically addressing the Apollos faction in this section, then the individual of this periphrastic reference is most likely its head. This same person seems to appear again in 4:7 when Paul asks: “Who singles you out, my brother (for this distinguished position of critic)?” (τίς γάρ σε διεξαγρίει) Given the delicacy of the situation in Corinth and the potential for further hostilities resulting from the divisions, the use of periphrasis seems most appropriate. Marshall outlines five features of this rhetorical device: a. it takes the place of a name of a person who is well known to the readers; b. it makes the person available for caricature; c. it is an exercise in comparison, usually according to the conventions of praise and blame; d. it is always used pejoratively; e. the intention is to shame the enemy. In other words, by not naming his opponent, Paul was able to refer to the particular factional leader directly, while still maintaining enough ambiguity to avoid further tension.

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37 See BDAG, 81, for this rendering. Weiss (Der erste Korintherbrief, 92) made this suggestion long ago when he said, “άνθρωπος kann natürlich einfach gleich τίς stehen—ohne besondere Nuance, aber hier, wo bald darauf der Gegensatz άνθρωπος—κύριός folgt, hat es doch wohl den besonderen Akzent: er muß sich ja bewußt sein, daß er „nur ein Mensch“ ist, der nicht ins Herz sehen kann und überhaupt nicht zum Richten berufen ist.” In a personal correspondence, Welborn makes a similar suggestion: “In evaluating Paul’s use of conventional devices such as periphrasis, I think we should bear in mind that the letter of 1 Cor 1:1–6:11 is a dynamic document in which Paul is seeking to dissuade the Corinthians from forming factions. Toward the end of Paul’s argument, as he grows more ironic, I think it is quite appropriate that he should avoid naming the principal characters involved in the formation of factions. The use of singular nouns and pronouns allows any reader to feel himself addressed in a general sense, but was probably intended to have a special resonance for that individual who was most conscious of his role in the formation of the Apollos faction.”

38 For this rendering, see Moffatt, The First Epistle of Paul to the Corinthians, 48. For suggestion of 1 Cor 4:7 being reference to a particular person, see Welborn, An End to Enmity, 419; Moffatt, The First Epistle of Paul to the Corinthians, 48. Paul’s rhetorical questioning here seems to echo Cicero’s interrogation of a wealthy man: “What is the meaning of that insolent boastfulness of yours in speaking of your money? Are you alone rich? Gracious heavens, am not I to exult in having heard and learnt something? Are you alone rich? What if you are not rich at all? What if you are actually poor?” (Parad. 6.42) In this essay, Cicero steps into the place of the sapiens and argues that true wealth consists in wisdom.

39 Marshall, Enmity in Corinth, 344; for other discussion of the device, see Welborn, An End to Enmity, 228.
10.2.2.1 λογίζεσθαι

Paul says in 1 Corinthians 4:1 that he wants this opponent to think about him carefully (ἡμᾶς λογίζεσθαι). This term has several meanings, but in this context would imply the process of thinking about or considering an issue to form a belief or opinion. For example, Isocrates encourages Nicocles that he should make it his practice to talk of things that are good and honourable, so that “your thoughts may through habit come to be like your words. Whatever seems to you upon careful thought to be the best course, put this into effect. If there are men whose reputations you envy, imitate their deeds (ἀττί’ ἂν σοι λογίζομένῳ φαίνηται βέλτιστα, ταῦτα τοῖς ἔργοις ἐπιτέλει, Nic. 38).” Again, he says to the Athenians, “Now I have come before you and spoken this discourse, believing that if we will only imitate our ancestors we shall both deliver ourselves from our present ills and become the saviours, not of Athens alone, but of all the Hellenes; but it is for you to weigh all (ὑμεῖς δὲ πάντα λογισάμενοι) that I have said and cast your votes according to your judgement of what is best for Athens” (Areop. 84). In reference to evaluating a person’s character, Aeschines says

If now you attend only to the plausible sound of his words, you will be deceived as in the past; but if you look at his character and the truth, you will not be deceived. Call him to account in this way: with your help I will reckon up what ought to be the inborn qualities of the ‘friend of the people’ and the orderly citizen (ἐγώ μὲν μεθ’ ὑμῶν λογισόμαι αδεί υπάρξαι ἐν τῇ φύσει τῷ δημοτικῷ ἀνδρὶ καὶ σώφρονι); and over against them I will set down what manner of man one would expect the oligarch and the worthless man to be. And I ask you to compare the two and to see to which class he belongs—not by his professions, but by his life. (Aeschines, Ctes.168)

In another speech he says, quoting Euripides, “To find the truth, I, as do all wise men (σοφοὶ), look sharp (λογίζομαι ταληθεῖς) to see the character that marks the daily life, and judge by that. The man who loves companionship of knaves I care not to interrogate. What need is there? I know too well the man is such as is the company he loves to keep” (Aeschines, Tim.152).41

This would certainly fit the situation in 1 Cor 1–4, where Paul’s character is being measured according to his perceived abilities and behavior. But further light can be shed on the term’s meaning in 1 Cor 4:1 when we consider its usage in 2 Corinthians. In 2 Cor 10:7

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40 BDAG, 597-598. By far its most common usage is as an accounting term, i.e., “calculate/reckon;” we can see this in the NT where it is frequently used in Romans to describe God’s crediting or reckoning to Abraham righteousness, cf. Rom 4:3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 22, 23, 24; similarly, Gal 3:6; Jas 2:23. Welborn (An End to Enmity, 83) notes this nuance, arguing that the situation involving Paul and finances, particularly in 2 Corinthians, would suggest that this was a term carefully selected by his critics.

41 This nuance would certainly fit Paul’s usage of the term elsewhere. E.g., in 1 Cor 13:11 Paul says that when he was a child, he reasoned (λογίζομαι) like a child; in Phil 4:8 he encourages them to dwell on (λογίζεσθαι) anything good or beautiful.
(τοῦτο λογίζεσθω), 10:11 (λογίζεσθω ὁ τοιοῦτος) and 12:6 (μὴ τις ἐίς ἐμὲ λογίσηται) we see λογίζεσθαι used in the same periphrastic construction as in 1 Cor 4:1, indicating that this situation not only continued, but also worsened. In 2 Cor 11:5, Paul says that he does not consider himself (λογίζομαι) to be inferior to the “super-apostles.” In 2 Cor 10:2, Paul requests that when he comes, he will not have to be as bold as he reckons (λογίζομαι) he will have to be towards those person who are evaluating him (λογίζομενοι). He goes on to state bluntly in 2 Cor 10:4 that the weapons he uses in his ministry have power in God to tear down the λογίσμοι of himself by his opponent(s), λογίσμοι which are not only hostile to Paul, but also presuppose an overestimation of the rational mind. Paul demands moreover, that the judgment of this individual be renewed towards the facts established in God (2 Cor 10:7, 11; 12:6).

We can see that there is definite sense of character evaluation being implied by λογίζεσθαι in 1 Corinthians 4:1. Paul is being compared to men who were typically elite and well trained, or at least competent in what they professed to teach. Moreover, as has been suggested above, he is being measured against men who made their living from either fees or support via a patron (in fact, failure to receive such support would have raised serious doubt as to the value of their wisdom). On both counts, Paul has failed according to this individual. In response, Paul makes it clear that he does want this person to evaluate the apostles, but he wants him come to the conclusion that they are not meant to be like the instructors of παιδεία, such as the rhetors or philosophers; rather, they are to be seen as servants (ὑπηρέται) and stewards (οἰκονόμοι). Of these two roles, however, the most important appears to be that of the οἰκονόμος. We will return to this momentarily.

42 Cf. Welborn, An End to Enmity, 83.
45 Welborn, An End to Enmity, 75.
46 The term ὑπηρέτης refers to a type of servant or assistant (BDAG, 1035). In military usage, the term denoted a servant who attended each man-at-arms in order to carry his baggage, rations, and shield (LSJ, 736). It could also refer to the oarsman in a bireme or trireme, especially the under-rower, a connection probably not lost in a port city like Corinth (Collins, The Power of Images in Paul, 117). In the NT it refers to the attendants in the synagogue or the Sanhedrin (cf. Luke 4:20; Sanhedrin: Matt 26:58; Mark 14:65; John 7:32, 45, 46; 18:3, 12, 22; et al.). In general religious usage, it characterizes someone, be they human or divine, in terms of the fact that he stands at the disposal of a higher will (Karl Heinrich Rengstorff, “ὑπηρέτης,” in TDNT 8:530-544, 1972, 531). The term would also have had special significance to Paul in respect to his calling. In Acts 26:16, Paul recounts his initial conversion where Jesus commissioned him to be a ὑπηρέτης of all that he had seen and heard. In this respect, there was little difference from διόκονος (1 Cor 3:5). Cf. Barrett, The First Epistle to Corinthians, 99; Robertson and Plummer, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the First Epistle of St Paul to the Corinthians, 74.
Having dealt with this individual, Paul now turns his attention to a group that is judging him (1 Cor 4:2–5), that is, the Apollos faction. This is indicated in the shift to the plural “I care very little if I am judged by you” (ἐμοὶ δὲ εἰς ἐλάχιστον ἔστιν ἵνα ύφ᾽ ὑμῶν ἀνακρίθω).47 In reference to this group’s evaluation, Paul changes terminology from λογίζομαι to ἀνακρίνειν. The term ἀνακρίνειν is primarily a forensic term; it refers to hearing a case or examining with a view to finding fault.48 It also can refer to engaging in careful study; for example, in Acts 17:11, the Berean Jews were said to have examined (ἀνακρίνειν) the scriptures daily. In the NT, its most common usage is in 1 Corinthians (ten of sixteen occurrences), where it shifts in nuance from a courtroom investigation to spiritual discernment, or the power of discrimination.49 Its frequency in this letter is an important feature of the situation at Corinth.

We have seen in section 7.5 that the πνευματικός is God’s mature person, one who exemplifies a “spirit-transformed” life and a style of living motivated by faith in Christ. This life, as we saw, also has characteristic out-workings as indicated in Galatians 5:22–23. But in 1 Cor 2:14–15, Paul highlights only one characteristic of the πνευματικός: that is, this person alone is able to correctly discern or evaluate (ἀνακρίνειν) the things of the Spirit and all other things in general. Moreover, as Paul points out, this one cannot be judged by anyone (αὐτός δὲ ὑπὸ οὗδενος ἀνακρίνεται).50 In the context of the passage, Paul’s reference to οὐδενός would have in mind those without the Spirit (ὁ θεογόνοι) who estimate the things of God according to worldly measures, and assume them to be foolish.51 So on the one hand, the spiritual person, according to Paul, can judge all things; but on the other hand, they themselves cannot be judged by anyone who lives according to the world’s values. This two-fold characterisation of the believer forms the foundation of his defence in 4:1–5. Paul is

47 Commentators make very little of the seemingly generic second person plural reference ύφ᾽ ὑμῶν ἀνακρίθω. However, it seems reasonable to suggest that Paul has a specific group in mind. Barrett (The First Epistle to Corinthians, 101) has already noted in reference to this statement: “It is a reasonable inference that that criticism of the apostle, which in 2 Corinthians will appear as a full-scale attack, had already begun.” This we now was a faction within the church. More recently, Klaiber (Der erste Korintherbrief, 62) has stated: “Sehr eindeutig, ja fast schroff macht Paulus klar, dass er ein letztes Urteil über seine Verkündigung und seine Treue zu seinem Auftrag von keiner menschlichen Instanz akzeptieren wird. Das zeigt, dass es in Korinth Leute gab, die seinen Dienst und seine Verkündigung nicht nur beurteilen, sondern als wenig erfolgreich und effektiv verurteilen.” Not every member of the Corinthian church was dissatisfied with Paul; it would be reasonable to assume, then, that not every person was judging him. If this is the case, then while not explicit, the ύφ᾽ ὑμῶν is likely referring to a specific group within the church who are judging him (i.e., the Apollos faction).

48 BDAG, 66. Five of its sixteen uses in the NT refer to a court setting: Luke 23:14; Acts 4:9; 12:19; 24:8; 28:18; cf. Demosthenes, Mid. 103; Plutarch, Brut. 9; Isaenus, 5.32; Lycurgus, 112; et al.


50 Passive: “put on trial.” Cf. Thiselton (The First Epistle to the Corinthians, 273) for this rendering.

51 For the connection of οὐδενός with ὁ θεογόνοι, see Ibid., 274.
being judged (ἀνοκρίνεται) by some of the members, something they (rightly) deem themselves capable of doing as mature believers, but their judgement is a false one because it is according to worldly categories. The negative judgement that has been made by this group has most likely come in response to the attitude that the head of their faction (Gaius?) has taken towards Paul.

10.2.4 Appropriation of the Metaphor: The Ὀἰκονόμος as Superior to the Intellectual Client

We saw above in 1 Cor 4:1 that a certain individual has evaluated (λογίζεσθαι) Paul negatively according to his lack of eloquence and refusal to accept support. In response, Paul tells him that he should see Paul’s role as that of an ὀικονόμος.

The ὀικονόμος was an overseer in a household, one who could have charge over a specific area or even the entire estate.52 By presenting himself in this role, Paul is able to make a number of assertions about his role in the church and his relationship to the Corinthians. First, it would suggest that he had a unique relationship with the master.53 Paul sees his role as “head slave,”54 put in charge of God’s property (including the people) and responsible for the daily running of the household. Second, it would suggest that his authority in the church is second only to God.55 In other words, the choice of this metaphor is in keeping with the foundational role that his previous metaphors have emphasised.

But at the same time, by referring to his role as that of an ὀικονόμος, he also avails himself of the task of choosing teachers. Returning to Lucian’s warning in Salaried Posts, we see that in order to get the position, the teacher is made subject to the ὀικονόμος. In being interviewed for the post, he says

Well, suppose you have been fortunate in everything beyond your fondest hopes. The master himself has commended your discussions, and those of his friends whom he holds in the highest esteem and trusts most implicitly in such matters have not advised him against you. Besides, his wife is willing, and neither his attorney nor his steward (ὁικονόμος) objects, nor has anyone criticised your past; everything is propitious and from every point of view the omens are good. (Merc. cond. 12)

55 Moreover, the derivative nature of this authority would have been more effective in that it precludes any questioning of authority by other, more regular criteria such as wealth, education, or legal status; cf. Martin, Slavery as Salvation, 83.
This faction (or at least its head) has attempted to co-opt Paul’s ministry into the role of an intellectual client. Paul responds by reminding them that as an οἰκονόμος he is superior to any such client position. In other words, by virtue of his role as the head slave, whose authority is second only to the master’s, he is not selected as a teacher by the church; rather, he (in consultation with the head of the house, i.e., God) selects teachers for the church.

### 10.2.4.1 Appropriation of the metaphor: Paul’s Refusal of Support

In 1 Corinthians 9:3ff, Paul gives his defence to this Apollos faction who are sitting in judgement of him (τοῖς ἀνακρίνουσιν) for refusing to receive the offer of support. The reason, he tells them in 9:16, is because “necessity (ἀνάγκη) is laid upon me. Woe to me if I do not preach the gospel!” This necessity is from his status as a servant of Christ (cf. Rom 1:1). He then states in 9:17 that “if I do this of my own will, I have a reward (μισθῶν ἔχω), but if not of my own will, I am still entrusted with a stewardship (οἰκονομίαν πεπίστευμαι).” On the one hand, he could take their offer of support and in turn preach of his own will, in which case he would receive a wage (μισθὸς), an option he refused. On the other hand, he could act according to his calling, that is, under compulsion as Christ’s οἰκονόμος, in which case, he would preach as one entrusted with a stewardship. In this sense, the first clause is hypothetical, while the second states the reality. The inference is that he refused to receive their support because he is Christ’s οἰκονόμος (1 Cor 4:1), not an intellectual client working for a wage (μισθὸς). The significance of this contrast is better understood in light of Lucian.

In *Salaried Posts*, Lucian describes the role of a literary client as that of wage earning (μισθοφόρος). This wage, Lucian says, is negotiated between the client and the patron in conjunction with his friends. However, what the client ends up with is nothing close to the

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59 For the connection of these two verses, see Martin, *Slavery as Salvation*, 71, 75, who notes, “to say that one is entrusted with an oikonomia is usually equivalent to saying that one is an oikonomos.” See also, Collins, *First Corinthians*, 348; Chow, *Patronage and Power*, 172–175; Theissen, *The Social Setting of Pauline Christianity*, 56–57; Schnabel, *Der erste Brief des Paulus an die Korinther*, 498. E. Coyle Still (“Divisions over Leaders and Food Offered to Idols,” *TynBul* 55, no. 1 [2004]: 17–41) has shown that there is a similarity of structure and argument in 1 Cor 4:6–21 and 8:1–11:1, arguing that at the most fundamental level, both sections are dealing with pride problems and both solutions are self-abnegation. Savage (*Power Through Weakness*, 54–99) highlights four key areas where Paul has been seen to fail in, that is, his refusal to boast, his poor physical presence, his poor speech and his refusal of support.

riches and honour that he expected when taking the role. Rather, at the end of significant haggling and manipulation, he is forced to be content with a scanty sum, since by this point it is not possible for him to get away.\(^6^1\) The end result is that the client becomes a slave to this master, forced to beg for his pay (\(\mu\sigma\theta\acute{o}_\varsigma\)). Lucian says that “In order to get it you must flatter and wheedle the master and pay court to his steward (\(\sigma\iota\kappa\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\varsigma\)), too, but in another way; and you must not neglect his friend and advisor either” (Merc. cond. 38).

Paul did not enter into the friendship offered by this person, as it would have placed Paul under obligation to him. Moreover, by virtue of his role as an \(\sigma\iota\kappa\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\varsigma\), he was already under obligation to his master, Jesus.\(^6^2\) Read in light of Lucian, the authority that came with being an \(\sigma\iota\kappa\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\varsigma\) placed Paul above any supported position—either as a teacher or literary client—that they could offer him.

The problem is that Apollos did accept this offer,\(^6^3\) resulting in a faction rising up who judged Paul negatively for refusing. This judgement however, at least in Paul’s view, is not the discernment of the mature Christian, but rather has become a quasi-judicial investigation.\(^6^4\) He says to them in 1 Cor 4:3 that their opinion, or that of any human court, is of little consequence;\(^6^5\) because as far as he is concerned, his only judge (\(\alpha\nu\alpha\kappa\rho\iota\nu\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\)) is God (1 Cor 4:4). Furthermore, only the master can judge his work and this is only according to his faithfulness in completing his assigned tasks. In short, the measure of an apostle, according to Paul, was their faithfulness to what God assigned them to do as opposed to their eloquence and the size of their following.

10.2.5 The Corinthians’ Verdict (1 Cor 4:5)

Paul concludes his argument with a warning in 1 Corinthians 4:5 not to judge (\(\kappa\rho\iota\nu\epsilon\iota\nu\)) anything before Christ’s return. The term \(\kappa\rho\iota\nu\epsilon\iota\nu\) refers to the ultimate result of the activity of the \(\alpha\nu\alpha\kappa\rho\iota\nu\epsilon\iota\nu\),\(^6^6\) making it a logical climax to this section. Taking seriously the imperative,


\(^{62}\) David Emilio Briones (“Paul’s Financial Policy: A Socio-Theological Approach” [PhD. diss., Durham: Durham University, 2011], 255) has rightly pointed out that as an \(\sigma\iota\kappa\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\varsigma\), Paul also functions in an intermediary role between God and the Corinthians. By proclaiming involuntarily, “he draws all attention to the true giver and possesses a special boast as an apostle who preaches ‘free of charge’ as his mediator.”

\(^{63}\) See n. 31 in this chapter.

\(^{64}\) Büchsel and Herntrich, “\(\kappa\rho\iota\nu\omega\), \(\kappa\rho\iota\sigma\iota\varsigma\), \(\kappa\tau\lambda\)\(\alpha\),” 944.

\(^{65}\) This possibly had in mind the \(\text{\textit{dies forensis}},\) a regularly held court day in the Roman provincial capitals like Corinth. See Schnabel, Der erste Brief des Paulus an die Korinther, 234; Collins, First Corinthians, 173; Witherington, Conflict and Community in Corinth, 139. Contra Barrett, who doubts this interpretation, suggesting that it is much more probable that Paul has in mind the day of the Lord and man’s feeble attempts to imitate God’s judgement (Barrett, The First Epistle to Corinthians, 101).

\(^{66}\) Kuck, Judgment and Community Conflict, 200.
Paul is saying: “stop reaching a verdict!”67 The most frequent use of the term in the NT is in reference to the judgement of God, particularly in the last days where each person will be judged and consequently rewarded according to his or her own work.68 In light of our backdrop in πατερία, Paul is pointing out what they are in fact doing: assuming the job of the parent. The Corinthians’ judgment seems to reflect a common practice, one that would have certainly familiar to the educated members of the church, where a parent would pay the teacher’s fees retrospectively at an agreed upon time, be it monthly or at the end of the year.69 This practice put significant pressure on teachers to perform, since they were accountable to students, parents, pedagogues, and even grandparents with regard to the child’s performance and failure to produce results could result in failure to be paid.70 If the parents deemed their children not to have progressed adequately, it was not uncommon for them to simply refuse to pay.71 The Apollos faction, it seems, has taken on this role; that is, they have assumed God’s role as the parent of the house and have already passed judgement on Paul’s abilities as an apostle; his “reward”: being dismissed in favour of Apollos. Paul is thus at pains to rectify this attitude; he stresses again that the only person who can properly evaluate his work as a teacher and give him his due praise (ἐπαινοῦ) is God (cf. 1 Cor 3:13), and this only at the last day.

10.3 The Purpose of the Metaphors (1 Cor 4:6)

In 1 Corinthians 4:6, Paul makes the meaning of his metaphorical language (esp. 1 Cor 3:5–4:5) explicit.72 He says to them, “I have applied all these things to myself and Apollos for

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67 Fee, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, 163.
69 For extensive discussion of the remuneration process of teachers and numerous ancient sources of the practice, see Bonner, Education in Ancient Rome, 146–153. Payment could also vary in type. Cribiore (Writing, Teachers, and Students in Graeco-Roman Egypt, 16) has shown from papyri records that payments, at least in part, could consist of pigeons and other birds, grapes, oil, or wine. This practice also made it possible to skimp on the quality of what was being paid.
70 Cribiore, Gymnastics of the Mind: Greek Education in Hellenistic and Roman Egypt, 73.
71 Bonner, Education in Ancient Rome, 146. Again, students might also form their own negative opinions about their teachers and in response, seek out one who they themselves deem worthy (P.Oxy. 2190) (see above 8.2.2).
72 I take the controversial phrase “τῶντα δὲ ἄδελφοι μετασχημάτισα ἕνως ἰματών καὶ Ἀπολλών δι’ ὑμῶν” as reference to the metaphors that have preceded (1 Cor 3:5–4:5). This seems to best fit the second purpose clause “that none of you may be puffed up in favor of one against another.” If the intention of Paul’s figurative language is to attack the Corinthians’ boasting about their teachers, then τῶντα μετασχημάτισα must surely refer to the preceding metaphors in which he relativises both of their roles and subordinates them to God. Cf. Morna D. Hooker, “‘Beyond the Things Which Are Written’: An Examination of I Cor. IV. 6,” NTS 10, no. 1 (1963): 127. For similar conclusions, see Donald P. Ker, “Paul and Apollos—Colleagues or Rivals?,” JSNT 22, no. 77 (2000): 92; Johan Vos, “Der ‘METASCHESMATISMOS’ in 1Kor 4,6,” ZNW 86 (1995): 154–172; Fee, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, 167; Barrett, The First Epistle to Corinthians, 106; Conzelmann, First
your benefit, brothers, that you may learn by us not to go beyond what is written, that none of you may be puffed up in favor of one against another.”

Paul tells them that he used this metaphorical language in order that the Corinthians would learn “not to go beyond what is written.” Welborn has argued that philosophers and statesmen would commonly apply this expression to those who threaten to arouse discord. The maxim itself was used by those addressing cities and the like, to exhort its citizens not to stray beyond their original constitutions, thus it would have been well understood by many of the Corinthians. In discussion of Paul’s usage of it in 1 Cor 4:6, some scholars argue that he refers to a pedagogical conception which his hearers would recognise from their early childhood. This is where a student would learn to write the alphabet by tracing out letters, being careful to stay within the parameters set by the teacher. Quintilian describes this process saying that at first, letters should be cut into a board, so that the pen may be guided along the grooves. Education, according to Quintilian, is a matter of imitation; the most basic example of this, he believes, is a child tracing the outlines of letters in order to learn how to write. Seneca suggests that, a boy’s finger is held and guided by another so that they can follow the outline of the letter. After this they then find a model to imitate and upon this

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73 The enigmatic phrase τὸ μὴ ὑπὲρ ἀ γέγραπτοι has been the subject of a proliferation of studies; one of the most comprehensive of these would be L. L. Welborn, “A Conciliatory Principle in 1 Cor. 4:6,” NovT 29, no. 4 (1987): 320–346; similarly, Ronald L. Tyler, “The History of Interpretation of τὸ μὴ ὑπὲρ ἀ γέγραπτοι in 1 Cor 4.6,” ResQ 43, no. 4 (2001): 243–252; Thistlethwaite, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, 348–356. For discussion regarding the composition and further emendation of the text, see Hering, The First Epistle of Saint Paul to the Corinthians, 28–29.

74 Welborn, “A Conciliatory Principle in 1 Cor. 4,” 341. As one pertinent example, he cites the speech περὶ πολιτείας, sometimes attributed to Herodes Atticus, where the citizens are urged to put an end to factional strife by living “according to the law.” Along these lines, James C. Hanges, “1 Corinthians 4:6 and the Possibility of Written Bylaws in the Corinthian Church,” JBL 117, no. 2 [1998]: 275–298 argues that Α γέγραπτοι refers to a foundational document of the Corinthian church, a public document, that is, one open to all the members which would be modelled on the familiar cult bylaws; this document would contain guidelines and principles he felt necessary for the success and health of the church. Though plausible, the broader concern for Paul seems to be pedagogical; the entire section, as this thesis demonstrates, appears to deal with their training and understanding as opposed to violation of codes or laws.

75 See especially Fitzgerald, Cracks in an Earthen Vessel, 124–127; Ronald L. Tyler, “First Corinthians 4:6 and Hellenistic Pedagogy,” CBQ 60 (1998): 101–103; Dutch, The Educated Elite in 1 Corinthians, 288–292. Against the hypothesis that “not beyond the things written” is reference to OT scripture citations in the previous chapters. E.g. 1 Cor 1:19/Isa 29:14; 1 Cor 3:1/Jer 9:24; 1 Cor 2:16/Isa 40:13; 1 Cor 3:19/Job 5:13; 1 Cor 3:20/Ps 94:11; I have excluded 1 Cor 2:9 since, as I have already argued, I do not believe it is an OT citation. For proponents of the view, see J. Ross Wagner, “‘Not Beyond the Things Which Are Written’: A Call to Boast Only in the Lord (1 Cor 4.6),” NTS 44, no. 2 (1998): 279–287; Hooker, “Beyond the Things Which Are Written”; Fee, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, 169.

76 Quintilian, Inst. 1.1.27. “By increasing the frequency and speed with which they follow these fixed outlines we shall give steadiness to the fingers, and there will be no need to guide the child’s hand with our own.”

77 Quintilian, Inst. 10.2.2.
to base their penmanship. This early stage of writing would also involve copying simple
maxims set by the teacher in order to instruct the students in moral principles. In other
words, in the context of education, the maxim refers to the early stages of training where the
student learns to write through imitation of their teacher’s initial example.

If then, the maxim “do not go beyond what is written” has in mind the original
constitution of a city or the basics of education, then it seems reasonable to suggest that in the
context of 1 Cor 4:6, Paul is making reference to the initial message that he preached in
Corinth. This seems more plausible if we consider our reading so far. It has been argued that,
in Paul’s view, the foolish message of the cross was completely sufficient for all believers at
every stage. This was the milk he first provided, but is also the solid food they now seek.
The troubles in Corinth have occurred when some of the Christians sought deeper wisdom
beyond Paul’s “milk.” The main problem (from Paul’s point of view) was that the wisdom
they sought was centred on human ideas and wisdom; the result was that it did not actually
add to Paul’s original message, it went beyond it. Paul responds to the overall situation in
3:5–23 with agricultural and building metaphors, demonstrating to them that anything taught
by Apollos was only watering the message of the cross that he first planted, or building on the
foundational message that he first preached. He then says in 4:6 that by understanding this
fact, the Corinthians will recognise that what Paul first preached is the wisdom upon which all
else depends (even the preaching of Apollos). In realising this, they will not attempt to go
beyond this foundational message; furthermore, they will not be “puffed up” over Apollos
or Paul, since they are both simply functionaries in God’s service (4:1–5).

Conclusion

1 Corinthians 4:1–5 has revealed a new aspect of the situation in Corinth. According to the
followers of Apollos, Paul was not only rhetorically inept, he also failed to observe the
standard friendship conventions between a patron and an intellectual client; worse still, he
worked as an artisan! This has brought Paul under severe criticism by the “mature”

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78 Seneca, *Ep.* 94.51. For discussion see Cribiore, *Writing, Teachers, and Students in Graeco-Roman Egypt*, 122.
79 Cf. Ibid., 126.
81 See the discussion in section 8.1.3.
82 Cf. Hooker, “‘Beyond the Things Which Are Written’,” 130.
83 If this reading is correct, the phrase “I have applied all these things to myself and Apollos … that you
may learn by us” is most likely referring to the fact that even Apollos, whom they have esteemed as superior to
Paul, does not “go beyond what is written.”
πνευματικοί who consider themselves to be capable of judging Paul. In response, Paul stresses throughout chapters 1–4 that his way of life was exemplary of a true minister of Christ. He is not, in other words, an orator or philosopher, rather, he is an apostle; more precisely, he is an οἰκονόμος, answerable only to his master.84

Until this point, Paul has outlined the nature of his teaching role to the Corinthians. He is indeed a teacher, but not like the σοφοί or orators they are used to. He has wisdom to impart, but it is not the wisdom of this world or its rulers. He provided them with the basics, that is, milk, but unlike παιδεία, the basics are also the solid food. Indeed, others may teach in Corinth after him, but they are only continuing the work that he began. Finally, his performance as a teacher can only be judged by his master to whom he is an οἰκονόμος, namely, Jesus Christ. Having made all of this clear, he now makes his final appeal as the most important person in a child’s education and upbringing: the father.

84 Given that some of the addressees would have οἰκονόμοι of their own, being told that they need to submit to one would not have been received well. Cf. Collins, The Power of Images in Paul, 118.
CHAPTER 11: PAUL THE FATHER

We have seen so far, that teachers were not simply educators; they were surrogate parents and role models. But in the young man’s life, the most important example, and the person he was expected to emulate, was the father. This, it seems, is at the heart of Paul’s final word in this section. In the previous metaphors, Paul has established the interdependency of his and Apollos’ roles (1 Cor 3:5–9). He has also described his ministry in terms of a servant (1 Cor 4:1–5). Now in this final metaphor, he demonstrates that, unlike the many teachers who pass through the Corinthian church, he is their only father. The implications of this metaphor are far reaching, particularly in light of Graeco-Roman παῖδες ἢ ἁγιασμός.

In this chapter we will (1) discuss the role and importance of the father in a child’s education; additionally, we will look at the function of imitation and memory as essential for learning. We will then (2) look at Paul’s appropriation of the paternal metaphor to his own ministry, making an important distinction between himself and Apollos, who he presents as a pedagogue. Finally, we will (3) look at the last of his metaphors: the rod of discipline.

11.1 The Importance of Fathers

The ancient family was the basis of reproduction, both physically and culturally, in that it produced and trained the next generation in the specific economic and social tasks of their particular groups.¹ The father’s duty was to turn his offspring into a worthy representative of the family—just as the (elite) pater himself had become a Roman aristocrat by following his own father’s example.² For example, a Roman senator, with the help of his friends and patrons, would train his son for his future role in society.³ In this way, children would learn their gender roles through their parents and family friends of the same sex.⁴ The family was also the means by which property, honour and the family cult were transmitted.⁵

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³ Sometimes the young aristocrat was apprenticed by a statesman. See Fiore, “Paul, Exemplification, and Imitation,” 232.
⁴ Dixon, *The Roman Family*, 26. In fact Dixon notes a striking feature of the ancient descriptions of children is the way in which they are praised for being like adults (104).
⁵ Garnsey and Saller, *The Roman Empire*, 126; Dixon, *The Roman Family*, 111.
moreover, were seen as a continuation of the family’s reputation. Roman sons and daughters literally bore the family name and could bring glory or discredit on it by their behaviour. We see this demonstrated in an inscription from Aphrodisias:

Myon son of Peritas… a man whose father and ancestors were of esteemed, of a first family which had often held the gymnasiarchy and stephanephoria and taken part in embassies and magistracies and all liturgies, a descendant of those who founded the homeland, and one who from his childhood lived finely and virtuously and in a manner appropriate to the reputation of his family, pursuing education (παιδεία) also in the important embassies in which he sought to distinguish himself, and in the priesthood of the god Nerva showed himself useful to his homeland by setting up images in gilt shields and statues of different kinds in sacred and public places, carrying inscriptions fitting the reputation of his family … (Aphrodisias 511)

In all, “children were considered a projection of their parents’ ambitions, a continuation of the family’s line, and a protection and support for their parents’ old age.” With such a responsibility being placed on them, it went without saying that parents needed to take particular care in a child’s upbringing and education.

11.1.1 The Parents’ Responsibility

Ps.-Plutarch warns that “Parents who do not take hold of the reins with firm hand at this period of life, are manifestly, by their folly, giving to their sons licence for wrongdoing” (Lib. ed. 12C). Moreover, wise fathers during this time, needed to be vigilant and alert, pointing out examples of men who through love of pleasure have become involved in misfortunes, and of those who, through their steadfastness, have gained for themselves approval and good repute. In other words, it was not simply a matter of removing faults; it was also a matter of leading by example. He insists that a father must abstain from random cohabitation with women (courtesans and concubines) in order that the child be of honourable birth (ευγενεία). Nor should a husband approach his wife “for the sake of issue” if he has taken any wine at all, for “children whose fathers have chanced to beget them in drunkenness are

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6 Dixon, The Roman Family, 110.
8 Cribiore, Gymnastics of the Mind: Greek Education in Hellenistic and Roman Egypt, 105.
9 In Life of Augustus, Nicolaus tells us that Atia and her husband Philippus “inquired each day from the instructors and curators what he had accomplished, how far he had advanced, or how he spent the day and with whom he had associated” (Nicolaus, Vit. Caes. 3). We then see the same attitude from Augustus, who it is said took a personal responsibility for the education of his grandchildren, instructing them in reading, swimming and other branches of knowledge (Suetonius, Aug. 64.3).
10 Plutarch, Lib. ed. 12C.
11 Plutarch, Lib. ed. 1B.
wont to be fond of wine, and to be given to excessive drinking” (Lib. ed. 1D). In fact, Ps.-Plutarch laments that some fathers, in their eagerness that their children may sooner rank first in everything, lay upon them unreasonable tasks, which the children find themselves unable to perform, and so come to grief. These fathers he says, through excessive affection, have demonstrated no affection at all. From the outset, it was the father’s responsibility to hold out the highest ambitions for the children and to ensure they were given the best opportunities to learn.

In the earliest years, it was the mother’s role to raise the child, often with the assistance of a nurse. Both Ps.-Plutarch and Quintilian outline various expectations of nurses. It was required that they be people of both good character and eloquence since it was recognised that this was the first person the child would hear and try to imitate, and it was the worst impressions that were the most durable. According to Ps.-Plutarch, foster-mothers and nursemaids were not to be selected at random, but rather, parents were expected to select the best possible. For him, they must be Greek in character. Furthermore, in telling stories to children, nurses were not to choose stories at random, “lest haply their minds be filled at the outset with foolishness and corruption.” Moreover, even the servants and companions of children were to be sound in character, Greeks, and distinct of speech, “so that the children may not be contaminated by barbarians and persons of low character” (Lib. ed. 3D–F).

Similarly, Quintilian says, “above all see that the child’s nurse speaks correctly.” The ideal, according to him, was that she be a philosopher; but failing that, the best should be chosen, as far as possible; the most important point being “that they be of good character and should speak correctly as well” (Inst. 1.1.4).

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12 Plutarch, Lib. ed. 9B.
13 Quintilian (Inst. 6.pr.2) says that a father needs to “devote the utmost care to fostering the promise shown by the son whom he destines to become an orator,” Quintilian, Inst. 1.1.1–3; this desire is reflected in his grief at the death of his own son in whom he says he had the “highest expectations, and in whom I reposed all the hopes that should solace my old age.”
15 Although this was the ideal, Messalla is quite disparaging of the reality, he says that “In our day we entrust the infant to a little Greek servant-girl who is attended by one or two, commonly the worst of all the slaves, creatures utterly unfit for any important work. Their stories and their prejudices from the very first fill the child’s tender and uninstructed mind. No one in the whole house cares what he says or does before his infant master. Even parents themselves familiarise their little ones, not with virtue and modesty, but with jesting and glib talk, which lead on by degrees to shamelessness and to contempt for themselves as well as for others. Really I think that the characteristic and peculiar vices of this city, a liking for actors and a passion for gladiators and horses, are all but conceived in the mother’s womb. When these occupy and possess the mind, how little room has it left for worthy attainments!” (Tacitus, Dial. 29)
11.1.3 The Father as a Teacher

Although mothers, nurses and pedagogues played a part in the son’s upbringing, by far the greatest influence in his life came from the father. As we have seen already, a son’s education in its simplest form was imitation of his excellence and conduct.\(^\text{16}\) The socialisation of an aristocratic son meant participating in his father’s daily activities, both political and social; the son would follow the father around and learned by watching and listening.\(^\text{17}\) As a part of the boy’s education, the father would impart advice to the child called \textit{praecpta paterna} (paternal precepts). This was teaching on a wide range of subjects, practical, political, social, and moral;\(^\text{18}\) it also included training in religious rites and practices.\(^\text{19}\) Since the boy was expected to follow his father into public life, it only made sense that his father, who was already active therein, would begin to advise him from an early age.\(^\text{20}\) The goal of all this was for the son to be seen as the living image of his father.\(^\text{21}\)

This devotion to and emulation of the father is evident throughout our sources. We have already seen Isocrates’ encouragement to Demonicus, that he should look to his father as his first example, saying that it is a shame for children not to imitate the noble among their ancestors.\(^\text{22}\) Plato warns that even alterations in children’s games are risky; the reason he suggests, is that “children who innovate in their games grow up into men different from their fathers; and being thus different themselves, they seek a different mode of life, and having sought this, they come to desire other institutions and laws” (\textit{Laws}, 798B–C); the result is the greatest of all banes. Horace pays tribute to the efforts of his father who went to incredible lengths to provide him with the best education

If the flaws that mar my otherwise sound nature are but trifling and few in number, even as you might find fault with moles spotted over a comely person—if no one will justly lay to my charge avarice or meanness or lewdness; if, to venture on self-praise, my life is free from stain and guilt and I am loved by my friends—I owe this to my father … who (though poor) boldly took his boy off to Rome, to be taught those studies that any knight or senator would have his

\(^{16}\) Cribiore, \textit{Gymnastics of the Mind: Greek Education in Hellenistic and Roman Egypt}, 106; similarly, Kleijwegt, \textit{Ancient Youth}, 68–71.

\(^{17}\) Harders, “Roman Patchwork Families,” 51. “The Roman father served as a role model of how a \textit{pater familias}, a \textit{patronus}, a scion of his family with its distinctive tradition, and a representative of the \textit{senatus populusque Romanus} should walk, talk, and act. By adopting the fatherly \textit{habitus}, a Roman youth also adopted the very idea of not only being a representative of his family, but also its tradition. \textit{Imitatio patris} should therefore be recognised as the aim of aristocratic socialisation.”

\(^{18}\) Bonner, \textit{Education in Ancient Rome}, 17; similarly, Cribiore, \textit{Gymnastics of the Mind: Greek Education in Hellenistic and Roman Egypt}, 105.


\(^{21}\) Harders, “Roman Patchwork Families,” 52.

\(^{22}\) Isocrates, \textit{Dem.} 9–11.
own offspring taught … he kept me chaste—and that is virtue’s first grace—free not only from every deed of shame, but from all scandal. Never while in my senses could I be ashamed of such a father. (Sat. 1.6.65–89)

Epictetus says that duty and devotion to a father was a child’s profession. “To treat everything that is his own as belonging to his father, to be obedient to him in all things, never to speak ill of him to anyone else, nor to say or do anything that will harm him, to give way to him in everything and yield him precedence, helping him as far as is within his power” (Diatr. 2.10.7). Martial says, “Do you see how the little Regulus, who has not yet completed his third year, praises his father whenever he hears his name mentioned? And how he leaves his mother’s lap when he sees his father, and feels that his father’s glory is his own?” (Epi. 6.38)”

Pliny writes to Genialis, saying that

I am glad to hear that you have been reading my published speeches with your father. It will help your own progress if you learn from all of his accomplishments what to admire and what to criticise, and at the same time you are taught the habit of speaking the truth. You have your model before you, in whose footsteps you should tread, and are fortunate indeed to be blessed with a living example who is both the best possible and your closest relative: in short, to have for imitation the very man whom nature intended you to resemble. (Ep. 8.13)

Ps.-Plutarch says that “Fathers ought above all, by not misbehaving and by doing as they ought to do, to make themselves a manifest example to their children, so that the latter, by looking at their fathers’ lives as at a mirror, may be deterred from disgraceful deeds and words. For, wherever old men are lacking in decency, young men too are sure to be most shameless” (Lib. ed. 14A).

11.1.4 Jewish and Christian Fathers

The father’s role was just as important in Jewish families. A young Jewish boy’s education usually took place in the home and since biblical times, fathers were responsible for educating their sons. According to the rabbinic tradition, “the father is bound in respect of his son, to circumcise, redeem, teach him Torah, take a wife for him, and teach him a craft.” When it came to respect for a father, Josephus says that “Honour to parents the Law ranks second only

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23 Similarly, Ep. 3.3.1–4.
24 Hezser, Jewish Literacy in Roman Palestine, 59; Blackburn, “The Aims of Education in Ancient Israel,” 48.
25 Collins, First Corinthians, 193. A significant point of difference with Jewish families was respect for life; that is, Jewish authors frequently condemned the practice of exposure by Greek and Roman fathers. See John J. Collins, “Marriage, Divorce, and Family in Second Temple Judaism,” in Families in Ancient Israel, ed. by Leo G. Perdue et al. (Louisville, Ky: Westminster John Knox, 1997), 140.
to honour to God, and if a son does not respond to the benefits received from them—for the slightest failure in his duty towards them—it hands him over to be stoned” (C. Ap. 2.27). Paul envisages the same relationship and responsibility in the Christian family. He commands the Ephesian fathers to raise their children in the instruction (παιδεία) and admonition (νουθεσία) of the Lord (see below 11.3.1 for discussion). In the same way, children are to obey their parents as the command states (Eph 6:1–4).  

11.1.5 Summary

In summary, the ancient father was expected to place the highest importance on the boy’s education, which was, at its core, imitation and admiration of his father. But, as we will see, imitation did not stop at the home.

11.2 Imitation and Memory

Theresa Morgan has outlined five natural faculties that measured the pupil’s ability to be educated and form his contribution to his education:  

natural speech, reason, a tendency to virtue, imitation, and memory. We have already looked at the first three in previous chapters, now in this final section we will explore the remaining two.

Both imitation (μιμησία) and memory were absolutely essential parts of παιδεία; Quintilian says that a skilful teacher will make it his first care, as soon as a boy is entrusted to him, to ascertain his ability and character. The two indications of ability and character are: first, his power of memory (a good memory is one that is quick to take in and faithful to retain impressions of what it receives), and second, the power of imitation, “for this is a sign that the child is teachable” (Inst. 1.3.1).  

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27 Morgan, Literate Education in the Hellenistic and Roman Worlds, 246.
11.2.1 Imitation

Looking first at imitation, this practice began in the home. We saw above that a child’s greatest responsibility was to carry on the family’s name. In order to inculcate their reputation and values, it was a common practice to make wax images of the family’s ancestors called *imagines maiorum*, which were kept on display in the atrium. These were busts of family members, cast in a way as to reflect the person’s *gravitas*, experience, political authority, and reliability. As images of their heritage, they served to remind the family members where they came from as well as the sort of deeds their ancestors accomplished in order to encourage emulation and even excelling of what they did. Sallust discusses their purpose when he says

I have often heard that Quintus Maximus, Publius Scipio, and many other eminent men of our country, were in the habit of declaring that their hearts were set mightily aflame for the pursuit of virtue whenever the gazed upon the masks of their ancestors (*maiorum imagines*). Of course they did not mean to imply that the wax or the effigy had any such power over them, but rather that it is the memory of great deeds that kindles in the breasts of outstanding men this flame that cannot be quelled until they by their own prowess have equalled the fame and glory of their ancestors. (Sallust, *Bell. Jug.* 4.5)

Ancestral images of all kinds served as an external conscience for the present generation and the embodiment of traditional values. In addition to displaying these images, the family was also expected to remember their ancestors’ names and political careers. This family memory was composed not only of knowledge, but of acts, because remembering one’s forefathers involves imitating them and taking them as one’s model in war, in politics, and in one’s moral life. But role models (*exempla/παραδείγματα*) were not just to be found in the home; in every part of society, models for imitation could be found. Works of art, inscriptions, statues, monuments, literature, even triumphs, funerals, and rhetorical set pieces all embodied and

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29 Ibid., 110–111; Sinclair Bell, “Role Models in the Roman World,” in *Role Models in the Roman World: Identity and Assimilation*, ed. by Sinclair Bell and Inge Lyse Hansen, (MAARSup 7; Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2008), 9. Pliny the Elder discusses these when he says “In the days of our ancestors it was these that were to be seen in their reception halls, not statues made by foreign artists, or works in bronze or marble: portraits modelled in wax were arranged, each in its own niche as images to accompany the funeral processions of the family; and always, whenever some one died, every member of the family that had ever existed was present. The pedigree, too, of the individual was traced by lines to each of the painted portraits. Their record rooms were filled with archives and records of what each had done when holding the magistracy” (*Nat.* 35.6).
32 Ibid., 19.
promoted desirable values that a person was to emulate. Overall, exempla were the basic means of moral instruction in the ancient world from the earliest times. This was certainly the case in a child’s education.

11.2.1.1 Imitation at School

We have already seen throughout this thesis that παιδεία served to replicate or reproduce the already existing social system. Corbeill notes that “Without having what one might strictly call an educational system, the Romans used educational circumstances to reproduce social hierarchies within their own society.” This meant that everything set before the pupil, from their first readings to the teachers themselves, were to serve as role models for imitation. At these early levels, even stress on good penmanship and on copying was paramount; moreover, the work set before the student was carefully selected by the teacher to impart moral lessons. Bloomer notes that “The ancient student was required to demonstrate strict adherence to the model provided. Lines were to be copied exactly; memorisation was aimed at exact, verbatim reproduction.” This kind of imitation continued throughout their education. Bloomer notes further that when it came to declaiming, “the schoolboy had to adhere to the set plot of the case … we should not imagine an open and inventive process.” In regard to the reading of oratory and history in the rhetorical schools, Theon says that the student should “fit their voice and gesture to the subject of the speech.” He says that “We shall present and imagine with the greatest care all that concerns an orator: his actions, credibility, age, and status; the place where the speech was delivered, the subject it treats and everything that contributes to the feeling that the speech actually concerns us as we read it aloud.”

Imitation, then, meant that a student resembled their master, from their speech and writing style, to their manners and morals. This was so much so, that by simply observing a

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34 Ibid., 4.
35 Corbeill, “Education in the Roman Republic: Creating Traditions,” 262.
36 Ibid., 282. For similar discussion, see Barclay, Educational Ideals in the Ancient World, 143–159.
37 See my discussion above at 3.4.1.
38 Cribiore, Writing, Teachers, and Students in Graeco-Roman Egypt, 155.
39 For discussion of the progressive types of reading material, see Ibid., 38–55.
40 Bloomer, The School of Rome, 115.
41 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
44 Cf. Clark, Rhetoric in Greco-Roman Education, 146. For further discussion of the tenets of imitation see Ellen E. Perry, “Rhetoric, Literary Criticism, and the Roman Aesthetics of Artistic Imitation,” SupMAAR 1
student’s behaviour, it was quite apparent to all whose student they were (cf. John 13:34–35, Acts 4:13). Theon notes that “Some young orators acquired so good an ability by listening to famous orators that their works were attributed to the master.”45 In arguing whether Socrates was a disciple of Homer, Dio says that “It is not absurd that the man who neither met nor saw Homer and yet understood his poetry and became familiar with all his thought should be called a pupil of Homer … then, if a follower, he would also be a pupil. For whoever really follows any one surely knows what that person was like, and by imitating (μιμούμενος) his acts and words he tries as best he can to make himself like him” (Or. 55.4). Some of the students of the sophist Hadrian, it is said, would try to imitate his accent, others his walk, or the elegance of his attire.46

11.2.1.2 Selecting a Model

This meant selecting a model to copy. In this task, Seneca encourages his students to “choose a Cato, or, if Cato seems too severe a model, choose some Laelius, a gentler spirit. Choose a master whose life, conversation, and soul-expressing have satisfied you; picture him always to yourself as your protector or your pattern. For we must indeed have someone according to whom we may regulate our characters; you can never straighten that which is crooked unless you use a ruler” (Ep. 11.10). According to Antonius, the very first step in training an orator was to find a model to copy, and having found the model, to copy them in such a way as to strive to attain the most excellent qualities of the model.47 Quintilian suggests that in the earlier stages of school, a student should imitate his more senior classmates; he argues that “beginners who are still of tender years derive greater pleasure from imitating their comrades than their masters, just because it is easier.” He says further that “children still in the elementary stages of education can scarce dare hope to reach that complete eloquence which they understand to be their goal.” The reason, he suggests, is “their ambition will not soar so high, but they will imitate the vine which has to grasp the lower branches of the tree on which it is trained before it can reach the topmost boughs” (Inst. 1.2.26). Students were also encouraged to find other models to copy as well. These were typically the authors they studied, from whom they were to derive the best principles of each. For Quintilian, these included Demosthenes and Cicero as major role models, but even to these, others could be

46 Philostratus, Vit. soph. 587.
47 Cicero, De Or. 2.90; Quintilian says the same, Inst. 10.2.14.
added. He says, “We shall do well to keep a number of different excellences before our eyes, so that different qualities from different authors may impress themselves on our minds, to be adopted for use in the place that becomes them best” (Inst. 10.2.24–26). Again he says that “He will consequently select as his models of eloquence all the greatest masters of oratory, and will choose the noblest precepts and the most direct road to virtue as the means for the formation of an upright character” (Inst. 12.2.27). Seneca, however, warns against having too many models. “Be careful lest this reading of many authors and books of every sort may tend to make you discursive and unsteady. You must linger among a limited number of master-thinkers, and digest their works, if you would derive ideas which shall win firm hold in your mind” (Ep. 2.2).

11.2.1.3 Imitation and Honour

Imitation continued into adult life. Pliny sets Cicero as his object of imitation, saying, “I am anxious to make him my model in my literary work; as I have reached the same priesthood and consulship at a much earlier age than he did, I hope to attain something of his genius at least in later life” (Ep. 4.8.5). Epictetus says, “When you are about to meet somebody, in particular when it is one of those men who are held in very high esteem, propose to yourself the question, ‘What would Socrates or Zeno have done under these circumstances?’ and then you will not be at a loss to make proper use of the occasion” (Enc. 33.12). The philosopher Nigrinus is commended for the example he set for those who cared to imitate him in “his simple diet, his moderate physical exercises, his earnest face, his plain clothes and above all, his well balanced understanding and his kindly ways” (Lucian, Nigr. 27). Seneca exclaims, “Happy is the man who can make others better, not merely when he is in their company, but even when he is their thoughts! And happy also is he who can revere a man as to calm and regulate himself by bringing him to mind!” (Ep. 11.9) In fact, the very desire to do so was deemed a virtue. Plutarch says

An indication of this (moral progress) is, in the first place, the desire to emulate what we commend, eagerness to do what we admire, and, on the other hand, unwillingness to do, or even to tolerate, what we censure … We must therefore believe we are making but little progress so long as the admiration which we feel for successful men remains inert within us and does not of its own self stir us to imitation … whenever we begin so to love good men … through our admiration and affection for his habit, gait, look, and smile, we are eager to join, as it were, and cement ourselves to him, then we must believe that we are truly making progress (in virtue). (Virt. prof. 84B–E)48

48 Similarly, Philo, Congr. 68–69.
Imitation was also tied to the pursuit of honour. In public life, one’s behaviour was constantly being evaluated, particularly amongst the elites; as a consequence of this, it was normal to ostentatiously imitate celebrated men.49 Models could be found in any public space in the form of statues and inscriptions. These served the dual function of honouring a benefactor and also inspiring others to emulate their deeds.50 “A young man would thus not only ensure that his conduct would be approved, but the imitation would be noticed, and he would be perceived to possess the prestigious qualities of the model.”51

It is clear then, that imitation was at the core of not only education, but also life itself. It was intimately connected to family, education, social intercourse, and even the overarching desire for honour. In fact, it has been argued that “The great sign of a child’s talent is of course the faithful imitatio that is memory. Faithful version of his father, of his teacher, and of the lessons given him, the child performs a most important ideological virtue.”52 This important feature of education worked hand in hand with the last aspect of παιδεία, namely, memory.

11.2.2 Memory

We have already seen that a child’s upbringing involved memorising the family’s deeds in order to facilitate imitation. But memory was also a central part of education in its own right. Cribiore points out that “Memory was the foundation of all knowledge in a world that could not rely on easily consulted books, tables of contents and indexes, library catalogues, and electronic search tools.”53 The importance of memory is seen in Plato, who was highly critical of the impact learning to write would have on the power of memory, saying that it “will produce forgetfulness in the minds of those who learn to use it, because they will not practice their memory. Their trust in writing, produced by external characters which are no part of themselves, will discourage the use of their own memory within them” (Phaedr. 275A). Ps.-Plutarch says that “Above all, the memory of children should be trained and exercised; for this is, as it were, a storehouse of learning” (Lib. ed. 9E). He says further that there is nothing

49 Lendon, Empire of Honour, 46.
51 Lendon, Empire of Honour, 47.
52 Bloomer, “Quintilian on the Child as a Learning Subject,” 119.
53 Cribiore, Gymnastics of the Mind: Greek Education in Hellenistic and Roman Egypt, 166.
in the world like memory for creating and fostering. He insists therefore, that the memory “is to be trained in either case, whether one’s children be naturally gifted with a good memory, or, on the contrary, forgetful. For we shall thus strengthen nature’s generous endowment, and thus fill out her deficiency” (Lib. ed. 9E). He concludes by saying that “nor should parents forget that those branches of instruction which involve memory make no small contribution, not merely to education, but also to the practical activities of life; for the memory of past activities serves as a pattern of good counsel for the future” (Lib. ed. 9F). We have already noted Quintilian’s comment that a skilful teacher will make it his first priority to ascertain the ability and character of the student. The surest indication of this character, he suggests, is his power of memory. “The characteristics of a good memory are twofold: it must be quick to take in and faithful to retain impressions of what it receives” (Inst. 1.3.1). He argues in fact, that “Memory is most necessary to an orator … and there is nothing like practice for strengthening and developing it. And at the tender age of which we are now speaking, when originality is impossible, memory is almost the only faculty which can be developed by the teacher” (Inst. 1.1.36).

11.2.3 Summary

In summary, παιδεία, and indeed life in general, was a matter of imitation. Teachers were not simply educators, but role models. However, the most important example, and the person a child was expected to emulate, was the father. This, it seems, is at the heart of Paul’s final word in this section of the letter. In 1 Corinthians 4:14–21, Paul brings the argument of the entire section to a close. We saw that in previous verses, Paul has established his role as a minister in relation to Apollos (1 Cor 3:5–9); that is, they are equals and co-workers. He then establishes his role as an apostle in relationship to God and the Christian community (1 Cor 4:1–5); that is, he is servant in God’s house and a chief slave (οἰκονόμος). Now in this final section, he shifts metaphors again in order to re-establish once for all his authority in the Christian community at Corinth. Not only is he the apostle to Corinth (1 Cor 1:1), but also, unlike the many teachers who pass through the church, he is their (only) father, and as such, the one who they must imitate and the one who can bring necessary discipline. The

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54 For comments on these passages, see Morgan, Literate Education in the Hellenistic and Roman Worlds, 250–251.
55 This last metaphor might also serve to define their collective relationship as ὀδηλφοί (1 Cor 1:11, 26; 2:1; 3:1; 4:6).
implications of this last metaphor are far reaching, particularly in light of Graeco-Roman παιδεία.

11.3 Metaphor 5: Paul the Father, Apollos the Pedagogue (1 Cor 4:14–17)

We have seen that in the hierarchy of those who to imitate in life, at the very top was the father. The father was always the most important person in the son’s life and below him were the various teachers who the father chose. In this final section, Paul is re-establishing his authority in the Christian community according to this hierarchy; that is, he is their father while any other teachers are simply pedagogues. But at the same time, he is drawing on the many aspects of a father’s role in the son’s life.

11.3.1 Admonition (1 Cor 4:14)

He begins in 1 Corinthians 4:14 by pointing out that the things that he has said are not intended to shame them, but rather to admonish (νουθετεῖν) them as his children (τέκνα). Paul has already referred to the Corinthians as children in 1 Cor 3:1; however, this was with the more deprecatory term νηπίος as an indictment on their lack of maturity. Here however, he reverts back to the normal term τέκνον in order to establish their familial bonds as children to a father in Christ. As his children, he wants to admonish (νουθετεῖν) them by what he has written. Paul’s use of νουθετεῖν is highly appropriate given the situation in Corinth and the present behaviour of some of the church.

In rhetorical terms, admonition was an important part of all three types of oratory as well as epistolary theory. Aristotle says

Now the employment of persuasive speeches is directed towards a judgement (κρίσις); for when a thing is known and judged, there is no longer any need of argument. And there is judgement, whether a speaker addresses himself to a single individual and makes use of his speech to exhort (νουθετεῖν) or dissuade, as those do who give advice or try to persuade, for this single individual is equally a judge, since, speaking generally, he who has to be persuaded is a judge. (Rhet. 2.18.1)

56 The father/son imagery also had a long history in Judaism where it depicted the relationship between a teacher and his disciple (e.g., Prov 1:8, 10; 2:1; 3:1; etc.; Eccl 12:12; Sir 2:1; 3:1; etc.). Cf. Fee, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, 184.
Ps.-Demetrius also designates admonition as a specific epistolary type (the τύπος νουθετιτικός). Admonition, he says, is the “instilling of sense in the person who is being admonished, and teaching him what should and should not be done.” He offers the following example of this type of epistle: “You acted badly when you ill-treated a man who had conducted himself well and had lived according to reason and had, generally speaking, done you no harm. Realise, therefore, that this action (of yours) deserves an apology. Indeed, if you had been so treated by someone else, you would have taken it amiss and demanded justice for what had been done to you.”

11.3.1.1 Admonition and Education

In educational terms, admonition was an important part of παιδεία. Plato says that “the most effective way of training the young is not (simply) by admonition, but by plainly practising throughout one’s own life the admonitions which one gives to others” (Leg. 729C). Plutarch tells us that “Philosophers, at any rate, for admonition and instruction (νουθετούντες και παιδεύοντες), use examples (παραδείγματα) taken from known facts” (Adol. poet. aud. 20C). We saw above (cf. 11.1.4) that Paul exhorts the Ephesian fathers to raise their children in the instruction (παιδεία) and admonition (νουθεσία) of the Lord. Similarly, the term is also found coupled with διδάσκειν. For example, Paul says to the Colossians (3:16), “Let the word of Christ dwell in you richly in all wisdom; teaching (διδάσκειν) and admonishing (νουθετεῖν) one another in psalms and hymns and spiritual songs, singing with grace in your hearts to the Lord.” Dio says that a good democracy is one grateful to those who admonish and instruct (διδάσκοντες και νουθετούντες). Admonition was also commonly attributed to the teaching practices of philosophers.

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58 Ibid.
60 Dio, Or. 32.27; see also Plato, Prot. 323D; Demosthenes, Chers. 76; Philip. 73; Plato, Resp. 399B; Plutarch, Rect. rat. aud. 46A.
61 Plutarch, Rect. rat. aud. 39A, 46A; Virt. prof. 82A; Dio, Or. 31.122, 33.10; Diogenes Laertius, Lives, 6.34–35; et al.
In cultural terms, failure to accept admonition was deemed to be an indication of poor character. Isocrates says “it is instinctive with most persons when admonished, not to look to the benefits they receive but, on the contrary, to listen to what is said with the greater displeasure in proportion to the rigor with which their critic passes their faults in review” (Bus. 3). Plutarch says that the “incurable are those who take a hostile and savage attitude and show a hot temper towards those who take them to task and admonish them” (Virt. prof. 82A). Conversely, those who receive admonition are highly praised. Plutarch says that those who patiently submit to admonition and welcome it are in a less serious plight. He goes on to say that submitting to such admonition and correction shows no slight indication of progress (in virtue). Similarly, Isocrates says that

While we find that the great majority of other men seek the society of those friends who join them in their follies and not of those who admonish (νουθετεῖν) them, just as they prefer the most pleasant to the most wholesome food, you, I think, are minded otherwise, as I judge from the industry you display in your general education (παιδεία). For when one sets for himself the highest standard of conduct, it is probable that in his relation to others he will approve only of those who exhort him to virtue. (Demon. 45)

As a means of training and development throughout life, Plato says that people are taught (διδάσκειν) and admonished (νουθετεῖν) from earliest childhood until the last day of their lives. As soon as they are able to comprehend what is being said to them, the nurses, the mother, the tutor (παιδαγωγοῦσα), and the father strive hard “that the child may excel, and as each act and word occurs they teach and impress upon him that this is just, and that unjust, one thing noble, another base” (Prot. 325C–D). After this, the child is sent to school and parents charge the master (διδάσκαλος) to take far more pains over their children’s good behaviour than over their letters and harp-playing. At this stage the child meets “with many admonitions, many descriptions and praises and eulogies of good men in times past, that the boy in envy (ζηλοῦσα) may imitate (μιμεῖσθαι) them and yearn to become even as they” (Prot. 326A). Admonition then, was a common feature of a child’s upbringing and education; it was

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62 Similarly, Nic. 42; Paneg. 130; De pace, 8.
63 Plutarch, Virt. prof. 82A.
64 Similarly, “Why, then, have I gone into these matters? Because I desire to commend those among my hearers who not only applaud this speech but prefer, as more weighty and more worthy of serious study, discourses which are composed for instruction (διδασκαλικός) and, at the same time, with finished art to others which are written for display or for the law-courts, and who prefer for the same reason discourses which aim at the truth to those which seek to lead astray the opinions of their auditors, and discourses which rebuke our faults and admonish (νουθετεῖν) us to those which are spoken for our pleasure and gratification” (Panath. 271).
65 Plato, Prot. 325D.
the solution to immature behaviour making it an appropriate response to the Corinthian divisions.

11.3.2 Appropriation of the Metaphor: Apollos the Pedagogue (1 Cor 4:15a)

Paul goes on in 1 Cor 4:15a to say that they have in Christ a multitude of instructors (παιδαγωγοί), one of these being Apollos. In the early years it was also common for parents to assist their child’s education, either with their own instruction (usually the mother), or, if their means allowed, by employing a pedagogue (παιδαγωγός/pedagogue) who would act as an extension of the parental authority and aid in the child’s training. Images of boys and pedagogues are often depicted in Greek vases, or in sculptures, typically escorting the child to school while carrying their equipment, or with the child seated on their knee teaching them to read. The images suggest a relationship of great affection between the two. In selecting the pedagogue, the father was expected to choose one who was thoroughly educated, or, if the pedagogue lacked such training, he (the pedagogue) should be aware of his shortcomings.

The pedagogue was to be part of the child’s life throughout their entire education; he would serve as a permanent escort wherever the child went outside the house, especially to school; he would help them with their homework; and when the young man was studying abroad (as was the case for many), accompany the boy to protect and provide for him. To this end, they were not only charged with the child’s education, they were also charged with his moral protection as well. Their role overall was to train the young child’s character to the path of virtue. Plutarch says, “For tutors (παιδαγωγοί) are the first to receive the child when it has been weaned and, just as nurses mould its body with their hands, so tutors by the habits they inculcate train the child’s character to take a first step, as it were, on the path of virtue” (An. virt. doc. 439F).

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66 See discussion below on page 247 for Apollos as a pedagogue.
67 Cribiore, Gymnastics of the Mind: Greek Education in Hellenistic and Roman Egypt, 105. Both Plutarch (Lib. ed. 15A) and Quintilian (Inst. 6.pr.) show great devotion to their sons’ education. For similar discussion of the early stages of education and family involvement, see Kleijwegt, Ancient Youth, 76–78; Rawson, “The Roman Family,” 38–42; Eyre, “Roman Education in the Late Republic and Early Empire,” 52–53.
68 Beck, Album of Greek Education, images 65, 66, 67, 68, 71, 73, 74, 81, 82, 83.
69 Quintilian, Inst. 1.1.8.
71 Laes, Children in the Roman Empire, 117.
72 It was his teacher of Rhetoric, Theodorus, who first noticed the cruel temper of Tiberius, calling him “mud mixed with blood” (Suetonius, Tib. 57.1).
By referring to other teachers in the Christian community as pedagogues, Paul is able to relativise their roles in comparison to his. Whilst pedagogues were important in the education of the son, they were only ever an extension of the father’s authority. In the same way, these other teachers (including Apollos) are only an extension of his role as the founder and father of the Christian community.

11.3.3 Appropriation of the Metaphor: Paul the Father

Paul then states in 1 Cor 4:15b–16 that they do not have many fathers, but in Christ, he became the Corinthians’ father. As such, he exhorts them to become imitators (μιμηταί) of him.

We have already seen the incredible importance placed on the father in educating and training the son; conversely, there was the requirement of the son to honour and emulate the father. The significance of this relationship in the ancient world makes it an ideal metaphor for Paul to use in defining his relationship to the Corinthians. In discussing this metaphor, scholars have often emphasised the authoritarian role of the pater familias as a main reason for Paul’s choice of it. They argue that Paul is concerned with (re-) establishing his authority in the congregation and the most appropriate way to do that is to present himself as a father.\(^\text{73}\) Certainly there is a sense of familial hierarchy in mind here. In patronal terms, it was the parents who were expected to outdo the children in benefits and services; children were never able, or expected, to repay in kind or equal value, hence they were expected to repay in love and honour.\(^\text{74}\) This is certainly a part of Paul’s understanding of his role, as we see from his statement, “children should not have to save up for their parents, but parents for their children” (2 Cor 12:14). But the assumption that Paul is simply trying to re-establish an asymmetrical authority overlooks the various roles a father had in antiquity.

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\(^{74}\) Marshall, Enmity in Corinth, 248.
Trevor Burke has highlighted five key aspects of this role that serve to illuminate Paul’s usage of this metaphor. The first aspect he sees is the hierarchy established in the family; that is, parent-child relationships were obviously always asymmetrical. Second, he notes the authority accorded to the pater familias; this was an unequivocal authority that the children were expected to submit to. The third factor he notes is imitation. As we have already seen, this is central to the relationship. The fourth aspect he discusses is affection. He says that many Graeco-Roman texts are explicit about the love a parent must have for their child. The final aspect he notes is education.

Burke’s study makes far better sense of the evidence we have seen above. According to this view, Paul, in calling himself a father, is not simply trying to re-establish authority, rather, he wants to re-establish relationship. As an apostle, he has a far more parental role than the many teachers since it was he who gave birth to them in the first place (cf. Gal 4:19). As such, he has the responsibility to raise them, train and admonish them, and ultimately present them to Christ as a pure bride (2 Cor 11:2). But in order for the Corinthians to truly fulfil their calling in Christ, they must become imitators of him.

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75 Trevor J. Burke, “Paul’s Role as ‘Father’ to his Corinthian ‘Children’ in Socio-Historical Context (1 Corinthians 4:14-21),” in Paul and the Corinthians: Studies on a Community in Conflict, ed. by Trevor J. Burke and James Keith Elliott, (NovTSup 109; Leiden: Brill, 2003), 100–105. Schnabel follows this five-fold outline, Schnabel, Der erste Brief des Paulus an die Korinther, 259.

76 For discussion of these first two aspects, see Chris Frilingos, “‘For My Child, Onesimus’: Paul and Domestic Power in Philemon,” JBL 119, no. 1 (2000): 91–104; Lassen, “The Use of the Father Image in Imperial Propaganda and 1 Corinthians 4:14-21”; Richard P. Saller, “Pater Familias, Mater Familias, and the Gendered Semantics of the Roman Household,” CP 94, no. 2 (1999): 182–197. White (“Paul and Pater Familias,” 464) notes that “While the term pater familias does not occur in normal Greek usage, the concept seems still to be alive in Greek cities under Roman rule. The common form in Greek that reflects such patriarchal household order in δικαιοσύνη or just δικαιοσύνη, both meaning ‘ruler of the house.’” However, caution should be maintained when applying these aspects to Paul’s metaphor. Kathy Ehrensperger (Paul and the Dynamics of Power: Communication and Interaction in the Early Christ-Movement, [LNTS 325; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2007], 128) rightly argues that when Paul wants to claim his authority, he more frequently refers to himself as an apostle. In the context of establishing his authority, Paul only twice refers to himself as a parent of the ἐκκλησία (1 Cor 4:15 and Gal 4:19); moreover, in these passages Paul simultaneously refers to himself in a motherly role (1 Cor 3:2 and directly in Galatians), language, she argues, that in a world structured according to dominant male roles, does not provide the strongest support for dominating power.

77 This is indicated most clearly in that the surrounding language of the metaphor in 1 Corinthians is of an educational nature. Ehrensperger concludes that Paul is not seeking to establish a permanent structure of domination and control; this, she suggests, would signal his intent to establish a static hierarchy, that is, according to Roman law, one could not opt out of the family relationship. She argues instead that “To read the metaphor as resonating with the wider educational discourse found in Paul’s letters implies taking into account that the members of the community are in a voluntary relationship with Paul and the wider network of the Christian movement” (Ehrensperger, Paul and the Dynamics of Power, 135–136).

On two occasions in 1 Corinthians (4:16 and 11:1), Paul requests the Corinthians to “become imitators of him” (μιμηταί μου γίνεσθε). This is not the only place that Paul holds himself up as an example for the congregations. Elsewhere, he commends the Thessalonians for becoming imitators of himself and his co-workers (1 Thess 1:6) as well as imitators of the Church in Judea (1 Thess 2:14). He encourages the Philippians to join together in following his example (συμμιμητής) and those who live as he and his co-workers do (Phil 3:17). In fact, Paul only calls churches he founded to imitate him; we could infer from this, that he wants them to draw on memories of his example while he was with them. In other words, as a solution to the many problems in Corinth, Paul wants the Christians to follow his example in the particular situations they have written to him about. For instance, like Paul, (some of) the Corinthians should lay down their rights to eat meat (1 Cor 9). Again, they should imitate the unity demonstrated between himself and Apollos, as opposed to their present divisions over the same. In other words, by presenting himself as their father, he assumes the role of teacher and exemplar. In doing so, he reminds the Corinthians that they are to follow his teachings (since he is an appointed apostle of Christ) and model themselves on his way of life (as he himself follows Christ [1 Cor 11:1]).

In order to remind (ἀναμιμήσκειν) them both of his ways in Christ and what he teaches (διδάσκειν), he says in 1 Cor 4:17 that he is sending to them Timothy. In metaphorical terms, Timothy was their older brother in the family or the more senior student in their class. We saw above (cf. 11.2.1.2), that, according to Quintilian, it was easier and better for a student to imitate their classmates than their teacher. As one of his most trusted co-workers, Paul is clearly confident that Timothy’s example will reflect his own behaviour while he was at Corinth. As Ps.-Plutarch comments, “the memory of past activities serves as a pattern of good counsel for the future” (Lib. ed. 9F). He then finishes the entire section in 1 Corinthians 4:21 with a warning to those who have become puffed up (πεφυσιωμένοι): he

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79 For discussion of Paul’s various uses of imitation language, see Andrew D. Clarke, “‘Be Imitators of Me’: Paul’s Model of Leadership,” TynB 49, no. 2 (1998): 329–360; Castelli, Imitating Paul.


82 Clarke, “‘Be Imitators of Me’: Paul’s Model of Leadership,” 344.

83 Cf. Mitchell, Paul and the Rhetoric of Reconciliation, 53–60. “Because the appeal to himself as example is the unifying rhetorical strategy of the letter, enumerating and describing Paul’s self-references in 1 Corinthians almost amounts to a summary of the contents of the letter.”

84 Quintilian, Inst. 1.2.26.
will return, the question is, as their father, in what manner do they want him to come, with a rod (ἐν ἱππωδω) or in a loving and gentle spirit?

### 11.4 Metaphor 6: The Rod of Discipline (1 Cor 4:19–21)

When Paul threatens to return to Corinth with a rod, he is obviously speaking metaphorically, implying that he would take on the disciplinary role of the father or the schoolmaster. In the ancient world, a father’s absolute sovereignty over his family (patria potestas) and particularly the power of life or death over the children is well attested. But the role of disciplinarian also extended to the teacher, who, as we have seen already, was expected to act like a parent. This meant that, for most students, their experience of school was often one of brutal punishments. In fact, a popular saying in grammatical training was “he who has never received a beating is uneducated.”

#### 11.4.1 The Use of the Rod in Schools

In ancient schools, it was not uncommon for students who were slow to learn or who misbehaved to be punished by beatings with one of several objects: a cane known as a ferule, a whip made of leather cords called a scutia, or a bundle of rods known as virgae. This punishment could also involve senior students. A gem, dating to the Graeco-Roman period, depicts a particularly vicious scene, where one schoolboy is stretched out over the back of an older boy while the teacher beats him with a whip. Obviously this experience was not a fond one for students. Martial says, “What right have you to disturb me, abominable schoolmaster; object abhorred alike by boys and girls? Before the crested cocks have broken silence, you begin to roar out your savage scolding’s and blows” (Epi. 9.68). And he later refers to their

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86 Cf. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. Rom. 2.26–27; Dixon, The Roman Family, 117–118; Garnsey and Saller, The Roman Empire, 136–137; Saller, “Pater Familias, Mater Familias, and the Gendered Semantics of the Roman Household,” et al. It should be noted, however, that despite being a reality in the Republic, the actual incidents of this sort of punishment in the Principate are rarely heard of. See Crook, Law and Life of Rome, 107.

87 Laes, Children in the Roman Empire, 141. See this work also for extensive discussion of the punishment of youth in the ancient world.

88 Bonner, Education in Ancient Rome, 143.

89 Beck, Album of Greek Education, image 275.
rods as hated exceedingly by children, and dear to schoolmasters.\(^{90}\) According to many teachers though, it was a course in virtue to “train the young to endure ‘full many pains and toils.’” This might involve cold baths, whipping the boys, or even scraping their knees with a knife-blade.\(^{91}\) However, not every teacher agreed with these methods. Both Ps.-Plutarch and Quintilian believed that a student would be better led to honourable practices through encouragement and praise; moreover, that the use of floggings and beatings is fit only for slaves.\(^{92}\) Quintilian says that “There will be absolutely no need of such punishment if the master is a thorough disciplinarian;” and besides, “what are you to do with him when he is a young man no longer amenable to such threats and confronted with tasks of far greater difficulty?” (\textit{Inst.} 1.3.15) But despite these occasional reservations, it was common practice for a teacher (or a father) to discipline a child with a rod, making it a very appropriate threat for Paul to finish this section with.

11.4.2 \textit{Appropriation of the Metaphor}

Paul tells the Corinthians that he will return to see them, Lord willing (4:19). The question, however, is with what attitude do they want him to come? On the one hand, he can come with gentleness and love (\textit{ἐν ἀγάπῃ πνεύματι τε πραύτητος}). His language here mirrors Galatians 6:1, where he tells the mature to restore those who are caught in sin with a spirit of gentleness (\textit{ὑμεῖς οἵ πνευματικοὶ καταρτίζετε τὸν τοιοῦτον ἐν πνεύματι πραύτητος}).\(^{93}\) We have explored this passage in several places and have seen the pedagogical nature of the instruction. No doubt for Paul, this is his ideal outcome: he returns to Corinth, and though he may need to admonish them, through their repentance and change of heart, he is able to do so as a loving, gentle father. But in the absence of such change of heart, he is also prepared to come with a rod of discipline.

By using the metaphor of the rod, Paul is drawing on the cultural understanding of discipline and admonition in the classroom and using it in similar terms in how own context.\(^{94}\) Plutarch says that the schoolmaster (\textit{διδάσκαλος}) who strikes one boy admonishes (\textit{νουθετεῖν}) others,\(^{95}\) setting an example for the whole class. In this scenario, Paul still

\(^{91}\) Lucian, \textit{Nigr.} 28.
\(^{92}\) Plutarch, \textit{Lib. ed.} 8F; Quintilian, \textit{Inst.} 1.3.13. Although Kennedy suggests that they would be almost alone in this view (Kennedy, \textit{The Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World}, 491; similarly, Cribiore, \textit{Gymnastics of the mind}, 70).
\(^{94}\) Contra Thiselton, \textit{The First Epistle to the Corinthians}, 378.
\(^{95}\) Plutarch, \textit{Sera.} 560A.
achieves the desired outcome (a repentant church), but it comes at the cost of a disciplined church member(s). But the question remains: what exactly does he intend to do?

11.4.2.1 Suggestions of the Meaning

This metaphor is generally met with ambiguity amongst commentators. Often it is glossed over with little regard to its actual implication; at other times, it is just ignored. Ciampa and Rosner suggest that it refers to what OT wisdom believed a father should use to drive out folly from the heart of children (Prov 22:15; 23:13–14), but they offer no literal explanations of what this discipline might be. Dutch deals with it at length, showing convincingly that the rod was to be understood in the context of discipline in παιδεία, concluding that it is a suitable response to educated elite who would be familiar with this kind of discipline in the gymnasium. But even in such a lengthy treatment, he still offers no suggestion as to what literal implication Paul might have in mind. Some who do offer an explanation see it as a threat of rebuke. Kistemaker suggests that the rod refers to the spiritual power of Christ. As a representative of Christ, he has the capacity to be able to correct the people “with an authoritative Word of God.” Similarly, Robertson and Plummer suggest that it refers to a “spiritual rebuke and discipline.” This is certainly a possibility, but other clues would suggest that Paul has something more serious in mind.

11.4.2.2 The Rod as Excommunication

Burke has drawn attention to the power of the ancient father to expose his unwanted children. He cautions however, that “Paul as the pater to the Corinthians cares too much to throw them on the slag heap.” This cautionary remark is perhaps unwarranted if Paul’s threat is read in conjunction with the following section (1 Cor 5:1–5) where he tells them to remove the
incestuous believer.103 If this is what Paul has in mind, then by threatening to brandish the rod, Paul is in fact (metaphorically) threatening to excommunicate the Christians who are responsible for the rivalries.104 This would certainly fit with the language he has used so far.

Paul has stated in 4:14 that this is a letter of admonition. It must be assumed therefore, that Paul intends it to achieve a resolution to the divisions. Should this letter fail to correct their behaviour, when he comes he will take further action with a rod of discipline. A similar process can be seen in Titus 3:10.105 Here, Paul gives instruction to the young minister in regard to how to deal with a ἁίρεσις; that is, one who causes divisions.106 In the context of Titus, it refers specifically to those who engage in, among other things, foolish controversies (μωραί ζητήσεις). The term is also a cognate of αἵρεσις (faction/sect), a term Paul uses to describe the various groups in Corinth (1 Cor 11:19). Such a person, he says in Titus 3:10, are to be admonished (νομικεῖν) twice and should they fail to heed the correction, are to be rejected (παραιτεῖσθαι). Though this last term is somewhat ambiguous, it is taken by some commentators to mean removal of a person from fellowship, in the same manner as 1 Cor 5:1–5.107

Can this three-fold process be what Paul has in mind in 1 Cor 4:21? If this letter of admonition is the first warning and his impending visit will potentially be accompanied with discipline, that is, a final action, then there would need to be a second warning in between these two. This, I suggest, is possibly the reason for his sending Timothy (1 Cor 4:17), who would arrive in Corinth after the letter’s arrival (cf. 1 Cor 16:10).108 In other words, should Paul’s letter fail in its attempt to correct their divisive behaviour, the Corinthians have a second chance to repent with a follow up visit from Timothy. Should this fail, Paul will be forced to come with a rod (i.e., excommunication). This hypothesis would certainly fit with

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103 For this connection, see Garland, I Corinthians, 149–151; Ciampa and Rosner, The First Letter to the Corinthians, 190.
104 “Möglichweise denkt Paulus an den Ausschluss der Christen aus der Gemeinde, die für die Rivalitäten verantwortlich sind” (Schnabel, Der erste Brief des Paulus an die Korinther, 268; similarly, Weiss, Der erste Korintherbrief, 122). Contra Garland, who suggests that “threatening to come after them with the rod, however, seems a bit extreme to settle such problems” (Garland, I Corinthians, 151). Schnabel rightly notes that this reasoning underestimates “die katastrophalen Konsequenzen, die sich aus fortgesetzter, aus säkularen Quellen gespeister Rivalität für die Existenz der Gemeinde ergeben könnten” (Schnabel, Der erste Brief des Paulus an die Korinther, 268).
106 BDAG, 28.
108 For this chronology, see Ciampa and Rosner, The First Letter to the Corinthians, 188; Barrett, The First Epistle to Corinthians, 116; F. F. Bruce, The Pauline Circle (Eugene: Wipf & Stock, 2006), 32–33; Schnabel, Der erste Brief des Paulus an die Korinther, 264.
the language of the letter. Already in this section, he has told the Corinthians that Timothy is coming to remind them of his ways (4:17). But in 16:10–11 he expresses serious concern about the potential fallout his visit might bring. There, Paul warns the Corinthians that upon his arrival, Timothy is to have nothing to fear; nor, Paul warns, should anyone treat him with contempt. Clearly Timothy has been given a tough assignment, one for which Paul is genuinely concerned for his welfare. It would not be a stretch to imagine that Timothy has been given the ominous task of admonishing certain arrogant members of the congregation.109

It is possible then, that Paul, by threatening to brandish the rod, is in fact threatening to remove the factional members from the church. His tone throughout the entire letter so far has been one of admonition and correction, but the length and detail into which he goes to correct them is indicative of how serious a threat they actually pose. It would not be unreasonable then, to imagine Paul, after exhausting all other options, finally removing them from the fellowship. It seems even more likely when we consider that these factious members appear to have done this very thing to Paul (excommunicated him) upon his eventual arrival.

11.4.3 Summary

In summary, by presenting himself as their father, Paul holds himself up as a model of life in Christ, but at the same time, holds up his own authority as not only an apostle, but also the founder of the church, as the reason for the Corinthians’ imitation of him. Witherington says that, in this passage, “Paul distinguishes himself both from the sort of father figure the emperor might be and from the sort other teachers, especially the Sophists, might be.”110 He is

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109 The reason for Paul’s instruction in regard to Timothy is an issue of uncertainty in scholarship (for discussion of the alternatives, see Garland, I Corinthians, 758–760.). Two possible reasons are suggested for Paul’s concern: first, perhaps Timothy on account of youth or timidity was inadequate for the task of confronting such people. Cf. Morris, The First Epistle of Paul to the Corinthians, 231; Robertson and Plummer, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the First Epistle of St Paul to the Corinthians, 391. Second, the Corinthians may take a negative attitude towards him because of his association with Paul. Cf. Collins, First Corinthians, 596; Horsley, 1 Corinthians, 223. Fee makes the connection between this request and 4:17, where the church is told that Timothy is coming to remind them of Paul’s ways (Fee, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, 821; similarly, Klaiber, Der erste Korintherbrief, 279). This perhaps moves us closer to a solution. We have already seen the words of Plato: “The most effective way of training the young is not (simply) by admonition, but by plainly practising throughout one’s own life the admonitions which one gives to others” (Leg. 729C). Again, Plutarch says that “Philosophers, at any rate, for admonition and instruction, use examples taken from known facts” (Adol. poet. aud. 20C). Admonition was practised in the context of example and memory, suggesting that Timothy’s visit to remind them of Paul’s ways was in fact an admonition of their own present ways. Given the arrogance felt towards Paul at that particular time, this would not have been received well. Moreover, Paul says in the next few verses that Apollos will not be returning; in other words, “although you want Apollos, you’re getting Timothy instead.”

110 Witherington, Conflict and Community in Corinth, 145.
their spiritual father, he is the one who begot them, he is their teacher, he is the one who they should look to as their example, and if need be, he is the one who can discipline them.
CONCLUSIONS FROM PART 3

In the introduction, I noted the comments of Ross Saunders; these are worth restating as we draw out the conclusions of this final part of the study. Saunders argues that the ideals of paideia “are not ignored by Paul: they are recognised and transformed into kingdom paideia.” He says

Christian paideia is aimed … at helping the transformed soul to mature, thus resulting in a way of life that is approved by God. Classical educators believed that transformation of human nature could be brought about by strictly applied paideia. Thus, while the resultant human behaviour may be similar and the ideals bear some outward resemblance, the means of achieving them are different … With the majority of his converts firmly educated in the ideals of Greek paideia—ideals often different from the ideals of the kingdom of God—it is no wonder that Paul has to spend so much time and energy in virtually re-educating them. He does this not by attacking Greek paideia, nor by setting up an alternative education system, but by referring all human ideals and conduct to the nature of God and the example of Jesus.¹

By employing these metaphors, I am not suggesting that Paul is positing an alternative education system. What I am suggesting, however, is that the closest cultural parallel to the church is a type of school that taught a Christian παιδεία; moreover, it is this resemblance which has caused those who have already been educated to try and impose worldly categories onto it.

We saw this clearly in part 2, where Paul was being judged next to Apollos according to categories found in Graeco-Roman παιδεία and had been deemed inferior. There it was also argued that these elite Corinthian Christians had labelled themselves “mature” (τέλειοι). Paul responds by outlining the nature of the wisdom that he preaches and defining true maturity as something that is characterised by Spirit-possession. These πνευματικοί, it was suggested, are the students of Christian παιδεία and in Paul’s view, the true mature ones. But for Paul, the major concern is their low view of his role in the church by comparison to Apollos’. It is to this that he gives the most lengthy and concentrated response in 1 Cor 3–4, and in doing so, he draws on imagery that would be most easily accessible to his hearers and most appropriate to the situation: imagery of education.

The purpose of Paul’s metaphorical language is threefold: first, it serves to demonstrate that the Corinthian behaviour in general is childish. Second, it serves to describe his and Apollos’ roles as only part of a bigger picture that involved other teachers, and ultimately God.

Third and most importantly, it presents his role in terms of the most important mentor and role model: their father. But does all of this metaphorical language reveal more about the situation than meets the eye? More specifically, since the divisions have occurred ultimately between Paul and the Apollos faction, can something of Paul’s attitude towards Apollos’ ministry be inferred?

It is often assumed in scholarship that Paul is on good terms with Apollos. The general tone of Paul’s discussion regarding Apollos seems to point to this conclusion. For example, in 1 Corinthians 3:5 Paul asks rhetorically “What then, is Apollos? What is Paul? Servants through whom you believed.” He says similarly in 4:1, “this is how one should regard us, as servants of Christ and stewards of the mysteries of God.” Again, in 3:21–23 he states emphatically: “let no one boast in men. For all things are yours, whether Paul or Apollos or Cephas or the world or life or death or the present or the future—all are yours, and you are Christ’s, and Christ is God’s.” These verses seem to suggest that Paul has no problem in being associated with Apollos as a fellow worker in Christ; moreover, he sees both of their roles as being subservient to God. Again, in 16:12, Paul responds to an urgent request from the Corinthians for Apollos’ return (most likely from the leaders of his faction). The fact that Paul was able to take the request directly to Apollos would at least suggest that they were on speaking terms and in close proximity. In the same place, he also refers to Apollos as “brother” (ἄδελφος), leaving little doubt that Paul recognises his place in the community. Their cooperation seems to be further demonstrated in 3:6–7, where Paul reminds them that he planted the initial seeds of the gospel, and after him, Apollos watered. In this passage, they are both presented as important figures in an ongoing process; that is, both have different roles, and each role is necessary for the other to work. However, their value in this process is overshadowed by the role of God, who vindicates their work by making it grow. Again, Paul relegates the significance of their roles to that of servants of God, saying in 3:7 that neither the one who sows nor the one who waters is anything; the only person who matters is God. If these passages are taken at face value, and we assume that Paul is being sincere, then it is

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3 Welborn, An End to Enmity, 411.
4 Ker, “Paul and Apollos—Colleagues or Rivals?,” 93.
5 Ibid., 94. Additionally, Apollos’ refusal to return would indicate that he shares Paul’s opinion regarding the divisions and is therefore hesitant to return for fear of inflaming them. Cf. Fee, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, 824; Thielton, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, 1332; Barrett, The First Epistle to Corinthians, 392; Witherington, Conflict and Community in Corinth, 317. Whatever the reason for Apollos’ refusal to return, it likely resulted in the church bringing in other teachers. See Winter, Philo and Paul among the Sophists, 142, 243.
perfectly reasonable to suggest that Paul considers Apollos to be not only a fellow worker, but also a brother.

But as it has been argued throughout this thesis, in 1 Corinthians 1–4, Paul wants to establish his own authority in the community. It would stand to reason then, that he needs to downplay Apollos’ role in order to elevate his own (at least in the eyes of the Apollos faction), while at the same time, maintaining an appearance of unity between the men. This is perhaps the reason why he chose to describe the various roles in metaphorical terms. On the one hand, each metaphor appears to present himself and Apollos on equal terms; on the other hand, the particular images chosen have an inherent hierarchy that places Paul above Apollos.

In 3:1–4, Paul reminds them of his love and concern for them; but at the same time, he also points out his own superiority when it comes to the things of God. Not only are they still immature and in need of milk, it is from him that they need it. By portraying himself alone in terms of a nurse or mother, it might be inferred that Paul sees the infant stages of their growth as his exclusive responsibility. In 3:6–9, both Paul and Apollos are presented as farmers who each have assigned tasks: Paul plants and Apollos waters. However, as Ker notes, “One might suppose that it is the universal principle that the one who plants has a greater claim on the work than the one who waters.” Welborn suggests further that in this metaphor, “Apollos is, figuratively, Paul’s ‘water-boy.’” Moreover, in 3:8–9, Paul draws a further distinction between their tasks and their ultimate reward. He says that the one who plants and the one who waters indeed have one purpose, in fact they are co-workers on behalf of God (3:9); however, they will each be rewarded according to their own labour. This would seem to imply that Paul wants to separate himself from Apollos’ work.

Furthermore, in 3:10, Paul tells them that he laid the foundation as a wise builder, but now an unnamed builder is building on it. Two things might be inferred from this: first, the builder only had a place to work because Paul first laid a foundation and what can be built is contingent on the foundation itself. Second, the unnamed builder is most likely a reference to Apollos and the wood, hay, and straw of 3:12 would denote his polished rhetoric and σωφία.

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6 Ker, “Paul and Apollos—Colleagues or Rivals?,” 84.
7 Cf. Francis, “‘As Babes in Christ’ - Some Proposals Regarding 1 Corinthians 3:1-3,” 54.
8 Ker, “Paul and Apollos—Colleagues or Rivals?,” 86; Collins, First Corinthians, 146; Joop F. M. Smit, “‘What Is Apollos? What Is Paul?’ in Search for the Coherence of First Corinthians 1:10-4:21,” NovT 44, no. 3 (2002): 242. Witherington (Conflict and Community in Corinth, 132) says that “Paul claims to be the planter of the congregation, Apollos only watered. This means that Paul came first, laid the foundation, and converted the Corinthians, that Apollos nurtured them, and that a certain distinction of labor exists between Paul and Apollos.”
9 Welborn, An End to Enmity, 373.
10 For this rendering of θεοῦ γὰρ ἐσμὲν συνεργοί, see Victor P. Furnish, “Fellow Workers in God’s Service,” JBL 80, no. 4 (1961): 369.
11 For support of the suggestion that this is Apollos, see Barrett, The First Epistle to Corinthians, 87; Witherington, Conflict and Community in Corinth, 133; Kistemaker, 1 Corinthians, 110; Horsley, 1 Corinthians,
which some of the Corinthians are running after. This does not have to be taken as a rebuke of Apollos’ style, rather, it is a warning to anyone that would follow in his footsteps: on the day of judgement, rhetorical skills will simply count for nothing. This is further supported by other verses in our passage. In 1 Cor 1:17 Paul tells them that he did not preach with wisdom and eloquence, in order that the cross of Christ be emptied of its power. In 1 Cor 2:1, he reiterates this point, saying that his preaching was not in demonstrations of superior speech and wisdom. Timothy Lim argues that in this description of his initial ministry, Paul appears “not only to be manifesting the worldly humility which is characteristic of the theology of the cross, but also to be contrasting himself to the other Corinthian preachers.” Welborn takes Lim’s suggestion further, arguing that “It is unlikely that the ‘eloquent wisdom’ with which Paul contrasts his own proclamation can have belonged to anyone other than Apollos.” In other words, Paul wants to make it clear that, not only is his role superior to Apollos’, but what they deem to be Apollos’ greatest contribution—and indeed, the thing that makes him superior to Paul—is actually of lesser worth.

Finally, Paul says in 4:15–16 that they have in Christ a multitude of pedagogues, but they do not have many fathers. Apollos, I suggest, is just one amongst these many pedagogues; Paul, on the other hand, is their father, an authority that surpassed any other tutor or pedagogue. This is an exclusive role that Paul claims for himself. Moreover, the paternal metaphor comes at the climax of the entire section, suggesting its priority in Paul’s

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13 Similarly, Horsley, who suggests that this is an example of covert allusion in order to be less offensive (Horsley, 1 Corinthians, 65).

14 For this suggestion, see Welborn, Paul, the Fool of Christ, 108–109; Ker, “Paul and Apollos—Colleagues or Rivals?,” JSNT 22, no. 77 (2000): 85; Fee, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, 185. Furnish (“Fellow Workers in God’s Service,” 370) suggests that this is in reference to the local leaders or troublemakers. In the overall argument of the passage, this would imply, among others, Apollos.

overall self-description. We have seen the importance of the father’s role in antiquity, so it would be hard to imagine that the significance would be lost on the Corinthians. But within the context of this metaphor, Paul also tells them that he is sending Timothy to remind them of his ways. It is interesting to note, that in 4:6, Paul holds up himself and Apollos as models of imitation. But now he suggests that the closest example of his own life is in fact Timothy. His reasons seem obvious: Paul wants to avoid further division by sending “his own true son” and their older brother Timothy as opposed to Apollos.¹⁷

It would seem then, that underlying Paul’s metaphorical language was an attempt to reassert his primary role in the congregation. Barnett argues that “Paul is ‘the planter,’ ‘the foundation layer’ and ‘the father’ with Apollos playing a lesser role in each case. With great diplomacy Paul manages to relegate a subsidiary role to Apollos while not dis-affirming his ministry and thereby bringing continuing divisions in Corinth.”¹⁸ In other words, at every point throughout this section, Paul skilfully draws on imagery from a person’s upbringing and education and places himself in a principal position. He presents himself as the chief authority in God’s household, the ὀικονόμος; one, as we saw, who has authority over any household tutors. At the same time, he presents himself as the most important authority, instructor, and role model that the Corinthians had, their father. Furthermore, he is indeed a teacher, but his teaching takes precedence in that he is also an apostle; that is, all others teachers must faithfully continue the work that he first established. Finally, though he is by no means the founder of the “Christian school”—this is obviously Christ—of all the would-be teachers who may come through Corinth, it is Paul who they must imitate, since it is he who most closely conforms to the founder’s life and doctrine.

¹⁷ He also holds up the household of Stephanas as an appropriate model to submit to (1 Cor 16:15–16). Cf. David G. Horrell, “Leadership Patterns and the Development of Ideology in Early Christianity,” SR 58, no. 4 (1997): 326.
CHAPTER 12: CONCLUSION

I began this thesis with the suggestion that 1 Corinthians 1–4 deals, primarily, with two opposing factions: one loyal to their teacher Paul and the other to their teacher Apollos. More specifically, I argued that the divisions have come about because the Apollos faction has favoured their teacher over Paul, and this on account of his more closely resembling teachers of Graeco-Roman παιδεία.

1 Corinthians 1–4 presents a series of issues that, I suggest, can all be explained against a backdrop of ancient education. In the second part of the thesis, we saw that the misconceptions over the wisdom (σοφία) and content of the Christian message (1:18–25); confusion over the particular status of the “chosen ones” (1:26–31), false expectations over the rhetorical style of the Christian teacher, and, within that, disdain at Paul’s refusal to employ contemporary oratorical methods (i.e., “wise speech,” σοφία λόγου) in his own preaching (2:1–5), and finally, a false understanding of what determined the quality and character of the “mature ones” (τέλειοι/πνευματικοί) in Christ (2:6–16) can all be explained in the context of first-century schools of oratory and philosophy.

Graeco-Roman παιδεία was a characteristic by which a person was honoured. It was a mark of culture that set its possessor apart from the common masses who did not have the means to receive an education. It was what determined an elite person’s fitness to engage in public life and was what prepared them for civic leadership. Moreover, as a mark of status, it brought with it a sense of superiority on the part of the possessor. We saw that in the Corinthian Christian community there was a small handful of wealthy members who themselves had most likely received this kind of education and it was this that was informing their opinion of Paul’s ministry. I argued that, during his first stay in Corinth, some of these elite members saw in him a level of education that would have enabled him to engage them at their educated level. Problems arose, however, when in Apollos they saw something far superior. Competition and comparison was inevitable and the Apollos faction judged Paul to be inferior on two major issues.

First, ethical categories taught in philosophical schools and embodied in the (I have suggested, Stoic) σοφός, who was the epitome of human achievement, were influential in their (mis)understanding of the “wisdom of God.” Some of the elite Corinthians felt that they had attained lofty heights in Christ, far superior to Paul, who was, by contrast to Apollos, a
μωρός. In response to this, Paul draws a sharp distinction between himself and these members, characterising his life and ministry in the worst possible terms in order to demonstrate how closely his own life resembles what God is seeking and what it looks like to embody Christian παιδεία. More importantly, Paul notes that the true embodiment of God’s wisdom, and the head of the Christian school is not a human teacher, but is in fact Christ. Second, these members have evaluated Paul’s weak persona and poor rhetorical ability as an embarrassing contrast to the eloquent orators to whom he was being compared. In response, Paul demonstrates that this conscious choice to appear weak and fearful is what aligned him with the “curriculum” of Christian παιδεία, that is, the foolish message of the cross.

As a result of these misconceptions, Paul’s critics have deemed themselves to be “mature” (τέλειοι) and the weaker members have likely supported these claims due to the cultural understanding that a person who possesses παιδεία is worthy of such honour. Paul responds by outlining the nature of the wisdom that he preaches and defining true maturity as something that is characterised by (among other things) Spirit-possession. These πνευματικοί, it was suggested, are the students of Christian παιδεία and in Paul’s view, the true mature ones.

In the third part of the thesis, we saw that Paul, in 1 Corinthians 3–4, employs a series of six metaphors in order to explicate what exactly his role should look like. Here he presents himself as a mother (3:1–4), a farmer (3:5–9), a wise master builder (3:10–15), a household steward (οἴκουνόμος, 4:1–5), and finally, a father brandishing a rod (4:14–17). The meaning of these metaphors, it was argued, can be found in ancient education. Paul is attempting to redefine his role as an apostle and a teacher of Christian παιδεία with imagery familiar to the Corinthians from their own educational milieu. Additionally, by employing metaphorical language, Paul is able to subtly re-establish his own authority in the church by pointing to the primacy of his role. Paul is not an authoritarian leader, however, as an apostle of Christ, he is ultimately responsible for his churches; like a father, he is concerned with the well-being of his children.

For those familiar with 1 Corinthians, these findings may come as little surprise; for decades now, it has been demonstrated the attitudes of these elite Corinthians and their views toward Paul and Apollos have been shaped by their experience of ancient education. We saw in the literature review that many of the issues that Paul is dealing with in Corinth can be explained by the particular doctrines of different philosophical or rhetorical schools. However, these studies that attempt to locate the problems in a particular sect or branch of higher studies are always faced with two challenges. First, even if a particular philosophical school can explain some of the issues raised in Corinth, it cannot explain them all. Second, although it is
clear that philosophical schools offer an appropriate backdrop to some of the language and values of the Corinthians (e.g., 1:18–25, 4:8–13); other issues can only be explained by the rhetorical schools (2:1–5). In fact, what these studies demonstrate is the eclectic nature of Graeco-Roman παιδεία in that a student of philosophy learnt oratory and a student of oratory learnt philosophy. Moreover, even within the philosophical schools, ideas were incorporated from other sects. Add to this the fact that some of the Corinthians are trying to incorporate these ideas into their Christian faith. What we are dealing with is not a single strand of doctrinal thought (though I have suggested that it was predominantly Stoic influence; this does not preclude other schools of thought, it simply reflects the popularity of the school in the first century), or one particular branch of higher studies, but rather, an amalgamation of ideas and values from the educational milieu of first-century Roman Corinth.

By taking this more general approach to 1 Corinthians 1–4, I hope I have been able to demonstrate that it was values drawn from the more generic category of “higher education” that are causing the conflict in the Christian community. Such an approach unshackles the interpreter from trying to locate the problems in one particular school and enables a sustained reading of the entire section, offering a plausible backdrop to every step of Paul’s argument. While it is fair to say that such an approach is messier and less precise than a single alternative, it is actually a more accurate reflection of the educational milieu of the first century. Figures such as Seneca the younger, Dio Chrysostom, Plutarch, and others like them, though perhaps claiming allegiance to a certain school, are not strict embodiments of any single one; but rather, the are an eclectic mix of different strands of thought and training. They are, however, the embodiments of elite values, figures with important public profiles, wealthy, eloquent, and wise. It is this kind of figure, I suggest, that the Corinthians looked for in their own teachers.

As with most projects of its kind, this study opens up further possibilities for research. For example, 1 Corinthians 1–4 is only half the story. From here it must be asked, how does this inform our reading of 2 Corinthians 10–13? Can what has been seen here give further clarity to something about Paul’s Jewish opponents that have been brought in to replace him? Beyond this, can these findings give further insight into the situation presented in 1 Cor 12–14, where the community is dividing over gifts of speech and knowledge? Answers to such question must await a later time; for now, however, the present study is complete.
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