POLITICS AND POLICY:
An analysis of the policy environment and motivating factors behind the English Language Policy in Rwanda.

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This thesis is presented as a partial fulfilment to the requirements for the Postgraduate Certificate in Research Preparation (Humanities).

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Declaration

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Synopsis

This thesis aims to examine the motivating factors behind the English Language Policy in Rwanda. This policy was implemented in late 2008 and represents a shift in the linguistic landscape of Rwanda from an era of trilingualism to bilingualism. Subsequently, French is no longer the medium of instruction in education or the language of choice in business and government. This policy reflects the various policy networks and elite in Rwanda and is anchored in the policy environment of the state.

Chapter 1 provides some initial insights into the background of Rwanda’s history and the English Language Policy. It presents a conceptual framework for this research by examining three theories, namely Elite Theory, Policy Networks and the policy environment which are highly applicable to the Rwandan context.

Chapter 2 examines the history of Rwanda from pre-colonial times to present day. This confers an understanding of the policy environment and particularly the changing elite, ideologies and policies of the state.

Chapter 3 explores public policy with an emphasis on the public motivations behind the English Language Policy in Rwanda. It analyses the motivations of globalisation and geostrategic pragmatism, the reasons given by policy-makers for the design of this policy.

Chapter 4 addresses the hidden motivations behind this policy, namely the anti-French sentiment in the Rwandan state due to the explicit involvement of French actors in the years leading up to and during the genocide of 1994.
Chapter 5 asserts that the English Language Policy was written as a result of both the public and hidden motivations of elites in positions of power in Rwanda. Furthermore, it formulates recommendations for further research.
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Finally, this thesis is dedicated to my friends and teaching colleagues in Rwanda, who have faced much adversity in life and though now are in their 30’s and 40’s, are endeavouring to learn the English language.
Glossary

BC – British Council
CHOGM – Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting
DRC – Democratic Republic of Congo
EAC – East African Community
MINEDUC – Ministry of Education
OIF – Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie
PARMEHUTU – Part of the Hutu Emancipation Movement
REAP – Rwanda English Action Program
RPA – Rwandese Patriotic Army
RPF – Rwandese Patriotic Front
UK – United Kingdom
UN – United Nations
UNAMIR – United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda
UNAR – Union National Rwandaise
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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Background of the research

Rwanda, the land of a thousand hills, is a landlocked state situated in Eastern Africa that has a democratically elected government. It is the most densely populated state in Africa, being the home of close to 10.5 million people (CIA World Factbook 2009, p.542). It was first colonised by Germany in the 1880s and by Belgium after the First World War until independence in 1962. During this era, French was introduced as the second official language after the national language, Kinyarwanda. Colonial policies, such as ethnic identity cards and indirect rule, were introduced resulting in the indoctrination of the ethnic identities of the three tribes Hutu, Tutsi and Twa. Ethnic identity is dynamic and multilayered, consisting of the socially constructed aspects of ethnicity that relate to ethnic boundaries and cultures as defined through social interactions inside and outside communities (Nagel 1994, p.152).

Consequently, the production of ethnic identities was to become the political undoing of the state where, nearly 100 years after the first colonisation, Rwanda was split apart by ethnic schisms “by a ‘modern’ world in pursuit of geo-strategic, economic and political ambitions” (Wallis 2007, p.9). The 1994 genocide of Rwanda has left a lasting mark on the political, cultural and emotional psyche of the state and those who call it home. In 100 days it is estimated that nearly 1 million people, mostly classified as ethnically Tutsi or moderate Hutu, were annihilated. Many investigations have been undertaken to determine the exact nature of events during this period and subsequently, France has been implicated in the genocide regime.

The French state became actively involved in Rwandan politics after independence. Additionally, the state actors formed political as well as personal ties. French policy in Africa has continually been founded on personal ties between respective presidents, their ministers and business leaders. In Rwanda, it was these personal ties that were to direct France into the heart of genocide (Wallis 2007, p.12). Both during and after the genocide, the French are accused of collaborating with the extremist Hutu government in planning and plotting the
annihilation of the Tutsi population. Consequently, the post-genocide Rwandan government has gradually cemented the separation from all things French, beginning with the introduction of a trilingual policy to include English as an official language just a few months after the end of the genocide. In late 2008, the government announced a change in this policy, known as the English Language Policy, which is to be implemented immediately. This policy deems that French is no longer to be the language of choice for government, education and business. Instead, English is to be spoken denoting a state shift from Francophone to Anglophone influence and from trilingualism to bilingualism.

The aim of this research thesis is to describe and analyse the motivating agendas behind the decision-making process of the English language policy, which was introduced in Rwanda in October 2008. The research explores a range of factors that have influenced Rwandan policy-makers by examining the links between the official and unofficial reasons behind the policy in conjunction with the historical, political and ethnic factors that are unique to the Rwandan context. The major issue of interest in this research is to examine the key elements that contributed to the policy decision-making process of the English Language Policy. These issues are the Rwandan government’s need for globalisation, the geostrategic pragmatism of commerce in the East African Community (EAC) (of which Rwanda is a member) and the state agenda against the Francophone states of Belgium and particularly France, for their purportedly detrimental involvement in Rwanda’s history. The main research questions guiding this study are:

1. What are the historical and political factors that have contributed to the introduction of the English language policy?

2. What are some of the likely implications of this policy for Rwanda?

The research incorporates a review of literature from the areas of Political Science, History and Linguistics. The study is qualitative, primarily using secondary sources and a deductive method. The research questions are anchored in two theories within the framework of policy analysis, namely Elite Theory and Policy Networks. The policy environment of the Rwandan context is also examined.
1.2 Elite Theory and the role of elites in Rwanda

There are many policy theories to consider when analysing public policy. Two of the main theoretical frameworks in policy analysis include Rational Choice Theory and Incrementalism. The rational choice model maintains that policy is composed as a consequence of policy-makers making a deliberate choice amongst alternatives (Stone 2002, p. 199). Incrementalism originates in the work of Charles Lindblom where he established an approach termed ‘successive limited comparisons,’ where policy originates from an existing situation and is ‘incrementally’ changed over time (Hill 1997, p.101). Stone contends that Incrementalism is an ‘unrealistic production model’ whereby policy is built in stages, as if on ‘a conveyer belt’ (Stone 2002, p. xi-xii). While there is value in both of these policy theories, neither addresses the issue of the impact of ideological influences on policy which is the focus of this research (Hill 1997, p.99). This thesis does not explore the intricacies of this policy, rather, the influences of elites and the resulting policy networks in Rwanda’s history is emphasised. As a result, Elite Theory and Policy Networks are the main frameworks used in this research. These concepts expound the influencing and motivating factors of policy-makers in the English Language Policy.

Classical elite theory is founded on the works of Pareto, Mosca and Michels (Etzioni-Halevy 1997, p.44). This theory is particularly relevant in the Rwandan context due to the presence of elites in government pre- and post-1994. The existence and influence of elites in the Rwandan state is expanded further in the proceeding chapters. Elite theory defines the elite as political persons of education and of administrative experience (Mills 1970, p.120). They are not necessarily of aristocratic heritage or nobility (Mills 1970, p.126), however, the current Head of State, President Kagame, claims a lineage with the former Rwandan monarchy (Waugh 2004, p.8). The theory asserts that political elites attain their positions in a number of ways: through revolutionary defeat, military victory, the control of water power or by commanding the control of economic resources (Hill 1997, p.43). The first two ways are particularly relevant for Rwandan elites. Mills (1970, p.132) explains that the elite determine their own duties, as well as the duties of those underneath them. They give the orders and are not merely bureaucrats, instead they command bureaucracies. Keynes (1970, p.29) asserts
that “the power drive is the animus of the elite” agreeing with Morgenthau (1978, p.29) that “international politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power”.

Indeed, it is the attainment and control of power that is the basis for all social relationships in Elite Theory (Keynes 1970, p.28). Hill & Klarner (2002, p.1134) acknowledge that classical Elite Theory may appear dated, however, concern with elite power in general as well as power economically remain a central theme in political science today. The theory has evolved over many decades and occupies political theory particularly in the arena of democracy, which deposits responsibility on elites in maintaining democratic states even in the midst of antidemocratic threats (Gibson & Anderson 1985, pp. 134-145). In recent years, elite theory has evolved into neo-elitism and is still that maintains a foundation on much of the original research of classical Elite Theory.

Neo-elitism examines the role of ideas in transforming public policies and the various functions that bureaucrats and politicians play in the decision-making process (Genieys 2005, p.423). Research has been undertaken in “the study of elites as a way of understanding changing regimes” (Genieys 2005, p.414). Therefore, this research is highly applicable to the study of elites in Rwanda’s various regime changes and thus, ideological and policy differences. This modified version of Elite Theory links the diverse patterns of regimes and their wider political context to transformations of state elites and the ensuing policies. Higley, Burton and Field (1990, p.421) argue that Elite Theory elucidates the flow of modern political history with contemporary events ‘better than competing theories.’ Genieys (2005, p.424) agrees that neo-elite theory has ‘opened a fertile area’ for the analysis of public policies, particularly in examining the role of actors in policy-making.

Subsequently, it is vital to understand the worldview of elites when they formulate public decisions. This neo-elitist perspective can be interpreted as a reconsideration of the role of bureaucratic elites in the state transformation process (Genieys 2005, p.424). This most recent approach to the study of elites also considers the “programmatic ideas that elites generate and the strategic positions that they occupy,” in order to understand and analyse the
changes taking place in a government” (Genieys & Smyrl 2008, p.76). Reyntjens maintains that in the Rwandan context, elites hold senior positions in the currently elected government, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which he claims “is essentially a Tutsi movement which serves to maintain a small Tutsi elite in power” (Reyntjens 2006, p.1110). Hintjens (2008, p.13) agrees with Reyntjens that this “small group (of elite) virtually monopolises the top echelon of the government ministries and of the military.”

The dominant Rwandan elite mainly have strong Anglophone influences or backgrounds, having returned to Rwanda after living in either Uganda or Tanzania for long periods, and are favoured above their fellow skilled Francophone compatriots (Hintjens 2008, p.13). These ‘programmatic elite’ have direct access to policy-making positions and are “agents of endogenous policy change” (Genieys & Smyrl 2008, p.76). In years to come, this may lead to renewed acute violence and therefore, the way policy is written and implemented needs to be thoroughly considered (Reyntjens 2004, p.177). The case of the elite in Rwanda is discussed in the later chapters, particularly in Chapters 2 and 3.

1.3 Policy Networks

The second theory utilised in this research is Policy Networks. Policy Networks are political structures that consist of relationships within the networks. These relationships are structural as they delineate the roles that actors play inside networks; stipulate the issues, which are examined and how to handle them; have distinguished sets of rules; and include ‘organisational imperatives.’ Consequently, there is major pressure to preserve networks (Marsh & Smith 2000, p. 5). There are three theoretical schools within Policy Networks; American, European and British. It is the latter that is mainly utilised in this thesis with a particular emphasis on the work of Marsh, Rhodes and Smith. The American school of Policy Networks emphasises the basis of a sub-government through continual contact between interest groups, bureaucratic agencies and government (Marsh 1998, p.4). Meanwhile, the European approach views the expansion of networks as signalling a new form of government and as such, having a much broader significance (Marsh 1998, p.3).
The British system examines the relationship between “networks as structures and patterns of behaviour between agents” (Marsh 1998, p.10). It stipulates that factors ‘exogenous’ to the network result in change in both the network and the policy addressed within the network (Marsh & Rhodes 1992, p.257). Evidently the context in which a network is situated impinges on the shape of the network as well as the behaviour of the agents within the network (Marsh 1998, p.11). The concept of policy networks “describes the general properties of the process by which some of the members of one or more policy communities interact” (Wright 1988, p.606). These policy communities are sets of actors who cluster together around a set of policy issues (Dunn & Perl 1994, p.312). In state-directed networks, of which Rwanda is one, the current policy community and “the political administrative style is one of managerial directive followed by a polite briefing” (Atkinson & Coleman 1989, p.59).

Marsh and Smith (2000, p.6) discuss the defining of networks by roles and responses. They emphasise that networks are not neutral as they reflect past power distributions and conflicts and shape present political outcomes. Accordingly, when a decision is reached within a specific network, it is not merely the result of ‘a rational assessment of available options,’ as rational choice theorists would propose, but rather, a reflection of past conflicts and the values and culture of the decision-makers (Marsh & Smith 2000, pp.6-7). They go on to form a ‘dialectical model of policy networks,’ which highlights the relations in policy networks, firstly acknowledging that the structural context affects both the structure of the network and the resources that actors have to employ within the network. Secondly, an actor’s skills utilised within a network is a result of both their intrinsic skill and the learning process they have been through (Marsh & Smith 2000, pp. 9 – 10). Hay (1995, p.281) terms this as a ‘strategic learning process.’

Changes within networks are largely in relation to changes in the context or the environment in which the network is situated. As discussed previously, the change is usually due to exogenous factors to the network that may affect the interests and resources of actors within a network (Marsh & Smith 2000, p.8). Thus, the Rwandan political environment provides a unique context from which to examine policy networks. The elite are at the forefront of the
key policy networks in Rwanda and, according to Marsh and Smith, are therefore influenced by exogenous factors when composing policies. This is particularly discussed in Chapters 3 and 4 where the official reasons; globalisation and membership of the EAC; and the unofficial reason; the French involvement in the genocide; behind the formation of the English Language Policy are examined.

1.4 Understanding the policy environment

A third essential area relevant to the Rwandan public policy context is the policy environment. Anderson (2002, pp.44-46) describes the policy environment as being a combination of the political culture and the socioeconomic conditions of a state. He goes on to explain that the political culture entails the widely held values, attitudes and beliefs of what governments should do and that it is impossible to separate social and economic factors in a state. Therefore, in order to understand policy-making, all these factors must be considered. Birkland (2005, p.5), however, unveils another key aspect of a state’s policy environment. Birkland states that in order to understand a policy environment of a state, it is essential to understand the history of that state. This particular aspect occurs in Chapter 2, which provides a contextual framework of Rwanda’s policy environment, exploring the political and cultural context with a particular emphasis on the history of the formation of the Rwandan state, colonial policies and the associated ethnic schisms.

Similarly, Manyard-Moody and Herbert (1989, p.142) maintain that the contextual setting within which policy-making occurs has a substantial impact on the policy process and on policy results. Additionally, Simmons et al. (1974, p.461) contend that the “technological, cultural and physical setting is also relevant” to the policy environment. Malone (2005, p.142) concurs that the assessment of the policy environment denotes becoming aware of factors beyond “the institutional level and understanding the dynamic nature of policy arenas.” The policy environment is continually considered throughout this thesis as it provides a contextual framework for the examination of the English Language Policy. The research concludes that the policy has been composed and implemented as a result of both the public and hidden factors outlined in this thesis.
Chapter 2: The Political Origins of Ethnic Identity in Rwanda

2.1 Rwanda’s historical narrative

Rwanda has a complex historical narrative that has been employed in various ways to polarise and politicise social relations (Rutembesa 2002, p.83). Most catastrophically, this history has been exploited to promote hatred, culminating in the genocide of 1994 that has left a significant imprint on all elements of Rwandan society. As a consequence, the history of Rwanda is still a highly contested subject, especially as it defines “the role and significance of ethnicity and the relations between Hutu and Tutsi which lie at the core of past violence and future peace” (Buckley-Zistel 2009, p.31). It is within this conceptual framework that examines the political and historical development of the formation of the state of Rwanda, that public policy needs to be contextualized. This includes the recent English Language Policy announced by the Rwandan government, which removes the French language from the areas of government, business and education. Instead, the policy embraces the English language as the medium of instruction and communication in all spheres of government and Rwandan society.

This chapter provides initial insights into the Rwandan policy environment with a particular emphasis on the political, socioeconomic and historical factors as outlined by Anderson (2002, pp.44-46) and Birkland (2005, p.5). The formation of the Rwandan state, from pre-colonial times to present day, including the politicised construction of ethnic identities and the divisive class distinctions that led to the genocide of 1994, is discussed. The aim of this research is to describe and analyse the motivating factors behind the design of the English Language Policy. Thus, as Birkland (2005, p.5) emphasises, it is essential to understand the complex background of the state of Rwanda when analysing public policy as it provides the policy environment in which new government strategies are constructed. The chapter provides a conceptual framework of the policy environment for Chapters 3 and 4 and demonstrates the influence of elites, of both Rwandan and colonial origin, on the political culture leading up to the genocide and in the years afterwards in the rebuilding mode of the state.
Additionally, the influence of elites is a fundamental aspect of this chapter, examining their changing roles and influence pre- and post-1994. As Dror (1983, p.287) explains, “Public policy-making is circumscribed and basically shaped by the social ecology.” This chapter firstly reviews two contesting theories of historical accounts of the origin of the state of Rwanda prior to colonisation. Secondly, it focuses on the days of colonisation by the Belgians and the various political initiatives and policies implanted during this era that have contributed to ethnic hatred between the Hutu, Tutsi and Twa. It is within the Belgian colonial context that the French language was first introduced to Rwanda. Thirdly, it briefly describes the Rwandan revolution in the 1960s, which led to decolonisation and independence from Belgium and further sealed the foundation for future atrocities. It is during this era that a change in the ethnicity of elites occurred, namely from Tutsi to Hutu, thus changing the policy networks and environment and leading to policies against the Tutsi. Fourthly, it provides information on the political climate in Rwanda in the early to mid-1990s. Finally, Rwanda’s current political system is reviewed.

2.2 Rwanda in Pre-colonial Times

The historical development of the Rwandan polity prior to ‘the Scramble for Africa’ is particularly contested and contorted by debates over ethnic origins and the rise of the pre-colonial Rwandan state. In particular, debates have reignited in recent times due to the central focus of the recent ‘cataclysms’ that have purged the region (Newbury 2001, p.257). Recreating the history of a predominantly oral society is difficult (Uvin 1999, p.254); however, understanding this part of the history of Rwanda formulates the policy environment and is thus important when illuminating contemporary policies. A further difficulty in elucidating the pre-colonial history of this region is that much of the historical accounts originate either from the colonisers or from Rwandans who lived much later along the historical timeline and recall events as secondary observers. Historiographically, the same code of history utilised in the Western world cannot be applied to non-Western pasts as “the object of enquiry does not belong to the same tradition as the enquiring subject” (Seth 2008, p.223).
There are several differing accounts of Rwandan pre-colonial history, two of which are discussed here. These contrasting theories paint a cultural, political and ethnical background that is filled with confusion and discrepancies. According to Uvin (2001, p.76), these narratives about Rwanda’s past can be distinguished according to whether they advocate an essentialist or a social-constructivist view. He explains that the essentialist discourse of the political system of pre-colonial Rwanda revolves around the demarcation of the Rwandan people. In other words, the Hutu and Tutsi people are entirely different races with separate histories, moral and ethical features. This theory formed the basis for the genocidal ideologies held by Hutu extremists.

In contrast, Uvin (2001, pp.76-77) asserts that the social-constructivist viewpoint is associated with the manner in which Hutu, Tutsi and Twa tribes were seen to be politically and socially connected with the land. This theory holds that there is no ethnical differentiation between the three groups of people; rather, Rwandans have the one origin. Their classification is not based on ethnicity; it is based upon a Rwandan’s wealth and connection with the land. The mode of production and farming was associated with a particular group – Tutsi with cattle, Hutu with agriculture and Twa with trapping and hunting. Those that had power over the cattle, the Tutsi, were the ruling elite (Newbury 2001, p.258). As such, the Tutsi were the chiefs of the land, however, there were many intermarriages between Tutsi and Hutu.

There was opportunity within the political structures, however, for a Hutu to rise up in the owning of cattle and land. This was termed kwihutura, literally meaning to ‘shed Hutuness.’ Conversely, a process called gucipira existed where it was possible for a Tutsi to be reduced to a Hutu status (Mamdani 2001, p.101). According to this theory, the relationship amongst all Rwandans was characterised by harmony. The labels of Tutsi, Hutu and Twa were purely related to wealth and social standing (Newbury 1989, p.52). It is this historical discourse that the current Rwandan government adheres to and it is the official history of the state (Buckley-Zistel 2009, p.34).
The differing views of the formation of the state in Rwanda highlights the complexity of issues surrounding history, politics and ethnicity. The essentialist and social-constructivist accounts are two of many differing discourses. It is not the aim of this thesis to determine which historical theory, or part thereof, is the truth. Rather, this thesis provides an overview of the complexities surrounding ethnic identities and aims to illustrate how this is linked to the current political climate. Regardless of the political origin of ethnicity, the Belgian colonisers ascribed racial connotations to the labels Hutu, Tutsi and Twa (Uvin 2001, p.78), and as a result, the French government preyed upon the Hutu-Tutsi distinctions for their own political gain and power consolidations of the state. This is discussed further in the following sections of this chapter.

This chapter also highlights the presence of elites within the changing regimes and how elite ideologies and policies have paralleled these changes, in particular with ethnicity. At each stage of Rwanda’s history, the elite have aligned themselves with the elite of an interested state; firstly states of Francophone origin and recently, those of Anglophone states. Subsequently, the policies emerging in the contemporary government have shifted initially from exclusion of either Hutu or Tutsi to inclusion and reconciliation and secondly, from French as a common language to English.

2.3 The Years of Belgian Colonisation

Colonisation is regarded as the policy undertaken by a powerful state to acquire a weaker state thereby economically exploiting or aiding what is deemed as a ‘backward’ people (Allen 1996, p.214). Rwanda was first colonised by Germany in the 1890s and then later by Belgium in 1916 until Rwandan independence in 1962 (Uvin 1999, p.254). It is this second colonisation that is discussed in this paper as it was the Belgian colonisers who introduced the French language to Rwanda as well as provoking and enhancing much of the hatred between the Tutsi and the Hutu through their policies.

Indeed, colonial rule has made a substantial impact on Rwandan politics and society and has drawn significant criticism in retrospect of the genocide. Scholars such as Catharine Newbury
(1998, p.16) assert that Belgian colonial rules only exacerbated the inequality between Hutu and Tutsi, inequalities which, she argues, pre-dated colonial occupation. This inequality was filtered through colonial state policies whereby arduous demands fell most severely on the land cultivators, in other words, Hutu. Two such examples of state colonial policy that imposed inequality between Hutu and Tutsi are firstly, the policy of indirect rule and secondly, the ethnic identification card policy. Indirect rule ensured the power remained with the Belgian colonisers by ruling through the Tutsi hegemony and elite system that was already established within the culture.

Meanwhile, the ethnic identification card policy mandated that every Rwandan must carry a card with them that provided their personal details and, most importantly, their ethnic status as determined by the colonisers (Mamdani 1999, p.869). These policies accentuated the ethnic divisions and added to the cultural distinctions of Hutu and Tutsi from earlier periods by literally writing the ethnic status of a Rwandan on a card. In many cases, the ethnicity written on that card determined a person’s status in Rwanda as well as their access to professions and the welfare and education systems of the state (Newbury 1998, p.16).

The Belgian colonial policy of indirect rule in Rwanda was centred on autonomy and ensured the:

Recognition of the Tutsi monarchy and the chiefs as the sole legitimate rulers of the country, and, as a corollary, the strict maintenance of Tutsi supremacy in every walk of life. The success of indirect rule as a political formula was believed to depend upon a systematic avoidance of all initiatives likely to upset the traditional social order (Lemarchand 1977, p.74).

This approach to colonisation was different to the policy of direct rule whereby “colonies were organized as polyglot formations—with a central civil authority and a constellation of district-based customary authorities, each with a distinct ethnic identity—in Rwanda district authorities did not correspond to ethnic powers” (Mamdani 1996, p.1). Instead, the colonisers ruled through the Tutsi elite who were in every district and society, enforcing and subjecting the peasant Hutu to colonial rule (Mamdani 1999, p.862). The Belgians recognised the distinction between the ruling Tutsi elite and the Hutu labour force and were eager to
preserve their conceptualisations of the political power structures, that is, that Tutsi aristocrats reigned over Hutu peasants. Thus, the Belgian colonisers partnered with and empowered the Tutsi rulers to maintain the balance of power within social relations (Newbury 1998, p.14).

The implementation of indirect rule ensured the success of Belgian dominion by maintaining the control of the Tutsi hegemony. Due to this policy, identity underwent the most change during the Belgian occupation, transforming into ethnicity. Resentment began to build between the politically-constructed ethnic Hutu and Tutsi (Newbury 1978, p.26). As Elite Theory maintains, these Tutsi elite maintained a gulf of power from the Hutu and determined the outworking of their positions, particularly ensuring that the Hutu remained as agricultural cultivators.

The policy of ethnic identification cards was implemented in the 1930s to indicate a person’s ethnic category. This included an official census of the population in 1933-34 (Mamdani 2001, p.98). The identity cards became a political tool of the state, utilised to determine an individual’s path in life. Such measures served to mold ethnicity into its “social salience” (Newbury 1998, p.15). It was impossible for the Belgian administration to know who belonged to which ethnic group. According to one account, the colonisers introduced a means-tested system for ethnic identification. This revolved around the number of cattle that a person owned. A man with more than ten head of cattle was classified as Tutsi and those with less than ten were classified as either Hutu or Twa, depending on their occupation (Destexhe 1995, p. 8). Several sources report this as an account of what happened at that time, yet some Rwandans claim it is apocryphal (Hintjens 1999, p.253).

The idea of colonially concocted ethnic identities was further seen through the Belgian administration of academic and economic resources. Those deemed of Hutu origin had limited access to education and were almost entirely excluded from high ranking administrative positions. These positions were only for the Tutsi elite (Newbury 1998, p.20). Mamdani (2001, p.22) agrees with Newbury that “political identities are a direct consequence
of the history of state formation, and not of market or culture formation and are inscribed in law. They are the consequence of how power is organised.” As Keynes (1970, p.28) contends in Elite Theory, the basis for all social relationships in Rwanda was formed by the attainment and control of power by the Tutsi elite in this era. Certainly, the years of colonisation are the founding factors in the contemporary Rwandan policy environment as they led to the tumultuous eras to follow, namely a revolution and genocide.

2.4 Decolonisation and Independence from Belgium

Ethnic identity from the colonial period in Rwanda became a matter of political classification that paved a path to Rwanda’s independence from Belgium in 1962 (Scherrer 2002, p.18). A significant pre-emptive move towards independence occurred in 1957 through the publishing of the ‘Bahutu Manifesto,’ which ultimately led to the Hutu revolution of 1959 and is “regarded as the first open revelation of a fundamental social disharmony in Rwanda society” (Lemarchand 1970, p.114). By this time, distinct ethnicity had become a fact of life in Rwanda, both at the level of state politics and in individual sentiment (Uvin 1999, p.255).

Furthermore, Hutus believed that a revolution was required at the local level in order for there to be political independence with Hutu majority rule (Mamdani 2001, p.104). Majority rule was achieved with the establishment of the first political party in Rwanda, the Party of the Hutu Emancipation Movement (PARMEHUTU) in 1962 (Kayibanda 2009, p.1). This affirms Elite Theory’s notion that one of the ways elites obtain their power is through revolutionary defeat (Hill 1997, p.43). Politics after independence were firmly set as ethnic politics (Uvin 1999, p.256). A change in the elite occurred and those classified as Hutu now held strategic positions of power. The structural context of the policy networks, as outlined by Marsh & Smith (2000, pp. 9 – 10), was founded on a hatred of the Tutsi.

It was within a short matter of time that the legacy of colonial policies began to appear. Three years after independence from Belgium in March 1965, Rwanda’s first president, Gregoire Kayibanda, an ethnic Hutu, decreed that any Tutsi who stayed in the country would be “threatened with extinction as a ‘race’ if the promonarchist Tutsi party, Union National
Rwandaise (UNAR), were to reassume power” (Martens, cited in Scherrer 2002, p.6). The newly formed Hutu majority PARMEHUTU government rapidly increased the “strength of ethnicisation and polarisation fostered by the postcolonial policies of the ethnopolitical power elites” (Scherrer 2002, p.28). The government adamantly opposed any opposition from Tutsis and engendered a culture of propaganda against them. For example, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Hutu government coined the term *Inyenzi*, translated ‘cockroaches,’ as a reference to “small groups of Tutsi-led rebels against the government” (Lemarchand 1970, p.198). This term was to resurface later during the days leading up to and in the genocide of 1994 (Mamdani 1996, p.10).

Marsh and Rhodes (1998, p. 257), explain that exogenous factors are critical in determining the structure of policy networks and thus, the responses of actors within these networks. A key exogenous factor in the decolonisation period of Rwanda was an underlying hatred of the former Tutsi elite by the new Hutu elites for their subjugation of the Hutu during the colonial era. The Hutu elite were taking their revenge on all Tutsi, ensuring that their policies paralleled their ideologies. In this case, the exclusion and part extermination of the Tutsi population had begun.

At independence, the new Hutu government decided to keep French, employed throughout the colonial period by the Belgian administration, as the official language. The independent Rwandan government, being one of the very few states to do so, also acknowledged an African language, Kinyarwanda. Although Rwanda had been a Belgian colony and had received much post-independence military assistance from them, allegiances shifted during the 1970s. “In 1975 a military and training agreement together with French aid money helped bring Rwanda into the French ‘family’ in Africa” (Peterson 2001, p.280). Juvenal Habyarimana, the second President of Rwanda, gained his position through a military coup and signed a military cooperation agreement with France (Smyth 2004, p.21).

For Rwanda, this ensured a steady influx of much needed funds and investment as well as military arms. The French government motivation was multifaceted, including ensuring the
continuation of the French language as well as a vested interest and control over resources (Hintjens 1999, p.273). Manyard-Moody and Herbert (1989, p.142) highlight the impact of the contextual setting of a state on policy. The introduction of the French alliance to the Rwandan context added another critical element to this context as members of the Hutu elite were supported by the French government and were thus influenced by the major subsidiary of the French state.

During the days of decolonisation, the Hutu uprising resulted in murders of Tutsi people and many Tutsis relocated to English-speaking states such as Tanzania and Uganda. This was the beginning of a post-colonial language split. For the Hutu and Tutsi remaining in Rwanda, French remained a primary language in conjunction with Kinyarwanda; meanwhile, the Tutsi Diaspora embraced the language of their state of refuge, English (Rosendal 2009, p.1). Rwanda was now politically, ethnically and linguistically divided. These refugees were to become the future elite of Rwandan society post-1994. Much of their ‘strategic learning processes,’ as Hay (1995, p.281) terms it, occurred in an Anglophone environment. This strategic learning has influenced the current policy networks within the Rwandan government, including the composing of the English Language Policy.

2.5 Rwandan Politics in the early 1990s and the genocide.

According to Newbury (1998, p.24), “politics and policies of the state need to be seen as critical elements in shaping ethnic relations and ethnic consciousness.” She explains that there is ample evidence that those in power in Rwanda in the early 1990s, mainly Hutu, did not manage or dampen ethnic tensions. Conversely, their policies pursued it. The dwindling economic situation in Rwandan also contributed to the policy environment, which culminated in many of the events of the early 1990s (Scherrer 2002, p.40).

In addition, under pressure from outside states and by the United Nations (UN), Rwanda introduced democracy. A multiparty system was introduced and a new freedom of press was instituted. These were tumultuous years and a ‘climate of mistrust’ between Hutus and Tutsis continued, particularly “following an unprecedented military invasion of Rwanda by Tutsi
rebels of the RPF operating out of Uganda” (Scherrer 2002, p.45). This invasion occurred in 1990 where some 4,000 Rwandan Tutsi soldiers and officers, who lived in Uganda working for the Ugandan National Resistance Army, mutinied overnight (Peterson 2001, pp.280-81). A later leaked document from the Rwandan government revealed that the French military was the overall command of stemming the rebel army Tutsi invasion (Prunier 1997, p.149) It was in the interest of the French government to support the Hutu government where they had arms sales agreements, rewards for private companies and the prevention of English-speaking Rwandans from coming to power (Hintjens 1999, p.273).

These events culminated in the genocide, which took place under the aegis of the Rwandan state whose progressively autocratic and unpopular government was, by the early 1990s, facing serious threats to its hold on state power, for which genocide exemplified a desperate attempt at survival (Hintjens 1999, p.241). The events of the colonial and decolonisation era contributed to a policy environment whereby actors and elites within policy networks decided to commit genocide. According to the UN, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, such as:

1. Killing members of the group;
2. Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
3. Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
4. Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
5. Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group (UN Convention on Genocide, 1948).

The year of 1994 proved to be the most horrific in Rwanda’s history where a “particularly lethal combination of obfuscation, terror and victim blaming facilitated genocide in Rwanda” (Hintjens 1999, p.244). On the 6th of April 1994, President Habyarimana’s plane was shot down, signaling the beginning of 100 days of genocide in which nearly one million
Rwandans were slaughtered. These were mainly Tutsi along with those Hutu classified as too moderate, too wealthy, too sympathetic to Tutsi, or politically inconvenient (Kanyagara et al. 2007, p.388). The Hutu government had produced lists of ‘wanted’ people, which there is evidence that the French government helped to produce (Melvern 2008). Those on the list were mercilessly hunted down and slaughtered, however, those not on the lists were not necessarily safe either. Identity cards, first employed by the Belgian colonisers and continued by the independent and extremist Hutu government, were utilised as a method of identifying targets. The massacres continued with people killing neighbours, any person who could not produce an identity card with “Hutu” on it, or indeed anyone suspected of being Tutsi (Komar 2008, p.172).

The UN has been greatly criticised for their lack of adequate action undertaken during the genocide and for allowing the Rwandan government to become a non-voting member and observer on the UN Security Council on 1 January, 1994 (Carlsson, Kupolati & Sung-Joo 1999, p.62). On 22 June 1994, with the backing of the UN, France began a military campaign in Rwanda known as ‘Operation Turquoise.’ They set up security zones in south-western Rwanda to protect Tutsis and displaced Hutus. There is, however, criticism that French troops also accepted and allowed the presence of militia members in these safety zones (Destexhe 1995, p.8).

In authorizing the temporary force, the Security Council underlined the humanitarian purpose of the operation, the length of which was restricted to a two-month period; unless the Secretary-General resolved before then that an expanded United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) was able to carry out its mandate (United Nations Chronicle 1994, p.8). Operation Turquoise concluded on 21 August 1994. It consisted of a 3,000-strong French military force that according to a French report to the UN “put an end to the massacres in Rwanda and ensured the protection of the population in the safe humanitarian zone” (United Nations Chronicle 1994, p.9). Ultimately, it was the forces of the RPF that liberated Rwanda from Hutu extremists (Reyntjens 2006, p.1103).
The thesis asserts that there is a hidden motivation behind the policy decision-making process that discontinues the utilisation of French and embraces English in Rwanda. The French language is firstly associated with both the Belgian colonial regime that imbedded racial ideologies amongst Rwandans and secondly, with France and her governments involvement in the genocide. Indeed, Rwanda and France have long traded accusations over the genocide. France believes that the RPF, led by General Paul Kagame, who was to become the future president, was responsible for killing President Habyarimana as he was near to signing a peace agreement with the rebels. Rwanda, however, accuses France of complicity in the genocide claiming that:

    France helped form Habyarimana's murderous government and gave military support to those who later led the genocide. Moreover, Rwanda says the French peacekeeping mission, 'Operation Turquoise,' stood by while the mass killing took place, and created a buffer that allowed Hutu killers to escape into Congo some of whom contribute to today's troubles in eastern Congo (Economist 2008, p.58).

2.6 Current Political System of Rwanda

Rwanda’s current government is composed of “a multiparty democracy with universal suffrage over the age of 18” (Pells & Te Velde 2008, pp. 4). Parliament consists of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. Elections for the Chamber of Deputies took place in September 2008 and the next Presidential election is in 2010. The first elections after 1994 took place in 2003, thus ending the transitional period of recovery from the genocide. The RPF securely won 33 of 53 seats and also hold the presidency with the election of Paul Kagame (Devlin & Elgie 2008, p.242). Following a national referendum, a new constitution was introduced prohibiting reference to ethnicity, and political activity or discrimination based on race, ethnicity or religion (Pells & Te Velde 2008, pp. 4).

However, many of the leading members of parliament in the RPF are of Tutsi background. Mamdani believes that this is because the Tutsi of Rwanda have come to “the conclusion that the only way for them to survive is to be in positions of power, resulting in a peace-like armed peace” (Mamdani 2001, p.660). Under the governance of these elite, wide-ranging reforms have been undertaken. As Genieys (2005, p.414) explains, in Elite Theory elite
regime changes parallel ideological and policy reforms. In Rwanda, the contemporary elite have reorganised the administrative divisions to decentralise power and create administrative units that are more ethnically diverse, anti-corruption and strong in the rule of law (Pells & Te Velde 2008, pp. 4-5).

There is no political party registered in Rwanda that claims large ideological differences from the RPF. “Multi-partyism, the constitutionally recognised form of governance in Rwanda is set in the context of the determination to avoid ‘divisionism’ and fight all forms of ‘genocide ideology’” (European Union EOM 2008, p.37). As such, the smaller parties have little or no influence over public policy and “the two non-coalition parties cooperate with rather than criticise the RPF” (Devlin & Elgie 2008, p.242). Instead, the key government policy decision-makers are the elite of Rwanda, including President Paul Kagame along with his cabinet ministers. Many of these elite are among the Diaspora returnees and have occupied important position within various Ministries. Having spent their exiled years largely in English-speaking countries, the elite have brought their strategic learning processes with them to the post-1994 Rwandan policy environment. This includes fluency with a more international means of communicating, the English language. They have additionally brought with them political models that have their origins in the British colonial empire (Schweisfurth 2006, p.703).

2.7 Conclusion

Rwanda’s history is fraught with contention and violence and is now in a new era of reconciliation. There is a plethora of information on Rwanda’s history and the genocide of 1994. Although the origin of the pre-colonial state is debated, the impact of Belgian colonisation still perforates throughout the state today. The Belgians, who introduced the French language to the Rwandan people, grafted their policies and regimes into the very essence of Rwandan culture and society. After decolonisation, the French government played a pivotal role in supporting the governance of Hutu-led regime up until the end of the genocide in 1994. These two governments have left a trail of decay and current bilateral relations, particularly between France and Rwanda, remain strained.
Having an understanding of the complex background of the state of Rwanda is essential when
endeavouring to unravel new public policy, as it provides the policy environment within
which new government strategies are crafted. Therefore, Chapter 2 provides a contextual
framework for Chapters 3 and 4, which examine the newly issued English Language Policy
of the current Rwandan government. Released in 2008, this policy cannot be taken in
isolation and needs to be placed in the policy environment of the events in the formation of
the state of Rwanda and the tragic events of the genocide.
Chapter 3: The English Language Policy in Rwanda and the Policy Environment

3.1 The Background of Language in Rwanda

French has been an official language of Rwanda since the days of Belgian colonisation in the early 20\textsuperscript{th} century. It has been used in all forms of society and communication, from government and business interactions, to being applied throughout the education system. The public policy announcement in 2008 that French is no longer to be an official language has ripple effects within both internal and external politics. This decision is not an isolated one and needs to be contextualised within the Rwandan policy environment. Chapter 2 provides this by giving a political and historical account of the formation of the state of Rwanda and the political structures and powers that over the course of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century have played a pivotal role in this state. It sets a political platform to understand the Belgian colonial and French governance roles in the development of ethnic distinctions and hatred that led to the genocide and the current political environment.

Having established this context, the focus of this chapter is to examine the new English Language Policy of the Rwandan government. The chapter firstly examines the definition of public policy. It explores the policy environment and the effect of this on policy-making by highlighting the key elements of Rwanda’s unique political context, thus producing a link between Rwanda’s past and present. Secondly, it provides an overview of the English Language Policy and gives an example of its implementation in the Rwandan Ministry of Education (MINEDUC). Thirdly, it examines the currently elected Rwandan government and the policy networks of state actors and elites involved in policy decisions. Finally, it provides some initial insights into globalisation and membership of the EAC, the official reasons for the English Language Policy given by actors and policy-makers.

It is not the aim of this minor thesis to analyse the intricacies of the contents of this new policy in Rwanda. Instead, the focus is on the decision-making process within which the English Language Policy is made and implemented. In other words, what are the motivating
factors of the Rwandan government in making this policy shift? How might this policy affect Rwandan society? These are the central questions addressed in this chapter.

3.2 Public Policy and the Policy Environment of the State of Rwanda

The term public policy refers to the actions of government and the intentions that establish those actions (Cochran, Mayer & Carr 1999, p.5). It is a comparatively stable, calculated course of action followed by an actor or set of actors in handling a problem or matter of concern (Anderson 2002, p.4). There are several parts to public policy decision-making including identification of the problem, collating the facts, making and generating the decision and finally, implementing and appraising the decision (Carrington 2003, p.323). Certain attributes that define public policy include:

1. The policy is composed in the public’s name.
2. Policy is generally produced or initiated by the government.
3. Policy is translated and implemented by public and private actors.
4. Policy is what the government proposes to do.
5. Policy is what the government designates not to do (Birkland 2005, p.17).

Evaluation of polices and government issues must be viewed in a wider context that transcends purely economic or statistical analysis (Birkland 2005, p.14). This includes describing policies, elucidating their existence, and appraising them (Nagel 2002, p.133). Furthermore, it is essential to acknowledge all the factors that influence public policy and the distribution of power, especially the interplay of the values and belief systems of the government ministers and officials involved in the decision-making process (Birkland 2005, p.14).

Chibba (2009, p.365) asserts that “culture and governance are pivotal to planning and implementing policy.” Two policy analysts, Walt and Gibson (1994, p.353), concur. Their
research focuses on the content, context, process, and actors involved, acknowledging that context influences actors. Additionally, power positions, values and expectations of the actors affect the process of policy-making. This is shaped by the interplay between the policy environment on a domestic, regional and international level (Nonneman 2003, p.131).

The context of colonisation has greatly influenced Rwanda as well as many African states and this has exerted a powerful influence on economic development in Africa. Serious obstacles have stemmed the emergence of good policy including such factors as “ethnicity, government corruption, poor political leadership, and absence of appropriate rights of citizens to consultation on economic matters” (Johnson 2004, pp.151-152). In the case of Rwanda, policy reform has been set against a milieu of harrowing challenges that beset policy-makers prior to and after the genocide (Kimanuka 2009, p.3). Thus, there are two major contributing factors to the policy-making environment in Rwanda, firstly, the Belgian colonial legacy of ethnic divisiveness, and secondly, the French government’s involvement in Rwanda during the 20 years prior to and then during the genocide. This is the policy-making environment from which the new English Language Policy has emerged.

3.3 Rwanda says ‘au revoir’ to French: The English Language Policy

Language policy is defined as the set of practises and guidelines that exemplify and define the role of language in the political, economic, social, religious, and educational life of a people and a country (Ringenberg & Walter 1994, p.342). Language in the state of Rwanda is like a ‘linguistic patchwork quilt,’ having three widely used languages. The traditional language is Kinyarwanda and is spoken by all Rwandans. French and English are the other two other dominant languages (King 2007, p.99). Fishman (cited in Coulmas 2005, p.133) describes Rwanda as “a multilingual country with diglossia.” He maintains that a unique phenomenon exists in Rwanda where in social situations there are two or more languages, which are genetically unrelated, “coexist in a stable state with different status according to their functions in specific domains.” Rwanda’s geographic neighbours either have French or English as their official languages. On one side lies ‘Anglophone’ Tanzania and Uganda.
while on the other, ‘Francophone’ Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (see Appendix 1).

The English Language Policy was announced in October 2008 and is to be implemented over the next five years (Rwanda English Action Program (REAP) 2009, p.1). The policy involves “dropping French and adopting English as the official language of communication and teaching” (Mwaura 2008, p.3). This decision needs to be placed in the context of the political history, including the development of language, of Rwanda. Throughout the last 100 years of Rwanda’s history, language has been linked to politics, first through the introduction of French in the years of colonisation and second, the introduction of English post-genocide. Prior to 1994, bilingualism was common in Rwanda. This included the traditional language, Kinyarwanda, and the colonially-inherited language, French.

After the genocide, the government introduced a trilingual policy to include English as an official language. This was as a result of the many returning Rwandans, mainly Tutsi, from the Diaspora and refugee camps, many of whom had taken refuge in Uganda and Tanzania, states with English as the official language. For the sake of political unity a trilingual policy (Kinyarwanda, French and English) was introduced shortly after the end of the genocide. English was thus added as an official state language and consequently this has contributed towards a new linguistic landscape in Rwanda (Rosendal 2009, p.19).

One example of the implementation of this policy is seen within MINEDUC as policymakers acknowledge the significance of preparing learners for living in a global society, economy and environment (Shah and Young, 2009, p.18). In retrospect of the genocide, the Rwandan government views education as a tool in the process of healing and reconciliation. Therefore, curriculum and policy development emphasise conflict resolution, critical thinking, national identity, and a revised view of Rwanda’s history (Rutayisire, Kabano & Rubagiza 2004, p.315). Indeed, Rwanda makes a unique case study of how policy implemented in education is influenced by forces beyond national boundaries (Schweisfurth 2006, p.697). MINEDUC’s shift in the medium of instruction policy reflects that of the state,
namely a shift from trilingualism to bilingualism. A portion of the previous trilingual policy is still found on MINEDUC’s website which states that:

Rwanda has chosen the path of multilingualism. This has economic, social and political justification. Apart from the mother tongue of Kinyarwanda, French and English have been introduced in all schools as curriculum subjects and as the language of instruction from primary grade 4. All three languages are found throughout the education system from primary to tertiary levels (Republic of Rwanda Ministry of Education n.d.a).

MINEDUC was one of the first government departments in which the English Language Policy has been put into effect. As a result, French is now only taught as an elective subject (if a student desires to learn it) (Mwaura 2008, p.3). According to MINEDUC, reducing the number of core courses from the compulsory curriculum (including the elimination of French) will improve the quality of education by increasing the number of hours a student spends per subject (Republic of Rwanda Ministry of Education n.d.b). This decision signals a dramatic shift away from the Francophone and colonial influence towards embracing the English language of the surrounding EAC, of which Rwanda became a member in 2007 (Kagame 2007, p.12). Rwanda also remains a member of Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie (l’OIF), that is, the International Organisation for French Speaking Nations (OIF n.d.). In doing so, it has not cut all political ties with the French-speaking world. The official public policy is currently unavailable in its full form, although the government has already taken significant measures to implement it, including widespread English training for teachers (REAP 2009, p.2).

3.4 The State Decision and Policy-Makers

The RPF is the current elected government of Rwanda. Their governance, that is the characteristics associated with the national system of administration, is embedded throughout all policies and districts (Weiss 2000, p.795). The party leader and Head of State, Paul Kagame, was officially elected by democratic vote in 2003 (The Australian 2003, p.23). Kagame grew up in Uganda and began his career in the RPF as a soldier in the Rwandese Patriotic Army (RPA), the military arm of the RPF. By the time of the genocide, he was the commander of the RPA forces (Kuperman 2004, p.62). One of the main aims of the RPF
while in government is “to devise and implement policies that promote the social welfare of all Rwandese and to pursue a foreign policy based on equality, peaceful co-existence and mutual benefit between Rwanda and other countries” (Rwandese Patriotic Front 2008).

The key government policy decision-makers are President Paul Kagame and his advisors and cabinet ministers. Many key politicians and decision makers are among the post-genocide Diaspora returnees and have occupied important positions of power and influence within all spheres of government. According to Hill (1997, p.72), it is highly likely that state policy networks have limited memberships. In Rwanda, policy networks maintain elites as members. These elites have spent years in exile in English-speaking countries. Thus, they have brought the English language with them into the policy networks.

In addition, the elites have introduced political models and ideologies into the Rwandan context, models that they have observed while in exile, which have their origin in the British colonial empire (Schweisfurth 2006, p.703). This aligns with various aspects of Elite Theory, as expressed by Genieys and Smyrl (2008, p.78), including the programmatic ideas implemented by elites and the strategic position they hold in order to accomplish this. Thus, elites influence the structure of government, the constitution and policy writing in Rwanda. One such ideology is globalisation and the need for economic expansion.

3.5 Globalisation, the driving force of the English Language Policy

The government’s announcement of the English Language Policy was closely followed by their reasons behind writing and implementing this policy. According to the Kagame administration, the official reason for a change of state language policy is the importance of fluency in English in the sphere of globalisation. The government views English as the preferential language of use for business, information technology and education. Rwanda is also a member state of the English-speaking EAC and as of November 28, 2009, is a member state of the Commonwealth (New Times 2009).
The second school of thought surrounding this policy originates from political observers and the media who unearth an alternative, underlying motivation embedded in the policy-makers decision in the rejection of all things French. The policy is as a result of the French government’s purported involvement in Rwanda prior to and during the genocide. This has been denied by Kagame and members of parliament who claim that the policy is not as a result of ill relations with France (Musoni 2008). This thesis offers a third explanation, namely that the English Language Policy is as a result of both Rwanda’s need for globalisation, as well as the strong anti-French sentiment of the state. This is explored further in Chapter 4.

Globalisation is a broad term, but in a simplistic definition, it is “the process of increasing interconnection and interdependence between societies” (Conley 2002, p.448). It is closely associated with the power and dominance of the English language (Kirkgoz 2009, p.663). According to Tsui and Tollefson (2007, p.1), “globalisation is effected by two inseparable mediation tools, technology and English; and to respond to the rapid changes brought about by globalisation, all countries have been trying to ensure that they are adequately equipped with these two skills.” Scholars who are anti-globalisation describe it as contemporary imperialism and colonialism. Bgoya (2002, p.288) argues that globalisation, especially of the English language, is another form of colonialism due to a state’s dependence on this foreign language and for imposing it on a state’s population without their consent.

The Rwandan government cites globalisation and the English language link with the business world and education as the main motivations behind the release of the English Language Policy. In a cabinet meeting in October 2008, the minutes revealed that a major reason for abandoning French and embracing English is “to make Rwanda more competitive in both the EAC and the International Community at large” (Kimenyi 2008). According to Musoni, the former Minister for Local Government (Musoni 2009), this change means that the Rwandan “financial sector will operate better with English because all the financial transactions in the region are done in English” (Majyambere 2008, p.10). In a recent interview, Kagame further explained, “during our turbulent history, many of our people went to live in English-speaking countries of the region and beyond. After the war and genocide, hundreds of thousands of
these English-speaking Rwandans returned....so we have a big community that speaks English in Rwanda” (New African 2009, p.42).

Kagame believes that not only business but also education is vital to the future of Rwanda. Consequently, MINEDUC is actively implementing the English Language Policy in all its schools. Kagame reasons that “the kind of education we want for our children is that which is in line with the vision in place for the development of our country (therefore) we have to prioritise the (English) language that will make them competent when they get on the labour market after completing school” (Kimenyi 2008). Mutsindashyaka, the former Minister for Education, emphatically started implementing the policy within government schools. “We have to start enforcing the policy as soon as possible if we want to succeed because it will only be after starting that we shall begin identifying any stumbling blocks and thereby rectify them” (New Times 2008b).

A considerable amount of aid funding is needed to support the policy. Schweisfurth observes that within MINEDUC “there has been a noticeable shift in the donor community away from France and Belgium as the main bi-lateral players to new partnerships, including the UK Department for International Development (DFID)” (Schweisfurth 2006, p.698). The United Kingdom (UK) has aligned itself with Rwanda to assist in employing English throughout the state. This is another indication of Rwanda’s shift away from the French and colonial influence to that of the English world. In a state rebuilding itself after absolute devastation, Rwanda elites view English as a means to further open trade opportunities in a world that is increasingly dominated by the English language. This policy move ensures that Rwanda will remain connected to the English-speaking world and continues to pursue the state’s strategic goals for the state outlined by the Kagame administration.

In a similar vein, Rwanda’s policy-makers have displayed geostrategic pragmatism in adopting English as a vital component in linking Rwanda with the EAC. Rwanda joined the EAC, an English-speaking state conglomerate, “on 18 June 2007 and is in the process of fully
connecting economically with the harmonisation of some policies like the Monetary Union, Customs Union, and Common Market” (New Times 2008a). Kagame reiterates that:

Joining the East African Community was a matter of formality because we (Rwanda) naturally belong to the East African region. If you look at the volume of trade, at the relations cutting across ethnicities, the connections people have across that region, we simply and naturally belong to that region (New African 2009).

This political move has clearly identified Rwanda with the English-speaking states of Africa as opposed to the African states aligned with French. It has opened more trade opportunities. From this viewpoint, the English policy is due to the fact the government sees that it is a key to global participation, economic development and a valuable source of knowledge (Gandolfo 2009, p.327).

Rwanda has further advanced its ties to the English-speaking world by applying for membership to join the Commonwealth states. “The case of Rwanda’s application to join the Commonwealth has moved from being slightly controversial in the 1990s, to being a distinct reality” (Pelless and te Velde 2008, p.3). Indeed, members at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in November 2009, decided to accept Rwanda’s application to the Commonwealth (New Times 2009). This is another political step and is part of a “wholesale realignment away from French influence” (McGreall 2008). Rwanda is only the second state member to be accepted into the Commonwealth, after Mozambique, to not have been a British colony (McIntyre 2008, p.281).

Rwanda has undergone a political journey to be considered for entry to the Commonwealth including the introduction of English, economic growth and anti-corruption campaigns though it has not been without its opponents such as the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (Gruenbaum 2009, p.532). Rwanda brings important lessons learnt to the Commonwealth for other states in the process of transition and acts as a model in terms of conflict prevention and good governance (Pelless and te Veale 2008, p.5). In addition, Rwanda’s application has the significant support of three Commonwealth member states – the UK, Uganda and Australia (Pelless and te Velde 2008, p.4-5). Commonwealth state
membership may supply Rwanda with unprecedented access to the English-speaking world in all realms of politics and economy.

In contrast, there are many arguments that address the negative effects of globalisation on language policy implementation. It is documented that globalisation strips minority groups of culture and linguistics. The English Language Policy in Rwanda may be seen as “linguistic imperialism that culturally impoverishes the third world by eroding its linguistic ecology” (Hornberger & Vaish 2009, p.306). In the Rwandan context with its tumultuous history, compelling every person of the state to learn and speak English may impede efforts of reconciliation in those people who speak French or only desire to speak or have access to Kinyarwanda. Other states, such as South Africa, Singapore, Turkey and India, who have initiated and implemented similar English language policies, have done so in the face of much difficulty, especially in the Ministry of Education. This includes inadequate levels of English-fluent trained teachers as well as students feeling distanced from “one’s own culture and language because of studying through the medium of English” (Kirkgoz 2009, p.678).

Furthermore, research has shown that English policies may impede the ability of indigenous speakers to attain fluency and proficiency in either the mother tongue or English (Van Wyk 2002, p.306). Such policies act “as a barrier to knowledge and legitimises the exploitative, hegemonic practices of globalisation” (Gandolfo 2009, p.322). Gandolfo believes that the consequences of introducing English policies may include the inability for Africans to effectively participate in their political and civic contexts (Gandolfo 2009, p.322-23). Considering this context and the similarly implemented policies in other states, the Rwandan government needs to ensure that the mother tongue, Kinyarwanda, is not diminished. Although Rwandans have had many differences in the past, be it ethnically, politically or otherwise, Kinyarwanda has always been a commonality amongst the people of the state. Policy-makers should consider the implications of implementing English as it may touch on the wounds of past ethnic schisms.
Additionally, Skutnabb-Kangas (2001, p.204) argues that English language policies may have implications for maintaining ethnic conflicts in order to preserve the mother tongue and the self-determination of a cultural group. Furthermore, the English policy plays a role in reproducing status inequalities (Gandolfo 2009, p.322). Rwanda’s history has been fraught with such inequalities, from the colonial Belgian administrations elevation of the hegemonic Tutsi, ethnic identity cards and the independent Hutu government’s anti-Tutsi policies. The current elites, who in Rwanda have traditionally been of Tutsi ethnicity, have become proficient in English and thus hold the positions of power and influence in the political and economic realms of the state (Trudell 2007, p.554). Meanwhile, those who speak only Kinyarwanda and do not learn English are unable to access such power (Gandolfo 2009, p.322). According to Elite Theory, this ensures that the power remains in the hands of the elites. Those who are unable to speak English are excluded while the elite maintain and command the state bureaucracies.

Ridge (2004, p.207) disagrees with Skutnabb-Kangas in that by ensuring English is as extensively available as possible, while maintaining the significance of the mother tongue, is the best protection against ‘elite closure,’ that is, “the use by an elite of a language as a means of excluding the rest of the population from participation in political and economic life” (Myers-Scotton, cited in Ridge 2004, p. 207). Therefore, policy-makers in Rwanda need to ensure that the implementation of English across business and education is balanced and objective otherwise the cycle of inequality will continue. It is those who in power who speak English that become the policy-makers who in turn write public policy that relegates and ensures they remain in power.

3.6 Conclusion

The traumatic events of the genocide have greatly changed the political landscape of Rwanda since 1994 and have contributed to the policy environment. After such devastation, the state has been rebuilding itself in all areas including the creation and introduction of new institutions, governance models and policies. Most recently in late 2008, the English Language Policy was announced whereby French, which has been embedded in Rwandan
society for almost 100 years, is no longer to be the language utilised in business, communication and education. The main reason behind this policy given by the government is as part of the need for Rwanda to be linked with the English-speaking world, that is, the globalisation of the English language. According to the Kagame administration, this will positively affect Rwanda by increasing trade alliances and providing students with more employment opportunities. This reflects the ‘programmatic ideas’ of Rwandan elites, which as indicated by Elite Theory, effects policy design and implementation.

Regionally, the political move to transform Rwanda into an English-speaking state also draws upon closer ties with the EAC. Internationally, it has placed further weight to Rwanda’s application for Commonwealth membership which was granted in late November 2009. The government believes this will increase Rwanda’s economic growth thereby decreasing poverty. More than this, it is thought that by utilising English, Rwanda will be opened up to the world more than just economically, but in all areas of political life and society.

According to RPF policy, policy-makers in Rwanda desire to increase opportunities for the benefits of all Rwandans, however, they also need to consider the potential negative effects of the English Language Policy and make adjustments accordingly. This includes, but is not limited to, the likely diminishment of the importance of the mother tongue, Kinyarwanda. This disconnects the people of the state with their cultural heritage. Furthermore, those who are unable to attain fluency in English may subsequently be unable to fully participate in their civic rights leading to inequality. The creation of a power differential aligns with Elite Theory as it ensure that power remain with the elites, in this case, the Tutsi’s who occupy strategic positions in the state.

In the light of Rwanda’s historical and political environment, policy-makers need to be mindful of promoting any policy that has the potential to differentiate from one person of the state to another lest the wounds of past ethnic schisms are re-opened. Furthermore, one must also consider the motivations behind this policy that for political reasons cannot be published or announced. This includes the anti-colonial and anti-French sentiments that have rippled
through the state post-genocide. The decision to eradicate French from Rwanda is closely tied with the government reaction and response to the Belgian and French control over the state. This is examined in Chapter 4.
Chapter 4: The Underlying Factors behind the English Language Policy

4.1 The anti-French sentiment of the state

Globalisation and membership of the EAC are the official reasons policy-makers in Rwanda have provided for the shift in official language from French to English. As discussed in Chapter 3, these are valid factors behind this policy. Indeed, policy-makers have aligned their decision with the state directions outlined in Rwanda’s state strategic plan named ‘Vision 2020,’ specifically, the “promotion of macroeconomic stability...(and)....transforming to a knowledge-based economy” (Rwandan Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning 2002, pp. 8-9). This thesis asserts that there is another key driving force behind this policy. This factor is the anti-French sentiment that has moved across the state due to the 100 years of colonial and French influence. It proposes that this second school of thought is a hidden component behind the motivations of the government policy-makers in Rwanda in eradicating the French language. It purports the duality of the reasons behind this policy, that the public reason of globalisation and EAC membership, combined with the underlying reaction to decades of acute mismanagement of Belgian and French foreign policy have caused the French language to be eliminated and English to be embraced by policy-makers in Rwanda.

This chapter provides further insights into the unique policy environment of Rwanda, specifically discussing and analysing the interplay of power politics, elites and policy networks in France and Rwanda. It highlights the history of bilateral relations between France and Rwanda that have contributed to Rwanda’s policy environment. The worldview of elites, as outlined by Elite Theory, is also discussed. Additionally, it expands upon the research aim by analysing a hidden motivation behind the decision-making process of this policy. This chapter firstly discusses the French government alignment with the former Hutu government from the time of independence in 1962 and how the change of regime in Rwanda led to a change of elite in government. Secondly, it examines the French involvement in the genocide and the effect of this on the contemporary Rwandan policy environment, that is, the anti-French sentiment. Finally, this chapter explores some of the implications of Rwanda
distancing itself from France, namely tense bilateral relations and a potential loss of trade with the Francophone world.

4.2 Bilateral relations between France and Rwanda prior to the genocide

The French Foreign Minister in the late 1970s, Louis de Guirangaud asserted that, “Africa is the only continent that remains within the reach of French influence. It is the only place where she can still, with 300 men, change the course of history” (Chaigneau, cited in Callamard 2000, p.165). This is adamantly true in the case of Rwanda. France, a permanent member of the UN Security Council was heavily involved in Rwanda – before, during and after the genocide. It began at the time of Rwanda’s independence from Belgium whereby France became a protector and invested interest of the state. France became the power behind the newly formed Habyarimana government, providing aid, funds and military assistance. The change in regime in Rwanda signalled the formation of a new Hutu elite, one that was aligned and formed networks with France.

According to the political analyst Ross Herbert, “France has traditionally had difficulty letting go of its colonies, and has meddled heavily and propped up its former colonies” (Baldauf 2007, p.6). He goes on to explain that Francophone states in Africa have largely delayed the same political reforms that English-speaking states did 15 years ago. As a result, anti-democratic behaviour, corruption, and economic and political decay have prevailed among African state actors. Rwanda is no exception as the pre-genocide Hutu government displayed all these aspects. Wallis (2007, p.6) asserts that France “is implicated to its core in the deaths throughout the tiny central African nation” as they supported some of the worst aspects of the Hutu regime in Rwanda.

Over the years post-independence, numerous collaborative agreements, both military and civilian, established a solid and permanent French presence in Rwanda. France became Rwanda's foremost arms suppliers and creditors. Inter-state relationships progressed from the official level to unusually close at the personal, whereby family members of both Heads of
States intermingled (Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide Report n.d., p.80). The French state’s allegiance to the Hutu government throughout these years ensured that the balance of power was in their hands with a continued Francophone presence, reliance on French foreign aid and military support, as well as the continued use of the French language. Caplan (2009, p.280) argues that the genocide may never have happened if the French government had not substantially supported the Hutu government. This has greatly contributed to the contemporary Rwandan policy environment as state elites and actors have a plethora of evidence on the French government’s involvement in the genocide. As a result, there is an increasingly anti-French reaction throughout the state.

4.3 French government involvement in the genocide

France was the most influential political power in Rwanda from the 1970’s to the early 1990’s. The French state involvement and affiliations in Rwanda with the Hutu government in the years post independence became a platform for their ultimately continued catastrophic support in the early 1990s. Certainly, Rwanda’s destiny has been shaped through the interplay between external actors and internal forces. There is great evidence that France cooperated with the Hutu conspirators, “implicitly sanctioning their activities and convincing them they could get away with anything” (Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide n.d., p.78). Essentially from the time of the RPF invasion in 1990 to the end of the genocide, the Rwandan government's closest ally politically, militarily and diplomatically was France (Kroslak 2007, p.3). Among scholars and governments alike, there is little to refute this point, however, “the exact nature of the French role is a matter of great controversy (Rwanda The Preventable Genocide n.d., p.78). There is a vast gulf between the official French account of their role and the interpretation of that role.

The year 2008 in Rwanda unveiled two significant political events. Firstly, in July a report named the Mucyo Commission, investigated by the Rwandan Ministry of Justice into the role of the French government and military in the genocide was released. Secondly, in October the English Language Policy was announced. The timing of the language policy release in such close proximity to the release of this report is no coincidence. The Mucyo Commission report was damning of both the “events leading up to April 1994 and the ‘Turquoise army’ on the
ground in Rwanda during the days of the genocide” (Rwanda The Preventable Genocide n.d., p.181). As Marsh and Rhodes (1992, p.257) stipulate, exogenous factors influence policy networks and their decision-making process. The research and findings of the French government’s involvement in the genocide is a significant exogenous factor in the Rwandan policy environment.

According to the findings of the Mucyo Commission, France supported the Habyarimana administration in the commission of genocide carried out between the following periods: October 1990 and March 1993, April and July 1994 and latter had a hand in the destabilisation of Rwanda using elements based in the former Zaire (DRC). The communiqué has five major points:

1. France was aware that genocide was being planned,
2. France had a primary role in the preparation of genocide,
3. France had a key role in the execution of the genocide,
4. The French army occupation under ‘Operation Turquoise’ resulted in further massacres in the safe zones they established,
5. French Political and military leaders were involved in the 1994 genocide, including the then French President Mitterand (Rwandan Ministry of Justice 2008, pp.1-8).

A bitter dispute has existed between the post-genocide Rwandan and French governments. Both political sides have thrown accusations back and forth. President Kagame condemns the French claiming that:

You (France) armed and trained the Presidential Guards; you have accepted that the Presidential Guards armed and trained, in front of you, the Hutu extremists. You have not required the President of Rwanda to abandon ethnic identity cards; vous portez donc une lourde part de responsabilité dans le génocidé en cours [you bear, therefore, a large share of responsibility in the genocide that is in progress]” (Le Figaro, cited in Callamard 2000, p.165).
In a similar vein, Jacques Bihozagara, a former senior Rwandan official and a founding member of the Tutsi-led RPF, claims French policy was driven by concerns about losing influence in Africa. He asserts that the policy aim of France was to “support the French-speaking Hutu-led government in Rwanda against the RPF, which had bases in Uganda, an English-speaking former British protectorate” (Maloof 2007, p.10). He further explains that “France thought a Francophone country was being attacked by an Anglophone country and they had to rush to the rescue.” The above statements by President Kagame and Jacques Bihozagara represent the views of many politicians in Rwanda. The worldview of Rwandan elites, in regards to their opinions of France and the genocide, is painted by these statements. In elucidating Elite Theory, Genieys (2005, p.424) places great importance on understanding the worldview of elites when illuminating the policy processes of a state.

In juxtaposition, France accuses Rwanda, particularly the RPF, of their involvement in the genocide. They avidly and publicly accuse President Kagame for his involvement in the shooting down of Habyarimana’s plane and have gathered witnesses to collaborate their charges against former Tutsi guerrillas who currently hold positions in government. The Rwandan government response was one of anger, breaking off diplomatic relations with France as the French government released warrants for the arrests of President Kagame, members of the state cabinet and political aides. Recently, however, some of these witnesses have retracted their statements (Agence France Press 2009). Regardless, the continued accusations by both states has contributed to tense bilateral relations and further added to the Rwandan policy environment. To add further injury to further bilateral relations, unlike the United States and Belgium, France has made no apology to Rwanda for the events leading up to and during the genocide (Gibney & Roxstrom 2001, p.915).

France was not the only state to have an impact in the fractured early years of the 1990s in Rwanda. The UN along with the UK and the United States of America displayed partiality and a grave lack of concern in the face of evidence of genocide. According to Piiparinen (2008, p.715), the “self-image of longue durée founded on impartiality surely affected the UN Secretariat’s decision-making in January 1994,” for it was commonly known that France was supporting the Hutu Presidential Guard and the Hutu militia, called the Interahamwe, in
both political and military terms. He states that any decision by the UN to intervene in the genocide by allowing General Dallaire, the commander of UNAMIR, to take action against the Hutu militia “would have violated French interests while simultaneously undermining the UN’s vision of itself as a neutral actor vis-a-vis great powers.”

### 4.4 Some Implications for Rwanda in the Francophone sphere

According to Daphrose Gahawka, a Rwandan cabinet minister, this policy “should not be politicised at any point” and is not to be regarded as a move against the French (Musoni 2008). In a recent interview, President Kagame portrayed a more pleasant regard towards relations with his counterparts in France:

> France was involved in the ugly history of our country, and we say it openly, we discuss it with them, and we have proposed to them to look at this history, to understand it, to put everything in its right place and proper context, and on that basis leave that history behind us and proceed with relations (New African 2009, p.42).

This statement, however, is the exception in a plethora of remarks of disdain towards France. Actions speak louder than words and the abandonment of the French language as well as the expulsion of the French embassy and the French Cultural Centre in Rwanda has sealed the political rift between these two states (Nolen 2008, p.20). Instead, President Kagame has promoted British culture and in May 2008, a few months prior to the release of the language policy, opened the British Council (BC) in Kigali (Kezio-Musoke 2008, p.2). Indeed, relations between France and Rwanda may take decades to fully reconcile.

Trade between the France and Rwanda is likely to be negatively affected; however, with Rwanda’s new found links to the English-speaking world, it is probable that the government will reap more rewards, politically and economically, by focusing on building trade partnerships with their English-speaking counterparts. This does not mean that Rwanda has cut all ties with France. For example, President Kagame is keen to build inter-state relationships with the European Union. He openly encourages relations based on trade and investment, not aid, as well as “appropriate policy choices, policy coherence and mutual accountability in Africa/Europe relations, particularly with regards to development and trade” (BBC Monitoring Africa 2007). Certainly, Rwanda is eager to grow economically.
4.5 Conclusion

Rwanda has a unique policy environment which has been shaped by its history and inter-state relations with Belgium and France. Accordingly, the English Language Policy transformation is more than a simple linguistic measure in Rwandan politics (Mwaura 2008, p.3). The linguistic change has been brewing for over a decade with its roots in Rwanda’s tragic history (Nolen 2008, p.20). The French language is closely associated with both the Belgian colonisers and the French political perpetrators and collaborators of the genocide. The latter has contributed to the contemporary policy environment as seen through various statements given by Rwandan elites and politicians. This includes President Kagame and many Rwandan ministers who have publicly made their sentiments and opinions known in regards to the French and their explicit involvement in the genocide. Such statements reflect what Elite Theory reveals about the influence of elite worldviews on policy. As a result, the statements by Kagame and Rwandan policy-makers disclose their worldviews of the French state which may have influenced their policy writing.

The regime change after the genocide resulted in yet another change of elite and policy networks within Rwanda. This elite, having a mainly Anglophone background, are concerned with the rebuilding of Rwanda and ensuring that the past ethnic schisms do not return. As Marsh and Smith (2000, p.6) discuss, policy networks are not neutral, being shaped by past history and conflicts. The contemporary power distribution in the Rwandan government is set firmly in the hands of a small group of Tutsi elite. Rwandan policy networks have displayed a partiality towards English by embracing the language as well as funding and advice from the UK and the BC. This thesis maintains that in response to the findings of the Mucyo Commission, policy-makers have exhibited prejudice towards the French state, by writing and implementing the English Language Policy, as well as closing the French embassy and French Cultural Centre in Rwanda. Bilateral relations remain strained and only time will tell if these two states will be able to reconcile.
Chapter 5: Conclusion

The aim of this research thesis is to explore and analyse the motivating factors behind the English Language Policy in Rwanda. All public policy in Rwanda needs to be placed in the contextual framework of Rwanda’s past. This includes the recent policy design of the English Language Policy in late 2008, a policy which denotes a change in the linguistic landscape of Rwanda and converts the state from trilingualism in Kinyarwanda, French and English to bilingualism, only Kinyarwanda and English. Subsequently, English is to be the state’s language of choice, utilised primarily in the education, business and government sectors. The research is embedded in three areas of policy analysis, namely Elite Theory, Policy Networks and the policy environment. These concepts provide a conceptual framework for studying policy in Rwanda as the changing elites and policy networks have a central focus throughout Rwanda’s history. Thus, the main research questions are ‘what are the historical and political factors that have contributed to the introduction of the English Language Policy?’ and secondly, ‘what are the likely implications of this policy for Rwanda?’

Elite Theory asserts that educated persons attain strategic positions in governments and influential organisations within a state. Driven by the desire for power, they command bureaucracies. Their worldview is expressed through policy and the formulation of public decisions. This concept is remarkably applicable to the Rwandan context due to the significant roles of elites and ultimately, the policies designed and implemented throughout Rwanda’s history. In addition, the theory of Policy Networks is also pertinent to Rwanda. The unique context has had various exogenous factors contribute to changes in policy networks and the policy addressed within them. As the theory maintains, the policy of a state reflects past conflicts and the values of decision-makers. Consequently, policy networks are not neutral. This aligns with the Rwandan policy environment which has experienced great conflict both internally with ethnic hostility, and externally, with tense bilateral relations with France.

Another essential area in analysing policy in Rwanda is the policy environment. There are a combination of factors that contribute to a state’s policy environment including the history of a state, the political culture and socioeconomic conditions. In Rwanda, all these factors have
played a pivotal role in contemporary state affairs. Therefore, emphasising the policy environment is crucial in understanding Rwandan policy. Subsequently, this research purports that there are both official and unofficial reasons behind the writing and implementation of this policy. The official reasons for this policy are two-fold. Firstly, state actors have publicly declared that the need for globalisation is a driving force behind this policy. Rwanda, being in a rebuilding mode after the genocide, needs to develop economically and views the English language as a linguistic tool to develop trade agreements with other states. This leads to the second element, namely geostrategic pragmatism. Rwanda is a member of the EAC and the Commonwealth, predominantly English-speaking state alliances, thus fluency in English is vital in maintaining links within these communities. In addition, this thesis asserts that there is an unofficial motivation behind the decision-making process of the English Language Policy. This is the Rwandan state’s firm stance against France for the latter’s overt involvement in the genocide.

The key argument of this thesis is that both the official and unofficial factors have contributed to the composition and implementation of the English Language Policy. These factors stem from Rwanda’s tumultuous history with the Belgian and French states that ultimately led to the genocide. The imprint of Belgian colonisation, including the introduction of the French language, left in its wake a disunited nation state, where ethnic tensions built up until the point of explosion. The underlying cause of this tension is the colonial policies introduced by the Belgians in the 1920s and 1930s, specifically, the introduction and implementation of identity cards in conjunction with the policy of indirect rule through the Tutsi elite. Meanwhile, the French state played a pivotal role in the post-independent era of Rwanda, collaborating and financing the extremist Hutu government in the years between 1970 and 1994. The fractured nature of ethnicity between Hutu, Tutsi and Twa continued to exist with increased state incitement of hatred, ultimately leading to the ruthless bloodbath in the genocide against the Tutsi. This history forms the foundation for understanding Rwanda’s policy environment.

The changing regimes in Rwanda have paralleled the changing ideologies and policies of the state. The elites during Belgian colonisation were Tutsi and ensured that the colonial policy
of indirect rule was upheld thereby maintaining their status of ‘elite’ and the Hutu as ‘peasant.’ Throughout decolonisation until the genocide, the elites were Hutu. Due to the colonial era, the Hutu elite were embittered against the Tutsi. Consequently, Tutsi were ostracised and became targets of violence. During this period, many Tutsi relocated to the neighbouring English-speaking states of Tanzania and Uganda where they continued their education. The pinnacle of this targeted violence was the genocide of 1994. Furthermore, in this period a bilateral relationship occurred between Rwanda and France where the latter provided substantial funds and military support. After the genocide, a new regime of elites occurred, mostly composed of the returning Tutsi from the Diaspora, bringing their ‘strategic learning processes’ including the English language as well as political models based on the former British colonial empires of their states of refuge.

The contemporary elite of Rwanda are a small cluster of Tutsi who have returned from the Diaspora. Elite Theory asserts that the driving force of elites is the accumulation of power. The Rwandan elite, including the Head of State President Kagame, hold many of the key positions in parliament and policy-making. The ensuing policy networks, which are shaped by past Rwanda’s conflicts and history, are not neutral. Various exogenous factors contribute to the policy decision-making process and environment. These factors include the legacy of colonisation in creating ethnic schisms, the French state involvement in Rwandan politics and the genocide and as a result, the need to create a stable state with a growing economy. This produces the policy environment out of which the English Language Policy was formulated.

In addition, the worldview of elites is seen through a range of verbalised public statements since the release of this policy. In general, this worldview depicts the elite aspiration to develop business and trade in Rwanda. Furthermore, although cabinet ministers deny that the English Language Policy is as a consequence of tense bilateral relations with France, various statements by those currently in power in Rwanda reveal the accusations and blame placed on France for complicity in the genocide.
Globalisation and growing economically is a matter of great interest to the elite of Rwanda. They contend that by speaking English and increasing political ties with the English-speaking world, this growth will occur. Therefore, this policy corresponds to Rwanda’s membership to the EAC as well as to the Commonwealth. One of the main policy outcomes is to educate all Rwandan children in English thereby attaining fluency in this global language thus, having a domino effect in the state’s future years by having a generation of fluent English speakers in the workforce. There are, however, negative attributes of globalisation such as a stripping away of cultural identity in minority groups. Kinyarwanda has always been the common language between ethnicities and as such, the implementation of this policy needs to be done delicately ensuring equal access to English education for all so as not to further impede on Rwanda’s ruptured past of ethnic schisms.

Globalisation is a valid reason behind the policy decision-making process; however, there is an underlying motivation due to France’s overt involvement with the former Hutu government and the genocide. Since the public revelations of this involvement, state actors including the President Kagame, have expelled the French embassy and the French Cultural Centre from Rwanda. The release of the Mucyo Commission findings revealed a large amount of detail on the specifics of the French participation in the genocide. Within a matter of months, the English Language Policy was announced, an unlikely coincidence. The consequences for discontinuing the use of the French language are yet to be fully disclosed, however, it is likely that trade may decrease between Rwanda and the Francophone world as well as continued tense bilateral relations.

This thesis has argued that the role of elites, the subsequent policy networks and policy environment have contributed to the factors behind policy design within Rwanda, namely the English Language Policy. Further research is recommended in Elite Theory, the majority of which has occurred in established democracies and developed states. The role of elites, particularly analysing Elite Theory and Policy Networks in developing democratic states in Africa, may provide a greater understanding of how elites influence policy within these contexts. Further research is also vital to highlight the policy outputs and particularly the policy outcomes of this policy. This includes examining over the subsequent years how
utilisation of the English language has effected Rwandan society and specifically influenced trade and economy. Finally, research that monitors the policy implementation is required to ensure that there is equal access to all Rwandans regardless of age, gender, ethnicity or locality.
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Appendix 1  Map of Rwanda and the neighbouring states

(University of Texas 2009)